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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
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INTERVIEW: GENERAL GALLAND

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INTERVIEW SUMMARY: GENERAL GALLAND

Part I - 4 June 1945

PILOT TRAINING

- A. Pilot basic training was 60 to 80 hours.
- B. Pre-Fighter Pilot Schools - 15 to 20 hours.
 1. Duration of training - 4-6 weeks.
 2. Only 15 hours in final combat fashion.
- C. Total hours training of pilots.
 1. Beginning of war 160 - 180 hours.
 2. End of war 100 - 120 hours.
- D. Result of training.
 1. Sufficient up to 1943.
 2. Obviously insufficient after 1943.
- E. Peace-time training enabled GAF survive Battle of Britain.
 1. Training in replacement units was haphazard.
 2. Two or three check flights.
 3. One replacement to every experienced Squadron Leader.
- F. Minimum standards of performance.
 1. Weather standards for flying units contained in complicated charts containing degree of clouds.
 2. Minimum with regard to visibility and ceiling.
 - a. Visibility was 1.5 Km.
 - b. Ceiling depended on degree of coverage.
- G. Group Captains responsible for formations taking to the air.
 1. If Group Captains refused, next lower unit Commander, if willing, would lead formations with G.C.'s in rear.
 2. Galland not pleased with these conditions.
- H. Galland's resume of deterioration of GAF training in 1944.
 1. Losses demanded that units be staffed with large numbers of young Pilots who only had 10 hours combat training.
 2. Three times GAF tried this method to keep Fighter force up to 1200.

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3. Plans were made to have 3700 fighters for combat in December, 1944. This never materialized as Bastogne offensive used up all German fighters.

- (1) Under this plan, losses anticipated were 1.2 to 1.5 per bomber shot down.
- (2) There were to be: 24 Wings, divided into four (4) groups, with each group having 16 planes.
- (3) Minimum combat strength of each Wing was to be 50 planes.
- (4) Hitler three times sent these defensive planes to the West against Goering's better judgment.

I. Pay of Pilots.

- I. 1. Flying Tech Sgt. had 70 marks per month more than Army Tech Sgt.
2. Lump sum if unmarried was 220 marks.
3. Luftwaffe obtained more medals than other branches.
4. Generals behind desks received most medals, but Galland states that this did not influence morale and efficiency of Luftwaffe.
5. Luftwaffe had particular rations and rest homes; and 1200-1500 marks of compulsory insurance.
6. Losses during Battle of Britain did not effect morale.
7. Great losses in 1944 did not effect morale of younger pilots.
8. Losses increased from accidents, but did not effect morale.
9. In 1944, GAF had two casualties from accidents per 25 Fighter Pilots. Also combat accidents increased, caused by introductions of new engines. No influence on morale.
10. Allied Bomber attacks on cities did not influence morale of fighter arm.

OPERATIONS

A. October, 1944, a rejuvenated fighter formation over Germany.

1. 800 fighters with reserve planned three attacks:

- a. Via North Sea.
- b. Bhansteig Drei.
- c. Not mentioned.

2. Final plan to have 3000 fighters oppose Allies, 3000 missions.

- a. Awaiting good weather for this plan to be consummated.
- b. Insane offensive in Eiffel made this mission impossible.

B. G.A.F. fighter pilots started experiencing great losses the middle of 1943.

1. Standard of training insufficient.
2. Sufficient to fight bombers not allied fighters.
3. In 1942 - 5% losses of fighter planes and 12-15% in material.
4. End of 1944 - 80-90% in material and 30% losses in personnel.

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- C. Galland states that aerial war over Germany won by fighters exclusively.
 - 1. G.A.F. fighter pilots lacked quality.
 - 2. Best manpower went to S.S.
 - 3. Weakest point in training was instrument flying and bad weather flying.
 - 4. In 1945 instrument and bad weather flying was emphasized but GAF fighters were never successful in this field.
- D. Allied day and night attacks disrupted the distribution of personnel and material for day and night fighter groups.
 - 1. No women used in training.
 - 2. Furlough system of GAF pilots was left to individual commanders and surgeons.
 - 3. Pilots not allowed to have wife or fiancee live within 30-50 km. of station.
- E. 12 KH bombs were most effective against airdromes.
 - 1. Allies should have tried to damage the lower layers of the earth with larger bombs.
 - 2. Allied attacks on airdromes in France prior to invasion limited the range and flying distance and maximum range of GAF Fighter arm.
 - 3. GAF had 40 jet planes.
 - () Allied air superiority prevented effectiveness.
- F. More mobility in Allied escort protection would have further thwarted GAF defense tactics.
 - 1. British spoofing attacks had good effect.
 - 2. Attacks at low altitudes with machine gun fire had good effects.

MANPOWER

- A. Many conflicts between command of Luftwaffe, Army and Navy.
- B. S.S. control supply of manpower.
- C. Luftwaffe could not replace their great losses in manpower from Army or Navy.
- D. The enthusiasm of Luftwaffe personnel for National Socialism was luke warm compared to the men in Army or Navy.

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INTERVIEW SUMMARY: GENERAL GALLAND

Part II - 7 June 1945

GERMAN AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT

- A. Start of war, GAF planes had more speed and rising ability than British aircraft.
- B. In 1940 German planes had small penetration ability.
- C. Fighters had only 1½ total flying time.
- D. This was greatest disadvantage when it came to the problem of rendezvous with their bombers.
- E. First FW 190 with "801" sent to front in Spring of 1941. Better maneuverability than "109" and the Spitfire. Engine had "diseases".
- F. FW 190 altitude was greatest defect.
- G. In 1943, mass production on this plane with the "605" was started.
- H. Rapid change in air war called for new programs and new schedules.

PRODUCTION

- A. Mass production on any one suitable fighter could not be realized.
 - 1. Constant change of plans.
 - 2. Dispersal.
 - 3. Bombing.
- B. Construction grew worse.
 - 1. Assembly lines interrupted.
 - 2. No assembly halls.
 - 3. This was due to air attacks.
- C. 1944 program for Fighters called for 5000 per month.
 - 1. Was never reached.
 - 2. Plans changed weekly.
 - (1) Due to elimination of unsatisfactory types and destruction of plants.
- D. Hitler responsible for fighter emergency program which called for HE 177's & "Tank 152".
 - 1. Goering did not agree but always gave in.

AIRCRAFT AND PILOT STRENGTH

- A. Ratio between monthly losses and planes ready at front.
 - 1. Losses in last 4 months of 1944 increased to 80-90%.
- B. Fighters available at front.
 - 1. Jan. 1944 - 1800
 - 2. Nov. 1944 - 5700
- C. Attacks on airfields.
 - 1. Time of invasion plane losses in France were mainly caused on airdromes.
 - 2. Loss thru bombers.
 - 3. Fighter low level attacks.
- D. Training of pilots determined in 1944 by the amount of fuel available.
 - 1. 1944 August, pilots in final stages of training was 1500.
 - 2. Fighter pilot schools, 9000.
 - 3. Basic pilot school, 20,000.
 - 4. A fighter pilot training program was never really accentuated until 1944.
 - 5. Hitler deemed attack more important than defense.

TACTICS

- A. 3 to 4 squadrons of fighters usually employed against bombers.
- B. From 20-50 planes.
- C. Combat altitude, 9000 meters.
- D. Attempt was made to avoid allied fighters.
- E. Then decision was made to fight a defensive battle only.
- F. Fighters demanded two escort groups.
- G. Escorts made mistake when they waited for Allies to make the attack.
- H. Luftwaffe could not successfully attack our bombers while assembling at high altitudes.
 - 1. A large amount of Allied fighters operating above bad weather caused GAF defenders greatest difficulty.
- I. Allied long range fighters astounded GAF.
 - 1. Allied bombing thru clouds could not be effectively halted because of Allied fighter protection.

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VULNERABILITY OF GERMAN ARMS PRODUCTION

A. Order of Vulnerability.

1. Oil.
2. Railways.
3. Plane production.
4. Luftwaffe's losses were greater thru bombing than from combat.
5. Tactical and strategic attacks overlapped each other in order of importance.
6. Allies should have attacked transportation system earlier than the industrial plants.
7. Bombing of cities had little military significance.

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466. Immediately afterwards, GÖRING called what came to be known as the Luftwaffe Parliament at the Luftkriegsakademie at Gatow. About 30 officers of high rank and influence met for three days to discuss ways and means of rebuilding the Luftwaffe. Amazingly enough, no officer from the all-important Führungsstab was invited.

467. GÖRING began with a speech saying that HITLER had commissioned him to rebuild the Luftwaffe and that he wanted advice. The 30 were to discuss who was to be replaced, what was to be done, and who was to do it. He said they were free to criticise anyone and everyone, except himself, because HITLER had appointed him and there was therefore no reason to mention him. GÖRING then appointed PELZ chairman and left.

468. Personal feuds soon made the meeting a chaos. Three groups appeared: the bomber, the fighters and the National Sozialistische Führungs group (made up of representatives of the special corps of political commissars which the Nazi Party sent into every flying unit). The individuals aligned themselves in this manner:-

Bombers:- PELZ, HERGMANN, Kraft von DEFFENSINGEN, BRÄUCHITSCH, SCHUBERT, DIESING, KNEEMAYER, BAUMBACH and MILLER.
 Fighters:- SCHMID, HÄRLINGHAUSEN, TRAUHOPT, LÜTZOW, STREIB, von HALZAHN, ROEDER, WISSE and GALLAND.
 U.S.F.Os.:- Von KLOSINSKI, STAUB and COLLOB.

469. The bomber people proposed a scheme of strategic bombing which sounded absurd to GALLAND. The fighters stuck to demands for a bigger force and the cancellation of almost all other Luftwaffe activity. The U.S.F.Os. demanded a renewal of Nazi fanaticism, and insisted that all formation leaders be made at once to attend a four weeks' course of political indoctrination. Finally chits were passed about for recommendations of people to be discharged and the feuds came to the boil.

470. The meeting ended with nothing accomplished. The Parliament broke up with mistrust, personal enmity, and confusion enhanced and with discipline dangerously damaged. The Führungsstab felt seriously slighted. The entire proceedings were taken down in shorthand and reported to GÖRING.

ARDENNES OFFENSIVE.

471. By now GALLAND was on the way out and PELZ was in the ascendant. GALLAND was no longer invited to official conferences and was rarely asked for advice; it is no doubt true that he saw that the war was lost and had no more heart to lead the Jagdwaffe.

472. His last official duty of any moment was the transfer of the fighter units to the West to prepare for the Ardennes offensive. Luftflotte Reich wanted to arrange the fighter units fan-shaped all along the Western border of Germany, but GALLAND prevailed upon them to arrange the units back from the border in depth so they could give each other mutual cover in flights to and from the battle zone.

473. GALLAND himself took no part in the operations of the Fighter Arm during and after the Ardennes offensive. These matters are dealt with in A.D.I.(K) 245/1945. GALLAND toured the Gruppen in the West and wrote a report which was highly critical of PELZ, who by this time was in command of Jagdkorps II, controlling all the fighter units in the West.

474. Egon control, as well as Benito, was extensively used and found satisfactory and fighter missions were planned as exactly as bomber missions, with courses, altitudes, and areas to be patrolled laid out in great detail, allowing formation leaders no initiative to utilise the tactical situation to their own advantage. The long-awaited F.W. 190D with Junkers 211 in-line engine now appeared in action