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Vielleicht profec

Den 22. Okt. 1956
vW/U

da wir
das in Weeg- Prozess

Herrn Legationsrat a.D.
E. von Selzam

Elm Cottage
Waterville
Oconomowoc
Wisconsin

Für
haben?
W

Sehr geehrter Herr von Selzam!

Auf dem Wege über den Verlag Hermann Rinn erhalte ich Ihr Schreiben vom 29.9.56 und danke Ihnen nicht nur für das Interesse, das Sie unserer Arbeit entgegenbringen, sondern insbesondere auch für die Übersendung der eidesstattlichen Erklärung vom 8. April 1948, die für uns und unsere Forschungsarbeit von ausserordentlichem Wert ist.

Ich hoffe, dass Sie indessen das beim Verlag Hermann Rinn bestellte Exemplar "Die Vollmacht des Gewissens" erhalten haben.

Ich bin mit meinen besten Empfehlungen
Ihr sehr ergebener

1) *zu*
= Weissachen Dok. 159 (in VDB 1B) (H. v. Witzleben)
1. Vorsitzender

2) *Aussachen:*

NG 3703 : 18.7.47: *Zulassung: bei Gründung s. Aussachen aus AA, frühe Kenntnis v. NS Verbrechen --*
NG 1955 : 18.7.47: *AH: Einblicke von AA in. Kenntnisse von NS Verbrechen*

Hohl

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Elm Cottage
Waterville
Oconomowoc
Wisconsin

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29. September 1956

Europäische Publikation e.V.
"Arbeitskreis Europäische Publikation"
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U. Bearworte	
am	
Erledigt: 25/9.	

23. X. 1/2

Im Anschluss an mein Schreiben vom 28. September d.J. übersende ich in der Anlage Photostat einer Kopie meines seinerzeitigen Affidavits fuer den vormaligen Staatssekretaer Freiherrn Ernst von Weizsaecker, das fuer die Untersuchungen des "Arbeitskreises" von Interesse sein mag.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

E. von Selzan

E. von Selzan,

Legationsrat a. D.

Institut für Zeitgeschichte

COPY

25-7309-3



Eidesstattliche Erklarung

Ich, Edward von Selzam, erkläre an Eides statt, dass das nachfolgend Gesagte der Wahrheit entspricht:

In nachfolgenden Ausfuehrungen, die dem Hohen Gericht in Nuernberg bei der Urteilsbildung ueber die Persoenlichkeit des vormaligen Staatssekretaers im Auswaertigen Amt, Herrn Ernst von We i z s a e c k e r, und seine Einstellung gegenueber der nationalsozialistischen Aussenpolitik helfen sollen, bin ich leider gezwungen, auch von meinen eigenen Widerstandsleistungen gegen die nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik zu sprechen. Ich tue dies mit Widerstreben und nur unter dem Gesichtspunkt, dass ich, wie mein Verhaeltnis zu Herrn von Weizsaecker nun einmal war, auf andere Weise einen Beitrag zur Wahrheitsfindung nicht zu leisten vermag.

Ich gehoerte der Oppositionsgruppe im Deutschen Auswaertigen Dienst seit 1938 an. Im Fruehjahr 1937 wurde ich vom Generalkonsulat in Calcutta an die Botschaft in London versetzt, um daselbst die Leitung der Politischen Abteilung zu uebernehmen. Diese Kommission war mir sehr wertvoll, da ich glaubte, in London in besonderem Masse fuer die Schaffung eines freundschaftlichen Verhaeltnisses zwischen England und Deutschland und ganz allgemein im Sinne einer deutschen Friedenspolitik wirken zu koennen. Hatte mich zwar in Indien die innerpolitische Entwicklung in Deutschland, die 1933 zur Machtuebernahme durch Hitler fuehrte, mit Sorge erfuehlt, so glaubte ich doch auf Grund der Tatsache, dass gerade der Reichspraesident, der kurz vorher mit Hilfe der Sozialdemokraten, der Demokraten und des Zentrums gegen die Stimmen der Rechtsparteien gewaehlt worden war, den Fuehrer der Nationalsozialisten zum Reichskanzler berufen hatte, hoffen zu duerfen, dass Hitler und seine Partei - zur Verantwortung gelangt - sich generell, vornehmlich aber in der Aussenpolitik, Zuegel anlegen wuerden. War die weitere innenpolitische Entwicklung nicht danach angetan, diese Hoffnung zu bestaerken, so schien sich doch fuer den aus der Ferne Beobachtenden die

Aussenpolitik

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Aussenpolitik der Nazis in mehr oder weniger massvollen Grenzen halten zu wollen. Ich verweise auf den Abschluss des Konkordates, den deutsch-polnischen Nichtangriffspakt und den deutsch-englischen Flottenvertrag. Da auch der Beamtenkoerper des Auswaertigen Dienstes unter Fuehrung des Staatssekretaers Bernhard von Buelow, jenes bedeutenden Voelkerrechtlers demokratischer Schulung, im grossen und ganzen unberuehrt gelassen wurde, war die Schlussfolgerung berechtigt, dass das Auswaertige Amt sich mit seiner Politik und seinen Grundsuetzen gegenueber den Nazis durchzusetzen vermoechte. Dass auch das Ausland seine anfaenglich schweren Bedenken zurueckzustellen schien, glaubte ich daraus entnehmen zu koennen, dass sich England kurz nach der Einfuehrung der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht durch Hitler im Fruehjahr 1935, die unter Bruch des Versailler Vertrages erfolgte, zu einem militaerischen Abkommen mit Deutschland, dem Flottenabkommen, bereitfand und dass bereits ein Vierteljahr nach der Besetzung der entmilitarisierten Zone des Rheinlandes im Jahre 1936, die eine Verletzung des Locarno-Vertragswerkes und des Versailler Vertrages darstellte, sich saemtliche auslaendischen Regierungen, einschliesslich der franzoesischen, der britischen und der amerikanischen, bereitfanden, ihre Nationalmannschaften zu den Olympischen Spielen nach Berlin zu entsenden.

Einige Monate Taetigkeit an der Botschaft in London unter Ribbentrop genuegten jedoch, mir die Augen ueber die tatsaechlichen Ziele der nationalsozialistischen Aussenpolitik zu oeffnen. Vom Zeitpunkt des Einmarsches in Oesterreich im Fruehjahr 1938, den ich, obwohl ihn das oesterreichische Volk nach Berichten mir befreundeter amerikanischer und englischer Augenzeugen in ueberwaeltigender Mehrheit begeistert billigte, der Methoden des deutschen Vorgehens wegen als das erste wirkliche Verbrechen aussenpolitischer Art des Hitler-Regimes empfand, datiere ich meine innere Umstellung von kritisch-passiver Resistenz zum Willen zu aktiver Widerstandsleistung. Den Mut zu dieser geistigen

Umstellung

Umstellung schoepfte ich nicht zum mindesten aus der Nachricht, dass gerade etwa zu diesem Zeitpunkt der bisherige Gesandte in Bern, Herr von Weizsaecker, zum Staatssekretaer im Auswaertigen Amt ernannt worden war. Die gesinnungsmaessige Sauberkeit, Rechtschaffenheit, Anstaendigkeit und charakterliche Integritaet dieses Mannes war mir gleich jedem alten Beamten des Auswaertigen Dienstes, wie uebrigens auch vielen meiner Freunde in England bekannt. Es stand fuer mich ueber jedem Zweifel, dass Herr von Weizsaecker allein deshalb den Posten des Staatssekretaers uebernommen hatte, weil er es fuer seine Pflicht hielt, unter Hintansetzung jeglicher Ruecksichtnahme auf die Sicherheit der eigenen Person zu versuchen, die Aussenpolitik des Reiches - trotz Hitler und Ribbentrop - wieder in die Bahnen Stresemanns, Bernhard von Buelows und Bruenings zu lenken. Die Tatsache, dass der Einfall in Oesterreich einige Wochen nach der Ernennung Weizsaeckers erfolgte, tat meiner Beurteilung der Persoenlichkeit dieses Mannes keinen Abbruch, da er innerhalb der kurzen Frist seiner Amtsfuehrung in Berlin unmoeglich noch haette den Verlauf der verhaengnisvollen Entwicklung um Oesterreich aendern koennen. Jedenfalls war in mir seit ~~dem~~ Herrn von Weizsaeckers Berufung das unendlich beruhigende Wissen lebendig, dass an dieser nach dem Ministeramt wichtigsten Stelle in der Zentrale des Auswaertigen Dienstes eine Persoenlichkeit von europaeischem Ausmasse stand, fuer die Gewissen und Pflichtgefuehl nicht nur gegenueber dem eigenen Volk sondern auch gegenueber den anderen Nationen, also der Patriotismus des Christen schlechthin, bestimmende Faktoren fuer sein Verhalten in aussenpolitischen Fragen waren. Dieses Wissen gab mir betrachtlichen Rueckhalt bei meinen eigenen weiteren Entschluessen.

Einige Monate nach dem "infall in Oesterreich wurde Dr. Theodor Koordt als Botschaftsrat an die Botschaft in London versetzt und damit mein unmittelbarer Vorgesetzter. Ich kannte ihn als Kollegen im "dienst seit Beginn der zwanziger Jahre. . Ich wusste, dass er lange Zeit Erster Sekretaer Bernhard von Buelows gewesen war und somit denkbar beste demokratische und voelkerrechtliche Schule genossen hatte. So ergab es sich ohne weiteres, dass wir bald schon

schon in ein besonders enges Arbeits- und Vertrauensverhaeltnis traten. Durch Kordt wurde ich davon unterrichtet, dass in Deutschland eine Gruppe von Generalen unter Fuehrung von Generaloberst Beck existierte, die sich ueber seinen im Stabe Ribbentrops taetigen Bruder E r i c h K o r d t engstens an Staatssekretaer von Weizsaecker anlehnend den Sturz Hitlers und seines Regimes zum Ziele gesetzt hatte. Der laufend sich taetigende unmittelbare Gedankenaustausch zwischen Theo Kordt und Herrn von Weizsaecker, ueber dessen Inhalt mich Ersterer jeweils in Kenntnis setzte, vermittelte mir die Bestaetigung meiner Annahme, dass nach wie vor fuer Herrn von Weizsaecker jegliche Austragung internationaler Streitigkeiten mit dem Mittel des Krieges - mit dem Hitler und Ribbentrop, wie seit dem Einfall in Oesterreich zunehmend erkennbar, nur zu gerne spielten - ein Verbrechen am eigenen Volke darstellten, das auch in seinen Augen im Hinblick auf die geschlossenen Vertraege, vor allem den Briand-Kellogg-Pakt, aber auch im Hinblick auf die in oeffentlicher Rede wiederholt gemachten Versprechungen Hitlers, zum Verbrechen an unserer nationalen Ehre und zum Verbrechen an der Menschheit werden musste.

Die Sudetendeutsche Krise.

Theo Kordt setzte mich schon bald nach seinem Eintreffen in London im Spaetfruehjahr des Jahres 1938 davon in Kenntnis, dass seinen von Herrn von Weizsaecker erhaltenen Informationen zufolge, Hitler und Ribbentrop danach strebten, die sudetendeutsche Frage mit Gewalt zu loesen. Herr von Weizsaecker habe ihn autorisiert, im geeigneten Zeitpunkt die Britische Regierung ueber die Massnahmen zu unterrichten, die seitens der Deutschen Opposition geplant seien, um dieser Entwicklung zu steuern. Herr von Weizsaecker lege grossen Wert darauf, dass die britische Politik sich auf die Notwendigkeiten der Deutschen Opposition einstelle und diese unterstuetze. In diesem Sinne fuehrte Kordt, in seinen Entschluessen ungehemmt infolge der Tatsache, dass er Geschaefststraeger war, eine Reihe von Besprechungen mit Sir

Horace

Horace Wilson, dem ersten Mitarbeiter und Freund des Premier-Ministers Neville Chamberlain, mit Lord Vansittart, dem Ersten Diplomatischen Berater der Britischen Regierung, und auch mit Lord Halifax, dem Britischen Ausserminister, oder liess den Genannten ueber seinen Verbindungsmann, den Professor Philip Conwell-Evans, Informationen zukommen. Die Zielsetzung dieser mit Wissen von Herrn von Weizsaecker gefuehrten Gespraeche war, die Britische Regierung zu einer Politik zu bestimmen, die zwar die Berechtigung gewisser Forderungen der Sudetendeutschen, wie sie beispielsweise im Karlsbader Programm niedergelegt waren, anerkennen, hingegen Hitler und Ribbentrop gegenueber keine Unklarheit darueber belassen sollte, dass eine gewaltsame Loesung der Sudetendeutschen Frage den Kriegseintritt Englands gegen Deutschland zur Folge haben wuesse. Diese von Herrn von Weizsaecker gewuenschte Linie der britischen Politik und ihre deutliche Bekundung waren um so notwendiger als der Britische Botschafter in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, bei Ribbentrop und Hitler abgesehen davon, dass er - anfaenglich jedenfalls - die Gewissens- und Verantwortungslosigkeit, das Verbrechertum Hitlers und seines Ausserministers garnicht erfasste, mit seiner vornehm-ruhigen Sprechweise des englischen Diplomaten keinen Eindruck machen konnte, vielmehr nur dazu beitrug, bei den Genannten die vorgefasste Auffassung zu staerken, dass die Britische Regierung bluffe, sich jedenfalls der sudetendeutschen Frage wegen niemals zum kriegerischen Vorgehen gegen Deutschland entschliessen wuerde. Mir ist deutlich Kordts muendlicher Bericht ueber eine Unterredung mit Herrn von Weizsaecker in Erinnerung, wonach sich dieser wiederholt ueber die taktisch und psychologisch verfehlte Haltung Sir Neville's gegenueber Ribbentrop sehr erregt habe.

Meine Kenntnis von der grundsatzlichen Einstellung des Herrn von Weizsaecker, die sich mit meiner eigenen ja voellig deckte, liess mich denn auch keinerlei Hemmungen empfinden, einem meiner aeltesten und zuverlaessigsten britischen Freunde, Group Captain Malcolm Grahame Christie, eingehend ueber meine ablehnende Beurteilung der Methoden und Absichten der nationalsozialistischen Fuehrung,

speziell

speziell in der Frage der Sudetendeutschen, Aufklaerung zu geben und durch ihn, der in enger Verbindung zu Lord Vansittart stand, zu versuchen, auch meinerseits auf die Britische Regierung einzuwirken, moeglichst scharfe Sprache zu fuehren (jedenfalls nicht die Sprache der konventionellen Diplomatie, die von Hitler und Ribbentrop doch nicht verstanden wuerde) und im uebrigen in der Sache selbst eine feste, ja kompromisslose Haltung einzunehmen. Zwar liess ich Christie gegenueber erkennen, dass ich der Ueberzeugung war, Herr von Weizsaecker sei nicht anderer Ansicht als ich (was er wohl auf Grund seiner persoelichen Kenntnis des Herrn von Weizsaecker auch geglaubt hat), doch habe ich bewusst davon abgesehen, bei ihm den Eindruck zu erwecken, als ob ich bei meinen Gespraechen mit ihm in Herrn von Weizsaeckers Auftrag handelte. Ueber Herrn von Weizsaeckers Einstellung war die Britische Regierung ohnehin durch den - ich moechte sagen - offiziellen Weg der Deutschen Opposition, der ueber die beiden Brueder Kordt fuehrte, unterrichtet. Meine Schritte bei Christie, die ich fast durchweg in eigener Verantwortung unternahm, erschienen mir, gerade weil sie zusaetzlich von mir aus erfolgten, Erfolg versprechender, weil ich glaubte, auf Grund meiner vieljaekrigen Taetigkeit im angelsaechsischen Bereich ueber ein betraechtliches Kapital persoelicher Freundschaft und persoelichen Vertrauens im Foreign Office und bei anderen einflussreichen britischen Stellen zu verfuegen. Wie dem auch gewesen sein mag, jedenfalls war ich ueberzeugt, dass meine Gespraeche mit Christie in hoeherem Sinne pflichtgemaess waren und dass sie, haette Herr von Weizsaecker davon gewusst, auch seine Billigung gefunden haben wuerden.

Als Theo Kordt mit Wissen von Herrn von Weizsaecker am 5.9.1938 Lord Halifax aufsuchte und ihm erklaerte, dass es fuer die Opposition von hoechster Wichtigkeit sei, wenn Chamberlain's am 24.3.1938 im Unterhaus abgegebene Erklaerung - etwa des Inhalts dass, sollte Frankreich zu seinen Verpflichtungen gegenueber der Tschechoslowakei zu stehen bereit sein, England, obwohl es nicht ausdruecklich durch juristische Bindungen zum Einschreiten verpflichtet sei, im Falle eines Krieges kaum

werde

werde abseits sehen koennen - durch eine weitergehende eindeutige Erklaerung der Britischen Regierung ergaenzt wuerde, und eine solche dann am 11.9.1938 im Unterhaus erfolgte und gleichzeitig noch durch eine amtliche Presse-Verlautbarung untermauert wurde, erschien dieses Ergebnis der Kordt'schen Demarche ihm und mir zunaechst genuegend, um entweder die gewuenschte retardierende Wirkung auf Hitler zu erzielen, oder aber, sollte dem nicht so sein, die noch schwankenden Generale zum Aufstand zu veranlassen. In der amtlichen Berichterstattung Kordts an das Auswaertige Amt kam deutlich zum Ausdruck, dass der Umschwung der bis dahin bemerkenswert indifferenten oeffentlichen Meinung in England die Britische Regierung in die Lage versetze, die nummehr angekuendigte Politik zu verwirklichen. Wir waren in London ueberzeugt, dass eine der beiden von Herrn von Weizsaecker erstrebten Alternativloesungen - Einschuechterung Hitlers, oder besser: Kriegsentschluss Hitlers mit unmittelbar folgender militaerischer Erhebung gegen Hitler - eintreten muesse. Doch schwand unser Optimismus bald. Einmal schienen, wie Theo Kordt von seinem Bruder Erich als Ansicht des Staatssekretaers erfuhr, die von der Britischen Regierung gewaehlten Formulierungen Hitler nicht zu beeindrucken - er konnte und wollte die diplomatische Sprache nicht verstehen - andererseits war sie auch Herrn von Weizsaecker nicht deutlich genug, um den noch zoegernden Generalen den Rueckhalt zu geben, dessen sie nun einmal leider bedurften. Die Verhaeltnisse lagen aber jetzt so, dass erneute Vorstellungen Kordts bei der Britischen Regierung keine weiteren Ergebnisse erwarten lassen konnten. - Ich kam dann auf den Gedanken, ob wir nicht versuchen sollten, einen Weg zu finden, die amerikanische Regierung, vor allem Praesident Roosevelt, zu einer der britischen Stellungnahme inhaltlich aehnlichen Erklaerung zu bestimmen. Kordt war zwar der Meinung, dass die Amerikanische Neutralitaets-Gesetzgebung einem solchen Vorgehen des Praesidenten entgegenstehen wuerde, doch teilte er meine Ansicht, dass nichts unversucht bleiben duerfe, um das von Herrn von Weizsaecker gesteckte Ziel zu erreichen. Da die Zeit in hoechstem Masse draengte, war es nicht mehr angaengig

INTERVIEW
WITH J.P.K.
TOOK ACTUALLY
PLACE ON:
SEPT. 12, 38

angaengig, sich der Zustimmung des Staatssekretärs zu versichern. Am Vormittag des 13. oder 14. September suchte ich dann, eingeführt durch den mir aus früherer Zeit befreundeten Botschaftsrat an der Amerikanischen Botschaft, Hershel V. Johnson, den mir persönlich noch nicht bekannten Amerikanischen Botschafter, Joseph P. Kennedy, auf und legte ihm nahe, Präsident Roosevelt zu einer in möglichst schlaffer Form gefassten Erklärung zu veranlassen, dass die Vereinigten Staaten Deutschland den Krieg erklären würden, sollte Hitler zum Kriege gegen die Tschechoslowakei schreiten. Ich war mir auch bei diesem Schritt völlig im Klaren, dass er die Billigung des Staatssekretärs gefunden hätte, wäre die Möglichkeit gegeben gewesen, ihn von unserer Absicht zu verstaendigen.

Dass dann die Entwicklung nicht den Verlauf nahm, den Herr von Weizsäcker und wir wuenschten, lag ausserhalb unseres Vermoegens. Am 13. September hatte Sir Neville Henderson von seiner Regierung den bestgemeinten Auftrag erhalten, der Deutschen Regierung mitzuteilen, dass der Britische Premier-Minister die Sudetenfrage in persoenlicher Besprechung mit Hitler zu regeln versuchen wolle. —

Es folgten die Konferenzen in Berchtesgaden und Bad Godesberg. Vor dem Abflug des Premier-Ministers nach Godesberg hatte ich auf dem Flugplatz in Heston Gelegenheit, Sir William Strang, der Herrn Chamberlain begleitete, eindringlich zu beraten, dass Herr Chamberlain fest bleiben, sich jedenfalls durch Schreien und Drohungen Hitlers nicht beeinflussen lassen moege. Ich war mir auch bei dieser Unterhaltung des Einverstaendnisses meines Staatssekretärs sicher, des einzigen Vorgesetzten im Auswaertigen Amt, den ich seit jenen Tagen noch als solchen anerkannte. (Diese meine Einstellung zu Herrn von Weizsäcker, die auch Kordt teilte, hat ihm uebrigens letzterer bei spaeterer Gelegenheit vermittelt.)

Als dann die Godesberger Konferenz ergebnislos verlaufen war und Hitler am 26. September seine notorische Sportpalast-Rede gehalten hatte, waren Kordt und ich wiederum zu der Ueberzeugung gelangt, dass Hitler nun doch zum Einfall in die Tschechoslowakei schreiten werde. Wir erwarteten, dass in diesem Fall die Generale doch noch gegen ihn losschlagen wuerden. Wir waeren nichtnach Deutschland zurueckgekehrt

zurueckgekehrt und waren uns darueber klar, dass dies den Intentionen des Herrn von Weizsaecker entsprochen haette.

Es folgte am 28. September der Vermittlungsvorschlag Mussolinis, der zur Muenchener Konferenz fuehrte. Erich Kordt unterrichtete seinen Bruder in London im Auftrage des Staatssekretaers fernmuendlich von dieser Tatsache. Das Gespraech endete mit den Worten des juengeren Kordts: ... und dies ist die zweitbeste Loesung.

Die Prager und die Polnische Krise.

Waehrend des nun folgenden Jahres, vornehmlich waehrend der Prager und der Polnischen Krise, habe ich meinen Geschaefstraeger in Bezug auf die taktische Ausfuehrung der ihm von Herrn von Weizsaecker gegebenen Weisungen und Richtlinien beraten und nach Vermoegen unterstuetzt. Diese, die Kordt entweder als Ergebnis persoenlicher Aussprache mit Herrn von Weizsaecker aus Berlin mitbrachte oder die ihm in verabredeter Code-Sprache fernmuendlich von seinem Bruder uebermittelt wurden, jedoch wie alle Weisungen des Staatssekretaers, die im Interesse der Deutschen Opposition erfolgten, aktenmaessig nicht festgehalten worden sind, zielten im Hauptsaechlichen darauf ab, die Britische Regierung - aehnlich wie waehrend der Sudeten-Krise - zu einer eindeutig klaren und unmissverstaendlichen Haltung gegenueber weiteren, sich fortlaufend abzeichnenden Gewaltplaenen Hitlers zu veranlassen. Ihre Haltung sollte einestells maessigend auf die Entschlussfassung Hitlers einwirken, andernteils aber die Deutsche Opposition stuetzen, die waehrend dieses Zeitraumes sowohl darunter litt, dass stoerende militaerische Umbesetzungen vorgenommen worden waren, als auch in zunehmendem Masse daran krankte, dass einige Generale, beeindruckt durch die Erfolge Hitlers auf aussenpolitischem Gebiet, mehr noch als gelegentlich der Sudeten-Krise zoegerten, unter allem Umstaenden zum Umsturz gegen Hitler zu schreiten. - Auf gleicher Linie bewegten sich meine Gespraechе mit Christie. Sie zielten darauf ab, der Regierung Chamberlain-Halifax eine Haltung zu

zu suggerieren, die etwa der damaligen Winston Churchills entsprach. Auch hierbei wusste ich mich, durch Theo Kordt auf dem Laufenden gehalten, in Uebereinstimmung mit der politischen Zielsetzung des Staatssekretärs, wie auch gleicherweise als ich kurz vor Kriegsausbruch in ähnlicher Weise mit dem Amerikanischen Geschäftsträger Hershel Johnson sprach wie während der Sudeten-Krise mit Botschafter Kennedy, und ebenso als ich schliesslich noch nach Ueberreichung der Kriegserklärung auf Lord Vansittart durch Christie einzuwirken versuchte, mit der Bombardierung deutscher Städte durch die Royal Air Force einige Tage zu warten, um den allenfallsigen militärischen Aufstand sich entfalten zu lassen und nicht Goebbels die Möglichkeit zu geben, eine solche Bombardierung propagandistisch gegen den Aufstand auszuwerten.

Ich bin der Ueberzeugung, dass es uns allen, die wir damals versucht haben, das drohende Unheil abzuwenden, sehr viel schwerer gefallen wäre, all diese im Sinne der Nazis als Landesverrat anzusprechenden Aktionen während der Jahre 1938 und 1939 vorzunehmen, wenn wir nicht gewusst hätten, dass Herr von Weizsäcker grundsätzlich hinter uns stand und unser Vorgehen billigte bzw., insoweit er nicht unterrichtet war, gebilligt hätte, wenn er Kenntnis gehabt hätte.

Nach Kriegsausbruch.

Nach Kriegsausbruch versetzte Herr von Weizsäcker Theo Kordt an die Gesandtschaft in Bern und mich an die Gesandtschaft in Haag. Wir hatten beide den Auftrag, die Berichterstattung ueber England wahrzunehmen. Gleichzeitig standen wir in Bereitschaft fuer den Fall, dass man britischerseits beabsichtigen sollte, Fuehlung mit uns aufzunehmen, deren oppositionelle Einstellung bekannt war. Ein solcher Kontakt wurde mit Kordt, jedoch nicht mit mir hergestellt.

Während der Zeitspanne September 1939 bis Mai 1940 war meine politische Berichterstattung ueber England ausschliesslich darauf abgestellt, eine Berichterstattung im Sinne der Erfordernisse der auf eine baldige Kriegsbeendigung hinzielenden Politik des Herrn von Weizsäcker zu sein. ~~Sei~~ war eine ausgesprochene

Zweckberichterstattung

Zweckberichterstattung, mit der ich ein Doppelziel verfolgte. Einmal sollte sie dem Staatssekretär Material an die Hand geben, das geeignet war, der Generalität die Entschlussfassung zum Aufstand zu erleichtern. Des anderen sollte sie herangezogen werden können, um Verschärfungen oder Ausweitungen der deutschen Kriegsführung, vor allem den stets drohenden deutschen Einmarsch in Holland und Belgien zu verhindern.

Zur Verwertung gegenüber den Generalen berichtete ich ausführlich über jede der zahlreichen Äußerungen von Mitgliedern der Britischen Regierung zum Thema der britischen Kriegs- und Friedensziele unter besonderer Hervorhebung der immer und immer wieder erklärten Bereitschaft, einem Deutschland ohne Hitler und ohne Nationalsozialismus dem ihm gebührenden Platz unter den Nationen einzuräumen.

Zur Verwertung gegenüber der nationalsozialistischen Führung unterstrich ich - vor allem in den ersten Monaten nach Kriegsausbruch - die Geschlossenheit der Bevölkerung des Vereinigten Königreiches wie auch jene der Dominien und Indiens im Willen zur Kriegsführung bis zum Sieg. Doch berichtete ich andererseits und fortlaufend, dass die Waffenruhe nach dem polnischen Kriegszug diesem Kampfwillen abträglich sei. Der tatenlose Krieg sei für das britische Volk entnervend und geeignet, den Einfluss derjenigen Kreise zu stärken, die für eine baldige Beendigung des Krieges seien. Die zunehmende Verschärfung der deutschen Luft- und Seekriegsführung gab mir Anlass zu sagen, dass hierdurch der britische Kampfgeist wieder gesteigert wurde und damit sich zeigende Symptome einer Kriegsmüdigkeit und daraus resultierenden Friedensbereitschaft wieder schwanden. Nach dem deutschen Einfall in Dänemark und Norwegen berichtete ich, dass der britische Kriegswille sich zu der allenthalben in der Öffentlichkeit lautwerdenden Forderung auf Aktivierung des Krieges gegen Deutschland verdichtete. - Während des finnisch-russischen Krieges meldete ich Anzeichen einer in England sich anbahnenden Erkenntnis von einer Parallelität der Interessen Englands und Deutschlands im beiderseitigen Verhältnis

Verhaeltnis zu Russland. — Der Gedanke, dass sich die Britische Regierung vielleicht doch zu Friedensbesprechungen mit einer nationalsozialistischen Regierung bereitfinden koennte, falls diese auch weiter sich zurueckhaltender Kriegsfuehrung befleissige bzw. zu ihr zurueckkehre, musste am Leben gehalten werden. — Soweit meine Berichterstattung, im uebrigen dachte ich wie folgt:

Mit Hitler an der Spitze Deutschlands wird von der Gegenseite unter keinen Umstaenden Frieden geschlossen; nicht einmal Besprechungen kommen in Frage. Friedensverhandlungen sind nur mit einer grundsatzlich anti-nationalsozialistisch eingestellten deutschen Regierung moeglich. Fuer diese muss der Boden, soweit als moeglich, bereitet sein. Daher darf auch schon unter den Nazis keine Verschaeferung (vornehmlich im Luft- und Seekrieg) oder Ausweitung (Einfall in Holland-Belgien) der Kriegsfuehrung eintreten, wodurch Chamberlains innerpolitische Position erschwert werden wuerde. Chamberlain und Lord Halifax aber sind die einzigen britischen Staatsmaenner, die unter Umstaenden versuchen wuerden, einen Verstaendigungsfrieden mit einer nicht-nationalsozialistischen deutschen Regierung vor dem Unterhaus zu vertreten. Herausgabe aller von deutschen Truppen besetzten Gebiete Polens und der Tschechoslowakei waere natuerlich selbstverstaendliche Voraussetzung gewesen. — Es lag auf der Hand, dass die Fuehrer eines erfolgreichen Aufstandes gegen Hitler sehr viel schwieriger nach einem etwaigen Einfall in Holland und Belgien in Friedensbesprechungen mit der Gegenseite wuerden eintreten koennen als wenn es zu einem solchen garnicht gekommen war. — Mein Bestreben war, mit meinen Berichten Herrn von Weizsaecker Karten in die Hand zu geben, mit denen er — soweit ihm das jeweils zweckmaessig erschien — sowohl in Foerderung der militaerischen Aufstandsidee als auch gegenueber der nationalsozialistischen Fuehrung — ihrer "Dynamik" Sand in die Raeder werfend — spielen konnte bis der Aufstand der Generaale endlich losbrach. —

In diesem Zusammenhang sei eine kurze Bemerkung ueber die manchmal recht

schwierige

schwierige Formulierung solcher Berichte gestattet. Sie durften bei den sie Lesenden keinen Verdacht hinsichtlich der Einstellung des Berichterstatters zum Kriege auslösen. Sie mussten also grundsätzlich in der Sprache der Nazis abgefasst werden. Sie mussten auch inhaltlich ihrer Psyche entsprechen. Und doch mussten sie fuer die oppositionellen Zwecke des Staatssekretäers brauchbar sein. Zweifellos erforderten sie des oeffteren eines gewissen Ausmasses an Mut. Ich habe mich ueber das Thema "Berichterstattung anti-nationalsozialistischer Diplomaten unter den Nazis gegen die Interessen der Nazis" einmal im Haag mit einem uns besuchenden, an Jahren aelteren, durchaus friedensliebenden Beamten des Dienstes unterhalten, der schliesslich entsetzt prophezeite, dass ich doch noch einmal im Konzentrationslager landen werde. Ich fuehre ein Beispiel an: Es waere gaenzlich zweckverfehlt gewesen zu melden, die Beschiessung britischer Fischerei-Kutter (in der Nazi-Sprache: Vorposten-Fahrzeuge) und der dem internationalen Schifffahrtsverkehr nach den englischen Haefen dienenden Leuchtfeuerschiffe durch deutsche Flugzeuge schade dem deutschen Ansehen in der Welt, vornehmlich auch bei den Neutralen. Bei der Mentalitaet Ribbentrops waere die Reaktion der gewuenschten entgegengesetzt gewesen. Eine Fassung, die lediglich besagt haette, die Beschiessung sei geeignet, sich zeigende Symptome britischer Kriegsmuedigkeit wieder schwinden zu lassen, haette kaum andere Wirkung gezeitigt. Gewisse Aussicht, das gewollte Ziel zu erreichen, ergab sich jedoch dann, wenn in einem Zusatz noch gesagt wurde, dass derartige Beschiessungen seitens der britischen Kriegstreiber propagandistisch ausgewertet wuerden. Die groesste Aussicht auf Erfolg aber hatte der Bericht, wenn er der schwindenden Kriegsmuedigkeit garnicht Erwaechnung tat, sondern nur das im obigen Zusatz Gesagte meldete. Ob dies nun stimmte oder nicht, war foellig unwesentlich, doch hatte jetzt erst der Staatssekretäer eine Waffe in der Hand, die sich im Sinne seiner Politik gegen Ribbentrop verwenden liess. — Die politischen Berichte ueber England aus dem Haag tragen zum Teil die Unterschrift des Gesandten Graf Zech. Doch wurden auch diese von mir entworfen; sie wurden ihm in Reinschrift vorgelegt.

vorgelegt. Von einer Ausnahme abgesehen, hat er sie stets bedenkenlos unterzeichnet. Ohne dass wir uns je ueber die meiner Berichterstattung zu Grunde liegenden Tendenzen ausgesprochen haetten, dachte er doch wie ich. Kopien meiner gesamten England-Berichterstattung aus dem Haag habe ich in der Schweiz verwahrt. Sie koennen erforderlichenfalls vorgelegt werden.

Schweiz 1940 - 1942

Als ich mich nach meiner Rueckkehr aus Holland Anfang Juni 1940 in der Personalabteilung meldete, wurde mir von Ministerialdirektor Schroeder, dem Chef dieser Abteilung bedeutet, dass man mich sofort aus dem Blickfeld Ribbentrops, der mir uebel wolle, verschwinden lassen muesse. Ich wurde zunaechst beurlaubt und anschliessend von Herrn von Weizsaecker der Gesandtschaft in Bern zugeteilt, woselbst ich die Wirtschaftsabteilung zu uebernehmen hatte. Es lag in der Natur der Sache, dass ich hier wieder mit Theo Kordt in engen Gedankenaustausch hinsichtlich seines speziellen Aufgabenkreises trat. Er bestaetigte mir, dass Herrn von Weizsaeckers Bemuehungen weiter darauf gerichtet waren, den Krieg zu beenden, bevor er zu einem totalen werden musste. Infolge der Offensive im Westen waren die Aussichten, mit der anderen Seite ins Gespraech zu kommen, zunaechst einmal voellig in sich zusammen gesunken. Durch Kordt hoerte ich von den endlosen und aufreibenden Bemuehungen des Staatssekretaers und seiner oppositionellen Freunde die weiterhin zoegernde und schwankende Generalitaet fuer einen Aufstand zu gewinnen. Wie bekannt, sind all diese Versuche ergebnislos geblieben bis sich dann in der zweiten Haelfte des Krieges das Unternehmen vorbereitete, das zu den Geschehnissen des 20. Juli fuehrte. Immerhin gelang es schon waehrend der Zeit meines Aufenthaltes in Bern, gewisse Voraussetzungen zu schaffen, die uns fuer vielleicht einmal doch moegliche Friedensbesprechungen vorteilhaft erschienen. Entgegen den ausdruecklichen Weisungen des Auswaertigen Amtes und entgegen den ausdruecklichen Anordnungen des Gesandten

Koecher

Koecher unterhielt ich im Einverstaendnis mit Kordt seit Beginn meiner Taetigkeit in Bern enge und freundschaftliche Beziehungen mit dem Amerikanischen Gesandten Leland Harrison und seinem Ersten Sekretar Donald Bigelow, Beziehungen, die durch den Ausbruch des deutsch-amerikanischen Krieges nicht unterbrochen worden sind. Diese Verbindung war Herrn von Weizsaecker bekannt und hatte seine Billigung. Es war damit ein Kanal fuer die deutsche Opposition geschaffen, jederzeit mit der amerikanischen Regierung in Verbindung zu treten. Als Folge meines Kontaktes mit den genannten amerikanischen Diplomaten gelangten verschiedene fuer die deutsche Opposition wichtige Hinweise ueber Theo Kordt an Herrn von Weizsaecker. Andererseits versuchte ich meinem amerikanischen Gewaehrsmann unsere Ansicht zu vermitteln, dass uns - es war dies Ende 1941 - eine baldige ^{Kriegs-}Beendigung nur dann moeglich schiene, wenn es in Deutschland zu einer militaerischen Erhebung gegen Hitler und das Partei-Regime kommen wuerde. Wenn man also britischerseits auf eine deutsche Revolution, die, da nur die Wehrmacht Waffen haette, nur eine militaerische sein koenne, Wert lege, muesse man mit der an und fuer sich durchaus berechtigten Kampfansage an den Militarismus, dessen Vernichtung Churchill kurz zuvor zum erstenmal neben der des Nationalsozialismus als Kriegsziel der Alliierten bezeichnet hatte, vorsichtig sein. Die unter Umstaenden zum AuBstand bereiten Militaers seien kaum Militaristen, wuerden sich aber doch durch eine uneingeschraenkte Kampfansage an den Militarismus getroffen fuehlen muessen, und deshalb in ihrer Entschlussfassung behindert sein. Mit diesem Gesprach waren besondere Risiken verbunden, da mir bekannt war, dass die deutsche Abwehr den Inhalt gewisser Telegramme der amerikanischen Auslandsvertretungen zu erfahren vermocht hatte. - Auch versuchten wir einmal, mit grundsatzlichem Einverstaendnis von Herrn von Weizsaecker, durch Professor Paul Keller, den schweizerischen Delegierten fuer Handelsvertraege, mit dem wir uns unmittelbar vor einer seiner Reisen nach London trafen, gewisse Gedankengaenge an die englische Adresse gelangen zu lassen, um auf diese Weise einen Kontakt herzustellen. Doch war auch diesem Versuch ein Erfolg nicht beschert.

Ich

Ich habe waehrend meines Aufenthaltes in Bern von Juli 1940 bis Ende 1942 Herrn von Weizsaecker, der bekanntlich bis 1938 Gesandter in der Schweiz war, von schweizerischer Seite des oeffteren und mit auffallender Waerme als Freund dieses Landes ruehmen hoeren. Auch im Hinblick auf diesen Umstand fiel es mir nicht schwer, meine Hauptaufgabe innerhalb meines Arbeitsbereichs als Leiter der Wirtschaftsabteilung der Gesandtschaft, naemlich die Ueberwachung und Kontrolle der schweizerischen Warenausfuhr vermittelt des Geleitscheinwesens und der Bewilligungsbefugnis fuer Kontingentsueberschreitungen, in einer die Interessen der Schweiz weitgehend beruecksichtigenden Weise zu handhaben. Hierbei lief ich bewusst Gefahr, mich in Gegensatz zu gewissen Partei- und militaerischen Stellen zu setzen, die an Hand meiner Rechenschaftsberichte und auf andere Weise die Durchfuehrung meiner Obliegenheiten ueberpruefen konnten. Die mir selbst gegebene Richtlinie fuer meine Arbeit war, im Rahmen meiner ausserordentlich weitgehenden Vollmachten, bei massvoller und demokratischen Prinzipien entsprechender Wahrnehmung der deutschen Interessen meinen Teil dazu beizutragen, die Schweiz waehrend des Krieges wirtschaftlich gesund zu erhalten. In der Tat haette ich durch rigorose Handhabung des Geleitscheinwesens und meiner sonstigen Bewilligungsbefugnisse den schweizer Export so behindern, beschraenken und zur Stagnation bringen koennen, dass die schweizerischen Wirtschaft schwerstens geschaedigt, wenn nicht sogar in vielen ihrer Teile ruiniert worden waere. Eine derartige Wahrnehmung meiner Dienstobliegenheiten wuerde durchaus die Billigung der nationalsozialistischen Wirtschaftskriegfuehrung gefunden haben, da Deutschland hierbei ohne Zweifel gewisse Vorteile fuer die Dauer des Krieges gewonnen haette. Hingegen gab ich mich bei meinem Bestreben, die schweizer Wirtschaft zu schonen, der Hoffnung und Erwartung hin, dass eine ungebrochene schweizer Volkswirtschaft nach Kriegsende einen wesentlichen Beitrag zum wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbau Europas, einschliesslich Deutschlands, werde leisten koennen und sich

sich auch hierzu werde verpflichtet sehen muessen. Mit dieser Art der Fuehrung meines Amtes wusste ich mich in voller Uebereinstimmung mit den grundsaeztlichen Ansichten meines Staatssekretaers, wobei ich gleichzeitig darauf vertraete, dass er mich decken wuerde, falls ich wegen meiner, der Einstellung der nationalsozialistischen Machthaber kontraeren Behandlung der Schweiz in Schwierigkeiten geraten sollte. —

Wie schon erwaeht, war mir Ribbentrop uebel gesinnt; Schroeder meinte, er hasse mich. Sowohl bei der Gestapo wie in militaerischen Kreisen standen meine Frau, eine Amerikanerin, und ich im Verdacht politischer Unzuverlaessigkeit und anti-nationalsozialistischer Umtriebe. Verschiedentlich sind schwerste Vorwuerfe gegen uns erhoben worden. Ende 1942 wurde ich ueberstuerzt von Bern in das Auswaertige Amt einberufen, wo man mich in einem Nebenreferat der Wirtschaftspolitischen Abteilung beschaeftigte. Auf Weisung Ribbentrops durfte ich im Ausland nicht mehr taetig sein - angeblich wegen der amerikanischen Volkzugehoerigkeit meiner Frau. So war ich zwar kaltgestellt, doch gleichzeitig vor Ribbentrop versteckt, was ich als durchaus zweckmaessig empfand. Als dann jedoch Herr von Weizsaecker an den Vatikan versetzt wurde und somit zu Einflusslosigkeit verurteilt schien, war dies fuer mich - aus Erwaegungen allgemeiner Art und solchen, die mich selbst betrafen - einer der Hauptgruende, dass ich mich im Sommer 1943 entschloss, von jeglicher weiteren Dienstleistung im Auswaertigen Dienst Abstand zu nehmen und mich, indem ich langen Urlaub unter Verzicht auf meine Gehaltsbezeuge nahm, vom Auswaertigen Amt zurueckzuziehen. 1944 wurde ich formell von Ribbentrop aus dem Auswaertigen Dienst entlassen.

Ich bin der festen Ueberzeugung, dass ich es in hervorragendem Masse Herrn von Weizsaecker zu verdanken habe, dass meine Frau und ich ohne Beeintraechtigung unserer persoenlichen Freiheit durch die gefaehrlichen Jahre der Aera Ribbentrop Hindurchgekommen sind.

Abschliessend

Abschliessend moechte ich meiner Beurteilung der Persoenlichkeit meines vormaligen Staatssekretaers dahingehend Ausdruck verleihen, dass er von allem Anfang an in schaeferster Gegnerschaft zu den aussenpolitischen Aspirationen der nationalsozialistischen Fuehrung stets und staendig versuchte, seine aussenpolitischen Plaene und seine Personalpolitik durchzusetzen. Wo immer er konnte, hat er - hier darf ich an das Verhaeltnis Talleyrands zu Napoleon erinnern - hoeherer Ziele wegen die Aussenpolitik Hitlers und Ribbentrops bekaempft und ist selbst nicht vor Handlungen zurueckgeschreckt, die Landesverrat im Sinne der Machthaber darstellten. Setzte er sich nicht durch - auch hier stimmt der Vergleich mit dem grossen Franzosen - so hat er sich nicht resigniert und feige zurueckgezogen, wie dies Maenner anderen charakterlichen Formats getan haben, sondern ist im Amt geblieben, um, wenn irgend moeglich, noch schlimmeres Geschehen zu verhueten. Seine ethische und sittliche Haltung aber war groesser als die Talleyrands. Er verblieb, unter Einsatz seines Lebens, seiner Ideale wegen in einer Stellung, die ihn, wie dieses Verfahren zeigt, zwangslaeufig in scheinbare Verquickung mit dem Boesen bringen musste und damit auch in den Verdacht, diesem verbunden gewesen zu sein. Das aber ist Selbstaufopferung edelster Praegung. Er handelte als wahrer Christ. Nur so konnte er - und nicht anders - die oppositionellen Kraefte innerhalb des Dienstes, die er stuetzte und schuetzte, befruchten, anspornen und beseelen, auch ihrerseits Jahre hinduerch, allen Fehlschlaegen zum Trotz, unbeirrbar den Weg zu gehen, den ihr vaterlaendisches und religioeses Gewissen ihnen vorschrieb.

Hinsichtlich meiner Person sei kurz bemerkt, dass mir Aeusserungen anderer Angehoeriger der Widerstandsgruppe im Deutschen Auswaertigen Dienst sowie solche international bekannter Persoenlichkeiten in den Vereinigten Staaten, England,
Indien

Indien, den Niederlanden, der Schweiz und Schweden ueber meine politische Haltung waehrend der Nazi-Zeit und ueber meine Widerstandsleistung zur Verfuegung stehen. Die Schriftstuecke koennen jederzeit vorgelegt werden.

Lauterbrunnen, den 8. April 1948.

gez.: E. v. Selzam

Obige Unterschrift des Legationsrates I.Kl. a.D. Edward von Selzam, geb. 9. Dez. 1897 in Darmstadt, wohnhaft in Insel Woerth im Staffelsee, Seehausen, Kreis Weilheim, zur Zeit in Wengen, ist heute in meiner Gegenwart vollzogen worden und ist also echt.

Lauterbrunnen, den 8. April 1948

gez.: O. Graf

Gemeindeschreiberei Lauterbrunnen

*Verified to be a true copy
Westerline, Wisconsin
June 11, 1956*

Kayserman

January 15, 1949

EDWARD C. W. von SELZAM

Institut für Zeitgeschichte ARCHIV	
Akt. 3847/67	Post. ZS 1309
Rep.	Kat.

Personal History

Born, December 9, 1897 at Darmstadt, Hesse, Germany.
Married, June 2, 1927, Anita Ravenscroft Henry, of Washington, D.C., and "Feticity Manor," of St. Mary's Co., Maryland.
Has two children, Lettice Lee and Ruediger Lake.

Record of Service.

- 1914-19, Volunteer, Ensign and 2nd Lieutenant in a Hessian Cavalry Regt., prisoner of War (Russia), from 1915 to 1918, escaped from Krasnojarsk, Siberia, in January 1918.
- 1919-21, Student of Law and Political Science at the Universities of Frankfort/Main, Munich and Wuerzburg.
- 1921, Graduated from the University of Munich, took a degree as Dr. of Law and Political Science at the University of Wuerzburg, with qualification: "magna cum laude."
- 1921-22, Board of Foreign Trade, Bremen: commercial matters in general.
- 1922-24, Foreign Office, Berlin: preparatory work for Consular and Diplomatic Service.
- 1924, Passed final examination for Foreign Service with qualification: "good."
- 1924-25, Member of commercial delegation in Paris.
- 1925-28, Embassy, Washington, D.C., reporting on American home-politics, on inter-American relations, on immigration questions, social affairs. Personal Secretary to Baron Ago Maltzan, German Ambassador in Washington, accompanied him on all his journeys in the United States.
- 1928-31, Foreign Office, Berlin, in charge of American and British sections of Press Department of Foreign Office, close relations with Berlin correspondents of principal American and British newspapers and news-agencies.
- 1931-37, Consulate General, Calcutta, India, Acting Consul General for four years, fostering German trade with India, close relations with British and Indian commercial firms, Commerce, and Indian Stores Departments, and reporting on economic and political developments in India.
- 1937-39, Embassy, London, First Secretary, in charge of Political Department, reporting on Anglo-German relations, on relations between United Kingdom and rest of the world. In 1938 joined the Foreign Office group in the Resistance against the Nazi Government headed by Oberbuergemeister Goerdeler and Colonel General Beck. Made every effort in his power to frustrate Hitler's war policy. For instance, during the Sudeten Crisis, on his own responsibility and contrary to all intentions of the Foreign Minister v. Ribbentrop, he saw the American Ambassador, Joseph P. Kennedy, and urged him to take certain steps with the American President to bar Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia which the latter had already decided upon at that time. In the days immediately preceding the outbreak of the war, he undertook a similar demarche with the American Charge d' Affaires, Herschel Johnson, in order to prevent the invasion of Poland. During and after the Sudeten Crisis, through the intermediary of Group Captain M. G. Christie, he gave warning and advice to the then Sir Robert Vansittart, Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Prime Minister, of what the Nazi Government was scheming in foreign affairs. Lord Vansittart wrote on Sept. 28, 1946: "I remember that, ... he (E. v. S.) did what he could to keep us informed during the latter part of the inter-war period."

- 1939-40, Legation, The Hague, reporting on political and economic developments in the United Kingdom, on relations between United Kingdom and rest of the world. Through the conception of his reports, made every effort to prevent the invasion of Holland and to enable his Secretary of State, Baron E. Weizsaecker, to encourage the generals to rise in revolt against the Nazi Regime. Jonkheer A. M. Snouck Hurgronje, Secretary-General of the Netherlands Foreign Office, wrote on August 13, 1946: "In the intercourse I had with him, he (E.v.S.) made it abundantly clear that his personal feelings were antagonistic to the Nazi Regime in Germany and I know he did all he could during his stay at the Hague to prevent the invasion, which he considered as great an outrage as we did."
- 1940-42, Legation, Berne, in charge of economic department, reporting on economic conditions in Switzerland, on commercial relations between Switzerland and rest of the world. Close relations with leading Swiss industrialists, Dr. Jean Hotz, Minister, and Chief of the Swiss Commercial Department, wrote on June 4, 1946: (translated from German) "I appreciate finding in you an expert, correct and loyal partner who possessed a great understanding of Switzerland, her needs and her special position. I know that due to your personal attitude you have not unessentially contributed to the fact that it had always been possible to find solutions acceptable to Switzerland in spite of the difficulties resulting from the directions of your government. In view of the governmental conditions in Germany at that time the methods of your work and the sentiments they manifested were of special value to me as also to my colleagues in the Federal Administration and the representatives of the Swiss Commercial community as far as they came in contact with you."
- 1942, Abruptly recalled to Foreign Office, Berlin. In general disgrace. Suspected by both Military and Gestapo on account of his liberal attitude and his American and British affiliations and sympathies. Suspected of anti-nazi activities and underground work. No evidence, however, could be produced. Shelved.
- 1943, Withdrew from active service by taking long leave without pay, retired to family estate in Southern Bavaria.
- 1944-45, Drafted into the Army as a 2nd Lieut. First, Eastern Front, then attached to a Polish Officers' Prisoners of War Camp.
- 1944, While serving in the Army, formally dismissed from Foreign Service, the reason given, because of his wife being American. (last rank: Counsellor of Legation I.Cl, of 1937.)
- 1945-48, Lived on family estate, the island "Woerth" in the lake "Staffelsee" Post Murnau, Oberbayern, Amer. Zone, Germany, where he started and ran successfully, a truck-garden.
- 1949, On January 6, 1949, came as a non-quota immigrant to the United States. He was accompanied by his family.

Description of duties and accomplishments (commercial field):

While in India:

1. Nominated and appointed agencies for industrial and commercial firms,
2. Reported on new commercial and industrial openings,
3. Through personal influence and contacts succeeded in preventing boycott of German goods in 1933 and 1934, especially acknowledged by his Secretary of State,
4. Supported Krupp, Essen, in their bid with Government of British India to get construction of Howrah Bridge at Calcutta against competition of several British firms,
5. Supported agents of German firms in their dealings with Indian Stores Department, Commerce Department and Princely States.

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20. Februar 1965

Elm Cottage
Waterville
Oconomowoc
Wisconsin 53066

Herrn Professor
Dr. Hans Rothfels
74 Huebinger
Waldhaeuser Str. 18

Sehr verehrter Herr Professor,

Herzlichen Dank fuer Ihre freundlichen Zeilen. Ich bin ganz Ihrer Ansicht, dass der Ihnen uebersandte Vortrag aus dem Jahr 1950 sich nicht zur Veroeffentlichung eignet. Was ich da sage ueber die Taetigkeit einer Opposition in Deutschland duerfte ich im Wesentlichen dem bekannten Buch von Allen Dulles entnommen haben und daher in vielen ueberholt, da neuere Forschung sehr viel gruendlichere Information der Oeffentlichkeit zugaenglich gemacht hat. Zweck der Uebersendung hingegen war allein, Sie, sehr verehrter Herr Professor, als die Autoritaet in Deutschland in Fragen der Opposition ins Bild zu setzen ueber Einzelheiten mehr beilaeufiger Art, die vom Standpunkt des Historikers aus gesehen gewisses Interesse beanspruchen moegen. Was ich ueber mein Wirken waehrend jener schrecklichen Tage sage, basiert auf meinem Affidavit, das ich im Jahre 1948 in Nuernberg gelegentlich des Weizsaecker Prozesses dem amerikanischen Gerichtshof in Eerteidigung von Herrn v. Weizsaecker vorgelegt habe. Ein Exemplar dieses Affidavits in deutscher Sprache, sowie weitere einschlaegige Dokumente, insbesondere Aeusserungen von Persoenlichkeiten des Auslandes zu meinen Bemuehungen, der Kriegspolitik des damaligen Regimes entgegenzuarbeiten, und anderes mehr, befinden sich bei meinen Personalakten im Auswaertigen Amt in Bonn und sollten fuer interessierter Forschung zugaenglich sein. Ein Grossteil des einschlaegigen Materials - doch keineswegs alles - hat mein Bruder Rechtsanwalt Dr. Wilfried v. S., 8 Muenchen, Promenadenplatz 9, in Verwahrung. Originale bestimmter Dokumente habe ich hier, so insbesondere Schreiben von Botschafter Joseph P. Kennedy, Christie, Vansittart, Snook Hurgronje, Hotz und Sulzer, auch das Protokoll ueber meine Vernehmung in Nuernberg - Kreuzverhoer Dr. Kompner.

In Zuge der Geltendmachung meiner Wiedergutmachungsansprueche habe ich dem Auswaertigen Amt Uebersendung meiner Haager Berichtssammlung angeboten. Hierauf hat das Amt nicht reagiert. Ich habe daher keinerlei Bedenken, dieses Material einer anderen interessierten Stelle in Deutschland zugaenglich zu machen. Sollte das Institut fuer Zeitgeschichte in Muenchen Wert auf den Besitz der Berichte legen, so stehen sie diesem auf Anfrage zur Verfuegung. Sollten Sie die Guete haben wollen, eine solche zu veranlassen, so waere ich Ihnen sehr dankbar, denn an besagtem Ort waeren sie wohl in nuetzlicherem Gewahrsam als hier bei mir in einer alten Truhe.

Meine Buchhandlung in Oxford schrieb mir uebrigens in diesen Tagen, und das duerfte Sie interessieren, dass "The German Opposition to Hitler" vom Verlag Oswald Wolff nicht mehr geliefert werden koenne. Man verwies mich an Regnery in Chicago. Ich verbleibe mit herzlichen Gruessen und in der Hoffnung, Sie im Herbst begruessen zu duerfen

Dr. Hans Rothfels *Marshall Guggenheim* 023

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Widerstand

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EDWARD CARL WOLFRAM von SELZAM,

Counsellor of Legation I. Class,
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"EXPERIENCE WITH THE RESISTANCE IN GERMANY"

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EXPERIENCES WITH THE RESISTANCE IN GERMANY

25-7309-27

A talk given to the members of Our Savior's English Lutheran Church, Oconomowoc, Wisconsin, in May 1950.

When Rev. Tanner asked me a couple of months ago to speak before this audience on some of my experiences, as I had been in many places and countries, I was thinking what would be most interesting to you for me to talk about. I thought, at first, of my times in India, where I had occasion to watch the political developments in that country, where I had occasion to see British policy at work, slowly retreating from a vast field of political and commercial enterprise, with one aim in mind, to keep India within the Commonwealth, in which they finally succeeded. - Then I thought of my adventures in Russia during the First World War, when I was a prisoner of war for three years in Siberia until I finally succeeded in escaping from that country. - But I then decided that a few remarks on my experiences as a Foreign Service Officer of my old country during the years when the Nazis had come to power in Germany, of the forces then at work in Germany to do away with Hitler and his regime, and of my particular part in these, unfortunately, unsuccessful efforts, would be worthwhile to remember and to put down on paper for your benefit.....

From 1938 I was a member of the resistance group in the German Foreign Service. At that time, about 15 officers belonged to that group, amongst them, the Secretary of State, Ernst von Weizsäcker. This group was part of a larger resistance movement which had come to life in about 1936. A very hidden life, however, because it worked underground. The leaders were Karl Goerdeler, former Mayor of Leipzig, Colonel General Ludwig Beck, Chief of the General Staff until his resignation in 1938 which took place in protest against Hitler's war plans, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Chief of the Intelligence Service (the "Abwehr"), and Generals Erwin von Witzleben, Hans Oster, and Freiherr von Hammerstein. All of them were shot, hanged or tortured to death in connection with the abortive attempt on Hitler's life in July 1944, about which I shall speak later. Their followers were army officers, intellectuals, scientists, civil servants, labor leaders, diplomats and leading Protestant and Catholic Churchmen. Though the German Resistance Movement had a very broad base, actually reaching from right to left, only comparatively few people belonged to it. It had to remain small because every additional member was a potential source of danger of detection by the Gestapo. Only those were admitted who had a definite contribution to make. Nearly all held positions through which they could exercise power or obtain valuable information. Should they expose themselves too much, their further service was a doubtful asset. To understand this, and to understand anything about any underground, it is necessary to understand something about the totalitarian police state. This is extremely difficult for people in a free country to realize. Every telephone is tapped, every person who is under suspicion is shadowed, letters are secretly opened, there are spies in every house, in every organization. People are arrested at random and tortured---and under torture they give away names. Some doctors and nurses reported what patients said under ether....

The German people, when Hitler came to power had no idea of these methods of the totalitarian state. They were soon to learn. The strange thing is that Hitler started off completely legally. He was the head of the largest minority party. He had not an absolute majority. But as soon as he had control of the machinery of the government, he did away with all the institutions of democracy such as free press, free speech, free parliament. He fought the Churches, and he fought Christianity. He established the police state which is the state of terror and constant fear. He killed about 6 million Jews. He

He killed hundreds of thousands- I regret not to know the exact figures- of Germans, and members of other nations, only because they refused openly to fall into line. Against this overpowerful state organization the underground had to fight... ..Of course, any underground movement in the European countries occupied by the Nazis had to face these difficulties, but the Underground in Germany had to face additional difficulties. Many Germans who hated Hitler, had scruples to do anything against him as long as their country was at war. The German Underground had no protection or help from abroad like its sister-movements in Norway, France, Belgium, Holland and Poland. It had no funds, no friendly base from which to operate. It was almost impossible to secure false papers. No recognition awaited its members. While most Norwegians in occupied Norway, for instance, were potential helpers to a Norwegian Underground fighter, a member of the German Underground could, by no means, trust other Germans unless he definitely knew that they were also connected with the Resistance, for fear of being reported to the authorities.And there is another thing the importance of which cannot be overstressed. Immediately after Hindenburg's death, under the Constitution of the Weimar Republic, Hitler became Acting Head of State. He at once ordered the armed forces to swear allegiance to him. But the officers, not to speak of the men, did not notice until they had raised their hands to take the oath that the formula was a completely new one. In this cynical age of ours, one is inclined to overlook the significance which the German Officer Corps, the majority of which was brought up in a religious tradition, attached to the importance of the oath. The oath read:

"I swear by God this holy oath that I will render unconditional obedience to the Fuehrer of the German Reich and People, Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces, Adolf Hitler, and that as a brave soldier I will be prepared at all times to give my life for this oath."

Whichever officer wanted to free himself from Hitler had to break this oath, which he had sworn by God. Only a few brave men succeeded in putting their duty towards their people above this oath. Only a few men were big enough to realize that such an oath could not possibly be in conformity with the Lord's demands on men as they are interpreted by our Christian Faith.....

But in spite of all these difficulties the Underground moved. Several attempts were made to remove Hitler and his government. The first was made in 1938 during the so-called Sudeten-Crisis. Had Hitler given orders to invade Czechoslovakia, General Halder, who had just replaced General Beck as Chief of the General Staff, and was in the plot, would not have marched into Czechoslovakia. In short, the plan was for the army to remove Hitler and to do away with Hitler's private army, the SS, as well as the whole Nazi regime. General von Witzleben was to be in charge of the military forces. The orders were to come from the High Command of the Army, that is from Halder, and from General von Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army whom Halder expected to win over in the last minute-- if not he would have put him under arrest. This plan had definite chances of success as the majority of the generals were opposed to a War with Czechoslovakia, though primarily from military reasons. War with Czechoslovakia would have meant War with France for certain and, possibly War with England. They did not believe Germany strong enough at that time to fight a war both in the West and in the East. A military dictatorship would have followed this revolt until the German State and People had been de-nazified. A complete record of the crimes committed by the Nazis had been

been prepared by Admiral Canaris for the benefit of the German people. ...Most unfortunately, the fact, that the British Government compromised with Hitler at Munich, made this attempt impossible.....In the preparation for this revolt I was personally involved. .. This is the story. -----

In the Spring of 1937, I had been transferred from the Consulate General in Calcutta to the Embassy in London, there to take over the Political Department. This appointment was of great importance to me for I believed that in London, in particular, I would be able to promote the creation of a friendly relationship between England and Germany and generally work in the interest of a German peace policy. This, at least, was my goal as it had been my goal since I joined the Diplomatic Service in 1922. - Although the domestic policy in Germany which in 1933 had led to the seizure of power by Hitler, had filled me with much anxiety while in India, I still believed at that time that there was reason to hope that Hitler and his party- having taken over the responsibility of government- would become more moderate, particularly with regard to foreign policy. This assumption which, as the developments showed, was wrong, I placed to the fact that it was President von Hindenburg- the very person who only recently had been elected by the co-operation of the Social-Democratic, the Democratic and the Center Parties against the votes of the Nationalists and the National-Socialists- that it was Hindenburg who had appointed the leader of the National-Socialists as his Chancellor. Even though further developments in the sphere of domestic politics were not apt to strengthen this hope, the foreign policy of the nazis, nevertheless, seemed to the distant observer at first to keep to a certain moderation. In this connection I refer to the signing of the Concordat with the Holy See, the German-Polish Non-aggression Pact and the German-British Naval Agreement. The conclusion, that the Foreign Office would win through against the Nazis with its policy and principles, seemed justified by the fact that the staff of the Foreign Service under the leadership of its Secretary of State, Bernhard von Buelow, that internationally known and recognized expert of International Law with his democratic training, had remained more or less intact.

less intact. The fact also that England, shortly after Hitler's introduction of universal military conscription in the Spring of 1935, a step which took place in violation of the Versailles Treaty- concluded a military agreement, namely the Naval Agreement, with Germany- seemed to prove to me that foreign countries had revised their initial grave objections. I saw the same proof in the fact that, only three months after the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936- which was another violation of the Versailles Treaty and also of the Locarno Pact- all foreign governments, including that of France, Great Britain and the United States, sent their national teams to the Olympic Games in Berlin.

(HAD)

When I arrived in London I found Ribbentrop there as German Ambassador. A few months service under that man, however, sufficed to open my eyes to the real aims of National-Socialist foreign policy. From the days of the march of German troops into Austria in 1938- which I considered the first real crime committed by the Hitler regime in the field of foreign policy, in view of the methods employed for the first time on that occasion- my attitude changed from a hitherto more critical but passive resistance into one of active opposition. I just could not go on giving the appearance of being a party to such gangster methods and decided to take steps which would make the British Government aware of my being completely in opposition to such criminal acts of a criminal government. I took courage for this spiritual change, not the least, from the news that the Minister in Bern, Herr von Weizsäcker, had been appointed Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. His clear mind, his honesty, decency and personal integrity were known to me as well as to every other old official of the Foreign Service- as well as to many French, British, American and other diplomats. I did not doubt for a moment that Herr von Weizsäcker, a deeply religious man of Protestant faith, had accepted this post solely, and with complete disregard for his personal safety, because he considered it his duty in spite of Hitler and Ribbentrop (who meanwhile had been made Foreign Minister), to direct the foreign policy of the Reich back in the channels of Stresemann, Bernhard von Bülow and Brüning. The fact that Austria's invasion took place several weeks after Weizsäcker's appointment did not diminish my regard for this man because he could not possibly have changed the fatal development of the decisions with regard to Austria during the short time of his office in Berlin. In any case, his appointment gave rise in me to the tremendously reassuring knowledge that the office of the Secretary of State- second in importance in the Foreign Service only to the office of the Minister- was held by a person of the best international repute. I knew that this man's attitude in all questions of foreign policy was, like my own, determined not only by his conscience and conscientiousness towards his own People, but also towards other nations. The fulfillment of his work in the field of international relations was based on what I should like to call the "Patriotism of a true Christian" which embodies principles quite different and contrary to those implied by a patriotism that follows the old saying "Right or wrong, My Country". - This knowledge of Weizsäcker gave me much strength in my own subsequent decisions, of which I will now speak.

My GOOD FRIEND

Several weeks after the invasion of Austria, Theo Kerdt was transferred from the Legation in Athens to the Embassy in London to take the position of Counsellor of Embassy and Deputy to the Ambassador. Thus, he became my immediate superior. I had known him as a colleague in the Service since the early twenties. I knew that, for many years, he had been principal secretary to Bernhard von Bülow, whom I have mentioned before. He thus had enjoyed the best possible training in what democracy means and in International Law. Naturally, all this resulted in an especially close relationship between us

both in connection with our professional work and outside. It was through Kordt that I learned for the first time that there existed in Germany an opposition group under the leadership of Karl Goerdeler and General Ludwig Beck- which consisted of several high ranking generals and well-known civilians who relied in matters of international kind on Weizsacker's advice through the intermediary of Kordt's brother Erich Kordt, who was the ranking official in Ribbentrop's staff. I learned that this opposition group had as its aim to bring about the fall of Hitler and his regime and to replace it by a regime of order, democracy and decency. Hitler and Ribbentrop toyed only too willingly with the idea of war, as had become increasingly clear after the invasion of Austria. The constant and direct exchange of ideas between Theo Kordt and the aforementioned leaders of the opposition, - of which the latter kept me informed - showed me that these men considered the solving of international differences by means of war not only as a crime against the German people but also as a crime against our national honor and as a crime against all mankind in view of the many existing treaties - above all the Briand-Kellogg Pact to out-law war which Germany had signed - and also in view of the repeated promises which Hitler had made in public speeches.

The Sudeten German Crisis

Already very soon after his arrival in London in the late Spring of 1938, Theo Kordt told me, that according to information he had received from the opposition, Hitler and Ribbentrop had decided to solve the Sudeten German question by force. He went on to say that the Secretary of State had authorized him on behalf of the Opposition leaders to inform the British Government at a suitable moment of the military measures planned by the German Opposition to check these criminal designs of the national-socialist Government of Germany. Furthermore, he said that the Secretary of State considered it of the greatest importance for the British Government to understand the position of the German Opposition and to adapt their policy towards Hitler - in the interests of preserving Peace - to the requirements of the German Opposition. It was fortunate that Kordt was entirely unhampered in the execution of these instructions owing to the fact that he was Charge d'Affaires at that time. He, consequently, had a number of secret discussions with Sir Horace Wilson, closest assistant and friend of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, with Lord Vansittart, first diplomatic advisor of the British Government, and also with Lord Halifax, then British Foreign Secretary. On other occasions he saw to it that the afore-mentioned persons were kept informed through his intermediary, an Englishman, Professor Philip Corwell-Evans. The purpose of these conversations - which if the Nazis had heard of them would have brought him to the gallows - was to incline the British Government to a policy which - although recognizing the justification of certain demands of the Sudeten Germans - would leave no doubts in the minds of Hitler and Ribbentrop that a violent solution of the Sudeten-German question would result in a British declaration of war against Germany. This policy which the leaders of the German Resistance wished Britain to adopt and to demonstrate unambiguously, was all the more necessary since the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, did not by any means - at least in the beginning of his mission - recognize the complete lack of conscience and responsibility on the part of Ribbentrop and Hitler, or their criminal nature, and was not able - with his quiet and dignified manner of speaking - to make any other impression on these Nazi-leaders except that of weakness and that the British were frightened. His attitude and very British manner, in fact, helped a lot in keeping their pre-conceived idea alive that the British Government was bluffing and that

that it would never decide upon a war against Germany because of the Sudeten-German question. I distinctly remember what Kordt told me when he described to me one of his conversations with Herr von Weizsäcker, during which the latter repeatedly and bitterly complained of Sir Neville's tactically and psychologically wrong attitude towards Ribbentrop.....

While Kordt had these secret and extremely important talks on behalf of the German Resistance with representatives of the British Government, in the preparation of which I helped and advised him, I was aware of my Secretary of State's basic attitude towards the evil ambitions of National-Socialism and felt, therefore, completely free to give detailed information of my opposition to the methods, aims, and the general creed of the National-Socialists to one of my oldest and most reliable British friends. This was, and still is, Group Captain Malcolm Graephane Christie. In particular, I discussed with him the Sudeten-German question in order to try through him- who, as I knew, was closely connected with Lord Vansittart- to influence the British Government to adopt a language as severe and strong as possible (in any case not the language of conventional diplomacy which Hitler and Ribbentrop were unable to understand), and to adopt a firm, uncompromising stand in the matter. I implied to Christie that I was convinced that my Secretary of State shared my opinion but tried to avoid the impression that in my conversations with him that I was acting on his instructions. In any case, the British Government was fully informed of the wishes and needs of the German Opposition through its- I like to say- official channels which led over the two Kordt brothers. My appeals to Christie, which I made almost wholly on my own responsibility, seemed to me particularly the more promising for the very reason that they were an additional attempt on my part. Also, owing to my having been stationed for many years on posts in the British Empire, I had a considerable number of personal friends among Anglo-Saxons and believed to enjoy the personal confidence of many members of the British Foreign Office and also of other influential British men in authority. As that as it may, I, as a German, as a European and as a Christian- in other words- that it was my duty in a higher sense, to have these conversations with Christie, although under the Law in Germany of those days, they constituted acts of treason. I was also convinced that the leaders of the Resistance would have approved them if they had known of them. I was in the fortunate position to have this channel and so I used it.

On September 5th., 1938, Theo Kordt visited Lord Halifax in order to tell him that the German Opposition considered it of the greatest importance that Chamberlain's declaration of March 24th., 1938 in the House of Commons, be supplemented by a more unequivocal statement on the part of the British Government. The contents of Chamberlain's March statement were that Britain could hardly stand aside in the case of war if France should stand by her obligations towards Czechoslovakia, although Britain herself was not expressly under a legal obligation to intervene. - A supplementary statement was then issued in the House of Commons on September 11th., 1938 which was given added force by an official press notice. After these events the results of the demarche by Kordt seemed at first to him and to me to be sufficient to effect either the desired delay of Hitler's action or, failing that, to enable the Opposition to start the military revolt and to stir those generals into action who so far had not been able to make up their minds. Kordt's official report about these British declarations to the Foreign Office in Berlin clearly expressed that a change in the general attitude of British Public Opinion- which had hitherto been remarkably indifferent- had put the British Government in the position to realize the newly announced policy of taking military action should Hitler decide to go to war against Czechoslovakia. We, in London, were- I admit- at

at first inclined to think that one of the alternative solutions aimed at by the Secretary of State, namely, either the intimidation of Hitler, or better still: Hitler's decision to start a war and the revolt against Hitler, following immediately, based on "Blitz" actions of the Army, would have to take place. But our optimism soon vanished. To begin with, as Theo Kordt heard from his brother Erich, Hitler was in no way impressed by the declarations of the British Government, he could not and would not understand diplomatic parlance, secondly, which was much worse, the leaders of the Opposition held the opinion that the official British statements were not clear enough to give them the sorely needed support to win over the Commander-in-Chief and the other generals who were still vacillating. At that stage, matters were such that renewed representations to the British Government on the part of Kordt did not hold out any promise of success.- The British Government did not seem inclined to go further. This failure of the British Government, at this particular moment, to convey and transmit to Germany an impression of unshakeable resolution to act and strike, should Hitler use force, by the way, is, in my opinion, one of the principal factors which brought about the chain of events which, eventually, led to the out-break of the war twelve months later.- The British had been warned by us but, for reasons of their own, of which I am no judge, had not heeded our warnings.Then I conceived the idea that we might try to find a way to make the American Government, above all President Roosevelt, issue a declaration similar to the one by the British Government. Kordt though was of the opinion that the American neutrality legislation, which at that time was still in force, would make such a step of the President impossible, but he shared my opinion that no stone should be left unturned. If the President could not see his way to comply with our request, at least the American Government would be made aware of the fact that there were forces within Germany which were acting against Hitler. On the morning of September 12th., I went to see the American ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy. I suggested to him that he urge President Roosevelt to issue a declaration as stern and as forceful as possible saying that the United States would declare war on Germany if Hitler were to start a war against Czechoslovakia. I do not know the result of this- if I may say rather unusual demarche on my part. But it might interest you to know that Mr. Kennedy, in a letter to me ~~dated~~ after the war, in very gratifying words confirmed this demarche.

The fact that matters did not develop along the course desired by the leaders of the German Opposition, particularly by my Secretary of State, was beyond our control. On September 13th., Sir Neville Henderson had received from his government the well meant but tragic order to inform the German Government that the British Prime Minister would try to settle the Sudeten question in a private conference with Hitler. This was followed by the conferences in Berchtesgaden and Bad Godesberg. Before Mr. Chamberlain's departure, I had the opportunity of speaking to Sir William Strang, the official in charge of German Affairs in the British Foreign Office, who accompanied Mr. Chamberlain. This happened at the airfield from which Chamberlain departed. I urged him to see to it that the Prime Minister should remain firm, and that he must not allow himself to be influenced by Hitler's shouting and threats. When the Conference of Godesberg came to an end without any results whatsoever and after Hitler had given a very aggressive speech on September 26th., we, in London, were again inclined to think that Hitler would order the invasion of Czechoslovakia. We were convinced that, in this case, the Opposition leaders

z would have succeeded in pulling the entire High Command, and with it the Army, on the road to revolt.....The staff of the Embassy would not have returned to Germany..... However, on September 28th., Mussolini submitted his mediation proposals which led to the Munich Conference.....Erich Kordt telephoned his brother in London and informed him of its results. The conversation ended with the significant remark: "Well, this is the second best solution."....The undoubtedly well-meant but fateful policy of appeasement which the British Government had seen appropriate to pursue, bore its first dangerous fruits. Peace was won once more, but at what a price! All efforts of the leaders of the German Opposition to get the vacillating generals to strike in revolt were foiled. Hitler again had won with his methods. Czechoslovakia, stripped of all her fortifications in the Sudeten mountains, had ceased to be a military problem. - The German people were jubilant, more because a war had been avoided than because of the Sudeten Germans' adhesion to the Reich. In fact, Hitler had won a war of aggression without firing a single shot..... An uprising at that moment would have ended in failure.

Crisis in Prague and Poland.

During the course of the next year, especially during the crisis in Prague, which led to the collapse of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, and during the Polish Crisis which led to the out-break of World War II, I advised Theo Kordt with regard to the tactical application of the instructions and directives issued by the Secretary of State, who was in constant contact with the leaders of the Opposition, and I supported him as far as possible. These instructions were either brought by Kordt as the result of his personal conversations in Berlin with the Secretary of State, or by special couriers who reported orally, or they were transmitted by telephone by Kordt's brother in Berlin in the form of a pre-arranged code. There were even instances that messages came through in official cables which when bearing the signature of the Secretary of State were given a different, sometimes quite contrary interpretation, to the actual text of the message as it would be read by an uninformed reader. Never, however, were such directives which we received on behalf of the Opposition, recorded or made any appearance in the files of the Foreign Office, this would have been too dangerous for everyone concerned. The Gestapo was omnipotent and had its agents everywhere, even amongst the staff of the Embassy. In our care to avoid everything which might endanger our efforts to counteract the policy of Hitler and Ribbentrop, Kordt and I never had our conferences at our desks, but moved our chairs into the middle of the room and whispered for fear that overnight a microphone might have been installed near our desks which would record our talks, which would have meant our end. This secrecy which was necessary during those difficult and dangerous years had one great disadvantage, and that is, that, if one wants now to search in the files of the Foreign Office for documentary evidence of the resistance work of the Secretary of State and the few Foreign Service officers who worked with him for the preservation of peace and against the war policy of the Minister von Ribbentrop, - hardly anything would be found. And "Quod non est in actis non est in mundo". If it were not for the corroborating statements of Foreign Diplomats or other non-Germans with whom we were in contact in those days on behalf of the German Resistance, it would be very difficult to prove to a doubtful world

the existence of such a resistance.

The directions we received during that year preceding the out-break of the War were chiefly intended to induce the British Government to adopt a perfectly clear and unmistakeable attitude towards all further, continuously looming plans of violence on the part of Hitler and Ribbentrop, just as we had tried during the Sudeten Crisis. On the one hand, the British Government's attitude was meant to have a moderating influence on Hitler's decisions, and on the other, to strengthen the German Opposition which, during this period, had received another setback by disturbing changes and transfers in the commanding posts of the Army ordered by Hitler personally. The Opposition was also suffering, in an increasing measure, from the fact that several commanding generals, impressed by Hitler's success in foreign policy, were even more hesitant than during the Sudeten Crisis to bring about the fall of Hitler. My conversations with my friend Christie were on the same level as those of Kordt with the official representative of the British Government. They were meant to induce the Chamberlain-Halifax Government to an attitude which, roughly, would have corresponded to that held by Churchill at that time.-- At this instance it may be appropriate to draw your attention to another great obstruction which we in the "Resistance against Hitler" had again and again to cope with and to overcome somehow.. It was not always possible to contact our leaders for approval of certain actions on our part which we considered necessary at a given moment. We then had to act entirely on our own responsibility, and solely on the basis of our own judgement in the light of our general knowledge of the intentions of the leaders of the Opposition. This was, for instance, the case when I made my demarche with Ambassador Kennedy, of which I spoke before, or when I took a similar step with Herschel Johnson, then American Charge d'Affaires, in the very last days before Hitler started the War, when I hoped against hope through him to get the American Government to take some kind of forceful action which would impress both Hitler and the generals- though in a different way. Or with regard to my talk with Christie, after the handing-over of the Declaration of War, when I tried, through him, to influence Lord Vansittart to appeal to the British Cabinet to postpone for a few days the bombing of targets in Germany by the Royal Air Force in order to give a potential military uprising the chance to develop and to stop Goebbels from using such air attacks as a means of propaganda against the revolt.

All this work of ours which aimed at sparing Germany and Europe another war - under the law in Germany of those days- was treason since we tried to frustrate Hitler's and Ribbentrop's policy which was a policy aimed at war. It involved a terrific mental strain of which we were constantly aware. If we had not had the deep conviction that what we did and were doing, was right and our duty in a higher sense the strain would have been unbearable.

Therefore, you will understand that when War was declared and all our efforts had failed, I was in complete and utter despair. - I felt that I just could not go on in the service of a Government which was criminal. But one cannot just resign and withdraw to some quiet corner in war-time. Then, when all our British friends had come and said "Goodbye" and gone again, and I suddenly realized that I was now an enemy alien, and that I would have to return to Germany the next morning, it became perfectly clear to my mind that I should prefer to remain in England rather than go back to Germany. But I decided to make my final decision dependent upon what the British Government would say as I did not wish to remain in England if I were not welcome. I therefore had Vansittart asked for his personal advice in the

matter. His very sympathetic and understanding answer was that, in view of the special circumstances then prevailing in England, he felt that he should advise me to go back to Germany, and- to serve the good cause on the other side.. So I went.

After the outbreak of the War.

After the outbreak of the war, and immediately following our return to Berlin, The Secretary of State transferred Theo Kordt to the Legation at Berne and me to the Legation at The Hague. We both had the same tasks, namely, to report on Great Britain and on the policy of her Government. At the same time, we stood in readiness in case the British should intend to contact us, who were known for our oppositional attitude and our dislike of the Nazi-Government. Such a contact was brought about with Kordt but not with me. His contact-man of our London days, Prof. Conwell-Evans, whom I have mentioned before, came to see him several times during the winter of 1939-40. The gist of the British messages were, that a Germany which had ridden herself of Hitler and his regime would find Great Britain prepared to enter into peace-talks. This, of course, was very welcome news for the Secretary of State and the leaders of the German Resistance, who could and did use this in their ceaseless efforts to win more of the vacillating generals to their cause and to get them to take action. Unfortunately, other feelers of the Opposition, to get definite assurances that the Allies would refrain from attacking Germany in the event that the removal of Hitler and his regime led to internal disorders in Germany, were much less unequivocal. Such promises, however, were essential to meet the inhibitions of the generals. Their view was that a successful rising of the army meant revolution. That revolution, in all likelihood, would mean fighting in Germany between anti-nazi troops and the SS Army which was composed of first-class soldiers. Such a civil war, however, would weaken the defending power of the Army in the West and open the door to an occupation of Germany by Allied troops. It was a tragic psychological mistake on the part of the British and the French that, for reasons of their own, their replies to these inquiries of the Resistance leaders- which went partly over the Vatican, partly over the former Chancellor Joseph Wirth who lived in exile in Switzerland- were ambiguous and non-committing.

I, in the meantime, did my best within the framework of my possibilities, to conceive my reports from the Hague about Great Britain in such a manner that they were useful tools in the hands of my Secretary of State for the purpose the Resistance leaders wished to accomplish. With my reports I pursued a double aim. On the one hand, they were meant to supply the Secretary of State with material to make it easier for the generals to come to a decision in favor of a revolt. On the other hand, they were meant as a means to prevent intensification or extension of the German war operations, above all the continually threatening invasion of Holland and Belgium.

I reported in detail, much to the disgust of many a nazi in the Foreign Office, on every one of the numerous statements by members of the British Government on the subject of British war and peace aims, emphasizing in particular the repeatedly expressed willingness to give Germany(a Germany without Hitler and National-Socialism), her due place among the nations. This material was meant for the

generals. On the other hand, I stressed, specifically, - especially during the first few months after the outbreak of the war- the unity of the population of the United Kingdom as well as that of the Dominions and India, in their willingness to fight on to victory. These reports were meant for the National-socialist leadership. But, I also reported continually that the lull in the fighting after the Polish Campaign, was a bad thing for this fighting spirit. The "phony" war, I said, was apt to unnerve the British people and strengthen the influence of those circles in Britain who advocated an early end of the war. The increasing intensification of German air and naval operations, caused me to state, that these events had increased the British fighting spirit and that, consequently, the symptoms of war weariness and readiness to make peace were rapidly disappearing. After the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, I reported that the British fighting spirit was gathering more and more strength and leading everywhere to the public demand for military action.- During the Finnish-Russian war, I reported symptoms of a growing consciousness in Britain of the parallel interests of Great Britain and Germany as opposed to Russia.- The idea that the British Government might, perhaps, be prepared to attend a peace conference with a National-Socialist Government, if the latter in the future would refrain from intensifying and extending its war operations and pursue a more moderate conduct of war, or resume such a conduct, had to be kept alive. So much for my reports. My thoughts, of course, ran along entirely different lines. They were these: As long as Hitler is at the helm of Germany, the other side will, under no circumstances, make peace. Even conferences are out of the question. Peace negotiations are only possible with a basically anti-National-socialist Government in Germany. But it is necessary to prepare, as far as possible, a basis for this new government. Therefore, even under the Nazis, there must be no intensification of war, especially in air and naval warfare, or extension of war- such as the invasion of the Low Countries- a development which would render Chamberlain's position more difficult. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, however, I felt, were the only British statesmen who might try to advocate a compromise peace with a non-Nazi Government in Germany in the House of Commons. Surrender of all Polish and Czech territories occupied by Germany would naturally have been a matter of course. - It was obvious that the leaders of a successful revolt against Hitler- which would have taken place after an invasion of Holland and Belgium- would encounter greater difficulties in entering into a peace negotiations with the other side than they would have had if such an international crime of aggression had not taken place at all. - - - In other words: By my reports, I endeavored to supply my Secretary of State with trump cards which he could use as he saw fit, either for the encouragement of those generals who could not make up their minds to follow the Opposition leaders, or against the National-Socialist leadership by throwing a monkey-wrench into the machinery of their "Dynamics"- until such time as the revolt of the Generals would at last break out.

At this instance it may be appropriate to say a few words with regard to the specific difficulties involved with that kind of reporting, particularly as to the formulating of such reports which, though going through official channels, were meant to serve the aims and purposes of the Resistance.

Their Nazi readers must not suspect the reporter with regard to his attitude to the war. Thus the language of these reports had, on principle, to be that of the Nazis. Their contents must also, somewhat, comply to Nazi psychology. But,

But, primarily, they had to be useful for the oppositional purposes of the Secretary of State. Thus, beyond doubt, they required a certain measure of courage. On one occasion, I had the opportunity to discuss with an elderly, thoroughly peace-loving official of the German Foreign Service- who called on me in The Hague- the subject of "Reporting by Anti-Nazi diplomats under the Nazis against the Nazis". This man, in the end, prophesied in a horrified voice that I would finally land myself in a concentration camp. I should like to quote one short example: You may remember that German aircraft in those days often fired on harmless British fishing craft (in the nazi language: Advance Post Vessels, "Vorposten-Fahrzeuge), and also on light-ships outside British ports which served international shipping. It would have been entirely mistaken to report that such actions would damage German reputation in the world, especially amongst the neutrals. In view of Ribbentrop's mentality, this would have had the opposite of the desired effect. The re-action would have been: "what do I care what others think, we are the only judges of our conduct in international affairs. The fellow had better stop expressing such sentimental ideas which do not fit into our conception of right or wrong in wartime." - - A text which would have indicated only, that this firing was apt to do away with all symptoms of British war weariness, would not have done much better. But there was definitely a certain amount of hope to reach the desired aim if I had added a remark such as " such firing was used by British warmongers for their war propaganda." But success could be surely expected from a report which did not even mention that British war weariness was waning as a sequel to such firing, but stated plainly and only "that such firing was used by British warmongers such as Churchill for their insidious war propaganda". - Whether or not that was correct, was quite immaterial, but now the Secretary of State had a weapon in his hand which he could use in the prosecution of his policy against Ribbentrop.

I am happy to say that I succeeded, during the war, in smuggling copies of all my reports from The Hague into Switzerland, so as to have them available for historical purposes if anything should have happened to me.

Jonkheer Snouk Hurgronje, the Secretary-General of the Netherlands Foreign Office, as well as other officials in the Dutch Foreign Service, were aware of my efforts to forestall the invasion of their country. When I said goodbye to Snouk after the occupation of Holland by German troops, he said to me; "We Dutch never forget a man to whom we owe gratitude". After the war, in August 1946, he sent me, entirely on his own initiative a statement in which he said, quote, "I know that he did all he could during his stay at The Hague to prevent the invasion, which he considered as great an outrage, as we did. unquote. You may well imagine how gratifying these words were to me.

In spite of the lack of unqualified moral support from the Allies, the leaders of the Opposition, especially Generals Beck, von Witzleben and Oster, tried their utmost in the months after the Polish Campaign to move the ranking generals, above all Halder, the Chief of the General Staff and von Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, into revolutionary action.

Several developments took place during the period from the beginning of the war until the offensive in the West in May 1940. General von Hammerstein, one of the most out-standing opponents of the nazis, who commanded an army in the West, had succeeded in arranging for Hitler to visit him at his field-headquarters. He was determined to seize the man and put him under arrest. With Hitler removed, success of a military revolt would have been as good as certain as all the ranking-generals would then have followed, especially if Hitler had lost his life on that occasion. - His death would have relieved them of their oath! Unfortunately, Hitler called off the visit.

A second plot on a different scale was planned in November 1939. Hitler had ordered the offensive in the West to start November 12th. The conditions were somewhat similar to those in September 1938 during the Sudeten crisis, though not as favorable as then. The Majority of the Generals presented an offensive at this time of the year for military reasons and expected defeat. Long nights, fogs and muddy grounds forestalled disaster for a Panzer-war. Some also had definite scruples about invading the Low countries and disliked the idea of becoming partners in an international crime. Everything was set, Goerdeler had been informed by Halder and Brauchitsch that they would strike the moment the orders for the attack should reach them from Hitler's Headquarters. Their Army Commanders were prepared and would have followed because they were the ones who were particularly opposed to an offensive in the beginning of the winter, which they considered sheer madness. The date for the offensive, which was to be the date of the revolt against Hitler, was postponed three times by Hitler and finally called off- and so disappeared the chances for a military uprising. The generals during this fateful November 1939, presented a deplorable picture, they were in utter confusion, and finally lost their nerve entirely, trying to destroy the traces of their commitments. In this they succeeded. We do not know of any information that the Gestapo may have received of these plans. Everyone involved kept quiet.-

In Spring 1940, General Beck made another effort. Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, was approached again but, Germany being involved in a major war, he did not dare to take the course which he had been prepared to take in 1938- namely, to go over the head of the Commander-in-Chief, von Brauchitsch- if necessary. This time, he made his decision contingent on Brauchitsch's approval, and Brauchitsch refused to act. Thus failed the last effort before the offensive in the West to win the generals for the aims of the Opposition.

But I should like to mention here that General Oster, who had already warned the Dutch Military Attaché in Berlin of the pending attacks on Holland in November 1939 and January 1940, and who had already given warning of the attack on Denmark, now again warned the Dutch that the invasion of Holland would start on May 10th., ... It did.

After the Low Countries and France had been overrun, the British Expeditionary Force pushed into the sea and Nazi-Germany practically established as the master of the whole European Continent, the military leaders of the Resistance who had warned that Hitler's aggression would result in catastrophe, appeared to be fools. Allen Dulles rightly states in his book "Germany's Underground", it would now require an actual catastrophe to break the spell which Hitler had cast over the German people and the German Army.

Such a catastrophe did not occur until Stalingrad, two and one-half years later. Until then there was no chance of bringing about a military revolt. The Resistance leaders tried here and there to stir up feeling amongst the generals but did not get anywhere. In fact, efforts had to be started a-new, and new methods and approaches had to be found to reach our goal, which was to remove Hitler and then to enter into peace negotiations on decent terms. In this connection the efforts of both Protestant and Catholic churchmen, apart from those of others, should be mentioned, who through the Bishop of Cichester and through the Vatican tried to create understanding abroad, especially with the British and American Governments, for the precarious position and for the requirements for help to the resistance movement in Germany. Unfortunately, they met with very little success. I should mention here, above all, the protestant pastor Bonhoeffer and the Catholic Bishop of Munster, Count Galen, whose fighting sermons from the pulpit were secretly distributed all over Germany and gave courage to Catholics and Protestants alike. These churchmen, through their teaching, formed the binding element between the different sections of the German Opposition. Pastor Bonhoeffer was hanged during the purge after the abortive attempt on Hitler's life in July 1944.

Another remarkable fact should be mentioned here. The idea of a military uprising continued to be a topic of discussion amongst the opposition leaders and the ranking army generals who readily discussed plans of revolt with these men but never betrayed their names. They just lacked the courage to go along and do what they probably all knew to be the right thing to do. They, with a few exceptions lacked the spiritual and intellectual greatness of military leaders of the Past. Therefore, still worse times were to come before the psychological conditions were created for another, then desperate, effort to revolt against the Evil which Hitler represented.

Switzerland 1940- 1942

After my return from The Hague, early in June 1940, I reported to the Personnel Department. I was informed that I had to be kept out of the sight of Ribbentrop who had it in for me. No wonder, in view of my reports from The Hague of which he had been told by the head of the Press Department, who did not like me either. After a short leave of absence, Herr von Weizsacker, the Secretary of State sent me to the Legation in Berne, where I was to take over the Economic Department. It was a matter of course for me there to renew my close contact with Theo Kordt concerning his task of reporting on Great Britain which was the same as the one which I had while in The Hague. I learned of the talks between Kordt and the British Embassy which, after the offensive in the West, had not been taken up again.. In the following months and years I heard of further unceasing and wearisome efforts on the part of the Secretary of State and his friends in the Resistance, to persuade the hesitating and wavering generals to stage a revolt. All these attempts remained fruitless until, during the second half of the war, preparations were started which led to the events of July 20th., 1944, of which I shall speak in a moment. Nevertheless, as early as 1940 during my stay in Berne, I succeeded in creating a favorable channel for communications of the Resistance to the other side through entertaining close and friendly relations with Leland Harrison, the American Minister in Berne and his First Secretary, Donald Bigelow. This, contrary to express directives from Ribbentrop and express instructions from my Minister in Berne. These relations were not interrupted by the outbreak of the war between Germany and the United States. So I tried to make my American friends understand- this was before the declaration of War by Hitler on the U.S. - that an early peace seemed only possible to me if there were to be a military

rising against Hitler and his regime, in Germany. Thus, if Britain were interested in a German revolution which would replace the nazis by a democratic and decent Government- but which could only take the form of a military rising since the Army was the only body holding weapons- one would have to adopt a certain measure of caution in the otherwise thoroughly justified slogan of the battle against militarism, the annihilation of which had quite recently been announced by Churchill for the first time, as a war aim of the Allies, second to that of the destruction of National-Socialism. I continued by saying that the generals, who were prepared to revolt could hardly be called militarists, but that they would feel concerned by an out and out declaration of war against militarism, a fact which would hamper them in their decision. We also tried to let certain ideas be known in Great Britain through Professor Paul Keller, a Swiss diplomat whom we met before his departure to London. The main purpose of these talks was to let the other side know that Kordt and I considered a military rising still possible, that there were tremendous difficulties to overcome, but that we did not doubt that it would happen eventually....

Like in The Hague, where I used my official position and assignment to counteract the war policy of the Hitler Government by sending reports which were to serve the purposes of the German Resistance, my official position and assignment in Berne as head of the Economic Department of the Legation, enabled me to counteract, to a certain extent, the intentions of those who directed the economic warfare in Berlin. My main task at the Legation in Berne was to supervise and control Swiss exports by means of Landcerts, which corresponded to the British and American Navy-certs, for certain Swiss goods which were to be shipped to neutral and allied countries and had to pass through Germany or Italy or territories occupied by German or Italian troops. I also had the authority for issuing licenses for other Swiss goods in excess of certain quotas. I tried to handle my job with the utmost consideration of Swiss interests. In this connection, I consciously exposed myself to the danger of antagonizing certain Party and military authorities in Germany who, on the basis of my accounts and by other means, could check up on the way in which I carried out my duties. My own policy for my work was, to safeguard German interest in a moderate and democratic manner and to do my share in keeping Switzerland economically sound during the war. In fact, within the scope of my extremely far-reaching powers, I could have hampered and restricted the Swiss Export Trade and brought about its stagnation through a strict handling of my consignment powers. Such an attitude of mine would have greatly harmed the Swiss economy and perhaps have ruined many of its branches. Such a handling of my job would have found the full approval of those in charge of economic warfare in Berlin since it would have undoubtedly resulted in certain advantages for Germany for the duration of the war. Being aware of, and feeling responsible for the needs of the economy of Switzerland, and acting accordingly, I entertained the hope and, indeed, expected that a stable Swiss economy would, after the termination of the war, be able and willing to make a considerable contribution towards the economic re-organization of Europe, including Germany. In this conclusion I was right. If I am correctly informed, Switzerland, since the war, has concluded over 60 trade agreements with other countries including the German Federal Republic, and has, all in all, given credits to other countries passing the twelve hundred million Franc mark. A most remarkable contribution by such a small country to the reconstruction of Europe. I knew that my Secretary of State fully approved of my policy in the execution of my duties, and I was convinced that he would cover me if I were to encounter difficulties through my attitude towards Switzerland which was so much in opposition to that of the top people in the Nazi Government.---

But Switzerland was my journey's end. My wife, who is American, and I were, by now, suspected by both the Gestapo and certain military, of political unreliability and anti-National-Socialist activities. In view of what I have told you to-night, these suspicions were not unfounded. On various occasions, the most serious charges had been raised against us. At the end of 1942 I was suddenly called from Berne to Berlin. I was questioned, but apparently no proof had been established against me. Upon Ribbentrop's orders, I was not to be allowed any more to work abroad, the reason given was: because of my wife being American. I was a marked person, and therefore not any more in a position where I could be of help to the Opposition. I then decided to leave Berlin and its dangerous atmosphere. I took long leave without pay. In April 1944 I was drafted into the Army and after five weeks training I was sent to the Eastern front. While a soldier, I was dismissed by Ribbentrop from the Foreign Service. While somewhere on the Eastern Front, steadily retreating before the advancing Russians, I learned of the last but also unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life. The Revolt which was planned for the first time in 1938 when it would have been successful- but did not because of Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler- finally took place. A bomb which was placed by Count Stauffenberg, an officer in the General Staff who had attended a conference at Hitler's Headquarters in East Prussia, had exploded but Hitler was not killed. Stauffenberg who had watched the explosion and thought Hitler dead, flew to Berlin, only there to learn that Hitler was still alive. General Beck and Stauffenberg wanted to go on. Orders of the Revolutionary Command which had occupied the War Ministry in Berlin, to the Commanders in other parts of the Reich and in the occupied territories, were followed by counter-orders from Hitler's Headquarters. Utter confusion reigned everywhere, except in Paris, where General von Stulpnagel had been successful in arresting all who were to be arrested. But when the evening of this fateful day came the cause of the revolutionaries was lost. Stauffenberg was shot on the spot. So were others. Beck shot himself. A purge swept over the country, it is said that 35,000 people- amongst them 3,000 officers- were arrested, tortured to extract more names, shot or hanged or put into concentration camps.... So ended the one big up-rising against Hitler and his regime. The Elite of the German people was liquidated.- They were the men of whom Churchill has said not long ago, " They were the real heroes on the German side".

Now what is to be learned from this. It is that, if freedom is suppressed as it was in Hitler's police state, there will always be men who fight against such suppression, who are prepared to risk their lives for liberty's sake. It is the same spirit that was rampant in the fathers of the American Revolution, it is the spirit of a Tom Payne, of a Patrick Henry, which was alive in those men in Germany whose religious and patriotic conscience drove them to try to rid Germany, to rid Europe, to rid all mankind of a tyrant who, in my opinion, was Anti-Christ. and who was then, finally, struck by God.

Wm. M. Seligman