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Richard Sorge

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

ZS/A-32/10-1

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 2

AUGUST 9, 14, 16, 20, 22, AND 23, 1951

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Institut für Zeitgeschichte – Archiv

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee has before it this morning General Willoughby. The Chair wishes to say to the general that his fine service in the armed services of the United States and in the Intelligence Department of the Army especially is well known to his countrymen, but never did he render a more worthy service, nor one more needed for the welfare and protection of this country, than to make known to this committee and to the people anything that savors of internal danger to this Government and to the American way of life.

The Chair wishes to congratulate the general for his presence here, and we feel certain that beneficial results will flow from his expression of his knowledge of the subject.

The general will be sworn.

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General WILLOUGHBY. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES A. WILLOUGHBY, MAJOR GENERAL, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, FAR EAST COMMAND AND UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, will you give your full name and your present military status to the committee?

General WILLOUGHBY. Charles A. Willoughby, major general, on duty as Chief of Intelligence of the Far East Command and the United Nations Command at this present time. I am under retirement procedures for disability and length of service.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, when do you expect to be separated from the service?

General WILLOUGHBY. Presumably on or about September 1.

Mr. MORRIS. General, what was your last military assignment?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have been General MacArthur's director of military intelligence on his immediate staff since the fall of 1939 without interruption.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in the Philippines with the general at the time of the Japanese attack?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; I was on duty in the same capacity with General MacArthur.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make the retreat from Bataan to Australia?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; I was one of the small group of staff officers selected to accompany him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make the subsequent invasion trek back through New Guinea on to the southwest Pacific and back into Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; I served throughout this period now known as the Campaign of the Southwest Pacific Area.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, what position did you hold with the occupation forces in Tokyo?

General WILLOUGHBY. The same as during the campaign, that is, chief of military intelligence with the understanding that the expanded staff of General MacArthur assumed occupation or civil, primarily civil, duties under SCAP, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General Willoughby, how did your duties divide functionally while you held that position?

General WILLOUGHBY. In general terms the division of functions would continue the normal military surveillance but would assume another aspect dealing with the internal security of Japan. A rough distinction would be between military and civil intelligence, and we use that term frequently—that is, the term "civil intelligence."

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, here in the United States the duties of the FBI are the internal security and not necessarily the Army?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But over in Japan the Army took on both the functions as if they were active in the capacity of an FBI; is that about what happened?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir; I concur with your definition.

I would say that under civil intelligence we had developed agencies similar to the FBI in America, known in Japan as the Counterintelligence Service.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, while you were occupying that position which you just described, did you come into the custody of the Richard Sorge espionage documents?

General WILLOUGHBY. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances of your coming into the possession of these documents?

General WILLOUGHBY. Under the general provisions of the Potsdam declaration we released a number of so-called political prisoners. In that group we discovered shortly that there were the remnants of an international espionage ring who were then serving varied sentences. The foreign nationals who profited by this political amnesty became especially interesting.

One case was that of Max Klausen, who turned out to be the radio operator of this ring. When this man disappeared via the Soviet Embassy, we realized that we were confronted with an espionage case of great significance.

In examining the court records pertaining to this trial—and I may say that it was a trial by civil court unconnected with the Japanese Army or Navy—we encountered a number of American Communists, second-generation Nisei with long residence in California.

Obviously this link with America made it mandatory that we make a thorough examination of this entire operation.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, were all the exhibits and all the evidence concerning this espionage ring found in court records or were they to be found some place else?

General WILLOUGHBY. They were initially based on a translation of the court records supported by interrogation by us, postwar, of the judges, the investigating officers, the Attorney General, and other Japanese officials charged with this case.

In addition, we made independent postwar interrogations of the members, that is, the remaining members of this espionage ring, to verify the fact that their statements voluntarily and without pressure by the occupation would coincide with the statements previously rendered to the Japanese authorities.

One notable statement to which I invite your attention is that of Teitchi Kawai, a still living eyewitness to all the activities of the principals in this case, especially Ozaki Hotsumi, Smedley, and Stein.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Smedley an American?

General WILLOUGHBY. Smedley was an American citizen.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was Stein?

General WILLOUGHBY. Stein was a British citizen, acquired citizenship in Hong Kong in 1941, an itinerant journalist of some reputation in oriental affairs who is thoroughly implicated in this case. If the fact is not known to you, he was arrested by the French secret police this spring, the Sûreté Nationale, on the advice of the French Embassy. The charges were espionage, and he was deported.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you learn this through official channels?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Like all police agencies, we are in intimate liaison with international police bureaus and there is a continuous mutual exchange of information.

Mr. MORRIS. You say, General, that Guenther Stein was arrested for espionage in France in 1950?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir. The significance that I personally attach to it is that when the initial report was released in February of 1949, Guenther Stein disappeared and has not been heard of since that period except in connection with his arrest by the Paris police.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Guenther Stein in prison in Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. No; he was not present at the time the espionage ring came to the notice of the Japanese police; otherwise, he would have been arrested. I will deal with his implication a little later on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I at this point point out that the reason we are stressing Mr. Stein as this particular time, if we are stressing him, is that we had testimony from Edward C. Carter, who was the head of the Institute of Pacific Relations, that Guenther

Stein was the Chungking correspondent for the Institute of Pacific Relations in China, and that in addition he was the British delegate to the Hot Springs conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations which was held in 1945.

There are other activities of Guenther Stein which Mr. Mandel will later in in this session introduce in the record, but the significance of our dwelling on this particular name is that Guenther Stein was one of the IPR personnel whom General Willoughby encountered in his scrutiny of the Richard Sorge case.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the same individual referred to by Mr. Carter?

Mr. MORRIS. That is the same individual, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, what reason do you have to believe that these Richard Sorge espionage records are authentic?

General WILLOUGHBY. As an investigating officer of some experience, I was of course convinced of their authenticity from the start, accepting the court records as evidence. However, in view of the inferential repudiation of my initial report as of February 1949, the Headquarters in Tokyo decided to go over the entire mass of documents and employing outstanding American, British, and Japanese lawyers then on duty at Headquarters in Tokyo.

I would like to briefly quote, Mr. Chairman, and make reference to the action, opinions, and reports of these lawyers, known as consecutive exhibit No. 12.

Senator FERGUSON. General, you made a report to the Army in 1939 on this espionage case, did you not?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It received some publicity in America, did it not?

General WILLOUGHBY. So I understand.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not that was ever recalled, or what happened to that report?

General WILLOUGHBY. If I interpret your question correctly, Senator, the report was filed by us, meaning the Headquarters in Tokyo, as a normal intelligence or internal security report of which there were many in the period. They decided to publish, to release it because it compared most favorably with the then notorious Canadian espionage case. We made, of course, no objection. Reports, which we file in Washington, are available to them at their discretion.

Senator FERGUSON. At least you figured that the release of this report would not affect adversely our security, either internally or in our foreign relations?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have rather a feeling that it would contribute toward the internal security by unmasking certain techniques, procedures, habits of the clandestine fraternity with which you are dealing.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was then released; is that correct?

General WILLOUGHBY. It was released.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it ever withdrawn?

General WILLOUGHBY. Not by us.

Senator FERGUSON. By anybody?

General WILLOUGHBY. Actually there was what I would term an indirect repudiation based solely on Agnes Smedley's protestation at the time, including a threat of libel.

Senator FERGUSON. Agnes Smedley was an American citizen? I asked you that before.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And she was mentioned in the report?

General WILLOUGHBY. Heavily implicated.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any reasons or to this day have you any reasons to believe that anything that was said about or in connection with Agnes Smedley in that report to the Army was not a fact?

General WILLOUGHBY. I take the same position today that I took in 1949 or at the time the report was prepared. Whatever was stated then is a fact which I am prepared to testify to, and I am about, in the quotation of this legal investigation, to give you the professional juridical views.

Senator FERGUSON. I anticipated that, but I wanted to clear the record first so that it would be clear that this was a report that was issued by your office and sent to Washington, it was released, it was then withdrawn under a so-called or, as you had learned, a threat of libel suit because of one person mentioned in it.

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And then I wanted to see whether the fact was that there was any change in your attitude as to the truthfulness or accuracy of that report, and I find that there is not.

General WILLOUGHBY. I concur with your statement, sir, in its entirety.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask one question there? You say they withdrew it. Whom do you mean by "they"?

General WILLOUGHBY. The War Department public relations officer, in my recollection, as well as officials of the Secretary of War's office, then under Mr. Royall, indicated that this report should never have been published. I am at the moment not familiar with the exact phraseology but, roughly speaking, that was the statement and the intent.

The result was that no action was taken on this report. Smedley never sued for libel, though her legal representative, Mr. Rogge, threatened to do that; and the case died, you might say, because of lack of further attention.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, the publicity that could be given to that was limited because of threats of libel. Now you do not feel, do you, or do you feel as a general in the Intelligence Division that anything that you are going to say here in relation to Smedley in this report can in any way affect adversely our internal or external security?

General WILLOUGHBY. In the sense of adversely you mean the publication of data?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. Indeed not. On the contrary, anything that I say this morning—and I am in complete sympathy with the purposes of this committee—will tend to clarify, to support, to add contributory evidence to the very courses that are now under your scrutiny and investigation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out since we have mentioned the name of Agnes Smedley that we have introduced evidence of her activity with the Institute of Pacific Relations and for that reason we are dwelling on that fact.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the same Agnes Smedley referred to by witnesses who have testified here before this committee previously?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I might point out that Mrs. Paul Massing has testified that she knew that Agnes Smedley was a member of the Communist Party and a member of the Soviet espionage ring of her knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore I think it is pertinent to this particular inquiry. It is not like taking an outside name.

Mr. MORRIS. General, you were about to read from the documents of the Sorge case.

General WILLOUGHBY. In line with your thought, senator, as to the quality of this evidence and in view of this, shall we say inferential repudiation, as I stated, we employed the best legal American talent then available in Tokyo to go over this entire mass of evidence running into perhaps more than a million words and thousands of photostatic exhibits, and this is the deliberate statement, opinion, and conclusion of these high-ranking American lawyers in important legal positions:

LEGAL OPINIONS OF DOCUMENTARY AUTHENTICATIONS IN THE SORGE CASE

We, the undersigned, fully realizing that certain processes and procedures are necessary for the authentication or verification of documentary evidence before they may be introduced in courts of record of the United States or be used as a basis for evidence, have examined the methods and procedures used for the authentication and verification of the documents listed in the following six pages—

meaning the raw material of the Sorge case—

and after having duly considered the testimony of witnesses and having examined their written statements and interrogations together with their seals and signatures appended thereto, have arrived at the conclusion that the authentication and verification of the documents, including the statements from witnesses, are in accordance with existing law and procedures.

We therefore certify that it is our opinion that the authentication and verification of each of the several documents mentioned is legally sufficient to give legal standing to their full use within the scope of the rules of civil procedures for the courts of the United States or foreign courts adhering to Anglo-American jurisprudence.

It is our further opinion that:

(a) The authentications herein referred to are good, sufficient, and legal identifications to the documents to which they relate.

(b) That such records and documents are sufficiently authenticated to permit their full use before any court of record subject to the limitations imposed by the prevailing rules of evidence, and, finally, that the procedures and methods employed in the authentication of the documents herein referred to are those that are normally used in the preparation of documents to be used for the same identical purposes for which these documents are or may hereafter be intended.

Now the signatures to that document are: J. Woodall Greene, member of the Maryland bar; J. S. Carusi, member of the Connecticut bar; Franklin E. N. Warren, member of the Oklahoma bar and member of the New Mexico bar; and finally, E. V. A. de Becker and Rokuro Yusami, a firm of international Tokyo lawyers who are members of the Middle Temple of London and members of the Inner Temple of London.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of that, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. I will have to check that date, but it is roughly in the spring of 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it after the withdrawal of the Smedley report?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then was there any reaffirmation or publication of the Sorge-Smedley report, or whatever we call it?

General WILLOUGHBY. Not since that date.

Senator FERGUSON. Not since that date, notwithstanding that these civilian lawyers gave this opinion after a thorough examination of all of the evidence that went into the making of that report?

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct.

Having presented to you, Mr. Chairman, this reputable American legal opinion, I would like to continue and state the conclusions which these very men arrived at because they are pertinent to the entire juridical quality of this case. I am now speaking of the same men and, for your clarification, they were members of the legal sections of the Far East Command in the Civil Affairs Department. They practiced their profession then, their technical knowledge in legal channels continuously.

I am now reading the end part of their conclusions, which is again a numbered exhibit. By amicable arrangement with Mr. Morris, counsel, these cross references are entirely known to him and available. When I speak of exhibits 12 and 20 he knows exactly where they are and can lay his hands on them. This is what these able and impartial lawyers have to say:

Based upon our examination of the documents listed immediately heretofore, it is the opinion of the undersigned that these evidences establish proof that Richard Sorge and his associates were espionage agents for the Russian Army and that Agnes Smedley and Guenther Stein are Communists in mind, spirit, and practice, and that they were actively and knowingly connected with the Sorge spy ring in China and Japan; and we are further of the opinion that the strong chain of evidence fully and conclusively supports the intelligence report entitled "The Sorge Spy Ring," dated December 15, 1947, a case study of international espionage in the Far East, and that such evidence amply justifies its submission to the Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army, by the G-2 of the Far East Command.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, do you have anything there on the element of coercion, the freedom from coercion?

General WILLOUGHBY. I am glad you asked this question, Mr. Morris. I do.

As part of this smear campaign, to use this slightly objectionable term, in the wake of my initial publication of this report, Smedley—although I am reluctant to bring up the name of a dead woman because she is merely a type and there are hundreds of others—at that time it was immediately charged that this was an illegal court procedure. They suggested that the Japanese Army in its known cruelty was involved and that whatever testimony was obtained was under pressure, under duress, under torture.

This element, which, of course, is one of defense, was so important that we made unusual efforts, that is, the legal group which I have just listed, to determine that that element was lacking. So, we obtained the affidavit through personal interrogation by the American lawyers of the attorney general of Japan, Mr. Yoshikawa Mitsusada.

It may be of interest to the chairman to know that this attorney general is now in the States. He is on an investigative or educational journey sponsored by both the American and Japanese Governments, and is in Washington. It is my understanding that he will be interrogated by another congressional committee.

SENATOR FERGLSON. Of course, he had first-hand knowledge of this Sorge case?

General WILLOUGHBY. Quite.

SENATOR FERGLSON. Because he was connected with it?

General WILLOUGHBY. Directly connected with it.

May I refer—merely a concession to age and faltering memory—to selected quick references? All of them are familiar to your counsel. These are my personal comments or briefs superimposed over perhaps 50 to 100 typewritten pages, abbreviated in order to assist not only this committee and their research staff but also the Washington authorities.

This affidavit—

I say—

is an affidavit by a Japanese Government official who was an attorney in the Tokyo district criminal court and interrogated Sorge in preliminary hearings in October 1941. The significance of this affidavit lies in the fact that Yoshikawa employed no irregular means of duress, third degree, or torture as the Smedley Innocent in her press statement at the time implied with a view of discrediting from the outset the quality of these important eyewitness statements, reports, and interrogation. The court was a normal constituted civil court. There was no pressure by the Army or Navy. The document in case was retained by Mr. Yoshikawa, as it was a corrected or edited copy of certain portions of the basic Sorge statement, and thus escaped destruction by burning as many documents were in our area of bombardments that destroyed important Japanese official buildings.

The further significance of the affidavit in substantiating the general court record is a clear picture this statement gives of the international character of Sorge's espionage ring in Tokyo and Shanghai, its military, strategic, political, and social objectives, its evident connection with the Moscow center, the Comintern, and the Soviet Army intelligence bureau.

For our purpose, if I understand Mr. Morris correctly, the emphasis is not so much on contents in addition to other evidence but the fact that no duress, no irregular means of coercion, no third degree, or torture, were applied in obtaining these statements or confessions.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, I wonder if you will tell us in general the make-up and the purpose of the Richard Sorge Soviet spy ring. Who, for instance, was Richard Sorge?

General WILLOUGHBY. While this has been fairly well covered by the press at one time or another—

SENATOR FERGLSON. I really think, Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of the record it should be placed in the record.

General WILLOUGHBY. Though we are merely scratching the surface, I will give my own version of this case.

Richard Sorge was a Soviet professional spy working under instruction of the fourth section—that is intelligence—of the Soviet army. He went to China in 1930 under cover as a legitimate journalist. As an aside or footnote, you will find that all of these agents somehow use an otherwise honorable profession, that of journalism, as their cover. You will find Stein being arrested in Paris as the correspondent of the Hindustani News.

You find Smedley operating as a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung. You find Sorge appearing as the correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung. He operated both in Shanghai and Tokyo. He obtained the collaboration of Miss Agnes Smedley, who, in turn,

introduced him to several coworkers of various nationalities—American, German, Chinese, and Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. When did he start this and when did he go there? Is that date given?

General WILLOUGHBY. That date is contained accurately in the exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. About what year?

General WILLOUGHBY. Between 1930 and 1940. He operated in Shanghai in 1930, moved to Tokyo in 1936, remained there until 1941, until his arrest and the subsequent development of this case.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Smedley used principally in China rather than Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. She was used principally in China, and so was Guenther Stein. For that reason testimony concerning those two is primarily with activities on the China mainland. There is, however, as I will develop further, an important link, in fact the link with the Japanese operations. That is in the person of Ozaki, a very interesting individual whom Smedley procured as a recruit and introduced to Sorge in China. So there is your link between the China mainland and the Japanese background.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out at this time that Mr. Ozaki was in 1936 the Japanese council delegate to the IPR conference at Yosemite?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. That makes Ozaki doubly interesting to this committee specializing in the quality of the membership of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Ozaki is a type member in good standing of the Institute of Pacific Relations in his days.

Senator FERGUSON. Not to change the subject, but did you run into the Institute of Pacific Relations when you were going over this case?

General WILLOUGHBY. Merely in the recognition that some of the protagonists here were members.

Senator FERGUSON. And were doing work in that organization?

General WILLOUGHBY. Quite.

Senator FERGUSON. That is how it came into the picture?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that is how this all comes into this hearing, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

General WILLOUGHBY. I understand your specialization, entirely meritorious, and I am merely contributing collateral axillary verification.

In order to once more emphasize the character of Sorge's organization—apparatus is the pseudo or Russian term for it—I would like to quote from his diary, duly authenticated reference in the hands of the counsel. This is Sorge speaking:

As head of the Japan spy ring, I was directly affiliated with the central committee of the U. S. S. R. Communist Party. I was also under the fourth bureau (intelligence) of the Red army with respect to the technical aspects of my work and a few subject matter problems.

As I see it—
this is Sorge speaking—

my espionage group should be considered a special arm of the central committee of the U. S. S. R. Communist Party. That was its essential characteristic.

Another distinguishing feature was its technical and organization connection with the fourth bureau (intelligence) of the Red army. The espionage group which I operated in Japan, all of its members have frankly confessed that they were working to advance the cause of communism and not for money or personal gain.

Mr. MORRIS. General, approximately how many members were there in that ring?

General WILLOUGHBY. Fifteen to twenty. While the personnel of this ring varied from time to time, this skillful bank of spies—agents, if you wish—worked for nine productive years before their discovery. The famous Canadian spy case was one of the best examples of this type of espionage. I believe, however, that the Sorge efforts in Tokyo compare most favorably with this famous case.

Senator FERGUSON. How many nationalities were in this ring? Sorge was a German?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Guenther Stein was British?

General WILLOUGHBY. British citizen of German origin.

Senator FERGUSON. Smedley was an American?

General WILLOUGHBY. Was an American.

Senator FERGUSON. Any Canadians?

General WILLOUGHBY. None in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you have the Japanese and the Chinese?

General WILLOUGHBY. And a class that is important in California is the Nisei or ex-California residents who were employed, recruited in this service. There were additional American citizens or applying for citizenship then resident in California in a certain strata of Japanese local population. So that is an additional element of membership.

Senator FERGUSON. They were not in any way, as far as counsel has been able to find out, connected with the IPR?

General WILLOUGHBY. No.

Senator FERGUSON. These California Japanese?

General WILLOUGHBY. No; they are not connected with the IPR, but there are some in conformance to your interest on which I believe Mr. Morris has made a fixation there.

Mr. MORRIS. General, will you in the forthcoming testimony confine your testimony to those four people, at least as much as possible, whom we have mentioned as people who are involved in the Institute of Pacific Relations? Now will you speak very briefly about Hotsumi Ozaki? In the first place, will you tell us, General, what his position in the Soviet spy ring was?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record an excerpt from the handbook of the sixth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which was held at Yosemite National Park in California, August 15 to 29, 1936. There listed among the members and group secretaries of the conference are, Japan, Hotsumi Ozaki, research member, Asahi Institute of the Far East, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun; and, secretaries, IPR, Kinkazu Saionji. They were both listed in the Handbook of the Sixth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I would like that introduced in the record as such.

The CHAIRMAN. How was the handbook secured? How do you identify the handbook?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify the handbook?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the handbook referred to there from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, it may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 81" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 81

[From Handbook For the Sixth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Yosemite National Park, Calif., August 15 to 29, 1935]

MEMBERS AND GROUP SECRETARIES OF THE CONFERENCE

Japan:

Hotsumi Ozaki, research member, Asahi Institute of the Far East, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (p. 49).

Secretaries: IPR: Kinkazu Saionji (p. 50).

General WILLOUGHBY. Do you desire a comment on Ozaki?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, General, if you please.

General WILLOUGHBY. Next to Sorge, Ozaki Hotsumi was by far the most important member of this ring. His death on the gallows with Sorge is somber testimony of his relative importance.

In April 1937 Ozaki became a member of the China section utilized by Prince Konoye, several times Prime Minister of Japan, which placed Ozaki in immediate contact with a most important Japanese governmental circle. This was accentuated when one of his associates in the China section became chief secretary of the first Konoye Cabinet in June 1937.

When the Japanese invaded China in 1937, the Foreign Office—that is the Japanese State Department—set up a special investigative agency to handle north China affairs and Ozaki was designated as a Tokyo liaison representative.

We thus have the picture of Ozaki, secret Communist, Soviet spy, intimate associate of Sorge, to hold first an official position as an adviser to the Japanese Cabinet from 1938 to the fall of the Government, as being attached to the entourage of a Prime Minister; in other words, unusual opportunities to obtain highly top-flight information.

Mr. MORRIS. You know, General, from your own military experience that a man who was chief secretary to a Cabinet is in a very strategic position to obtain information?

General WILLOUGHBY. Of course.

Even more important than his official position, Mr. Chairman, was his friendship with old friends of college days who became very prominent at that time, namely, Ushiba and Tomohaiko Kashi, who were private secretaries to Prince Konoye.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like, Mr. Chairman, the record to show that Ushiba was predecessor of Saionji as secretary to the Japanese council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

General WILLOUGHBY. In these two men were centered the so-called "breakfast group," an informal discussion society of the bright young men around Prince Konoye. When dinners became inconvenient, these men met at breakfast, hence the name "breakfast groups." That

is an informal gathering of the important individuals closely affiliated with the Prime Minister and with the Foreign Office.

The American equivalent would be, if a selected group of State Department advisers were in an informal gathering, having access to usually top-level information. That was the group actually in existence, and we will see presently what they did with their opportunities.

Mr. MORRIS. You say, General, Ozaki was a full-fledged member of this spy ring?

General WILLOUGHBY. That I will demonstrate, or rather it is part of the attestation of the American lawyers long after we had already arrived at that conclusion. He is, next to Sorge, the most important member of this espionage organization.

Senator FERGUSON. General, from your facts are you of the opinion that the Institute of Pacific Relations, that is the Japanese branch, was in effect being used as a spy ring for Russian Communists and the Russian Red army because of the tie-in with the Foreign Minister's office and the others?

General WILLOUGHBY. I think that conclusion can be arrived at because of the membership, the intimacy, the association of those individuals, especially Ozaki, who had an official position and was the representative of the IPR in the Yosemite meeting. That relationship, of course, continued throughout his activity.

Senator FERGUSON. So it gave them a field to work in, the foreign relations of Japan and the foreign relations of America, through the American branch and the international branch of the IPR?

General WILLOUGHBY. I would say that I agree with your conclusions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce into the record at this time and present to the committee at this time a letter from Mr. Edward C. Carter to Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field relating to the two Japanese that General Willoughby has just named, Ushiba and Saionji? Ushiba was secretary of the Japanese council of the IPR, who was succeeded by Saionji as secretary of the Japanese council of the IPR.

Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would authenticate that document and read the pertinent sections in the record.

Mr. MANDEL. I read a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 29, 1938, marked "private and confidential," addressed to Frederick V. Field from Edward C. Carter. The following is an excerpt from the letter:

DEAR FRED: As you know, we began early last autumn trying to get a man of the rank of Ushiba, Matsukata, or Saionji to join the international secretariat. None of these was available, but in January as you know Yasuo was nominated and has proved a very valuable member of the staff. As our work developed, we found that we needed to clear up a great many outstanding questions between the secretariat and the Japanese council, so on May 5 I cabled Dr. Yamakawa as follows:

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is enough. We would like to introduce the entire letter in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be introduced in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 82" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 82

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York, June 29, 1928.

Private and confidential.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR FRED: As you know, we began early last autumn trying to get a man of the rank of Ushiba, Matsukata, or Saionji to join the international secretariat. None of these was available but in January as you know Yasuo was nominated and has proved a very valuable member of the staff. As our work developed, we found that we needed to clear up a great many outstanding questions between the secretariat and the Japanese council, so on May 5, I cabled Dr. Yamakawa as follows:

"Please cable could Saionji come New York for 1 or 2 months this summer to discuss questions arising from Dufoe's letter of February 9. We will pay all expenses."

On May 8, he replied as follows: "Will do best to comply with your request."

Now I have received a cable from Viscount Ishii, reading as follows:

"Japanese council regrets unable agree research project envisaged by international secretariat. In view of importance of problem for institute, Takayanagi sailing on July 16 to discuss matter with you. Circumstances prevent Saionji from leaving."

I have replied to Viscount Ishii as follows:

"Takayanagi most welcome. Hope he can remain at least throughout August and September. Am confident that on studying our plan of work here, he will discover that secretariat project can serve the interests both of Japan and Japanese council."

Ishii cabled Dufoe in a similar vein and Dufoe has asked me to indicate that he cannot see Takayanagi in Winnipeg, owing to the dislocation of his work by the Royal Commission, but suggesting that I urge Takayanagi to come straight through to New York preparatory to going to Lee for the week of August 10 which Dufoe is planning to spend at Lee. That is the only week he can manage to clear for the IPR between now and the end of the year.

I do not think it is in the interest of the IPR, either from the Japanese or the Pacific council point of view to publicize Ishii's cablegram. As I have stated in my reply, I feel that if Takayanagi can come and work with us for several weeks and have the unhurried week at Sunset Farm with Dufoe and others, a great deal of progress can be made.

Of course, we do not know as yet what the Japanese objections are. It may be that they want the secretariat to go ahead but with the record showing that the Japanese council voted against the project. It may be that they want the whole basis of the project altered so that the documentation of the inquiry will be similar to that of an IPR conference, namely, that it will consist in the main of national council contributions. It may be that the reports they have received of the attitude toward the conflict expressed in writing and speech by members of the secretariat makes them feel that the secretariat is incapable of directing an objective study of this sort. It may be that they feel that we made some technical mistakes in procedure in the way the project has been set up.

All of these are at this stage merely surmises on my part. The help that I want from you can be given if you will answer the following questions: (1) Do you think our procedure is sound to urge Takayanagi to come straight through to New York for consultations here just before going to Lee for the round-table conference with Dufoe? (2) If you wish a visit from Takayanagi at Pacific center, would you agree that he might render a greater service if he visited you on his way back to Japan in the autumn, rather than stopping over for a few days on his arrival on the *Chichibu Maru* on July 29? (3) Have you any advice as to whether I should go to San Francisco so as to be on the wharf with you to welcome him and bring him across the continent, or would you be willing to meet his steamer and put him on the first train east?

Takayanagi will doubtless want to have a talk with Aisberg some time while he is in the United States. Enclosed is a letter that I am sending to Aisberg today which is self-explanatory. I am wondering whether it would not be better

for Takayanagi to have his talk with Alsberg after he has cleared matters with Dafoe, inasmuch as Dafoe, in his circular letter of February 9 to the members of the Pacific Council, assumed responsibility for recommending that the secretariat go ahead with the project.

By September, Takayanagi would be in a very much better position to profit fully from Alsberg's sage advice than he might be immediately on landing.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

General WILLOUGHBY. These data that are being furnished on the American IPR are as interesting to me as probably my comments are to you. This is an entirely new field. I regret only that I did not have that information in 1947, 1948, or 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, this committee just received these files within 6 months; these were the private files of the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. These files were taken under subpoena duces tecum and brought from New York here.

General WILLOUGHBY. I must congratulate this committee on its fast and decisive action.

Speaking of Ozaki, in summing up his relation to the Konoye Cabinet, the intimacy with Saionji, whom we will examine under a magnifying glass presently, I would say it is obvious that Ozaki's special position gave him unsurpassed opportunities to learn the exact nature and progress of all principal diplomatic or military projects of the Japanese Government.

Does that clarify the position?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Would you say he was probably the outstanding assistant to Sorge in the espionage ring, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. That has been repeatedly asserted, and he was so recognized in the interrogations and in the official appraisal of the Japanese judges and the opinion of the American legal investigators.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, the next name I think we will come to will be that of Saionji. As we have stated before, General, Mr. Saionji was the secretary of the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations for a period of time. I wonder if you will tell us what his connection with the espionage ring was.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes indeed.

Saionji is a very interesting figure because of his background and the curious sidelight on Japanese social and governmental character.

To begin with, Saionji was the adopted grandson of the late famous Genro, Prince Saionji. To understand his position, the Genro are of the elder statesmen of Japan who served under the Meiji restoration which launched Japan as a world power. These elder statesmen consequently enjoyed an exceptional degree of veneration by the Japanese population, and some of this prestige naturally accrued to their family, and especially this man Saionji.

Saionji was a full-fledged member of the Sorge espionage ring in addition to his other qualifications that we developed. He was arrested by the Japanese police and was found guilty of passing secret information to Ozaki, an associate of the breakfast club. Saionji was given a sentence of 3 years with a stay of execution, undoubtedly a concession to the importance of his family connections.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, is there any evidence that Ozaki and Saionji were closely associated with each other?

General WILLOUGHBY. They were intimate, and the association ranged over many years.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Saionji's position with the Japanese Government?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was a consultant of the Foreign Ministry, that is the Japanese State Department, and the Cabinet and belonged to the bright young men forming the "breakfast club," the bright young men around Prince Konoye.

Senator FERGUSON. So they had them in Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. I concur.

Mr. MORRIS. General, what role did Agnes Smedley play in the Sorge spy ring?

General WILLOUGHBY. That has been covered generally, but here again I will give you an abbreviated pointed formation.

Smedley's association with the China spy ring of Richard Sorge dates back to 1930. Smedley introduced Sorge to Hotsumi Ozaki, that same Ozaki was his right-hand man, then a special correspondent for the Asahi Shimbun, but here again is the predilection of these individuals to seek cover in an otherwise honorable profession, to wit, correspondents of important newspapers.

Smedley was also instrumental in securing the services of Teikichi Kawai, who is still living and whose affidavit furnished freely to the American occupation authorities is one of the most important exhibits in this entire series available to the counsel. In fact, may I suggest, Mr. MORRIS, that you quote from exhibit 28, from the question series 100 onward, what our friend Kawai had to say.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you extract from the records the interrogation of Mr. Kawai just referred to by General Willoughby and read those portions commencing on about question 98?

The CHAIRMAN. To what records do you refer and how were the records made?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this record was a record that was in the possession of General Willoughby, which is a pertinent exhibit taken from the official files in Tokyo.

Is that right, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Duplicates are in the War Department, the same type of records which I described when I quoted the opinion of the American legal group.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, this opinion of the legal group went to the War Department and became part of the official files?

General WILLOUGHBY. It did.

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the interrogation of Kawai Teikichi, dated March 31, 1948, and April 1, 1949:

Question 98. When did serious discussions start about your second assignment?

A. I was asked if I would be able to go back to Manchuria the same night I submitted my report in Smedley's apartment.

Question 99. When were definite plans made for you to return?

A. I think we talked about that when we were walking through the park.

Question 100. Describe that a little more fully.

A. At the first meeting in Smedley's apartment I was asked whether I would be able to go back or not at which time I answered that I would be able to go. When we left that night we decided to meet again the next morning at Smedley's apartment. Sorge came late after everyone else had assembled, and it was decided at that time I would go to Mukden. After the meeting at Smedley's

apartment the four of us, Ozaki, Smedley, Sorge, and I, went by automobile to the park. We made definite plans for me to go back to Mukden at that park.

Question 251. Can you tell what Smedley's influence and position were in Chinese espionage? Was she a person of high rank in the activity?

A. Yes, I did get that impression.

Question 252. In your conversations and contacts with Smedley did you get the idea that she had direct contact with Moscow or with Russia?

A. I got the impression that she had some liaison with the Comintern.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, you are reading from the testimony of Mr. Kawai, a member of the espionage group, which testimony was taken in 1949; is that correct?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

General WILLOUGHBY. May I add to this, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General WILLOUGHBY. This interrogation was made by Mr. Wood-all Greene, one of the group of American lawyers. This is a voluntary statement of a member of this ring. He happened to be a Communist belonging to the Japanese Communist Party and that party was so apprehensive at that time about his testimony that I was obliged to furnish this man police protection because of threats directed against him.

Senator WATKINS. Did I understand, General, that you said he is still living?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, he is available as a personal witness. In order to save the committee expense, in view of their known limited allocation of funds for this purpose, a completely notarized affidavit is available, and it is this affidavit that Mr. Mandel has now quoted from.

Senator WATKINS. He was a member of the spy ring?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was a member of the spy ring, yes.

Senator WATKINS. How did he escape punishment?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was punished. We released him in this grandiose gesture following the Potsdam Declaration in 1945. He was in jail and was released as a potential amnesty gesture, which released all the members of this spy ring.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, there were some executed?

General WILLOUGHBY. Only two.

Senator FERGUSON. Two had been executed?

General WILLOUGHBY. All the rest were imprisoned and released.

Senator FERGUSON. Under the Potsdam agreement?

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct.

Senator WATKINS. Was he not tried by the Japanese at the time Sorge and the others were tried?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was tried. He was a member of Sorge's ring, arrested, and in due process of law was tried and convicted with all the others. When we stepped into the picture in 1945 we made a sort of grand gesture, primarily designed to protect political prisoners, that is without definition, because in the fall of 1945 we were busy disarming the Japanese Army and occupying Japan, ranging from roughly Seattle to San Diego, Calif., with four divisions.

So, this sort of thing was interesting but by no means pressing, and we released perhaps people we should have not released.

Senator WATKINS. What was the sentence given him by the Japanese courts?

General WILLOUGHBY. Is the sentence of Kawai listed there? My memory being what it is, it would be like asking Edgar Hoover the details of case No. 1560. I had a policy-making position.

Senator FERGUSON. You do know he was released in 1945 under the Potsdam agreement?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. I think I can answer your question in just a moment. Ten years, and the release date of this gentry incidentally was in October 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. He did prove to be of assistance to the military authorities in Japan; did he not?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. We realized that if we could get in this group of prisoners someone of sufficient authority in his position to give us the story—us, the American occupation forces—it would be a valuable confirmation of the documentary evidence, and we proceeded then to interrogate all of them, and we found this man Kawai.

Since my interest was primarily in Stein and Smedley at the time, I concentrated on those two. We found his testimony to be conclusive of the character of which Mr. Mandel has just given you a sample. He was, therefore, of great assistance to us. He is now available on call. This affidavit is available. Given time we might produce the affidavits of all of them.

The CHAIRMAN. However, you had corroborating evidence besides his voluntary statement?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Ohashi?

General WILLOUGHBY. Ohashi was in the same category, a relatively minor individual whom we also interrogated. Both knew and worked with Smedley is the gist of their contribution.

Senator WATKINS. What surprises me about it is that he escaped execution if he was a spy and working in the spy ring.

General WILLOUGHBY. That is a very interesting comment. It is also to some extent characteristic of the civil quality of this court. They did not treat all of them in a summary fashion. They made a fine distinction on relative importance. Sorge was No. 1, Ozaki was No. 2, the rest in a descending scale of relative guilt, shall we say. However, their sentences ranged, for example, Koshiro 15, Taguchi 13, Akiyama 10, Kawai 10, Hotzumi 8—down to 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Repeat again the sentence imposed on Saionji.

General WILLOUGHBY. Saionji, according to this record, was found guilty of passing secret information to an unauthorized person—namely, Ozaki—was given a sentence of 3 years with a stay of execution, a suspended sentence. Talk of the time is that being the grandson of the Genro, who has the same emotional standing with Japan as the signers of the Declaration of Independence with us, got him off the hook.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you will read from the testimony of Ohashi, just referred to by General Willoughby, in connection with the supporting evidence on Agnes Smedley.

Mr. MANDEL. This is the testimony of Ohashi Imaeda, May 2, 1949.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it you are reading from the same document, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From which you presented the excerpt before?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir; who is listed here as chief, Ikegami Police Station:

Question 5. In your voluntary statement of April 16, 1949, you said that Sorge mentioned Agnes Smedley. Will you tell us what he said about her?

A. Sorge was in China before he came to Japan. He organized an espionage ring in Shanghai, and Smedley was one of the members of the ring. Sorge was introduced by Smedley to Ozaki, who later became one of the leading members of the ring in Japan. Sorge met Smedley for the first time in Shanghai, but Smedley was not a member of this group in Japan. In 1934 Smedley stopped for a day in Japan. She went to the Asahi Shimbun, where she met Ozaki, who tried to contact Sorge but was unable to do so. Smedley left the same day.

Question 6. Did Sorge tell the nature of Smedley's duties in connection with his ring in China?

A. Sorge did not go into details about the activities of any of the members of the ring in Shanghai. I merely interrogated him concerning the names of the members of his ring and did not go into details concerning their activities. I was interested only in information covering the Japanese phase.

Question 7. In your statement of April 16, 1949, you said that Sorge praised Smedley's work in Shanghai. Is that true?

A. Sorge did say she was a very intelligent woman, that she had been with the Eighth Route Army and knew quite a bit about that organization, and also that her information was very good.

I will skip now to question 9, on Sorge's mention of Smedley and her activities in connection with his spy ring in China:

Question 9. Did you infer that she was an important member of the ring?

A. Yes; I did get that impression. As far as the members of the Shanghai ring were concerned, with the exception of Paul and Smedley he only listed their names. He often mentioned Paul and Smedley, which gave me the impression that she was an important member of the Shanghai group.

Question 14. You said that Sorge considered Stein one of the top members in his ring, also that Sorge informed you that Stein's house in—

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that Mr. Mandel defer the rest of that until we come to the Stein testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. General, was Guenther Stein a member of Richard Sorge Soviet espionage ring?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was. Guenther Stein, special correspondent for a London newspaper, was a regular member of the Sorge spy ring. A notebook confiscated from Sorge lists six members together with their aliases, and Stein was listed among the six. An intercepted radio message to Moscow referred to his code name. In this connection, we are in possession of course of the entire series of radio code messages dispatched to Moscow by Sorge in this period, and many of the operators involved in it are mentioned not only by activity but by code references.

There is testimony by Max Klausen—Max Klausen was his radio operator at the time—that this wireless operator erected a transmission set in Stein's residence to forward reports to Russia. Stein not only was living on the premises but at the time gave his consent.

I think, Mr. Morris, that exhibit 23 has a direct quotation from this testimony, the establishment of a radio transmitter communicating with Khabarovsk, a Siberia station, is damaging activity.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, General. I would like Mr. Mandel to read from the police investigation of Max Klausen, which was made on the 25th of October in 1945. I would like Mr. Mandel to read page 9 on this Consecutive Exhibit No. 23, closure No. 1-A. This is from the interrogation of Max Klausen, whom General Willoughby has

identified as one of the leading members of the Sorge espionage ring.

The CHAIRMAN. You are reading from what again?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will be reading from Consecutive Exhibit No. 23, which was in the custody of General Willoughby in this connection.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

GUENTHER STEIN

One night in December 1935, while I was still at the Sano Hotel, Sorge called me to his home and introduced me to Guenther Stein. Stein and I discussed radio, and he drew a map to show me where he lived. I visited him several days later at his home in Motomura-cho Minatoku, examined the house to see whether it was suitable for installation of radio equipment and decided with his consent to use two of his upstairs rooms. As previously indicated, I installed the equipment and began testing around the middle of February. I transmitted around 30 messages from Stein's home. I stopped using it in 1937—I do not recall the date—when he left for England via Siberia. Stein once confided to me that while in Moscow, a special correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt, before coming to Japan, he had been a Communist sympathizer. I did not know the nature of his previous activities in Japan, but I am sure that in addition to the above he went to Shanghai as a courier. There is no doubt that he was a member of our group.

Senator FERGUSON. General, you might just clear that up.

Of course, the man who was speaking was a member of the espionage organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Max Klausen.

Senator FERGUSON. They are the group of men mentioned.

General WILLOUGHBY. The organization.

Mr. MORRIS. General, would you prefer that Mr. Mandel read a continuation of the Ohashi testimony, or is your testimony now coming up more appropriate?

General WILLOUGHBY. On the subject of Stein?

Mr. MORRIS. Guenther Stein.

General WILLOUGHBY. If I may make a suggestion—

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

General WILLOUGHBY (continuing). I am at your disposal, being a Government employee, soon to be on half pay.

You can continue on this theme, and you will merely reiterate that that he set up the radio station in his house, furnishing the cover of a fairly respectable position at the time, while the Japanese Secret Service was running around in nervous apprehension as to where the code messages to Russia were coming from. They didn't think of Stein, of course.

There is your story.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read, then, the next two questions in the Ohashi testimony, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Question 14. You said that Sorge considered Stein one of the top members in his ring, also that Sorge informed you that Stein's home in Motomura-Cho Minato-Ku Tokyo-To was used by Max Klausen for the transmission of messages to Russia. The testimony of Sorge and Klausen contains that information also. Did Sorge give you any additional information about Stein?

A. Not that I recall.

Question 15. You referred to a notebook which was confiscated from Sorge and in which were listed the top members of his ring, including Richard Sorge,

Branko de Voukelitch, Max Klausen, Stein, Ozaki, and Miyagi. Did you see that notebook?

A. Yes; I did see that book.

Question 16. Did you actually see the name Guenther Stein in Sorge's handwriting in this notebook which listed the top six members of his ring?

A. I do not remember clearly whether Guenther Stein was listed as such, or not, but his pseudonym was listed.

Question 17. Were all the names listed as aliases in the book?

A. In that book some members were listed by their real names, some by their aliases, some by more than one alias, but I do not remember clearly whether Stein's name or his alias was listed, but to anyone knowing these individuals by both their real names and by their aliases as I did, it meant the same thing.

Mr. MORRIS. General, will you tell us something about the influential position that Guenther Stein was able to assume in Tokyo?

General WILLOUGHBY. He had a wide range of contacts, naturally, in the press fraternity. He also had some entree in the British Embassy, being a British subject.

Generally speaking—and this is based on inquiries from people who have known him—they rated him as an individual with access to important international information.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder, General, if you think it would be appropriate if Mr. Mandel would read further from the confession of Richard Sorge on the important position that Guenther Stein was able to achieve in Tokyo at the time.

I offer you this volume, General, and ask you if you will identify the excerpt he is about to read.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

For your information, Mr. Chairman, this is a sample of actually over 150,000 pages, translated from Japanese text court records. This is the story as written by Sorge himself, not in the nature of a confession, because he was interrogated in a series of Attorney General's interrogations, but he wrote a sort of diary.

He was under the impression that, in view of the importance that he held in the Soviet hierarchy that he might be released at the last moment.

Waiting 3 or 4 years, his resistance perhaps weakened and he began to jot down in an informal diary type his thought and feelings, his record. That is a part of this record.

Mr. MORRIS. When was he executed, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. Executed in 1944, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. And arrested in 1941?

General WILLOUGHBY. 1941; yes, sir.

An interesting sidelight in the international field, if I am not imposing too much on your time, is that the Japanese Government was then on a neutrality basis with Russia, as you know, until 5 minutes to midnight. They came in in August of 1945, after we had accomplished the Pacific War. The Japanese were very anxious, of course, not to upset this neutrality balance, and in one of the commentaries on this case, the Attorney General warns his individuals, his subordinates, to be sure that the conduct of the trial, the interrogation, and so forth, would be of such a humanitarian plane that the Soviet Embassy, if they should become interested in the end, could take no offense or register objection.

So this is as close to a voluntary statement by Sorge, this diary, which we entitled in our translation as Sorges' own story, typewritten, typed by himself at a leisurely pace.

He even made editorial and stylistic corrections.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read from the document so described by General Willoughby.

Mr. MANDEL. Referring to Stein:

He was a sympathizer but never an actual member of my group. Actually, however, he did give us positive cooperation.

Stein was closely associated with Ambassador Dirksen, whom he had known since Moscow, and who looked upon him as an intelligent and important person. More significant for our work was the connection with the British Ambassador which he enjoyed by virtue of the fact that he represented a British newspaper. He was especially close to the famous Sir Sanson in the British Embassy. From the British Embassy he was able to obtain information chiefly on general diplomatic policy. At times he had opportunities to talk to the then British Ambassador and British naval attaché.

As Stein was also on very intimate terms with all the foreign newspapermen, especially the British and American reporters, he sometimes wanted interesting individual facts from them. Lastly, he had close connection with Domei and hence like Vogelreich was able to scent out the general political undercurrent and atmosphere there. He was also very valuable as a source of information in that he had studied the Japanese economic situation very conscientiously and had written complete books about it. His economic studies clarified many facts hitherto little understood. His chief fields of study were Japan's foreign trade and financial problems.

Senator FERGUSON. May I just inquire whether, in connection with Stein, you ever heard the name Herbert Norman?

General WILLOUGHBY. That name does not appear in what we have now classified as the Sorge record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at this point, I think it might be appropriate if I point out that we had Dr. Karl Wittfogel, who is a distinguished professor of Columbia University. He is head of the Chinese language project of Columbia University. We had him on the stand here on Tuesday. He identified as a member of a Communist study group and as a member of the Communist Party Herbert Norman.

Herbert Norman is today, Mr. Chairman, Chief of the American Far Eastern Division of the Department of External Affairs of Canada. That is a place of great importance.

I was wondering, General Willoughby, if you knew Herbert Norman at all when you were in Tokyo.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, I knew Herbert Norman. He was the Canadian Minister in Tokyo in the period 1946 to 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. He was then only the Canadian Minister to Tokyo?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. He has since assumed this high position.

General WILLOUGHBY. The Canadian Minister.

Technically, all diplomatic representatives maintain their diplomatic classification, ambassador, minister, chargé d'affaires. They were attached to SCAP.

In other words, he was the chief of the Canadian diplomatic mission attached to SCAP.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think at this place in the record we might make reference to the testimony of Wittfogel on page 318.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. It will bring out who Herbert Norman was back in 1938 and his connection with the Pacific Affairs and the IPR.

I think the letter on pages 319 or 320, No. 72, from Edward C. Carter to Owen Lattimore, under the name of "Dear Owen," is signifi-

cant in the light of Wittfogel's testimony, and if it is referred to in the record here it could be of importance to this testimony.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to read from the letter No. 72, in the record, on page 319 or 320, from Carter to Owen Lattimore. It begins: "Dear Owen"—and that has been identified as Owen Lattimore.

Here is the paragraph that I think ought to be put in here:

I think that Norman may be able to do some writing for Pacific Affairs on contemporary matters providing he writes under a nom de plume.

Mr. SORWINE. Is that the letter, Senator, which referred to the using of Mr. Norman as a conduit for transmission of information?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And that he used a fictitious name rather than his own name because he would be connected with the Canadian Embassy.

The reason I thought of that General, was that when you brought Stein as being connected with the Canadian Embassy in a way—

General WILLOUGHBY, British Embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you also said Canadian. Did you not?

General WILLOUGHBY. What was the quotation?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not say both Canadian and British when you read that about Stein, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. British.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It covered both. That is why I thought the Norman testimony was significant.

General WILLOUGHBY. Of course, I was not aware and I am intensely interested in this Wittfogel testimony on that particular name. But, of course, I am in no position to—

Senator FERGUSON. That is the reason why I want to know whether or not he came into the record.

General WILLOUGHBY. He did not come into this record we are now dealing with, and of course my personal acquaintanceship in Tokyo was that of a SCAP official with a foreign diplomatic representative, and I am reluctant to dwell on this.

Senator FERGUSON. I would not want you to do so. I want the testimony emphatic that if it was as it is now, that he was not mentioned at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would you want me to read into the record today the testimony of Dr. Wittfogel, or do you think it is clear enough?

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would clarify it if you read an excerpt from it, so as to tie it in with Wittfogel's testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. I am now reading from the testimony of Karl August Wittfogel, of last Tuesday. This is page 318. The question put to Dr. Wittfogel was:

Who were some of the other students at this student group?

This is a Communist student group that met on Cape Cod in the summer of 1938.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There was a talented and pleasant young man who was studying in the Japanese department at Columbia. His name is Herbert Norman.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a member of this study group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. To your knowledge, did he know that it was a Communist study group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. It was obvious.

Mr. MORRIS. To you.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think it was obvious in general.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it obvious, therefore, that he was a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would introduce in the record first of all a letter that would indicate Herbert Norman's associations with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a record taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated May 30, 1940, from Edward C. Carter to Owen Lattimore. It reads as follows:

"Herbert Norman was in the office about a fortnight ago on the eve of his sailing for Tokyo, with language officer in the Canadian Legation. He is very eager to continue active contact with the institute and in the field of Japanese political history. He would like to do some writing on the key figures of the Meiji period. I am sending a copy of this letter to Holland as it may be that he will see ways of using Norman on writing that might not be quite within the scope of Pacific Affairs."

The CHAIRMAN. Right there, Mr. Morris, can we get the tie-in between the Norman referred to by Senator Ferguson in interrogating the witness and the Norman referred to by Wittfogel? Are they one and the same?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Dr. Wittfogel described Herbert Norman as a Canadian.

Senator FERGUSON. He was going to the Embassy at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. The witness identifies him as the consul.

General WILLOUGHBY. As the Canadian chief of the diplomatic mission in Tokyo approximately 1946 to 1950.

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to see if they are one and the same person.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I think the next letter bears on that point.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, is the letter you just read dated much earlier than 1946?

Mr. MORRIS. It was 1940.

I am reading from another letter dated September 5, 1940, which was introduced into the record of last Tuesday on page 601.

Mr. Mandel, there is another letter, apparently a memorandum, headed "E. C. C. from W. L. H.," apparently from Mr. Carter to Mr. Holland, dated September 5, 1940.

It is on a typed letterhead of the Gianini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.:

Phil is leaving tonight and is taking Landon's book on the Chinese in Siam and the major part of Yasuto's Industrial Japan. Among the other manuscripts to be sent to him very shortly will be Laura Thompson's book on Guam for the American Council, Wentworth's Philippine Living Standards in Hawaii, the new catalog, and Wittfogel's monograph on oriental society. I am hoping to have the two big books by Mills and Kesting published commercially in this country. Phil will be in Japan from about September 18 to October 6 and can be reached in care of the Japanese IPR.

This is the significant sentence, Mr. Chairman:

Any very secret messages might be sent in care of Herbert Norman at the Canadian Legation. Phil will cable us after he arrives about whether the Japanese want him to remain for an extra week or two to help them with their publications.

So in 1940 Herbert Norman was associated with the Canadian Legation.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

What is the question now?

General WILLOUGHBY. I might make a remark. As a police officer, this is a most interesting statement by Dr. Wittfogel on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. The Chair understands that at this present time Herbert Norman is Chief of the American Far Eastern Division of the Department of External Affairs of the Canadian Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record an extract showing the number of articles that Guenther Stein has written for the Institute of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. Mandel, will you describe that compilation that appears on that page before we introduce it into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the source of the information?

Mr. MORRIS. It is a compilation by Mr. Mandel. I am asking him to testify, Mr. Chairman, as to what that represents.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the source of his information?

Mr. MANDEL. These are articles from Pacific Affairs, the official organ of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and also another one of its publications, called Far Eastern Survey, and lists the writings of Guenther Stein.

Just by way of sample, let me read a few titles: "Japanese State Finance," in the December 1937 issue of Pacific Affairs.

In the Far Eastern Survey we have "What's Free China," June 29, 1942, and so on, giving a list of approximately 15 titles.

Also, Mr. Stein was coauthor of a study of American trade with Pacific countries, which was slated for fall publication in 1947 by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. We offer that document as the next exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 83" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 83

GUENTHER STEIN

Writer of articles in Pacific Affairs:

Through the Eyes of a Japanese Newspaper Reader, pages 177-190, June 1936.

Japanese State Finance, pages 393-406, December 1937.

The Yen and the Sword, pages 5-19, March 1939.

China's Price Problem, pages 322-333, September 1941.

Free China's Agricultural Progress, pages 329-343, 1943.

Book "The Challenge of Red China" reviewed, page 190, June 1946.

Book review of American Business with East Asia, page 105, March 1948.

Writer of articles in Far Eastern Survey:

China's Inflation Menace, June 1, 1942, page 124.

What's Free China, June 29, 1942.

People's Political Council Reorganizing, July 13, 1942.

Chungking Considers the Future, September 7, 1942, page 190.

The Chinese Press Weighs Allied Strategy, June 14, 1943, page 117.

Japan's Army on China's Fronts, July 14, 1943, page 141.

Free China's Industrial Production, August 11, 1943, page 161.

China's Fiscal Program, August 25, 1943, page 169.

China's Internal Transport System, October 20, 1943, page 208.

Overseas Chinese Look Ahead. November 17, 1943.

China's Forbidden Crisis, March 12, 1947, pages 49-52.

Listed on research and publication program of the Institute of Pacific Relations, May 9, 1947.

Study of American Trade with Pacific Countries by Guenther Stein.

Shirley Jenkins and an advisory committee of businessmen versed in problems of far eastern trade. Publication date—fall, 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we find anywhere that Stein ever wrote under a fictitious name, an alias?

Mr. MANDEL. I have no record of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Norman was supposed to, was he not? Is not there evidence in the hearing, a letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in introducing this compilation of Mr. Mandel's, I would like to have the record show that there were 21 contributions through the years by Mr. Guenther Stein to the Institute of Pacific Relations in one of its subdivisions.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to tie this in properly.

Mr. Mandel, in your listing here, from what source did you get the information?

Mr. MANDEL. From the Index to Pacific Affairs and Far Eastern Survey, as published by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. You found it where?

Mr. MANDEL. In the actual index that they publish.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean you looked at the magazines yourself, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. At the index.

Mr. MORRIS. And you made up this compilation having the official records in front of you?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. Can I contribute something?

Mr. MORRIS. Very well, General.

General WILLOUGHBY. This is a purely impromptu, off-the-cuff contribution, but as you are establishing, I take it, the literary quality of Mr. Stein, this is what we thought about that field.

Lately I have read a most illuminating study by Mrs. Irene Kuhn on the subject of, to me a revealing subject, of how Communist-slanted books bought, sold, reviewed, peddled, propagandized, log-rolled or log-jammed, as the case may be.

I am quoting from this article.

After an absence of 13 years from the United States, I am, of course, avid for information that would give me the modern landscape.

Mrs. Kuhn's article, which had its fifth reprint in the American Legion, deals with the technique of propagating, peddling, and supplanting Communist-tainted books.

Guenther Stein's reports by their titles, I would say, look rather innocuous. But this is what one of our investigators has to say about him:

Late in 1944 he was one of a group of six who visited Yen-an.

Yen-an is a hot-land of Chinese Communists, the cradle of Chou Teh and other gentlemen with whom we are now engaged in North Korea.

He was one of the two correspondents whose accounts of Communist China were published as books. His *Challenge of Red China* (McGraw-Hill, 1945) has the outward appearance of thoughtful reporting. His book has had a great deal of effect in perpetuating the legend that Chinese Communists aren't Communists and are not in any way connected with the Soviet Union—a legend started and kept alive so much earlier by Agnes Smedley. Like Agnes Smedley, Guenther Stein was an established Soviet agent, and one can be certain that neither of them was publishing the truth about Chinese Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Again, that is a memorandum from one of your staff; is it?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, and filed with the War Department, and is part of the original report of 1947, 1948, and 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the one that was later suppressed after it was released.

General WILLOUGHBY. It was later, shall we say, released and then given the "cold shoulder."

Mr. MORRIS. And you think, Senator, it is significant that when Herbert Norman did write for Pacific Affairs, Carter and Lattimore wanted him to write under a nom de plume?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. I think that ought to appear in the record, owing to Wittfogel's testimony.

Senator WATKINS. Would that not be because he was a member of the Canadian Foreign Service and could not write, without getting into trouble, under his own name?

Mr. MORRIS. It may well be.

I would like to introduce into the record at this time, Mr. Chairman, a memorandum dated June 24, 1942, from Mr. "W. W. L."—presumably Mr. Lockwood—to "E. C. C. and W. L. H."—presumably Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland. This reads:

A further comment on circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it to John Fairbank he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his China staff—

Now, at that time Mr. Fairbank was associated with the OWI—who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in return. I am leaving the matter for you to handle, however.

I would like to introduce this into the record, Mr. Chairman, as evidence of the fact that the Office of War Information at that time was expressing a great deal of interest in seeing Guenther Stein's—as Mr. Lockwood says—"stuff" in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

Will you identify that, please?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that as an authentic document?

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you get it? Where did it come from? What is its authenticity?

Mr. MANDEL. I identify this memorandum dated June 24, 1942, from "W. W. L. to E. C. C." marked also "W. L. H." as taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 84" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 84

JUNE 24, 1942.

W. W. L. to E. C. C., W. L. H.

A further comment on circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it to John Fairbank, he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his China staff, who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in return. I am leaving the matter for you to handle, however.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, I wonder if you would tell us what this espionage ring was able to accomplish by way of transmitting secret information to the Soviet Government and aiding the Soviet foreign policy?

General WILLOUGHBY. There is an enormous amount of information of records on that subject, Mr. Morris. I will touch upon the high lights for this committee.

For example, under interrogation from memory alone, in the initial stages, Sorge dispatched more than 50 reports, Klausen another 50. The decoded radio messages added much greater detail.

The CHAIRMAN. Radio messages from whom to whom?

General WILLOUGHBY. From Sorge via Klausen to his Russian superiors. The relays were either via Harbin or direct to Khabarovsk.

However, the year 1941 was naturally the crucial year for all of us, and I think you will get an impression of the quality and importance of those reports if I limit myself roughly to that year, 1939-40, with emphasis on 1941.

For example, the relation of Russia with the Central Powers, with Germany, was of an immense interest in that year. Sorge, having a position as press attaché of the German Embassy, on the one hand, and having a direct access to Prince Konoye—that is, the Japanese Premier—and/or their State Department, through Ozaki, was in a position of not only obtaining the details of the German negotiations, which he relayed promptly to his Russian masters, but he was able to get the reaction or actions of the Foreign Office and do likewise.

Now, that information, if the Allies had known it—had had advance notice of this in that critical year 1941—might have changed the course of history.

For example, the quality of this man's reports is an example: An appraisal of the Japanese output of munitions, which, from a military viewpoint is, of course, terribly important to all those who were then contemplating or considering Japan as a potential enemy.

He made periodical reports beginning with February of 1940 throughout 1940 and 1941.

In August 1941 he reported an item which the American Navy was intensely interested in, had they known it; namely, the record of petroleum storage and stockage available to the Japanese military forces.

His report was that there was in storage in Japan sufficient petroleum for 2 years' use by the Navy, half a year by the Army, and half a year by the nation at large. That became a prime military objective for use in the course of the war.

On the 20th of May, through his connections, of course, with the German military attaché in the Embassy, of which he was a member—

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe, General Willoughby, exactly what his relationship was?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was the officially designated press relations officer of the German Embassy in Tokyo.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to whom now?

General WILLOUGHBY. Sorge.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the German Ambassador at that time?

General WILLOUGHBY. General Ott, whom he had known in China and by a process of friendship probably got this assignment.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, did Richard Sorge hold a military rank in the Soviet Army?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was, as he stated, "a subordinate to the Fourth Bureau," which is the intelligence section of the Soviet Army, and had the assimilated rank of colonel.

In other words, you find a Russian intelligence officer being the press attaché, with diplomatic immunity, at the German Embassy, at a time when the relationship of these two nations was one of crucial international balance.

Mr. MORRIS. And this time you are now describing is May 1941? That is just 1 month prior to the Hitler invasion of the Soviet Union?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

The type of Sorge's reports was due, of course, probably not to inherent talent, but to the advantages of his unusual position.

On the 20th of May 1941, he flashed a warning—meaning to Russia—that the Reichswehr would concentrate from 170 to 190 divisions on the Soviet border, and on the 28th of June would attack along the entire frontier; the main effort, however, would be made in the direction of Moscow.

This attack did occur on the 22d of June.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, General, that brings me back to many of the things that happened at the Pearl Harbor hearings. We were slightly interested in knowing whether Japan was going to attack America, Russia, or Britain in her colony.

General WILLOUGHBY. Right.

Senator FERGUSON. And if we had Americans like Smedley in this spy ring, they may have been able to acquire, through various rings, for instance, here in Washington—we have learned about papers being taken from the State Department—that Japan was getting some information through this same spy ring to her as to what our intentions were.

Is that not possible?

General WILLOUGHBY. Your point is well taken, Senator, and I think I can give you a connecting link here.

The potential of Japan to attack Russia via Siberia or to attack south, which would involve the Philippines—that is, United States and the British—was of equal interest to Russia, but it was also of equal interest to us. And the deduction which is permissible, if Smedley was in a position of intimacy with this bird Sorge, is that she might have obtained that information, too, had she been on the right side of the fence.

But regardless of that, sir, actually that became Sorge's main mission. He was ordered to concentrate on what Japan was going to do, because without that knowledge the Russians would not withdraw from the Siberian mainland the divisions they maintained.

Once having assurance that Japan would go south—that is, an attack which would involve the United States—they were then free to denude their Siberian border and put their troops into the defense of the frontier then in existence.

Actually, they came in time to save the situation in the German advance—well, their farthest advance in that period: Smolensk, Stalingrad.

So it might be said that, predicated on the information furnished by this superbly competent agent, the Russian situation on the west front depended as a life and death question. He gave them the answer.

This is very interesting—always with a background of your own and pre-Pearl Harbor inquiries, which I remember very well, indeed.

Sorge maintained a concentrated watch on United States-Japanese negotiations during the summer and fall of 1941. His information was full and accurate; naturally so, since Ozaki was so close to Prince Konoye, the keyman in these negotiations.

During early October, Sorge reported on this mobilization, that it was completed in mid-September and that men from 25 to 35 years had been called up—mobilization of an expansion in forces as a prelude to war.

By the 15th of October, Sorge transmitted his final sober conclusions that the Japanese had decided to move south, and that there now was no serious danger of an attack through Manchuria in the direction of Siberia. He felt that his mission was completed.

He drafted a dispatch, suggesting his recall to the Soviet Union. His radio operator Klausen argued that his request was premature, and the message was never sent. Three days later Sorge and Klausen were under arrest.

Mr. MORRIS. It is significant, General, that they were arrested just a few days after their mission was accomplished; is it not?

General WILLOUGHBY. The throw of the dice—the fortunes of war.

Mr. MORRIS. General, we have had testimony before this committee that high officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations, some of whom have been identified as members of the Communist Party, exerted great efforts in November 1941 to prevent a 90-day truce being worked out between Japan and the United States.

This committee has that testimony both in executive and open session, namely, that high officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations, some of whom have been identified as members of the Communist Party, made great efforts to prevent a 90-day truce being worked out between the United States and Japan.

I wonder if you would care to comment on that and possibly correlate any information or evidence that you have with that testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith, the calendar is to be called on the floor. The chairman of this committee has many bills on that calendar. Will you kindly take the chair and carry on for me?

General, I am sorry to have to leave. I will be back to see you again.

Senator SMITH. Will you proceed, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Does the general understand the question?

General WILLOUGHBY. Would you mind repeating it?

Senator FERGUSON. Before you proceed with that, if I might refer back, I would like to introduce a memorandum from the Pearl Harbor hearings, joint hearings, page 1160, held in 1945. The memorandum is dated Chungking, November 25, 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. That can be marked the next exhibit number.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 85" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 85¹

[Exhibit taken from hearings on Pearl Harbor attack, 1945, p. 1160]

CHUNGKING, November 25, 1941.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE: After discussing with the generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never

¹ Previously used as exhibit No. 24.

seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any *modus vivendi* now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. To get back to the question, General:

We have introduced into the record documents and testimony to the effect that high officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations, some of whom have been identified before this committee in executive and open session as members of the Communist Party, or connected with the Communist Party, were making efforts in November 1941, to prevent the United States and Japan from effecting a 90-day truce at the time, at the request of the military leaders of the country, namely, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A 90-day truce was sought in order to prevent any outbreak of hostilities. We had evidence, as I say, introduced, General, that IPR officials, top officials in the IPR, were trying to prevent that truce from being effected.

I wonder if any evidence or information that you acquired while you were in Tokyo would have any bearing on the testimony that we have already taken before this committee on that score, General Willoughby.

General WILLOROUGHBY. I would say that this is a very complicated question, since it deals with activities in the United States when I was absent in the Philippines at that time, since 1935.

And, of course, I must delegate activity to other officers and cannot specifically point to anything that is in the nature of concrete evidence.

With this limiting background and based purely on recollection, and guided solely by a desire, of course, to assist this committee in its hard-working enterprise, I will say that, as a student of history and of Japan, that I have the impression that Prince Konoye was desperately serious in effecting a last-minute understanding with the United States and that there was, in the opinion of many Japanese of substance and probity, there was a fear that certain elements, unidentified in the States, were opposed to such an understanding.

That is probably an unsatisfactory answer, but it is the best I can do.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you very much, General.

Senator Ferguson has made reference to a dispatch sent by Owen Lattimore, who at that time was personal adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to Lauchlin Currie, who was then executive assistant to the White House, in which Lattimore urged that the *modus vivendi* be rejected. The date of that is November 25, 1941.

Further, General, we had testimony here from Mr. Carter that he was called down to Washington by Harry Dexter White, who was

then Under Secretary of the Treasury, asking Mr. Carter to use his influence to prevent any—as he described it—sell-out of China at that time.

At that time they were showing a concern for China, when this took that form.

General WILLOUGHBY. Amazing, amazing.

Mr. MORRIS. This has already been introduced into the record.

Now, in connection with Guenther Stein, I would like to point out, General, that you have been testifying through your records that Guenther Stein was doing espionage work for the Soviet fourth bureau, fourth army.

General WILLOUGHBY. There is his association, with Sorge as one of his associates. If we established that he was a trusted and important associate of Sorge—and that, I think, is established—I will take out the words, "I think"; we've got it all, cross-reference of Klausen, his wife, Kawai, et cetera.

So if we classify him as a bona fide member of this ring, then, of course, the reference of reporting to the fourth army is to be understood in that light.

He didn't report directly. He reported to Sorge, and it was Sorge who relayed the information.

I think it is a fine distinction which I may be exaggerating, but I am making it.

Mr. MORRIS. General, I would like to point out that he has written 21 articles for the Institute of Pacific Relations and two more letters, which Mr. Mandel will authenticate and read into the record on Guenther Stein, as well as the letter from Mr. Lockwood to Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland that the Office of War Information and the Institute of Pacific Relations was circulating—to use their own words—"Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington."

I see here in this letter we have already introduced Lockwood says:

When I mentioned it to John Fairbank—

who was then head of the China section of OWI—

he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his China staff, who all voiced a similar interest.

In other words, the Office of War Information was actively promulgating Guenther Stein's material. So it apparently served another function at that time, did it not, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. I would agree with you; yes.

Senator FRACUSON. Of course, the evidence clearly shows that he was an agent of the Comintern, so that he at all times, whether they be two or one, the Red army and communism in Russia, he was serving both those according to the documented record. Is that not right?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was; in his capacity as an indispensable and important member of the Sorge organization, whose complete purposes were for these two agencies that you mentioned, the army, on the one hand, the Comintern, on the other.

I haven't the slightest hesitancy personally, if you wish to ascertain that, that Stein is as guilty as Smedley or any of the others listed.

Senator FRACUSON. And you have no doubt, have you, from these records, that Stein was a Communist?

General WILLOUGHBY. None; none whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Smedley was a Communist?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have no doubt about that, personally.

And I notice there is a reference, which Mr. Morris has, that Sorge recommended her to the clearinghouse in Moscow, who pass on the bona fides of these agents, and he needed the supporting certification of another card-bearing member and he got it from somebody.

Anyway, that is a very unusual step to have taken, and I base my feelings about her on this.

Senator FERGUSON. So you have not any doubt that she was one, have you?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have no doubt.

Mr. MORRIS. About Guenther Stein's present activity, General, do you know from official authority that he was arrested for espionage in France in 1950?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Of course, Mr. Morris, when you begin to sum up or draw conclusions, my opinion, or, rather, my thought process is probably not any better than yours, but when I know of an individual with that record disappearing at the time a report was published—he disappeared within 24 hours after the War Department released the 1949 version—and then remains incognito at large and then picked up by the French police in the spring on an espionage charge, he is one of the boys who continued to be in the same business.

Conversely, talking about Smedley, with due deference to her demise, you find her being pictured by a columnist at the time, and notably Mr. Harold Ickes, as an upright American woman, of unimpeachable reputation, veracity, and political coloring, and then find her willing her ashes to Chou Teh, the commander in chief of the Chinese Communist Army, with whom we are now engaged in Korea, and having her ashes placed in a special shrine in Peking, under actual governmental ceremony of extreme value in the heartland of Asiatic communism.

You don't have to be either a police officer or investigative genius to draw your almost inescapable conclusion on these two characters.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read into the record two letters which bear on Guenther Stein's position and activity in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I read one letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 6, 1942, addressed to Mr. Richard R. Sanger, Economic Intelligence Division, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C., from W. L. Holland:

In reply to your letter of June 29 to Mr. Lockwood, of the American Council, I am glad to send you under separate cover our latest radio letter from Guenther Stein in Chungking.

Some of this material will probably be used in a forthcoming issue of the Far Eastern Survey, but you may be interested to have it in the meantime.

As far as possible we shall try to send you these reports from Stein as soon as they come in.

Sincerely yours.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into evidence as further evidence of Guenther Stein's activity through the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 86" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 86

NEW YORK CITY, July 6, 1948.

Re: OW-S-FES.

Mr. RICHARD H. SANGER,

*Economic Intelligence Division, Board of Economic Warfare,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. SANGER: In reply to your letter of June 29 to Mr. Lockwood, of the American Council, I am glad to send you under separate cover our latest radio letter from Guenther Stein in Chungking.

Some of this material will probably be used in a forthcoming issue of the Far Eastern Survey, but you may be interested to have it in the meantime.

As far as possible, we shall try to send you these reports from Stein as soon as they come in.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Mr. MANDEL. I have another letter here, addressed to W. MacMahon Ball, of the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, at 177 Collins Street, Melbourne, Australia, dated February 3, 1939, from Owen Lattimore. I read one sentence:

Guenther Stein, who is by long odds the best economic journalist in the Far East, writes an article on the inherent weakness of Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. This is now from Mr. Lattimore, is it, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is still from Mr. Lattimore's letter:

If an authority of the standing of Stein makes a case as strong as this in an article on the weakness of Japan, should the instinctive response be "what is on the Japanese side?" Should it not be "if this is true, how does it affect Australian interests?"

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into evidence as the next exhibit the letter just read from by Mr. Mandel.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 87," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 87

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., February 6, 1939.

Dr. W. MACMAHON BALL,

*Austral-Asiatic Bulletin,
Melbourne, C. E., Australia.*

DEAR BALL: To my unspeakable chagrin I have missed a cog. I made a mental note that your boat sailed on February 9, and was going to catch you by air mail. Today I had the article ready for mailing and on turning up my written note found that you had sailed on February 1. I am terribly ashamed of this as I like to make a point of hitting my assignments on the nose.

Anyhow I am sending the article herewith by air mail to Los Angeles, hoping it will catch a fast mail from there. If it arrives too late, has to be held over an issue, and thereby gets out of date, throw it in the wastebasket and blame me.

I am sending a carbon copy to E. C. Carter, who may overhaul the original with a fast letter to you asking you not to publish. I am making a general practice of submitting everything I write to Carter so that he can reprove me whenever I say anything unbecoming a propagandist and a gentleman.

Following up our conversation at lunch, I have read the December-January issue of the Bulletin, the latest to arrive here. This issue contains an example of what I shall rudely call exaggerated neutrality. Guenther Stein, who is by long odds the best economic journalist in the Far East, writes an article on the inherent weakness of Japan. One of your editors hastened to soften the shock and to avoid any impression that the Bulletin is anti-Japanese by writing an

article in which he seeks to prove that there is a lot to be said on the other side. The impression thus created is that the war in the Far East is no business of Australians. Australians can look at it from a safe distance and say "Well, well, how interesting. A lot to be said on both sides, evidently."

Is this true? If an authority of the standing of Stein makes a case as strong as this in an article on the weakness of Japan, should the instinctive response be "What is to be said on the Japanese side?" Should it not be "If this is true, how does it affect Australian interests?" For the fact of the matter is that you in Australia and we in America have the same kind of interest in the outcome of this war. We are not distant and disinterested spectators. A victory for Japan would mean one kind of world, in which we should be vitally interested. A victory for China would mean another kind of world, in which we should also be vitally interested. I am distressed at the lack of realization of this in both America and Australia. We keep balancing "what can be said for China" with "what can be said for Japan" dodging the really important questions, which are "Where do we come in, or where do we get out?"

As far as the Bulletin is concerned, all of this is none of my business. Consider, therefore, that the seat of my pants presents a broad target, and deliver me a long-distance kick in the middle thereof at your leisure.

I hope we'll be meeting again.

Very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, I understand that there is a slight conflict here in the date of Guenther Stein's arrest in Paris. Apparently the testimony conflicts. You said last spring, and again I think you said in 1950,

General WILLOUGHBY. Of course, I am not a walking file case, naturally, having this type of information at my fingertips.

Have you got a translation which I will identify as having been made by me? That is a message from the French Ambassador to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, we have that, General.

General WILLOUGHBY. That will give you the date. It must have been this spring.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, we will get that, General.

General WILLOUGHBY. The INS carried it as a news item. I am so impressed with the accuracy of intelligence reporting by journalistic professionals that I consider their reportage as always a part of my evidence. So if you cannot locate it there, I know of an INS dispatch at that time. It must have been around February, I should say, offhand speaking.

If the INS hasn't got it, then I am sure AP has. If not, Mr. Bett.

Mr. MORRIS. While we are getting that, General, I would like to ask you about certain leaders of the IPR who were active at headquarters during the war.

During last Tuesday's session, General, we had testimony from Prof. Karl Wittfogel that T. A. Bisson was a member of the Communist Party when Dr. Wittfogel knew him back in 1935—I think the date was.

Do you know that Mr. Bisson was assigned to your headquarters and served there until 1948, General Willoughby?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have a recollection that Bisson was a Department of Army civilian employee in one of the civil sections of SCAP, probably the Government section, in the period 1946-48.

Here again the exact dates you have to indulge the fact that I do not have the details of every investigative case at my fingertips.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask a question, if I might, please.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. General, are you under the same ban as other witnesses who came here, that they are unable to testify in relation to personnel files and so-called loyalty files?

General WILLOUGHBY. I am.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, your lips are closed to this committee and you are unable to give to this committee anything in relation to a personnel file?

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So if there is or is not a personnel file and its contents on any of these people that we are talking about in the United States Government, the people cannot learn through this committee what that file shows, or anything that is in that file, or your knowledge as to that file; is that correct?

General WILLOUGHBY. Will you permit me, Mr. Chairman, as this is a question of administrative significance, that I answer that in my way?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may answer it your way. I do not call for a yes or no answer. I just want the evidence. I want the facts.

General WILLOUGHBY. The point was brought up by the counsel yesterday in which he requested from me information on Mr. T. A. Bisson, one Miriam Farley, and one Grajdanzev, who has since changed his name to Grad.

Mr. MORRIS. And they, General, are people who have been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations, are they?

General WILLOUGHBY. I realize that.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were employed at your headquarters, who were assigned to your headquarters by executive authority in the United States?

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct. They were hired in the States and unloaded on Tokyo.

Senator FERGUSON. I think the word "unloaded" may enable us to draw some conclusions from that word.

General WILLOUGHBY. In which case, Mr. Chairman, you must permit me an editorial rescission.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I understand that.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would like to put it this way: Mr. Chairman, as a citizen, I am naturally most desirous to assist this important committee. However, as a Federal officer, I am expected to observe Army orders and Presidential directives.

I invite your attention to a Department of Army circular letter dated August 21, 1948, on the subject, Release of Personnel Records and Information. I quote:

No information of any sort relating to the employee's loyalty and no investigative data of any type, whether relating to loyalty or other aspects of the individual's record, shall be included in material submitted to a congressional committee.

The provision of the Presidential directive of March 13, 1949, I intended to apply to records of former employees as well as persons now in the Federal service.

These people, Bisson, Farley, Grajdanzev, fall under the category of former employees.

Still quoting the regulation:

Any individual who may appear as a witness before a congressional committee will respectfully decline to testify concerning the loyalty of any person or as to the contents of any investigative files and will state that he is forbidden to answer such questions by pertinent directives of the Army.

Senator WATKINS. I take it, General, that the order of that directive is not classified.

General WILLOUGHBY. No. The basis is the Presidential directive of 13th of March 1948.

You can find it in Bulletin No. 6, Department of the Army, on the 17th of March 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. We have had high military officers and others quote the same in the hearings where the present Chair was chairman.

In other words, you are unable to give us this information?

General WILLOUGHBY. Based on the precise wording of this.

Senator FERGUSON. I shall, however, ask the chairman of this subcommittee if he will not again ask the President to allow this committee to have access, through you or someone else, to personnel files in relation to activities of certain people whose names are brought to the attention of the committee, particularly those connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, I want the record to show that I join in that request.

General WILLOUGHBY. May I add the following?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. I desire to further clarify my position in this matter and say that the personnel files and records are within the purview of Counterintelligence.

While this investigation unit, like the Four Hundred and Forty-first CIC in Tokyo, is a subdivision of G-2, my personal and prior attention was concentrated on the Korean War effort and on military intelligence in the Far East.

Ultimately you must obtain information from officers whose sole business it was to develop and maintain personnel investigations.

I am, of course, not familiar with the details of literally thousands of file references or case histories.

Senator FERGUSON. Apparently the same rule applies not only to personnel files and those that have been employed, but it applied to Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field, who made an application for a position as an official in the Intelligence Branch of the United States Military Service.

The present Chair asked for that file, and all that is in it is merely a medical report, but no application for the position or letters of recommendation, or anything else. Nothing is in the file except a medical report.

Senator WATKINS. That is notwithstanding evidence to the fact that numerous other persons had made statements referring to said letters.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; notwithstanding their testimony.

I want to express my opinion to the witness, the able general in Intelligence, that he does feel that he is bound by a Presidential and a military superior order, and he has given the reason for not giving this information and not answering these questions, that I accept his explanation.

But that does not prevent me, as a Senator and temporary chairman, from advocating to the chairman and to the counsel that we again, in behalf of the people of the United States, ask for this information, because I think it is valuable to our internal security and our defense.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in this connection, I would like to point out that the reason we are asking for these particular three files is that Mr. T. A. Bisson, Miss Miriam Farley, and Mr. Andrew Grad have been active people in the Institute of Pacific Relations, who in addition were assigned to General Willoughby's headquarters.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. I will ask Mr. Mandel if he will further identify from the exhibits already introduced, and letters that we may introduce now, something about the identity of those three people.

Senator FERGUSON. I might say in reply to that that is true, and it is always our duty, as members of this committee, to produce all the evidence we can outside of what the official records show, which would aid us greatly.

But it creates an impossible burden on many occasions upon this committee to complete its investigation.

Senator WATKINS. This record is from the letters taken from the IPR files, is it?

Mr. MORRIS. Some of the letters and some from exhibits already introduced, Senator.

Mr. MANDEL. It has been previously introduced that the Windows On the Pacific biennial report of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, dated 1944 to 1946, on page 11, refers to T. A. Bisson, of the international secretariat.

Another exhibit previously introduced was a letter to Mr. Bisson from Wilma Fairbank, dated October 19, 1943, which referred to Mr. Bisson as the acting editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. So he was a member of the secretariat as well as the acting editor of the Pacific Affairs before he was assigned to General Willoughby's headquarters in Tokyo?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Grajdanzev?

Senator WATKINS. What is the date of that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. The date of the letter was October 19, 1943, and the date of the report was 1944-46.

Mr. MORRIS. They have already been introduced, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated November 26, 1941, addressed to Mr. Robert K. Straus, 10 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y., from Robert W. Barnett.

I read a portion of this letter which refers to Mr. Grajdanzev:

A month ago one department of the United States Government, and then later three departments, asked the institute for a monograph on the carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway together with a full analysis of the differentials in east to western movement of goods, the location of repair shops and round houses, the various points where congestion occurs, etc. Mr. Grajdanzev prepared a monograph which has been hailed in three Government departments as far more accurate than anything which they themselves could have prepared. This is just a sample of the kind of work which the institute is able to do and explains why the governments in this and other countries are so eager to get the services of members of the institute staff.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman, and have that marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 88," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 88

NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

Mr. ROBERT K. STRAUS,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. STRAUS: In response to your request for me to do so, I have tried to set down in this letter how the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations has risen to the demands of the national emergency.

From the Army, Navy, the Federal Reserve Bank, the Department of Commerce, the Administrator of Export Control, and the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supplies have come repeated calls for assistance which have been fulfilled by our research staff. Owen Lattimore, as you know, the editor of Pacific Affairs, was loaned to serve, on the nomination of President Roosevelt, as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's personal political adviser. We loaned first to the Universal Trading Corp. and then to the American, British, and Chinese Governments Ch'ao-ting Chi to serve as Secretary General of the A. B. C. Currency Stabilization Fund. We are glad that the War Department has recognized the ability of our expert on the Netherlands East Indies, Miss Ellen van Zyll de Jong, by giving her a research appointment. We assisted in arranging that Irving Friedman, a former member of the Secretariat, enter the division of monetary research of the Treasury Department. William W. Lockwood, on temporary leave, has worked as secretary of the American Committee for International Studies, and simultaneously for General Maxwell's and for Colonel Donovan's offices in Washington, but recently has taken over the secretaryship of the American Council. Both Mr. Carter and I have been invited to serve on the staff of the office of the Coordinator of Information, but have remained here because the necessity for popular education and private research seemed now more urgent.

A month ago one department of the United States Government, and then later three departments, asked the institute for a monograph on the carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway together with a full analysis of the differentials in east to western movement of goods, the location of repair shops and round-houses, the various points where congestion occurs, etc. Mr. Grajdanzev prepared a monograph which has been hailed in three government departments as far more accurate than anything which they themselves could have prepared. This is just a sample of the kind of work which the institute is able to do and explains why the governments in this and other countries are so eager to get the services of members of the institute staff.

Our service to governments has not, happily, lessened thus far our aid to business groups, the press, and university and secondary-school circles. The demands for institute services from all these groups is greater than ever before. We provided indispensable information to the Fortune staff as it prepared its far eastern issue. We have assisted teachers' organizations to carry out their far eastern projects. We have set up some 13 regional conferences. Under the leadership of Catherine Porter, Miriam Farley, Dorothy Berg, and Kurt Bloch, a greatly enlivened Far Eastern Survey reaches a wider and more attentive audience. We broadcast weekly over CBS. We are publishing inexpensive pamphlets, among them Showdown at Singapore, Philippine Emergency, Japan Strikes South, Our Far Eastern Record, American Aid to China, and the Soviet Far East.

In the international field only in France and Holland has the work of the institute been curtailed. The Royal Institute in London has recently augmented its studies of the Far East and the far-eastern program of the Canadian and Australian institutes is more fundamental and better supported than at any period in the past.

You will agree with me, I feel sure, that the reasons which led to your support of the American Council last year are doubly valid now. May I suggest that you raise your 1940 contribution of \$25 to \$50 for 1941-42? This may prove to be the year of the long-awaited Japanese-American war—or, of Japan's surrender to ABCD economic pressure. Either development will greatly increase the

American Council's responsibilities to our Government and to the American public.

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT W. BARNETT.

Senator FERGUSON. For the purpose of explaining to the members of the committee, who are Mr. Straus and this man Barnett?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Straus is of no significance in this instance, Senator, but Mr. Barnett served as secretary of the Washington office, I believe, and is now an important official of the United States State Department.

Senator WATKINS. Do the records show that?

Mr. MORRIS. In other places, Senator.

As I say, at this point we say that Mr. Straus has no significance in this.

Mr. MANDILL. I have here a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 10, 1941, addressed to Lt. Col. Frederick D. Sharp, room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Our research has shown that Colonel Sharp was at that time connected with Military Intelligence.

The letter states:

DEAR COLONEL SHARP: I am sorry for the delay in answering your questions on the Siberian railways. I had hoped to put one of my colleagues at work on it, but his schedule has been a little dislocated through learning that his father and two other members of his family were killed in the German bombing of Belgrade.

Instead, I have asked another of my colleagues, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzev, to turn up as much material as possible. Without sources he has drafted the enclosed very tentative memorandum, a copy of which I enclose.

Neither he nor I wish you to regard this interim report as authentic or definitive. To give you anything really satisfactory will take about 12 days of very thorough research. Mr. Grajdanzev and I hope we can send you something to meet your requirements not later than July 22. Will that be too late for your purposes?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Then there is another letter addressed to a Mr. Thurber. No initial is given. It is under date of July 23, 1941, addressed to the same address, room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue, which was the office at that time of Military Intelligence:

My colleague, Andrew Grajdanzev, has handed me the first draft of his notes on the Trans-Siberian Railway. I have not had an opportunity to check through this, nor have I had any of my other colleagues check on it. However, knowing that you are in a hurry for this first draft, I am sending it over today and will send you any corrections as soon as they reach my desk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Finally, I have a letter to Mr. Carter, Edward C. Carter, dated July 24, 1941, from Lt. Col. Frederick D. Sharp, G. S. C.:

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have received the report on the Trans-Siberian Railroad drawn up so ably by your colleague, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzev.

To thank both you and him in proportion to its value would be difficult. May it suffice to say that our own researches are at an end with such a reference source, and that Mr. Thurber, of my office, will be sorely tempted to draw on your knowledge of industries and raw materials east of the Urals, which is the next goal.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received in evidence and marked the next consecutive exhibits.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 89, 90, and 91," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 89

NEW YORK, N. Y., July 19, 1941.

LT. COL. FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue,¹
New York, N.Y.

DEAR COLONEL SHARP: I am sorry for the delay in answering your questions on the Siberian railways. I had hoped to put one of my colleagues at work on it, but his schedule has been a little dislocated through learning that his father and two other members of his family were killed in the German bombing of Belgrade.

Instead, I have asked another of my colleagues, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzov, to turn up as much material as possible. With sources he has drafted the enclosed very tentative memorandum, a copy of which I enclose.

Neither he nor I wish you to regard this interim report as authentic or definitive. To give you anything really satisfactory will take about 12 days of very thorough research. Mr. Grajdanzov and I hope we can send you something to meet your requirements not later than July 22. Will that be too late for your purposes?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 90

NEW YORK CITY, July 23, 1941.

MR. THURBER,
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue,
New York City.

DEAR MR. THURBER: My colleague Andrew Grajdanzov has handed me the first draft on his notes on the Trans-Siberian Railway. I have not had an opportunity to check through this, nor have I had any of my other colleagues check on it. However, knowing that you are in a hurry for this first draft I am sending it over today and will send you any corrections as soon as they reach my desk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 81

NEW YORK, N.Y., July 24, 1941.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have received the report on the Trans-Siberian Railroad drawn up so ably by your colleague, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzov.

To thank both you and him in proportion to its value would be difficult. May it suffice to say that our own researches are at an end with such a reference source, and that Mr. Thurber, of my office, will be sorely tempted to draw on your knowledge of industries and raw materials east of the Urals, which is the next goal.

Gratefully yours,

FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.

MR. MANDEL. I have another letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 3, 1942, addressed to Mr. George H. Kerr, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Room 2628, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.:

DEAR MR. KERR: Thank you for your letter of April 2 about Grajdanzov's report on Formosa. Under separate cover I am sending you an advance copy

¹ New York Office, Military Intelligence.

of the book which is now being bound. I have already sent copies to Remer in the Office of the Coordinator of Information, and to Bisson on the Board of Economic Warfare.

Both Grajdanzev and I would be glad to have your comments, and if there are any points which you think should definitely be corrected I would suggest that you let me know in the next day or two, as we may want to insert an errata slip in the book. The book itself is unfortunately a makeshift piece of manufacturing because we had to work with an incomplete and unsatisfactory set of proofs.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Finally, on April 2, 1942, George H. Kerr writes to William L. Holland, on the stationery of the War Department, War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Room 2628, Munitions Building:

MY DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I regret that my sudden coming to Washington in February precluded further talks with you about Formosa, to say nothing of further writing.

Some weeks ago there came to our MID files—and my Formosa section—a set of galley sheets of Dr. Grajdanzev's extraordinarily good work, which I first saw briefly in your office and now have read thoroughly. No covering letter came with it to me and so it is not clear whether this is a loan or a final gift to our files. If it is not a loan, I shall be free to divide it according to subjects and distribute it among my folders. If it is a loan, I shall keep it intact and forward it to you as soon as some of the statistical material can be digested. We live very largely on loans these days.

Please tell Professor Grajdanzev that it will give me great pleasure some day to talk with him. His work is certainly excellent. There are only a few very minor suggestions I might make, none of first importance.

Have the added chapter or chapters on strategy been set up? I would not be free to add anything attributable to my sources here, but I would be glad to read through the chapter again to make sure that some errors in judgment have not crept in. Needless to say, such checking must be done anonymously.

With every good wish,

GEORGE H. KERR.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I think that will suffice for Mr. Grajdanzev, who, as the record will show, has now changed his name to Mr. Grad.

Mr. Chairman, we offer that letter from Mr. Holland to Mr. Kerr, and the letter from Mr. Kerr to Mr. Holland, as the next consecutive exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 92 and 93," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 92

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.

April 3, 1942.

Mr. GEORGE H. KERR,

Military Intelligence Division, War Department,

Room 2628, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. KERR: Thank you for your letter of April 2 about Grajdanzev's report on Formosa. Under separate cover I am sending you an advance copy of the book which is now being bound. I have already sent copies to Remer in the Office of the Coordinator of Information, and to Bisson on the Board of Economic Warfare.

Both Grajdanzev and I would be glad to have your comments, and if there are any points which you think should definitely be corrected I would suggest that you let me know in the next day or two, as we may want to insert an errata

slip in the book. The book itself is unfortunately a makeshift piece of manufacturing because we had to work with an incomplete and unsatisfactorily set of proofs.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 93

WAR DEPARTMENT, GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2,
Washington, April 2, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR Mr. HOLLAND: I regret that my sudden coming to Washington in February precluded further talks with you about Formosa, to say nothing of further writing.

Some weeks ago there came to our MID files—and my Formosa Section—a set of galley sheets of Dr. Grajdanzev's extraordinarily good work, which I first saw briefly in your office and now read thoroughly. No covering letter came with it to me, and so it is not clear whether this is a loan or a final gift to our files. If it is not a loan, I shall be free to divide it according to subjects and distribute it among my folders. If it is a loan, I shall keep it intact and forward it to you as soon as some of the statistical material can be digested. We live very largely on loans these days.

Please tell Professor Grajdanzev that it will give me great pleasure some day to talk with him. His work is certainly excellent. There are only a few very minor suggestions I might make, none of first importance.

Have the added chapter or chapters on strategy been set up? I would not be free to add anything attributable to my sources here, but I would be glad to read through the chapter again to make sure that some errors in judgment have not crept in. Needless to say, such checking must be done anonymously.

With every good wish,

GEORGE H. KING.

My residence address: 2700 Wisconsin Avenue NW.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder, Mr. Mandel, if you can just tell us briefly who Miss Farley is, in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and possibly one letter indicating that she was looking forward to her activity in Tokyo?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an excerpt from the volume entitled "Security in the Pacific," a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, at Hot Springs, Va., January 6-17, 1945.

On page 159 Miriam S. Farley is listed as having participated in the conferences of 1936, 1939, and 1942. She is listed here also as an editor of the American Council Pamphlet Series, research associate, American Council, IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. She was the editor of the Far Eastern Survey; was she not, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. We offer that document as the next exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 94" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 94

[From Security in the Pacific, A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs, Va., January 6-17, 1945]

CONFERENCE MEMBERSHIP, UNITED STATES

Miriam S. Farley (1936, 1939, 1942), editor, American Council Pamphlet Series, research associate, American Council, IPR (p. 159).

(Years in parentheses after names indicate attendance at previous IPR conferences.)

Mr. MANDEL. I have here another letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 8, 1946, addressed to "Dear Bill."

Senator FERGUSON. Who could "Bill" be?

Mr. MANDEL. It may be William L. Holland, or William W. Lockwood.

I read only the last paragraph, as follows:

I've been put to work doing the political section of MacArthur's Monthly report. There will be a certain sporting interest in seeing how much I can get by with.

Yours,

MIRIAM.

This is addressed from "M. S. Farley, GHQ, SCAP, Government Section, A. P. O. 500, Care Postmaster, San Francisco."

Senator FERGUSON. This would indicate that on April 8, 1946, Miriam whose name was—what?

Mr. MANDEL. Farley.

Mr. MORRIS. Miriam S. Farley?

Senator FERGUSON. "M. S. Farley, GHQ, SCAP, Government Section, A.P.O. 500, care of Postmaster, San Francisco." She was then a Government employee on General MacArthur's staff and she was writing to someone in the Institute of Pacific Relations, because this is in the file and you obtained it from that file, and the paragraph was as she had written it.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You have identified this from the files; have you not, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was that personnel file that we were asking the general about that we might get some information from. That is correct; is it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive the whole letter because we do not want to take a section out of context.

Mr. MORRIS. The whole letter is introduced into evidence and will be marked as the next consecutive exhibit number.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 95," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 95

APRIL 8, 1946.

DEAR BILL: Matsuo asked me to send this on to you after I had read it. It is a report which he did for the political adviser's office, and is not for publication. I saw Yasuo last week. He looks well though much older, and is working 10 hours a day as editor of the English edition of Jiji Press. He has a year-and-a-half-old son. He told quite a tale of the days of the surrender. It seems he was instrumental in breaking the story of the first note (accepting Potsdam terms on condition that Emperor, etc.), Domei, with which he then was, got hold of the note somehow from the Foreign Office and was not authorized to make it public. After consultation between Yasuo and his chief, they did so nevertheless—put it on the radio. Within half an hour they got a reaction from San Francisco. Then the Kernspical (Gendarmerie) descended on them and they had quite a rough time for 3 days. Y's chief was locked up for a while. To cover themselves they claimed to have gotten the story from the Moscow radio.

I've been put to work doing the political section of MacArthur's monthly report. There will be a certain sporting interest in seeing how much I can get by with.

Yours,

MIRIAM.

M. S. FARLEY,

GHO, SCAP, Government Section, A. P. O. 500, care of Postmaster, San Francisco.

P. S.—I forgot to say that Yasuo wanted to be remembered to you, Phil Lillenthal, and others at the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we do not want to restrict our request for files to those particular people.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that. The request may be in connection with all that you may list.

Mr. MORRIS. That are other particular people about whom we would also like a file, because we understand that there are such files in the Tokyo headquarters.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I think this would be a sufficient example and this will be the last we will cite, Hugh Deane, who was an active member of the IPR.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter addressed to Mr. Hugh Deane, Radio News Room, Coordinator of Information, Washington, D. C., January 12, 1942, and signed by Miriam Farley:

It is good to know that you are working in our propaganda department because I know that you have a lot to contribute to it. I am passing on your letter to several of my colleagues, including Bill Lockwood, and you will probably be getting lots of suggestions from us. If you don't keep after us; we are standing on our heads.

Mr. MORRIS. And that was addressed to Mr. Hugh Deane at the Office of the Coordinator of Information?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was the date?

Mr. MANDEL. January 12, 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced in the record, Mr. Chairman, as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 96" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 96

JANUARY 12, 1942.

Mr. HUGH DEANE,

Radio News Room, Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR HUGH: It is good to know that you are working in our propaganda department because I know that you have a lot to contribute to it. I am passing on your letter to several of my colleagues, including Bill Lockwood, and you will probably be getting lots of suggestions from us. If you don't keep after us; we are standing on our heads.

One rather obvious suggestion that occurs to me offhand is to plug Hull's note of November 26 and other American statements such as our note of December 1938 indicating that the United States was always willing to consider the peaceful alteration of the status quo including economic concessions to Japan. "We made you a fair offer but your military leaders rejected it and chose war," etc. Another rather obvious line which has doubtless already occurred to you is, "the Nazis are not your friends, they look down on the Japanese race and are just using you for their own purposes." This can be backed up by quotations from Nazi writings, the kind of thing that is found in the special section of Asia magazine for November 1941.

For our part we shall of course be much interested to know the kind of stuff that our Government is broadcasting to Japan. Would it be possible for us to obtain a file of transcripts of these broadcasts? It seems to me that it would be a very good thing if at a little later date the Far Eastern Survey could carry a short article describing American propaganda to Japan providing that this is consistent to the policy of your department.

You will be interested to know, in case you have not already heard, that we are about to open an office in Washington for the purpose of keeping in touch with all of the various departments of the Government which are working on the Far East. Bob Barnett is to be in charge and some of the rest of us will doubtless get down occasionally. I know that Bob will want to look you up as soon as he gets established.

I am passing your order for the Far Eastern Survey on to the subscription department.

Sincerely yours,

MIRIAM FARLEY.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the record also to show that previous exhibits have described Mr. Hugh Deane as the editor of a publication now being circulated and printed in Shanghai, which is Communist China.

Hugh Deane was listed as an associate editor of the Shanghai Monthly Bulletin, which is now published from Shanghai.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how long he has been connected in that capacity in Shanghai?

Mr. MORRIS. No. We have just introduced particular volumes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Hugh Deane was so associated in Communist China?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, at the time China was under Communist control.

Mr. Chairman, we have planned to introduce many more exhibits, such as those we have just introduced, but in consideration of the fact that the general is here and has been here all morning, I think we would like to discontinue the hearing at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask the general something. I know he has been ill.

Mr. MORRIS. The general has one more thing.

Senator FERGUSON. He has been ill, but I want to ask him one more question.

General, in your experience in the Far East, have you found that the policies of communism, the Communist Party line, has been affecting in any way United States relations with and in the Far East?

General WILLOUGHBY. If I interpret your question correctly, Senator, you want me to give you a statement of the impact of communism on the Far East, with particular reference to Japan?

Senator FERGUSON. No. The United States and its relations in the Far East.

General WILLOUGHBY. Perhaps it is the fatigue, or the late morning hour, but would you mind stating that again, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Here is what I want to find out, if you can give me the information: If you have seen any evidence of communism, as practiced by Russia, and the principles of communism in the Far East, having any bearing or relations to our policies, American policies, in the Far East?

General WILLOUGHBY. I will try to give you a series of perhaps disconnected comments, hoping that at the end the mosaic will become clear.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would say that the impact of communism, as practiced by the Russians, of course, is by now pretty well known. It affects all Communist parties in all countries. It affects the Japanese Communist Party, and inferentially, of course, created a problem for the occupation forces, that is, America as exemplified by the occupation forces, in which we had either to take a stand or support the Japanese Government in taking a stand against the Japanese Communist Party and what it stood for.

We felt that that party was not a national party at all. It has no political independence or identity, that it took its orders from the master mind, the Politburo, like so many other Communist parties of national origin.

We felt that if we could not maintain American predominance in the sense of political ideals, that someone else would move in; that if we create a vacuum in the Far East, that that vacuum, on the basis of pure applied physics, would be filled by someone.

That someone is Soviet Russia.

Then we talk about the problems of the Far East now and in the past 10 years. We really mean the corrosive influence exercised by the power politics of the Soviet against and upon neighboring areas.

You had that example in what they have done to North Korea, liberated by us in 1945, and within a space of 5 years, converted to a warlike opponent of the United States.

You have seen the same thing in China. And unless the American policy is firm along this outpost of western civilization, that runs from, roughly, Alaska through Japan, through the Philippines, down to and including the British and Indonesian areas; if we create or permit the development of a vacuum there, that great and sinister power will move into it as it has moved into it on other occasions.

Whether that falls within the purview of a calculated policy by the United States, in that case the policy of our Government, I am not in a position to comment in either approving or disapproving manner.

But to any student of a geographical strategic problems, we must accept that the western frontier runs roughly from British Malaya through Siam, through Indochina, where there is an active front in Chungking; through the Philippines and the island chain leading ultimately to Alaska.

That is an opinion which is a blend of geopolitical military strategic factors, predicated on the raw materials which we must seize or not permit to fall into opposing hands.

In other words, it is a global problem of such complexity that it is probably difficult to answer in a brief summation statement.

And I may be disappointing to you, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. No; I am glad to get that opinion.

I would like to have this answered: We found that there was an attempt to get Guenther Stein's works that he had written, to exert an influence. We find from this evidence that he was and is a Communist and was a Russian spy as a Communist.

Do you find any evidence that the writings of such people have had an influence upon America's foreign policy in the Far East?

I cite merely his writings as one example that he was writing here these many articles for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

General WILLOUGHBY. I will attempt to give you a reply considering the moral importance of this committee, or any congressional committee, which earnestly seeks to arrive at demonstrable facts, and it is within the obligation of citizenship, immigrant or otherwise, to assist those committees.

In an appraisal of my reply, which I am developing as I go along, you must discount my absence from the United States since 1938. I am a sort of oriental Rip Van Winkle, who is returning now in a series of shattering disillusion.

But I will say that, in general, your thesis that that type of writing is corrosive, objectionable, deteriorating to public opinion, cannot be challenged, and I agree with you. I think that there is a deliberate attempt to circulate, to public relation, to sell this type of book by every channel which these people are capable of, and I again refer to the illuminating article of Irene Kuhn in the American Legion, and Ralph Toledano's in Mercury, which are some of the outstanding articles that I have read since my return from abroad; that they show how that type of book is promoted, supported, book reviewed in calculated channels of subversion, while other books which would establish a balance of judgment are suppressed, belittled, criticized.

So in general terms, taking Stein or Smedley, or the ubiquitous Grajdanzev, to build up their stuff as the last word in reliable, technical, and expert information is part of a pattern of conversion of the mind, which is going on, and has been going on apparently for some time.

Does that answer your question?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, it does; because we get from the file of the Institute of Pacific Relations, June 24, 1942, "W. W. L. to E. C. C." and "W. L. H.", a further comment:

On circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it to John Fairbank he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his Chinese staff, who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in return.

And I underscore:

John suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in return.

It continues:

I am leaving the matter to you to handle, however.

Mr. MORRIS. John Fairbank, Mr. Chairman, was head of the China desk of OWI at the time.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would say, as an interested bystander, that this letter is almost conclusive and highly indicative of the techniques that they employ in recommending each other and disseminating their work.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean Communist work?

General WILLOUGHBY. People that range from communism to fellow traveling, befuddled liberals, and whatever that category that has been described so often in the current press reports.

Senator FERGUSON. In your work in the Far East, you naturally came in contact with Communists and their activities, and that is

the reason that I asked you the question, because I know that you could not perform your functions as a general in the United States Intelligence Service, major general, without having contact and experience. I know that your opinion will be of great value to this committee.

Now, General, you had something you wanted to present.

Mr. MORRIS. This clears up, Mr. Chairman, a conflict that may have come into the testimony earlier, about the time of Guenther Stein's arrest in Paris. The general has an official document there which he will identify and which will be introduced into the record.

General WILLOUGHBY. I will act as assistant to the counsel to file this. It is a message from the French Embassy to me in response to a query on the whereabouts and activities of Guenther Stein. In order to preserve its authenticity I will read it in its original French, and give you the translation immediately.

Entré en France dans le courant de 1949, Guenther Stein a obtenu le 18 octobre de la même année une carte de correspondant de l'«Hindustani Times», quotidien de New Delhi.

* * * Entered France during 1949, Guenther Stein obtained, on the 18th of October of the same year, an identification card as accredited correspondent of the Hindustani Times, which is a daily of New Delhi.

A son arrivée, il a produit un passeport délivré le 2 septembre 1941 par les autorités de Hong Kong, ville où il avait été naturalisé citoyen britannique le 6 août 1941.

At his arrival, he produced a passport, which he obtained on the 2d of September 1941, through the authorities of Hong Kong, the town where he obtained naturalization papers, as a British citizen, on August 6, 1941.

Il a été expulsé de France pour espionnage, en vertu d'un arrêté du 14 novembre 1950 et s'est dirigé sur l'Angleterre.

He was expelled from France for espionage—

The term is "espionage"—

following his arrest on the 14th of November 1950 and apparently left for England.

Il est probable qu'il se trouve encore actuellement dans ce pays.

It is likely that he at this time is actually in that country.

Mr. MORRIS. Who signed that, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. It has no signature because it is a carbon copy, but I will identify it as a report from the French Embassy in Tokyo to me.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have it introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit, having been identified by General Willoughby.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 97" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 97

Note

Confidential

Entré en France dans le courant de 1949, Guenther Stein a obtenu le 18 octobre de la même année une carte de correspondant de l'«Hindustani Times», quotidien de New Delhi.

A son arrivée, il a produit un passeport délivré le 2 septembre 1941 par les autorités de Hong Kong, ville où il avait été naturalisé citoyen britannique le 6 août 1941.

Il a été expulsé de France pour espionnage, en vertu d'un arrêté du 14 novembre 1950 et s'est dirigé sur l'Angleterre.

Il est probable qu'il se trouve encore actuellement dans ce pays.

GUENTHER STEIN

Translation:

Entered France during 1949. Guenther Stein received a press card for the Hindustani Times, a daily of New Déphi on October 18 of the same year.

On his arrival, he produced a passport issued on September 2 1941, by the Authorities of Hong Kong, the city where he obtained naturalization papers, as a British citizen, dated August 6, 1941.

He was expelled from France, on a charge of espionage, following his arrest on November 14, 1950, and has left for England. It is probable that he is actually in that country.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I want to thank you for coming before us this morning. I realize that there has been some handicap by virtue of Executive order. I hope that it is not found that you have violated any of the sections of that order and that, as the chairman has expressed, it is this committee's desire that there be no retaliation against any Government employee for testifying before this committee.

Again I want to thank you. I know that you have been ill. We appreciate your coming down. We regret the length of the session.

General WILLOUGHBY. Not at all.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess now. I do not want to say that we are through with your examination, because we may call you at another time.

We will meet again at 10 o'clock on Tuesday. Counsel will tell you as to whether or not you are desired.

Again I want to tell you that we appreciate your coming down.

General WILLOUGHBY. Glad to be of service.

(Thereupon, at 12:55 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Tuesday, August 14, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, AUGUST 14, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Senators McCarthy and Mundt; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Miss BENTLEY, will you stand and be sworn, please?

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Miss BENTLEY. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF ELIZABETH T. BENTLEY, CLINTON, CONN.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the stenographer, please?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, my full name is Elizabeth T. Bentley.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you speak loudly enough so that all can hear you, please?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. My address is Clinton, Conn.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, I wonder if you would tell us briefly of your formal education.

Miss BENTLEY. I have an A. B. degree from Vassar College, a master's degree from Columbia University, and a year's study at the university in Florence, Italy.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first join the Communist Party of the United States?

Miss BENTLEY. In the middle of March 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay in the open Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. The so-called open Communist Party, that is, where I was attached to a unit of some twenty-odd people, for 3½ years up until about October 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. You say about 3½ years?

Miss BENTLEY. About 31½ years.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you then discontinue all connection with the Communist Party, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. No, I went with what they called the underground; that is, I was working for an Italian Fascist contact. I was put under a person under whom I worked.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you were working for the Italian Fascist Party, you had infiltrated?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. From there you went into what?

Miss BENTLEY. I was put in contact with one person to whom I reported.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that?

Miss BENTLEY. Jacob Golos, G-o-l-o-s.

Mr. MORRIS. Jacob Golos?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his position?

Miss BENTLEY. He was quite high up in the NKVD, which is the OGPU. He was also a member of the three-man control commission.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was a member of a three-man control commission of the American Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. That is practically the outfit that runs the American Communist Party. They are the disciplinary committee that can take action against the members.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who the other two members were at that time?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know offhand. It's on record some place.

Mr. MORRIS. But you know he was one of three men?

Miss BENTLEY. He was one of three men.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was also connected with the NKVD?

Miss BENTLEY. He had been connected with it as far back as the early twenties.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the NKVD?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't think I know what it means in Russian, but it's the internal security police, translated. It includes all of the Soviet espionage work whether military intelligence or rounding up the recalcitrants.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it is the Soviet military police?

Miss BENTLEY. That is right, operating abroad.

Mr. MORRIS. Abroad, from the Soviet Union?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You say Golos was a representative of the NKVD for the Soviet Union?

Miss BENTLEY. And a high-up one.

Mr. MORRIS. And a high-up one?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us the nature of your assignment with Golos?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, after I had left the Italian Library of Information, which was the Italian Fascist outfit I mentioned, I stayed on with Mr. Golos as my contact, doing odd jobs for him. Finally the odd jobs came into contacting undercover Communists to get information. It started with a gentleman by the name of Abraham Brothman. He was doing espionage work.

Mr. MORRIS. He is the man who recently was convicted in New York?

Miss BENTLEY. He was recently convicted in New York for obstructing justice.

Mr. MORRIS. You were a witness in that case?

Miss BENTLEY. I was a witness in that case.

It gradually worked up to picking up people who were working for the United States Government and gathering information.

Mr. MORRIS. While you had that job, I wonder if you would describe what your relation was to Earl Browder, head of the Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. I never dealt with Mr. Browder until after Mr. Golos' death, at which time I took over his job.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your relation?

Miss BENTLEY. I was the boss, and he took the orders on intelligence matters.

Mr. MORRIS. On intelligence matters?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. If we wanted people to run cover businesses for agents, he would provide them. In one case that I recall a Soviet intelligence agent was about to be drafted into the Army, and he was to contact the NMU fraction—that is, the Communist group in the union—and get him shifted into the merchant marine.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Miss BENTLEY. 1944—the beginning of 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would you contact to get him shifted to the merchant marine?

Miss BENTLEY. I didn't do that; it was his job.

Senator FERGUSON. That was his job?

Miss BENTLEY. That was his job.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time Browder was the head of the American Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. Browder was the head of the American Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. Since then he is not connected in your opinion with the American Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. I doubt if he is connected with the American Communist Party?

Senator FERGUSON. What about the International Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. What gives you that opinion?

Miss BENTLEY. He was in 1946, and I see no reason to change my opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you were the assistant to Mr. Golos from what year?

Miss BENTLEY. From the middle of October 1938 until his death in 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. So for that 5-year period you were the assistant to Golos?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened upon the death of Golos?

Miss BENTLEY. Upon the death of Golos, because evidently no plans had been made within the secret police, I took over his job temporarily.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Was his death from natural causes?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes; he died of a heart attack. He had an extremely bad heart.

MR. MORRIS. So at that time, after you had succeeded Golos, your relationship to Browder would be that of his superior in intelligence work?

MISS BENTLEY. That is correct; yes.

MR. MORRIS. Did you know about the Institute of Pacific Relations at that time?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes; I did vaguely before 1943, but much more closely starting with the summer of 1943.

MR. MORRIS. What were your dealings with the Institute of Pacific Relations and concerning the Institute of Pacific Relations?

MISS BENTLEY. Well, it happened rather by accident. I had better go back a little bit on that and mention that in February, I think it was 1941, we took on a new Communist agent, and that was Mary Price, who at that time was secretary to Walter Lippmann. The Soviet Intelligence felt that Lippmann had valuable material in his files, and therefore we had taken her on to get us copies of it.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Did you get copies?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes, we got complete copies—or so, at least, she told us.

SENATOR FERGUSON. You know you got some copies?

MISS BENTLEY. We got a tremendous amount. I know I went down one time and typed a pile like that [indicating].

MR. MORRIS. When you say "came down," what do you mean by that?

MISS BENTLEY. From New York to Washington. I was living in New York, and I would come down on trips to Washington.

MR. MORRIS. Where would you go in Washington? In other words, when you say you came to Washington?

MISS BENTLEY. I went to Mary Price's house. She was living on Olive Avenue at that time.

MR. MORRIS. You never went to Mr. Lippmann's place?

MISS BENTLEY. Oh, no; because Mr. Lippmann did not know anything about it.

SENATOR FERGUSON. She was a secret agent?

MISS BENTLEY. She was a secret agent.

SENATOR FERGUSON. And you were attempting to steal things out of Mr. Lippmann's files?

MISS BENTLEY. Not only attempting, but we succeeded.

SENATOR FERGUSON. You succeeded. What were these things you copied? Do you recall any of them?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes. A number of them were documents dealing with our relations with Britain. Some of it was material that seems to have had some relation to the War Department and things of that sort.

MR. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, you stated that your dealings with Mary Price at that particular time brought you into contact with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I wonder if you would explain that.

MISS BENTLEY. Mary got into rather bad health in the late spring of 1943 and went to Mexico on a vacation. She suggested that we keep in contact with her through Mildred Price, her sister. Mildred Price was a member or executive secretary of the China Aid Council.

MR. MORRIS. Member or executive secretary?

Miss BENTLEY. Executive secretary, which is tantamount to being the head of it. That was a Communist-dominated organization.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the name of that organization?

Miss BENTLEY. The China Aid Council. At that time it was located, I think, around Twenty-third Street and Fifth Avenue. At first we looked on Mildred as a means of getting word back and forth to Mary. Then when we began talking to her we began realizing that there was a fertile field from which to get intelligence and that is when we began to get interested in the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. This China Aid was for Communist China?

Miss BENTLEY. China Aid Council. I would say so.

Senator FERGUSON. There were different names for China aid, and I wondered.

Miss BENTLEY. The China Aid Council was particularly concerned with the Eighth Route Army and the Communist-dominated part of China.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the China Aid Council completely dominated by the Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; according to what she told me.

Mr. MORRIS. She was executive secretary?

Miss BENTLEY. Executive secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any way that you can amplify that?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; Mr. Golos told me the same thing, and later Earl Browder told me the same thing.

Mr. MORRIS. Mildred Price's assistant was the woman named Mentana Sayers?

Miss BENTLEY. Michael Sayers' wife.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know her to be a Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. Mildred told me that.

Mr. MORRIS. But Mildred Price did tell you that Mentana Sayers, her assistant in the China Aid Council, also was a Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Is this the Mary Price that came from North Carolina and ran for public office down there?

Miss BENTLEY. I understand that. I believe Senator Hoey told me at one time she was running on the Progressive ticket. Was that it?

Senator SMITH. Something like that.

Miss BENTLEY. She went back to Greensboro, having come from there, in 1943.

Senator SMITH. It was some State office, I believe.

Miss BENTLEY. That is the same one.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer into evidence two letterheads with incidental letters of the China Aid Council into the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. From what source are you getting these?

Senator SMITH. May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Is this the same girl that was connected with the Southern Council for Human Welfare?

Miss BENTLEY. She went with the Southern Council for Human Welfare in the spring of 1945 and how long she stayed with them I don't know.

Senator SMITH. Was she a Communist at that time?

Miss BENTLEY. She had been one for at least 10 years before I met her. She was a charter member of UOPWA.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record three letterheads. Mr. Mandel will identify the source, but I would like to show these to ask Miss Bentley if the organization that she has just testified about is the organization referred to on these letterheads.

First is a letterhead of the China Aid Council of the American League for Peace and Democracy. I would like to offer that to Miss Bentley and ask her if that is the same organization that she has just testified about.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, I imagine that is the same one. There wasn't any League for Peace and Democracy at the time I knew the organization, but I was told, again second-hand, that that was an offshoot of it.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Here I show you a letterhead dated November 24, 1941, China Aid Council combined with the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans, and ask you if that is the same organization about which you are testifying.

Miss BENTLEY. That is the same organization. It has the same phone number and same address.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you notice who the executive secretary and the administrative secretary to the executive secretary are? I think it is at the bottom of the list.

Miss BENTLEY. Mildred Price is the executive secretary, and Mentana Sayers is administrative secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now I offer you a third letterhead, Miss Bentley, and ask you if you will identify that organization. That is a letterhead dated March 1, 1944, I believe; is it not?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, this is after the organization moved up to around Columbus Circle.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss BENTLEY. It left its quarters at 200 Fifth Avenue.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that that is the same organization about which you have testified?

Miss BENTLEY. That is the same organization, but it moved uptown into a building with, I understand, other Chinese organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. That organization was Communist-controlled, you say, and you were dealing with Mildred Price, executive secretary, who, according to your testimony, virtually ran the organization?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now will you authenticate those exhibits?

Mr. MANDEL. The letter dated March 1, 1944, from the China Aid Council combined with the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans is addressed to William Holland of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Being the same letter that has just been shown to the witness?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes; and going from Mrs. Edward C. Carter, president. It is a part of the Institute of Pacific Relations files which were turned over to us.

Now the letterhead reading "China Aid Council of the American League for Peace and Democracy" is not a part of the institute files, but comes to us as a result of our research, and I might note that the American League for Peace and Democracy has been cited as a Communist front by Attorney General Biddle.

We have another letterhead from the China Aid Council combined with the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans dated November 24, 1941, signed by Arthur Upham Pope, chairman, American Committee for Chinese War Orphans.

The CHAIRMAN. Being the same exhibit as was shown to the witness?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. This is also a part of the institute files.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read the members of the executive committee on that last letterhead?

Mr. Chairman, in the course of our investigation we are going to show that many of the personnel of the Institute of Pacific Relations were connected with the China Aid Council, so I think at this time as an example I would like to point out the list of people who were on the executive board as shown on the last letterhead, which I believe is a 1941 letterhead.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. You wanted only people connected with the institute read, or all of them?

Mr. MORRIS. Put the whole list in.

Mr. MANDEL. The chairman is Dr. Claude E. Forkner. Then we have the honorary vice chairmen—

Mr. MORRIS. Leave the honorary vice chairmen out.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have Arthur Upham Pope, treasurer. Then we have the executive committee, consisting of Dr. Henry A. Atkinson, Dr. Henry L. Bibby, Lyman R. Bradley, Mrs. Edward C. Carter, Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi, Mrs. Elizabeth B. Cotton, Mrs. Lucy Forkner, Margaret Forsyth, Talitha Gerlach, Dr. Claude E. Heaton, Philip J. Jaffe, Sally Lucas Jean, Mrs. Philip C. Jessup, Duncan Lee, Mrs. Lin Yutang, Dorothy McConnell, Edgar H. Rue, Mrs. Gordon M. Tiffany, Mildred Price, executive secretary, and Mentana G. Sayers, administrative secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, Miss Bentley, in connection with your development of your association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You had mentioned Mildred Price and then had gotten to the China Aid Council.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel want these exhibits to go into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce these three letterheads and have them marked as the next three consecutive exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be so marked and entered into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 98" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 98

CHINA AID COUNSEL COMBINED WITH THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR CHINESE WAR ORPHANS

NEW YORK 19, N. Y., MARCH 1, 1944

Mme. Wei Tao-ming, honorary chairman

Mrs. Edward C. Carter, president

Arthur Upham Pope, vice president

Mrs. Elizabeth B. Cotton, treasurer
 Sally Lucas Jean, chairman, children's division
 Dr. Claude E. Heaton, chairman, medical division

Board of directors:

Dr. Phyllis Ackerman
 Dr. Henry A. Atkinson
 Samuel L. M. Barlow
 Dr. Leona Baumgartner
 Dr. Henry L. Bibby
 Dr. Peter Blos
 Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi
 Mrs. Angelika W. Frink
 Talitha Gerlach
 Philip J. Jaffe
 Mrs. Philip C. Jessup
 Beatrice Kales
 Dr. Lawson G. Lowrey
 Mrs. C. Reinold Noyes
 Dr. Max Pinner
 Mrs. John Tee-Van
 Mrs. Gordon M. Tiffany
 Dr. George M. Wheatley
 Mildred Price, executive secretary
 Mentana G. Sayers, executive assistant

Participating in National War Fund, Inc., through United China Relief, Inc.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 99" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 99

CHINA AID COUNCIL COMBINED WITH THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR CHINESE WAR ORPHANS

200 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY, NOVEMBER 24, 1941

Dr. Claude E. Forkner, chairman
 Honorary vice chairmen:
 His Excellency, Dr. Hu Shih
 His Excellency, Dr. W. W. Yen
 Arthur Upham Pope, treasurer
 Executive committee:
 Dr. Henry A. Atkinson
 Dr. Henry L. Bibby
 Lyman R. Bradley
 Mrs. Edward C. Carter
 Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi
 Mrs. Elizabeth B. Cotton
 Mrs. Lucy Forkner
 Margaret Forsyth

Talitha Gerlach
 Dr. Claude E. Heaton
 Philip J. Jaffe
 Sally Lucas Jean
 Mrs. Philip C. Jessup
 Duncan Lee
 Mrs. Lin Yutang
 Dorothy McConnell
 Edgar H. Rue
 Mrs. Gordon M. Tiffany
 Mildred Price, executive secretary
 Mentana G. Sayers, administrative secretary

Participating in United China Relief

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 100" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 100

"GIVE TO SAVE LIVES IN CHINA"

City

Address

Name

No. 5801

捐 助 醫 藥 給 中 國

GIVE

FOR

MEDICAL

AID

TO

CHINA

CHINA AID COUNCIL AMERICAN LEAGUE
for PEACE and DEMOCRACY

National Office, 266 Fourth Ave., New York, N. Y.

捐 助 醫 藥 給 中 國

THE CHINA AID COUNCIL

of the
American League for Peace and Democracy

has the cooperation of

AMERICAN FRIENDS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE
CHINESE HAND LAUNDRY ALLIANCE JAPANESE PEACE SOCIETY
CHURCH LEAGUE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
METHODIST FEDERATION FOR SOCIAL SERVICE, LEAGUE OF WOMEN SHOPPERS
and many other organizations

Some of the individual sponsors are:

Sherwood Anderson	Prof. Frank Graham	Bishop Robert L. Doolittle
Dr. Chao Ting Chi	Mag. G. Duggan	A. Philip Randolph
William E. Dodd, Sr.	Prof. Robert M. Lovett	Prof. Eugene Stanley
Sherwood Eddy	Bishop Francis J. McConnell	Marshall Stewart
Dr. Harry F. Ward	Robt Stephen S. Wain	

Miss BENTLEY. During the summer and fall of 1943, we became interested in the far eastern field and in the IPR group.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss BENTLEY. Mildred Price at this particular point was Communist unit organizer for the unit operating in the far eastern field.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain that a little more fully, please, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. As you probably know, the Communist Party, the lowest echelon is made up of what they call the unit. That contains anywhere from three people on up. In the so-called head of that for purposes of party work is the unit organizer. Mildred, being a very energetic person and willing to take on a great deal of labor, was elected as unit organizer.

Since she was unit organizer of that far eastern unit, which included the IPR and the other organizations, we turned to her to see if there were people in the IPR and others of those far eastern organizations that came within our sphere of influence who would be useful for intelligence work. I once asked Mr. Golos why we just didn't take on the Institute of Pacific Relations itself, and he said, "No; they are operating much too loosely."

Mr. MORRIS. What did he mean by that?

Miss BENTLEY. He meant by that that they were operating so much in the open and they were making so many blunders that it would be a mercy if the FBI didn't get them.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean the Communists in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. The Communists in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Miss Mildred Price indicate to you the degree of control that the Communists exercised in the institute?

Miss BENTLEY. She told me it was one of our organizations in the sense that we exercised a control over it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Golos confirm that?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he did.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you amplify on that?

Miss BENTLEY. He told me it was an organization that originally had not, as far as he knew, been much under our control but later came under our control.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what you call an instrument?

Miss BENTLEY. It would be a Communist-front organization of a sort. It is hard to find the exact technology for it.

Mr. MORRIS. At the time he told you that you were his assistant working for the Soviet military police?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. But, he said the members in that were operating in what he said was a dangerous method and therefore he said he didn't think we should take it on en masse. However, we did go through the list of Communist members in the IPR to see if there was anybody to salvage. We had already picked up Duncan Lee, who had to go to Washington in 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Duncan Chapin Lee?

Miss BENTLEY. Duncan Chapin Lee.

Mr. MORRIS. What had he been doing?

Miss BENTLEY. He had been working for a law firm in New York, and then he received a position as a lawyer in OSS.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you had taken him out of the institute?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he had been brought to our attention by Mary Price through Mildred Price, and we found that he would be very close to General Donovan. Therefore, we relayed word to Mildred to disconnect him with that unit and put him in contact with us.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you meet him?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I did. Mary Price took care of him for, I believe, 6 months, and then I took him over personally.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you took him from the institute for work in your particular undertaking?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. To your knowledge, was he completely a member of your organization at that time?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he had been a Communist Party member I gathered for some little while. He paid his dues to me, I brought him his literature, and he was under Communist discipline. He was quite definitely a member.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he at that time working for Donovan?

Miss BENTLEY. He was one of that circle of lawyers who worked around Donovan. I don't know what they were called—advisers, probably.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get any information from him?

Miss BENTLEY. Quite a bit.

Senator FERGUSON. Out of the OSS?

Miss BENTLEY. I think he was our most valuable source in the OSS.

Senator FERGUSON. He delivered the material directly to you?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the nature of the material that he delivered to you, in what form, in manuscript?

Miss BENTLEY. Most of it was given to me orally because he was frightened to death of what he was doing and afraid to pass it on. Some of it he had written on scraps of paper.

The CHAIRMAN. You got no microfilms?

Miss BENTLEY. No, no; we only had two people doing our micro-filming.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, was there anyone else whom you got into your organization via the IPR?

Miss BENTLEY. There was one other, Michael Greenberg. He was not strictly speaking a member of the American party, being at that time a Britisher, and the policy of the party at that time was not to have aliens as members.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this Michael Greenberg, we have had testimony last Tuesday on Michael Greenberg and at the same time we introduced into the record a series of exhibits showing his connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I just would like to review those at this time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. While he is looking that up, was Greenberg connected with the United States Government in any way?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I think it was the summer or fall of 1943 that he came down to Washington and took a position as sort of assistant to Lauchlin Currie, who was then I believe in the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Greenberg ever deliver any papers to you?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he delivered information via Mildred Price to me. He was extremely temperamental and I thought it unwise to have him meet me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did this information come out of the White House?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; it was mostly on the Far East, on China.

Senator FERGUSON. It came out of the White House and he was assistant to Lauchlin Currie?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; or one of the assistants. I don't know whether he was the only one.

Mr. MORRIS. The nature of the exhibits is they showed that Greenberg succeeded Owen Lattimore as editor for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to what exhibits?

Mr. MORRIS. Exhibits 8, 7, and 51.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. All I want you to do is to identify the exhibits and their connection with the party named.

Mr. MORRIS. We will have to get that, Senator. I would like to comment upon exhibit No. 67, which was taken from the institute files. It is from Michael Greenberg on the letterhead of the White House in Washington, addressed to Miss Hilda Austern, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR HILDA: Mr. Currie has asked me to write you about the sending of IPR publications to William D. Carter in New Delhi, India. He says that he is baffled by the problem.

The only thing I can suggest is that you select a few books and try to get them out via OWL.

Sincerely yours,

MICHAEL.

That was introduced as exhibit 67 at the open hearings of August 7, 1951.

I would like to introduce, Mr. Chairman, at this time a letter dated May 23, 1942, from Mr. Y. Y. Hsu to Mr. Carter. I will ask Mr. Mandel if he will verify that that was taken from the institute files.

Mr. MANDEL. This letter was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and is dated May 23, 1942, addressed to "Dear Mr. Carter," and it is from Yung-ying Hsu.

Enclosed please find a memorandum which Miss Mildred Price worked out with my assistance. She has submitted a copy to Mr. Mills of the CIO Greater New York Industrial Council. The memo is written, by the way, on Mr. Mills' specific request. Miss Price would like to have a conference with you to discuss the same problem. She also suggests my participation. The present memorandum is based upon findings in my two previous memos which have been submitted to you and Mr. Holland. There are a few new points which I intended to examine more closely as a part of my research work. These have been included in the present document in the form of general statements. I believe they are reasonably correct. I have not been able to secure an additional copy of the present memo for Mr. Holland. I am sure you will make the enclosed copy available to him as you see fit.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evidence as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted and properly identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 101" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 101

Office, May 23, 1942.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Enclosed please find a memorandum which Miss Mildred Price worked out with my assistance. She has submitted a copy to Mr. Mills, of the CIO Greater New York Industrial Council. The memo is written, by the way, on Mr. Mills' specific request.

Miss Price would like to have a conference with you to discuss the same problem. She also suggests my participation.

The present memorandum is based upon findings in my two previous memos which have been submitted to you and Mr. Holland. There are a few new points which I have intended to examine more closely as a part of my research work. These have been included in the present document in the form of general statements. I believe that they are reasonably correct.

I have not been able to secure an additional copy of the present memo for Mr. Holland. I am sure you will make the enclosed copy available to him as you see fit.

Sincerely yours,

YUNG-YING HSU.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we will have the exhibit presently showing that Michael Greenberg succeeded Owen Lattimore as editor of Pacific Affairs, which is the publication of the International Institute of Pacific Relations.

THE CHAIRMAN. Very well.

MR. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did Earl Browder ever come to you to talk over about the degree of control the Communist Party had or its interest in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

MISS BENTLEY. Did he come to talk to me about it?

MR. MORRIS. Yes.

MISS BENTLEY. It arose from the fact that this particular Communist Party unit of which Mildred was the organizer and took care of business in the field, had as its political commissar Frederick Vanderbilt Field. He was to give them directives as to what they were to do and to relay messages to the top Communist leaders, especially to Browder. Browder had been personally in China and was interested in the far eastern situation.

MR. CHAIRMAN. What did you call Mr. Field?

MISS BENTLEY. I said that the closest I could come to his function re the far eastern field would be political commissar.

MR. MORRIS. So, Miss Bentley, you testify therefore that the Communist Party exercised control over the institute through Earl Browder through Frederick Field?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes; and through other groups, the party nucleus, the party units within the far eastern field.

MR. MORRIS. Who headed that unit within the far eastern field?

MISS BENTLEY. Miss Mildred Price, but Frederick Vanderbilt Field was the man who was higher up than Mildred Price.

SENATOR FERGUSON. During what period would he be the commissar in the Far East?

MISS BENTLEY. During the period I knew it, I can say from my own experience, certainly in 1933 and 1934. I know that three times Mildred Price complained to me that Fred Field had not shown up to have conferences and they did not know how to apply the party line in the Far East; that they needed instructions, and would I go to Browder and complain. She couldn't go directly. Three times I went to Browder and said, "Will you get Fred Field on the job he should be doing?" and he, Browder, said, "I will do that."

Senator FERGUSON. So he was the man steering the organization and laying down the party line to Mildred Price as far as the party line concerned the Far East?

Miss BENTLEY. In other words, he relayed the line. I wouldn't say he made up the party line.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. He was the man responsible for telling, at least, Mildred Price what the party line was?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the way that people are steered to the party line, through someone like Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Miss BENTLEY. Not entirely. This was an unusual situation. Usually you have a pyramiding from your unit to your section to your district, but this was considered to be such an important unit that they couldn't risk having it go through all these levels of Communist Party development, and therefore it went specially.

Senator FERGUSON. From a man like Field down through to her so that she could work the party line and hew to it in the Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct, and it was done that way so that there would be less danger.

Mr. MORRIS. You testified that her other activity was that she was executive secretary of the China Aid Council?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. There was no conflict between that assignment and the assignment in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. No, rather they complemented each other.

Mr. MORRIS. May I introduce into the record after Mr. Mandel identifies this letter as a copy of a letter to Michael Greenberg, managing editor, Pacific Affairs, dated April 28, 1942. This is by way of showing that Michael Greenberg was connected with Pacific Affairs.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a copy of a letter dated April 28, 1942, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. Michael Greenberg, managing editor of Pacific Affairs, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City, signed by F. V. F., presumably Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say that is a copy of a letter, did it come from the files in this form or have you the original?

Mr. MANDEL. We have the original, and that is a carbon.

The CHAIRMAN. The original was in the files?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a true and correct copy?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The original is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I inquire for the record when Frederick Vanderbilt Field applied for a commission in the United States Army in the Intelligence Section? What was the date of that?

Mr. MORRIS. I believe it was May 1942, in my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that come in the time when he was Communist Commissar for the Far East?

Miss BENTLEY. It could have been that. From what Mildred said he had been for some time, and that was in the summer of 1943, so it could be.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that be an important position, to have the commissar on our intelligence staff, for the Communists, I mean?

Miss BENTLEY. The Soviet Intelligence didn't like to lose anybody to the Army unless they could get into strategic positions--that is, not the infantry but with Intelligence they would consider that very good.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be an important position?

Miss BENTLEY. That would be an important position.

Senator FERGUSON. As you say, though, you tried to keep your members out of the real fighting because they could give you little aid?

Miss BENTLEY. They could give us little aid, and they would also get knocked off. We tried to get them into Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. You tried to get them into a safe spot.

Senator SMITH. Did you know about the efforts and maneuvers made to get Frederick Field in the Intelligence Service of the Army?

Miss BENTLEY. No, I didn't.

Senator SMITH. At that time, I mean.

Miss BENTLEY. No. I had heard of Fred Field before, but I had really not come up against him until 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. You have testified that Michael Greenberg was taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations and sent to Washington. Would you tell us a little bit about his assignment in Washington?

Miss BENTLEY. I am afraid I probably told you most of what I know. He was simply one of the assistants to Lauchlin Currie in the far-eastern field, which he knew well.

Mr. MORRIS. Lauchlin Currie was then executive assistant to the President?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. Right on the heels of that I believe he became, was it the head of FEA or Far Eastern Division?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have in the record when Greenberg became a United States citizen?

Mr. MORRIS. I think we have that later on, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. That will go into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, I at this point think we should discuss Mr. Lauchlin Currie.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 102" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 102

APRIL 28, 1942.

Mr. MICHAEL GREENBERG,
Managing Editor, *Pacific Affairs*,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR MICHAEL: I have read the letter which George Taylor has written to *Pacific Affairs* regarding my review of his book. I understand from you that the editors have opened the way for him to write this letter and intend to print it in the same issue which will contain my review. I also understand that this is the first time in the history of the journal that the editors have permitted a reviewer to be attacked in this manner and without allowing his review to stand unchallenged for at least one issue.

Let me say that I regard Taylor's letter as nothing more nor less than an attempt to smear me personally. I am naturally sorry to find my former

associates so frightened of their shadows as to lend themselves to this method and procedure.

I shall not offer any reply to Taylor's letter. My review stands; it expresses about all I wish to say on the matter. Anything further would simply add to a personal controversy in which I have no interest. A counterreply on my part would make the magazine look even more ridiculous than it will under present circumstances.

In order to point out to you, and for the record to show how thoroughly irresponsible I believe this matter to have been handled, let me review what happened:

1. Bill Holland telephoned me to ask if I would be willing to review the Taylor book. I replied that I had not read it, but would be glad to do so and write a review. After reading the book I felt that I should not review it for a journal like Pacific Affairs because my review would have to be extremely critical. I telephoned you to explain this and asked you to find a substitute. You replied that you wished me to go ahead with the review, knowing that it was to be strongly critical.

2. I turned in the review a few days later. As you were not in your office when I went to the I. P. R. I gave the message to Hilda Austern. At this point I want to clear up what appears to be another misunderstanding. In asking Hilda to give you the review I asked her to request you to make no changes in the copy without my having the opportunity to approve them. I specifically did not take the unreasonable and dogmatic position that no changes were to be made. Simply that I wanted to see them if they were made. I checked this with Hilda today and find that she agrees that this was the message she passed on.

3. Finally, I was informed that the editors had decided to let Taylor write an answer for publication with my review, and you then gave me a copy of his letter.

I would have regarded this as entirely appropriate if I had originally been asked to contribute to a political discussion of the main impressions given Mr. Taylor's book—I say "main impressions" because, as you are well aware, somewhere in the book he says everything, therefore, the reviewer can only comment on the general impressions he conveys. But I was not asked to do this. I was simply asked to write a review for a supposedly scholarly journal. I myself thought I was not the person to do this, but on calling this to your attention I was urged to go ahead. Taylor, on the other hand, was apparently let loose to write a slippery political rebuttal packed with ridiculous innuendoes about my "revelation" received of course straight from Moscow.

A final word. In printing Taylor's letter I should like to ask the favor that you print it precisely as you showed it to me, with no editing, no deletions whatsoever. I shall count on its being sufficiently absurd to thoughtful persons to vindicate my judgment of his book and, by inferences, of his work.

I said that was a final word, but obviously there must be one more. If you and the other editors want to forget the whole business, I suggest that you withdraw my review, get someone else—any of a hundred "scholars" with whom you are in contact—to review it for the next issue, forget the entire episode yourselves, and give me the very great privilege and pleasure of so blanketing this out of my mind that I retain the high respect for my I. P. R. colleagues that I am most anxious to preserve.

With most cordial personal regards,

F. V. F.

Mr. MORRIS. We have exhibits to show that Mr. Lauchlin Currie was a very active adviser and participant in the Institute of Pacific Relations work. While we are introducing those exhibits, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Miss Bentley if she will testify concerning the relationship that Lauchlin Currie had to her particular activities in that period.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. One of the espionage groups that I handled in Washington, which I roughly call the Silvermaster group because the man who headed it was N. Gregory Silvermaster.

Mr. MORRIS. Approximately how many people were in that group?

Miss BENTLEY. I think there were 8, 9, or 10.

Senator FERGUSON. Silvermaster was in what section?

Miss BENTLEY. FSA, which is the Farm Security Administration, which is a part of the Agriculture Department, although for 6 months I think he was in the Board of Economic Warfare.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have trouble or difficulty in moving these agents that you had into strategic positions in Government or in the Army that you were talking about, that you did not want them where there was danger but you wanted them in strategic positions? For example, Silvermaster, did you have trouble moving people such as that, or how were they moved to strategic positions so that you could get your information?

Miss BENTLEY. We didn't have too much trouble. In the case of Silvermaster, he pulled strings and got in there.

Senator FERGUSON. What were your avenues for placing people in strategic positions?

Miss BENTLEY. I would say that two of our best ones were Harry Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie. They had an immense amount of influence and knew people and their word would be accepted when they recommended someone.

The CHAIRMAN. Harry Dexter White was in what department?

Miss BENTLEY. Under Secretary of the Treasury, under Mr. Morgenthau.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, Currie and White were your instrumentalities in putting people in strategic positions?

Miss BENTLEY. I would say they were our most important ones.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did you have any other ones?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. I mean, whoever we had as an agent in the Government would automatically serve for putting someone else in. For example, Maurice Halperin was head of the Latin American Section in OSS, and we used him to get Helen Tenney in. Once we got one person in he got others, and the whole process continued like that.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you desired to shift a person from one position to another position you would use White and Currie?

Miss BENTLEY. We would use White and Currie if we could.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know who White's principal contacts were in the Government so that he could place people in Government?

Miss BENTLEY. It was my understanding that he knew practically everyone in Washington who had any influence.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not know who he would contact?

Miss BENTLEY. No, not specifically; that was his affair, and we did not inquire into it.

Senator FERGUSON. As I recall the Far East, Mr. Morgenthau at the time before Pearl Harbor had drawn a plan for the Far East, it was the Morgenthau plan. Did you know anything about it?

Miss Bentley. No, the only Morgenthau plan I knew anything about was the German one.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know who drew that plan?

Miss BENTLEY. Due to Mr. White's influence, to push the devastation of Germany because that was what the Russians wanted.

Senator FERGUSON. That was what the Communists wanted?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely Moscow wanted them completely razed because then they would be of no help to the Allies.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that Harry Dexter White worked on that?

Miss BENTLEY. And on our instructions he pushed hard.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard of the Morgenthau plan that was set up for the Far East?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't recall it.

Senator EASTLAND. Who else participated in drawing up the Morgenthau plan besides Harry Dexter White?

Miss BENTLEY. I am afraid I don't remember now.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Sol Adler have anything to do with it?

Miss BENTLEY. As far as I remember Sol Adler was in China.

Mr. MORRIS. He was in China?

Miss BENTLEY. He was a Treasury Department expert, but most of the time he was in China. I am quite sure he hadn't returned by that time.

Senator EASTLAND. What you say is that it was a Communist plot to destroy Germany and weaken her to where she could not help us?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. She could no longer be a barrier that would protect the Western World.

Senator EASTLAND. And that Mr. Morgenthau, who was Secretary of the Treasury of the United States was used by the Communist agents to promote that plot?

Miss BENTLEY. I am afraid so; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by "I am afraid so"?

Miss BENTLEY. Certainly Secretary Morgenthau didn't fall in with Communist plots.

Senator FERGUSON. But you know it to be a fact?

Miss BENTLEY. I know it to be a fact.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not qualify it, do you?

Miss BENTLEY. No; I don't qualify it. I didn't want to give the thought that he did it knowingly.

Senator SMITH. He was unsuspectingly used.

Senator FERGUSON. So you have conscious and unconscious agents?

Miss BENTLEY. Of course. The way the whole principle works is like dropping a pebble into a pond and the ripples spread out, and that is the way we work.

Senator FERGUSON. Some are conscious and some are unconscious as to what they are doing?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. A good many of our most valuable items came from the fact that many people in the Pentagon couldn't contain themselves, and they had to confide in our people.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would tell us for our record the relationship that Harry Dexter White had with your work.

Miss BENTLEY. Harry Dexter White, I couldn't tell you that he had actually been a member of the party, but to all intents and purposes he was because he followed its discipline. According to Nathan Silvermaster he was afraid to meet people like myself. He had for some years been working for an agent who had turned sour, later identified as Whittaker Chambers. That had given him a terrific fright, and he had stayed away for a while from these activities.

Then he had met the Silvermasters and they had brought him back into their group. His attitude was that I am going to help you, but my right hand doesn't want to know what the left is doing. Therefore, he didn't want to meet anyone he knew to be a Soviet agent, he wanted to pass it through Silvermaster to me.

Senator FERGUSON. This idea of Chambers going sour on the Communist Party was learned by the State Department because he made his report to the State Department, did he not, so that the people knew that he had gone sour? That was before he testified in court or in the open, was it not?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know, but the Communists know when their people go sour before anybody else does usually.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn that Chambers had given information to the American Government officials who were anti-Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. I didn't know anything about Whittaker Chambers at all except as a man called X who had handled a number of my people in 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. So his name you did not learn?

Miss BENTLEY. No. They gave a name such as Sam or Al and you don't know his real name.

Senator FERGUSON. So White did not name Chambers as the man who went sour?

Miss BENTLEY. No. I don't know whether White knew Chambers. Certainly he didn't give it to Silvermaster.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have a confidential Government record come to you from White?

Miss BENTLEY. Many of them, all labeled from "Harry" because Soviet agents like to know who is providing what.

Mr. MORRIS. How many copies of such reports would you receive?

Miss BENTLEY. How many copies?

Mr. MORRIS. Would it come in duplicate?

Miss BENTLEY. Sometimes it was a carbon copy. Many, many times those documents were photographed in the Silvermasters' cellar because they couldn't be spared.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give us a concrete example of your dealings with Harry Dexter White?

Miss BENTLEY. In the way of material?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Who gave it to you, for instance?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, in the early days Lud Ullmann, who was then working in the Treasury, used to bring it out. Sometimes Harry was leery about bringing it out himself. Sometimes it would be given to Bill Taylor.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is William Taylor?

Miss BENTLEY. He was another Communist Party member in the Treasury who paid his dues and was a member of the Silvermaster group.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Ullmann in the same category?

Miss BENTLEY. Ullman was in the same category. I knew Ullmann as well as the Silvermasters.

Mr. MORRIS. Let us take Ullmann. Would he give you a report and tell you it was a report from Harry White?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, and he would also type on it "from Harry."

Mr. MORRIS. What would you do?

Miss BENTLEY. I would take that back, and when Mr. Golos was alive I would give it to him and after he passed on I would give it to the successor agent.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom?

Miss BENTLEY. To the succeeding Soviet contact I had; there were three of them.

Mr. MORRIS. In any case, were they ever microfilmed?

Miss BENTLEY. Many cases. In many cases the volume got too big, and they had to be microfilmed.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was that done?

Miss BENTLEY. In their basement. They had a home-made affair there where they put their camera.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you describe where that was?

Miss BENTLEY. The Silvermaster home?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss BENTLEY. Right off Chevy Chase Circle, I think it was 5515 Thirty-fourth. I have forgotten the exact number.

Mr. MORRIS. You have been there?

Miss BENTLEY. I was there almost every 2 weeks. I should—

Mr. MORRIS. What was your purpose in going there?

Miss BENTLEY. My purpose in going there was to collect Communist dues and all the information collected during the 2 weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the bulk got so large that you could not carry it to New York?

Miss BENTLEY. Physically I could have carried it, but it would have been unwise to go hauling large bundles around like that.

Senator FERGUSON. And you got it into microfilms so that you could take them into New York without being seen and having a package?

Miss BENTLEY. There was also the problem with lots of documents that you could only take them overnight and return them in the morning.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, would you testify about an idea of Harry Dexter White whereby he was going to perfect your intelligence organization?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't quite understand the question.

Mr. MORRIS. You have testified in executive session that Harry Dexter White had a plan whereby he was going to integrate all intelligence matters coming into your ring.

Miss BENTLEY. Do you mean the trading of information between Government agencies?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss BENTLEY. He not only had a plan, but we put it into effect.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us about that.

Miss BENTLEY. We were so successful getting information during the war largely because of Harry White's idea to persuade Morgenthau to exchange information. In other words, he would send information over to Navy, and Navy would reciprocate. So there were at least seven or eight agencies trading information with Secretary Morgenthau.

Mr. MORRIS. You say this plan of trading information was initiated by White?

Miss BENTLEY. This plan was initiated by White because he knew it would come across his desk.

Mr. MORRIS. He being the Executive Assistant?

Miss BENTLEY. He was the Under Secretary, next man down the ladder.

Senator EASTLAND. Who negotiated that agreement?

Miss BENTLEY. From what I was told, it was Secretary Morgenthau himself.

Mr. MORRIS. You say it was initiated by White?

Miss BENTLEY. It was initiated by Harry White.

Senator EASTLAND. You testified he used Morgenthau?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, I wonder if you would tell us exactly what your relations were with Lauchlin Currie.

Miss BENTLEY. Lauchlin Currie was not, as far as we knew at that time, a member of the Communist Party, but he was very close to various members of the Silvermaster group, including George Silverman, whom he knows very well, and Silvermaster. He was willing to bail them out when they were in trouble, when they were being fired for disloyalty or when they needed help to get a job.

Besides that he was passing on information to us.

Senator FERGUSON. Currie was passing it on?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us any information on what you received through Currie?

Miss BENTLEY. Most of it was far eastern. There was the time when he relayed the information that the Soviet code was about to be broken.

Mr. MORRIS. Broken by whom?

Miss BENTLEY. The United States authorities.

Mr. MORRIS. He discovered that the United States authorities had broken the code, and he relayed it to you?

Miss BENTLEY. Were about to break it. I relayed it back, and my Russian lead said, "Which code?"

Senator EASTLAND. Did he say which code?

Miss BENTLEY. No, I was unable to get back and find out. He just said the Soviet code.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get that information?

Miss BENTLEY. That information came from White via Silverman, as I recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. From Currie?

Miss BENTLEY. From Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a highly classified fact at the time?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely. I don't know enough about Government labelings, but it was certainly something you wouldn't pass around.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it your understanding, Miss Bentley, that Lauchlin Currie was a full-fledged member of the Silvermaster group?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he always act in that capacity or was he reassigned in some fashion?

Miss BENTLEY. It was my understanding he was going to be reassigned when I left the group in September, I think it was, 1944. My Soviet contact told me that they did not believe in having such large groups for security reasons because if someone turns sour they know too much; that he intended to put White directly in contact with a Soviet superior, and Lauchlin Currie also in direct contact with a Soviet agent, and possibly with some of the smaller fry he could put

two or three in one group. But he definitely mentioned putting White and Currie in direct contact.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was it that mentioned them?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know his real name, he was known to me as Bill.

The CHAIRMAN. He was living where?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know whether he lived in Washington or New York.

Mr. MORRIS. But he was your superior in the Soviet military police?

Miss BENTLEY. He was my superior in the Soviet military police and also I am quite sure it went through.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what particular agent Currie was going to be assigned to?

Miss BENTLEY. No, I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you say you think it went through?

Miss BENTLEY. Because after this Soviet contact had taken over the Silvermaster group he requested me to stay on with them for 3 months. In talking with Silvermaster he told me they had already put the plan into effect, and they were about to make contact with Soviet agents, so I am convinced it went through.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think at this time we should point out what Lauchlin Currie's relations were with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I therefore ask Mr. Mandel if he will call to our attention some few of the exhibits that we have selected to show what Lauchlin Currie's role was in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Are these exhibits to which you refer being made a part of the record?

Mr. MORRIS. We will introduce them.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the foundation, the source, and how you got it.

Mr. MANDEL. First I refer to the testimony of Edward C. Carter on July 25, 1951, in which he identified Lauchlin Currie as a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Now I have here a photostat of a letter dated October 27, 1942, addressed to Joseph Barnes at 430 West Twenty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. Where does the instrument come from?

Mr. MANDEL. The instrument comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it an original instrument or photostat?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a photostat. It is signed by Edward C. Carter and the letter reads as follows:

DEAR JOE: Recently in Washington Lauchlin Currie expressed to me the hope that some day when you are in Washington you would give him the privilege of a private talk. As you know, he is an intimate friend and admirer of Owen Lattimore and has himself made two visits to Chungking. You and he would find a great deal in common, not only in matters Chinese, but in affairs elsewhere. I do hope that you can see him soon.

His office is in the State Department Building, but you reach him through the White House exchange.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that letter into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked and entered into the record (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 103" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 103

NEW YORK, N. Y., October 27, 1942.

JOSEPH BARNES, Esq.,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR JOE: Recently in Washington Lauchlin Currie expressed to me the hope that some day soon when you are in Washington you would give him the privilege of a private talk. As you know, he is an intimate friend and admirer of Owen Lattimore and has himself made two visits to Chungking. You and he would find a great deal in common, not only in matters Chinese, but in affairs elsewhere. I do hope that you can see him soon.

His office is in the State Department Building, but you reach him through the White House exchange.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated November 30, 1942, and the memorandum is addressed to Mr. Carter, copy for Mr. Jessup at Mont Tremblant. This is in connection with the Mont Tremblant conference of the IPR.

In response to your request for designations of American Council members of Mont Tremblant committee, I am putting down the following suggestions.

This is signed by William W. Lockwood.

These should be reconsidered at Mont Tremblant after checking with Jessup so that they are merely tentative for the present.

The Pacific Council: Jessup, the regular American Council member, will be in the chair so presumably another American should represent the Council. I believe Kizer is the best choice.

Program Committee: Currie would be an excellent member, with Field as alternate. Currie may not wish to be burdened with this, however, and I understand you have Field in mind as program committee secretary, which would be excellent. The final decision here I would like to leave until later.

International Research Committee: Dennett is the best person, in view of his availability afterward for continuing responsibility. I would hope that Frank Coe could at least sit in on the meetings, in addition.

International Finance Committee: Brayton Wilbur; alternate, Brooks Emery.

Publications Committee: Tentatively, Len De Caux.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that received into the evidence as the next exhibit, pointing out that the significance of this document is that Lauchlin Currie, about whom we have had testimony, on November 30, 1942, was proposed by Mr. Lockwood in official capacity to Mr. Jessup as chairman of the program committee of the Mont Tremblant conference, which was the triennial conference and one of the important functions of the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. The exhibit will be properly marked in sequence and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 104" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 104

NOVEMBER 30, 1942.

Memorandum to: Mr. Carter.
Copy for: Mr. Jessup, Mont Tremblant.

In response to your request for designations of American Council members of Mont Tremblant committee, I am putting down the following suggestions.

These should be reconsidered at Mont Tremblant after checking with Jessup so that they are merely tentative for the present.

The Pacific Council: Jessup, the regular American Council member, will be in the chair so presumably another American should represent the council. I believe Kizer is the best choice.

Program committee: Currie would be an excellent member, with Field as alternate. Currie may not wish to be burdened with this, however, and I understand you have Field in mind as program committee secretary, which would be excellent. The final decision here I would like to leave until later.

International research committee: Dennett is the best person, in view of his availability afterward for continuing responsibility. I would hope that Frank Coo could at least sit in on the meetings, in addition.

International finance committee: Brayton Wilbur; alternate, Brooks Emeny.
Publications committee: Tentatively, Len De Caux.

Wm. W. Lockwood.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated February 18, 1941, addressed to Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi from Edward C. Carter and reads as follows:

DEAR CHI: What would you think of my sending to Chungking some such cable as the following:

"LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
"American Embassy, Chungking;

"If press could report you had visited Chow Enlai this might help public opinion in view present crop ugly rumors regarding serious break in China's unified resistance."

It is a very ticklish matter, and I do not want to make things worse. However, it is certainly not in American interest or that of any country in the Pacific for China to start a two-front war.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as the next consecutive exhibit pointing out at the same time that Dr. Chi is a man who has been identified by several witnesses here as an important member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 105" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 105

NEW YORK CITY, February 18, 1941.

DR. CH'AO-TING CHI,
New York City.

DEAR CHI: What would you think of my sending to Chungking some such cable as the following:

"LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
"American Embassy, Chungking.

"If press could report you had visited Chow Enlai this might help public opinion in view present crop ugly rumors regarding serious break in China's unified resistance."

It is a very ticklish matter, and I do not want to make things worse. However, it is certainly not in American interest or that of any country in the Pacific for China to start a two-front war.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. This is another letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and is dated March 10, 1944, addressed to Dr. John Fairbank, care of Dr. Lauchlin Currie, the White House, Washington, D. C., signed by W. L. Holland.

DEAR JOHN: Here is a letter to Liu Yu-wan which I should like to have sent by hand or via the APO in Chungking. Would you be kind enough to inquire whether John Davies can take it with him if he is likely to be going through Chungking in the near future or alternatively whether it could be sent via APO

to Mac Fisher or Jack Service or someone else whom you know to be in Chungking and willing to deliver the note? If for any reason you prefer not to do this, don't hesitate to tell me. I shall be down in Washington next Wednesday and probably Thursday also.

No more stuff seems to have come from Hsiang. Is there any way you could get a note to him via Kates or Mac Fisher asking whether anything has been transmitted for the use of the IPR?

As Carter probably told you, we have now prodded the University of California into taking some action about our friend and have offered to advance them a travel fund immediately.

P. S.—As a project in the field of cultural relations with China, I wonder what you and Wilma would think of the idea of getting an American publisher to reissue all or most of the chapters in the Symposium on Chinese Culture.

Mr. MORRIS. The significance of this document, Mr. Chairman, is that John Fairbank received his mail care of Dr. Lauchlin Currie at the White House. I would like to have that introduced as the next consecutive exhibit in the evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 106" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 106

MARCH 10, 1944.

DR. JOHN FAIRBANK,

*Care of Dr. Lauchlin Currie,
The White House, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR JOHN: Here is a letter to Liu Yu-wan which I should like to have sent by hand or via the APO in Chungking. Would you be kind enough to inquire whether John Davies can take it with him if he is likely to be going through to Chungking in the near future or alternatively whether it could be sent via APO to Mac Fisher or Jack Service or someone else whom you know to be in Chungking and willing to deliver the note? If for any reason you prefer not to do this, don't hesitate to tell me. I shall be down in Washington next Wednesday and probably Thursday also.

No more stuff seems to have come from Hsiang. Is there any way you could get a note to him via Kates or Mac Fisher asking whether anything has been transmitted for the use of the IPR?

As Carter probably told you, we have now prodded the University of California into taking some action about our friend and have offered to advance them a travel fund immediately.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

P. S.—As a project in the field of cultural relations with China, I wonder what you and Wilma would think of the idea of getting an American publisher to reissue all or most of the chapters in the Symposium on Chinese Culture which the China IPR published in Shanghai in 1932. One or two chapters, for example, on industry are a little out of date but the book is still constantly being quoted and asked for though it has long been out of stock. If you thought the scheme worth while, I might ask Hu Shih and perhaps one or two other Chinese here to add supplementary chapters which would serve to bring the book partly up to date. There's such a demand from the publishers today for books from the Far East that I don't think we would have any difficulty in finding a publisher.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is another memorandum dated June 20, 1942, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "1942 conference personnel, interview WWL," presumably with W. W. Lockwood, "with Lauchlin Currie, June 17, regarding IPR 1942 conference."

1. We may proceed on the assumption that the administration looks with favor on the idea of the conference and will put no official obstacle in the way of participation by Government people. (This implies no guaranty, of course, that any particular individual will be able or will agree to attend.)

Currie himself would like to be at the conference and presumably we can count on his being present.

Official participation will be essential to success.

2. Wallace and Perkins would be ideal, if available. Currie also suggested Harry White of the Treasury and Jim Baxter of the Office of Strategic Services.

As for the State Department, it is awkward to choose among four or five individuals. Berle would be important to secure, but he is always bracketed with Acheson. Similarly, Hornbeck and Hamilton are usually bracketed together. Pasvolsky is very important in the whole postwar set-up of the State Department.

Currie evaded a direct answer to the question as to whether we must include the old-line far eastern people, but indicated by inference that it would be rather awkward not to do so. He also said that if Alger Hiss were invited and Hornbeck were not, it would put the former in an impossible position. Currie's suggestion was that ECC see Welles, extend the courtesy of an invitation to him personally, and then invite his suggestions as to which of the other top State Department people should be included. Currie also mentioned Wallace Murray, Chief of the Near Eastern Division, which takes in India and Burma. He expressed no opinion as to Murray's personal qualifications.

There is no strong reason from the Washington viewpoint to prefer September to December or vice versa. Currie himself, however, thought that last year's plan of catching people at the end of the summer was a good one.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into evidence, and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit, the item referred to. The purpose of introducing this exhibit is to show the role that Lauchlin Currie played as a high adviser in connection with the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 107" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 107

[1942 conference personnel, June 20, 1942]

INTERVIEW WWL WITH LAUCHLIN CURRIE JUNE 17 REGARDING IPR 1942 CONFERENCE

1. We may proceed on the assumption that the administration looks with favor on the idea of the conference and will put no official obstacle in the way of participation by Government people. (This implies no guaranty, of course, that any particular individual will be able or will agree to attend.)

Currie himself would like to be at the conference, and presumably we can count on his being present.

Official participation will be essential to success.

2. Wallace and Perkins would be ideal, if available. Currie also suggested Harry White of the Treasury and Jim Baxter of the Office of Strategic Services.

As for the State Department, it is awkward to choose among four or five individuals. Berle would be important to secure, but he is always bracketed with Acheson. Similarly, Hornbeck and Hamilton are usually bracketed together. Pasvolsky is very important in the whole postwar set-up of the State Department.

Currie evaded a direct answer to the question as to whether we must include the old-line far eastern people, but indicated by inference that it would be rather awkward not to do so. He also said that if Alger Hiss were invited and Hornbeck were not, it would put the former in an impossible position. Currie's suggestion was that ECC see Welles, extend the courtesy of an invitation to him personally, and then invite his suggestions as to which of the other top State Department people should be included. Currie also mentioned Wallace Murray, Chief of the Near Eastern Division, which takes in India and Burma. He expressed no opinion as to Murray's personal qualifications.

3. There is no strong reason from the Washington viewpoint to prefer September to December or vice versa. Currie himself, however, thought that last year's plan of catching people at the end of the summer was a good one.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a group of telegrams, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

One telegram is addressed to Edward C. Carter:

Glad to see you at 12:30 Wednesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

The telegram does not show a date, but the subsequent telegram will undoubtedly indicate the date of the correspondence.

The next is a copy of a telegram dated September 17, 1941, to Lauchlin Currie, White House, Washington, D. C.:

Wire collect could I see you 10 minutes any time Thursday or Friday preferably Thursday.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Here is another telegram dated October 7, 1942, to Lauchlin Currie, Executive Offices of the President, the White House, Washington, D. C.:

Visiting Washington tomorrow Thursday will telephone you in morning for appointment.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Another one dated October 7, year not given, the White House:

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations;

Eight any time would be better if convenient.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

Here is another dated June 26, 1942, a note addressed to Currie:

I am going to be in Washington on Thursday, July 2, and hope you can see me in the forenoon of that day.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Another telegram, a copy of a telegram, June 23, 1942, addressed to Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President, Washington, D. C.:

Washington visit postponed until next week.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Another copy of a telegram dated May 5, 1942, addressed to Lauchlin Currie:

Wire collect can you spare 5 minutes any time Wednesday.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

And then we have another here, dated April 25, 1942, a telegram to Edward C. Carter.

Planning to attend conference Tuesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

The telegram is marked as coming from the White House.

Mr. MORRIS. Are they samples of correspondence that you have discovered in the files between Lauchlin Currie and Edward C. Carter?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. They are not all of the correspondence between these two people, are they?

Mr. MANDEL. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce these telegrams just read by Mr. Mandel into the record, and have them marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The purpose of these telegrams is to show the relationship that existed between Lauchlin Currie and Edward C. Carter, namely, that Carter frequently went to Washington and conferred with Lauchlin Currie in the White House. Mr. Carter, at that time, was the secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. These will be inserted into the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 108" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 108

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D. C., April 25, 1942.

EDWARD CARTER,
129 East Fifty-second Street:
Planning to attend conference Tuesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

MAY 5, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
White House, Washington, D. C.:
Wire collect can you spare 5 minutes any time Wednesday.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

JUNE 23, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Administrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.:
Washington visit postponed until next week.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

NEW YORK CITY, June 26, 1942.

MR. LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Administrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CURRIE: I am going to be in Washington on Thursday, July 2, and hope you can see me in the forenoon of that day.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D. C., October 7.

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations:
Eighth any time would be better if convenient.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

OCTOBER 7, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Executive Offices of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.:

Visiting Washington tomorrow, Thursday, will telephone you in morning for appointment.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

SEPTEMBER 17, 1941.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
White House, Washington, D. C.:

Wire collect could I see you 10 minutes any time Thursday or Friday, preferably Thursday?

EDWARD C. CARTER.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

EDWARD C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations:

Glad to see you at 12:30 Wednesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is a brief memorandum, dated July 10, 1941, "W. L. H." presumably W. L. Holland, from "E. C. C." presumably E. C. Carter.

I am, of course, delighted that you have persuaded Chi to allow us to go ahead with his book suppressing only those passages which are likely to affect Chi's work.

My acquiescing in Chi's request did not derive from a desire to defer to Washington bureaucrats, but simply and solely to my desire to refrain from doing anything which would defeat the purposes of Chen Han-sen, Chi, Lauchlin Currie, Harry White, and Morgenthau in their very big program in China.

I had a feeling that you would be able to persuade Chi to approve of precisely what you have secured his approval for. I am naturally delighted.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as the next consecutive exhibit. I understand that Senator Ferguson has a question he would like to ask about it before we pass it on.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know anything about this program, and concerning which I was talking about previously, in China? Did that come to your attention?

Miss BENTLEY. No; I am afraid not. I was pretty new in the game at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew about it in the one in Germany but not the one in China?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to point out at this time that we have thus far introduced into the record evidence that Chen Han-sen, Chi, Lauchlin Currie, and Harry White are the four people mentioned in this memorandum as having had former connections with the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. The exhibits will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 109" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 109

JULY 10, 1941.

W. L. H. from E. C. C.

I am, of course, delighted that you have persuaded Chi to allow us to go ahead with his book suppressing only those passages which are likely to affect Chi's work.

My acquiescing in Chi's request did not derive from a desire to defer to Washington bureaucrats, but simply and solely to my desire to refrain from doing anything which would defeat the purposes of Chen Han-sen, Chi, Lauchlin Currie, Harry White, and Morgenthau in their very big program in China.

I had a feeling that you would be able to persuade Chi to approve of precisely what you have secured his approval for. I am naturally delighted.

Mr. MANDEL. Another exhibit coming from the file of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 15, 1942. "E. C. C." presumably Mr. Carter, from "W. W. L." presumably W. W. Lockwood.

In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice—say that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup—on elimination. This list runs too much in

the regular groove as regards non-Government people. So far as Washington is concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key positions.

Then follows a list of individuals. Under the heading of "Government," we have Ernest H. Gruening.

Mr. MORRIS, I think, Mr. Mandel, we do not have to go into that list. I think, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as evidence of the fact that the Institute of Pacific Relations, and, in this case, Mr. Lockwood writing to Mr. Carter, considered that the competent advice should be gotten from Currie, who is Lauchlin Currie, Barnes who is Joseph Barnes, and Jessup who is Philip Jessup, again to establish that Mr. Currie was looked upon by the institute as one of the senior advisers of that organization.

As such, I would like to have it introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 110" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 110

JUNE 15, 1942.

F. C. C. from W. W. L.:

In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice—say that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup—on elimination. This list runs too much in the regular groove as regards non-Government people. So far as Washington is concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key positions.

GOVERNMENT

Gruening, Ernest H., Governor, Alaska
 Bean, Louis, Board of Economic Warfare
 Perkins, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare
 Biedler, Winfield, Board of Economic Warfare
 Shoemaker, James H., Board of Economic Warfare
 Stone, W. T., Board of Economic Warfare
 Wallace, H. A., Vice President, Board of Economic Warfare
 Staley, Eugene, Bureau of the Budget
 Barnes, Joseph, Coordinator of Information
 Bunche, Ralph, Coordinator of Information
 Fabs, C. B., Coordinator of Information
 Hayden, J. R., Coordinator of Information
 Wheeler, Leslie, Department of Agriculture
 Ropes, E. C., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Trade
 Berle, A. A., Department of State
 Davies, Joseph, Department of State
 Grady, Henry, Department of State
 Hiss, Alger, Department of State
 Hornbeck, S. K., Department of State
 Sayre, Francis B., Department of State
 Stinebower, L. D., Department of State
 Vince, Jacob, Treasury Department
 White, H. D., Treasury Department
 Gulick, Luther L., National Resources Planning Board
 Emerson, Rupert, Office of Price Administration
 Nathan, Robert, War Production Board

OTHERS

Bassett, Arthur, American Red Cross
 Bates, Searle, International Missionary Council
 Beukema, Col. Herman, West Point
 Binder, Carroll, Chicago Daily News

Clapper, Raymond, Washington columnist.
 Cowles, Gardner, Des Moines Register and Tribune.
 Dennett, Tyler, historian.
 Dollard, Charles, Carnegie Corp.
 Emery, Brooks, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland.
 Field, Frederick V., New York.
 Herod, W. H., International General Electric.
 Jessup, Prof. Philip C., Columbia University.
 Kizer, Benjamin H., Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission.
 Lochhead, Archie, Universal Trading Corp.
 Luce, Henry, Time, Inc.
 Molyneux, Peter, Texas weekly.
 Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute.
 Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B., United States District Court, Spokane, Wash. (ex-Senator).
 Sprunt, Allan, Federal Reserve Bank, New York.
 Sweetland, Monroe, National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief.
 Voorhis, Jerry, House of Representatives.
 Wilkie, Wendell, attorney.
 Willis, Joseph H., Rockefeller Foundation.
 Wilson, C. K., General Electric.
 Yarnell, Admiral H. B., United States Navy, retired.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel has just one more, Mr. Chairman, bearing on this point of Lauchlin Currie's position in the IPR.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is a letter dated August 28, 1941, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Lauchlin Currie, Executive Offices of the President:

DEAR CURRIE: A Chinese scholar who ought to know better has written recently to at least three of my friends criticizing at length Lattimore and Lattimore's appointment, the IPR, etc. All three of his correspondents have referred the letters to me.

It is not terribly important, but I would like to send copies of the letters to Lattimore, but in such a way as to make certain that they are not read by others before reaching him. Have you any means of getting a letter of mine to Lattimore if I were to send it to you to forward?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom was that addressed?

Mr. MANDEL. This is addressed to Lauchlin Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. At the White House.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is the reply, dated September 2, 1941, on the stationery of the White House, addressed to Edward C. Carter:

DEAR CARTER: I will be glad to get the letters you mentioned to Lattimore uncensored. Since it will not be official business I will have to ask you for airmail postage as far as Hong Kong.

Sincerely,

LAUCLIN CURRIE.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into the record, and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 111" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 111

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
 New York City, August 28, 1941.

LAUCLIN CURRIE, Esq.,

Executive Offices of the President,

White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CURRIE: A Chinese scholar who ought to know better has written recently to at least three of my friends criticizing at length Lattimore and Lattimore's

appointment, the IPR, etc. All three of his correspondents have referred the letters to me.

It is not terribly important, but I would like to send copies of the letters to Lattimore, but in such a way as to make certain that they are not read by others before reaching him. Have you any means of getting a letter of mine to Lattimore if I were to send it to you to forward?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 2, 1941.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
*Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR CARTER: I will be glad to get the letters you mentioned to Lattimore uncensored. Since it will not be official business I will have to ask you for airmail postage as far as Hong Kong.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Lauchlin Currie.
LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of introducing those exhibits was to show the connection of Lauchlin Currie, about whom we have had testimony this morning, with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Miss BENTLEY, do you know Sol Adler?

Miss BENTLEY. Not personally; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know about Sol Adler?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. Solomon Adler was, again, a member of the Silvermaster group. He paid his dues through Mr. Silvermaster to me. Most of the time I was in charge of that group, he was over in China. But he did send reports to various people, including Harry Dexter White in the Treasury Department, which were relayed on to us.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what were the natures of those reports, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. Reports on internal Chinese politics, mainly, as to what the Nationalists were doing and what the chances were for the Eighth Army people and the Communists in China.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his Communist assignment in China? Can you tell us a little bit about that, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. When he went over there he was told—that was before my day, so I didn't participate in it—he was told that he should follow the party line in China, and carry out to the utmost whatever Moscow wanted in the Far East.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was that?

Mr. MORRIS. This is Sol Adler, Senator, who was one of the high officials in the Treasury Department, and who was in charge of the Treasury Department for China.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you can tell us something more about Solomon Adler, Miss Bentley? Anything more about Solomon Adler that you can tell us would be helpful.

Miss BENTLEY. In what respect?

Mr. MORRIS. About his connection with the organization.

Miss BENTLEY. I understand that he had been connected with the organization for a few years before I came along.

He not only was connected with the Silvermaster organization, but he had Communist contacts within China. One of those was Chi. I have forgotten his first name.

MR. MORRIS. Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi?

MISS BENTLEY. He was the man proposed to be the Chinese delegate to the United Nations. Is that the same one?

MR. MORRIS. That is right.

MISS BENTLEY. Well, he had dealings with him, both in this country and in China, and with numerous others of the Communists in China, although he was supposed to cultivate the Nationalists on behalf of our own Government, and also to forward the Communist plan.

He was really quite friendly, for example, with Madam Chiang Kai-shek. I remember one report that came through on Adler at one time that complained that he was not tending to business and influencing the quarters he should be. He was playing too much bridge with Madam Chiang Kai-shek.

MR. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know a man named Israel Epstein?

MISS BENTLEY. I don't know him personally, no. I know about him.

MR. MORRIS. Would you tell us what you know about him, Miss Bentley?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes. In February 1941, I helped set up a cover business, to cover the espionage activities, with funds supplied by Earl Browder, of the American Communist Party, and with a contact from a Soviet agency which had been arranged by Soviet Intelligence. We needed personnel, and Israel Epstein's then wife, Mrs. Edith Epstein, had just returned not too long before from China, and we considered her. So Mr. Golos got her dossier and discovered that Israel Epstein had been a member of the Russian Secret Police for many years in China, and because Mrs. Edith Epstein was his wife, she would be fit to take on as part of our personnel in the business.

MR. MORRIS. Was there any doubt in your mind that Israel Epstein was an important Soviet agent?

MISS BENTLEY. No doubt at all. Mr. Golos checked up on him and had heard a great deal about him.

MR. MORRIS. How reliable would a report like that, from Mr. Golos about Mr. Epstein as a Soviet agent, be as far as you are concerned?

MISS BENTLEY. Any report which I would get from my Soviet superior on those things would be reliable on that.

MR. MORRIS. So there was no doubt in your mind that Israel Epstein was what he told you he was?

MISS BENTLEY. No doubt whatsoever.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Did you ever take his wife on as an agent?

MISS BENTLEY. No, we simply used her in the office. It turned out she was not as far left as her husband, and we did not like our agents to know too much about us. Since we hired her in the office, it would be unwise to take her as an agent.

SENATOR FERGUSON. But you did put her in the office?

MISS BENTLEY. We did put her in the office because we thought she would be discreet and protect us in case anything came up.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you can bring forth the exhibit to show Israel Epstein's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

MR. MANDEL. Mr. Epstein was the author of the article entitled "Hong Kong, Past and Present," in the Far Eastern Survey for April 24, 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the Far Eastern Survey a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. It is an official publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Here is a letter dated September 6, and the year is not given. It is addressed to "Dear Holland" signed by "I. Epstein."

The CHAIRMAN. That was obtained from where?

Mr. MANDEL. It was obtained from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

I clean forgot about giving you the particulars for the letters on Saturday. One letter should be written for me, and the other for Miss Liu Wu-Kou, Kweilin. It is not necessary to have any for anyone in Chen Ta's or other academic outfits, because they can work from their own institutions.

Enclosed also are the excerpts from the translation of Chiang's book. Would like to have these back when you are through.

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of it, I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. and Elsie.

When are you leaving? Are you returning here if you do go down to Kweilin? I ask because we will be requesting you to take some stuff to New York.

Sincerely,

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as the next consecutive exhibit bearing on Israel Epstein's activities with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 112" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 112

DEAR HOLLAND: I clean forgot about giving you the particulars for the letters on Saturday.

One letter should be written for me, and the other for Miss Liu Wu-Kou, Kweilin. It is not necessary to have any for anyone in Chen Ta's or other academic outfits, because they can work from their own institutions.

Enclosed also are the excerpts from the translation of Chiang's book. Would like to have these back when you are through.

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of it, I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. and Elsie.

When are you leaving? Are you returning here if you do go down to Kweilin? I ask because we will be requesting you to take some stuff to New York.

Sincerely,

(Signed) I. EPSTEIN.

SEPTEMBER 6.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know anything about John K. Fairbank, who was mentioned in the last letter?

Miss BENTLEY. Only that he was sometimes used by Mildred Price to bring material back from China. You see, it was difficult to bring things back from China that wouldn't go through the censorship or wouldn't otherwise get opened and looked at. Mme. Sun Yat-sen and a number of other people in China, a few Communists, were sending material to Mildred for the China Aid Council. So, anyone who was sympathetic or one of the boys would bring them back on their trips.

Mr. MORRIS. And do you know that Mildred Price did use John K. Fairbank to bring back messages from whom?

Miss BENTLEY. From Mme. Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. MORRIS. To?

MISS BENTLEY. To Mildred Price, from China, because I know at least one occasion when he did bring all these documents back.

MR. MORRIS. Was Mme. Sun Yat-sen a Communist?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. Could you develop that a bit for us?

MISS BENTLEY. As to show Mme. Sun Yat-sen was?

MR. MORRIS. Yes; and her relations with your organization.

MISS BENTLEY. Mme. Sun Yat-sen, as far as I know, had been a Communist for quite some time, and was very important in the Communist movement over there. And, therefore, she was in contact with the China Aid Council, which was going all out to help the Communist area.

MR. MORRIS. So, you do know that she was working with the China Aid Council?

MISS BENTLEY. Quite definitely. They got consistent letters from her, and they wrote back, and their aid was going to Communist areas in China.

MR. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, would you try to place a date of the time when John K. Fairbank brought a message back from Mme. Sun Yat-sen to Mildred Price? Was it during the time he was the head of the China Division of the Office of War Information?

MISS BENTLEY. I don't know exactly when he was head of that. I would say it was in 1944. It was after Mr. Golos' death. It must have been 1944, or the tag end of 1943.

MR. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, could you tell us what you know about Philip Jaffe?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes. His name first came up when, as I told you, we had been canvassing the IPR through Mildred Price to see if we could find good intelligence material. We had gone through them. It didn't look hopeful; a lot of them were too temperamental, and our best prospect as an intelligence worker seemed to be Philip Jaffe, according to Mildred, although she did say that she was very much afraid that he was rather too well known as a Red and, therefore, he wouldn't be too useful.

In undercover work, you have to have people who are inconspicuous and not too well known. So, we decided not to go on with that project. But she described him as being a very loyal comrade and reliable.

MR. MORRIS. So, it is your testimony that you did not take Philip Jaffe from the Institute of Pacific Relations for espionage because he was too open a Communist?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes. We got that information from Mildred Price.

MR. MORRIS. And, for that reason, he wouldn't be suitable?

MISS BENTLEY. That is correct; yes.

MR. MORRIS. Were you ever warned against associating with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes. I was told to be very careful in dealing even with Mildred. As a matter of fact, I think Mr. Golos' phrase was: "It was as red as a rose, and you shouldn't touch it with a 10-foot pole."

MR. MORRIS. The IPR?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes. He felt, from the point of view of good undercover work, they were far too bungling and they were too much in the open, and it was far too dangerous to be associating with the Institute of Pacific Relations. It might get us in trouble.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you ever hear of Edward C. Carter's relationship to the Communist organizations mentioned?

Miss BENTLEY. I know very little about Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about him?

Miss BENTLEY. I know that Mildred Price brought his name up, inasmuch as they were associated, and she said he was O. K., and by that she meant that he was a reliable person that she could trust.

Mr. MORRIS. That she could trust in connection with the party work?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. Whether or not he was actually a party member is something I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more you know about Edward C. Carter, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. Not that I can think of at the moment.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a Miss Harriet Lucy Moore?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. I knew Harriet Moore personally. This forum, that I told you we set up as a cover business in 1941, had a license to ship parcels to Russia. Right after we had set it up in February, you remember, the Germans attacked Russia. And the result of that was that we got the brilliant brainstorm of wanting to send packages to Russia, and the Russian War Relief was born not too long after that. And in connection with that, I had dealings with Harriet Moore, and I was told by Mr. Golos, by the people downtown in the Communist Party, that she was a comrade and I should deal with her as such.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record a long series of exhibits showing Harriet Lucy Moore's connections with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

In the middle 1940's, she was acting secretary of that organization. Prior to that, Mr. Chairman—I think it was 1941—she was chairman of the nominating committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations. At that same year she was also a member of the executive committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and a member of the board of trustees.

Mr. Chairman, those exhibits have already gone into evidence, together with many others, showing that she was very actively associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Miss Bentley has now testified about knowing her as a member of the Communist Party.

What do you know about Frederick V. Field, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know him personally. I know, as I have stated before, being told by Browder and by Mildred Price.

Mr. MORRIS. Your dealings with him were through Browder?

Miss BENTLEY. My dealings with him were through Browder, because I was not getting into the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you ever have a meeting at Field's house?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. Earl Browder very often used Fred Field's house to meet people where it had to be highly underground.

Mr. MORRIS. Field was not there?

Miss BENTLEY. Field was not there; no. He just loaned the house to Browder, and Browder was there when I went with a couple of people that he didn't want to come out in the open. They met there. I understand that was done quite frequently on undercover meetings.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the nature of that particular meeting?

Miss BENTLEY. That particular meeting was in connection with what should happen about the cover business.

Mr. MORRIS. And how long did it last?

Miss BENTLEY. The cover business?

Mr. MORRIS. No; the meeting?

Miss BENTLEY. I would say we were there a good 2 hours, probably. We had quite a number of things to talk about.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, do you know of an organization called the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Miss BENTLEY. I have heard about it; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about it, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I have been told that it, again, was in the Communist sphere of influence.

Mr. MORRIS. By whom?

Miss BENTLEY. I think I was told that by Mildred Price.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything about the publication Amerasia?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about Amerasia?

Miss BENTLEY. I was also told that that was Communist-dominated.

Mr. MORRIS. Who told you that?

Miss BENTLEY. Both Golos and Mildred Price.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know anything about Owen Lattimore?

Miss BENTLEY. No; I don't know Lattimore.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not know whether he is a Communist or not?

Miss BENTLEY. No; I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Robert Miller?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I know Robert Miller. Robert Miller was one of the Communist Party members that I took on as an espionage agent way back in 1941. He worked for the CIAA. That is Nelson Rockefeller's Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, I think it was called. I think he was in the Political Division of that outfit. I think in 1944 he migrated from there to the State Department. He was one of the people I dealt with directly, collected his dues and got his information.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you ever have any direct relations with John P. Davies?

Miss BENTLEY. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever have anything to do with any of his reports, official State Department reports?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, through the Silvermaster group. I was told that he was quite sympathetic to our cause, and I remember one report of his that they gave to me which definitely showed that fact.

Mr. MORRIS. You were shown a report written by John P. Davies?

Miss BENTLEY. I think it was just after he came back from India. I wouldn't swear to it, but I think so.

Mr. MORRIS. What did the report show, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I remember at the time saying, "Yes; they were quite right about his sympathies," because the report showed it.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know James S. Allen?

Miss BENTLEY. I may have met him once. I am not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about James S. Allen?

MISS BENTLEY. Not too much. You see, he was more or less in the open party, and I was undercover. So, if I met him at all, it was in the early days in the party, when I could associate openly with people.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I might point out that these people that we are asking Miss Bentley about are people who are connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and have been shown to be such by previous exhibits.

I would like to point that out, Mr. Chairman.

Do you know Frank Coe?

MISS BENTLEY. Not personally. He, again, was a member of the Silvermaster group, worked in the Treasury Department. I collected his Communist Party dues from the Silvermaster group, and it was my understanding from the Silvermasters, again, that he had been a member of the party for quite some time.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have already introduced the exhibits into the record which show that Mr. Frank Coe attended conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Mandel, have you anything further?

MR. MANDEL. This is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, marked "Private IPR Discussion Group on United Nations Cooperation," dated March 15, 1943, at 700 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C. On this list is Dr. Frank Coe, Michael Greenberg, and others.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

THE CHAIRMAN. That was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Mandel?

MR. MANDEL. They all came from the files of the institute.

THE CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record at this point.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 113

PRIVATE IPR DISCUSSION GROUP ON UNITED NATIONS COOPERATION, MARCH 15, 1943, WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMBERS EXPECTED

The Honorable Frances Bolton, House Office Building, Washington, D. C.
 Mr. Ralph Bunche, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.
 Mr. Edward C. Carter, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.
 Dr. Frank Coe, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.
 Mr. Cabot Coville, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
 Mrs. Judith Daniel, Institute of Pacific Relations, Washington, D. C.
 Mr. Michael Greenberg, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.
 Dr. George H. C. Harr, Research Chairman of the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council, Washington, D. C.
 Mr. W. D. Holland, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.
 Mr. William C. Johnstone, dean, junior college, George Washington University, Washington, D. C.
 Dr. Kan Lee, China Defense Supplies, Washington, D. C.
 Miss Katrine Parsons, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.
 Mr. L. B. Pearson, Minister-Counselor, Canadian Legation, Washington, D. C.
 Sir George Sansom, British Embassy, Washington, D. C.
 Mr. R. Tirana, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.
 Dr. A. P. Tixier, Fighting French Delegation, Washington, D. C.
 Mr. Alan Watt, Australian Legation, Washington, D. C.

ATTENDANCE UNCERTAIN

Mr. Wilfred Benzon, International Labor Office, Montreal.
 Mr. Joseph Jones, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
 Mr. David Weintraub, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, Washington, D. C.
 Mr. Len DeCaux, Publicity Director, CIO, Washington, D.C.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know anything about Joseph Barnes?

MISS BENTLEY. Not personally; no. He was a friend of Mr. Golos. Mr. Golos worked with him, and Mr. Golos told me he was O. K.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by "he was O. K."?

MISS BENTLEY. That meant that he could be worked with and would take directives.

Mr. MORRIS. Communist directives?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know Vladimir Kazakevich?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us what you know about Vladimir Kazakevich?

MISS BENTLEY. He was originally a White Russian who came to this country, I think, in the twenties, and then fell in with some Communist Russians on the west coast in the early thirties, never actually becoming a member in the sense that he was possessed with a book or that he was considered one, but to all intents and purposes was just as good. He was a propagandist for the Russians. He lectured for them. He wrote articles for them, and he had continuous dealings with Mr. Golos.

Whenever he found any interesting information, he brought it in to him, knowing where it was going. In fact, Mr. Kazakevich even told me several times he knew that. At one time he got a job at Cornell University giving courses on Russian civilization to Army students. But someone discovered him, I think it was Mr. Woltman on the then World Telegram, and he was exposed. I understand that he has now gone back to Russia. At least, I read it in a newspaper article.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you can tell us what you know about Alger Hiss?

Mr. Chairman, we have had previous testimony showing that Alger Hiss was an adviser of the IPR, and a member of the board of trustees of the IPR. For that reason, we are going to ask Miss Bentley if she had any connections, indirect or direct, with Alger Hiss.

MISS BENTLEY. They were indirect ones, but to my mind conclusive ones.

In 1944 I took on a group of people I called the Perlo group.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Perlo?

MISS BENTLEY. Victor Perlo is a gentleman that I understand was a quite brilliant statistician with the War Production Board. He is now out of the Government. At the last I heard of him, I think he is in the Jefferson School in New York.

One of the members of the group was a Mr. Harold Glasser, in the Treasury.

In the process of checking everyone's past, I found that Mr. Glasser had, at one time, been pulled out of that particular group and had been turned over to a person whom both Mr. Perlo and Mr. Charles

Kramer refused to tell me who it was, except that he was working for the Russians, and later they broke down and told me it was Mr. Alger Hiss.

Of course, I immediately checked that with my Soviet superior, because it could have been somebody else's intelligence service, and could be dangerous. Word came back to me "that is all right. Lay off the Hiss thing. He is one of ours, but don't bother about it any more."

Mr. MORRIS. And you did not bother about it?

Miss BENTLEY. No. When you were told by your superior to lay off, you laid off.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have more testimony from Miss Bentley in the executive session, but I think it is of such character, particularly inasmuch as it involves foreign governments, that we should have an executive session on that score.

I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we adjourn until after lunch and commence with an executive session at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

The chairman will be unable to preside after lunch. I have another committee meeting.

Senator Smith, could you preside?

Senator SMITH. I have another committee meeting also. I could probably be here for a little while. I think my committee starts at 3 o'clock.

Mr. MORRIS. It is important testimony, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I was wondering if we could meet at a later hour in the afternoon, when I might get through. What would you say to 4:30? It would be a little late.

Mr. MORRIS. That would be all right, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. I might be able to be here for an hour, at 2 o'clock.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we will be able to finish in an hour, Senator Smith.

The CHAIRMAN. How about at 4:30?

Mr. MORRIS. That will be fine, Senator.

Senator SMITH. You spoke about collecting Communist dues and making your rounds.

How often did you make these rounds? I believe you said every 2 weeks.

Miss BENTLEY. I came down every 2 weeks. Once in a while it would be less frequent, if people were on vacations, and once in a while more frequently if there was extra data. I didn't collect them every time.

Perhaps I should explain. Ordinarily, in the open party, they try to collect them regularly. When it comes to undercover work, it is done more or less as a matter of lightening your hold on a person. In other words, the money that you get out of him isn't so important, it is impressing on him that he has one more link in the party.

Senator SMITH. Did you collect the dues in other spots than Washington?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. For example, the Perlo group came up to New York to meet me, and I collected them there.

Senator SMITH. What is the amount of the dues?

Miss BENTLEY. That is one of the most awful things for anyone to try to get. I don't know whether you have ever seen a Communist

dues scale, but no one short of a financial wizard can keep them straight, and they change all the time.

All I can remember of my own dues is that at one time when I earned \$25 a week, I paid 25 cents a week dues. But it was broken down in categories, almost like an income tax, and then a surtax after so much.

Senator SMITH. Did you have any trouble collecting from your members?

Miss BENTLEY. Very often. Very often, at least they said, they were financially embarrassed.

Senator SMITH. Did you get any money for this work from Russia?

Miss BENTLEY. No; in our case we didn't, no. As a matter of fact, it went the other way around. People were paying dues, including myself, for the privilege of being Communists. We were not being paid by Russia. But then, that is good espionage practice. The Russians told me that they felt that a person who thought something of it would be able to go up higher.

Senator SMITH. They train you also on that phase, do they?

Miss BENTLEY. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would put into the record additional evidence that Harry Dexter White was associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations? We have already put in some, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. Taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations is a memorandum dated November 3, 1942, for Miss Harriet L. Moore, Prof. Philip C. Jessup, and Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer, entitled "Invitations Issued for the American Group, Mont Tremblant Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations."

Listed here as representing the White House, Currie, Lauchlin (attendance probable); Treasury Department, White, Harry D. (in London).

Others mentioned are Frank Coe, William T. Stone, and others.

Mr. MORRIS. That was for the Mont Tremblant Conference in 1942, is that right, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. That is right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 114" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 114

NOVEMBER 3, 1942.

For: Miss Harriet L. Moore
Prof. Philip C. Jessup
Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer

INVITATIONS ISSUED FOR THE AMERICAN GROUP, MONT TREMBLANT CONFERENCE,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

White House: Currie, Lauchlin (attendance probable.)
State Department: Hornbeck, Stanley K. (attendance probable.)
Treasury Department: White, Harry D. (in London.)
Board of Economic Warfare:
Perkins, Milo (declined.)
Coe, Frank (accepted for part time.)
Stone, William T. (accepted for part time.)
Office of Strategic Services:
Remer, C. F. (accepted.)
Despres, Emile (accepted.)
Bouche, Ralph (accepted.)
Brown, Norman (accepted.)

- Federal Reserve Board: Hausen, Alvin H.
 Office of War Information: Barnes, Joseph (declined.)
 Office of Price Administration: Emerson, Rupert (declined.)
 Congress: Coffee, John M.
 Journalism:
 Luce, Henry R. (declined.)
 Reid, Mrs. Ogden.
 Waymack, W. W.
 Business and law:
 Kizer, Benjamin H. (accepted.)
 Herod, W. B. (declined.)
 Grady, Henry B. (attendance probable.)
 Hoffman, Paul G.
 Labor:
 DeCaux, Len (CIO) (accepted.)
 Shiskin, Boris (AFL.)
 Academic:
 Sproul, R. G.
 Earle, Edward M. (accepted.)
 Shotwell, James T. (declined.)
 Moore, Harriet L. (accepted.)
 Wilbur, Ray Lyman.
 Jessup, Philip C. (accepted.)
 Emery, Brooks.

TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN GROUP

Governmental:

- Acheson, Dean, Department of State.
 Barnes, Joseph, Office of War Information.
 Baxter, James P., Office of Strategic Services.
 Berle, Adolf, Department of State.
 Leukens, Col. Herman, United States Military Academy.
 Currie, Lauchlin, White House.
 Emerson, Rupert, Office of Price Administration.
 Hamilton, Maxwell, Department of State.
 Hornbeck, Stanley K., Department of State.
 Nathan, Robert, War Production Board.
 Perklas, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare.
 Stone, William T., Board of Economic Warfare.
 Studebaker, John W., United States Office of Education.
 Wallace, Henry A., Vice President.
 Welles, Sumner, Department of State.
 White, Harry D., Treasury Department.

Nongovernmental:

- Bates, Scoble, University of Nanking; International Missionary Council, New York City.
 Binder, Carroll, foreign news editor, Chicago Daily News, Chicago.
 Clapper, Raymond, Scripps-Howard columnist, Washington.
 Dennison, Eleanor, National League of Women Voters, Washington.
 Earle, Edward M., Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.
 Elliot, Thomas, United States Congressman from Massachusetts, Cambridge.
 Field, Frederick V., New York City.
 Gibson, Hugh, New York.
 Grady, Henry E., president, American President Lines, San Francisco.
 Herod, W. B., vice president, International General Electric Co.; president, United China Relief, New York City.
 Jessup, Philip C., Columbia University, New York City.
 Kizer, Benjamin H., chairman, Northwest Regional Planning Commission, Spokane.
 Luce, Henry R., Time, Inc., New York City.
 Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute, New York City.
 Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B., United States district court, Spokane.
 Sproul, Robert G., president, University of California, Berkeley.
 Sproul, Allan, president, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City.

Sweetland, Monroe, director, National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief, Washington.
 Viner, Jacob, University of Chicago, Chicago.
 Wilson, C. E., president, General Electric Co., New York City.
 Wilson, Howard, Harvard University; American Council on Education, Cambridge.
 Yarnell, Admiral Harry E. (retired), Newport.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is a letter from the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 21, 1942, addressed to Robert W. Barnett, from William W. Lockwood, and I read a few excerpts:

The interviews with conference invitees yesterday were quite successful on the whole. Remer and Bunch definitely will come unless OSS policy prevents. Despres makes the same reservation; also he is not yet sure of being able to get away for that time. Coe and Stone accept tentatively, although uncertain about whether they can get away for the full period. Emerson doubts very much that he can free himself to attend. Coe and Stone have agreed to take up the question with Perkins, and have hopes that he will attend for 2 or 3 days, though no longer than that. Other possibilities developed in discussion, and these I'll take up with you later.

Meanwhile there are one or two specific things I'd like you to do.

Harry White is in London, I am told, though I didn't call his office. I am mailing a formal invitation to him, and suggest that you call his secretary to say that this is something about which we should like to talk with White on his return.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record, and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 115" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 115

OCTOBER 21, 1942.

Mr. ROBERT W. BARNETT,
 J. P. R. 700 Jackson Place NW.

DEAR BOB: The interviews with conference invitees yesterday were quite successful on the whole. Remer and Bunch definitely will come unless OSS policy prevents. Despres makes the same reservation; also he is not yet sure of being able to get away for that time. Coe and Stone accept tentatively, although uncertain about whether they can get away for the full period. Emerson doubts very much that he can free himself to attend. Coe and Stone have agreed to take up the question with Perkins, and have hopes that he will attend for 2 or 3 days, though no longer than that. Other possibilities developed in discussion, and these I'll take up with you later.

Meanwhile there are one or two specific things I'd like you to do.

Harry White is in London, I am told, though I didn't call his office. I am mailing a formal invitation to him, and suggest that you call his secretary to say that this is something about which we should like to talk with White on his return.

I also invited Len De Caux, CIO publicity director and editor of the CIO News. He immediately gave his tentative acceptance. I got a very favorable impression from conversation with him, and Michael knows him.

De Caux suggested Boris Shiskin of the A. F. of L. as another good labor person for the conference. He is the research director, I believe. If the nominating committee approves, I'd like you and Michael to see him at the Washington headquarters and extend an invitation. Before doing this, however, you had better wait for further word from me.

In the opinion of Miss Coe, and Despres, we ought to try to get Beale or Acheson, or both. More about this later, too.

One important gap in the present line-up is India. The Washington possibilities are Paul Alling, now political adviser and formerly chief of the State Department's Near Eastern Division; Wallace Murray, present chief; Eric Beecroft, and Norman Brown. From what I learned of the two State Department men, neither would be very useful to us. As between Beecroft and Brown,

I'd like your opinion and Michael's. Despres says that the written work of Brown's section is first rate—imaginative and pointed. He doesn't know Brown's qualifications as a conference participant. Remer thinks well of Brown as more than the conventional academician. In his favor are not only his position, but also his academic standing. Although we are paying little attention to this consideration in making up the American group, it would be desirable, other things being equal, to include at least one person with senior rank among scholars in the Asiatic field. But this shouldn't decide the matter unless on other grounds as well Brown is the best nominee.

Another possibility we might consider is someone from Knox's office or Stimson's. Coe and Hiss mentioned Adlai Stevens, one of Knox's special assistants. Hiss also suggested with some approval Harvey Bundy, former assistant Secretary of State and now special assistant to Stimson. Then there is General Little, a Marine general formerly in China, now retired (?). Also General Maguder, whereabouts unknown. Despres suggested Admiral Hart, saying that it wouldn't be a bad idea to have someone who would give a pretty forthright and orthodox Navy view, as this view will greatly influence the postwar settlement.

Still other suggestions include Robert Sherwood, head of the OWI's Overseas Section, and Gardner Cowles.

Ben Kizer probably will write Congressman Coffey a personal letter, and leave it to us to follow up with an interview.

In a day or so I'll send a revised list indicating where we now stand on invitations and acceptances.

Read Hager, by the way, would like very much to see you, and took down your telephone number. He has been with Rupert Emerson in the office of the OPA regional administrator handling Territories and possessions. Next week he probably will shift to the civilian staff of the Munitions Assignments Board. This will put him in a key position, as a member of the group, working for Hopkins in this field. His home address is 2031 Duidekoper Place.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary*.

Mr. MORRIS. You see there that Harry White is represented as invited as representing the Treasury Department.

Senator SMITH. I think, Mr. Chairman, that maybe the statement should be made there that that does not mean, the introduction of this exhibit does not mean, that all of the people on here, whose names are on here, are called suspects because there are names of a great many.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand it is introduced for a purpose, to connect Harry Dexter White.

Mr. MORRIS. It is introduced to show that Harry Dexter White was interested in IPR activities.

In this particular case, he was a delegate to the Mont Tremblant Conference in 1942.

Senator SMITH. I see names of a great many American citizens here on those two sheets of paper, and I was wondering about it.

The CHAIRMAN. The exhibit does not refer to them at all.

Senator SMITH. That is exactly what I wanted.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, further along those lines, Mr. Chairman, you have pointed out that incidental association between people whom we have named as Communists here, which association reflects only mere association and nothing significant, that we have asked the members of the committee to withhold any conclusions about their particular identity with the Communist organization.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. One more question.

Could you tell us what you know about Joseph Eckhart.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, quite a lot about Joseph Eckhart. I met him originally in November 1936 because he needed a secretary, or so the excuse was, to edit his letters, because his English wasn't too good.

I was introduced to him by the then organizational secretary of the city office of the League Against War and Fascism.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that?

Miss BENTLEY. Beatrice Carlin.

That organization, of course, has been thoroughly branded as being Communist dominated; not only that, the organization originated in Moscow. It was understood that Mr. Eckhart was a Communist.

As time went on, he was unable to use me because he had come to this country, I understand, for the express purpose of trying to get airplanes to Spain. That was during the civil war. He was going to sneak them out through Mexico. The Neutrality Act intervened along in there, and he stayed on until 1938, and found that he couldn't use me.

But I discovered that he was a highly important person at that point, that he had come from Moscow without the usual strings of reporting to superiors, and I knew him, as I said, from November 1936 until January, I guess it was, 1938.

I found out later on that he was a Soviet military intelligence person. Mr. Golos told me that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have introduced that testimony into evidence not immediately connecting the Institute of Pacific Relations with that individual person.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Is that all you have to offer?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, until we have an executive session, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

The committee will stand in recess until 4:30 when we will have an executive session.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a. m., Tuesday, August 14, 1951, the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., Thursday, August 16, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 16, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Senators McCarthy and Mundt; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS, your witness?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I am going to call on Mr. Carter first. Mr. Canning and Mr. Chambers, I wonder if you would accommodate the gentlemen of the press by letting them have the pictures?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say to the witnesses that they are not required or do not have to have their pictures taken in this committee. If there is no objection on their part, they may sit up here and the press may take pictures, otherwise they will not be taken.

Mr. CHAMBERS. In any case one more will not matter.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter?

The CHAIRMAN. Now again may I say that the acoustics in this room are not very good, and when it is crowded it makes it just a little bit worse. Will you kindly bear with the committee and try to be as quiet as possible, especially if you have to speak to your neighbor, in which case please resort to the whisper method only.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris, the witness has been sworn.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of calling Mr. Carter in today is that we have run into a certain amount of difficulty in determining the identity of a person mentioned in one of the exhibits. Since Mr. Carter was the recipient of the letter involved I thought it would be best to have him in here to answer this particular question. We had one day last week testimony by Prof. Karl August Wittfogel of the School of Chinese Studies in Columbia University, testimony that Herbert Norman was in 1938 a Communist.

In filing our exhibits at the time there was a possibly significant letter that we introduced at the time, which reads as follows, and this is a letter now which was introduced as an exhibit on that occasion. It is a letter from W. L. Holland to Mr. Carter dated September 5, 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the origin of that letter?

Mr. MORRIS. It was identified by Mr. Mandel as taken from the IPR files.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the exhibit number?

Mr. MORRIS. What is the exhibit number, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Exhibit No. 72.

Mr. MORRIS. I will read the letter. The significant paragraph reads as follows:

Phil is leaving tonight and is taking with him Landon's book on the Chinese in Siam and the major part of Yasuo's Industrial Japan.

It goes on to list other things that this Phil is taking with him to Japan.

Phil will be in Japan from about September 18 to October 6, and can be reached care of the Japanese IPR. Any very secret messages might be sent him care of Herbert Norman at the Canadian Legation.

We do not know who Phil is, Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that counsel is now reading from Exhibit 72 of the hearing of the committee.

Mr. MORRIS. We thought we would ask Mr. Carter who Phil is, in this letter that you received from Mr. Holland.

Mr. CARTER. I will be very glad, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Just tell us who Phil is, that is the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Identify him by his last name.

Mr. CARTER. Lilienthal.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you want to say something?

Mr. CARTER. If I may. In view of the introductory remarks of Mr. Morris regarding Mr. Norman, I wish to say that the reiteration by the counsel of this committee of Dr. Wittfogel's slanderous attack on Mr. Norman is, I think, out of keeping.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the end of the answer, that is sufficient.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire, Mr. Chairman, what the secret information was that you wanted to send or was being sent?

Mr. CARTER. May I answer this question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Lilienthal was at that time research assistant to Mr. W. L. Holland, whose office that year was provided by the University of California in the offices of the Giannini Foundation, and we had a large number of research manuscripts which Mr. Lilienthal was taking to Shanghai to be printed there for two reasons, one because costs in Nationalist China for printing were very low, and second, Shanghai was a very good distribution point for the whole Pacific. Mr. Lilienthal took these manuscripts, but was to stop in Tokyo to visit the Japanese IPR.

It was a somewhat tricky situation because at that time Japan and China were at war, and the Japanese were opposed to the IPR at that time because the IPR writers usually supported actively China's resistance to Japan under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. There might be some necessity of communicating with Mr. Norman, but it was undesirable to involve the Chinese and the Japanese in any fur-

ther controversy, and so we used, or it was proposed by Mr. Holland, that the facilities of the Canadian Legation be used.

As a matter of fact, there was no occasion for using them, and no message was sent.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not use our Embassy, the American Embassy?

Mr. CARTER. You would have to ask Mr. Holland that.

Senator FERGUSON. And the secret messages were these documents that were to be printed?

Mr. CARTER. No, they weren't the documents; they were simply—

Senator FERGUSON. Manuscripts to become documents?

Mr. CARTER. The manuscripts were to become documents, but it was not about those manuscripts that were to become books, it was in the case the Japanese, who were very critical of the international IPR and the American IPR at that time because they regarded the IPR as pro-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-Japanese, it was simply in case some misunderstanding of that sort came up that this precaution was taken but never exercised.

Senator FERGUSON. Now Herbert Norman.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he representing the IPR in Japan?

Mr. CARTER. No; he had been a research assistant in the International Secretariat sometime before, and after he had finished his Rockefeller Fellowship at Harvard he wrote one of the really great books in the IPR shelf, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State. Because of his eminence in the Japanese field, after he terminated his work with the IPR the Canadian External Affairs Ministry appointed him to their Legation in Tokyo.

Senator FERGUSON. Your only reason then for using Norman was that he was a member of the Legation?

Mr. CARTER. Two reasons. One was, he was a former member of our staff and was still interested in the institute, and his book was continuing its sale, and he was there in the Legation. Mr. Lilienthal would see him, and it was thought that it might be a convenient post-office address, but as I said, it was not used. There was no occasion to use it.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator WATKINS. Did not the Japanese at that time have a unit in the IPR in good standing?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes.

Senator WATKINS. Whatever material you sent out would be sent to them the same as to other countries that had units?

Mr. CARTER. The final product would be sent to them just as it was to all the other countries in the Pacific.

Senator WATKINS. In view of the nature of your organization, why was it necessary to have secrets?

Mr. CARTER. Because Japan and China were in a state of violent war, although I think technically it was undeclared.

Senator WATKINS. That is the only reason?

Mr. CARTER. Obviously.

Senator WATKINS. I do not think it is so obvious, otherwise I might have caught it before you gave your answer.

Mr. CARTER. It was obvious to me. I am sorry I did not make it obvious to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a letter here, and while we have Mr. Carter on the stand I would like to ask him a few questions on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. We had testimony yesterday, day before yesterday, by Elizabeth Bentley that Israel Epstein was a Soviet agent. That was brought out in the regular course of her testimony, and she knew that from her official dealings in the Communist Party.

Now this letter concerns itself with *The Unfinished Revolution in China*, which was written by Israel Epstein, and this letter, which Mr. Mandel will identify, was one of the letters taken from the IPR files.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated June 12, 1947. Would you like it read?

Mr. MORRIS. May I have a copy of that, please?

I think, Mr. Chairman, if we have this read paragraph by paragraph and then I will ask Mr. Carter a few questions about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the first two paragraphs?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if you have copies of that letter, would you give a copy to Mr. Carter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is marked "Private and confidential."

DEAR MISS FORD:

The reference is to Miss Ann Ford, publicity director, Little, Brown & Co.—

This is to acknowledge Epstein's *The Unfinished Revolution in China*, which you so kindly sent me a few days ago. I have already read two-thirds of it and hope to complete it within a few days.

I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting it read at an early date among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives; John Foster Dulles and John Carter Vincent of the State Department. You will know better than I how to make certain that they read it in the near future. A letter from me on the subject might lead a few of them to think that I was recommending it because I was an admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly discount my recommendation.

I have another suggestion to make. The book is so full of profound understanding and admiration of the Chinese people that I think it is equally important to find ways and means of getting a wide circulation in China. Have you thought of a Chinese edition? In the past there has been a tendency for Shanghai publishers to get out pirated editions in English. This would be all to the good if the printing was done accurately and the full text was reprinted. Sometimes, for necessary reasons, they make substantial cuts.

Mr. MORRIS. That is enough for the time being. Why were you so interested, Mr. Carter, to have the leaders, the heads of our State Department, John Foster Dulles, John Carter Vincent, and Secretary of State George Marshall, read *The Unfinished Revolution in China* by Israel Epstein?

Mr. CARTER. And Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives. It struck me as a human document by a man who had been long in China and seemed to me to have a rather broad and deep knowledge of things Chinese and the Chinese people.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not know that Israel Epstein was a Soviet agent?

Mr. CARTER. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you recognize the book as a Communist publication?

Mr. CARTER. I did not. I would hardly have sent it to as astute and wise and patriotic men as this list if I had thought that it was Communist propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you never knew Israel Epstein was a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. At that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Or a special pleader for the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The question was, Did you know him to be?

Mr. CARTER. I did not know him to be a Communist on June 12, 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you changed your mind since then as to whether or not he was?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you could answer that question "Yes" or "No" and then make your explanation. It would save time, Mr. Carter, if you do that.

Mr. CARTER. I am terribly sorry, Senator McCarran, but this is one of the things that you can't say "Yes" or "No."

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question and see whether you can answer "Yes" or "No."

Senator FERGUSON. Let me put the question again. Have you changed your mind as to Epstein being or ever having been a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. I have reconsidered and have not reached a final conclusion.

Senator FERGUSON. You are now in doubt?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You are familiar with this book, are you not, *The Unfinished Revolution in China*?

Mr. CARTER. I haven't read it for a long time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I would like to have the clerk of the committee put some of these paragraphs in here, but I do not want to delay this examination this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will designate, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I will have them designated and see that they go in the record here, and I will have a copy of that furnished to you and then ask you, and get an answer later, about what you think in the light of your reconsideration.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The witness has made a statement that on June 12, 1947, he did not know Mr. Epstein to be a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that we might have a comprehensive answer on that point, Mr. Carter, did you on June 12, 1947, know Mr. Epstein ever to have been a Communist or ever to have worked for the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read the next to the last paragraph in the letter—that is, the next to the last in the P. S.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

P. S.—Of course, many will say that Epstein is a special pleader. I think this is probably true, but I think he is pleading for a more sound analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders. I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications will make as wise a choice.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, what did you mean there, that Epstein was a special pleader?

Mr. CARTER. He was pleading for the Chinese people.

Mr. MORRIS. That is your interpretation of the expression "many will say that Epstein is a special pleader"?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. He was pleading also for a new kind of world, was he not? Do you not say that?

The CHAIRMAN. It is the P. S., I think.

Mr. MORRIS. He has it, I believe.

Mr. CARTER. He is "pleading for a more sound analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Mr. Epstein was there pleading for what you thought was a sound analysis of the world?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In view of the fact that we had Israel Epstein identified as a Soviet agent as of that time, does it surprise you about your own opinions of the world situation at that time?

Mr. CARTER. Not completely because some of the identifications alleged in this room haven't convinced me of their authenticity.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony then that you do not believe that Israel Epstein was a Soviet agent at that time?

Mr. CARTER. I had no knowledge at that time that he was a Soviet agent, and I do not know today whether he was or was not.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read one paragraph here about you saying that he was a special pleader for a new kind of world and ask you whether it was this kind of world that you were talking about. This is page 411.

The only point in this formulation with which a student in political science might quarrel was the phrase "Communist form of government." Communism is not a form of government but an economic society.

Now, is that what you were talking about, that he was a special pleader for that?

Mr. CARTER. Well, not having read the book for some time and being confronted with a few sentences out of a big book—

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

Mr. CARTER. At the moment I don't feel that I would help the committee at all by making an answer. I would be very glad to study it and send you in writing my reaction and my answer to your question.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were saying that he was a special pleader for a particular form of government or kind.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Do you not think that Epstein was advocating communism in this book?

MR. CARTER. I don't want to be difficult, but I would like to read the book unhurriedly.

SENATOR FERGUSON. I will ask you questions later on it then.

MR. CARTER. All right.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there was reference there to—

I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications will make as wise a choice.

I think it would be appropriate to make excerpts from Mr. Lattimore's review, which appeared in the New York Times.

SENATOR FERGUSON. First, I would like to ask Mr. Carter the question, Did you think that Owen Lattimore would give the same kind of review of this book as you had in mind, a new form of government that was appropriate?

MR. CARTER. I can't remember what I had in mind. I did regard and still regard Owen Lattimore as very knowledgeable about China, and this was a book by a man who knew a great deal about China. Whether I had in mind any particular emphasis on this or that point in the book I can't for the life of me remember this morning.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Now, you were all for the book?

MR. CARTER. I thought it was a good book, and that it should have wide circulation, and that it should come to the attention of our most thoughtful Americans.

SENATOR FERGUSON. And you felt that if Owen Lattimore reviewed this book he would take the same slant on it as you have taken?

MR. CARTER. Well, I thought he probably would see that it was a useful book.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Yes. You anticipated that he would follow the same thinking on it as you had?

MR. CARTER. No.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Well, you say "I hope other publications will make as wise a choice."

MR. CARTER. I thought he was a qualified reviewer, and I hoped that other papers would get equally qualified reviewers.

SENATOR FERGUSON. And you anticipated that he would recommend it?

MR. CARTER. I thought it was likely.

SENATOR WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

THE CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith, I think, wanted to ask a question.

SENATOR SMITH. I was wondering if Mr. Carter would read the last paragraph on sheet 2 and tell us what he meant by that.

THE CHAIRMAN. Will you kindly read that, Mr. Carter?

SENATOR SMITH. Out loud.

MR. CARTER (reading):

I imagine the Kuomintang government will put the book on the "forbidden" list for import in China. I would hope that you could get it into the hands of Ambassador Leighton Stuart and some of the American correspondents like Benjamin Welles—

That is the son of Sumner Welles—

Christopher Rand and Arch Steele, Sun Fo, Madame Sun Yat-sen and a few others, before the bronze curtain falls.

Senator SMITH. What did you mean by that paragraph, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I thought that it certainly should be in the hands of our Ambassador, Leighton Stuart, who has a lifelong knowledge of China, some of our principal American correspondents, and Sun Fo, who was a member of the Chiang Kai-shek cabinet, Madame Sun Yat-sen, who was a member of the Soong family, and others.

It seemed to me that I was suggesting that this book come to the attention of first, correspondents from the Times and Tribune and other American papers.

Senator SMITH. When you put in quotation marks "forbidden list," what did you mean by that?

Mr. CARTER. I knew at that time that the war-weariness following the war, the difficulty of reorganizing China at that time after the devastation of the Japanese and so forth, that some agencies of the Nationalist Government were very sensitive to any criticism of the regime and that they might, that some bureaucrats might, put this on a forbidden list.

Senator SMITH. You regard this book as inimical to the Nationalist interests then?

Mr. CARTER. No, I thought it could be very useful to the Nationalist Government, but I thought that some of the less intelligent bureaucrats in the Nationalist Government might think it was hostile.

Senator SMITH. Do you not think it was hostile to the Nationalist Government?

Mr. CARTER. On what point?

Senator SMITH. The book.

Mr. CARTER. I think I said I would comment after I had read the book. But I think it was critical of certain features in the Nationalist Government, features that our own Ambassador, Leighton Stuart, was aware of and constantly labored in private with Chiang Kai-shek to reform.

Senator SMITH. Do you not regard the book as being one that would add to the blame, so to speak, of the Nationalist cause and encourage the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. I did not so regard it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not regard it as an open espousal of the Communist cause?

Mr. CARTER. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. How can you reconcile the fact that Israel Epstein in your opinion was a special pleader for Communist China? It was your testimony that he was a special pleader for the Chinese.

Mr. CARTER. I felt that Leighton Stuart was a special pleader for the Chinese.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question.

Mr. MORRIS. In view of your testimony when you discussed the idea of Israel Epstein being a special pleader, you felt he was a special pleader on the part of Communist China?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How can you reconcile this paragraph which Senator Smith has been just examining you on where you say that the book would probably be put on the forbidden list by China?

Mr. CARTER. Put on the forbidden list, as I said, by some bureaucrat.

Mr. MORRIS. By the Chinese Government? Obviously it is an official list you are talking about?

Mr. CARTER. The dichotomy in the various bureaus of the Chinese Government, or multichotomy, were such that, as in some other governments, one section of the government doesn't know what the other section's right hand and left hand is doing.

Senator WATKINS. Modeled after our own?

Mr. CARTER. I wouldn't make that aspersion.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like an answer, Mr. Chairman, to my question whether this book was an open espousal of the Communist Chinese cause.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask a question. You at least thought, Mr. CARTER, that this book was more favorable to the Communist element in China than it was to the then existing Nationalist Government?

Mr. CARTER. I wouldn't affirm that without reading the book again.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you wanted to get it to Madame Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, and Sun Fo, members of the Cabinet.

Senator FERGUSON. But Madame Sun Yat-sen, you wanted to get it to her?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. She was more favorable to the Communist side at that time?

Mr. CARTER. She was very keen on the united front.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the united front meant to some of those people victory for the Communists, did it not?

Mr. CARTER. I suppose it did to the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now was she not favorable to the Communist side?

Mr. CARTER. She is apparently living now under Communist rule. I don't know whether she is having a good time or bad time.

Mr. MORRIS. She is an official of the Government, is she not?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Have you any doubt that she is sympathetic to the Communist Government?

Mr. CARTER. Pretty nearly everyone—the Chinese Communist Government, the Communist Government of China, contains hundreds, thousands of former Chiang Kai-shek officials.

Senator FERGUSON. But that does not say that they are not Communists?

Mr. CARTER. They may or may not be.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think the present Chinese Government in China proper is not a Communist Government?

Mr. CARTER. The leaders are Communists and are following definitely an out-and-out Communist line, but there are employed in high positions in that Communist Government a great many Chinese who were loyal supporters of Chiang Kai-shek and the National regime. Which category Madame Sun Yat-sen is in today I don't know. I have read a great many attacks saying that she has gone over hook, bait, and sinker to the Communist cause.

I have heard other statements that she is very critical of many of the features of the Communist regime and not having been on the spot I am not able to reach any balance.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not want to say then that this book was more favorable to the Communist side of the Government, of the people in China, that were represented?

Mr. CARTER. Not until I have read it.

Senator FERGUSON. But not withstanding this statement that you were fearful that it was going on the forbidden list and would be kept out?

Mr. CARTER. As I said, there were cliques, there are opposition groups, within the Kuomintang government, and as the Senator hinted, as there exists elsewhere.

Senator WATKINS. I was referring to the fact that you said one group would not know what the other group was doing. I thought that perhaps you meant they were following what our people were doing.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find Owen Lattimore more sympathetic to the Communist China side than to the Kuomintang side?

Mr. CARTER. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. But you thought he was a wise choice to review this kind of a book?

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have Mr. Mandel read excerpts from this review by Owen Lattimore, which has been referred to in testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. This review is taken from the New York Times book review section, June 22, 1947, pages 5 and 29. I will read excerpts:

* * * From Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China to Theodore White and Amateo Jacoby's Thunder Out of China the list of names is distinguished—and most of these writers won their distinction solely or primarily by what they had to say about China. Israel Epstein has without question established a place for himself in that distinguished company * * *

* * * The writers either throw their weight into criticism of the Kuomintang, like Mr. White and Mr. Jacoby, or into outspoken support of the Chinese Communists, like Mr. Epstein * * *

There is no question about Mr. Epstein's partisanship. He not only justifies Chinese Communist policy but he justifies it and Russian policy in relation to each other and in relation to American policy, * * * Mr. Epstein has presented enough facts for this reviewer, at least, to form an opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Who wrote that?

Mr. MORRIS. Owen Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that disappoint you when you said that you hoped other publications would make as wise a choice?

Mr. CARTER. This was written over 4 years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall now that Lattimore said that about the book?

Mr. CARTER. I don't. I am very glad to see it and discover that Lattimore was writing frankly and honestly about the book.

Senator FERGUSON. Now your opinion of Lattimore, does that bring you to the conclusion that this book was more favorable to the Communists than to the non-Communists?

Mr. CARTER. It does; certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. No doubt about it?

Mr. CARTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. Your letter of June 12, 1947, is the one that had the paragraph that I directed your attention to just now. I notice this review was published in the New York Times June 22, 1947, 10 days after you wrote the letter?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Had you seen Lattimore's review that was going to be published at the time you wrote your letter of the 12th?

Mr. CARTER. No; I hadn't seen it. Well, I don't remember. I think it's unlikely, but I can't swear to it. Mr. Morris might bring up something.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, are you now going to change your testimony, namely, that you did not recognize that to be an open espousal of the Chinese Communist cause on further thought?

Mr. CARTER. I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, that on piecemeal quotations I would like to read the book.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Are you going to change your mind?

Mr. MORRIS. I have two other reviews that I think are appropriate.

Senator FERGUSON. You agreed with this opinion of Lattimore? You usually agreed with Lattimore's opinion on China; did you not?

Mr. CARTER. Usually, not invariably.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you now in conflict with this opinion? Does this not refresh your memory?

Mr. CARTER. Well, it tells me what Lattimore's reaction to the book was.

Senator FERGUSON. You never got that reaction?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember. I am not trying to stall.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it not seem strange to you now, not having to use hindsight, that you would recommend a book to George Marshall, Senator Vandenberg, my distinguished colleague, and others mentioned in this article, that Owen Lattimore talked of in this language? Does that not now seem strange to you?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I have such high respect for the intellectual ability and integrity of all those men that I must have thought they would make up their own minds.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you want to get this side at least to them, the Communist side?

Mr. CARTER. I had no desire to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how do you reconcile that with Lattimore's judgment that you respect so much, on China if this was not a Communist propaganda book?

Mr. CARTER. Of course, I have to let you do the reconciling.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you ever know a Communist to do some writing that he did not infiltrate his writings with Communist propaganda? You have been a great reader and a student. Have you ever known a Communist to write and not infiltrate his writing with Communist propaganda?

Mr. CARTER. I have read translations of Soviet Russia, presumably Communist scientists on fish, on forests, on cattle breeding, where I could never discover a Communist line. That is my answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us get a little closer. I will change my question a little. You did answer that, I think, by some avoidance when you got to fish and cattle. Let us go into the political field.

Have you ever known a Communist writer to not infiltrate his political writings with Communist propaganda?

Mr. CARTER. I think it's their usual pattern.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Not only usual.

Mr. CARTER. Invariably, you would say?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder—

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want that answer to stand about the fish now, or do you want to strike it out?

Mr. CARTER. No; I would leave it in. Put reindocer in also.

Senator FERGUSON. I still think the Commies have a line on the fish question.

Mr. CARTER. The Japanese think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you read excerpts from two other reviews of the same book?

Mr. MANDEL. I read excerpts from a review by Frederick V. Field appearing in the *New Masses* for July 22, 1947, on pages 20 and 21. The *New Masses* is a Communist magazine.

The main subject of the *Unfinished Revolution in China* is the history, first, of China's war of resistance against Japan, and second of the struggle of the Chinese people against the Kuomintang dictatorship and American imperialism. * * *

Then we find further down the following:

* * * During the war against Japan it was in those parts of China where the people were moved to organize themselves by Communist leadership that resistance was successful and that Chinese history spurred forward. * * *

The next is a quotation from the *Daily Worker* of June 18, 1947, a review of the same book by Samuel Sillen.

We have had many excellent books about China in the past few years, books by topflight reporters like Harrison Forman, Guenther Stein, Agnes Smedley, Theodore White, and Annalee Jacoby. At the top of this list belongs a book published today, Israel Epstein's *Unfinished Revolution in China*.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you read either of those reviews, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't subscribe to either the *New Masses* or the *Daily Worker*. I see them occasionally on subway stands.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recognize now that the three reviews are very much similar, in fact, Sillen's analysis of the thing, talking about the distinguished company, almost coincides completely with Lattimore's?

Mr. CARTER. Well, not quite; Lattimore does not mention Smedley, Guenther Stein, or Harrison Forman.

Mr. MORRIS. He mentioned Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China*, and Ted White and Annalee Jacoby's *Thunder Out of China*, and says:

Israel Epstein has without question established a place for himself in that distinguished company.

Mr. CARTER. Is that from the *Daily Worker*?

Mr. MORRIS. No; that is from the review by Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that distinguished company?

Mr. CARTER. Lattimore thought so. You will have to ask him.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter, with respect to the thing by Field, published in the *New Masses* 10 days after your letter, had you seen Mr. Field's review at the time you wrote your letter?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator SMITH. Were not you and Mr. Field working very closely at that time, June 1947?

Mr. MORRIS. He was a member of your executive committee, was he not, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I have forgotten the exact date. Perhaps you could refresh my memory as to when he resigned from the board's executive committee. He had a long time previously resigned as a member of the staff, and when he resigned as a member of the staff my weekly or monthly or daily contact with him ceased. He was working on other things mostly.

Senator SMITH. Did you subscribe to what Field said in his review?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember seeing it until this morning. Which particular point?

Senator FERGUSON. About the American imperialism.

Senator SMITH (reading):

that their foreign oppressors are today primarily American imperialists—

Mr. CARTER. That was the usual Communist line all over the world, that the people of the United States of America were imperialists if we had taken over the job from the French, and so forth.

Senator SMITH. This was a review of that book?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Is this one of the reasons why you wanted this book to be distributed in China to slant the people further in favor of the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. What I was concerned about, Senator, was that the most intelligent people in this country could get an understanding of various points of view and stresses in China. I felt that unless the Kuomintang cleaned house economically, administratively, militarily, the Communists were bound to take over, and I hoped that public opinion in this country could be so informed that before it was too late Chiang Kai-shek and the better elements in the Nationalist Government could listen to our Ambassador Leighton Stuart, listen to others, clean house, and prevent the Communists from taking over China.

Senator SMITH. But your paragraph here was referring to getting the book circulated in China.

Mr. CARTER. Well, my focus first of all with the American edition was to get it circulated in the United States. A second suggestion was that there be a Chinese edition in the hope that it would reach as many Chinese as possible who were in a position to aid in the reform of the Kuomintang and shoring it up and making it so democratic, so efficient, that the Chinese Communists would have nothing to offer and that Chiang and the better element around him would remain in China. And we now know he is not in China but is in Formosa.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Carter, did you then think that the way to change the Chiang Kai-shek government was to espouse the cause of communism?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Is not that just what this book did? Is that not exactly what the book did?

Mr. CARTER. If that is your opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. I take these men who wrote about it. Is that not what they say it did?

Mr. CARTER. It certainly looks like it.

Senator FERGUSON. You read it before you recommended it?

Mr. CARTER. I read the book, I think, in manuscript or galley proof.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you now think that that was the way to change the Government of China, was to advocate the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. I did not; I just said that I thought we were playing for time as a chance that Chiang, with American aid, could save the situation and stop the Communist avalanche.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Do you know of any other books of similar nature that you recommended to our Secretary of State and those that were in the Far Eastern Division or people in Congress that had something to say in relation to foreign policy that was similar to the Epstein book?

Mr. CARTER. It was our practice to send to appropriate officers of our Government copies of all our publications. Of course, they automatically went to the Library of Congress, they went to those few people in Congress who were members of IPR, the Far Eastern Division, the Secretary of State's Office, and so on.

Senator FERGUSON. It was your purpose to influence public opinion in America in the Far East?

Mr. CARTER. It was our purpose to provide facts and diverse opinion so that the public could make up its own mind. Mr. Root, Mr. Hughes, many of our Secretaries of State have said that the Government has great difficulty in acting intelligently because of the lack of an informed public opinion. So far as the Pacific was concerned we conceived our role to get the facts, to provide a variety of opinions, analyses from all sorts of points of view so that the public, the Government, press, and business could make up its own mind.

Senator FERGUSON. You did hope, however, that it would follow the suggestions that you were making?

Mr. CARTER. The institute as such didn't make suggestions on policy at all.

Senator FERGUSON. You were hoping that this book, the Unfinished Revolution in China, would influence American public opinion?

Mr. CARTER. We thought it should be; I thought it should be considered.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "we" who do you mean, Mr. Carter? Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Lattimore was not on the staff of Pacific Affairs at that time. I meant my colleagues on the staff. I wish now to speak for myself. I hoped that this and other books would aid because I think you remember, Senator McCarran, always throughout our history we have concentrated on Europe. We teach French, Italian, German, and Spanish. It is only recently that we have taught Chinese and Japanese. We wanted the public to have ample data on the Far East.

The CHAIRMAN. So for that reason you wanted a Communist doctrine spread in this country; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you mark this "private and confidential" when you wanted so many people to know about it?

MR. CARTER. Well, I was writing to a publisher, Little, Brown & Co. in Boston using the names of eminent people whom I had not consulted. I had not consulted Senator Vandenberg or General Marshall. I simply said, "You may wish to get this book into the hands of these people."

SENATOR FERGUSON. Was the reason that you wanted this private and confidential that you were saying that this book would be forbidden in your opinion in Nationalist China?

MR. CARTER. It could be.

SENATOR FERGUSON. That would be a reason for keeping this confidential?

MR. CARTER. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, without laboring this point too long I would like three more paragraphs read into the record at this time. Would you read the first three paragraphs in the P. S.?

THE CHAIRMAN. Of what?

MR. MORRIS. From the letter of Mr. Carter to Miss Ford.

THE CHAIRMAN. All right.

MR. MANDEL (reading):

I have not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, however, that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete suggestions from him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately a copy.

P. S. 2.—Referring to General Marshall, I wish you could find someone who could get him to read the book from start to finish and not simply the end with Epstein's analysis of Marshall. It seems to me he would need the cumulative effect of the preceding chapters to make him reassess objectively his own role.

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but he has probably never seen it organized so logically. If he were sold on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, why were you so anxious that John Carter Vincent read the book?

MR. CARTER. Wasn't he Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department at that time?

MR. MORRIS. As such did he have access to General Marshall?

MR. CARTER. Well, through, I suppose, the Under Secretary of State. I never knew whether he went directly to General Marshall or not.

MR. MORRIS. Why do you say here—

If he were sold on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover.

MR. CARTER. John Carter Vincent's official duty at the that time was to handle the China administration of the State Department, and he would probably be regarded in a formal organization of the Department by General Marshall as one of the far eastern experts.

THE CHAIRMAN. And you thought that this book would be a good book for General Marshall to be guided by naturally?

MR. CARTER. I thought it would be a good thing for him to read.

MR. MORRIS. What did you mean when you said, Mr. Carter:

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but he has probably never seen it organized so logically.

What did you mean by that, Mr. Carter?

MR. CARTER. I thought John Carter Vincent was very open-minded, I still do, and I thought that there would be very little material that was in it new to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Why do you say that, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Because his whole machinery of the State Department, War, Navy, Treasury, Agriculture, the data, the intelligence, of that whole area came automatically to him and his colleagues.

Mr. MORRIS. Including Communist doctrine?

Mr. CARTER. Well, the State Department's job was to find out what was going on, whether the people who were operating were friends or foes. Their duty was to study Communist China. They sent people to study. Any government that is on its job has its intelligence officers going into what is called enemy territory and our Government apparently did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, did you ever consider John Carter Vincent to be a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have these two documents received as the next consecutive exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 116" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 116

JUNE 12, 1947.

Private and confidential.

MISS ANNE FORD,

Publicity Director, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass.

DEAR MISS FORD: This is to acknowledge Epstein's *The Unfinished Revolution in China*, which you so kindly sent me a few days ago. I have already read two-thirds of it and hope to complete it within a few days.

I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting it read at an early date among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives, John Foster Dulles and John Carter Vincent of the State Department. You will know better than I how to make certain that they read it in the near future. A letter from me on the subject might lead a few of them to think that I was recommending it because I was an admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly discount my recommendation.

I have another suggestion to make. The book is so full of profound understanding and admiration of the Chinese people that I think it is equally important to find ways and means of getting a wide circulation in China. Have you thought of a Chinese edition? In the past there has been a tendency for Shanghai publishers to get out pirated editions in English. This would be all to the good if the printing was done accurately and the full text was reprinted. Sometimes, for mercenary reasons, they make substantial cuts.

Would it be out of the question for you to consider at an early date printing a cheap paper cover edition for maximum circulation in India, the Philippines and China with the expectation that some orders would come in from Indochina, Siam, Burma, and the Netherlands East Indies?

The book combines in one volume several books. It is a penetrating history of China during the war years. It is a sociological document of importance, and it is a military handbook that might have been of enormous value to the Maquis in France and even to the little handful of anti-Hitler Germans in Germany. It might become a military and political handbook for Viet-Nam and in other Asiatic areas if the imperialist powers try to reassert their pre-Pearl Harbor domination.

The book is not so much needed in the Communist areas in China as it is in the Kuomintang areas where its authoritative accounts would give new hope, as well as new methods, to the millions of Chinese who are dissatisfied with the right wing Kuomintang domination. You have only to read the newspapers to discover what a large potential market for Epstein's book there is amongst non-Communist professors and students in the Chinese universities. The history of the last few decades proves conclusively that the Chinese student

movements are far more influential in China than in many other countries in starting new and creative political and social movements.

More than at any other time in recent years, there is a large British public both in the United Kingdom, Canada, and also in Australia and New Zealand which would find the book illuminating, not only with reference to China, but in their thinking with reference to a great many movements in the continent of Europe and elsewhere.

I congratulate Little, Brown & Co.'s merriment in deciding, not only to publish this book, but in leaving no stone unturned in getting a very wide circulation.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—I have not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, however, that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete suggestions from him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately a copy.

P. S. 2.—Referring to General Marshall, I wish you could find someone who would get him to read the book from start to finish and not simply the end with Epstein's analysis of Marshall. It seems to me he would need the cumulative effect of the preceding chapters to make him reassess objectively his own role.

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but he has probably never seen it organized so logically. If he were sold on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover.

Of course, many will say that Epstein is a special pleader. I think this is probably true, but I think he is pleading for a more sound analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders. I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications will make as wise a choice.

I imagine the Kuomintang government will put the book on the "forbidden" list for import in China. I would hope that you could get it into the hands of Ambassador Leighton Stuart and some of the American correspondents like Benjamin Welles, Christopher Rand and Arch Steele, Sun Fo, Madame Sun Yst-sen and a few others, before the bronze curtain falls.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 117" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 117

REVIEWS OF *THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION IN CHINA*, BY ISRAEL EPSTEIN, BOSTON, MASS., LITTLE, BROWN & CO.

(By Owen Lattimore, New York Times, Book Review, June 22, 1947, pp. 5 and 29):

* * * From Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China* to Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby's *Thunder Out of China* the list of names is distinguished—and most of these writers won their distinction solely or primarily by what they had to say about China. Israel Epstein has without question established a place for himself in that distinguished company. * * *

* * * The writers either throw their weight into criticism of the Kuomintang, like Mr. White and Mr. Jacoby, or into outspoken support of the Chinese Communists, like Mr. Epstein. * * *

There is no question about Mr. Epstein's partisanship. He not only justifies Chinese Communist policy but he justifies it and Russian policy in relation to each other and in relation to American policy. * * * Mr. Epstein has presented enough facts for this reviewer, at least, to form an opinion.

He convinces me that the trend of the civil war in China is not toward the triumph of an ideology or the winning of dictatorial power by individual generals or politicians. * * *

(By Frederick V. Field, New Masses, July 22, 1947, pp. 20-21):

* * * The people of China have arisen against both their native and foreign oppressors and because it happens that their foreign oppressors are today primarily American imperialists the story of this great historical event is especially pertinent to the political life of the American people.

There is no other book that so faithfully or expertly records this momentous turning point in history as Epstein's * * *

What distinguishes Epstein's work from the notable contributions of the others is, first, that his is more comprehensive both at the contemporary and historical levels, and second, the amazing wealth of detail which he has assembled. * * *

The main subject of *The Unfinished Revolution in China* is the history, first, of China's war of resistance against Japan, and second of the struggle of the Chinese people against the Kuomintang dictatorship and American imperialism. * * * He writes about the American missionary who sold out to the would-be emperor Yuan Shih-kai and the reader recognizes the present Congressman who now parallels his infamous role.

* * * During the war against Japan it was in those parts of China where the people were moved to organize themselves by Communist leadership that resistance was successful and that Chinese history sported forward. * * *

The Unfinished Revolution in China deserves to be widely read.

(By Samuel Sillen, *Daily Worker*, June 18, 1947, p. 11) :

We have had many excellent books about China in the past few years--books by topflight reporters like Harrison Forman, Gunther Stein, Agnes Smedley, Theodore White, and Annalee Jacoby. At the top of this list belongs a book published today, Israel Epstein's *Unfinished Revolution in China*.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Chairman, that that is all we want on this particular point at this time.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you call Mr. Canning?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Canning, will you come forward, please?

Will you raise your right hand? You do solemnly swear in the testimony that you are about to give before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, it will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. CANNING. I do.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM MARTIN CANNING, CINCINNATI, OHIO

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, will you give your name and address to the stenographer, please?

Mr. CANNING. William Martin Canning, 789 North Crescent Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, will you tell us your most recent employment?

Mr. CANNING. I was until recently on the staff of Xavier University of Cincinnati.

Mr. MORRIS. You are a graduate of what college?

Mr. CANNING. College of the City of New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a graduate degree?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, I have a master's degree from Columbia.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year did you obtain that, Mr. Canning?

Mr. CANNING. 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Canning, did you ever join the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you join the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. In the early part of 1936 I joined the Communist Party unit at the City College.

Mr. MORRIS. And how long did you remain a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. A little over 2 years, until the latter part of 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, during that period were you ever in a position that you were able to discern people in the Communist movement and learn of their identity?

Mr. CANNING. Yes. I, of course, was active in the City College unit and as a student at Columbia I knew others there at Columbia who belonged to other units of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position in the Communist fraction there, Mr. Canning?

Mr. CANNING. At City College?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. CANNING. Well, I had various positions at one time or another. I assisted in the editing of a secret publication distributed among the staff, the City College Teacher-Worker. I was also literature director for another period.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder generally, Mr. Canning, could you give us an idea of how many members of the City College faculty were in the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. Somewhere between 40 and 50. I have forgotten that now.

Senator FERGUSON. Out of a total number of how many?

Mr. CANNING. The total staff?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. CANNING. The total staff consisted perhaps of 300, at least 300.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, you also had occasion to know who some of the people on the Columbia faculty were who were members of the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. Not so much on the faculty, but I did know graduate students who were members of the Columbia unit.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the schools have separate cells?

Mr. CANNING. That is right; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of calling Mr. Canning here today is to ask him to identify some of these people that he encountered in City College and at Columbia whose affairs have come into the Institute of Pacific relations, and we are going to discuss that.

First, of all, Mr. Canning, did you know a man named Lawrence Rosinger?

Mr. CANNING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about him?

Mr. CANNING. I knew Lawrence Rosinger while he was a student at City College and subsequently when he continued on at Columbia in graduate work. I knew Lawrence Rosinger to be a member of the Columbia University unit of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any doubt in your mind whatever that Mr. Rosinger was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. No.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions did you meet him?

Mr. CANNING. Quite frequently.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you estimate it as much as possible?

Mr. CANNING. I would meet him at Columbia several times a week during 1936 and 1937, in that period.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would introduce into the record at this time evidence of Rosinger's activities within the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. I would just like to ask a question. Did you discuss communism with Rosinger?

Mr. CANNING. I did; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you feel certain that he was a member of the Columbia unit?

Mr. CANNING. There is no doubt in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. No doubt?

Mr. CANNING. No.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. These excerpts have been taken from the official publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations and from books written by Mr. Rosinger and I read some of these excerpts.

Author of *China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44*, Princeton University Press in cooperation with the International Secretariat of the IPR, published in 1944.

On the jacket of Mr. Rosinger's book entitled "State of Asia," and this book is issued under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1951, I quote:

Lawrence K. Rosinger has covered far-eastern events as a member of the research staffs of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. His books include *China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44*—

and so forth.

He is listed as a member of a meeting staff and round table recorder in a volume entitled "Problems of the Pacific, 1939, Proceedings of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Seventh Conference, Virginia Beach, Va., November 18, December 2, 1939," page 275.

He is listed as a conference member of other conferences in 1939 and in 1949. The one held in New Delhi, India, was in 1949.

Then his writings in the official publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations, including the *Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs*, are here listed.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I would like to have that received as the next consecutive exhibit.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 118" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 118

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

Author of *China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44*, Princeton University Press in cooperation with the International Secretariat, IPR, 1944.

"Lawrence K. Rosinger has covered far eastern events as a member of the research staffs of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. His books include *China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44*; *China Crisis; Restless India, and India and the United States*." (Jacket of *State of Asia*. By Lawrence K. Rosinger and Associates. Issued under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951).

Listed as a meeting staff and round table recorder (*Problems of the Pacific—1939, Proceedings of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Seventh Conference, Virginia Beach, Va., November 18, December 2, 1939*, p. 275).

Listed as a conference member:

"Lawrence K. Rosinger (1939). *Far Eastern Research Associate, Foreign Policy Association*." (*Security in the Pacific: A Preliminary Report of the*

Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs, Va., January 6-17, 1945, p. 190).

"L. K. Rosinger, associate member, American Delegation India-American Conference, New Delhi, December 1949, listed as research associate, American Institute of Pacific Relations." (Source: Indian-American Relations, Proceedings of the India-America Conference held in New Delhi in December 1949 issued under the joint auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs and the American Institute of Pacific Relations. P. 72.)

"Mr. Rosinger is a member of the staff of the American Institute of Pacific Relations; and of the editorial board of its magazine, the Far Eastern Survey" (Jacket of India and the United States by Lawrence K. Rosinger, An Institute of Pacific Relations Book, 1950).

Writer of the following articles for the Far Eastern Survey:

- Book Reviews, 1944, pages 73 and 133.
- India in World Politics, 1949, pages 229-43.
- The White Paper in Brief, 1949, pages 205-208.
- Book Review, 1949, page 45.

Writer of the following articles for Pacific Affairs:

- Book Review, 1936, pages 610-611.
- Book Review, 1937, pages 102-103.
- Book Review, 1938, pages 421-432.
- Book Review, 1939, pages 186-188.
- The Far East and the New Order in Europe, 1939, pages 357-389.
- Politics and Strategy of China's Mobile War, 1939, pages 263-277.
- Book Review, 1940, pages 336-337.
- Book Review, 1940, pages 111-113.
- Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1940, pages 263-278.
- Book Review, 1941, pages 480-482.
- Book Review, 1942, pages 117-118.
- Book Review, 1941, page 347.
- China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44, book reviewed, 1945, pages 287-288.
- Book review, 1946, page 97.

Senator FERGUSON. What year were you discussing these matters with Rosinger?

Mr. CANNING. As I recall, throughout this period of my own membership he was also a member of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. The years again?

Mr. CANNING. From the early part of 1936 to the latter part of 1938.

Senator FERGUSON. So it is just before these writings?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Some of them even while you were doing the discussing?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, did you make available to the proper authorities your knowledge that Rosinger was a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you will extend that just a little bit. Tell us to what extent you made that known to the authorities.

Mr. CANNING. Well, my first testimony on these matters of the City College Communist unit and Columbia University activities was in 1940 during the hearings of the New York State Legislative Committee on the Public Schools, Coudert committee.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you testified publicly that Lawrence Rosinger was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. As I recall.

Mr. MORRIS. That fact was probably reported in all the press at the time?

Mr. CANNING. As to the publicity, I did testify on all of these matters both in private testimony and in public but, Mr. Morris, I don't recall whether or not the public testimony carried this information.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you leave the party, if you did leave it?

Mr. CANNING. In the latter part of 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have any other letters showing Mr. Rosinger's activities with the Institute of Pacific Relations? I would like to have you read them if you have.

Mr. MANDEL. I have a letter here dated August 9, 1940, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. Edward Carter and signed by Lawrence K. Rosinger. I read the first paragraph as follows:

On returning from my vacation, I found that a letter had arrived from the New York City Board of Education, appointing me to a high-school teaching position, beginning with this fall. I wish that I were not confronted with a choice between this and devoting all my time to the Far East, but I have decided to accept. Refusal now would simply make it necessary to accept 6 months hence or to be removed from the list and might involve going to a far less satisfactory school than the one I have been assigned to.

Another letter, dated August 19, 1940, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "E. C. C.," presumably E. C. Carter, from "W. L. H.," presumably William L. Holland. I read from the paragraph referring to Rosinger as follows:

Speaking of Rosinger, I am of course delighted to hear that he has landed a job and I think that he is wise in taking it. I should like your advice on his request that we extend the research grant of \$500 to apply for a longer period. Since the grant has already been authorized and is to be turned over to the custody of the American Council, I suppose there is no real objection to this procedure.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that writing, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. That is E. C. C., presumably E. C. Carter, to E. C. Carter from W. L. H., presumably W. L. Holland.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the chairman to take cognizance of the fact that this was dated 1940. I would like to have this entered into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit together with this previous one.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 119 and 120" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 119

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

New York City, August 9, 1940.

MR. EDWARD G. CARTER,

Loc. Mass.

DEAR MR. CARTER: On returning from my vacation, I found that a letter had arrived from the New York City Board of Education, appointing me to a high-school teaching position, beginning with this fall. I wish that I were not confronted with a choice between this and devoting all my time to the Far East, but I have decided to accept. Refusal now would simply make it necessary to accept 6 months hence or be removed from the list and might involve going to a far less satisfactory school than the one I have been assigned to. Besides, as you know, I expect to be married in the near future, and it may be well to secure a steady position as soon as possible.

This will not interfere with my IPR work, except that it will slow down the pace. I have practically finished the research for my inquiry report on China's recent political development and will begin writing next week. By the beginning of the school term (September 9), I should have about 50 printed pages done (i. e., approximately one-third of the book). Teaching will not prevent my going forward with the rest in the evenings and over weekends, and the entire

report should be finished some time in the fall (let us say, by the end of November).

As you know, Bill Holland assigned me \$500 for 5 months' research (September 1940-January 1941) on another book, which is to be my doctoral dissertation as well as an IPR publication: Nationalism and National Unity in China, 1924-35. The fact that the inquiry report will extend into the fall means that I shall not be able to start on this second project until a few months after the expected date. Besides, teaching will make it necessary to devote part time rather than full time to the new research. I would therefore like to suggest that the \$500 grant apply to a period of 12, instead of 5 months, i.e., cover the entire year, September 1940-August 1941. I feel that this is a logical arrangement that will be fair to the IPR as well as satisfactory to myself. I have not yet written to Bill Holland about this, since I am awaiting your approval. If you find it satisfactory, I will write to Bill, and perhaps you will want to do the same.

I have received the pamphlet, Total Defense, and will send you my comments in a few days.

I was very sorry to learn of your sister's death and wish to extend my condolences.

Sincerely yours,

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER.

EXHIBIT No. 120

BIRKBEY, CALIF., August 19, 1950.

E. G. C. from W. L. H.

Many thanks for your letter of August 14, about the Fahs manuscript. I think you have reached a most statesmanlike compromise and I am very pleased that Fahs has agreed to accept so many of the changes. I know that Fahs regretted that we did not put the long marks over the vowels of Japanese words. I recognize that there is a good deal to be said for including them, but our decision was based simply on the fact that Hills and I had gone into the question when Norman's book was being printed and had come to the conclusion that the extra expense was not warranted, since there were really no instances where the omission of the marks would have resulted in error or ambiguity. Having once established that rule we felt that we should follow it in the case of Fahs' manuscript, where the number of Japanese words was even smaller. I would be perfectly happy to be overruled in this matter, particularly if the printer can insert the marks without having to do substantial resetting. I personally feel that inserting them would be both unnecessary and pedantic. In fact in many of Fahs' references I felt that he was being unnecessarily learned by quoting the full Japanese titles of laws, which for the purposes of the inquiry might better have been given in the English translation, as in Allen's book, since there was nothing peculiarly Japanese about the language. If Fahs had had occasion to quote rather long passages of Japanese or to discuss the meaning of certain Japanese terms, then I should have had no hesitation in making full use of the long remarks.

I am interested in his report of the opinions expressed by Borton and Norman. Phil and I were both surprised to hear that Norman had raised any question since he and Phil and I had extensive correspondence over the bibliography and Norman usually had no hesitation in expressing his desires. Neither Phil nor I recollect that he raised any objections to the manner of quoting French titles.

I am sending a further personal note to Fahs to thank him for having come so far in meeting our wishes. I shall be interested to hear his reaction to the letter from Ushiba.

I have read Angus' memorandum on Peffer's report with great interest. While I do not often agree with Angus' interpretations, I have great respect for his clarity and powers of criticism. It seems to me that his comments are important, and that it would be a good idea for you to make a rather strong personal plea with Peffer to attempt some means by which those comments and also those made by Denny Condiffe and myself could be at least mentioned in the report. As you know, Toybee takes account of criticisms in footnotes, but if necessary they could be lumped together in an appendix, together with any specific replies or general remarks that Peffer cared to make. In addition to this, I think it would be desirable for Peffer or you to explain in the preface to the book that it is necessarily different in character from other reports in

the inquiry series because it must be frankly a personal view and somewhat speculative in character.

I am a little perturbed to know that Angus is still not in favor of publishing his own memorandum nor of enlarging and revising it as we had hoped. I don't know what we can do about this, but it seems to me that we had reason to expect a good deal more from Angus for the money that was paid to him in one way or another. Perhaps there is some totally new subject that he would prefer to write on, not strictly in the legal field. At any rate, I hope you will let him know that we feel the inquiry will not be complete unless it has a substantial report from him on his or some other topic.

I shall send you my comments on Loth in a day or two. In the meantime I have been wondering what the situation is on the manuscripts by Harriet Moore and Keenleyside. There is also the same question of Borton's report. At one time I thought Leaning had screwed himself up to the point where he thought he could attempt a rewrite job. However, the political situation in Japan has been changing so fast that I now think it might be a better idea for you to discuss the whole question afresh with Borton, and ask whether he would not rather let you attempt a fairly substantial revision in which he could omit the greater part of the economic sections, including the materials on agriculture and population which are now being covered more fully by Miriam Farley. I would also suggest a working arrangement by which either Shepherd or Leaning could go over Borton's revisions from week to week, so that we should not have a substantial rewrite job at the end. It might even be desirable to offer Borton a further \$40 or \$50.

If this plan could be followed, I believe that we might salvage something pretty useful from the study. Something should be done because there will be a serious gap in the inquiry documentation if we omit a study on Japanese political developments. It will parallel the corresponding Chinese study by Rosinger. Speaking of Rosinger, I am of course delighted to hear that he has landed a job, and I think that he is wise in taking it. I should like your advice on his request that we extend the research grant of \$500 to apply for a longer period. Since the grant has already been authorized and is to be turned over to the custody of the American Council, I suppose there is no real objection to this procedure. The only slight reservation I have is that we stretched a point or two in making this grant to Rosinger, largely on the ground that it would enable him to devote 4 or 5 months full time in the American Council to completing a study on which he has already done considerable research. However, I know that high-school salaries are pathetically low, especially for anybody contemplating marriage, and I also have high regard for Rosinger's scholarship. So, if you are prepared to back me up, I shall be willing to accede to Rosinger's proposal.

I enclose a letter from Miss Cleve, which you may want to read and return to me. The last paragraph refers to a suggestion I made some months ago, urging that something pretty decisive should be done about leasing or ceding some of the British West Indian possessions to the United States as a means of getting American good will and increasing material support, and also taking the wind out of the sails of the extreme isolationists in this country. Miss Cleve is lukewarm, as I suspected she would be. It was ironical, however, that her letter arrived on the very day that the papers announced that actual negotiations were in progress about this scheme.

Mr. MANDRE. This is a letter dated June 6, 1940, to Mr. Carter from Owen Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you read that, I would like to inquire, Mr. Canning, did you ever know whether or not Rosinger either publicly or privately withdrew from the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. During the period that I was in the Communist movement he did not withdraw.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that he had after that?

Mr. CANNING. No; I never did.

Senator FERGUSON. Either in a public manner or private manner?

Mr. CANNING. No; I had no knowledge of his having left.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read anything by Mr. Rosinger in the last few years, Mr. Canning?

Mr. CANNING. I have read several articles of his; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they impress you as the writings of a man still in the Communist movement?

Mr. CANNING. It would be hard to say. There is no open sign that what he is writing is Communist propaganda, but the tendency is toward support of the Red Chinese group.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, they are not the writings of a man who has broken with the Communist Party, in your opinion?

Mr. CANNING. I think the writings would give no evidence of his either being in or out of the party; that is, the few that I have read.

The CHAIRMAN. What is next?

Mr. MANDEL. Another letter, dated June 6, 1940, to Mr. E. C. Carter from Owen Lattimore, refers to "Rosinger's promised article on Soviet policy ought to interest him; and so should Brandt's article on the Far East and the World Market." I cite also the testimony of Mr. William L. Holland in company with Edward C. Carter in executive session on June 21, 1951. Mr. Morris asked:

How about the grant to Rosinger?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think, either late in 1949 or early 1950, I requested from the offices of the Rockefeller Foundation a special grant to be made to the American IPR to enable Mr. Rosinger to undertake a comprehensive survey of the post-war Far East. This book, entitled "The Stars of Asia," edited by Rosinger, with contributions by some 13 other Far East experts, had just been published by Alfred Knopf.

It continues the quotation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this is a reading of testimony that already has been presented to the committee. The point of that is to show that it would indicate from that testimony that Mr. Carter had obtained two grants from the Rockefeller Foundation for Mr. Rosinger to continue his work.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations a typed list of some experts on China, Netherlands Indies, and Manchuria, and among those listed is the name of Lawrence Rosinger, Manhattan High School of Aviation Trades, 220 East Sixty-third Street, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the last two letters read by Mr. Mandel introduced in evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be so marked.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 121, 122, and 122-a" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 121

BALTIMORE, MD., June 6, 1940.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations,

126 East Fifty second Street, New York City.

DEAR CARTER: Thanks for sending me Corbett's comments. I am glad to see that plans for the next issue of Pacific Affairs fit in with his suggestions. Rosinger's promised article on Soviet policy ought to interest him; and so should Brandt's article on the Far East and the World Market.

I might also be able to make an article on What Japan Knows About Outer Mongolia, from the translation of a Japanese book which Gradaunov is to send me.

With regard to Corbett's idea for a "substantial review article combining Buell and Bingham * * * working out in practice their plan of Pacific

association," wouldn't you consult with Corbett to see whether he himself would undertake such an assignment? His qualifications and his outlook indicate that he is the man to give such an article depth as well as breadth.

If he should want to do it for the September issue, the copy would have to be in my hands at the end of this month.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 122

[Executive session, vol. 53, June 21, 1951]

EXCERPTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER AND WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
(P. 260)

Mr. MORRIS. How about the grant to Rosinger?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think, either late 1949 or early 1950, I requested from the offices of the Rockefeller Foundation a special grant to be made to the American IPR to enable Mr. Rosinger to undertake a comprehensive survey of the post-war Far East. This book, entitled "The State of Asia," edited by Rosinger, with contributions by some 13 other leading Far East experts, has just been published by Alfred Knopf.

Now you may also be referring to the fact that in late 1949 the Rockefeller Foundation—I think on the request of my predecessor, Mr. Clayton Lane—made a travel grant of, I should imagine, something like \$2,000 to Mr. Rosinger to enable him to go to India to attend the India American Conference which was held jointly by the American IPR and the Indian Council of IPR in Delhi, in the summer of 1949.

EXHIBIT No. 122-A

SOME EXPERTS ON CHINA, NETHERLANDS INDIES, AND MANCHURIA

(This list is by no means comprehensive. In certain categories it could be added to extensively.)

China:

Economic:

William W. Lockwood, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J.
W. L. Holland, Giannini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley
C. F. Reiner, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
John E. Orchard, Columbia University, New York
Ch'ao-ling Chi, Universal Trading Corp., 630 Fifth Avenue, New York
Kurt Bloch, Fortune Round Table and Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York

Economic and political:

William W. Lockwood. (See above.)
W. L. Holland. (See above.)
Robert W. Barnett, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second
Street, New York
Lawrence K. Rosinger, Manhattan High School of Aviation Trades, 220
East Sixty-third Street, New York
Owen Lattimore, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
T. A. Bisson, Foreign Policy Association, 22 East Thirty-eighth Street,
New York
Cyrus H. Peake, Columbia University, New York
Kate L. Mitchell, Amersia, 125 East Fifty-second Street, New York

Political:

Nathaniel Peffer, Columbia University, New York
John K. Fairbank, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
G. Nye Steiger, Simmons College, Boston, Mass.
Harley P. MacNair, University of Chicago
Harold M. Vinacke, University of Cincinnati, Ohio
Miriam S. Farley, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second
Street, New York
Dorothy Borg, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second
Street, New York

Relation of ancient China to China today:

- Karl A. Wittfogel, Columbia University, New York
 Owen Lattimore. (See above.)
 L. Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University, New York
 Herlee G. Creel, University of Chicago

Problems of Chinese language:

- George Kennedy, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 Owen Lattimore. (See above.)
 L. Carrington Goodrich. (See above.)

Manchuria:

- W. L. Holland. (See above.)
 Kurt Bloch. (See above.)
 Miriam S. Farley. (See above.)
 John R. Stewart, National Credit Office, 2 Park Avenue, New York
 Russell G. Shiman, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations,
 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York
 Owen Lattimore. (See above.)
 Andrew Grajdanzev, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second
 Street, New York

Netherlands Indies:

- W. L. Holland. (See above.)
 Ellen van Zyll de Jong, international secretariat, IPR, 129 East Fifty-second
 Street, New York
 Amyr Vandembosch, University of Kentucky, Lexington
 Rupert Emerson, formerly of Harvard, now in the Territories Section, De-
 partment of Interior, Washington, D. C.

All of the foregoing are American citizens except the following:

Mr. Holland is a New Zealander who has resided in the United States for several years.

Dr. Chi is Chinese, but is employed by the Sino-American Corp., set up jointly at the instance of the Chinese and American Governments.

Dr. Bloch and Dr. Wittfogel have probably taken out their first citizenship papers.

Mr. Grajdanzev is a Siberian who reads Russian, Chinese, and Japanese. He has taken out his first citizenship papers.

Mr. MANDEL. Another item from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations is dated February 5, 1940, "TVF from LKR," presumably Frederick Vanderbilt Field, from Lawrence K. Basinger. I read the first sentence:

I think Lattimore's article is excellent, clearly thought out and very well put. I have a few suggestions of a minor character that may improve it further * * *.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the letter introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so marked and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 123" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 123

FEBRUARY 5, 1940.

F. V. F. from I. K. R.:

I think Lattimore's article is excellent; clearly thought out and very well put. I have a few suggestions of a minor character that may improve it further:

Page 1, paragraph 3, line 3: Shouldn't "therefore" be "however", since the implication of the two previous sentences is that we are taking a strong position toward Japan?

Page 3, line 10: Since the implication here is that we should develop a correct policy before the events, instead of sadly understanding events after they have occurred, how about saying "the problem today is one of correctly understanding and shaping history in the making"?

Page 4, line 11: Wouldn't it be better to say: "It will be partly because of American stupidity"? After all, if it is foolish to say that Russian influence by itself can bring Bolshevism to China, then it is at least equally false to attribute that power to the United States.

Pages 4-5: The argument here is that social explosions result when internal forces meet outside pressures. I don't know what can be done about it, but this argument—despite a certain cogency—struck me as a little bit foolish, since it is almost equivalent to saying that (e. g.) if Tsarism had been Tsarism, then there would never have been a Bolshevik revolution. And yet the point has its validity. Perhaps it would be helpful to indicate here (as well as later) that the pressures upon China do not now constitute a fixed mathematical quantity, but that their weight can be changed radically by the counterpressure of the United States.

Page 5, last line: Considering the highly dubious origin of the New Life movement (i. e. it was essentially a political move in the civil-war period), I wonder whether it should be cited as an example of the drive toward "modern," "efficient" political ideas. I don't know much about what has happened to the movement since the outbreak of the far-eastern war, but my feeling is that New Life is pretty much in the background—perhaps almost the discard.

Page 6, line 10: Perhaps it would be desirable to qualify "every" by "almost," since I suppose that there are certain elements, particularly compradore elements in the captured cities, that—whatever their abstract desires—would be willing to deal with the Japanese permanently. Or is Lattimore's statement "wants to grow stronger" sufficient to make "almost" unnecessary?

Page 12, paragraph 3, line 5: "led by the Communists." Since Lattimore has not stated precisely what the nature of the split in the united front might be, one would be entitled to assume that important Kuo-min-tang elements might go along with the Communists. In this case, one could only say that the Communists would have more weight than they do now, but whether they would actually be the leaders is at least open to discussion. (This, I think, is particularly valid, since Lattimore has already said that "most" of the Chinese, in the circumstances mentioned, would go along with Russia and that only "some" of them would be of the Wang Ching-wei type.)

At this point perhaps it would buttress the argument to mention the well-known fact that Sun Yat-sen turned to Russia back in 1923-24 only after he was convinced that he could expect nothing—except possibly opposition—from other powers.

I think it might be wise in the paragraph next to the last line in the article to indicate that there might be ways, other than the embargo, of helping China—just so that the suggestions made will have as catholic a character as possible.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated October 9, 1940, "E. C. C. from W. L. H.," presumably E. C. Carter from William L. Holland, and Mr. Holland writes regarding a trip that he is proposing to make: "The principal people I want to see," and he lists among others Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evidence as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked and received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 124" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 124

GIANNINI FOUNDATION,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
Berkeley, Calif., October 9, 1940.

E. C. C. from W. L. H.

Thank you for your letters of October 7 about the meeting on the 16th and 17th. I shall be awaiting your word about whether Tarr can come. I can easily arrange to meet you in Chicago on the morning of the 15th, and would like to leave by an afternoon train that would enable me to spend an hour or so that evening in Ann Arbor with Bender and Hayden. I could then go into Detroit and get an overnight train to New York from there. I should like to have 1 day in Washington and this might be either on the 18th or the 21st or 22d, thus leaving the week end free for a possible meeting at Lee.

I should be glad if you would make some appointments for me in the New York office. The principal people I want to see are Shepherd, Yasuo, Grajdanzey, Ellen van Zyll de Jong, Rosinger, Porter, Farley, Anstern, and Downing. In addition I should like to see Leaning, Greenberg, and Virginia Thompson, if she is well enough. At Columbia I should like 15 minutes each with Willfoegel,

Peffer, Leonard, and Roth. Perhaps some of these can be arranged at the IPR office. Leonard can be reached through Jessup's office or through Catherine Porter. I'd also like to see Harry Price and, of course, Fred Field either in New York or Washington. I shall count on seeing Lockwood either in New York or at Lee. In Washington the principal people I want to see are Rupert Emerson in the Interior Department, Henry Deimel and Sydney Smith in the State Department, Ladejinsky and Rossiter in the Department of Agriculture and Johnstone, Tasea, and Merrill. I can arrange these appointments myself after I know the rest of my time table.

I'd also like to have an evening or an hour or two with Lattimore in Baltimore. If time permits, I'd also like to have a word with Bisson, Yarnell, Jaffe, and Mitchell, but I expect these can be fitted in easily, perhaps at lunch. I'd also like a word with Shiman and Kay Greene.

Probably Matsuo had better come straight on to New York at fast as possible so that I could see him about the 25d. If possible I'd like to leave that night, but this can be kept flexible.

I take it from your letter that you have no particular business that you want me to see Wilbur or Sproul or Mrs. McLaughlin about before I leave.

W. L. H.

Mr. MANDEL. Another letter referring to France is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated August 14, 1940, E. C. C. from K. M., presumably E. C. Carter from Kate Mitchell. I read the first sentence:

With regard to Rosinger's letter of August 9 it is of course up to Bill Holland to decide whether the research fund is willing to extend the time of the grant to August 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that to be introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 125" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 125

August 14, 1940.

E. C. C. from K. M.

With regard to Rosinger's letter of August 9, it is, of course, up to Bill Holland to decide whether the Research Fund is willing to extend the time of the grant to August 1941. I should say that there was no objection inasmuch as Larry doesn't ask for any more money, and considering the fact that most of our research reports are received at least 10 months later than the specified date! Why don't you tell Larry that you approve in general, but that he should take the matter up with the Research Committee. As far as his inquiry project is concerned, I suppose we will have to be satisfied with a completed manuscript in November. Are we allowed to keep our unexpended printing fund balance for use after the first of the year?

With reference to the letter from Peffer of August 6, I haven't any special comments to offer as I have not seen a copy of the manuscript, therefore cannot pass judgment either on Holland's criticisms or Peffer's refusal to accept many of them. If there is a spare copy of the manuscript floating around anywhere, might I have a look at it over this week end?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I also would like Mr. Mandel to introduce into the record or to reintroduce if it is necessary, the fact that in 1949 Lawrence Rosinger was called down to Washington by the Secretary of State to be a consultant on foreign policy to submit a memo far-eastern policy and to attend a 3-day conference in the capacity of a consultant.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have an exhibit setting that up or are you referring to testimony already taken?

Mr. MORRIS. I think Mr. Mandel has an official announcement of that fact from the State Department that he will make reference to.

Mr. MANDEL. I quote from a release dated May 20, 1950, No. 289, Department of State. It says:

The 31 who submitted memoranda were and included in that list are Lawrence Rosinger, New York, N. Y. Then describing further the memo says:

The following, including Mr. Lattimore and some others of the 31, attended the round table at the Department October 6, 7, and 8 (1949), to discuss Far East policy.

On that list we find Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 126" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 126

[For the press, Department of State, May 20, 1950. No. 259—For release at 7 p. m. e. d. t., Saturday, May 20, 1950]

EXCERPT

The 31 who submitted memoranda were: Dr. Lawrence K. Rosinger, New York, N. Y. * * *

The following, including Mr. Lattimore and some others of the 31, attended the round table at the Department October 6, 7, and 8 (1949), to discuss Far East policy: Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, you also introduced into the record the fact that the last publication that was supported by a grant of the Institute of Pacific Relations was edited by Lawrence K. Rosinger.

Mr. MANDEL. That is already in the record.

I have a letter here dated November 12, 1943, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. John Carter Vincent, UNRRA Conference, Hotel Claridge, Atlantic City, N. J., from T. A. Bisson.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: Knowing that you must be exceedingly busy at this time, I am sorry to bother you with a minor detail. We believe that the original copy of Mr. Lawrence Rosinger's manuscript on Wartime Politics in China was sent to you for criticism. With your new FEA responsibilities, there is no reason to burden you with this task of reading and review. However, we are anxious to have the manuscript copy itself returned here for the printer, if it is conveniently possible to have it sent back.

Hoping to see you in New York soon,

Sincerely yours,

T. A. Bisson.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 127" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 127

NOVEMBER 12, 1943.

Mr. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,

UNRRA Conference, Hotel Claridge,
Atlantic City, N. J.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: Knowing that you must be exceedingly busy at this time, I am sorry to bother you with a minor detail. We believe that the original copy of Mr. Lawrence Rosinger's manuscript on Wartime Politics in China was

sent to you for criticism. With your new FEA responsibilities, there is no reason to burden you with this task of reading and review. However, we are anxious to have the manuscript copy itself returned here for the printer, if it is conveniently possible to have it sent back.

Hoping to see you in New York soon,

Sincerely yours,

T. A. Bisson.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of this long introduction of documents into the record is to show extensive activity on the part of Louis Rosinger, who has been identified here as a Communist in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MANDEL. Another letter dated February 21, 1944, is addressed to Dr. John Fairbank, care of Mrs. Wilma Fairbank, Division of Cultural Relations, State Department, from W. L. Holland:

I enclose a manuscript by Larry Rosinger on China's Wartime Politics in the hope that you can find a few minutes in which to read it and give me your criticism. This was supposed to have been sent to you some weeks ago, but I have been waiting for some comment from people in the State Department. The comments, when they arrived, were not very enlightening, but you know how these things are. If you don't feel like reading the whole thing through, I wish you would concentrate on the last part from page 47 onward—

and so forth.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. There are only a few more, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 128." and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 128

FEBRUARY 21, 1944.

DR. JOHN FAIRBANK,

Care of Mrs. Wilma Fairbank,

Division of Cultural Relations, State Department,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR JOHN: I enclose a manuscript by Larry Rosinger on China's wartime politics in the hope that you can find a few minutes in which to read it and give me your criticisms. This was supposed to have been sent to you some weeks ago, but I have been waiting for some comments from people in the State Department. The comments, when they arrived, were not very enlightening, but you know how these things are. If you don't feel like reading the whole thing through, I wish you would concentrate on the last part, from page 47 onward. The manuscript is unsatisfactory in several ways mainly because Rosinger had originally intended to write about twice as much but had to change his plans because of his illness and lack of time.

I shall be down in Washington next Friday and would like to see you then for a few minutes.

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

P. S.—I have sent the books from Lowdermilk to Wima.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter which comes in "care of Mr. Lauchlin Currie, the White House, February 28, 1944," signed "John" and typed initials, J. K. Fairbank.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. You said signed "care of Lauchlin Currie." Just give us that again to clarify the record.

Mr. MANDEL. The return address is "care of Mr. Lauchlin Currie, The White House, Washington, D. C."

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, this is John K. Fairbank, and he uses as his return address, "care of Lauchlin Currie, The White House, Washington, D. C."

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. This is from the files of the Institute:

"Dear Mr. HOLLAND: I have referred to the latter part,"

and then in pencil "of Rosinger's ms on China."

"and it seems like a very good job indeed. Can't something be done to send Rosinger to China sometime? The Government will not be happy about this, but it is so well done that they can hardly call it propaganda. How can we expedite bringing our friend to California?"

Sincerely,

J. K. FAIRBANK.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. So marked and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 129" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 129

C/O MR. LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D. C.
February 28, 1944.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,

*Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I have read over the latter part and it seems like a very good job indeed. Can't something be done to send Rosinger to China sometime? The Government will not be happy about this but it is so well done that they can hardly call it propaganda.

How can we expedite bringing our friend to California?

Sincerely,

J. K. FAIRBANK.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, you noted that this was care of Lauchlin Currie. I am hoping that the committee can subpoena Lauchlin Currie here to make an explanation of many of these matters that were going through his hands and his connection with the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. I would also like to call your attention to the fact, Mr. Chairman, that Fairbank says, "It is done so well that they can hardly call it propaganda."

Senator FERGUSON. This letter indicates that he ought to be called to make an explanation of these things.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, Senator, at the proper time in the hearings that will be accomplished.

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a letter dated January 5, 1942, from the files of the institute, addressed to G. E. Hubbard, Esq., Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, London, England. I read part of a paragraph:

In spite of the war or rather because of it, the IPR is busier than ever. We have had to let some of our staff go to various Government jobs, but have managed to fill all vacancies so that on balance both the American Council and the Pacific Council staffs are stronger than ever -

and further down—

Rosinger is in the office of the India Government Trade Commissioner here in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evidence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. So marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 130" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 130

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, January 5, 1942.

G. F. HUBBARD, Esq.,
*Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office,
London, England.*

DEAR HUBBARD: It was delightful to get your letter. I am enclosing copies of two of the broadcasts in the series. Unfortunately no copies are available of the initial broadcast which Yarnell and I led off. This series has been an attempt by the American Council of the IPR to make more widely available the material which it is so carefully and laboriously assembling. I understand that the first eight broadcasts are appearing in pamphlet form in a week or two. I will see that a copy goes to you. I assume that you still see the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs.

In spite of the war, or rather because of it, the IPR is busier than ever. We have had to let some of our staff go to various Government jobs but have managed to fill all vacancies so that on balance both the American Council and the Pacific Council staffs are stronger than ever. Lattimore is of course an asset in Chungking, though he is not technically on the IPR staff. Michael Greenberg and Mrs. Dobbs are carrying on Pacific Affairs well within the Lattimore tradition. Ch'ao-ting Chi is secretary general of the ABC stabilization fund in China and is gaining experience that will ultimately be of the greatest value if and when he is able to return to the secretariat. Friedman, who did that very able book on British relations with China, is now in the Treasury in Washington. Rosinger is in the office of the India Government Trade Commissioner here in New York. Shiman has gone to the Tariff Commission, and Miss Ellen van Zyll de Jong, to Military Intelligence.

W. W. Lockwood has come back from Princeton and taken over the secretaryship of the American Council. For a time he had to work in Washington in the Office of Export Control, but he has managed to disentangle himself from Government service.

Ullenthal got out of Shanghai in time and is back on the American Council staff.

The Government has been after Barnett and me, but both of us have been able to persuade the United States authorities that we can render a bigger service to every department of the Government by continuing the staffs of the American and Pacific Councils intact rather than by scattering our energies through a dozen Government departments.

I wish you could write us more fully about your own work and views now that we are comrades in arms.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. The final exhibit taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated December 30, 1943, on the stationery of the Foreign Policy Association, addressed to William L. Holland and signed "Larry Rosinger." I read the first paragraph:

DEAR BILL: Thanks for the comments from Stewart. I disagreed with one or two of them, but I believe they will be very useful. I am looking forward to the suggestions from Fairbank and Hiss.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 131" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 131

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION,
New York, December 30, 1943.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York 22, New York

DEAR BILL: Thanks for the comments from Stewart. I disagreed with one or two of them, but I believe they will be very useful. I am looking forward to the suggestions from Fairbank and Hiss.

I have taken care of your order for the two foreign policy reports, which I understand will be sent to you at a 20 percent discount. I think you will be interested to know that we will publish on February 1st another report of mine, tentatively titled "The Western Stake in Colonial Asia". I doubt that this will be available in print much before publication date, but if your conference is taking place before the end of the month, it may be possible to secure some copies. In any event, if you want me to, I will send you the proofs in about 2 weeks.

Yours,

LARRY ROSINGER.

Mr. MORRIS. Do any of the Senators have any questions on Mr. Rosinger?

Senator FERGUSON. I don't on Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, we had testimony recently that a man named Moses Finkelstein ran a Communist study group. Professor Wittfogel has testified that this Communist study group met in New York City. At least his contentions were that it met in New York City when he so testified. Did you know that Moses Finkelstein ran a study group in New York City?

Mr. CANNING. Yes. I knew Moses Finkelstein as both a teacher at City College in the evening session and as a graduate student at Columbia.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. He was a member of the Communist unit at Columbia University.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that of your own knowledge?

Mr. CANNING. I did, and I did attend for some time a group that did meet at Moses Finkelstein's house, a Communist study group which met there about once a week for a period of several months.

Mr. MORRIS. You didn't know all members of the group, did you, Mr. Canning?

Mr. CANNING. There weren't very many in that group at the time, and I believe I knew all of them.

Senator FERGUSON. They met as Communists?

Mr. CANNING. That is right. One or two who were not members of the party would meet as well.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the purpose of having some come in like that?

Mr. CANNING. To interest them in communism.

Senator FERGUSON. To convert them to the idea?

Mr. CANNING. To Communist ideas.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he run any other study groups there that you know of?

Mr. CANNING. Not that I know of. That is the only one that I attended.

Senator FERGUSON. The only one that you attended.

Mr. CANNING. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that he ran any others?

Mr. CANNING. No, I don't of my own knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you heard that he ran others?

Mr. CANNING. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that a man named Daniel Thorner was a member of a study group there?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, he was one of the people who met in the study group that I referred to.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that Daniel Thorner was a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. From his own statements to me that he belonged to the Columbia University unit.

Mr. MORRIS. Do we have anything indicating that Daniel Thorner was active in IPR affairs, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. I read from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated June 2, 1942, a memo to ECC, presumably E. C. Carter, from CP presumably Catherine Porter, and I read a paragraph in which Daniel Thorner, who is in the COI, working under Brown's direction, is referred to:

Brown has an extremely high regard for Thorner, and Beecroft thinks he is one of the most promising young men in the country. He does not know Thorner's background beyond the fact that he is a New York man, that he studied at Columbia and wrote his thesis on the history of Indian railways in relation to the progress of industrialization in India. Beecroft says that Thorner probably knows more about the transport problem in India than any other person in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. I think that already has been introduced and is exhibit No. 77, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here also as an exhibit previously introduced a list of research fellows and students of the Walter Hines Page School, 1940 to 1951, which is headed by Owen Lattimore, and among these students, research fellows, and so forth, is the name of Mr. Daniel Thorner.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that already has been introduced into the record.

Mr. CANNING. do you remember when Prof. Karl August Wittfogel was invited to address a study group at the home of Mr. Finkelstein?

Mr. CANNING. No; I don't know about that.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't know that particular session?

Mr. CANNING. Not during the time that I attended the study group, I don't recall any invitation to Mr. Wittfogel.

Mr. MORRIS. But you did know that at least one study group did meet at the home of Moses Finkelstein?

Mr. CANNING. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was that?

Mr. CANNING. In the neighborhood of Columbia.

Mr. MORRIS. In New York City?

Mr. CANNING. I think about One Hundred Fourteenth Street, in New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what Mr. Finkelstein is doing today?

Mr. CANNING. I understand from the newspapers that he is teaching at Rutgers University, but under a different name. Finley, I believe his name is now.

Senator FERGUSON. What is his real name?

Mr. CANNING. Finkelstein; Moses Finkelstein.

The CHAIRMAN. Under what name is he going now?

Mr. CANNING. Finley, F-i-n-l-e-y.

The CHAIRMAN. He would take an Irishman's name, would he not?

[Laughter.]

Senator WATKINS. How do you know that?

Mr. CANNING. I believe that was first called to my attention a year or so ago when I was questioned by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever check to see that he was actually teaching at Rutgers?

Mr. CANNING. No; I didn't personally check. I was told that by this agent of the FBI who was questioning me.

Senator WATKINS. That is where you got your information?

Mr. CANNING. That is right, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it public knowledge that Mr. Finkelstein was a member of the Communist Party, Mr. Canning, if you know?

Mr. CANNING. I testified to it previously.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1940?

Mr. CANNING. In 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he tried by the board of higher education?

Mr. CANNING. I don't believe that he came up for a trial. I think he resigned, though I would have to check to be sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know if the same gentleman has a grant from one of the foundations?

Senator FERGUSON. Who is that?

Mr. CANNING. Moses Finkelstein, formerly Moses Finkelstein.

Senator FERGUSON. What has he to do with this grant from the Ford Foundation?

Mr. CANNING. It is a grant apparently to improve the teaching standards of the university.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear, either publicly or privately, that he had withdrawn from the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. No, I have never heard that he has withdrawn from the party.

Senator FERGUSON. You do know that when you knew him back in New York he was a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. He was a Communist, and especially active in the Columbia University unit.

Senator FERGUSON. He was directly connected with IPR, but do you know any other Communist in your cells or that you knew up in these colleges that came down in the Government, the United States Government?

Mr. CANNING. There was one other who belonged to the same Columbia University unit, Theodore Geiger.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes; he was.

Senator FERGUSON. Any doubt about it?

Mr. CANNING. No doubt in my mind that he was.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you know him?

Mr. CANNING. I knew him both at City College where he was a student, and later at Columbia University where he continued his graduate studies.

Senator FERGUSON. About when did he leave there?

Mr. CANNING. When did he leave Columbia? City College?

Senator FERGUSON. Or City College.

Mr. CANNING. I think he finished at City College, he received his bachelor's degree in 1935.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did he come in the Government?

Mr. CANNING. Into the Economic Cooperation Administration.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he is in Government now?

Mr. CANNING. No. I have been informed that he has resigned.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Mr. CANNING. Not a very long time ago, several months ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Just months ago.

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his position in Government?

Mr. CANNING. He was, I believe, Deputy Administrator to the ECA, though I am not certain of his exact title.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the same man that you knew in Columbia as a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he active in communism?

Mr. CANNING. He was.

Senator FERGUSON. As active as you and Finkelstein?

Mr. CANNING. Not quite as active as Finkelstein, but perhaps as active as I was.

Senator FERGUSON. As you were?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anybody else who came into Government?

Mr. CANNING. One further person—

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, did you ever hear that this man had ever left the Communist rank, either publicly or privately hear that he had left?

Mr. CANNING. No, sir; I never heard that he had resigned.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard?

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say, Senator, that some time ago the "watchdog committee" of the Committee on Appropriations made a representation to ECA as to this individual and drew the attention of ECA to his past history and asked for an investigation, following which I think there was a resignation. That is my impression.

Senator FERGUSON. I hope that Geiger will be given an opportunity to rebut this or to answer this testimony.

Is there anybody else who came down here in Government?

Mr. CANNING. During the war I was surprised to read in the New York World-Telegram in 1945 that a certain Louis Balamuth had been associated in the atomic bomb project at the University of Chicago.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Mr. CANNING. I believe it was 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. 1945. Was he—and are you certain about it—a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir; he was a member of the same cell at City College to which I belonged.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he active as a Communist in that cell?

Mr. CANNING. His main activity in the cell was editing—he was in charge of putting out this secret publication I spoke of, the Teacher Worker.

Senator FERGUSON. He was active then in the cell as a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You learned that he went with the Atomic Energy Commission activity over in Chicago?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever learned that he either publicly or privately withdrew from the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. No; I never learned of any withdrawal from communism.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. CANNING. No, I don't know where he is now, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You gave his full name?

Mr. CANNING. Yes. Louis Balanuth.

The CHAIRMAN. How long did you know him to be a Communist in that cell to which you belonged?

Mr. CANNING. Throughout the entire period of my membership he was an active member of that unit.

The CHAIRMAN. That was for about what length of time in years?

Mr. CANNING. About 2½ years.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anybody else who were Communists, that you knew to be Communists, who came in the Government?

Mr. CANNING. No other persons that I can recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no doubt and you have no doubt now that these men at the time that you are talking about and knew them were actually Communists?

Mr. CANNING. I have no doubt whatsoever, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just one question in addition to the questions propounded by Senator Ferguson. You knew them to be active participants in the Communist cause in this country?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir. All those persons named during the period of my membership were actively engaged in Communist work.

Senator SMITH. I would like to ask one question.

Mr. CANNING, during the period that you were a member of either of those cells, did you from time to time make any memoranda about people who were making up those cells that would give us any light now on the membership?

Mr. CANNING. In the testimony which I gave some 11 years ago and in the subsequent hearings before the New York City Board of Higher Education, I gave a full account of the Communist activities at City College.

Senator SMITH. I mean did you include the names of parties who were members at that time?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. That is all in the record back there.

Mr. CANNING. All in the New York State Legislative Record.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that public?

Mr. CANNING. The hearings were both private and public.

Senator SMITH. Since that time have you run across any memoranda such as frequently one has, memos, diary notes, and what-not that would refresh your recollection and add any other names to that list?

Mr. CANNING. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Was there any such thing as a roster of the membership of those cells that you may have had?

Mr. CANNING. The chairman of the unit no doubt kept records of that sort.

Senator SMITH. Who was the chairman?

Mr. CANNING. The chairman of this particular cell I have been speaking of was Louis Balamuth.

Senator SMITH. Who was the chairman of the other cells?

Mr. CANNING. Morris Schappes is a very important organizer of the City College unit. There was an Arthur Braunlich who was for a time the head of the entire City College unit. Some six or seven persons who were the principal leaders in the Communist cell there, the Communist unit.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the last part of this testimony does not relate to the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is a subject that has interested the Senators and the evidence has come out under that form.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all I have with Mr. Canning, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Senators?

Senator FERGUSON. I think it ought to remain in this record because it is material to the question being studied by the whole committee as to Communists in government. It certainly ought to remain in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It certainly will remain in the record. That is where it belongs. That is where it was made, and there is no reason for taking it from the record.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris, with the next witness. That is all, Mr. Canning, for this time. I thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Thanks very much for coming in this morning.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers is the next witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chambers, do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS, WESTMINSTER, MD.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the stenographer, Mr. Chambers.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Jay David Whittaker Chambers, Route 2, Westminster, Md.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am a writer and dairy farmer.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your last employment, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. My last employment was with Time magazine.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The year 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would tell the committee whether or not you ever belonged to the Communist Party?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I belonged to the Communist Party from the early part of 1925 until the middle of April 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. At what period of time did you belong to the underground Communist Party, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I belonged to the underground Communist Party from about June of 1932 until the middle of April 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you describe for us the method by which you transferred from the open party to the underground party?

The CHAIRMAN. First of all, I would like to ask what is meant by the underground Communist Party as distinguished from the Communist Party proper.

Mr. CHAMBERS. The Communist Party internationally has always been organized on two planes. There is the open Communist Party with which we are all almost or are almost all familiar now, and the underground Communist Party which is organized as secretly as possible.

The underground Communist Party a great deal of the time is actually the more important part of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you ever have any direct dealings with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No, I do not believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I knew Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us of your experiences with Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. CHAMBERS. To do that I will have to go back of that subject a little way to describe my reasons for meeting Fred Field.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, Mr. Chambers.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I met Fred Field in 1937. I met him in connection with Mr. Lawrence Duggan, the late Lawrence Duggan. Mr. Duggan was then in the State Department, and I think at that time in the Latin American Division. I was then in the Soviet apparatus in Washington, which was headed by Col. Boris Bykov. That apparatus worked very closely with the so-called Ware group, which had been organized in Washington by Harold Ware, who was a Communist. The group consisted of Communists and was a unit of the Communist Party and its members were all or chiefly Government employees. In that group—in fact its secretary-treasurer—was Henry Collins, who first worked, I believe, with the NRA and then in the Department of Agriculture and later in the military government in Germany. He is now head of the Russian-American Institute in New York, if my information is correct. That institute I think has been cited by the Attorney General.

Senator Ferguson. You mean cited as Communist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Cited as subversive. Mr. Collins had been a college friend of Lawrence Duggan, and from my earliest days in Washington in the Communist Party, which was the spring of 1934, I heard Lawrence Duggan's name mentioned as someone very sympathetic to the Communist Party. His name was first drawn to my attention, I believe, by one Webster Clay Powell, who was then an

assistant to Harold Ware in a little Communist front called Farm Information, or some such name—Farm Research, I believe. Webster Clay Powell subsequently became an employee of the State Department and I think served in Australia in one of the legations. In any case Webster Powell first drew my attention to the name of Lawrence Duggan.

Henry Collins was equally sure that Lawrence Duggan was a man for the Communist Party to approach and particularly for the Soviet apparatus to approach. He voluntarily made at least two efforts to recruit Lawrence Duggan as a source in the State Department for the Soviet apparatus. Neither of those efforts was successful. Lawrence Duggan was approached obligingly in another way. At one point Alger Hiss, after he had entered the State Department, thought that he would be able to recruit Noel Field. Noel Field and Lawrence Duggan were very close friends and I believe lived in the same apartment house. As soon as Alger Hiss began to entertain the Fields, he also began to see the Duggans. A question arose early in that association between Hiss and Field about which Soviet apparatus Field should belong to, because Hiss discovered, much to his surprise, that there was a second Soviet apparatus operating in Washington. We now know that it was the apparatus headed here by Hede Gumperz, or Hede Massing, as she is now better known. Then Noel Field received an offer to work, if I remember correctly, in the International Labor Office in Geneva, Switzerland, for the League of Nations. He accepted that offer. Before he left—

The CHAIRMAN. Who is this?

Mr. CHAMBERS. This is Noel Field. I suppose everyone here is aware that Noel Field has disappeared into the Russian occupied territory.

Before Noel Field left for Geneva, Alger Hiss had a conversation with Field about Duggan, and he asked Field if Duggan would work for the Bykov apparatus. Field said that since he, Field, was leaving, Duggan would continue his work here for him. I heard nothing more of Duggan until the year 1937.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Chambers how did he know about the conversation between Duggan, Hiss and Field. Were you present or did one of those people tell you?

Mr. CHAMBERS. What I know of that conversation is from what Alger Hiss told me at that time.

In the year 1927 Colonel Bykov decided that the apparatus should make an attempt, which was I suppose the fourth attempt—

Senator FERGUSON. The apparatus was an espionage apparatus.

Mr. CHAMBERS. That was the Soviet espionage apparatus in Washington, the head of which so far as I know was Boris Bykov.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you trying to get information out of the State Department? Is that why you wanted these people in your apparatus?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. CHAMBERS. To repeat, Colonel Bykov decided to make another attempt to recruit Lawrence Duggan for his apparatus. In pursuance of that effort I talked to J. Peters. J. Peters was the head of the underground section of the American Communist Party. Peters knew that Fred Vanderbilt Field and Lawrence Duggan were friends

and told me so. I then asked Peters to introduce me to Fred Vanderbilt Field, and that Peters did in New York City close to Park Avenue and Thirty-fourth Street. I then had lunch with Fred Vanderbilt Field, but before I go into our conversation at lunch perhaps I should go a little further into what Peters told me about Fred Field in the course of a general casual conversation, in discussing Frederick Vanderbilt Field. Peters told me that Field was a member of an underground unit of the American Communist Party, which was meeting, if I remember correctly, in a house belonging to Mr. Field's mother somewhere in Central Park West, New York. In that unit were Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Joseph Barnes. Peters was considerably disturbed about the unit because some difficulty had arisen between the two men about their wives. I believe they subsequently divorced their wives and remarried each other's wives. I am not sure of the details.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony that the present Mrs. Barnes was the former wife of Frederick V. Field.

The CHAIRMAN. That was earlier testimony before this committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barnes has so testified.

Senator FERGUSON. How could that interfere with communism? [Laughter.] That you were frightened about it? What was wrong?

Mr. CHAMBERS. What was disturbing J. Peters was what would disturb any executive if he found such a situation among his personnel.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a little disturbing.

Mr. CHAMBERS. A disturbing factor.

I had, as I said, lunch with Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and I asked him to go to Washington and try to recruit for the Bykov apparatus Lawrence Duggan in the State Department. Field, as nearly as I can remember now, left either that day or the next day for Washington, and I saw him a day or two later. He told me that he had had a long conversation with Lawrence Duggan, and that Lawrence Duggan said that he could do nothing for the Bykov apparatus because he was already connected with another apparatus.

I think that is all.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the other apparatus, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That was not defined. I can't answer that except as I assume it was the Hede Massing apparatus.

The CHAIRMAN. There were two apparatuses working here in Washington at that time?

Mr. CHAMBERS. There were at least two.

The CHAIRMAN. One was by Hede Massing?

Mr. CHAMBERS. One was headed by Hede Massing.

The CHAIRMAN. The other was headed by whom?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The other was headed by myself locally and by Colonel Bykov.

Senator FERGUSON. Just so the record may be clear, were these so divided that you were each trying and getting information out of the State Department and other departments unbeknown to the other?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is right. That is what is called in the Communist Party the principle of parallel apparatuses. The apparatuses are set up so that neither in theory shall have any knowledge of the personnel or the activities of the other.

Senator FERGUSON. That is valuable to get information. It is not to check the other apparatus to see whether it is remaining honest?

MR. CHAMBERS. I have reason to believe that there are still other apparatuses for that purpose.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Outside of that you have your counter espionage?

MR. CHAMBERS. I believe so.

SENATOR FERGUSON. So, to get information they are set up parallel.

MR. CHAMBERS. These two apparatuses, as I know now, were informational apparatuses. Unquestionably there are other counter-intelligence apparatuses, of which I have no direct knowledge.

SENATOR FERGUSON. You did not know how they checked the loyalty of the Communists?

MR. CHAMBERS. The check on loyalty would be in the first instance an inner-organizational check. Everyone in any Communist organization is always vigilant about the loyalty of all other Communists.

SENATOR FERGUSON. You see, they object so strenuously to their loyalty being questioned when they are in Government. As I understand it, they have a very close check in their own organization as to loyalty.

MR. CHAMBERS. There is a kind of invisible control which is self-operating, and self-starting. There are in addition other organizational controls, but of their nature I can't speak from direct knowledge.

SENATOR FERGUSON. But there is a loyalty check on them?

MR. CHAMBERS. The loyalty subject preoccupies Communists a great deal for the obvious reason that the conspiracy must be tight or it will fail. In other words, I am sitting here. You can't have people like that in a conspiracy.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the purpose of this testimony at this time is to show that these three people who have been named so far, namely Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Joseph Barnes, and Lawrence Duggan, were active in the Institute of Pacific Relations and during that period were active members of the Communist organization. For instance, we have shown that Joseph Barnes was the secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations from 1931 to 1934. Mr. Frederick V. Field was the secretary from 1934 to 1940 and remained on the executive committee until 1947. Mr. Duggan, we have had testimony, was the man used by the IPR when they gave consideration to founding a Latin-American division of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to relate that as much as possible, Senator, to show that this does come within the scope of the inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations.

It may be that we are laboring this too much on Mr. Barnes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chambers is now the fourth witness who has identified Mr. Barnes as a member of some Communist unit and Communist organization, and yet I think it is necessary, Mr. Chairman, because Mr. Barnes continues to deny it.

THE CHAIRMAN. Very well.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Mr. Chambers, did you ever contact Harry Dexter White, who was in the Treasury Department?

MR. CHAMBERS. Yes; I knew Harry Dexter White rather well.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Was he in any apparatus?

MR. CHAMBERS. Harry Dexter White was a source of the Soviet apparatus which I have mentioned.

THE CHAIRMAN. Was a source? Give that again.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Was a source for material. He gave both original Government documents and a weekly or fortnightly written memo summarizing information which had come to him in the course of his activities. One specimen of that memo is I believe now in the custody of the Justice Department.

Senator FERGUSON. A memo that White gave?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is right, in his handwriting.

Senator FERGUSON. In his own handwriting. Did you ever see any notes of Harry Dexter White in relation to the Far East, the Pacific, the Chinese, economic problems?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I did, and the specimen that I have referred to, the exhibit contains, as nearly as I recall, some information about Chinese finances. I am not familiar with the subject, and I have forgotten the exact matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Were those notes in your safety deposit box at one time?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No, I don't believe they were ever in my safety deposit box.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where they were obtained? Were they ever obtained by the Un-American Activities Committee?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I will have to think for a moment to remember what the chain of custody was. I believe that they were first given to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but I am no longer quite sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you tell us the contents of those notes?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am sorry, I have forgotten very largely what is in that exhibit. The exhibit exists.

Senator FERGUSON. If you can give the committee any information on where that exhibit may be now, the committee would appreciate it.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I should think counsel would know or could find very easily. For one thing, Senator Nixon, while he was Congressman, read them I believe into the Congressional Record.

Senator FERGUSON. He did?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I believe so. Shortly after the conviction of Alger Hiss.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know, as a matter of fact, that they were in the handwriting of White, Harry Dexter White?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Without any question.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no question about that.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Moreover, the handwriting has been certified.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record documents showing Harry Dexter White's extensive association and activity within the Institute of Pacific Relations. I wonder, Mr. Chambers, if you would amplify on your knowledge of Harry Dexter White's association with the Communist organization.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Harry Dexter White was not a member of the Communist Party as near as I know, and I have reason to believe that is true because he was reluctant to accept any form of discipline. I had the impression that he was a man of such character that he very much enjoyed being of the Communist Party but not in the party and not subject to its discipline. In that relationship he was willing to go to great lengths to assist them.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us about some of the lengths that he did go to assist?

MR. CHAMBERS. I think I have already stated the two chief ones. He gave original and handwriting memo of his own containing Government information.

MR. MORRIS. And the other one?

MR. CHAMBERS. I meant that to include two.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you know Solomon Adler?

MR. CHAMBERS. No, I never have known and so far as I know, I never have seen Solomon Adler.

MR. MORRIS. Did you know he was a member of the Communist organization?

MR. CHAMBERS. I cannot testify definitely that he was. I can, however, tell you what I do know about him, which is this: That at some point, I presume in the year 1936 or 1937, J. Peters told me that one Schloma Adler—

MR. MORRIS. Will you spell that please?

MR. CHAMBERS. Well, I probably can't spell it any better than you can. I presume it is Schloma, S-c-h-l-o-m-a, and is a Jewish diminutive of the name Solomon. In any case, J. Peters told me that one Schloma Adler was supplying a weekly memo containing information about the United States Treasury to the Communist Party. I know nothing further about it.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced documents into the record showing Solomon Adler's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and we are going to have further testimony bearing on Mr. Adler's activity in the Far East and in the American Embassy in Nanking. That will come later. Mr. Chambers' testimony related to that fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you know Len De Caux?

MR. CHAMBERS. No; I never knew Len De Caux.

MR. MORRIS. Did you know that he was a Communist?

MR. CHAMBERS. Yes; I knew Len De Caux was a Communist and I knew he was in Washington, and I believe that he was here for the Federated Press roughly from 1934 through 1938.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have anything at this time that we could introduce showing Len De Caux's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

MR. MANDEL. I have a letter here, August 4, 1944, on the stationery of Columbia University, city of New York—

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to reading that, Mr. Chairman, I think he ought to state how you knew he was a Communist.

MR. CHAMBERS. Again, my knowledge of his Communist is subject to a conversation with J. Peters, who at one point wanted me to meet Len De Caux, whom he thought might be helpful to the Soviet apparatus. For some reason which I have now forgotten it was never accomplished.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever find Peters, in these tops of the Communist organization, to be wrong on who were Communists and who were not, who could be trusted in the cause and who could not?

MR. CHAMBERS. I have no recollection of any such occasion. It seems to me very unlikely that there would be.

Senator FERGUSON. So you always accept as truth that kind of statements by Peters and other tops?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I would have accepted any statement that Peters made about such a point.

The CHAIRMAN. I might state here at this point—I don't have to state to the Senators who are sitting here—that we are dealing with hearsay, but we are also dealing with a conspiracy, and the exception to the rule on the receipt of hearsay applies here.

Senator FERGUSON. After you establish the conspiracy, hearsay between the conspirators and statements are admissible even in a court of law.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do your records show Len De Caux's activity with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Len De Caux is shown as a member of the Board of Trustees of the American Council on page 158 of a volume called Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the IPR, Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to 17, 1945. I have here a letter dated August 1, 1944, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the stationery of Columbia University in the city of New York as addressed to Mr. Raymond Dennett, secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and signed by Philip C. Jessup. It is signed "Phil." This letter reads as follows in part:

DEAR RAY: In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what you have in mind about a secretariat for the delegation * * * the following are people whom I would include—

and among those suggested is the name of Len De Caux.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that introduced into evidence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be marked and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 132" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 132

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
NAVAL SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION,
August 1, 1944.

MR. RAYMOND DENNETT,

Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR RAY: In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what you have in mind about a secretariat for the delegation. I do not recall that we have ever made the kind of distinction which you seem to have in mind for the American delegation. The Pacific Council provides a secretariat for the conference and some of our people have been taken by the Pacific Council for that purpose. Maybe I miss the point and if so I wish you would let me know.

The following are people whom I would include: Benjamin Kizer, Brayton Wilbur, Eric Johnston, Will Clayton, George A. Morison, Mansfield Freeman or J. A. MacKay, Lauchlin Currie, Dean Acheson, John Carter Vincent, Harry White, Rupert Emerson, Owen Lattimore, W. A. M. Burden, Abbot Low Moffat, Robert J. Watt, Len De Caux, Col. Carl Faymonville, Colonel Shoemaker, Virginius Dufney or R. E. Freeman, Walter Lippmann, Sumner Welles, Joseph Barnes, Frederick V. Field, Harold Sprout, Grayson Kirk, Ada Comstock Note-

stein.

In reply to yours of the 31st, I do not know Coons, but have no objection to him. I doubt if Wilson would add much but Alger Hiss would fine.

I definitely would exclude Hunter on the ground that we have too much of the Kizer group; I would exclude Captain Pence because he is now out of the Occupied Areas Section. If either of them were available I would suggest Commodore Vanderbilt or Commodore Stassen.

I suppose we may need to invite General McCoy for organizational purposes. I do not know anything about General Blissell. Yarnell should certainly come as a vice chairman and not as a member of the American delegation. Apropos your statement below "Military" on page 11, I would get away from the idea of California naming a delegate.

Personally I would exclude Swing and would add to your press people Waymack of Des Moines.

I would be careful that we do not get too stodgy a delegation but keep a balance. I think the above list is fairly good. Another Government man who would be new to us but very helpful because of his interest in native peoples and Pacific Island government is John Collier, head of the Indian service and a fine person. Let me know what you hear from the others and we will see how things add up.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESUP.

Frank Coe of FEA also good (penciled note).

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mr. White in New Hampshire, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Has your testimony covered that meeting with him?

Mr. CHAMBERS. At great length.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you ever meet Edmund Clubb? I think before you answer that question, Mr. Chambers, would Mr. Mandel tell us who Edmund Clubb is.

Mr. MANDEL. The Biographical Register of the Department of State dated April 1, 1950, on page 98, lists Edmund Clubb in his most recent position as follows:

Consul General at Shanghai from May 29, 1949, at Peiping September 23, 1947. Class I, April 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. What is his present position?

Mr. MANDEL. Presumably that is his present position. I have no later data.

Mr. MORRIS. No, that is not his position. Mr. Clubb is the head of the Chinese desk, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. In the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. In the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that should be established by something more than that.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That is why I want to know what the official record shows.

Mr. MANDEL. The New York Times of July 13, 1951, refers to Oliver Edmund Clubb as director of the Office of Chinese Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the United States Department of State?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How is that spelled?

Mr. MANDEL. C-l-u-b-b.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the same man you are talking about?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I believe it is.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you ever meet Mr. Clubb?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances of your meeting Mr. Clubb?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Probably in June, in May or June of 1932, while I was editing the New Masses.

Mr. MORRIS. That is 1932.

Mr. CHAMBERS. 1932. While I was editing the *New Masses*, which is a Communist-controlled magazine, there came into my office a young man who asked to see Walt Carmon.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Walt Carmon?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Walt Carmon had been in effect the managing editor of *New Masses* before I became editor.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he have any connection with the Communist underground?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Walt Carmon may or may not have had connection with the Communist underground. I don't know. He was a Communist.

This stranger seemed rather disturbed not to find Walt Carmon in the office where he expected him. Walt Carmon, in fact, wasn't any longer in the building, in the *New Masses*. The man, the stranger, told me his name was O. Edmund Clubb.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you recognize a picture of him?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I can no longer identify a picture of Clubb. If you realize that I spoke to him not more than 15 minutes in the year 1932, I think it is simply impossible to make a positive identification.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot identify the picture.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I feel that other impressions bear on it, and I should not make an identification of him positively.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Nevertheless this man told me his name was O. Edmund Clubb, that he was a consular official of some kind at Hankow, I believe, that he was on leave of absence, and he had some kind of message which he wanted to deliver. The difficulty about my recollection of Edmund Clubb or Oliver Clubb is that I can no longer remember what that message was or even to whom it was to be delivered, but there has stayed in the back of my mind an impression which I will not testify to positively that the message was written and that it was for Grace Hutchins. Grace Hutchins is an open Communist, a member of the open Communist Party, has run on the Communist ticket in various elections, and is well known to be a Communist. But I cannot testify more positively to anything along those lines. Clubb then sat talking a little about China. Naturally I don't recall what our conversation was over that length of time, but I do remember that we talked about Hayang Arsenal. As you probably know, Hankow is one of three cities which lie close together—originally called the Wuhan cities where the Communists made their last stand when Chiang Kai-shek first swept them out. I have a further recollection, which I hesitate to make positive, that the message was from Agnes Smedley, but again I can't really testify to that positively.

Senator FERGUSON. This is your best judgment; is it?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I find it impossible, with the play of so many influences on my mind, because people are always asking me questions, bringing me information, and there are actually areas of my experience where I can no longer distinguish between what I once knew and what I have heard and learned in the course of testifying. I have given many thousands of words of testimony by now, as you know.

Mr. MORRIS. But there is no doubt about the fact that Clubb came into the *New Masses* office.

Mr. CHAMBERS. There is not the slightest doubt about it. He further told me that his parents lived in Minnesota and that he was going there to spend at least part of his leave with them.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you amplify any more about whether or not Clubb at that time was a member of the Communist organization?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I have no knowledge whatsoever.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have anything to show that Mr. Clubb was assigned to Hankow at that particular time?

Mr. MANDEL. I read again from the State Department Register of April 1, 1950, which says that Oliver Edmund Clubb was born at South Park, Minn.; and, further, that he was vice consul at Hankow on March 12, 1931. That is obviously the date of appointment.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to defer our introducing evidence showing Clubb's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to ask you if you have that evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. There is that evidence; yes, sir. I would like to defer introducing that until the subject comes up the next time.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. This question is not very necessary, Mr. Chambers, but will you identify Alger Hiss to be a Communist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Will I identify Alger Hiss to be a Communist?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. It may not be necessary to your mind, but we are making a record here.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes; Alger Hiss is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The reason I ask that is that we have introduced into the record in the past extensive documents showing Hiss' activity with the Institute of Pacific Relations. In fact, he was a member of the board of trustees; and, as I say, other documents show extensive activity on his part within the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any doubt in your mind that Alger Hiss was a Communist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. None whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. You are positive of that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Certainly.

Mr. MORRIS. I think this is all for the time being, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. What about this afternoon?

Mr. MORRIS. We have nothing planned for this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will rise at this time.

(Whereupon, at 2:15 p. m., the hearing recessed until 10 a. m. Wednesday, August 22, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MONDAY, AUGUST 20, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 4:30 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Willis Smith presiding.

Present: Senators Willis Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Mr. Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator SMITH. The committee will come to order.

Will you take the oath, please? You solemnly swear that you will well and truly interpret unto the witness called to testify before this subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the oath which shall be administered to him; and that you will well and truly interpret unto said witness the questions which shall be propounded him by counsel and by members of the committee and the testimony of said witness delivered before this committee, so help you God?

Mrs. TAKESHITA. I do.

Mr. KURODA. I do.

Senator SMITH. Will you take the oath, please, Mr. Yoshikawa. Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give in this proceeding before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MITSUSADA YOSHIKAWA, MUSASHIHO-SHI, TOKIO, DIRECTOR, SPECIAL INVESTIGATION BUREAU, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, INTERPRETED BY MRS. KATSUYO TAKESHITA, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND REV. ANDREW Y. KURODA, WASHINGTON, D. C., OF JAPANESE SECTION, DIVISION OF ORIENTALIA, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mrs. TAKESHITA. Mitsusada Yoshikawa, who is presently the Director of the Special Bureau, Attorney General's Office, of the Japanese Government.

Mr. MORRIS. I will address the questions to you.

Mr. Yoshikawa, what is your present occupation?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Director of the Special Investigation Bureau, Attorney General's Office.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you work for the Japanese Government officially?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position in Japan at the trial and prosecution of Richard Sorge and his associates in the Sorge espionage ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was connected with the Tokyo Criminal Court as a procurator at the time and was connected with the Tokyo Criminal District Court Procuration Bureau.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe your functions in that case?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. At the time of the Sorge case a group of procurators was formed to investigate the Sorge case, and I was one of them.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a Japanese Government official?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. They were all procurators.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a Government official position?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in over-all charge of the case?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No. There was one chief procurator assigned to the case. He was the chief of a division of the criminal affairs bureau.

Mr. MORRIS. What in particular was your function?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. There were two assistant procurators assigned to the case under the chief procurator, and one of them was I.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you do as opposed to what the other man did?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was appointed to carry on the investigation of the foreigners in this group.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the other man carry out the investigation of the native Japanese?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In that capacity, did you examine Richard Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I believe that the arrest of Sorge took place in the latter part of November 1941, and from that day on until May 1942 the investigation of Sorge was carried on every day.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you examine him every day?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes. I gave special orders to the police to carry on the investigation of Sorge in the morning, while in the afternoon I personally conducted the examination of Sorge myself. However, in the first week I carried on the investigation by myself entirely.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Sorge freely and willingly speak?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. During the first week he denied all the charges.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did he confess after 1 week?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I believe that there are four reasons for his confession. The first reason that might be given for his confession is that much material evidence was unearthed with the arrest of these persons. In the material evidence that was discovered in the Klausen home was a wireless apparatus for sending messages and the German Statistical Yearbook, which was used as a part of the code, and had coded messages, and also the original code. The second reason for Sorge's confession could be laid to the fact that, with the arrest of these members, practically all members of the ring were apprehended at one time. The third reason that might be given is that all the

other members of the ring had given their confessions before Sorge. For instance, we had received a confession from Klaussen that he belonged to the fourth section of the Red army headquarters. Furthermore, Brando de Boukelitz was a member of the French Communists, and was in Japan as a correspondent for the Havas newspaper. It is one of the very famous news agencies in France.

Mr. MORRIS. How many reasons have you given now?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Three reasons. I spoke to Sorge about the discovery of the material in evidence and the confessions of the other persons. It is my belief that Sorge felt much relieved that he had just about completed all the work that he had set out to do since his arrival in Japan in 1933. That is the fourth reason.

I discovered this after Sorge had made his confession. About a week before Sorge's arrest, I learned that Sorge and Klaussen and de Boukelitz gathered together in Sorge's home and met together, and they spoke this: "It seems that we have lost contact with the Japanese lately. I wonder what the reason for that is. We have just about completed all the intelligence work which we had started out to do in Japan, and we have learned what Japan is to do at this critical time. Since Germany has begun her attack on Russia, let us leave Japan and go to Germany to carry on our work, and let us do intelligence work in Germany for Moscow."

This was the sort of conversation that was carried on at the time. Sorge and his group in a sense enjoyed a feeling of relief, but they felt that they had completed a very important piece of work in Japan and had completed their mission successfully.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they say what the mission was?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. They have confessed to that in detail.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the substance of their mission?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The important question at the time was whether Japan, after her long war in China, would send or direct her military activities to the north or to the south.

Senator FERGUSON. So, it was not only to obtain intelligence—that is, information—but they were to penetrate for the purpose of getting Japan to strike to the south rather than to strike Russia, which meant that they were to strike America and Britain rather than Russia; is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That was the second motive in Sorge's mission in Japan. The first was to gain objective information.

Senator FERGUSON. The second was to have this take place, though, of attacking to the south rather than attacking Russia?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How could a German like Sorge accomplish that task? Did he have some Japanese on his side?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge was not only very intimate with the German Ambassador Ott, but he was also intimate with many of the military general staff. Furthermore, a man with whom Sorge had very close connections, Ozaki, was one of the "brain trust" group in the Konoye Cabinet, and he belonged to this group which had great influence in the policy making of the Cabinet.

Furthermore, Ozaki was a top-notch newspaperman.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after the attack at Pearl Harbor was Sorge arrested? Or was it before?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was before Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. How long before?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The latter part of November 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. The attack took place on the 7th of December.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was the 8th in Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. How long before that was Sorge and his group arrested?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. About 2 or 3 weeks before.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Sorge relate anything about a modus vivendi between Japan and America?

Mrs. TAKESHITA. Would you explain modus vivendi?

Senator FERGUSON. An agreement or stay of proceedings, as it were, when they were negotiating prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor. A 90-day truce, as it were, in their negotiations.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No. Sorge's sources of information were not just the Konoye Cabinet, but also from the top officers in the military clan.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of a proposed modus vivendi between America and Japan prior to the 8th, as you say, of December?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No; I do not remember. Sorge considered the negotiations taking place between America and Japan as of very high importance, and he paid very, very close attention to the negotiations that were going on at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Then Sorge did say that he was watching negotiations between America and Japan prior to the attack?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Sorge confess to you more than you felt that he knew?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; almost all of it was so. All the information.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he confess more than you felt that he knew about?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I think you have the wrong answer. Did Sorge confess to more facts than you felt that he knew?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, most of what Sorge told me was more than I knew. May I explain. The character of the Sorge group in the beginning was a great question, and if it were connected with Moscow, how did they receive instructions. All those questions were very important at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't understand the question. Was Sorge a Communist when he died?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Of course.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he freely confess to Mr. Yoshikawa secrets that Mr. Yoshikawa could never have learned otherwise?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In part the things that I learned were entirely from Sorge's confessions and that part was a very important part.

Mr. MORRIS. If Sorge knew that another ring was operating, another spy ring was operating, does Mr. Yoshikawa think he would have confessed about that, too?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It is my private opinion, but I don't believe that he would.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your private opinion that you don't think that he would?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't think Sorge would.

Mr. MORRIS. Why not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. If another group had been active in Japan at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Were any coercive methods used in obtaining the confessions?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No coercive methods were used.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any pressure put on the prosecutors on the part of the Japanese Government?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. There was.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The first man in this group who was arrested was Ozaki. Ozaki was a man held in very high esteem in the Konoye Cabinet, and it was expected that the arrest of Ozaki would have a very bad political effect on the Konoye Cabinet, but Ozaki immediately upon his arrest made the confession to me that he was an international Communist. Because of that, Konoye was not able to ignore that confession and put pressure on the procurators. Furthermore, after the arrest of Ozaki, because of other political reasons, the Konoye Cabinet resigned, and it was succeeded by the Tojo Cabinet. Therefore, we did not have any political pressure put on us in the case of Ozaki, but when Sorge was arrested some pressure was put on us.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the pressure to stop prosecution, or was it to press it and carry through the prosecution?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was not a pressure that was strong.

Senator FERGUSON. But whatever pressure there was, which way was it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was just a matter of arrest at the time. The matter of prosecution had not come up yet.

Senator FERGUSON. About getting a confession, what was the pressure?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. When Sorge was arrested, Ambassador Ott and his wife became highly indignant. The Ambassador, through the Tojo Cabinet, requested that they be allowed to see Sorge and to have a report of the case immediately.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, Ott was Ambassador to Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And Sorge had some connection with the Ambassador, with the German Embassy, is that right?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As I remember, Ott was a military attaché to the German Embassy at Nagoya at the time of the ambassadorship of Von Dirksen. From that, Sorge had become intimate with Ott from that time that he was a military attaché.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Sorge hold any positions with the Germans?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge did not have any official position, but he was considered one of the closest friends of Ott and was regarded as one of his highest advisers. Therefore Sorge had access to all the German military and political secrets, and consulted him on many matters concerning such matters. At times when the German high officials connected with the army or the Government came to Japan, out of respect for Sorge's position they would divulge many of the confidential matters to Sorge, and he would go practically every day to the German Embassy and was connected with the newspaper in the Embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a public-relations officer?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Not in the way of liaison; no. He was just connected with a news service or a press release.

Mr. MORRIS. For the Embassy?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, for the Embassy. At one time Ott said to Sorge that he would very much like to have him attached officially to the Embassy. Although this was a very high position for Sorge, he declined. The reason for his declination was that there would be an investigation of his past and he wanted to avoid that.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the principal purpose of this ring to collect information for the Soviet Union?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they carry on another function?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As I said before, Ozaki and Sorge, working together, tried as much as possible to influence Japanese military news to the south.

Mr. MORRIS. What was their second function?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. To influence—

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us the details of this endeavor to influence the foreign policy of Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Although his position was unofficial, he enjoyed a very high standing in the Germany Embassy, and he was also a member of the Nazi Party, and as a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung he had many friends among the Japanese and the foreigners in Japan. He also knew many persons in the high military command. Ozaki also had a very important position as one of the brain trust group in the Konoye Cabinet. He also had a good reputation as a topnotch newspaperman. Through consultation between themselves they initiated this political strategy. Moscow had forbidden that they take any part in political matters, to do anything that might connect them with the Japanese Communist Party. Sorge asked Moscow whether it would be permissible for him to engage in this political maneuvering. There was no answer from Moscow to that question. Sorge took it for granted that Moscow had given silent consent and, together with Ozaki, engaged in activities that would influence Japanese foreign policies as they wished. One of their methods was of course to speak to many people about what political policy Japan should take, and also to write articles on the subject. The main points in their propaganda were as follows: The first reason was that the Reds were militarily very strong and that their social set-up was also very powerful. If Japan should go to the north, it would be very unlikely that she would be the victor.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "go to the north," you mean attack the Soviet Union?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Even though Japan should send her armies into Siberia, she would find very little there that she could use, and she would probably meet with greater difficulties than she had encountered in her war with China, and historically speaking, Japan has always failed in any military missions to the north.

Moreover, should Japan send her forces to the south, she would find many resources in that area which she needs and could use.

Mr. MORRIS. When you testify that Japan should move to the south, you mean Japan should attack Great Britain, the United States and the Dutch?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. French Indochina, America, England, and the Dutch.

Mr. MORRIS. Whenever in your testimony you refer to moving to the south you mean attacking all those countries?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes. I mean the dispatching of military forces to the south. By "resources" I mean great amounts of oil and rubber and other resources. For these reasons, then, it would be more advisable for Japan to go south rather than to the north.

I would like to add a few explanations as to the political position of Ozaki.

Senator FERGUSON. Ozaki is the man who was directly connected with Sorge in this espionage ring?

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Ozaki's first name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It probably is Hozumi, but in the group which investigated him he was called Hidemi. There are many readings of Japanese characters. Although Ozaki was a Communist, his position was somewhat different from the Communist Party in Japan. The aim of the Japanese Communist Party was to work within the framework of the Japanese Communist Party in Japan, and to instigate a revolution and win political power in Japan. However, Ozaki's position differed from the Communist Party in Japan. Ozaki's position was that Japan should be Communized through the cooperative efforts of Russia, China, and Japan, and that Japan should become a satellite under the leadership of Moscow. In the many conversations with Sorge we formulated the strategy which I have described.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Institute of Pacific Relations' name ever come into the investigation?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In what way?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Ozaki had as one of the sources of information a person by the name of Saionji.

Mr. MORRIS. What is his first name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Kimikazu. The acquaintance of Ozaki and Saionji began with their attendance at a meeting at an American-Pacific conference in America.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the Institute of Pacific Relations conference, isn't it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know in what year?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not remember distinctly but I believe it was about 1937.

Senator FERGUSON. How else, if it did, did the name come into these hearings, the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Other than that which I have just told you about, I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that by previous exhibits we have identified Mr. Saionji as the secretary of the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. The record will so show.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain to us the relationship that existed between Ozaki and Saionji?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The intimacy between Ozaki and Saionji increased with their return to Japan, and both of these men were

members of the group closely connected with the Konoye Cabinet, and they were very good personal friends also.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Saionji arrested with the other members of the ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Saionji's arrest came very much later. I believe it was in the spring of 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he give important secrets to Ozaki?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, regreably, but Saionji did give many of the important state secrets to Ozaki.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Gunther Stein implicated in this spy ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He was an indirect member of the group.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he consciously work for the group?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; he did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe some of his activities?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. According to Sorge's confession, Gunther Stein was a man well versed in economics and a man of great activity. Gunther Stein, knowing that Sorge was a member of the group connected with Moscow, cooperated with him freely. Sorge valued Gunther Stein's cooperation very highly, and it was Sorge's wish for Gunther Stein to become a direct member of the group. He proposed that to Moscow. By a "direct member" I mean a person who is registered in Moscow and receives money from Moscow, and furthermore is protected by the Moscow network.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that we introduced at a recent hearing records that Gunther Stein was the representative of the IPR in 1937 and we also introduced into the record extensive articles that he wrote for the Institute of Pacific Relations. I think the number is 21, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. The record will so show.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Agnes Smedley a member of this spy ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there any other Americans involved in this spy ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes. It would be a very general statement. I would not be able to give definite facts.

Senator FERGUSON. How many?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Several. When Sorge was carrying on his work in Shanghai there were more than three, including Agnes Smedley.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As I remember, it was about from January 1931 to December 1932.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the other members in addition to Agnes Smedley who operated in the spy ring in Shanghai during that period of time?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. One was an American by the name of Jacob, a newspaper correspondent.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Jacob his true name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not believe that it was his true name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ask Sorge for his true name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I asked him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he refuse to tell you?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He smiled but did not answer me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he give you a description of Jacob?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I asked him that also but he did not give that information to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any other American in the spy ring in Shanghai during that period?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; there were.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was a young official connected with the American consulate in Shanghai.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get the name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I asked the name but Sorge did not give it to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he give you a description?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I asked him that also but he would not give that information to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever give the name of Agnes Smedley?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But he wouldn't give you these other names?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No; he did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Would not? Did you try to get the names?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He would not give them to me, even though I asked him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to get the names?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I did not try to compel him to give the names.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that because they were in Shanghai rather than Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That was one of the reasons, yes; because we wouldn't have any jurisdiction over them in the other country.

Mr. MORRIS. Did part of the spy ring operate in Harbin, in Manchuria?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge used another group in Harbin as a mail box.

Senator FERGUSON. A mail drop?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As a message center.

Mr. MORRIS. Did this message center deal directly with the Soviet fourth division?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was an intelligence group connected with the fourth section of the Red army.

Mr. MORRIS. And they operated directly under Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How did it operate?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Under instructions from Moscow, this Harbin center would act as a courier, which would relay messages or wireless messages for Sorge to Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any reason to believe that there were Americans associated with that set-up?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was not I who investigated this case, but it was through one of my subordinates who investigated Max Klausen that I obtained this. The fact that this Harbin group was used as a message center is in the statement that Sorge made to me. Although Klausen was working under Sorge in Shanghai under the instructions from Moscow, Klausen was attached to the Harbin group for a while. According to the procurator who investigated Klausen, I was told that there was a wireless apparatus set up in the American consulate in Harbin.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was Klaussen? Was he a German?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; he was a German.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he the man who sent the radio messages?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; he was a wireless operator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever find the wireless in the American Embassy?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. This was information which I got from the report of the procurator who investigated Klaussen.

Senator FERGUSON. But Klaussen must have then stated to the procurator that the place where he had the wireless was in the American Embassy. Is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Klaussen stated that the wireless was in the American consulate.

Mr. MORRIS. This was a wireless of the spy ring, was it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was not an apparatus belonging to the American consulate. It was an apparatus belonging to the spy ring.

Mr. MORRIS. And they used the American consulate general's office as a headquarters?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; surprisingly it was so.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Around 1931 and 1932.

Mr. MORRIS. Just approximately the same time as the American operators in Shanghai?

Senator FERGUSON. 1931 and 1932?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this in China or Japan where the apparatus was in the Embassy?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was in Harbin, Manchuria.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Yoshikawa, we had testimony before this committee that Sorge relayed to his superiors the message that the German Army was going to attack the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941. Do you have any information that would confirm that?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Before war had been declared between Russia and Germany, many members of the German high command came to Japan and visited the German Embassy. According to their reports, although I do not remember whether it was 150 divisions or 1,500,000 men, it was their report that this large number of the German military were massed on the Soviet-Russian border, and that they would be able to attack and accomplish the fall of Petrograd within 2 months. That was the plan of the German military. There were some differences of opinion among the Germans at the time. However, it was already decided that this plan would be put under way and that the attack would be launched. This information was not only related to Sorge by the German military officials, but also by Ambassador Ott. When Sorge heard this he was amazed at the plan and he took measures to confirm the information, and then to relay the information to Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. Did this spy ring ever learn that there was to be an attack on America?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In a broad sense; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us what you know about it.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In July, after the outbreak of the war between the Germans and the Russians, there was a mobilization of 1,300,000 men in Japan. This was a very, very large mobilization and a highly important one. Whether this large force would be deployed to the north or to the south was a question of great military importance in Japan. Along with this, the Kwantung army in Manchuria, under the pretense of special army maneuvers, mobilized the rolling force of the South Manchurian railway. Sorge was very zealous in this investigation as to whether this army would be deployed to the north or the south, and he tried to obtain this information through Ozaki.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he obtain the information that it would be used against the American, British, French, and Dutch?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As a result of his information activities he learned that this force would be sent to the south.

Senator FERGUSON. Which meant that it would be an attack on America, the British, the Dutch, and the French, rather than upon Russia. Is that right?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It is a question as to whether that meant it would be actual warfare to the south, but even at that time many of the Japanese forces were being sent into French Indochina. Sorge was engaged in a detailed study of the negotiations, which were taking place between America and Japan at the time. Not only was he interested in what the government was planning, but also what the military had in mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Sorge tell you that he learned that Japan was going to attack America?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In October or November 1941 Sorge arrived at the conclusion that Japan would send her forces south, and sent that information to Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you reconcile that testimony with what you said before the Un-American Activities Committee that was reported in the press recently?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was shown a wireless message which was sent by Klaussen, carrying a message to that effect.

Senator FERGUSON. You were shown a message that had been sent by Klaussen, who was one of the spy ring, to Russia, advising Russia that it was the intention of the Japanese military forces to move south and not against Russia, is that right?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. This message also contained the sentence that Japan would attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Attack what?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Attack the south.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the date of that message?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not remember the date, but I saw the message and it brought back the fact that I had seen that. Sorge also confessed to the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Was America's name used in that message?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not believe that America was mentioned as America.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you interpret the message that they would attack in the south? The Japanese were already fighting in China and in Indochina.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In the attack, other places such as Java and Singapore would be included.

Senator FERGUSON. That was Dutch. Singapore was British and Java was Dutch.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then your language should not be interpreted either here or before the Un-American Activities Committee that the Sorge ring knew that Japan was going to attack America. Is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge stated that of necessity attacking to the south would mean going to war with America.

Senator FERGUSON. Then Sorge did tell you the name "America" in relation to the attack of Japan, is that right?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge said so.

Senator FERGUSON. Sorge said that?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge mentioned America.

Senator FERGUSON. So that as I understand it now, your testimony here under oath is that Sorge said to you that he had learned from the Japanese Government prior to the time of his arrest, which was prior to the Pearl Harbor attack on the 8th your time, the 7th our time, that he learned that an attack by the Japanese would be made upon America?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge stated so.

Senator FERGUSON. The answer is yes, that he did state so, is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Sorge visit any American Communist en route to Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He stated so; yes. But on the details of that matter, I had the police make the investigation.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the result of the investigation?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. After his stay in China, Sorge went to Moscow and then he left for Japan from Moscow by way of America. At the time he made arrangements to have a Japanese Communist in America join him in his activities in Japan. I do not know definitely just whom he met and where he met them.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the American Communist? What was the American Communist's name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I had given instructions to the procurator, the policeman Okashi, to investigate the matter, but I do not believe that Sorge disclosed the man's name.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Ushiba was ever a Japanese Communist?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not believe that he was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Tsuru was ever a Japanese Communist Party?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I had never heard that he was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he active in Communist activities?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. While I was investigating this case I did not hear anything of that nature.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any instance whereby the American

Communists aided the Japanese Communists in Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain it to us, please?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was before the arrest of Sorge, and I believe it was in either 1937 or 1938. It was a period in which the Japanese Communist Party has been greatly weakened and was in a state of disorganization. It was a very important matter to the Japanese Communists that the party be reorganized. However, that was not possible at the time with their own strength alone, and unless they received help from Moscow they would not be able to attain that end. We had the instance that at this time the Japanese branch of the Communist Party in America gave aid to the Japanese Communists in Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean those Japanese and Japanese-Americans in the American Communist Party?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Not only the Japanese. Although the group was made up of Japanese, there were also other Americans who participated in this aid. The methods which they employed were as follows: They put out a very good publication by the name of International Correspondence or Kokusai Teuhin. The contents of this publication were directed toward propaganda in Japan, taking up the current problems of that time within Japan, and gave instructions as to what steps should be taken by the Japanese Communists and it was also a very radical magazine. Another publication which was put out was the Taiheiyo Rodo-sha, which in translation means the Pacific Worker. It was a magazine put out by an organization which endeavored to bring into close relations the various radical trade unions of the various countries bordering on the Pacific. This office published this publication. This publication was published in Japanese also, and it took up practical problems such as what the Japanese Communists should do within the labor organizations in Japan. This publication was sent by mail to all the right, center, and left labor front organizations and labor organizations in Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it Mr. Yoshikawa's testimony that these publications were put out by American Communists in aid of the Japanese Communist Party because its ranks had been depleted by the Reds in Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I haven't any other questions.

Senator SMITH. I want to thank you very much for your participation and testimony here.

The committee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 6:26 p. m. the committee was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 424 Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Connor, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Senator Welker; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Budenz, will you be sworn? You do solemnly swear that the testimony that you are about to give before the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BUDENZ. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you give your name and address to the reporter, please.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.

Mr. BUDENZ. Louis Francis Budenz, Crestwood, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, where were you born?

Mr. BUDENZ. Indianapolis, Ind.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. BUDENZ. Assistant professor of economics at Fordham University.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, were you ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, I was a member of the Communist Party and of its national committee.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. For 10 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what positions you held in the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I held quite a few positions, and I will give some of them.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, give the more notable ones, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. I was labor editor of the Daily Worker, editor of the Midwest Daily Record—that was a Communist paper in Chicago—managing editor of the Daily Worker and president of the corporation publishing that paper, a member of the national committee of the Communist Party, as I have stated, chairman of the Commission on Publications, penetrating various publications for the Communist Party, and a member of the radio commission, penetrating the radio industry. There were other assignments.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long were you a member of the national committee of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Nine years, six of them public, three of them secret.

Mr. MORRIS. And when did you break with the Communist Party, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. October 11, 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, since that time, Mr. Budenz, have you cooperated with Government agencies in trying to eliminate Communists from positions of power?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, to the best of my ability, that is, working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation upon their request, and also always on subpoena.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, could you just give us a general idea to what extent, say in hours contributed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. BUDENZ. During the last 5 years I have contributed 3,000 hours, approximately, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in questions directed to me and in the research required by those questions.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a witness at the trial of the 11 Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. I was the first witness at the trial of the 11 Communists, and I might say that I was on the witness stand 10 days at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us if you were also a witness at the Santo and Peters proceedings, the deportation proceedings against Santo and J. Peters?

Mr. BUDENZ. I was a witness for the Government against Santo and J. Peters, Soviet agents, and as a matter of fact I might say I was the chief witness against J. Peters, who was one of the chief Soviet espionage agents in this country. After my testimony, both of these men agreed to go to Europe voluntarily.

Mr. MORRIS. And were you responsible for the exposure of Gerhard Eisler?

Mr. BUDENZ. In 1936, I stated publicly that Gerhard Eisler was a representative of the Communist International. That was confirmed thereafter. And I was a witness at one of his trials.

Mr. MORRIS. What trial was that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was the trial down here in Washington, in which he was convicted.

Mr. MORRIS. Convicted of what?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Perjury, was it not, on the passport?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think that was it.

Mr. MORRIS. And then there were other contributions that you have made to various Government agencies, were there not, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, I have appeared many times before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. I think it is 14 times. And before the House Labor Committee, before the Senate committee which was chaired by Senator Ferguson, and before the committee under the chairmanship of Senator Tydings. Just recently, I appeared for the New York Board of Education in the educational situation there as an expert on Marxism and Leninism, and most recently the State of New York subpoenaed me in the case of the International Workers Order, which now by court order has been declared to be dissolved.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, this committee is conducting an inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations. We are going to ask you a series of questions, all of which will be related, either directly or indirectly, to the Institute of Pacific Relations. And we are going to ask you, to the best of your ability, to answer all these questions.

At the outset, Mr. Budenz, were you in a position in the Communist Party where you would have access to more secrets, to the identity of more people, than the ordinary Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most decidedly. Indeed, more than the normal member of the national committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Why is that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. As managing editor of the Daily Worker, it was essential that I know the various delicate turns and twists of the line; not only of the line but of the emphasis of the line in the particular period of time.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "line" in that respect, what do you mean, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I mean the Communist viewpoint at that particular moment, the Communist objective. This has nothing to do fundamentally with the Communist philosophy, except that it is an expression of it in action during a period of time. And that had to be emphasized in the Daily Worker, not merely as to what the line was but as to its various delicate nuances, if I may use that term. The Daily Worker is not a daily paper in the normal sense of the word. It is the telegraph agency of the conspiracy giving directives to the conspirators.

Mr. MORRIS. On individuals?

Mr. BUDENZ. On individuals likewise. It was a matter of political life and death to have a correct viewpoint of the various individuals who were dealt with by the Daily Worker.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it the same today as it was in your day?

Mr. BUDENZ. What is that?

Senator FERGUSON. Is the Daily Worker now a telegraph agency for the men in the conspiracy?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I can't testify of my own first-hand knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. But as to what you see in it?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. It is the telegraph agency of the conspiracy. That is its sole function. It parades under the guise of a daily paper in order to protect itself through the cry of freedom of the press, but it is not concerned primarily with how much circulation it has. The circulation sometimes has gone down to 8,000 a day. Its concern is to get out every day to the Communists throughout the country, the active ones, the instructions upon which they are to act. It is used in that way, by the way.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Budenz, from the eyes of the then editor of the Daily Worker and a member of the national committee of the Communist Party, what was your opinion of the Institute of Pacific Relations? What did you know of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BUDENZ. What I know is perhaps the better way to put it, because I was at Politburo meetings and in consultation with members of the Politburo constantly. As a matter of fact, day by day I was in consultation. And frequently I was at Politburo meetings because of my position. The Politburo in these discussions declared the Institute of Pacific Relations repeatedly to be a captive organization, completely under control of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. You say the Institute of Pacific Relations was a captive organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Completely under the control of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. This was during the entire period of my membership in the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be from 1935 to 1945?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1935 to 1945.

We have to distinguish according to the Communist parlance between captive organizations and fronts. Communist fronts are those created by the Communist Party itself. Captive organizations are those penetrated successfully and taken over. That is to say, the policies are under control of the party, although not necessarily all the personnel is.

The United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union is a very splendid example of that in the trade-union field. That was an organization that was certainly not Communist. The overwhelming majority of its members were not Communists. But it was completely controlled by the Communists. And the Institute of Pacific Relations was viewed in the same light.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Budenz, you mentioned the Politburo. Would you dwell on that somewhat, so that we may know exactly what you mean by that, for the record?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Politburo is the name used by the Communists for the political bureau of the Communist Party, whose name has now been changed to the National Board. Many of these Communist organs undergo many changes of name, either for conspiratorial reasons, to avoid legal identification later, or for some other purpose. The term "Politburo" though, was the original name. That is to say, it was modeled after the Politburo in Moscow, and on the same leadership principle.

It is the governing body insofar as there can be one, in America, of the Communist Party, although it receives its instructions from the Communist International representatives.

The CHAIRMAN. You say it is called what, now?

Mr. BUDENZ. The National Board of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. You are talking about the American section, which is tied directly to the Moscow section; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. The Moscow directing body, that is, the political body of the Soviet Union, is called the Politburo. But

that is the Moscow Politburo. I am speaking about the American Politburo.

Senator FERGUSON. I understood.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, would you say there was a cell, a Communist cell, operating within the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, Alexander Trachtenberg, in these political bureau discussions, emphasizing the importance of the work of this cell, described the Institute of Pacific Relations as "The little red schoolhouse for teaching certain people in Washington how to think with the Soviet Union in the Far East."

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would tell us who Alexander Trachtenberg is, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Alexander Trachtenberg is one of the most important members of the Communist conspiracy in this country. He is the cultural commissar of the Communists in this country. He has published all the authorized works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and all other works authorized by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow. Through his hands these works have to go. He is technically the head of International Publishers, but he is vested with much more authority, with reference to the Daily Worker. He is in charge of the whole cultural work of the party, or at least he was when I was in the party.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it your testimony that the Communists use the Institute of Pacific Relations to influence foreign policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any doubt in your mind, Mr. Budenz, that when a man like Trachtenberg is speaking about this being an educational process, this IPR, here in Washington—and I take it that is what is meant by the "little red schoolhouse"—that that was an actual fact, that he knew what he was talking about, because of his tie-in in the whole Communist activity?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; and because he knew it through the reports which were received from the Communists within the Institute of Pacific Relations, largely through Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Senator FERGUSON. And when he was giving this information, you being the managing editor of the Daily Worker, these were instructions to you as part of the party line here in America?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was an observation in the Politburo, a political observation, a conclusion.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was information that you might be able to operate on in the future if necessity required?

Mr. BUDENZ. Absolutely.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore had to be accurate?

Mr. BUDENZ. Every Communist judgment has to be carried in some form into action.

Senator FERGUSON. And it had to be accurate for you to carry on; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. Communist information among themselves is absolutely accurate. It must be. It is the foundation of their work.

Senator FERGUSON. You see, we hear a lot said about so much evidence in this conspiracy being hearsay. And I am trying to get at the point as to what weight this committee can give to hearsay of this nature. Are you able to tell the committee now that in your

opinion this is, let us say, a hearsay that deserves consideration by a committee?

Mr. BUDENZ. This is an official communication between leaders of the conspiracy.

Senator FERGUSON. Among themselves?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. An estimate of their work among themselves, borne out, however, by other corroborating facts. The fact that Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field was secretary of the American council, among other acts and other incidents of that sort which we cannot go into now in detail, support this judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, there is so much supporting evidence around this hearsay that you feel absolutely certain this morning when you are giving this testimony that this was a fact?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, I could not be more certain if I had heard this said within the Institute of Pacific Relations itself.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to get your idea on this question.

Mr. BUDENZ. It was based on reports by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, an official of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. He was really the man who reported to your agency?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was coming from the Institute of Pacific Relations among the coconspirators and giving it to all of them, so that they may operate and act upon it?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask: Could it be possible that Mr. Field was mistaken, that he just thought they were acting that way; that he really did not have members of the party in their sufficiently strong to influence it?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I believe that he was not. In fact, I have knowledge that there were a considerable number of Communists within the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. Have you given the committee the names of those that you say you have no knowledge were members?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have.

Senator WATKINS. That will come out later, I suppose.

Mr. MORRIS. No; that hasn't come out yet, Senator.

Mr. Budenz, will you tell us how this cell operated in connection with the Politburo, this cell that operated within the Institute of Pacific Relations? Will you tell us structurally how it was connected to the Politburo of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. BUDENZ. Of course, this cell, as all Communist cells, changed from time to time in personnel. It was largely, though, linked up with Amerasia and was a joint cell with Amerasia, and it operated by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, an officer of the Institute of Pacific Relations, reporting to the Politburo on the activities of the cell within the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the results of these activities.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, could you tell us, Mr. Budenz, approximately how many times you were present at meetings of the National Committee or the Politburo of the Communist Party, at which Field, as secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, reported on the activities of the cell in the Institute of Pacific Relations, approximately?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, that would be very hard to state. The meetings were irregular. I should say four or five times a year.

Mr. MORRIS. Four or five times a year, or for a period of 10 years?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. With the exception of my being in Chicago, although even then Field did report to the Politburo in my presence when I was in from Chicago.

Mr. MORRIS. And when you say that he reported to the Politburo, did he at the same time receive instructions from the Politburo to carry on his work?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most definitely. That was the purpose of his report.

Mr. MORRIS. So there were two purposes then: to report in on the activities of the institute and at the same time receive directives from higher authorities in the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Right at that point, Senator Ferguson's observation a few minutes ago dwelling on the subject of hearsay testimony brings my attention back to a remark that I heard over the radio the following morning from the date on which the chairman made reference to the fact that hearsay testimony may be received on certain conditions. The authorities are unanimous that hearsay testimony is not ordinarily to be received. One of the exceptions is in the establishment of a conspiracy. All of the authorities are unanimous that where a conspiracy is being established or has been established, then hearsay testimony under an exception to the rule may be received. The remark made over the radio was to the effect that this was testimony of a nature which would never be received in any court of justice. The gentleman who made the remark might stand corrected by reading Wigmore on Evidence or any one of the other standard works on evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I think I ought to put in the record the same idea that I have. And I do not wish to accuse any newspaper of misquoting what we said here, because I know the difficulty of giving accuracy on legal matters. As to those of us who are trained in the law, it is an easy matter for us, but sometimes we feel that there are misquotations. I felt there was a misquotation on the radio and in the press on this question of hearsay. I want it understood that I have said as a lawyer, and I say it now, that after a conspiracy has been established statements between coconspirators are always admissible in evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. As an exception to the rule.

Senator FERGUSON. As an exception to the hearsay rule. And that applies in criminal cases. As a former member of the bench, I applied the rule. It has been affirmed in Michigan decisions in conspiracy cases and in cases that I tried on the bench.

So I feel that I have made a study of it and there is no question about it. But it has to be applied, that when the conspiracy has been established then the statements among the coconspirators, as we find here in this case, are admissible in evidence even in courts of law.

That is the reason I was asking my questions on what you felt about this hearsay, how it was, and what weight you were giving it. Because we, as members of this committee, must weigh all of the evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. You may continue, Mr. Morris. I am sorry to interrupt.

Senator WATKINS. May I observe that this is not a court, and nobody is actually being tried here. It is an investigation, and it is not bound by the same rules that a court of law would be bound by.

The CHAIRMAN. No; you are entirely right, Senator. But it has been the desire of the chairman to follow what he deems to be orderly procedure under what he understands to be and knows to be court procedure as nearly as we can, so as not to get off into a wild field where there is no limitation.

Senator WATKINS. I greatly appreciate the chairman's statement on that, and I have admired his conduct of this hearing and the adherence to these rules of evidence, even though we are not required in this type of an investigation to observe them. I think it is being conducted on a very high plane. I say that as a former judge who has tried conspiracy cases and is acquainted with the rule just referred to by the chairman and Senator Ferguson.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. May I point out, Mr. Chairman, lest anyone have the wrong impression here, that the overwhelming bulk of Mr. Budenz's testimony here today will be events that he experienced.

The CHAIRMAN. The only reason that the chairman brought it up is that I was reminded of the remark by a well-meaning commentator who evidently did not catch the real meaning of my expression.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you describe a few of those many meetings of the Politburo that you attended and heard Frederick Field report and receive directives with respect to the Politburo? Will you take a few of those meetings, some of the more notable ones, and describe exactly what happened as you recall it from your own personal experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. Necessarily, many of these meetings will not be recalled with any great clarity as such. However, the first meeting, necessarily, at which I met Mr. Field, impressed itself on me. That was in 1937, when he was introduced to me by J. Peters as Comrade Frederick Spencer. This was a meeting called of certain members of the Politburo and of others interested in China work—Harry Gannes, foreign editor of the Daily Worker, J. Peters, Ferruci Marini, whose name was also Fred Brown in the Communist Party—to receive a report of Browder.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, are they important Communists, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. These are representatives of the Communist International, to whom I have referred.

Mr. MORRIS. Are they leaders of the Communist underground movement?

Mr. BUDENZ. They were at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Just develop a little bit of their importance. Most of their names this committee is not acquainted with.

Mr. BUDENZ. J. Peters should be known by now. He was the chief espionage agent for the Communist International apparatus. He was the link or liaison officer between the Communist International apparatus in this country and the Soviet secret police. That is on record in my testimony against him in his deportation proceeding. His other activities have been aired in other investigations.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Gannes?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, he is now dead. He was then foreign editor of the Daily Worker. Every foreign editor of the Daily Worker is knee

deep in the conspiratorial apparatus, particularly in regard to international communications. And this was true of Harry Gannes, who had been to China and had many very close connections with many underground groups and individuals in connection with China.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe who Brown was?

Mr. BUDENZ. Brown was the man who was in charge of the organization and the preparation of the party for, I should say, violent operations. He had charge of the organizational work for the Communist International of the Communist Party. There were other members of the political bureau there, but I just cannot recall them, because they changed from time to time.

Mr. MORRIS. You say Browder was present, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. He made the report that day.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe what happened at that meeting as you recall it from your own personal experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. At that meeting Earl Browder declared that we had to end the business of speaking so loudly about the Chinese Communists as being champions of Soviet conditions as in Russia. Although we had begun to taper off on that, we had to emphasize their democratic character. And he described them as being represented as North Dakota nonpartisan leaguers. He likewise said that we should bring out the full democratic content of the Communist movement and particularly the fact that they represented Asia for the Asiatics against white imperialism, and were for the complete independence and democratization of Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. Up to that time, how were you treating the Chinese Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. Up until that time largely we had treated them very extremely, as champions of a Soviet China completely. In fact, the Communist propaganda used to talk about Soviet China in those provinces under Red rule. I say during the time when the transition was taking place, however, there had been a tapering off of that, but there had not been any sharp decision upon the matter.

Mr. MORRIS. And that is as much as you can recall about that particular meeting at this time, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. There is more about the meeting if you wish me to go into it.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I wish you would, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. Because at that meeting it was decided that Owen J. Lattimore, because of his position, should more or less initiate or supervise the matter of having writers and authors and people in public opinion take up this attitude.

Mr. MORRIS. And when you said "because of his position," what did you mean by that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Because of his being in a position where he was not — For instance, Field's connections with the Communist Party were very close at that time, even, and were fairly well known in quite a circle. And then in addition to that, Lattimore was supposed to have quite an influence in the publishing world.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, was Lattimore discussed as a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Instructions were given to him as a member of the Communist cell, yes, sir. That is, through Field; not in person.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say instructions were given by the Politburo to Lattimore through Field that he should do some work in connection with the change of policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain what he was supposed to do in connection with that?

Mr. BUDENZ. The details were not worked out. As a matter of fact, that is a common Communist procedure, that the details are not worked up. They are left to the initiative of the individual. They are checked on later. And his success or failure is commented upon.

Senator O'CONNOR. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question right there?

Mr. BUDENZ, you of course have demonstrated clearly your close association with the operations and your knowledge of the men who were taking an active and an influential part. I would like to ask you just a question or two concerning Owen Lattimore.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONNOR. The question suggests itself as to whether his name might just have been used loosely, or whether in fact, from your knowledge of everything, he was identified actively and knowingly with the Communist movement?

Mr. BUDENZ. He was specifically mentioned as a member of the Communist cell under instructions. There was no loose mention of his name.

Senator O'CONNOR. Do you recall just what position he held at that time, if any, with either IPR or with any other movement, either as a captive organization or as a front?

Mr. BUDENZ. I don't specifically. It is my impression that he was the editor of their publication. As a matter of fact, there was reference to the fact that he was—yes, he was the editor of their publication.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose publication? You say "their publication."

Mr. BUDENZ. This was Pacific Affairs, if I remember correctly. They had two.

Senator O'CONNOR. I was wondering whether in their operations there was any possible code designation that might either have attached to him or in any way might have identified him if he were actually an active member.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Later on; not in connection with this meeting.

Senator O'CONNOR. No, I said that because you have mentioned his name in connection with the meeting.

Mr. BUDENZ. During the course of time the Politburo issued for a number of years, from the time when I first entered the party, in 1935, or rather from the time I became a member of the national committee, in 1936, to all members of the national committee, an onion-skin report of all their proceedings in great detail. However, people in key or delicate positions were designated either by blanks, when they were easily described by the circumstances, or by initials. Now, Lattimore was described as L or XL in these onionskins.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by an onion-skin?

Mr. BUDENZ. I mean onion-skin paper, these light papers sent around. They were sent around to every member of the national committee up until 1940 and 1941. During the Hitler-Stalin pacts they were ended, through fear that the onionskins would be used against the Communist Party.

Senator O'CONNOR. And was that done frequently? That is to say, was his designation indicated on frequent occasions?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, rather frequent. I can't designate the number.

Senator O'CONNOR. From it all, Mr. Budenz, would you say as to his connection with the movement whether his position in the entire movement was an important one or an unimportant one?

Mr. BUDENZ. His position from the viewpoint of the Communist Party was a very important one. It was particularly stressed in the political bureau that his great value lay in the fact that he could bring the emphasis in support of Soviet policy in language which was non-Soviet. And they consider that a very valuable asset. I could give you many quotations on that. It was discussed more than once.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Field's designation?

Mr. BUDENZ. Field was Secretary—

Senator FERGUSON. No. In this onionskin paper.

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, he first was designated under the name of Spencer. Where they had false names like that, they used "Spencer." And for quite a while he went under the name of Spencer and then he went under his initial of F.

Senator FERGUSON. Just under F?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then when XL, who was Owen Lattimore, you say—is that right?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in high authority given the interpretation of what these initials were on these onionskins, so that when you would read them you would know who would make the statement and who was designated?

Mr. BUDENZ. Only upon inquiry. And I had to inquire, since I was editor of the paper in Chicago, the Midwest Daily Record.

Senator FERGUSON. Over what period, would you say, was Lattimore described in these onionskin sheets of paper? Over what period of time?

Mr. BUDENZ. I should say about 4 years. It ended in 1940 or 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. About 4 years?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And part of this plan was to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and its relation to the Soviet Union. Was that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct; not only on China, but on the whole Far East, to advance the Soviet objectives in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it ever discussed in these meetings that Owen Lattimore was a man who could put out propaganda and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was precisely the estimate given, that the weight of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy, but that they were expressed in that language, which was non-Soviet in character.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore terms that designated that it was coming out of Russia were avoided; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But still carrying out the Communist line?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator O'CONNOR. If I might just ask a question there: Mr. Budenz, did I understand you to say that Owen Lattimore was designated for the purpose of exerting influence on the Japanese as well as the China policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was later on, to my knowledge.

But during this period we are speaking of, most of the emphasis was on China.

Senator O'CONNOR. On China. I understand. I did not want to anticipate what you might come to later, but just so that we can get the connection, it did happen that subsequently he was referred to as exerting an influence on the Japanese policy as well as on China?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator O'CONNOR. And continuously over 4 years, you would say, these matters continued, in relation to which he was supposed to exercise an influence on the China policy as well?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. There may have been some gaps.

Senator O'CONNOR. But it, however, started from a time and did not end until 4 years thereafter.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is in regard to that particular incident. However, there were other references.

The CHAIRMAN. You used the term "during this period," Mr. Budenz. I wonder if you would, just for the record, and for clarification, state what the period was, what years?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, that was the years 1937 or 1936, to 1940 and 1941. That is the years of the onionskin papers. We are only discussing them at the present moment, as I understand it.

Senator O'CONNOR. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, we were discussing this 1937 meeting of the politburo, and Mr. Lattimore's name came up, and we had this series of questions.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you take that up, I would like, along the line of the thinking that we were carrying out, to have you read two paragraphs in a letter that is already in evidence, dated July 10, 1938. I will mark those two paragraphs.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that exhibit, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I will try and find it.

Mr. MORRIS. It is exhibit No. 4, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read them aloud, so that they will go in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I wanted an executive meeting before we commenced this hearing this morning, but members of the committee were not present. I would like to take about 5 or 10 minutes now in recess, if the members of the committee would come with me to the rear room for just a minute, please.

(A short recess was taken.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Budenz, getting back to that memorandum, that exhibit 4 that I gave you to read, what do you have to say about the language in that? Is that in your opinion carrying out what was expressed about Owen Lattimore?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think it is a splendid example; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That he was telling the IPR in effect that the policy of the Communists in Russia was to be carried out, but it was to be carried out, how, as he says?

The CHAIRMAN. I think the whole excerpt should be read, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And then comment on it as you go along, explaining how it does carry out the purpose for which Lattimore was to be used by the Communist Party.

Mr. BUDENZ (reading):

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiatics, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

For the general purposes of this inquiry it seems to me that the good scoring position, for the ICR, differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the same label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable.

That is a typical Lattimore method which was approved by the Politburo. That is, to not appear to be a Communist, but to forward the burden, as I have said, of the Communist line, to throw the weight into Communist support.

Senator FERGUSON. To carry it out, but not let it appear that in carrying it out you, the man who is advocating it, is a Communist.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

And as a matter of fact, beyond that, to influence people who are non-Communists by appearing even to present it in non-Communist approaches and in non-Communist language:

For Japan, on the other hand, hang back as not to be inconveniently ahead of the Japanese liberals, who cannot keep up, whereas the Chinese liberals can. So the chief thing is to oppose the military wing of Japanese aggression in China, counting on a check there to take care of both the military and the civilian components of aggression in Japan.

Well, there is a lot about the British here, and the French.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would go to the Russian part.

Mr. BUDENZ (reading):

For the U. S. S. R.—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and above all without giving them or anybody else an impression of "subservience."

That, again, is indicative of the method of expression to which I have referred. This was to throw the weight of support to the U. S. S. R., not to American policy, but to the U. S. S. R.

Senator FERGUSON. And to do it in such a way that the American people and the other people would not feel that it was being advocated by a Communist.

Mr. BUDENZ. By anyone subservient, namely, by a Communist; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, coming back to the question: Is that the position that you say Lattimore, Owen Lattimore, was described in this meeting as having the capacity to take, to carry out the policy of the Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; in that meeting, and on a number of other occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, the witness is prepared today to testify to five episodes concerning Owen Lattimore, and we are going to come to those later.

Senator FERGUSON. That will probably cover this.

But I did at this time, when he brought up this question of Owen Lattimore's position with the party, want to ask him his opinion as in this letter written by Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Carter, exhibit 4, as to whether this did in his opinion carry out that policy.

And your answer is—

Mr. BUDENZ. That is a very fine example of the expression of Mr. Lattimore to which reference was made with approval.

Senator O'CONNOR. Before you leave that, you made mention in answer to a question by Senator Ferguson that this was a typical Lattimore method, or words to that effect.

Would you say that he continued to operate in that manner? Or did he change after it?

Could you say whether or not he has until recent times continued in that line?

Mr. BUDENZ. I, of course, am confining myself to such information as I obtained officially within the Politburo, and I am stating that it was their conclusion time after time that he was very serviceable because of this peculiar facility of his in this matter.

Senator O'CONNOR. Would you say that the reference to the Japanese situation would confirm your previous contention that he did have influence on the Japanese policy questions on China?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, Senator, except that later this became more pronounced.

The CHAIRMAN. Any question, Senator Smith?

Senator Watkins?

All right. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. We were discussing the meeting of the Politburo in 1937, and you had gotten as far as the mention of the name of Owen Lattimore, and then you had some questions amplifying that point.

Have you finished testifying about that 1937 meeting, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir.

I would like to state, in regard to Frederick Vanderbilt Field, that it was specifically mentioned there that he was to be the political representative of the cell, or was the political representative of the cell, for the party.

Further than that, likewise, at the conclusion of the discussion, J. Peters having explained to me that Frederick Spencer was actually Frederick Vanderbilt Field, that I would know that later, that I would see his pictures, and the like, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Harry Gannes, and J. Peters, at the conclusion of this political bureau meeting, in my presence discussed the matter of couriers to Washington on underground work in regard to the Far East.

The details of that work, naturally, I am unfamiliar with.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything else about that 1937 meeting that you are prepared to tell us about now, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. That seems to exhaust it, so far as my memory goes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, could you think of one or two other meetings that you have testified about that you can describe to us in detail?

Mr. BUDENZ. There was the meeting in 1943.

The CHAIRMAN. This other meeting was when, this one to which you referred?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1937.

However, in regard to Frederick Vanderbilt Field, if you will permit, I would like to refer to the meetings in 1940.

There were a series of meetings of the political bureau in 1940, which, to some degree are more or less blurred in my memory, because they had to be held at second-hand. Many of the members of the political bureau were already in hiding at that time, since the party had come to the conclusion that it was about to turn the imperialist war into civil war. They expected instructions along that line during the Hitler-Stalin pact period.

The discussions, though, with the politburo by Mr. Field arose over whether he should leave the Institute of Pacific Relations as secretary of the American Council and go to the American Peace Mobilization as its head. The politburo had decided quite early that he should, because they wanted a national organization. They already had a localized organization, but they wanted a national one.

And they held a convention in Chicago, I think in that summer, at which Mr. Field was chosen.

The CHAIRMAN. What summer was that?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1940.

In the course of this discussion, Mr. Field declared that Dr. Philip Jessup, who was an official, in fact, one of the responsible officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations, had impressed upon Mr. Field that he thought that Mr. Field could be of more service in the I. P. R. than he could in the American Peace Mobilization.

Mr. SORWINE. Service to whom, or to what?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was never very clear, at least so far as my memory is concerned. I thought to the cause of humanitarianism. But that would be only my interpretation.

The Politburo, however, in a number of zig-zag meetings, because some of them had to be conducted, as I say, for instance, by conference with Jack Stachel from under cover and the like, decided Mr. Field then should go to the American Peace Mobilization for two reasons:

First, that it was necessary to create a very strong reserve of the party eventually, if the party should become illegal completely, and that Mr. Field would qualify splendidly as a leader of that reserve, being a man of wealth, not having any technical difficulties, as the Communists call it, that is, not having any false passports, and having a position in society which would lead to a reluctance on the part of the Government to take action against him.

The second reason given was he need not end his relations with the IPR, but could eventually even increase them, though maybe not under the guise of being secretary.

But the first reason was the compelling one, because most of the party leaders were going under cover at that time, and they needed a structure which could serve for the party openly, and the American Peace Mobilization was, I should say, the chief one chosen for that purpose.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, our exhibit No. 14, which we introduced into the record on July 26, duplicates the testimony given by Mr. Budenz here, and I think I would like this reread at this particular time, to show how the two tie in, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL (reading) :

EXHIBIT 14

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, HELD AT 5 P. M., THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1940

Present: Philip C. Jessup, chairman, Philo W. Parker, Francis E. Harmon, Edward C. Carter.

The second paragraph of these minutes is as follows:

The chairman read a long telegram which he had received from Mr. Frederick V. Field in Chicago on September 1, in which Mr. Field indicated that he had been called to the secretaryship of a new society which was being created to strengthen the forces of democracy during the coming critical years. He had a deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility, because the election of officers was taking place at that time. He felt it was necessary to accept despite his obvious personal preference to postpone the decision pending consultation with Dr. Jessup and others. As he anticipated criticism and misunderstanding, his continued deep interest in the welfare of the Institute of Pacific Relations demanded, he felt, the affirmation of his immediate resignation from all I. P. R. responsibilities. Dr. Jessup explained that he had subsequently talked at length with Mr. Field, who explained in detail the reasons that had led him to accept the new position. Mr. Parker voiced the feelings of all present when he inquired whether Dr. Jessup felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the secretaryship of the American Council. Dr. Jessup replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final. Under the circumstances it was moved that a minute be drafted indicating the committee's acceptance of the resignation with great regret. The minute should include an appropriate appreciation of the distinguished service which Mr. Field had rendered during 11 years of service with the American Council. The hope was to be expressed that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the American Council.

Senator FERGUSON. This democracy that is explained in this letter was Communist, was it not?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was the organization devised to help Hitler. It picketed the White House. It assailed President Roosevelt and his "war and hunger program." And it was designed to step up the tempo of opposition to any defense efforts on the part of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was really the Communist line.

Mr. BUDENZ. It was completely controlled by the Communists from beginning to end. That was a Communist front, not a captive organization.

Senator O'CONNOR. Obviously it was a Communist front and it was so known and its actions indicated that it was inherently Communist. Have you ever heard of any repudiation by Mr. Jessup of that laudatory expression concerning Field, who, of course, has been proven to be one of the greatest traitors in this country.

Mr. BUDENZ. No, I have not, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, can you tell us of another meeting you attended which Mr. Field reported for the IPR?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was a meeting of 1943 which I began to anticipate and then thought of the 1940 series of meetings. At this meeting of the political bureau at which Earl Browder I know definitely was present, and I believe Robert William Weiner. His name strikes me because he was not always present at these meetings, and other members of the Politburo who were not generally there, including

Trachtenberg. At this meeting Mr. Field stated that he had received word from Mr. Lattimore. It is my impression that he had seen Mr. Lattimore personally just a day or two before, but I may be mistaken there. It was a communication either personally or in some other way. Mr. Field just returned from a trip and I get the impression that he had talked to Mr. Lattimore personally, and Mr. Lattimore stated that information coming to him from the international Communist apparatus where he was located indicated that there was to be a change of line very sharply on Chiang Kai-shek, that is to say, that the negative opposition to Chiang Kai-shek was to change to a positive opposition and that more stress was to be put upon attacking Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the Communist Party line change at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Communists took action to discover the accuracy of this. They were advised that there was in the course of preparation an article by Vladimir Rogoff, the Tass correspondent, written at Moscow's request on this question which would attack the appeasers in China and Chiang Kai-shek.

The CHAIRMAN. The Tass correspondent, you say.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you explain what Tass was?

Mr. BUDENZ. Tass was the official Soviet news agency in this country and so far as I know still is, but I knew it then quite definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Was this article subsequently communicated to the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. This article was communicated to the Daily Worker. The first message was received through Grace Granich who had been in charge of Intercontinent News, a Soviet agency, which had been put out of business by the Department of Justice, but who continued to maintain her relations with the Soviet Embassy, Consulate, and other sources of information, including communications to Moscow and we were advised of the coming of this article and then we received it.

Mr. MORRIS. And was the Communist line actually changed as a result of these steps that were taken?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Politburo suggested that someone, and the name of T. A. Bisson was mentioned in that connection, be enlisted to write an article in connection with the Institute of Pacific Affairs publication on this matter explaining the democratic character of the Chinese Communists and indicating that Chiang Kai-shek and his group represented antidemocracy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me, Mr. Budenz, but you mentioned the Institute of Pacific Affairs. You were referring to the Institute of Pacific Relations and its publication Pacific Affairs?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. I sort of got the two together.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record at this time the article referred to by Mr. Budenz, not as it appeared originally in War and the Working Class, but as it was reprinted in the Daily Worker. I would like to offer this into evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Please lay the foundation for it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, can you testify to the authenticity of it?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an article taken from the Daily Worker of August 12, 1943, page 8, and is headed "Soviet expert warns of appeasers in China," by Vladimir Rogoff, reprinted from the Soviet Trade Union periodical the War and the Working Class.

Mr. MORRIS. Does it appear, Mr. Mandel, what date this appeared in the War and the Working Class?

Mr. MANDELL. It does not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I offer you the article described by Mr. Mandel and ask you if you can recall the existence of such an article in the Daily Worker?

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that the witness is being shown a photostatic copy of the article.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, this is the article.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any particular passage in the article that you think the committee should be interested in?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This article attacks the appeasers of Japan in China. You will note in so doing it attacks the whole governmental policy, that is to say, it says that 3 years have passed since Chiang Kai-shek gave certain orders in regard to reforms. Now, I will quote:

Three years have passed since then. The reforms in the army with the aim of training new cadres, reorganizing control and strengthening discipline were not completed, and the task of the creation of their own war economic base was not accomplished. The main reason for this is the diverse work of the "appeasers," the defeatist and capitulators.

There is more to this line, but this is, I should think, a key expression.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you an editor of the Daily Worker when this appeared?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your purpose in putting this in the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. This was our understanding that we were to begin, under the guise of attacking the appeasers of Japan, to have an onslaught against Chiang Kai-shek.

The CHAIRMAN. The appeasers of whom?

Mr. BUDENZ. Of Japan, that is, in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Up to that time what was your official Communist policy with respect to the situation?

Mr. BUDENZ. The official Communist policy was very critical of Chiang Kai-shek, and that will lead us to other episodes—

Mr. MORRIS. Up to that time what had been the policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. The policy had been critical of Chiang Kai-shek, but the policy now was, as we understood it, that we were to prepare for an all-out attack on Chiang Kai-shek, which was entirely different. However, if I may continue this, what the Soviet Government was trying to tell us was that this should be done under the cover of coalition government. Later on Rogoff had to explain and in fact apologize for his article, and Harriet Lucy Moore had to write an article, if I remember correctly, in Soviet Russia Today. It may have been in one of the organs of the Institute of Pacific Relations also explaining that Rogoff's article had been misinterpreted, but the purpose of this whole thing was to put the skids, if I may use that phrase, under Chiang Kai-shek under a gradual developing campaign for coalition government.

Mr. MORRIS. And that is what you meant by the sharp change in policy that you testified to earlier?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. Moscow has difficulty every once in a while in letting the Communists know the difference between how

they should emphasize things and the general presentation of the subject. We could not have such a sharp attack on Chiang Kai-shek if at the same time we were to advocate coalition government, but the purpose of the coalition government was to destroy him.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it your testimony that this conference that you testified about today took place prior to the publication of this article in the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the article should go in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. I move that it be introduced into the record and made an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It shall be made a part of the record and appropriately marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 133" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 133

[From the Daily Worker, August 12, 1943, p. 8]

SOVIET EXPERT WARNS OF APPEASERS IN CHINA

(By Vladimir Rogov)

[Reprinted from the Soviet Trade Union periodical the War and the Working Class]

Moscow, August 11 (by wireless to Inter-Continent News).—During the 6 years of war the Chinese command, at the cost of considerable territorial losses, succeeded in saving the troops from defeat. Despite the numerous odds the Chinese Army preserved its capacity for resistance.

The Japanese militarists failed in their plan for a rapid conquest of China. The Japanese proved incapable of breaking the resistance of the Chinese people and bringing them to their knees. The war against China became clearly drawn out, threatening Japan with ever-growing complications.

In defensive battles on an extremely long front the Chinese Army, weakening the Japanese troops, gained the necessary time for reorganizing its troops and strengthening their fighting capacity. Soon after the fall of Wuhan (Hankow) in October 1938 Chang Kai-shek outlined a program for the reorganization of the country's armed forces, whose principal points were as follows:

Firstly, China's national policy must become the policy of a long, defensive war.

Secondly, the necessity to develop the guerrilla movement.

Thirdly, for conducting a general counteroffensive it is necessary to create a new, many-millions-strong army, trained in the use of the most up-to-date war equipment.

COVERT OPPOSITION

However, from the outset the intentions of the commander-in-chief of the Chinese Army, Chiang Kai-shek, met with covert resistance. Three years have passed since then. The reforms in the army with the aim of training new cadres, reorganizing control and strengthening discipline were not completed, and the task of the creation of their own war economic base was not accomplished. The main reason for this is the diverse work of the "appeaser," the defeatists and capitulators.

The war economy resources of National China (Free China) are tremendous and afford an adequate base for the rearmament and supply of the massed army. On its territory National China has all the strategic raw materials necessary for the conduct of a prolonged war.

Nevertheless, large-scale construction has not been undertaken since the industrial and financial circles prefer to engage in profiteering rather than invest their capital in the armaments industry.

The unrestrained profiteers advance the "theories" that the people are weary of war and that it is primarily necessary to satisfy the demand of the population for goods, etc.

This situation leads to the weakening of the army's fighting capacity and greater dependence on the supply of armaments from the United States and Great Britain, which however has encountered serious difficulties since the beginning of the Japanese war against the United States and Great Britain. The elements favoring capitulation have sabotaged the measures for mobilizing the internal resources with the object of creating their own war economy base, as well as the measures for extending economic warfare against the Japanese invaders.

China has no lack of human reserves, but the Chinese Army nevertheless receives no regular reinforcements. There are insufficient trained reserves. There is not even an organized military registration of the population. To this day the law on universal military service is not fully carried out. The army receives a large percentage of men unfit for service.

The main defect of the Chinese Army is the shortage of trained commanding personnel. All foreign military observers who have visited the Chinese Army agree that the Chinese soldier is tenacious and enduring in the field and is unpretentious as far as food and uniforms are concerned; whereas the commanding personnel is extremely weak and backward in military and technical training.

The army's equipment is still at low level. The organization and control of troops are far from perfect. One of the defects of the Chinese Army is the lack of an effective united command and of coordinated operations on the separate fronts. The internal friction and suspicion among the generals could not but affect the fighting capacity of the troops and their discipline.

In Chungking, of course, there are no open advocates of surrender, but this does not mean that there is a lack of capitulators and defeatists there.

The capitulators and defeatists who occupy important positions in the Kuomintang weaken the strength of China by their harmful political intrigues and constitute a serious danger at present.

Since December 1941 the Japanese have centered their attention on the war in the Pacific. The war in China has receded to the background. This has led to the appearance among Chinese military and political leaders of a certain complacency of which the Japanese imperialists took advantage to intensify their peace offensive.

JAPANESE MANEUVERS

The Japanese conquerors are now concentrating on deepening and sharpening the internal contradictions in China and are trying in every way to utilize these contradictions to weaken China and strengthen their positions in the struggle against China.

These Japanese plans profit from the maneuvers of the Chinese appeasers, who provoke conflicts and incidents up to armed clashes, do their utmost to undermine the military collaborations of Kuomintang circles with the Communist Party and incite the persecution and rout of the eighth and fourth armies, which as units of China's united national army have inscribed many heroic pages in the history of the resistance of the Chinese people to the Japanese invaders.

These armies consist of the most progressive, tenacious, and selfless people of China. They are led by the Chinese Communist Party which enjoys merited prestige among the broad masses of the working people as the organizer of their struggle for national freedom and independence.

Today by direct military pressure new attempts are being made to bring about the dissolution of the Chinese Communist Party and the liquidation of the eighth and fourth armies. The Chinese command has transferred new divisions to the districts where these armies are stationed, with tremendous supplies of munitions and food, obviously to preparation for an attack on the eighth and fourth armies with the aim of liquidating them even at the price of unleashing civil war.

Such an attack of the Chungking generals on the eighth and fourth armies which, moreover, is completely unprovoked by these armies, would be a treacherous stab in the back of the Chinese people and play into the hands of the Japanese imperialists who could hope for nothing better.

A number of outstanding Kuomintang leaders oppose such treacherous activities of all sorts of appeasers, capitulators, and provocateurs. The Chinese Government, nevertheless, does not exert firmness in overcoming the activities of the capitulators designed to undermine national unity and weaken China's resistance against Japanese aggression.

KYRWITNESS ACCOUNT

In the last few years I have had occasion to visit more than 15 provinces of China. Both on the front and in the deep rear, in occupied Shanghai and Manchukuo, representatives of various circles of China watch with grave concern the criminal activity of the traitors, turncoats, defecists, and saboteurs. Nevertheless they are unanimous in their confidence that all the plans to provoke civil war are doomed to failure since National China, in hard fighting, has accumulated much strength and will not permit the great national liberation cause of the Chinese people to die.

With inexhaustible strategic raw material resources and tremendous manpower reserves at its disposal, China has every possibility for victory over the enemy. The necessary conditions for this victory are the realization of radical measures for reorganizing the entire economy on a war footing, subordinating all economic life to the needs of the front and strengthening the armed forces against capitulation and defeatist moods, and most important, the genuine unity of all national forces in the struggle for freedom and national independence.

On the extent to which Chiang Kai-shek and the Chungking leading circles will understand the importance of this principal condition and succeed in averting the danger of internal struggle in China, tortured by the enemies of the Chinese people—the inevitable consequence of which would be measures directed against the eighth and fourth armies and the Communist Party—rests whether the exhausting war forced upon the Chinese people by Japanese imperialism will be brought to a successful conclusion in the interests of the whole Chinese people.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz has testified that Mr. T. A. Bisson figured in the discussions at this time. I would like to introduce into the record, after identification by Mr. Mandel and authenticity affirmed by him, excerpts from an article written by T. A. Bisson in the Far Eastern Survey which was a publication of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MANDEL. This is from an article, China's Part in a Coalition War, from the Far Eastern Survey, published by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in its issue of July 1943, and I will read the following excerpts:

However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called feudal China; the other, democratic China. These terms express the actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the two Chinas.

Then I go further:

DEMOCRATIC CHINA

The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Communist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown off the feudal incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective. Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one supporting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which has freed the peasant—the primary producers in these areas, and, indeed, over most of China—from the crushing weight of rent, taxes, and usurious interest charges as levied by a feudal economy.

And further down:

The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers around this relationship.

Mr. MORRIS. Are the other paragraphs on this page, Mr. Mandel, excerpts from the article which you have been reading?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have those other excerpts inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 134" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 134

[From Far Eastern Survey, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, July 14, 1943, vol. XII, No. 14]

CHINA'S PART IN A COALITION WAR

(By T. A. Bisson)

However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called feudal China; the other, democratic China. (6) These terms express the actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the two Chinas.

DEMOCRATIC CHINA

The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Communist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown off the feudal incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective. Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one supporting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which has freed the peasant—the primary producer in these areas, and, indeed, over most of China—from the crushing weight of rent, taxes and usurious interest charges as levied by a feudal economy.

But the ingenuity of this reform, without which it could hardly be made to work, is that the newly introduced procedures of local democracy serve as the final sanction. The landlord and entrepreneur are not excluded from this process, but neither are they permitted to dominate it. Tax assessment committees, for example, are controlled by a majority of local members and exercise a strictly local jurisdiction. Farmers know well what their neighbors own.

Over wide areas of this new China, elected councils—village, town, and district—and elected executive officials have completely supplanted the old autocratic system of feudal agrarian China. These councils and officials are either

¹ The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers around this relationship.

unpaid or receive mere pittance which leave them no better off economically than their fellow citizens.

It is this democratic process, finally, which permits a large measure of free competition to operate over the whole of the economy. Bureaucratic price controls are not attempted. They are as unnecessary in this society as they would be in a New England town meeting. No landlord or merchant, with the watchful eyes of his neighbors upon him, can engage in hoarding or speculation. Within limits set mainly by local democratic checks, the individual landlord or entrepreneur is free, and is even encouraged, to expand his operations, and many are doing so.

By no stretch of the imagination can this be termed "communism"; it is, in fact, the essence of bourgeois democracy, applied mainly to agrarian conditions. The leaders in Yenan see in this program more than the answer to China's immediate problem of efficiently mobilizing her resources for the war against Japan. They see in it also the means of throwing off China's feudal shackles, the transition to modern nationhood.

The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers around this relationship.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, you made reference to T. A. Bisson. Was the reference to Bisson to him as a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And it was your knowledge that T. A. Bisson was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. My official knowledge. I have not met Mr. Bisson, but I have repeatedly heard him referred to officially and have been so advised he is a member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you elaborate on that just a little bit when you say "officially"? Officially by whom?

Mr. BUDENZ. Officially in Politburo discussions such as this in 1943 by Earl Browder, who was general secretary of the party, and then again on several occasions subsequent to that by Jack Stachel, who was the official representative of the Politburo to the Daily Worker.

The CHAIRMAN. As to the T. A. Bisson, can you tie that in individually by an expression that you know of? Could there be other T. A. Bissons?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; this was definitely the T. A. Bisson who was the so-called far eastern expert in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations. His activities were discussed, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. That particular article of T. A. Bisson was the subject of considerable controversy and I think at the expense of a few minutes we should introduce elements of that controversy on the record to see how important an article this particular one was.

Mr. Mandel, do you have anything from the institute files bearing on this subject?

Mr. MANDER. This is a letter dated August 3 from the Chinese News Service marked "confidential," addressed to Mr. Edward G. Carter.

It is signed by C. L. Hsia, representing the Chinese News Service. I read a paragraph from this letter:

I believe I said to you at Princeton that I could not agree with you or Mr. Tarr about the reason given for your declining to disown Mr. Bisson's article. Freedom of speech does not warrant any of us making attacks on the government of a friendly nation or making misrepresentations as to facts. To label the National Government of China as "feudal" is an open attack on my Government, and to say that certain casualty figures emanating from sources other than the Chinese Government or Chinese "official reports" is a misrepresentation. You are free to tell Mr. Tarr that I cannot accept his interpretation of the right of free speech.

Then another letter from the same gentleman is dated July 17, 1943, addressed to Mr. William Holland.

The CHAIRMAN. From whom?

Mr. MANDEL. From C. L. Hsia, director of the Chinese News Service. He says:

When I telephoned yesterday, I thought it would be polite for me to come and see you and Mr. Carter to exchange views on the article written by Mr. Bisson. Since I more or less said to you what I had to say on the subject, I don't know whether there is any point in my coming to see you on Monday. I find that I won't be able to get back to town on Monday until after half past 11, so if you and Mr. Carter still wish to have a talk with me, I think I can make it around about 12 noon.

What I said to you yesterday was purely my personal reaction and as a friend and member of the IPR I cannot speak for the China Council, nor in my official capacity. Personally I am deeply solicitous for the interests of the IPR, but the principles, objectives, and functions of the IPR may be defeated through the pursuit of this kind of activity, namely, an open, deliberate attack on one of its members, because I know how the Chinese members of the IPR feel about it, even among the most "democratic and liberal" and the most pro-IPR group. If Mr. Bisson tries to divide China into "federal and democratic," then I can't think of anybody in the Chinese IPR who can be said to be on the

"democratic" side. I imagine nothing can be done about it—I mean Mr. Bisson or the American Council or the international secretariat are not prepared to do anything in the way of retraction or amendment—so I don't see what useful service can be served by my coming to see you and Mr. Carter—

et cetera.

I have here a statement by Hollington K. Tong, who has been an official of the Chinese National Government, and whose biography can be found in the China Handbook on page 777, and here is his full comment on the whole Bisson incident, which I would like to introduce into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like two more paragraphs read in the record, Mr. Chairman. This is a point that has been disputed by Mr. Carter, and I think we should elaborate on it just a bit.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. I will read:

We took a serious view of the Bisson thrust for two reasons. In the first place, the Far Eastern Survey is not a magazine of private American opinion. It is an official publication of an organization of which there is an active China branch, and Mr. Bisson is a member of the board of directors of that organization.

Therefore, an article attacking China, published in the Far Eastern Survey, would appear to have the sanction of the institute, including its China branch. In the second place, in the middle of war, such an attack seemed nothing less than a boost to the enemy's propaganda.

My first action in the matter was to notify Guenther Stein, Chungking correspondent of the IPR, that his privilege of sending his weekly messages to the IPR free of charge through Chinese Government radio facilities would be withdrawn until Bisson's article was satisfactorily explained. This caused alarm at the Press Hotel, and I was visited by a delegation from the Foreign Correspondents' Club. Did my action imply that the Government's policy in the future would be to deny transmission facilities to them if articles deemed unfavorable to China were found to have been published by their principals at home, they asked. I pointed out that I was only withdrawing free Chinese Government facilities from the IPR correspondent pending an explanation from IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that whole letter introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it has been identified as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct.

First, I would like to introduce into the record the previous letters referred to, dated August 3, 1943, and July 17, 1943, from C. L. Hsia, the letter of August 3 to Mr. Edward C. Carter as the first, and the letter of July 17, to Mr. William Holland as the second, and have them marked as the next consecutive exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be so filed.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 135" and "Exhibit No. 136," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 135

CHINESE NEWS SERVICE,
New York, N. Y., August 3, 1943.

Confidential.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

DEAR Mr. CARTER: Many thanks for your note of July 31, which was purely for my private information. I greatly appreciate your sending me a copy of your confidential memorandum to Miss Porter.

I believe I said to you at Princeton that I could not agree with you or Mr. Tarr about the reason given for your declining to disown Mr. Bisson's article. Freedom of speech does not warrant any of us making attacks on the government of a friendly nation or making misrepresentations as to facts. To label the National Government of China as "feudal" is an open attack on my government, and to say that certain casualty figures emanating from sources other than the Chinese Government are Chinese "official reports" is a misrepresentation. You are free to tell Mr. Tarr that I cannot accept his interpretation of the right of free speech.

I hope very much that what you wrote Miss Porter can be made public or in some other way you can make clear that Mr. Bisson's article does not reflect the viewpoint either of the American Council or of the Pacific Council.

Furthermore, I wish to advise you quite sincerely and frankly that the policy or attitude represented by your telegram to Liu Yu-wan will greatly embarrass him and his colleagues in Chungking. Knowing the situation as I do, a matter like this may make it impossible for some members of the China group to participate in the next IPR conference. I wish to make it quite clear that I am speaking as a personal friend and a member of IPR and not delivering an ultimatum, as I am not an officer and cannot speak for the China Council.

In my other capacity, I am duty bound to report to Dr. T. V. Soong what are the reactions of the Pacific Council and the American Council to my request that they publicly dissociate themselves from Mr. Bisson's article where he attacked the National Government of China. I do not know what he will do. He may think it is too small a matter to bother about and let it drop. On the other hand, he may wish to inform the China Council of his dissatisfaction. So far, the only course open to me is to report to him to the effect that neither the Pacific Council nor the American Council is willing to disown any part of the article written by Mr. Bisson.

The suggestion that Mr. Bisson write a second article does not appear to me to be any solution of the difficulties with which we are confronted. As I said to you the other day, no writer will ever admit that he was wrong. If he says he made a slight mistake, probably he will give half a dozen reasons for that slight mistake and those reasons will put him more "right" than ever. My frank advice is that he had better keep quiet for a time and let other people have a go at it.

I will try to get in touch with Miss Porter as soon as possible and I hope she will publish our comments on Mr. Bisson's article. In this connection may I repeat what I have said before, that it has been insisted that whatever comments we may make will have the same privilege of being circularized as a special release as did the summary of Mr. Bisson's article.

Sincerely yours,

C. L. HULL, Director.

EXHIBIT No. 136

CHINESE NEWS SERVICE,
New York, N. Y., July 17, 1943.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: When I telephoned yesterday I thought it would be polite for me to come and see you and Mr. Carter to exchange views on the article written by Mr. Bisson. Since I more or less said to you what I had to say on the subject, I don't know whether there is any point in my coming to see you on Monday. I had that I won't be able to get back to town on Monday until after half past 11, so if you and Mr. Carter still wish to have a talk with me I think I can make it around about 12 noon. (Will you please telephone my secretary, Mrs. Chen?)

What I said to you yesterday was purely my personal reaction and as a friend and member of the IPR. I cannot speak for the China Council, nor in my official capacity. Personally I am deeply solicitous for the interests of the IPR but the principles, objectives, and functions of the IPR may be defeated through the pursuit of this kind of activity, namely, an open, deliberate attack on one of its members, because I know how the Chinese members of the IPR feel about it, even among the most "democratic and liberal" and the most pro-IPR group. If Mr. Bisson tries to divide China into "feudal and democratic," then I can't

think of anybody in the Chinese IPR who can be said to be on the "democratic" side. I imagine nothing can be done about it—I mean Mr. Bisson or the American Council or the International Secretariat are not prepared to do anything in the way of retraction or amendment—so I don't see what useful purpose can be served by my coming to see you and Mr. Carter. But I thought as an old friend you would not mind my calling your attention to what I consider to be a highly regrettable incident.

Very sincerely yours,

C. L. HSIA, *Director.*

Mr. MANDEL. This is an excerpt from a book called *Dateline: China*, by Hollington K. Tong, from pages 204, 206, and 208, published in 1950 by the Rockport Press.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce the statement into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 137" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 137

EXCERPTS FROM THE BOOK, *DATELINE: CHINA*, BY HOLLINGTON K. TONG

[Pages 204, 206, and 208—Published by the Rockport Press, Inc., New York, 1950]

A note of incongruity was given to the whole attack by the fact that it was the Institute of Pacific Relations which fired the shot. The institute had been established, ostensibly, to promote good will among the peoples living in the Pacific area. Even though we knew that leftist influence had long been strong in its secretariat, it hurt us to see a blow coming from such a quarter.

In June 1943, Mr. T. A. Bisson, of the international secretariat of the institute, wrote the following in an issue of the *Far Eastern Survey*:

"The early promise held out by the war for the broadening and deepening of Chinese unity through the achievement of liberal political and economic reforms has not been fulfilled. Two Chinas have emerged, each with its own government, military forces, political and economic institutions. One is generally called Kuomintang China, and the other Communist China. But the terms 'feudal China' and 'democratic China' more accurately express the actualities as they exist today."

This seemed to us an unwarranted and unfriendly attack upon China and the Chinese Government, since Mr. Bisson's "Kuomintang" or "feudal" China was the National Government of China.

We made an issue of it.

We took a serious view of the Bisson thrust for two reasons. In the first place, the *Far Eastern Survey* is not a magazine of private American opinion. It is an official publication of an organization of which there is an active China branch, and Mr. Bisson is a member of the board of directors of that organization. Therefore, an article attacking China, published in the *Far Eastern Survey*, would appear to have the sanction of the institute, including its China branch. In the second place, in the middle of war, such an attack seemed nothing less than a boost to the enemy's propaganda.

My first action in the matter was to notify Guenther Stein, Chungking correspondent of the IPR, that his privilege of sending his weekly messages to the IPR free of charge through Chinese Government radio facilities would be withdrawn until Bisson's article was satisfactorily explained. This caused alarm at the Press Hotel, and I was visited by a delegation from the Foreign Correspondents' Club. Did my action imply that the Government's policy in the future would be to deny transmission facilities to them if articles deemed unfavorable to China were found to have been published by their principals at home, they asked. I pointed out that I was only withdrawing free Chinese Government facilities from the IPR correspondent pending an explanation from IPR. To give free Government facilities to an organization which maliciously attacked the Government seemed to me foolish in the extreme. I also pointed out the different status of the IPR as compared to other independent, non-organization papers and magazines.

Meanwhile, a spirited interchange of letters and rejoinders was taking place with the IPR. Dr. C. L. Hsia, of our New York office, presented our point of view in a letter to the institute which was published with an introductory

editorial note stating that "Bisson's article expressed a point of view seriously held by many sincere American friends of China."

Also, in the same issue, Mr. Bisson contributed a rebuttal to Dr. Hsia's letter. Although both Mr. Bisson and Mr. Edward C. Carter, the secretary general of the IPR, who, incidentally, was also national president of the American Society for Russian Relief, stated that Mr. Bisson's article expressed ideas which were entirely his own and did not come officially from the organization as a whole, it seemed to us that the editorial note appended to Dr. Hsia's letter confirmed our feeling that the editorial board of the Far Eastern Survey was backing Bisson's point of view. They were setting a precedent which would make it possible for prejudiced writers and commentators in the United States to issue any sort of libel against China with impunity under cloak of being "sincere American friends of China."

The question of the Bisson article was further discussed a month later (August 1943) when Mr. Carter himself, accompanied by Mr. W. L. Holland, research secretary of the IPR, came out to China for a 3-week visit. Dr. Meinlin Chiang, president of the National Peking University and chairman of the China branch of the IPR, discussed the matter with Mr. Carter. The members of the China branch of the IPR were as disturbed by the article as I had been, and the China branch finally lodged a formal protest. As a result, the president of the Institute of Pacific Relations issued a statement publicly dissociating the institute from the views expressed by Mr. Bisson, and we considered the matter closed. Guenther Stein's privilege to make use of our free facilities was restored to him.

During the controversy, the Institute of Pacific Relations came very close to losing its China branch altogether, which would have left it a predominantly American rather than an international organization. The China branch, whose members are by no means all Government officials, is a liberal-minded organization. But its members rebelled at the thought of being made a party to an international organization which openly attacked their Government.

During this period an article appeared in Moscow's War and the Working Class, written by V. N. Rogoff, who had been a Tass correspondent in China, and a personal friend of mine. This article was cabled by the United Press correspondent in Moscow both to England and the United States and appeared in hundreds of American and British papers. Mr. Rogoff stated that the Chinese Government was facing serious internal difficulties that could result either in civil war or a victory for Japan. He claimed that "appeasers" and "defeatists" in China were seeking to provoke trouble by urging the dissolution of the Communist units of the Chinese Army and that the alleged "intriguers" were undermining the Chinese war efforts and "have evolved the theory of an honorable peace with Japan or the futility of fighting." He insinuated that no serious attempt was being made by China to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more about that particular meeting you would like to tell us about?

Do you have any comment on the Bisson article as it was read today?

Mr. BUDENZ. Nothing. It shows that the Politburo's views were carried out in this article and that Communist China was held forth as the democratic China.

Mr. MORRIS. And it is also an example—is it not—that the Institute of Pacific Relations was used as an instrument for carrying out that policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is a very splendid example, splendid from the Communist viewpoint.

Mr. MORRIS. Before we leave the subject of Frederick V. Field, I offer you a pamphlet which was put out in his name and ask you if you can recall that particular pamphlet.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. We were instructed by the Politburo to emphasize this pamphlet. The Daily Worker did so, and throughout the party it was emphasized and pushed, as the party does those things.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify for us that pamphlet?

Mr. BUDENZ. This is entitled "China's Greatest Crisis," by Frederick V. Field, published by New Century Publishers, Inc., of 832 Broadway, New York, in January 1945.

The New Century Publishers, may I say, are official publishers for the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew that from your own experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very definitely. The head of it was Robert William Weiner, the head of the secret conspiratorial fund of the Communist Party and former treasurer of the Communist Party, and also former president of the International Workers Order, but it was also under control of Trautenberg, to whom I have referred before.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that particular pamphlet?

Mr. BUDENZ. From first-hand knowledge, having been many times in the offices of this publication, conferring with Mr. Weiner, and with other officials of that Communist-created organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that particular pamphlet, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. This pamphlet was, as I say, pushed by the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything significant about that pamphlet that we should know in carrying on an investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

In the very introduction of the pamphlet it gives an explanation of the author. This is called "About the Author."

Frederick V. Field, the author of this pamphlet, is a member of the executive committee of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and an authority on far-eastern problems. He is also executive vice president of the Council for Pan-American Democracy, and a member of the editorial board of *New Masses*.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that reference to the Institute of Pacific Relations made with any significance?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. That was in order that the name of the Institute of Pacific Relations would be an entering wedge into many civic organizations, to ministers, to professors, to others who were circularized with this pamphlet; that is, either it was sent to them, or their interest was solicited.

Mr. MORRIS. This is to show in this particular pamphlet that it was a new Communist publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. But that is a subject of common knowledge?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is not.

Mr. MORRIS. So, it is your idea with reference to this description of Mr. Field and your testimony is that it was done to confuse? Is that it?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was done specifically, to my knowledge. I was in meetings in which this was discussed, the necessity for publishing this pamphlet among wide groups of people who were not yet familiar with China from the Soviet viewpoint, in order to get their interest and attention.

In order to get their interest and attention it was printed in this fashion.

Mr. MORRIS. And the name of the Institute of Pacific Relations was so used for that purpose?

Mr. BUDENZ. Specifically used for that purpose.

Mr. MORRIS. And the material in that pamphlet is Communist propaganda?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was decisively. It was approved by the Politburo.

Senator WATKINS. I thought you referred to some fund that the Communists had in connection with this.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe he referred to an individual who had charge of the fund.

Senator WATKINS. Maybe that was it, but at any rate, I wanted a further explanation, if you could give one.

Mr. BUDENZ. I think that would take us quite far afield, to go into this fund, but I can say that Robert William Weiner, to my personal knowledge, was the head of the conspiratorial fund of the Communist International apparatus in this country which doled out thousands of dollars in cash for many purposes; that is to say, if a Communist would take a trip abroad which is illegal, he couldn't put that on the books of the Communist Party. Earl Browder, if he had taken an illegal trip to the Orient or to Moscow, he was given this expense in cash and this was quite a large business.

Robert William Weiner's assistant incidentally was Lem Harris, who springs from the Wall Street brokerage house, although he is not in that business. He merely comes from that family.

Senator WATKINS. Would you know whether any of that fund was used to finance that pamphlet just as you have described it?

Mr. BUDENZ. That I would not know.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, what was the date of this pamphlet?

Senator O'CONNOR. 1945.

Mr. BUDENZ. 1945.

Senator O'CONNOR. Mr. Chairman, I do think it is pertinent at this point to observe that this is the very pamphlet about which we interrogated Mr. Field and he declined to answer on the grounds it would incriminate him.

Mr. MORRIS. It is, incidentally, introduced in the record as exhibit 10.

Senator O'CONNOR. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. The secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations before Mr. Frederick V. Field was Mr. Joseph Barnes, who, according to documents, was secretary from 1931 to 1934.

Did you know that Joseph Barnes was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I did not know Mr. Barnes during this period to which you refer.

Mr. MORRIS. I am not asking you that. I am asking you if you knew Mr. Barnes was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. BUDENZ. I did know Mr. Barnes was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that from personal encounters, as well as from official conferences of the Communist Party leaders?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe to us any personal encounter you had with Joseph Barnes in connection with Communist Party work?

Mr. BUDENZ. I had one personal encounter.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that?

Mr. BUDENZ. I would—

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go into that, the name "Joe Barnes" or "Joseph Barnes" is not an uncommon one. I would like some way to identify the Joe Barnes to which you have reference.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz, if he continues with his testimony, will bring that out, and I will make it a point to tie up the two names.

Mr. BUDENZ. The Joseph Barnes I have reference to was the foreign correspondent for some time of the New York Herald Tribune and later on, not to my personal knowledge, but in the public print, took over a part ownership of PM.

The CHAIRMAN. PM was a newspaper regularly published in New York for some time?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was a daily paper. Its name was changed to something like the New York Star.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. BUDENZ. In the 1936 period it is my impression that the 1936 convention of the Communist Party—my very sharp impression—a few newspapermen who were Communists were admitted into the convention or into a national committee meeting. I say that on that I am not quite clear; it was either a convention or national committee meeting, and I am practically certain it was the convention of the Communist Party of 1936.

The purpose of introducing these Communist newspapermen into the convention or national committee meeting, which broke all the rules of the party up to that time since those were always executive sessions, was to have them go out and represent the party as an American institution under the new idea that was developed later by Browder so fully in saying communism is Twentieth Century Americanism, and in the hall where these people met, a small room attached to this meeting of the Communists, were several newspapermen, among whom was Joseph Barnes.

I was introduced to him by Si Gerson in the presence of J. Peters.

Mr. MORRIS. Why does the name stand out? Why does the name stand out since many years have passed and why does it stand out that you recall meeting him at this particular time?

Mr. BUDENZ. This incident which is so clear in my memory that I have reported it a long time ago to other agencies stands out in my memory because Joe Barnes was so emphasized as having been of service to the party from the very moment I came into it.

Mr. MORRIS. Prior to that time you had heard the name of Joseph Barnes?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mentioned in connection with the activity of the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. On many occasions?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, a number of occasions, so much so that it became quite a personality with me without me knowing him.

Mr. MORRIS. And it is your testimony that these people you met on this occasion, which you think was 1936, were all Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know it was the 1936 period. The only thing I am uncertain of, though my uncertainty is not very great, is whether it was the convention or national committee meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to have one matter brought out clearly for the record.

Are you stating that you know Mr. Barnes to have been a Communist because he was one of these newspapermen who was admitted, or are you stating that you knew him to be a Communist and that he was in this group which was admitted? In other words, does your statement that he was a Communist rest on the fact that he was one of the group which was admitted?

Mr. BUDENZ. Partly, although it also rests on official reports in the Politburo to the effect that Barnes had been of great service to the party as a Communist; secondly, to the fact that he was introduced as Comrade Barnes to me by Si Gerson.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was on this particular occasion?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would the situation be this: That you knew prior to this occasion, and had known for some time prior to this occasion, that there was a Joseph Barnes who was a Communist and who had been of great service to the party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And on this occasion you met a Joseph Barnes who was identified to you and in your mind as the same Joseph Barnes who was a Communist and who had been of service to the party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is the Joseph Barnes that you have already identified here?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. The Joseph Barnes presented to me was presented in such a vivid color as of aid to the party that he was supposed to be outstanding.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he was introduced by J. Peters?

Mr. BUDENZ. By Si Gerson.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have, or did you have, any experience subsequent to that experience which you believe took place in 1936, that could confirm your understanding that Joseph Barnes was a member of the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

I had a number of references to Barnes in the Politburo as a Communist, and also statements by Jack Stachel to me officially advising me of that fact. In about 1941 Earl Browder told me, though I don't know positively that he acted on what he said, that he was to take a certain newspaper with him to the Atlanta prison, he being privileged to only subscribe to one paper, because of the great influence of Joe Barnes in that paper and the contributions he had made.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the chairman of this committee must be on the floor very shortly. I am going to ask Senator O'Connor if you would kindly take over. I may not be able to be here this afternoon, Senator. Do you want to continue with the hearing this afternoon?

Mr. MORRIS. I think we will have to get some more testimony in. We are just really getting into this testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, can you preside this afternoon?

Senator O'CONNOR. Yes, I can.

Senator O'CONNOR (presiding). The hearing will please be in order.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I offer you an article written by Joseph Barnes entitled "American Dream," which appeared in the Atlantic Monthly, pages 111 to 116, in January 1937. I offer you this article and ask you when you first saw that article?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yesterday.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first communicate to the committee your testimony about your meeting with Joseph Barnes?

Mr. BUDENZ. Last spring, and I communicated to other agencies before that, but I communicated to the committee specifically last spring.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you look at that article and tell us what that purports to be?

Mr. BUDENZ. This article is a review of the Communist Party convention of 1936 and also a review of the Communist tendency developing out of that convention. It presents the Communists as being Americanized.

Mr. MORRIS. And does that description of the Communist Party convention conform in every way with your understanding of the party purpose in allowing newspapermen to cover the convention?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; it may not be always expressed in Communist phraseology, but naturally the Atlantic Monthly, although I could talk about the Atlantic Monthly too, in that it wouldn't appear in that form.

However, this does express the purpose of the newspapermen being admitted, those who were.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer this into the record in its entirety and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. Has it been identified?

Mr. MORRIS. I have described it.

Mr. MANDEL, did you authenticate that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of an article appearing in the Atlantic Monthly in January 1937, pages 111 to 116, entitled "American Dream," by Joseph Barnes.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be admitted and marked in evidence.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 138" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 138

[From the Atlantic Monthly, January 1937, pp. 111-116.]

AMERICAN DREAM

(By Joseph Barnes)

I

The Communist Party of the United States, assembled in convention in New York City last summer, nominated its candidate for President as "the new John Brown of Osawatimie." This leather-faced Kasper, with a prairie twang in his voice, conducted a campaign which was patently not planned from Moscow. Over national radio networks, on the platforms of union meeting halls, and from a cell in the Terre Haute, Ind., jail, he insisted on the legitimate and historical right of his followers to the title of sons and daughters of the American Revolution, and defenders of American liberty.

"John Brown's Body" blared from the party's bands in alternation with the "Internationale." The American flag festooned the rafters of the party's meeting places. Mr. Browder's zeal for American democracy, which led him to single out the Republican Party as the tool of big business interests, to be defeated

at all costs, made his party's campaign for the first time a factor in national political discussion.

This borrowing of American symbols was more than a political stratagem, or a knavish trick of Communist expropriation. The seventh world congress of the Communist International in Moscow a year ago had bent the party line more sharply in this direction. But in its membership, its growing press, and its special language of exhortation, the Communist Party had for several years been naturalizing itself in the American scene.

Mr. Albert Jay Nock has properly rebuked, in the October issue of the *Atlantic*, the word-mongers who foist "imposter terms" upon a gullible public, twisting their meanings to serve new ends. But the true study of semantics is more than invective against philological jugglery; it is the attempt to learn the reasons for real changes in the meaning of words. The success or failure which the Communists may have in adopting the slogans of 1776 and 1861, and infusing them with new life, will show how far and why these terms have changed their meanings.

Many of them, coined or borrowed in a simpler time, when words and slogans could be held in the mouth until even their taste was fixed, have inevitably changed since they first set the pattern of American speech. Since then, the rich have compounded their riches and the poor their poverty. Mr. Browder can find ample evidence in the reports of college deans, relief administrators, or industrial-relations experts, that freedom, liberty, revolution, the American dream, are being given, in many American minds, new definitions not to be found in McGuffey's Eclectic Readers.

Every crackpot third party may appropriate for its own purposes the word "American," and the song "The Battle Hymn of the Republic." But in Mr. Browder's campaign some of the fighting words were not mere borrowings; they were already a part of the Communist vocabulary. Even in the maze of Marxist rhetoric these words may be made for many Americans to sing with something of an older throbbing rhythm. They lose the bitter, anxious note given them in so many latter-day speeches or in Mr. Hearst's editorials, the flatted pitch betraying fear that our liberties may be something less impishable than the rocks and rills which cradled them. They can carry confidence and faith to millions of Americans for whom the old American dream has not yet curdled.

II

That dream itself was largely one of freedom. It was born in the hearts of men who wanted freedom enough to fight the wilderness for it. And for the greater number of them, from Daniel Boone who wanted room enough "to rattle bars in" to the Polish immigrant who wanted a loom and a less crowded ghetto and no more pilgrims, the wilderness and its simple, natural freedom were forthcoming.

Sir Charles Lyell, English geologist, traveled through the eastern seaboard of the United States in 1841, as open-mouthed as any Englishman of his time could be at its geological wealth and at the freedom of its people. When he asked the keeper of his inn at Corning, N. Y., to find his coachman for him, that free-born Yankee called into the barroom: "Where is the gentleman that brought this man here?" It was, Sir Charles concluded, the young country's chief blessing.

"I am also aware that the blessing alluded to," he wrote in his diary, "and many others which they enjoy, belong to a progressive, as contrasted with a stationary, state of society; that they characterize the new colony, where there is abundance of unoccupied land, and a ready outlet to a redundant laboring class. They are not the result of a democratic, as compared with a monarchical or aristocratic, constitution, nor the fruits of an absolute equality of religious sects, still less of universal suffrage."

Karl Marx paraphrased Sir Charles on this point a few years later, but the identification of freedom with political liberty was already frozen in American thinking. Twenty years later, at the beginning of the Civil War, more than half the entire area of the United States, over a billion acres, still belonging to the Government. The opening of the West had hardly started. So long as a man could move, and stretch his arms, and "rattle" new bears, he was not far wrong in thinking himself free. And if he thanked the Constitution or his right to vote for this blessing of freedom, it was an error which history and the inviting, empty prairies overlooked.

Today the sons and grandsons of these searchers for freedom have reached a full stop in the expansive pressure of a young people into its promised land. For a few hundred farmers, crowded from the soil by the relentless growth of tenancy—which has claimed in Iowa until 60 percent of the State's 222,000 farms are tenant-operated in 1936, and 80 percent are mortgaged—there is the Matanuska Valley in Alaska. For a few hundred textile workers in New York City, whose very looms have been transported to the cheaper-labor cities of the South, there is Mr. Tugwell's Hightstown, N. J., resettlement project. Both were designed as symbols to revive the old American confidence in the invincibility of the pioneer. But both serve today to remind Americans that there is no longer an open geographical frontier offering freedom to large numbers of those who seek it.

There are still drought and grasshoppers and business depressions and tax-collecting politicians, it is true. But without unoccupied land for a redundant laboring class the older pioneer virtues of individual strength and character have been seen for nearly 7 years to falter badly against even these old adversaries. You can't "rasstie," many Americans have learned, a public utility or the United States Steel Corp.

Instead, a few have learned, you can organize. It is among these few that Mr. Browder still numbers most of his 51,000 enrolled supporters. But his party's campaign to become a mass revolutionary party has been planned in larger figures. Only an embittered class of industrial workers can be won by talk of dialectics, proletarian dictatorship, and "Hands Off China." Besides them, the black-browed Marxist has slowly but carefully learned, he must win the support of millions of Americans who still feel themselves the sons of pioneers and who dream the great American dream.

For most of these, he argues, property has become an empty word, a memory, like stone walls and rail fences to an Iowa farmer. Where the title deeds and gilt-printed certificates have survived, the cold, constricting grip of finance capital on management has wrenched both profit and the sense of ownership from the shell of property to which the middle class has clung. The old controversy of Marxist scholars as to the relative rates of growth of the so-called middle and working classes has been forgotten. It has been dwarfed by the blunt, unpleasant fact that every year, growing by geometrical progression through prosperity and depression, there are more men and women dependent for a living on a job, the surplus value of their labor taken from them, the specter of unemployment staring them in the face.

The interests of these Americans, Mr. Browder and his board of strategy have seen, lie with those of the working class. Only their loyalties, the accumulated pressure of a strong tradition, keep them befuddled by a Liberty League which works for liberty only for the rich. The Communists have set out this year to change these loyalties.

They have premised their plans on the assumption that the new allegiance of these millions need not be to Moscow, but to Bunker Hill and Harper's Ferry. They have found in the American dream issues which are fresh and vital today. By a policy of "united front" with other groups which recognize these issues, and by working on social and economic problems which have replaced the geographical frontier, they propose to use the American dream in a new search for freedom.

III

The primary purpose of the Yankees moving westward across the American Continent, and of the later Americans who came as immigrants to a country already settled, was to make a living. A better living has been the first promise they have demanded of those who wished to change their homes or their ways of thinking. In recent years the depression, unemployment, and increasing fear of an accelerating spiral of boom and panic leading to some undefined disaster have prepared many Americans to listen to tales of greener pastures.

This the Communists have recognized, and their appeal for new support rests squarely on a promise of abundance. To support the promise, they can point with powerful effect to the constricting scope of human life and enterprise in the middle-class nations of the modern world. With much less effect as yet, at least for Americans, they can cite the rising standard of living and the widening world of the Soviet Union. But while they wait for these two converging lines to meet in inevitable revolution, there are other elements of the American dream which they can shape to their own purposes.

The first of these is the desire of security. The depression has been blamed perhaps too much, for the rising clamor which has enlisted even the Republican Party in support of the principles of social insurance. The true cause may have been rather the prosperity of postwar years, which sucked farmers to the cities and undermined the independence of the small merchant and producer. Merger and monopoly were the order of the day, and the economics of self-sufficiency were relegated to the textbooks, unlearned and unpracticed.

How far this change has already gone may be seen in the increasing repudiation by large numbers of citizens, not all of them on relief rolls, of the venerable American maxim that insecurity is a necessary incentive to hard work. What would make men work, we used to ask, if it were not for the wolf at the door?

How can they work, many now ask instead, if they have no access to the tools with which to work? These are no longer the ax and hickory with which Daniel Boone made insecurity his blessing of freedom. Today they are jobs, for corporations, banks, and railroads, work to be done with hand or brain for someone else, and a wage at the end of the week. Even the farmers, caught in the spider web of mortgages and closing markets, have begun to learn that the incentive of fear, when independence has dried up with the free land, is small defense against the wolf.

Another traditional element of the American dream, according to the Communist analysis, is the revolt against injustice. To a nation familiar with abolitionists, quakers, and pacifists, this is nothing new. Even its most recent forms have only put into the conversation of increasing numbers of Americans what Ruskin knew about himself 65 years ago.

"For my own part," he wrote, "I will put up with this state of things, passively, not an hour longer. I simply cannot paint, nor read, nor look at minerals, nor do anything else that I like, and the very light of the morning sky has become hateful to me, because of the misery that I know of, and see signs of where I know it not, which no imagination can interpret too bitterly. Therefore, as I have said, I will endure it no longer quietly."

I once knew a missionary in China, a man of fine, explosive moral indignation. His ancestors had been Connecticut Yankees, whose tombstones in the cemeteries of Litchfield County, the Western Reserve, Iowa, and California marked one of the trails of American history. His last expansive thrust sent him into China, equipped with little but his Bible and the American dream. The misery he saw around him made him rage and quiver.

A few days ago I met his son, organizing unemployed workers in New Jersey. With him one of the driving forces of American life had come full circle. The religious character of the older emotional protest had changed. But no one who has seen a Yankee agitator, like this missionary's son, forced by the misery he sees to break his silence, can doubt that his accents are those of his father, and of Emerson and of Thoreau.

Much of the same ethical basis underlies still another of the elements in modern American thinking, especially that of a younger generation, on which the Communists have based their strategy and shaped their language. This is the desire for a world of ideas that makes sense. It is the belief that the values and the esthetics of a civilized people, like its economics and its social mores, are not predestined to perpetual confusion and debasement.

It is this half-inarticulate conviction that has enlisted so many younger writers in the United States under the banner of a still-nascent proletarian literature. The treason of the intellectuals has become a series of mass desertions from the standards of a business society. The present confusion of many of these younger writers betrays their avowed desire for synthesis and order. Yet large numbers of them have joined the chorus of revolt, apparently for some personal satisfaction they derive from looking at the still dim outlines of an integral world.

It may be that the attraction to them of the Marxist world is nothing more than the ageless appeal of any church to any believer. It may be simply a rock on which to rest a weary head. But there are few such syntheses left with equally compelling vitality inside the world of middle-class culture and ideas, according to the Communists; and they claim to be embarrassed by the number of their recruits who come to them for faith alone.

All these things, it may be argued, are not new, by the very token of the ease with which the Communists can find American words with which to fit them. We have sought freedom and security before, and rebelled against injustice, and looked with patience for integration in a world that moves too fast for any simple hypothesis to hold it. Those who have failed have become cynical, but have gone on living, and there has been little change.

Some young Americans have found two new and ponderable changes, which have made the whole equation new. The first is Soviet Russia. To the imagination of a Montana wheat grower or a Detroit mechanic, hard empiricists in their American dream, the scale of 5-year plans and their tough and palpable reality may make them compelling visions. Americans know of their own experience that steel and wheat and machines rank high among the things for which men live.

The second is Marxism. It is not the party line of any orthodox or schismatic group, but the tool for understanding which a few scholars, and fewer leaders, have learned to use. To the English world it is still fresh and untested; and it has the plausible ring in many ears that only those doctrines have which promise the millennium—in this case, a society without classes and without poverty, where men may be really free.

"The objective, external forces which have hitherto dominated history," Engels promised, and the promise still holds good, "will then pass under the control of men themselves. It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness, will fashion their own history; it is only from this point that the social causes set in motion by men will have, predominantly and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom."

IV

For some years it has been easy to dismiss the Communists as foreigners in the fatal sense of that term, alien to our people and to our land, speaking a language few men understood. Only out of our own soil, it was cheerfully repeated, could roots spring that would fulfill what Herbert Croly called the "promise of American life."

In one sense the Communists have admitted the validity of this claim in their adoption of Thomas Paine, Samuel Adams, and John Brown for their political iconology, and their campaign to capture the American dream. In another, they have repudiated it, in their steadfast insistence that there is no exception to the rules of capitalist decay.

The continent is no longer virgin, they insist. Its people count their ancestors in all the corners of the world. They make their living and sell their labor as in any other industrial country. The exceptional scale and speed of American life serve only to telescope the inexorable changes inherent in all industrial civilization. The specter that was haunting Europe in 1848 has appeared mysteriously lurking in the shadows of America.

This specter may not be conjured away so easily in the years to come as in the last decade. In Gary, Ind., along the Monongahela River, on the San Francisco docks, and in the rayon mills of North Carolina, it is reported, the Communists have found new men, speaking the American tongue, unhampered by doctrinaire orders from Moscow, to spread their naturalized doctrine.

William Z. Foster, the party's elder statesman and three times candidate for President, is the son of a Taunton, Mass., carriage washer, who learned his economics not from Karl Marx but from Lester F. Ward. On a platform he chews gum with the slow, deliberate rhythm of a baseball fan. Robert Minor, a Communist candidate in November for Governor of New York State, is a grandson of a first cousin to Gen. Sam Houston, first president of Texas. At the 1936 convention he nominated, as "an average American," Earl Browder, former bookkeeper and Standard Oil employee, who wears a gold wedding ring and lives in Yonkers, speaks with the slow, dry irony of a Kansas farmer, and writes in a style that suggests a little of Daniel Webster mixed with much of "Sockless Jerry" Shapson.

These men spoke at Communist meetings during the campaign to shirt-sleeved mechanics and miners, organizers from Alabama textile mills, sailors and stevedores from three American coasts. Most of their lieutenants appeared to be young. Few were women. A surprising majority had Scotch or Irish names and Yankee checkbones. On these men, more than on Browder, or Foster, depends the success of this new experiment with the American dream.

Even more will it depend, perhaps, on the competition they encounter. It would be comforting to think that there was a reasonable body of ideas being shaped by liberals or conservatives to bring the old American dream into line with new realities in American life.

The depression has uprooted many families and with them many loyalties and ways of thinking. When they settle again, it will inevitably be in new patterns.

In the short run, most of these appear to be of two kinds. On the one hand, conservatives hold out the nostalgic hope of a return to the older agrarian virtues, confused themselves between the laissez-faire spirit of independence they preach and the controlled monopoly they practice. On the other hand there is a fumbling effort to trim and cut the American dream by endless compromise, a liberal muddling through which promises only scarcity to the sons of men who wanted abundance and freedom.

Given time, either of these sets of ideas might bend the tradition of Daniel Boone and the American pioneer to the new and imperious demands that daily living makes on millions of confused Americans. But there may well be no time. In a world where war and fascism are bacteria in the air we breathe, the few who see the danger and prepare to struggle against it may win the title they have claimed—spiritual inheritors of the founding fathers.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, we have had testimony here previously that Harriet Lucy Moore was a Communist, and in addition, we have introduced extensive records showing that she was a very active person in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Will you tell us if you knew that Harriet Lucy Moore was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I knew Harriet Lucy Moore was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet her personally?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; she attended several meetings of the national committee, the enlarged national committee, and I believe, Mr. Chairman, that should be explained.

The national committee is generally composed of 60 members, though it can go up and down according to Communist exigencies, but that is not the national committee meeting to which I refer.

The national committee meeting to which I refer is the enlarged national committee which takes place about four times a year and in which from 300 to 400 Communist leaders throughout the country are invited to attend. A very strict security surveillance is kept on the meeting by the Communists and it is very secret. It generally took place up in the forties in New York in a large hall there which the Communists had rented off and on.

Now, there at that meeting, occasionally in the forties—the exact time I couldn't say just at the moment—but Harriet Lucy Moore was present. Only Communists were admitted to these meetings.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Harriet Lucy Moore a member of the cell that operated in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BUDENZ. She was, both according to my knowledge gained in national meetings and in the reports of the Politburo.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything else about Harriet Lucy Moore's activities, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, they were called so much to my attention that I am really at a loss how to express them; that is to say, she wrote articles which were passed on by the Politburo and she was specifically praised for a review of Owen Lattimore's book which she presented, I think, to Soviet Russia Today, though it may have been another magazine. I remember the incident. It was brought up as a sample of good Communist work.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she active in Russian war relief, as well?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; she was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have previously indicated that Harriet Lucy Moore was the acting secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, as well as at one time chairman of the nominating committee of the institute.

Mr. BUDENZ. We would like some testimony from you on the subject of whether or not Owen Lattimore was a member of the Communist organization. Can you relate the episodes that indicated to you that Owen Lattimore was a member of the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. These episodes which I have brought to your attention?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. You have called to our attention five or six episodes.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain these in detail, stressing at all times in your relating of them the fact of Owen Lattimore's association with the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. These episodes indicate within the conspiracy the importance of Lattimore as a sort of an advance guard for the Communist Party out in the land of the heathens, so to speak, as he was not exactly described; but as he was described, and his active and prominent part from the Communist viewpoint, such as his being assigned to prepare the ground, at least for this campaign of agrarian reformers and Asia for the Asiatic, his being conversant with changes in the line, which actually did take place, and after information we found the correct way in which to carry them out, his being likewise stated by Mr. Jack Stachel when he went with Henry Wallace to Soviet Siberia and to China—

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate them in chronological order?

Mr. BUDENZ. You want me to go over them again? I was trying to save time.

Mr. MORRIS. You did get into some of them when we were talking about Frederick Field. I wish you would rerelease them, stressing on each occasion the role that Lattimore had on these particular episodes.

Senator O'CONNOR. I think it would be informative to us all if he would enumerate the episodes first, and then possibly go into detail in confirmation.

Mr. BUDENZ. 1937, that was the episode in regard to Browder's bringing forward the idea that the Communists should be represented as democratic, as agrarian reformers, as Asiatics for the Asiatics.

There Lattimore's important role is indicated by his being given an assignment by the Politburo.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was the assignment in general?

Mr. BUDENZ. The assignment was to be responsible for seeing that there was produced in the American publication market articles and books which would carry forward this point of view.

Mr. MORRIS. Did his role in Pacific Affairs come up at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; at that time it was stressed by Earl Browder specifically as leader of the party, that Lattimore was performing a very great service for the party in Pacific Affairs by more and more bringing in Communist authors.

Browder said: "We appreciate that every writer for Pacific Affairs can't be a Communist," that, however, the number must be increased and that Lattimore had shown a willingness and readiness to do so.

Mr. MORRIS. Subsequent to that time, did you follow the publication Pacific Affairs?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes; although, of course, today that is not all fresh in my memory.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that all of the people writing for Pacific Affairs were Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; it is not. I said that Mr. Browder stated that it was not understood that everyone who wrote for Pacific Affairs was a Communist; quite the contrary.

The very function of Pacific Affairs or the Institute of Pacific Relations was to have a non-Communist appearance and a non-Communist approach, but carrying the burden of the Communist viewpoint always.

Now, the fact is that some of the writers for Pacific Affairs undoubtedly were non-Communists. That was stated by Browder, and, I think I can say that from him in other discussions this was intended to be so.

As a matter of fact, it was even said that people of outstanding position would undoubtedly be attracted to the Institute of Pacific Relations as they had been in the past and that would be a gain to the Communists because their names would be used and very frequently they would not know anything about what was happening, they being busy people, so the emphasis on Lattimore was that he was getting more and more Communists, however, to give the proper weight to the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we will, at a subsequent time, during Mr. Budenz' testimony, put into the record the Communist writers who did contribute to Pacific Affairs, but at this time I would like to proceed with Mr. Budenz' narrating the episodes and indicating to him from his own experience that Lattimore was a Communist.

Mr. BUDENZ. 1943 was the report by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, as I say, my understanding being that he had just seen Lattimore and that Lattimore told him there was to be a change in regard to Chiang Kai-shek, that the negative criticism was to be changed to positive criticism. In other words, into an effort eventually to destroy Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of the Nationalist government in China. That, of course, was borne out by the fact that we immediately received verification of that, the only difficulty being that we interpreted it somewhat incorrectly, as it happens every once in a while.

This is not only a difficulty of the Communists here; it is a difficulty that Moscow has in getting over their viewpoints, where they have a double-talking viewpoint. We had that situation on a number of other occasions to which I could refer, but I think I better not or we go far afield, but that is not a new experience in the Communist policy.

The Politburo wishes really to smash those with whom they are coalescing, but that has to be the property or knowledge of the Communists, whereas the coalition has to be the property or knowledge of the non-Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony at that time that Mr. Field had received an official Communist communication from Lattimore?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us of any other episodes?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1944, the trip of Vice President Henry Wallace. I don't know whether I can emphasize the importance of this trip to the Communists as much as it should be. It received a very great attention from the Politburo and it was constantly brought to my attention by Jack Stachel as the representative of the Politburo as a very important mission which would redound to the benefit of the Communist cause in the Far East.

In that respect a great deal of dependence was placed on Owen Lattimore, whom I was told by Mr. Stachel at that time to consider a Communist—

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean, "consider a Communist"? Is that a technical word you are using?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was a technical term we used which meant he was an authority from the Communist viewpoint. He was a Marxist authority.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that warning given to you by anyone else at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, there were many other references of similar character. I remember specifically Stachel's because my relations with him were very close and he was constantly giving me these instructions.

I do know that similar statements were made within the Politburo itself by other members in connection with Wallace's trip.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the significance of that? Was that a note of warning to you by Stachel, or was it an admonition, or what?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, I should say an underscoring of Lattimore's position, that we should be on the alert for anything that Lattimore might say or do. That was really carrying out the Communist line.

If I may explain that for just a moment, there isn't just the line to carry out, but you must know at any particular moment how the line is to be emphasized. You might talk about united fronts, but you might be emphasizing one particular element in the united fronts, or something like that, or, in the case of Italy, where we were taken by surprise, you might attack Badoglio one day and find you should be with him the next day, according to Moscow's policy.

That was within all one line of procedure with regard to Italy, but Badoglio suddenly changed in that line.

Now, in order to be advised of such things as that, we were to rely on anything Lattimore might say or do that we would be aware of.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you also to handle the name of Lattimore in any particular way?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, with consideration; yes, sir. As a matter of fact, it has been handled with great consideration.

Mr. MORRIS. And you handled it with consideration?

Mr. BUDENZ. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Could Stachel possibly be giving you misinformation under those circumstances?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is utterly impossible. The Communist Party is an army and the whole strength of its invasion of the country, which is what it is doing, is being advised correctly through the whole organization insofar as it is necessary for a person to be advised of the facts in a situation, but when someone is designated as a Communist that is utterly impossible to be false, because if that were so then the whole thing would fall into chaos.

Senator O'CONNOR. Just before you leave that episode, the one in 1944, and with specific reference to the conversation with Stachel, do you place any significance on the fact that he told you to consider Lattimore as a Communist; that is to say, were those words used, "to consider him as"?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Now, you understand that some of these discussions and considerations had to be carried on under pressure. As a matter of fact many offices have arranged their walls so that you can't hear through them for various business reasons, but ours were arranged that way so that the staff of the Daily Worker couldn't hear what was being said by the leadership because many confidential and secret messages were brought there.

Now, the thing is that because of that fact, and the danger of interruption, and all that, we tried to reduce everything to what I used to call political shorthand, my own term, namely, to make everything as concise as possible, and the phrase "to consider a man as Communist" came to me that he was an authority as a Communist and that we should regard him as such.

That is a distinction from other phrases, like "treat him as a Communist," or things like that.

Mr. MORRIS. What does that mean?

Mr. BUDENZ. That he is part of the Communist conspiracy. These things had to be divided because of interruptions by staff members of conversations of this character.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that when a man had been referred to by the phrase "consider him as a Communist" that he was to be regarded as speaking with authority on matters of Communist ideology; that he was an interpreter of the line with the party back of him?

Mr. BUDENZ. That's correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And if a person was inclined in their own mind to differ with what such a man had said that he had better take notice that there was something wrong with their thinking because he was right?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

You must understand in the case of Mr. Lattimore this was only said at that time with regard to his functioning in the Wallace mission.

Mr. MORRIS. I did not understand whether you were trying to "treat" or "consider" Mr. Lattimore as a Communist.

Mr. BUDENZ. Consider him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. I thought you used the word "treat" in your testimony a while ago.

Mr. BUDENZ. I say that that was also a phrase used.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that in connection with the Wallace mission the word was passed by the use of the phrase "consider him as a Communist," that with respect to that mission Mr. Lattimore might not be setting the line; he was giving the line, and he was interpreting that mission in Communist terms?

Mr. BUDENZ. That's correct. He was a representative of the party in the Wallace mission.

Senator SMITH. He was sort of a VIP in the movement?

Mr. BUDENZ. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Would a man like that be allowed to make a statement, to voice a criticism of the Soviet Union, which would not be consistent with the official Communist Party line?

Mr. BUDENZ. In order to explain that, I think we have to understand the Communist position, the position of the Communist conspiracy.

Mr. MORRIS. As best you can answer the question, though, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. He would be granted an exemption if the burden of his work was such as to rebound to the line of the party in that field to which he was assigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any such exemptions that were granted to people?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain that?

Mr. BUDENZ. There was a noted Hollywood actor who was certainly a devoted Communist. As a matter of fact, he wept every time there was any thought that he might not be a Communist, although he couldn't publicly proclaim it. He was granted an exemption to contribute to the Finnish relief because it was said in the political bureau by V. J. Jerome that, "What are a few cents to Finland compared to the place he occupies in Hollywood for the party? There is no scandal in the party. No one knows he is a Communist."

An open Communist couldn't do that without being expelled, but a concealed Communist is permitted these exemptions.

In another case a college professor who has done very yeoman work for the party, particularly in Communist fronts—he always comes back to the Communist fronts, no matter what line is being pursued—was given an exemption to say a kind word about Trotsky. Of course, Trotsky was thoroughly dead at that time, but he was given permission to say a kind word about him in order to distinguish him from the Communists because the burden of his activities in Communist fronts, to which I say he constantly returned, was much greater from the party viewpoint from this casual reference to the fact that he wasn't known publicly as a Communist and there would be no scandal in the party. That is a phrase used.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us of any other episodes that indicated to you that Lattimore was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Incidentally, in this respect, I might bring this out in another way in order that it be understood and not cause confusion, and that is that just recently when a number of Communists who were heads of trade-unions signed affidavits that they had all suddenly had a common inspiration to resign from the Communist Party, the Daily Worker ran an explanation that their function and the way they should act would be different from that of the rank and file. The rank-and-file Communist must continue because he is expected to assert openly that he is a Communist at all costs, but these leaders, because they have responsibilities to great masses, organizations, funds, and the like, may properly, while continuing their fraternal relation with the Communist Party, swear that they are not Communists.

In other words, right there is a note. I could bring in many other examples. I want to show that there is an open example there in the

pages of the Daily Worker that here is a leader of a trade-union who is a Communist. Ben Gold is an example, among others.

Suddenly one day he says he has resigned from the Communist Party and he can take the affidavit with the National Labor Relations Board. The Communists in the Daily Worker had to explain that because that did create some difficulty, and so they said that the rank-and-file Communist must continue to assert his open communism. He has no responsibility to large institutions, funds, and to the welfare of masses, but those who have responsibility, while maintaining their fraternal relations with the party, may repudiate the party openly in this way, so they went to the extent of repudiating the party in that case.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us the next episode, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The next episode is a brief one, but a rather important one, and that was during the Amerasia incident, which occurred very rapidly and it is not as sharp, even though later, in my memory as some others, but nevertheless in the Amerasia case in 1945 there were many hurried meetings in the Politburo and segments of the Politburo, and in that connection Lattimore's name was mentioned several times; that is, that he should be appealed to for help, and, finally, Jack Stachel did report that Lattimore had been of considerable assistance in the Amerasia case.

The nature of the assistance I could not say.

Senator O'CONNOR. Could you state, Mr. Budenz, by whom Lattimore's name was mentioned? You said it was mentioned by several.

Mr. BUDENZ. By Jack Stachel specifically mentioning that he had been of great assistance to the defendants in the Amerasia case.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you describe for us the role of Jack Stachel and your relationship to him at this time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Jack Stachel, who is among those who were convicted in the trial on Foley Square, has been for years the most important Communist in the United States for all-around activity. He was one of the small commission of five which was in constant touch with Moscow.

Mr. BUDENZ. He also was the one who brought the line very frequently to the political bureau from this contact with Moscow representatives. When I say "in touch with Moscow," that doesn't always mean with the Soviet Embassy or Consulate; it means through intermediaries.

He was the one who was in touch with Gerhart Eisler.

In other words, he was the most important cog in the Communist machine linking up the legal party, the open party in this country, with the illegal Stalinite representatives from abroad.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say that he monitored your work in the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. In addition to that he became a representative of the political bureau of the Daily Worker. That was a custom, though, for years, different personnel being involved on that.

When I first went with the Daily Worker, Alexander Bittelman of the party was the chief even though Hathaway was supposed to be editor-in-chief. He met every day with the editorial staff of the Daily Worker. He could meet because he knew the line that he had received from Communist International representatives.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Jack Stachel your superior?

Mr. BUDENZ. Just a moment. Even Bittelman was succeeded by others like William Z. Foster and others and Stachel for a long time during a large part of my being managing editor was a representative of the Politburo. He therefore was my direct and immediate superior in the conspiracy.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there another episode involving Owen Lattimore that you can testify about, Mr. Budenz, connected with his Japanese activities?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. That leads us, of course, into another field and I wasn't thinking along that line at the moment.

As the war against Japan approached the climax the Communist conspiracy proceeded to emphasize the necessity of a hard peace in Japan. They had in mind a Morgenthau plan for Japan and anyone who was against that, who would treat the Japanese people in any reasonable terms, was denounced as a Fascist and an agent of the Zaibatsu. That is a Japanese term, as I understand it, meaning the industrialists of Japan.

That was the Communist position which you could find very extremely emphasized in the Daily Worker and other Communist publications of that period.

They wanted to have a hard peace for Japan, just as they emphasized the necessity of a hard peace for Germany. This was clearly told us in order to alienate these countries from the United States.

In this connection a very valuable Lattimorian contribution was made. Just in the middle of the Communist campaign Lattimore gave an interview to the United Press attacking the Zaibatsu and declaring that the democratic element should be brought forward. That's what the Communists were saying, the democratic element from the Communist viewpoint being themselves.

Now, this statement by Mr. Lattimore in that period was considered so important that extra copies of the Daily Worker were published and distributed throughout the country and the party was advised in a private directive—they get out many of these private directives—well, they advocated that Guenther Stein's books be published in that manner and Harrison Forman's books, and the like.

In one of these directives they emphasized that Lattimore's interviews, just as it appeared in the Daily Worker, should be given the widest distribution in trade-unions, youth groups, and the like; in communities, in other words.

Senator SMITH. What year was that?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1945.

Mr. SOUTHWINE. Doesn't Zaibatsu mean a little more than industrialist? Doesn't it mean the larger merchants? Does it not carry a connotation of blood-sucking oppression?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. It was the use by the Communists of an attack upon a group who perhaps needed criticism, but the Communists used that to identify themselves with all of the anti-Zaibatsu elements and to make themselves the sole democratic group.

In the midst of this campaign Mr. Lattimore's statement served Communist purposes well. I cannot say that that was the arrangement of the Communist Party in this instance—I don't know that—but I know that we were instructed to use it because it was so effective.

Mr. SOUTHWINE. You think it might have been rather timely?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was certainly considered timely by the Communists. It was right in line with their campaign.

Mr. MORRIS. You mentioned Guenther Stein and Harry Forman as having books published by the Communist Party. Were they both Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your official position with the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have here numerous exhibits bearing on the testimony of Mr. Budenz on Communist Party policy on Japan, as well as the UP release at that time, the interview at that time which Mr. Lattimore gave. I prefer to introduce those into the record immediately after lunch. The witness seems to be tired, and I suggest that we adjourn until 2 o'clock.

Senator SMITH. I have one question I would like to ask you if you can tell us now.

I thought I heard you say that the purpose of the movement for a coalition government in China was to destroy somebody or some movement.

Mr. BUDENZ. Destroy Chiang Kai-shek and establish Communist China.

As a matter of fact, Senator, if time will permit later, I can refer you to statements by the Chinese leaders to that effect right at the moment they were advocating a coalition government.

Senator SMITH. Was that before, after, or about the time that Lattimore became the confidential adviser of Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was after.

Senator SMITH. Do you regard Lattimore's connection or appointment as a confidential adviser to Chiang Kai-shek a part of that plan to have a coalition government to destroy Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. BUDENZ. That I could not testify to. I have my opinion, but I cannot testify with absolute knowledge, of my own knowledge.

You see, during that period partly I was out in the Middle West, and after taking over the duties of the Daily Worker, and I couldn't say that of my own knowledge.

Senator SMITH. You did know that Lattimore turned up as an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. And I know that the Communist political bureau was not ill-served by that function. That he was deliberately put there for that purpose, I cannot say.

Senator SMITH. You do not know who put him there, or how that came about?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir.

Senator O'CONNOR. If there are no further questions the committee will take a recess until 2:30.

(Thereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:30 p. m. upon the expiration of the recess.)

Senator O'CONNOR. The hearing will please be in order.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.—
Resumed

Senator O'CONNOR. Mr. Budenz, just before the noon recess there were certain matters referred to concerning Owen Lattimore about which I should like to ask you a few questions. You had recounted the several episodes starting in 1937 and then up to 1943 and 1944, which, in your opinion, referred to Owen Lattimore's activities. I would like to ask you whether throughout that period you met Owen Lattimore.

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; I did not meet Mr. Lattimore at any time until at the hearing in Washington.

Senator O'CONNOR. My next question is whether it is significant, and inasmuch as you say you were yourself active in the affairs of the Communist Party and you attribute to Mr. Lattimore certain interests in furtherance of Communist purposes, whether it is significant that you did not meet him or know him.

Mr. BUDENZ. It is significant. It is significant in the sense that many men of Mr. Lattimore's functioning were directed—I don't know that he was directed—but many men of Mr. Lattimore's functioning were directed specifically to avoid all contacts with official Communist organs that would commit them in any way in the public eye. As a matter of fact, there is quite a difference of responsibility among members of the Communist Party, Mr. Chairman.

I don't know whether you want me to pursue that or not.

Senator O'CONNOR. I think it would be of very great interest to have you do so at this time.

Mr. BUDENZ. We have what I call the Communist spectrum. The spectrum of Communist allegiance; that is a term I used while I was still a Communist and to some extent was adopted by other people who discussed this in the Politburo. That is to say, we will take the spy.

Anyone engaged in espionage like Judith Coplon, and there are a number of those people trained for espionage alone, must not give any indication of any association with Communists. As a matter of fact, they are not even permitted to approach Communist branch meetings; they are ordered not to do so. They cannot have any contact with known Communists.

That of course is quite obvious why that would be. The infiltrator of government is somewhat in a similar position and is not supposed to have any vestige of Communist membership on him and to avoid any public relationship with Communists. Beyond that he is also permitted of course within limitations to make such statements critical of the Communist Party as will assure his non-Communist standing so that he may put the burden—I use that word "burden" of his activity in the Communist cause because that was the way it was used—the weight of his activities in the Communist cause.

Then there is the infiltrator of other organizations. They likewise have the same responsibilities, though they are not so much protected as anyone in the Government. I mean protected by the Communist Party. They likewise can misrepresent.

You take, for example, during the one month that I was supposedly a non-Communist, though a Communist, in August 1935, I was specifically directed by Stachel again to criticize the party to non-Communists but to do it lightly and to put the burden of my arguments in

favor of cooperation with the Communists, although I was a fully admitted Communist Party member working as a non-Communist until they could decide what my function should be.

We have also the case of even Ben Gold, the open Communist, and this was worked out while I was still in the party, though it didn't come to fruition until the next CIO convention, who as an open Communist signed a report denouncing Communist infiltration in the CIO. That was in order to ameliorate the feelings of Philip Murray.

These special exemptions are granted by the district leader functioning as a non-Communist in infiltrating into other organizations in order that his infiltration may be effective.

Next in the category are the members of the Communist fronts who have still another set of responsibilities, to follow out the fronts, to respond when called upon, but who again deny they are Communists, and of course in denying it have to express occasionally why they are not Communists. You just can't say, "I am not a Communist," you have to explain why. They are permitted to do that, although 95 percent of the Communist fronts, according to my knowledge, are members of the Communist Party.

When I say members of the Communist Party I do not mean necessarily card-carrying Communists because most Communists do not carry cards but are subject to Communist allegiance.

Then there are the open party members, the expendables as they have been called, the rank-and-file Communists, the picket-line Communists who are supposed to be open, and they are not permitted to deviate from the line of the party because they represent the reputation of the party.

Likewise with the bureaucrat or functionary. The word "bureaucrat" is not used in the party. Although Lenin said our party is bureaucratic, they don't like to use that. They are functionaries. They, of course, have a deep responsibility and they cannot deviate from the party at all. Anyone who is a section organizer or district organizer of the party or the like in his person is the party because the leadership principle is very strong.

Among the bureaucrats, though, there are variations again. There are those illegal agents sent in here by Stalin who direct the party, who are largely underground; there are the open party representatives like William Z. Foster, today, and Browder when I was there, and the like; and then there are, of course, certain functionaries who for one reason or another, from time to time, become concealed.

Now each one of these, at the time that they perform these different functions, have different responsibilities in regard to how much they will assert their Communist integrity. The great question that was always put in the Politburo and at State committee meetings, and I have attended a number of State committee meetings where this question came up for lesser people in the party, those people who were concerned, the question always was how far they could go in order that they could carry on their deceit of others, what scandal it will create in the party.

According to the answer to that question were they granted a certain immunity from being quite regular from the party line or party regulations.

Senator O'Connor. Mr. Budenz, therefore did you consider it exceptional or extraordinary or unusual that Owen Lattimore was not known to you or seen by you during this period?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; that could be said of a number of other people, some of whom later on were divulged to be Communists. That would be true of Dr. Norman Bethune, a noted Canadian surgeon who also was very active in the Communist Party in the United States and for various reasons was not known to me. I never saw him. He was supposed always to be a non-Communist. He asserted strenuously, he was not a Communist, but after he died in China, helping the Chinese Reds, Earl Browder announced at a public meeting that the wish of Bethune when he went to China was that he be publicly acknowledged to be a member of the Communist Party for many years.

Now Dr. Bethune was not known to me. I just mention him because his case was rather outstanding.

Senator O'Connor. All right, Mr. Morris, will you proceed then?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we had gotten as far as Mr. Budenz' testimony on a certain press interview given by Mr. Owen Lattimore. I would like to introduce that into the record at this time.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify this photostat you have just given me?

Mr. MANDEL. I have had this photostat made of the Daily Worker of September 5, 1945, page 8, of an article by Gwen Morgan entitled, "Allies Must Break Japanese Monopolists' Grip," says Lattimore."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you recognize that article?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you editor of the Daily Worker when that was published?

Mr. BUDENZ. I was indeed; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that part of the Communist program to impose a hard peace on Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. You will find that this is accompanied in the Daily Worker by demands of a similar character though expressed sometimes in different language. Just at this time the campaign of the Communists was for a hard peace in Japan, and this hard peace was to be directed against the Zaibatsu.

That is in accordance with Communists calling other people Fascists or saying they are against monopoly and saying they are the only democratic elements. This campaign was to be carried on in that manner.

As a matter of fact, I believe we shall see an interesting development of this in the effort to destroy anyone connected with the Government who opposed a hard peace for Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean people in our State Department?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. That was the Communist program, but that would have to be developed further.

Mr. MORRIS. Now is there any particular thing in that article that you would like to comment further on, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think not. The article more or less speaks for itself and it accompanies the campaign of the Daily Worker, which upon investigation would have been found to be along the same line. The emphasis of both the Daily Worker and of Mr. Lattimore was that the democratic elements in Japan should be brought forward, but when you examine who the democratic elements in Japan were, Mr. Lattimore doesn't examine them except very superficially, and the

Daily Worker did, we will find them to be those represented by the Communists.

The importance of this article so far as I am concerned and so far as my knowledge is concerned is this: (1) That it was quite in line with the headline reading, "Allies must break Japanese monopolists' grip" which was what the Communists were driving for at that time; (2) that it was used so widely by the Communist Party to my own knowledge—that is, among non-Communist groups.

Mr. MORRIS, Mr. Chairman, this photostat of the Daily Worker article, the Daily Worker of Wednesday, September 5, 1945, page 8, with the headline reading, "Allies must break Japanese monopolists' grip," says Lattimore, "I would like to have this introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit."

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be admitted and will be given the next consecutive number.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 139" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 139

(From the Daily Worker, New York, September 5, 1945)

"ALLIES MUST BREAK JAPANESE MONOPOLISTS' GRIP" SAYS LATTIMORE

(By Gwen Morgan)

BALTIMORE, September 4 (UP).—Owen Lattimore, former adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, said today that the Allies must free Japan of the "Zaibatsu's" grip before democracy can develop there. He declared that the Zaibatsu—or industrialists—merged completely with the militarists in controlling Japan for aggression and that the primary control always was civilian.

"Together," he said, "they are like a small octopus with huge tentacles which holds everything in its power. Their tool and front was the Emperor, owner of vast shares and estates, and he still is—although now they are loudly disclaiming the militarists."

Lattimore said in an interview at Johns Hopkins University, where he is director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, that preserving the Emperor and the Zaibatsu means preserving the "entire machinery that made Japan an aggressive country."

The biggest misconception about Japan, he said, is that the interests of the industrialists, the militarists and the Emperor differ.

"The only difference is that the civilians or industrialists are the go-slow crowd about aggression," he said. "The militarists are the go-fast. The Emperor belongs to both of them."

The Emperor's holdings alone, he said, amount to thousands of shares in banking, railroad, sugar, utilities, paper, and shipping companies, as well as hundreds of thousands of acres of land.

Lattimore said breaking the stranglehold of the Zaibatsu would make possible the development of a "genuine spontaneous and thoroughly Japanese movement which would substitute for the Emperor a real republic."

He declared that if this were permitted, supported, and encouraged by American policy it would take the form of middle-of-the-road democracy, and there would be no "danger" of communism.

"The only danger of communism would arise if American policy were to choke off the development of democracy, leaving communism as the only alternative to reactionary Japanese forces supported by the victorious powers," he said.

Lattimore said a democratic potential does exist in Japan, composed of thousands of small, independent businessmen who were not brought completely under the Zaibatsu until the war period and now would like to regain their independence; laborers who have been shorn of rights and poorly paid, and peasants whose cooperatives have been subject to monopoly control and who have been dominated by landlords, the most powerful of whom are related to the Zaibatsu and military families.

MONOPOLISTS' PROGRAM

Lattimore said the Zaibatsu were better prepared for defeat than the United States for victory.

"They already have put their collaborationist team on the field to capitalize on the United States belief that the Emperor controls them while, in fact, they control him," he said.

He predicted this would be their line of action:

1. To stimulate disorder and conflict in China.
 2. To work up antagonism between Russia and the other Allies.
 3. To be awfully good boys with the Americans and carry out their wishes.
- If any uprisings occur in the name of democracy, the Japanese authorities would run to the Allies and report it as subversive activity.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with a publication called the United Nations World, whose editor is Louis Dolivet?

Senator O'CONNOR. I note that it is dated Baltimore, September 4. What is the year?

Mr. MORRIS. 1945.

Senator O'CONNOR. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the United Nations World, the editor of which in 1950 was Louis Dolivet?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know of Louis Dolivet?

Mr. BUDENZ. Louis Dolivet was officially stated to me by Earl Browder to be a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with an article appearing in the United Nations—

Mr. BUDENZ. May I explain how that arose?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. It may take your time.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all right.

Mr. BUDENZ. There was a predecessor to this paper which was independent, we didn't have the United Nations. It was Free World or something like that.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. As chairman of the publications commission of the party I organized for the penetration of the Free World and even had arranged for a secretary to be in Louis Dolivet's office, which was a very common method of Communist penetration to get information. I first consulted because this was partially an international matter, I consulted Mr. Browder. He told me not to do this, that Mr. Dolivet was with us, that he had technically resigned in order to come to the United States, but that he was a Communist in good standing so far as the party was concerned.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the same Louis Dolivet who became editor of United Nations World?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is the same man.

Mr. MORRIS. Now I have a copy of the United Nations World dated March 1950, the masthead of which shows that Louis Dolivet was the editor. On page 22 there is an article, Asia Reconquers Asia, by Owen Lattimore. I ask you if you have read that article, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you comment on it for us, please?

Mr. BUDENZ. This article carries out very skillfully the Asia for the Asiatics campaign of the Communists. Of course, this is after

my being in the party, but it carries forward exactly what the idea was.

Mr. MORRIS. You learned what the Communist policy was from your experience in the Communist movement?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. It begins with this statement:

It is clear that the change of power in China cannot properly be described as primarily a victory of Communist armies or of Communist ideas. The chief phenomenon has been the moral and political bankruptcy of the National Government of China, whose "ability" to collapse greatly exceeded the ability of the Communists to push it over.

Well, we could go forward, but there is another paragraph here that might be of some pertinence.

The shift of power which took place in spite of a formidable American intervention and in the absence of any ponderable Russian intervention means that China for the first time for a hundred years is beyond the control of the most powerful of the western nations. There are a number of reasons for believing that the power of control by intervention which has fallen from the hands of the west has not passed into the hands of Soviet Russia. It may well be that Russia also will not be able to "move in on" China and take over control within China.

Well, Mr. Lattimore must certainly have been advised when he wrote that article of the many official declarations of the Chinese Communists not only of adherence to Stalin but of adoration of him. I have scores of such statements in my own library. To state that there was no Russian intervention in China and to picture the whole thing as just a revolt against the west is typically in line with the Communist position to those who were not Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us the date of that article, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The date is March 1950.

Senator O'CONNOR. Will the hearing please be in order? Mr. Morris, will you kindly resume?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Maxwell S. Stewart a Communist to your knowledge?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Maxwell S. Stewart under circumstances that would conclusively show to you that he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe those circumstances to the committee, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was in the early forties. The exact year I cannot remember as yet. The incident I remember very definitely.

There was a confidential matter connected with the party that I had to consult Mr. Stewart about. I had an appointment at the Nation with him. I went to Mr. Browder to consult with him, as the leader of the party, as to whether I could talk to Maxwell S. Stewart, and in what capacity.

Mr. Browder said, "You may speak to him as a Communist." So in the resultant conference, I disclosed to Mr. Stewart that I knew that he was under the same allegiance that I was.

Mr. MORRIS. You did meet with Mr. Stewart?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes, in the office of the Nation.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Stewart's position in the Nation at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. He was one of the editors, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any other reason to believe that Maxwell S. Stewart was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Many reasons.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you describe them, please, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Maxwell S. Stewart has been one of the most active members of the Communist fronts that exist in the United States. I cannot keep track of all of these Communist fronts.

In connection with these Communist fronts, over and over again Maxwell Stewart was discussed by the leaders of the party with me as either an initiator or sponsor or one who could be relied upon to see that others joined these Communist fronts.

In that connection, I learned repeatedly over the years from the early forties until I left the party in 1945, that Maxwell Stewart continued to be one of the reliables of the party—a phrase which was used in his regard by Mr. Browder.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you put something officially into the record to show that Mr. Stewart was the editor of the IPR Popular Pamphlet series?

Mr. MANDEL. In the report entitled, "Windows on the Pacific, Biennial Report of American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations," 1944-46, page 11, we find this notation:

In Miriam Parley's absence, Maxwell S. Stewart, editor of the well-known Public Affairs Pamphlets, assumed the editorship of the IPR Popular Pamphlet series.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that excerpt read by Mr. Mandel to appear in the record and that exhibit be marked the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be admitted and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 140" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 140

[From Windows on the Pacific, Biennial Report of American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1944-46 (p. 11)]

MAXWELL S. STEWART

In Miriam Parley's absence, Maxwell S. Stewart, editor of the well-known Public Affairs Pamphlets, assumed the editorship of the IPR Popular Pamphlet series.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you take a sample pamphlet completely written by Mr. Stewart and call it to the attention of the committee, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a pamphlet entitled, "Wartime China."

Mr. MORRIS. Will you listen to what is read here, Mr. Budenz? We may ask for a characterization.

Mr. MANDEL. (reading):

By Maxwell S. Stewart. IPR Pamphlets No. 10. American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations. Published in 1944.

I read from an excerpt on page 45.

As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other

countries and you can also find resemblances to the "grass-roots" Populist movements that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective opposition party in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many progressive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists as "agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that whole excerpt appear in our record and that pamphlet be introduced by reference as part of the record.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be so introduced and marked.

(The pamphlet referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 141" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, have you any comment to make on that excerpt from Mr. Stewart's article?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This appeared while I was very active in the Communist Party. This is good illustration of the carrying out of the North Dakota Non-Partisan League formula.

This describes the Chinese Communists as the Populists. That is similar to the American Populist. It is a complete deceit on the American people because, at the same time, if I may be privileged to say so, Mr. Stewart and the Institute of Pacific Relations had at their disposal official statements by the Chinese Communists, such as they made in the opening of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International in 1935, that they were pledged to Soviet power throughout the world and to mounting the barricades in that pursuit.

In other words, the Chinese Communists by their official declarations had thoroughly established in the Communist world their own character as adherents of Moscow and completely devoted to Marxism Leninism.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, that was a pamphlet written by Mr. Stewart. Do you have an example of one edited by Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. MANDEL. We have a pamphlet entitled "Land of the Soviets," by Marguerite Ann Stewart, edited by Maxwell S. Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Marguerite Ann Stewart the wife of Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. This is published as a cooperative project between American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Webster Publishing Co., St. Louis, Dallas, and Los Angeles.

I have selected some excerpts from that pamphlet to give the tone of the pamphlet. I now read a few of these excerpts.

Because these Soviets were the organ which represented the people most widely at that time, they grew rapidly in influence and respect during the troubled months of 1917 until, on November 7, they became the government.

But while the Russians are quick to condemn those who display ambition for personal power, they have no praise too high for the person who devotes himself conscientiously to the common good. An additional motive peculiar to the Russian system is the pride of ownership of the Soviet workers. They have a voice in running the factories.

Mr. MORRIS. Just one more, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. In reference to the Soviet purges:

The Soviet answer to those who thus broke the peace was swift and severe. It regarded such acts as violations against Socialist property and punished them accordingly. The culprits were forcibly removed from their villages. In some cases they were imprisoned, but more frequently their property was confiscated and they were sent to another part of the country to begin life again; in a few instances they were shot.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budez, do you have any comments to make on that?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, if the Communist Party circulated that, it could not be better done as a Communist apologia. It is precisely what the Communists were saying. It is thoroughly a Communist point of view.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have such of the excerpts as extracted by Mr. Mandel from the pamphlet, *Land of the Soviets*, written by Marguerite Ann Stewart and edited by Maxwell S. Stewart introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be admitted and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 142" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 142

LAND OF THE SOVIETS

(By Marguerite Ann Stewart, edited by Maxwell S. Stewart, cover by LaVerne Rice)

(A cooperative project between American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations and Weiser Publishing Co., St. Louis, Dallas, Los Angeles)

* * * * *

Because these Soviets were the organ which represented the people most widely at that time, they grew rapidly in influence and respect during the troubled months of 1917 until, on November 7, they became the government (p. 3).

* * * * * As we know, under the capitalist system, property of all kinds may be owned by private individuals or commercial organizations, and all business is conducted primarily for the profit of the owner. * * * * * But, under a Socialist system, the factories and other types of business are socially owned, that is, they belong to the population as a whole and are operated by the government, not for the profit of any one person or group of individuals, but for the benefit of all the people. * * * * * And all industry—every single factory, office, bank, grocery, and department store, every theater, movie, bakery, and newspaper—is the property of the people as a whole and is operated by their government or by their organizations (p. 6).

* * * * * Ivan Petrovich Petrov might be considered a rather typical Russian city worker. Blonde, rosy-cheeked, and of medium height, he has a keen sense of humor; loves to dance, sing, and talk until late at night and to enjoy himself with his friends; admires things on a big scale and adores mechanical devices and machinery. * * * * * Ivan, a very responsible worker, was a member of the factory committee, elected by the workers to advise the director of the plant. Each day he and Anna took Sasha to the attractive nursery school maintained by the factory for the children of its employees (p. 17).

* * * * * Curious as it may seem to us, the person at the top of the social scale is the worker (p. 21).

* * * * * But while the Russians are quick to condemn those who display ambition for personal power, they have no praise too high for the person who devotes himself conscientiously to the common good. * * * * * An additional motive peculiar to the Russian system is the pride of ownership of the Soviet workers. They have a voice in running the factories. * * * * * (p. 26.)

Why did the Russians resort to revolution in 1917? Was such a complete overthrow necessary? And, why, after the revolution, did they set up a system so different from that of other governments? Why were they not satisfied with a republic, for example, like that of the United States? (p. 27.)

* * * * * On November 7 (October 25 by the old Russian calendar), the Red Guards were sent by the Soviets to surround the Winter Palace and all the Government buildings in the name of the Socialist revolution. All the provisional ministers were arrested except Kerensky, who had managed to escape. * * * * * Thus, at one stroke, the peasants obtained the right to more than 500 million additional acres which had heretofore belonged to the Crown, the nobility, and

the church. Industry likewise was taken over as the property of the people (p. 37).

Probably the greatest surprise of Hitler's life lay in the fact that the Russian peasants, particularly in the Ukraine, did not hail his approach in 1911 as a signal to revolt against the Soviet Government. * * * (P. 53.)

* * * The Soviet answer to those who thus broke the peace was swift and severe. It regarded such acts as violations against Socialist property and punished them accordingly. The culprits were forcibly removed from their villages. In some cases they were imprisoned, but more frequently their property was confiscated and they were sent to another part of the country to begin life again: in a few instances they were shot. * * * (P. 60).

* * * Communists are expected to be an example to others (p. 66).

* * * Each of these has its own village soviet, chosen at a village meeting not unlike our New England town meeting. * * * City soviets are also elected directly by the people (p. 68).

* * * The 1936 constitution also introduced into the Soviet Union many of the elements of democracy as we know them in this country. It introduced the secret ballot (p. 69).

Mr. BUDENZ. Incidentally, I did not say that rashly. These phrases can be found almost in the same order in official Communist documents.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know that Ben Kizer is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe how you know that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know this through official information given me by Jack Staebel, and also by the district leader of the party in Washington, Henry Huff.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, at that point, if you do not mind, I think, for the same reason that the chairman commented today, it might be well at this juncture to identify Ben Kizer.

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. I would be glad to do it. He is a rather well known and, as a matter of fact, distinguished lawyer in the State of Washington and has quite a wide circle of acquaintances.

He has been rather active on the Pacific coast advancing the Soviet idea of the Far East, that is, those Soviet ideas which could be put forth under a non-Communist cover.

Mr. Kizer has been mentioned to me—I cannot give you exactly the occasions, but on a number of occasions—and in reports to the national committee on one or two occasions was praised by the district leader of the Communist Party in Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the name, Mr. Budenz, of the leader of the Communist Party in Washington?

Mr. BUDENZ. Henry Huff.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have something to show that Mr. Kizer is presently on the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letterhead, a 1951 letterhead of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, showing Benjamin H. Kizer as a member of the board of trustees.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like this letterhead identified by Mr. Mandel introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be introduced and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 143" and is as follows:)

Gerard Swope, chairman
 Robert G. Sproul, vice chairman
 Heaton L. Wrenn, vice chairman
 Clifford B. Marshall, treasurer
 William L. Holland, executive vice
 chairman

Trustees:

Edward W. Allen
 Raymond B. Allen
 J. Ballard Atherton
 Joseph W. Ballantine
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 Arthur G. Coons
 George B. Crassey
 Walter F. Dillingham
 Brooks Emeny
 Rupert Emerson
 John K. Fairbank
 G. W. Fisher
 Richard E. Fuller
 Sidney D. Gamble
 Martha A. Gerbode

L. Carrington Goodrich
 John R. Hersey
 Joseph E. Johnson
 Benjamin H. Kizer
 Clayton Lane
 Owen Lattimore
 Herbert S. Little
 William W. Lockwood
 Charles F. Loomis
 James A. MacKay
 George C. Marshall
 Charles E. Martin
 Frank E. Midkiff
 J. Morden Murphy
 William Phillips
 James H. Shoemaker
 Gregg M. Sinclair
 Paul C. Smith
 J. Wallace Sterling
 Donald B. Straus
 George E. Taylor
 Donald G. Tewksbury
 W. W. Waymack
 Sumner Welles
 Brayton Wilbur
 Herbert J. Wood
 Louise L. Wright

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any information on the activities on the part of Mr. Kizer?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify them and read them into the record, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter addressed to Mr. Miller Freeman, from Charles W. Eliot, Director of the Executive Office of the President, National Resources Planning Board, Washington, D. C. It is dated May 1, 1943.

We have delayed replying to your letter of March 30 inquiring about Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer's, The Northern Pacific International Planning Project, as reproduced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, because this statement as mimeographed in a confidential edition by the institute was being cleared by the Office of Censorship in Washington and by the United States Army. Those two agencies have completed examination of the document and related maps and have given their approval to general publication of the material with some modification.

The confidential mimeographed edition was not reproduced by this agency and we assume that it was kept confidential, because it was realized by the institute that some of the statements might be objected to by military authorities and it was for this reason that the document was submitted to the censor and to the Army for clearance.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES W. ELIOT, Director.

This comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Then we have here a letter to Benjamin Kizer from Owen Lattimore, dated January 27, 1939, which is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I read parts of the letter.

I have just been reading with great appreciation an advance copy of your article to come out in Amerasia. This article will do a lot of good, I think. It is one of the best statesmanlike discussions of the whole subject that I have seen.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this Mr. Lattimore writing?

Mr. MANDEL. This is Mr. Lattimore writing.

Is it in time, however? Aren't we all of us too late? One of the most shocking things about the present atmosphere of crisis is that at the very time when the Gallup poll has tabulated the fact which most of us know already—that the majority of people in this country are in favor of Loyalist Spain and disgusted with the Spanish embargo—nothing has been done about it, and Barcelona has been allowed to fall.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment on that, Mr. Budenz, to the extent that you heard it read?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, except that it followed the Communist position at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have these two letters introduced into the record and marked as consecutive exhibits.

Senator O'CONNOR. The Chair has brought up the question because of our possible doubt as to the propriety of introducing a letter dated May 1 from one Charles W. Elliot to Mr. Miller Freeman.

Mr. MORRIS, would you indicate why you think it is relevant?

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of introducing that letter was to show that Benjamin H. Kizer's book, *The Northern Pacific International Planning Project*, was reproduced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and that it was being cleared by the Office of Censorship in Washington and by the United States Army. It is being introduced simply for those two facts, without any implication whatsoever with respect to the addressee or the sender.

Senator O'CONNOR. Yes. With regard to those two matters, it also is not indicated whether it was reproduced with or without the authorization—I do think if it is introduced for that limited purpose, without there being any inference upon the sender or the addressee, it would be permissible.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. When Senator McCarran had the chair, he issued a caveat at one time that these letters being introduced carry no implication broader than the mere fact of the letters themselves. There is no implication by the mere association of either the addressee or the people mentioned in the body, or the senders of the letters.

Senator SMITH. Was this found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel testified that it was extracted from the files.

Senator O'CONNOR. Senator Smith, I had no difficulty about it being applicable to the IPR. I did think it might have some unfortunate connotations in regard to the sender or the addressee. But with the stipulation that has been made—

Senator SMITH. The question occurred to me whether or not it was reproduced by or with the consent and the approval of any of these men. I do not know.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, on that point, the letter says it was reproduced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and that letter was in the files of the institute. It was for that purpose that we are showing Mr. Kizer's association with the institute.

Senator SMITH. That is the only purpose of it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONNOR. With that limited purpose, it will be admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 144 and 145" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 144

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD,
Washington, D. C., May 1, 1933.

MR. MILLER FREEMAN,
71 Columbia Street, Seattle, Wash.

DEAR MR. FREEMAN: We have delayed replying to your letter of March 30 inquiring about Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer's The Northern Pacific International Planning Project, as reproduced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, because this statement as mimeographed in a confidential edition by the institute was being cleared by the Office of Censorship in Washington and by the United States Army. Those two agencies have completed examination of the document and related maps and have given their approval to general publication of the material with some modification.

The confidential mimeographed edition was not reproduced by this agency and we assume that it was kept confidential, because it was realized by the institute that some of the statements might be objected to by military authorities and it was for this reason that the document was submitted to the censor and to the Army for clearance.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES W. ELLIOT, *Director.*

EXHIBIT No. 145

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., January 27, 1933.

MR. BENJAMIN H. KIZER,
Old National Bank Building,
Spokane, Wash.

DEAR MR. KIZER: I have just been reading with great appreciation an advance copy of your article to come out in *Amerasia*. This article will do a lot of good, I think. It is one of the most statesmanlike discussions of the whole subject that I have seen.

Is it in time, however? Aren't we all of us too late? One of the most shocking things about the present atmosphere of crisis is that at the very time when the Gallup poll has tabulated the fact which most of us knew already—that the majority of people in this country are in favor of Loyalist Spain and disgusted with the Spanish embargo—nothing has been done about it, and Barcelona has been allowed to fall. Is this purely inertia? Is it just a lag between the forming of the popular will and the expression of that will through political action by the Government? Not just that, I am afraid. The effect of the natural inertia or lag has been very much aggravated by the lobbying and string-pulling of those who "view with alarm" just that very thing—the expression of the popular will.

Are we going to be as far behind the run of the play in Asia as we have in Europe? Maybe we have a slight edge, because, as you have pointed out, the key to the whole situation is the fact that Japan is the angle of the Fascist triangle. The Japanese don't need to be defeated outright. If they are just properly stalled, it will nullify the gain in Europe made by Italy and Germany.

We have just met here your friends, the Hazellon Spencers, and are enjoying them very much. I had dinner there the other night with Archibald MacLeish. He has been giving a series of lectures here on modern poetry. Very brilliant and some penetrating analyses. I think he is dead right in saying that in our times, the atmosphere of our generation, the genuinely poetic mood is bound to be political.

With warm regards from both my wife and myself.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MANDEL. I have a list of positions held in the IPR by Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer, as taken from the official publication of the IPR, which I wish to place in the record.

The positions include vice chairman, American Council, IPR; member of the international secretariat, and other positions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record Mr. Mandel's compilation of the positions held by Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer in its entirety in the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. Mr. Budenz, there is no doubt that this is the individual to whom you refer? It gives his address as "Attorney, Spokane, Wash."

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be introduced.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 146" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 146

BENJAMIN H. KIZER

Benjamin H. Kizer (1933, 1936), member of the law firm of Graves, Kizer & Graves; Chairman, Region No. 9, National Resources Planning Board; associate member of the War Labor Board; vice chairman, American Council, IPR (p. 160).

Source: War and Peace in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the eighth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations on wartime and postwar cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East, Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 4-14, 1942; international secretariat, IPR; copyright, 1943.

Benjamin H. Kizer (1933, 1936, 1942), lawyer (Graves, Kizer & Graves), Spokane, Wash.; trustee, American IPR; associate public member, National War Labor Board, 1943-45; Director, China Office, UNRRA, 1945-46 (p. 120).

Source: Problems of Economic Reconstruction in the Far East, tenth conference of the IPR, Stratford-on-Avon, England, September 5-20, 1947; international secretariat, IPR; copyright, 1948.

B. H. Kizer, attorney, Spokane, Wash. (p. 456).

Source: Problems of the Pacific, 1933, economic conflict and control proceedings of the fifth conference of the IPR, Banff, Alberta, Canada, August 14-26, 1933; edited by Bruno Lasker and W. L. Holland, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill.; published June 1934.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter on the letterhead of Benjamin H. Kizer, dated August 23, 1937, and addressed to Frederick V. Field of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to read the letter. [Reading:]

Now that dramatic and bloody events in the Far East are so rapidly making history of the sort that we have come to regard as inevitable, no matter how evil the consequences, I have taken occasion to reread, in the quiet of Sunday afternoon, your article "The Far East and American Foreign Policy," reprinted from *The Annals*.

Even more than in my first reading, I am deeply impressed with the insight into those tangled relations that it discloses. It calls to my mind a characteristic sentence of Judge Holmes: "The final gift is, I think, insight." Your article has that "final gift" in its best form.

You take up the question of American foreign policy in the Far East where the rest of us who recently contributed in Amerasia left off and give us a relatively complete picture, not merely of that policy but of its probable consequences. It is the world's tragedy that, although such insight as yours exists, the world is incapable of making use of it while nations stumble along blindfolded by their want of insight, with consequences that play havoc with human happiness and human destiny.

More than ever your article makes me eager to hear you on the neutrality topic at Victoria next month.

Yours faithfully,

B. H. KIZER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, this letter was written on August 23, 1937. At that time did you know that Frederick V. Field was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I had not yet met him, but I knew from official statements that he was a member.

Mr. MORRIS. Your earlier testimony was that you attended a meeting with him in 1937.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. That was approximately in October.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. This was in October. Do you think it is possible that Mr. Field could have assumed such an important position in the Communist Party in the ensuing 2 months?

Mr. BUDENZ. No. He had come to my attention before as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. So, at the time Mr. Kizer wrote this letter praising Mr. Field's writing on the Far East, you know that Frederick V. Field was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. I had not met him, however, until approximately October, as far as I recall. I may have met him earlier.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be introduced and marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 147" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 147

SPokane, Wash., August 23, 1937.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

MY DEAR FRED: Now that dramatic and bloody events in the Far East are so rapidly making history of the sort that we have come to regard as inevitable, no matter how evil the consequences, I have taken occasion to re-read, in the quiet of Sunday afternoon, your article "The Far East and American Foreign Policy," reprinted from *The Annals*.

Even more than in my first reading, I am deeply impressed with the insight into those tangled relations that it discloses. It calls to my mind a characteristic sentence of Judge Holmes: "The final gift is, I think, insight." Your article has that "final gift" in its best form.

You take up the question of American foreign policy in the Far East where the rest of us who recently contributed to *Amerasia* left off and give us a relatively complete picture, not merely of that policy but of its probable consequences. It is the world's tragedy that, although such insight as yours exists, the world is incapable of making use of it while nations stumble along blindfolded by their want of insight, with consequences that play havoc with human happiness and human destiny.

More than ever your article makes me eager to hear you on the neutrality topic at Victoria next month.

Yours faithfully,

B. H. KIZER.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter on the letterhead of the National Resources Planning Board, field office, Portland, Oreg. It is dated December 1, 1942. It is addressed to Mr. W. W. Lockwood, and it is signed by George Sundborg, senior planning technician, region X.

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: We have just received from the Military Intelligence Service of the Army a request that it be furnished with four copies of your American Council Paper No. 2, which as I understand it is Mr. Kizer's paper

on the North Pacific planning project, prepared for presentation at Mont Tremblant. The copies are needed for distribution within the Army.

Can you take care of this request? The address is:

North American Group,
Military Intelligence Service,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Lt. J. S. Culbertson.
Sincerely yours,

GEORGE SUNDBORG,
Senior Planning Technician, Region X.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose for introducing this letter into the record is to show that Mr. Kizer's papers were being distributed and taken up by the Army Intelligence on December 1, 1941. With that limited purpose, I introduce this letter into the record and ask that it be marked the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. Are we to understand that it was found in the records of IPR?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel did so testify.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be then introduced at this time for that limited purpose.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 148" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 148

NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD,
FIELD OFFICE,
Portland, Oreg., December 1, 1942.

Mr. W. W. LOCKWOOD,
*Secretary, American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR Mr. LOCKWOOD: We have just received from the Military Intelligence Service of the Army a request that it be furnished with four copies of your American Council Paper No. 2, which as I understand it is Mr. Kizer's paper on the North Pacific planning project, prepared for presentation at Mont Tremblant. The copies are needed for distribution within the Army.

Can you take care of this request? The address is:

North American Group,
Military Intelligence Service,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Lt. J. S. Culbertson.
Sincerely yours,

GEORGE SUNDBORG,
Senior Planning Technician, Region X.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a footnote dated November 5, 1948, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

"C. L. from E. C. C." "C. L." may be Corliss Lamont, and "E. C. C." may be E. C. Carter.

The letter reads as follows:

I don't know whether you ever met Ben Kizer who for years has been one of our staunchest board members from anywhere in the country. He believes profoundly in the institute and has the broadest kind of international outlook. It will pay you to keep very closely in touch with him and whenever you do decide to go to the Northwest, you should spend at least a full day with him in Spokane and let him arrange for a visit at least to nearby Pullman. The above is occasioned by this letter which I wish you would return.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be so introduced.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 149" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 149

[Handwritten note:]

R. D. C.: Please note for me.

R. C. C.: Thanks, and double congratulations for footnote in both [unintelligible]—L.

NOVEMBER 5, 1948.

C. L. from E. C. C.

I don't know whether you ever met Ben Kizer who for years has been one of our staunchest board members from anywhere in the country. He believes profoundly in the institute and has the broadest kind of international outlook. It will pay you to keep very closely in touch with him and whenever you do decide to go to the Northwest you should spend at least a full day with him in Spokane and let him arrange for a visit at least to nearby Pullman. The above is occasioned by this letter which I wish you would return.

[Handwritten] R. D. C.: Has E. C. C. asked Mayer for his India letters? P. E. L. might find them a useful suggestion for FES articles.—K. R. C. P.

[Handwritten] I'd also like to see them.—W. L. H.

Mr. MORRIS. One reason for mentioning this is to show that Ben Kizer was for many years associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations as a board member. It is also introduced for the other comments contained therein.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated November 2, 1948. It is from Benjamin H. Kizer to Mr. Edward C. Carter. It was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

DEAR NEB: Responsive to your good letter of the 29th instant, I have concluded, for this year only, to add \$100 to my contribution, and make it \$150. This, in spite of the fact that the drains on me for this year are exceptionally heavy. I do this solely because I do want to support you as fully as I can in this year. I have a deep loyalty, admiration, and affection for you, and for the generous, self-abnegating way in which you have so richly spent your life in the cause of international relations, now of primary importance to us all.

I will send the remittance within a month. Just now, I am accumulating pennies for the final installment of income tax, which I want to have behind me before remitting.

With friendliest greetings, as always,

Yours faithfully,

BENJAMIN H. KIZER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 150" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 150

SPOKANE, November 2, 1948.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

DEAR NEB: Responsive to your good letter of the 29th instant, I have concluded, for this year only, to add \$100 to my contribution, and make it \$150. This, in spite of the fact that the drains on me for this year are exceptionally heavy. I do this solely because I do want to support you as fully as I can in this year. I have a deep loyalty, admiration, and affection for you, and for the generous, self-abnegating way in which you have so richly spent your life in the cause of international relations, now of primary importance to us all.

I will send the remittance within a month. Just now, I am accumulating pennies for the final installment of income tax, which I want to have behind me before remitting.

With friendliest greetings, as always,

Yours faithfully,

BENJAMIN H. KIZER.

P. S.—I have a letter from Arthur Mayer that indicates that he has returned from his trip to India. His office has sent out mimeographed letters to a circle of friends, covering his India experiences. Do ask him for a set of them. You will find them richly rewarding.

B. H. K.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a small note dated August 16, 1942, which is headed "W. W. L. from R. W. B."

We presume "W. W. L." to be William William Lockwood, and "R. W. B." to be Robert W. Barnett.

The letter reads as follows. This is also taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

W. W. L. from R. W. B.

Your letter of July 23 to Kizer is most interesting and very sound. I don't see Julian Arnold maneuvering public opinion and congressional pressure groups with the finesse required. He is essentially sentimental about China. Lattimore has pointed out what damage sentiment might do. Would it be desirable for Schwelienbach, now, to take the lead in initial soundings and have Arnold and Walsh et al. attach themselves to him? I would like to talk to you about this.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make an inquiry.

Senator O'CONNOR. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. For whom did you say the initials "R. W. B." stood?

Mr. MANDEL. Robert Warren Barnett. The initials "W. W. L." stood for William W. Lockwood.

Senator SMITH. What is the basis for your assumption?

Mr. MANDEL. We have numerous correspondence with those initials and those names.

Senator SMITH. The reason I ask this, Mr. Chairman, I do know this gentleman Barnett. I know he went to school in my State, our State university. About 40 or 45 years ago, I knew his father. I was interested when you called out his name.

Mr. MANDEL. He is the secretary of the Washington IPR and there is a great deal of correspondence from him with his name written out.

Senator SMITH. There is no question about his identity?

Mr. MANDEL. No.

Senator SMITH. If there was any question, I wanted to raise the propriety of introducing something that carried an assumption.

Mr. SOUTHWINE. The situation is this, Mr. Senator. These particular initials are found with great frequency in the files.

The gentleman concerning whom Mr. Mandel said the initials presumably referred to is the only person with those initials who we know is closely connected with the institute. He was connected, as Mr. Mandel testified.

Senator SMITH. I did not know.

Senator O'CONNOR. I might ask Mr. Mandel if he can give us assurance that as of this time, August 16, 1942, or at or about that time, those parties were so connected.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. This morning, was there not another name mentioned Robert Somebody? Who was that mentioned this morning?

Mr. MANDEL. Nobody else.

Senator SMITH. There was something said about a Robert Somebody this morning. I do not recall now. I just wanted to be sure.

Mr. MORRIS. May I make an observation, Mr. Chairman, on that?

Senator O'CONNOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I notice from my perusal of the files in the Institute of Pacific Relations, the people did not make any reference by initials only to staff members; that is, by their own staff members, and in their own offices. Robert Barnett is the only staff member or officer who does have those initials.

Senator SMITH. I did not know whether he was a member or not.

I was just trying to be guarded lest we might attach some implication to some initials here that is not warranted. What you say puts a different light on the subject.

Mr. MORRIS. I, myself, understand that Mr. Robert W. Barnett was the secretary of the Washington, D. C., chapter of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. That is something I had not heard of before.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced into the record.

Mr. MANDEL. The next exhibit is that of a photostat of a round-table proceedings of August 26, 1936; obviously connected with the Yosemite IPR Conference which occurred at that time.

This give the comments of the various participants. I want to read only the comments of Kizer, who is listed here as representing the United States:

We may begin with the illuminating point of Mr. Dafee that between 1922 and the present time the emergence of the powers Russia and China has made a fundamental alteration in the balance in the Pacific.

We have discovered that the United States and other powers are now more or less powerless so that the Washington Treaty is correspondingly out of date. There has been a tendency in the discussions to emphasize political questions at the expense of economic ones. The emergence of Russia as a Pacific power has been due to her emphasis on internal economic development and the same is true of China with her emphasis on the reconstruction policy. Nations emphasizing their internal economic policy are thereby making a contribution to the settlement of problems around the Pacific.

We should study the possibility of adjustments of strains by each nation trying to adjust its own internal problems so that it does not need to export goods or labor and so disturb other economies.

Senator O'CONNOR. Mr. Morris, before going into that, if we can go back for just a brief moment to the previous exhibit, which is a note from W. W. L. to R. W. B.

A reference is made to one Julean Arnold. Is there any further information that bears on that individual that might indicate or identify him?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce that excerpt from the Department of State?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the Register of the Department of State. It is dated April 1, 1950.

Julean Arnold, Jr., is listed here. I will just read his last position in the Department of State. "P-4, May 3, 1946, as a country specialist." This is his full biographical record.

Senator O'CONNOR. This register, I note, is as of April 1, 1950.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Reference to him is purely incidental. There is no implication in any way.

Senator O'CONNOR. I wanted to be certain that he was identified so that it would not reflect on anyone else.

All right. That will be introduced.

(The first document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 151" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 151

AUGUST 16, 1942.

W. W. L. from R. W. B.

Your letter of July 23 to Kizer is most interesting; and very sound. I don't see Julian Arnold maneuvering public opinion and congressional pressure groups with the finesse required. He is essentially sentimental about China. Latimore has pointed out what damage sentiment might do. Would it be desirable for Schwelienbach, now, to take the lead in initial soundings and have Arnold and Walsh et al attach themselves to him? I would like to talk to you about this.

Arnold, Julian, Jr.—b. Hankow, China, of Am. parents Oct. 8, 1914; Shanghai Am. Sch. grad.; Pomona Coll., B. A. 1938; Fletcher Sch. of Law and Diplomacy, A. M. 1938; cmd. agt., Bu. of For. and Dom. Com., 1939-41; U. S. Army 1941-46, lt. col.; app. country specialist, P-4, in the Dept. of State May 3, 1946; P-5 Feb. 9, 1947; GS-12 Oct. 30, 1949; married. (Register of the Department of State, April 1, 1950, p. 18.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that the last exhibit read by Mr. Mandel be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be so marked.

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 152" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 152

ROUND TABLE C. AUGUST 26, 1936

(Recorder, C. B. Fahs)

(Chairman (Motylev) opened discussion on the first three questions of subtopic A in the agenda.)

KIZER (United States). We may begin with the illuminating point of Mr. Dufoe that between 1922 and the present time the emergence of the powers Russia and China has made a fundamental alteration in the balance in the Pacific. We have discovered that the United States and other powers are now more or less powerless so that the Washington Treaty is correspondingly out of date. There has been a tendency in the discussions to emphasize political questions at the expense of economic ones. The emergence of Russia as a Pacific power has been due to her emphasis on internal economic development and the same is true of China with her emphasis on the reconstruction policy. Nations emphasizing their internal economic policy are thereby making a contribution to the settlement of problems around the Pacific. We should study the possibility of adjustments of strains by each nation trying to adjust its own internal problems so that it does not need to export goods or labor and so disturb other economies.

SCHILLINGLAW (United States). To what extent does Mr. Kizer imply isolation?

KIZER. Not in least. The policy of voluntary association will develop better when the nations adjust their internal stresses so that the question of cooperation with other nations is really a voluntary one.

MOTYLEV. We should pay attention to military as well as political questions. For example, the problem of navies and the denunciation of the Washington Treaty. Also changes in the economic strength of various nations and their political effects.

BELSHAW (New Zealand). It seems that the emphasis of question (3) is on maladjustment but behind that problem is the actual increase in economic power, e.g., of Japan and the U.S.S.R. Japan's increase in armaments is both motivated by and made possible by her increasing economic strength. On the other hand the preoccupation of the United States and Great Britain with domestic problems has made more difficult the maintenance of a positive interest in the Far East and so removed an obstacle to Japanese expansion. The question

involves the possibilities of agreement between the great powers as to what policy should be in the east. I have an idea that agreement between two parties is easier when they are approximately equal in strength. When there is a wide disparity in strength the possibility of agreement is less. In the east it is now virtually impossible for the United States or Great Britain to take effective action and therefore it is much more difficult to agree on policy. Changes in relative power are also influenced by the political situation in Europe. In Australia and New Zealand there is a growing feeling that we can no longer rely on defense by the British Navy. Therefore there is an emphasis on internal defense, e.g., by development of air force. The fear is not of occupation but of the changing balance. I should like to see a discussion of the increase in productive capacity and the resulting maladjustment.

TAKAHASHI (translated by Nagakura). The greatest factor in the change of economic conditions is that the principle of freedom of trade has been wiped out. This is the fundamental reason for various disputes of a political nature.

HAMANO. Re Takahashi's statement I should like to add that recent changes must be traced back to the World War which caused a great price rise and a reduction of exports from England. As a result far eastern countries became more or less self-sufficient. India which before the war imported three-fourths of its cotton piece goods now only imports one tenth or one fifth. This tendency was accentuated by the depression of 1929—also a result of the war—which decreased the price and market for the agricultural products of the east (and so reduced the exchange resources available for imports). We must consider the internal production changes in each country. Takahashi says free trade was forbidden but why? The cause is the self-sufficient tendency growing out of the high prices of the World War.

HOPPER. (United States). Question 1 implies a shift of power in the east, the decline of western states and the increase of the U. S. S. R. and Japan. Could we not list the changes meant in order to avoid confusion?

LATTIMORE (United States). If we are to discuss changes in the distribution of power we must get common idea of the nature of power. The present period may be considered the period of breakdown of Washington treaties. The treaties were surely the expression of a sigh of relief of the countries dominant after the war who thought they could establish a stable state of affairs in the Pacific. The great omission of the Washington treaties was the Soviet Union. No one foresaw the rapid rise of the Soviet Union and the vindication of its principles. I said sometime ago that the shift in balance of power in the Far East was from a maritime to a land basis. Soviet critics challenged me, prophesying that Japan would demand a larger rather than a smaller navy in connection with its land expansion. They were right and I wrong. It is not simply a geographical question of distribution of land and sea power. The rise of the Soviet Union has vindicated the efficiency in practice of an economic system quite different from that of the other powers. We must be very careful when speaking of nations and national policies. Motive powers are frequently interests not nations themselves. The question implies a change in the nature of power and a challenge to the western system of a new system challenging it in efficiency. The tendency of China in the past was to gravitate to the stronger power and to adopt capitalism. The rise of the U. S. S. R. not only changed the balance but raised the question of relative efficiency and China now shows a conflict of tendencies—half to the west, half to the U. S. S. R. This influence of the Soviet Union must not be confused with propaganda.

KIZER. Has not Lattimore too easily given up his point that the center of gravity was bound to shift from sea to land? Was not the denunciation of the Washington treaty by Japan part of its program to establish power on the continent?

LATTIMORE. I still think the theory is sound as far as it goes but it does not go far enough. Must also consider balance of efficiencies between social and economic systems.

MORYLEV. The discussion has brought us to the question of navies. What is the economic and political significance of the denunciation of the Wabs. [sic] naval treaty? What are the prospects of a naval race?

ROSE (Great Britain). Suggest invite Admiral Taylor who is a naval expert.

MORYLEV. All right but question not only a military one. Has economic and political significance as well.

VAN MOOR. The question especially concerns countries in the tropical sphere of the Pacific. As China, Japan, and the U. S. S. R. have developed economic stability they have developed a certain amount of self-sufficiency which has

decreased foreign trade. As Moylev has pointed out the 5-year plan was intended to supply the home market. Japan has also sought to develop markets and sources of material within her control. Nevertheless there have been increased Japanese exports to the Dutch East Indies. If this were not balanced by Dutch East Indies trade to the United States we would have the contradiction of Asiatic countries forcing exports to be limiting exports from the Dutch East Indies.

Another consideration is that if the United States should withdraw from the Pacific the Philippine Islands would enter this unhappy family of nations and conditions would be worse than now. The policy of self-sufficiency can be followed by countries of great area and economic resources but is difficult for small countries with limited resources. As long as economic nationalism predominates it tends to dislocate trade in the less favored countries.

Mervisey. Called on Admiral Taylor for a statement on the naval issue and on the influence of the development of air forces.

TAYLOR (Great Britain). Air power may have important effects in certain limited regions but not on the general question of sea power in the Pacific because of the great distances concerned. Aircraft are an important auxiliary to naval forces but their influence by themselves on sea power is slight. They cannot carry stores or troops in large quantities. If these are carried by ships they must be defended by ships except perhaps at the terminals.

In regard to sea power. In our estimate the settlement at Washington of naval ratios plus status quo agreements gave everyone a fair degree of security. It gave Japan a greater degree of security than the British Empire can ever possess.

HOPPER. Asked Taylor whether view should not be directed to broad Pacific area. Wasn't it shown in the Mediterranean that the air force dictated settlement? Could this not be applied to the China coast?

TAYLOR. I was in the Mediterranean and did not think air power a deciding factor. Of course there are certain areas where air power will have to very great effect but in the Pacific the distances are too great. Hongkong to Japan is 1,500 miles. It is possible but not a "military operation." It would be possible for purposes of frightfulness but that is ineffective policy.

HOPPER. The distances in the north are less. Vladivostok to Tokyo is only 700 miles.

TAYLOR. The distance is still very great.

SCHILLINGLAW. What will be the effect of denunciation of the treaties on policies and strengths in the next few years.

TAYLOR. General answer impossible. Depends on circumstances in Pacific and elsewhere. We all hope that although Japan has not signed she will not depart from the 1936 agreements to such an extent as to cause any other power to have to increase armaments beyond the present ratios and that there will be no need for change re agreement armaments status quo in the Pacific.

WRIGHT (Great Britain). Do the Japanese agree that the Washington treaties give Japan a greater measure of security.

TAMURA (Japan). The reason for denunciation was the desire on the Japanese Government to recover autonomy of national defense. The 5-5-3 ratio was accepted reluctantly by the Japanese people and led to many tragedies, such as the assassination of the Premier. We do not intend to have the same strength as Great Britain and the United States, but psychologically want equality of status. It is a question of national pride. Japan is satisfied with the release from the restrictions of the treaty and has no intention to increase naval power and engage in a naval race with United States or Great Britain.

WRIGHT. Does this mean that Japan would be opposed to a collective system or to all-around disarmament?

TAMURA. That is another question. For 15 years Japan was a loyal member of the League of Nations. Difficulty was that Japan's two great neighbors, the United States and U. S. S. R., were not members. For example, in the case of the North Manchuria Railway dispute of 1929 between the U. S. S. R. and China, when hostilities broke out, Japan cooperated with the United States in refusing to interfere along with other League powers. Another difficulty in collective agreements is that the rise of Russia has changed the conditions under which the so-called Nine-Power Treaty was signed. The U. S. S. R. is not a party. The treaty guarantees the integrity of China, but Outer Mongolia would seem not to be a territory of China.

China's territorial integrity has been violated by a nonsigner of the Nine-Power Treaty. A great power nonparty to the treaty has penetrated Outer

Mongolia and Outer Mongolia has been alienated from China. This is a serious problem to us, because we are direct neighbors. The United States and Great Britain are far off, interested only in trade and not concerned, but for Japan it becomes a question of self-defense.

MOTYLEV. Is the Nine-Power Treaty still recognized or not?

TAMURA. Of course.

DAVOR. The unofficial opinion in the United States seems to be that it has lapsed.

SCHILLINGLAW. The statements of Secretary Stimson and Hull indicate that it is still effective.

VAN MOOR. Would the accession of the U. S. S. R. to the Nine-Power Treaty change the view of Japan?

TAMURA. I cannot answer. Would the U. S. S. R. join the treaty?

MOTYLEV. That is a conditional question, and I need not answer. Can we turn to the question of the influence of reconstruction in China on the changing balance of power?

LEE (China). A full answer is impossible. Reconstruction in China exercises a stabilizing influence on peace in the Far East, provided that it does not induce aggression on part of other powers. Reconstruction efforts have centered on the development of unity—for example, through road building, a nation-wide radio network, and so forth—and this unity should be a stabilizing influence.

HAMANO. Recently American air companies have extended lines in the interior of China. Are these paying lines or not?

LEE. Are Japanese airlines paying? Most airlines are not. In any case the control of these lines is solely in Chinese hands.

HOPPER. The United States has taken no action in regard to the Nine-Power Treaty, but I believe it is the opinion of the State Department that the three Washington agreements fall together.

DAVOR. It is a nice question of international law.

MOTYLEV. The problem of the balance of power requires attention to tendencies of development. From this viewpoint, it is much more complicated. It is necessary to pay attention to the real economic strength and the strength of the social order, to the influence of real economic possibilities on future development, to possible American naval and air expansion, and to the significance to the Pacific of the European balance of power. We cannot hope to answer the whole question, because the round-table is more or less limited to questions of economics and access to raw materials. But clarification requires understanding not only of facts but also of tendencies.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment on that exhibit, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The date is important. Yes; I do. This follows exactly the line laid down by Eisler: that the Pacific Ocean was to become a Soviet lake.

It is well known through the Communist Party. It is in line with the agreement with the Communist Parties of China, the Philippines, the United States, and Japan—under the guidance of Moscow—to get American "imperialism" out of the Pacific, because they declared that America is powerless in the Pacific and should turn to its own internal development.

Mr. MORRIS. That is your interpretation of the article to the extent that you heard it?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. Insofar as you would express it in non-Communist expressions.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. Chairman, the next name we have on the list here is a person who is now dead. Again, as the chairman has counseled at the outset, we do not introduce this name to introduce evidence about that particular person.

Our interest is his associations in the past with people now living. It is for that purpose that we introduce the following evidence on Evans F. Carlson.

Mr. Budenz, do you know that he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. General Carlson was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet him, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I met him on one occasion in the middle forties.

Mr. MORRIS. Were his Communist activities extensive?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. He has been a Communist for a long time according to the official reports made in the Politbureau and to me. I met him at Fred Field's house. He was not a general then. I think at that time he was for the moment retired. But he returned to the Army again.

I saw him for only a moment because I had to go back to the Daily Worker. I met him along with Marian Bachrach.

Mr. MORRIS. Along with official party circumstances?

Mr. BUDENZ. It would have been a party meeting. Then, again, General Carlson was very widely discussed just before I left the party as the man who would lead the movement for a Red China in the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he—I am sorry.

Mr. BUDENZ. That developed later in the organization, I understand. This was being discussed very definitely. His consent had already been received according to statements in the Politbureau when I left the party.

Mr. MORRIS. What organization did that become?

Mr. BUDENZ. I just cannot recall its name. If you can recall it to my—

Mr. MORRIS. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were in the party, you heard that organization being formed?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And you heard that Evans Carlson was to be the head of that organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read from the—

Senator O'CONNOR. Can you amplify, or give us any further information as to its objective or purpose other than that which you have given in such a general way?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This organization was to be a new organization which would declare that the United States would completely withdraw any interest in China and should allow the Chinese Communists to develop their activities there.

Of course, it had many ramifications; but that was the general idea: Within the United States to drive for the United States' abandoning Nationalist China completely.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you know if you have a listing that that organization is listed as a subversive organization by the Attorney General?

Mr. MANDEL. It was cited as a subversive organization by the Attorney General—Attorney General Tom Clark on April 27, 1949. Senator FERGUSON. What did you say the name was?

Mr. MANDEL. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt that Carlson was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir. That was brought to my official attention on many occasions and over a number of years.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce or read the exhibits showing Evans Carlson's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I wish to introduce a list of books and articles officially published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations and written by Evans Fordyce Carlson.

Quoting from his book, if I may, an authorized biography of Evans F. Carlson, entitled "The Big Yankee." I read from page 257, a letter from Carlson to United States Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson in answer to the latter's question as to the nature of the Chinese Communists:

Their political doctrines are representative democracy; their economic doctrines are the cooperative theory, and only in their social application are they Communists, for they place a great deal of emphasis on social equality. * * * They want democracy in China, free speech, free press, and the rest.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, would you recognize that as Communist propaganda?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. I also would recognize the author of General Carlson's biography as a Communist—Michael Blankfort. He is well known to myself as a Communist. He had many consultations with me as such.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, were you going to read the list of books written by Evans Carlson and put out by the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. Author of *The Chinese Army*. Author of *Strategy of the Sino-Japanese War*, Far Eastern Survey, May 19, 1941, page 99. Author of *The Chinese Mongol Front in Suiyan*, Pacific Affairs, 1939, pages 279-284, and the writer of *Letters Regarding the Guerrilla War in China*, in Pacific Affairs, June 1939, pages 183-184.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that excerpt made by Mr. Mandel introduced into the record in its entirety and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be so introduced and marked by the reporter.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 153" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 153

EVANS FORDYCE CARLSON

Author of *The Chinese Army—Its Origin and Military Efficiency*, published by the international secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations; publications office, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, 1940.

Author of *Strategy of the Sino-Japanese War*, far-eastern survey, May 19, 1941, page 99.

Author of *The Chinese Mongol Front in Suiyan*, Pacific Affairs, 1939, pages 278-284.

Quoting from *The Big Yankee*, an authorized biography of Evans F. Carlson, written by Michael Blankfort (Little, Brown & Co., 1947), page 257, a letter from Carlson to United States Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson in answer to the latter's question as to the nature of the Chinese Communists: "Their political doctrines are representative democracy; their economic doctrines are the cooperative theory, and only in their social application are they Communists, for they place a great deal of emphasis on social equality. * * * They want democracy in China, free speech, free press, and the rest."

Writer of *Letters Regarding the Guerrilla War in China*, in Pacific Affairs, June 1939, pages 183-184.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any letters showing Carlson's activities within the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. We have here several letters from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

One is dated March 27, 1939, which is a letter addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, from Owen Lattimore. I will read the letter:

Thanks for sending me the copy of the letter from Carlson. If I had known about this before, I should have risked impertinence by writing to urge him not to resign. As an officer in the Marine Corps, known to have a favorable view of China's prospects in the war, and known to be restrained from giving full expression to his views by Navy Department policy, Carlson had quite a potent effect. As an officer who has resigned his commission in order to speak out, he will have a momentary sensational effect, but is in danger of soon being disparaged as more sentimental than realistic. I hope very much that he has the ability to earn his way by writing and speaking, but there is no evidence to go on. As I did not see him on his brief trip east, I have no recent impressions by which to gage his possible usefulness as a "Friend of China."

I expect I shall be hearing from him direct before long and if so I shall write you again.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that "Friend of China," in quotes, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'CONNOR. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I was just wondering why the words "Friend of China" were in quotes. Would that mean anything?

Mr. BUDENZ. Where?

Senator FERGUSON. Right at the bottom of the letter there.

Mr. BUDENZ. It in itself does not mean anything. No, I would not put any particular interpretation on it, except, of course, for one who had Mr. Lattimore's allegiance as a "Friend of China" and —

Mr. MORRIS. Was that the same allegiance that Evans Carlson had?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any other comments to make on that incident, Mr. Budenz? Did you hear about that within the Communist Party—the resignation of Carlson?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell what you recall about it?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, in reference to his resignation, I know it was partly due to the fact that he had such a strong feeling for the Chinese Communists, that he felt he could serve better by being outside the Army, where he could express his opinion.

He had come into contact with them, and had formed a very strong alliance with them, or, at least, a friendship with them, and wished to speak out on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that letter indicate to you that Mr. Lattimore thought it would be better for him as a "Friend of China" to remain in the services and act in the services rather than quit and go out?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, most decidedly. That was the way the advice was given to Carlson. I was not there. I was not present. That was the advice the party gave to General Carlson, and he used the first opportunity to take advantage of it when the war came along.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his rank; do you know?

Mr. BUDENZ. He was a colonel most of the time. My understanding is they made him a general. I do not know the exact specifications.

We referred to him as colonel Carlson, but he has been referred to in recent years as general.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the same man?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. It is the same man.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record this document and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be so introduced and admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 154" and filed for the record.)

EXHIBIT No. 154

BALTIMORE, Md., March 27, 1939.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations, New York City.

DEAR CARTER: Thanks for sending me the copy of the letter from Carlson. If I had known about this before, I should have risked impervience by writing to urge him not to resign. As an officer in the Marine Corps, known to have a favorable view of China's prospects in the war, and known to be restrained from giving full expression to his views by Navy Department policy, Carlson had quite a potent effect. As an officer who has resigned his commission in order to speak out he will have a momentary sensational effect, but is in danger of soon being disparaged as more sentimental than realistic. I hope very much that he has the ability to earn his way by writing and speaking, but there is no evidence to go on. As I did not see him on his brief trip east I have no recent impressions by which to gauge his possible usefulness as a "Friend of China."

I expect I shall be hearing from him direct before long and if so I shall write you again.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MANDEL. The next letter from the files of the institute is dated June 6, 1940. It is addressed to Mr. John H. Oakie. The sender is Mr. Frederick V. Field. I shall read the letter:

DEAR JACK: I wonder if you know that Maj. Evans Carlson is going to be in Berkeley for a few weeks in connection with the Mills summer institute, and that he will then proceed to China? You doubtless do have this information but I want to urge you to try and arrange a meeting at which Carlson can speak perhaps more frankly and openly than he could at Mills for he has direct contacts with our administration people from the top down and has a pretty good first-hand picture of the way things are moving. One interesting point, for instance, is that our whole naval strategy is in process of rapid transition which if it goes through will withdraw approximately half of the fleet from the Pacific for operations in Latin American waters. This, as you can obviously see, has broad implications with regard to the possibility of our taking any action—even short of military action—in the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know that on June 6, 1940, Frederick V. Field was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. He certainly was. He not only was a member of the Communist Party, but he was openly an enemy of President Roosevelt as the head of the Nation and of the United States Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment to make on that letter, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think it speaks for itself.

Senator SMITH. I would like to ask a question.

Senator O'CONNOR, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. I notice the word "Administration" is capitalized. Whom do you think they were referring to—the national administration or the administration of some other activity?

Mr. BUDENZ. No. He means the national administration.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into evidence and marked the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 155" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 155

NEW YORK CITY, June 6, 1940.

Mr. JOHN H. OAKIE,
San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR JACK: I wonder if you know that Maj. Evans Carlson is going to be in Berkeley for a few weeks in connection with the Mills Summer Institute, and that he will then proceed to China? You doubtless do have this information but I want to urge you to try and arrange a meeting at which Carlson can speak perhaps more frankly and openly than he could at Mills for he has direct contacts with our Administration people from the top down and has a pretty good first-hand picture of the way things are moving. One interesting point, for instance, is that our whole naval strategy is in process of rapid transition which if it goes through will withdraw approximately half of the fleet from the Pacific for operations in Latin-American waters. This, as you can obviously see, has broad implications with regard to the possibility of our taking any action—even short of military action—in the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know that I know who John H. Oakie is.

Mr. BUDENZ. I do not either.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not offhand.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, he was an officer of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. I know.

Mr. MORRIS. We are not going to introduce any evidence about it at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. It would seem from this letter, as I read it, then, that Field thought that Carlson had some information in relation to our Navy that could be given to Oakie and other men.

Mr. MORRIS. He was a Marine officer.

Senator FERGUSON. Carlson was?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. This Mills Summer Institute; what was that?

Mr. MANDEL. Mills College. It is a women's college on the west coast.

Next is a letter dated June 15, 1943, addressed to Lauchlin Currie, and it is from Edward C. Carter. It is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

DEAR CURRIE: Sweet, of UCR, has compiled the enclosed list of foreign personnel that might be of use in relief and rehabilitation positions in China. If there is anything of use to you in it will you make a copy for your files and return this copy to me in due course.

"Col. Evans Carlson, as you doubtless know, is back from the Pacific with new and characteristically valuable experiences behind him. He leaves tonight

for Washington and will be at the Army and Navy Club for the next 2 days in case you want to see him. I assume he will be seeing the President.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be admitted, and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 156" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 155

New York 22, N. Y., June 15, 1943.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE, Esq.,

*Executive Office of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR CURRIE: Sweet, of UCR, has compiled the enclosed list of foreign personnel that might be of use in relief and rehabilitation positions in China. If there is anything of use to you in it will you make a copy for your files and return this copy to me in due course.

Col. Evans Carlson, as you doubtless know, is back from the Pacific with new and characteristic valuable experience behind him. He leaves tonight for Washington and will be at the Army and Navy Club for the next 2 days in case you want to see him. I assume he will be seeing the President.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. That letter, Mr. Chairman, seems to imply that Mr. Carlson had access to the President.

Senator O'CONNOR. It is noted.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Lauchlin Currie, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. By official reports; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When he was in the White House?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Executive Administrator, or whatever his position was; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you know about him?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, we have an episode concerning Lauchlin Currie that we are going to develop tomorrow in better sequence.

I think it would be more appropriate to wait until tomorrow, if you do not mind.

Senator FERGUSON. I will withhold my question.

Mr. MORRIS. If that is satisfactory with you, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The reason I think it should be brought up—two reasons; one, Currie's connection with the institute, and Currie's present position.

As I understand it, while it could not be classified as officially with the United States Government, it is in connection with money that is loaned by the United States Government or financed by the United States Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, the episode that I relate to, and suggest that we take up at another time, involves many exhibits, and we are not quite ready for it.

Senator FERGUSON. I will withdraw it.

Mr. MORRIS. It should be interesting to find out.

Senator FERGUSON. I think he ought to be given an opportunity to come in here and explain some of these associations and things that happened here in the file.

MR. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated August 26, 1939. This is from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter. It is from Evans F. Carlson.

I will read excerpts from the letter.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of the 15th, in which you enclosed the comment from Colonel Faymonville. I agree with Colonel Faymonville that " * * * the politics, economics, and military power of the Soviet Union constitute an important background for any event which happens in Asia * * *." I did not consider that an extended discussion of the relations of the Soviet Union to China formed a part of the subject under discussion. If you consider it desirable I can prepare four or five hundred words on that angle.

The nature of the concessions which China has had to make to gain Russian assistance is debatable. It is certain that such assistance has been used to induce the generalissimo to make certain concessions regarding the mobilization of the people and the ethical indoctrination of the army. I know from my conversations with Russian military men that these two doctrines are regarded as important potential military weapons.

I plan to depart for New York on Monday, the 28th. My plan is to move toward China by way of Europe. I would like to go via the Soviet Union if I can negotiate the necessary credentials.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that letter in its entirety into the record and ask it be marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

SENATOR O'CONNOR. It will be admitted and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 157" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 157

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., August 26, 1939.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,

Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations,

New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of the 15th, in which you enclosed the comment from Colonel Faymonville.

I agree with Colonel Faymonville that " * * * the politics, economics, and military power of the Soviet Union constitute an important background for any event which happens in Asia * * *." I did not consider that an extended discussion of the relations of the Soviet Union to China formed a part of the subject under discussion. If you consider it desirable I can prepare four or five hundred words on that angle.

The Relation of Russia to the Sino-Japanese conflict can be argued from various points of view. If approached from the point of view of international politics, i. e., based on the self-interest of nations, it must be obvious that Russia's interest in China's independence is predominant. I have felt since this conflict began that Russia could not permit China to succumb to Japan. She has been providing assistance in an unofficial manner since September 1937. If China should reach the point where she could not carry on, even with the subrosa assistance, I believe that Russia would engage Japan openly and officially in order to assure China's independence.

The nature of the concessions which China has had to make to gain Russian assistance is debatable. It is certain that such assistance has been used to induce the generalissimo to make certain concessions regarding the mobilization of the people and the ethical indoctrination of the army. I know from my conversations with Russian military men that these two doctrines are regarded as important potential military weapons.

I plan to depart for New York on Monday, the 28th. My plan is to move toward China by way of Europe. I would like to go via the Soviet Union if I can negotiate the necessary credentials.

I hope to see you in New York. If possible, I would like to make the modifications in the manuscript which may be indicated.

With kind personal regards, I am,

Sincerely,

EVANS F. CARLSON.

Ian Pruitt is en route east.

Mr. MANDEL. Finally, there is a reference to exhibit No. 20. This is from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is dated August 30, 1939.

The note is marked "F. V. F. from E. C. C." Presumably "F. V. F." is Frederick Field, and "E. C. C." is Edward C. Carter. The note reads as follows:

You will be interested in this letter from Major Carlson. I will endeavor to furnish Carlson with the necessary Soviet credentials.

Senator SMITH. This is from whom?

Mr. MANDEL. From Carter to Field.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be introduced.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 158" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 158

F. V. F. from E. C. C.

AUGUST 30, 1939.

You will be interested in this letter from Major Carlson. I will endeavor to furnish Carlson with the necessary Soviet credentials.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose for introducing that correspondence and that testimony about Mr. Carlson was relevant to present associations with people now living.

Mr. BUDENZ, do you know Talitha Gerlach?

Mr. BUDENZ. She is an active Communist-front member, and engaged in educational activities. She has been known to me personally. She was at several committee meetings in the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt that she was, when you knew her, a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have no doubt at all. Not only from those occasions, but from repeated references to her in the State committee of New York and in many other official—

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Budenz, you spoke of her as an active Communist-front member. Does that characterization have a particular meaning in Communist parlance, or did you merely mean to generalize that she was a member of perhaps many and various Communist fronts?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, they do not use the expression "Communist fronts." They distinguish them between captive organizations and those which the Communists create. Those which the Communists create are Communist fronts. This woman has been a member of many Communist fronts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your characterization of her as an active Communist-front member was interesting. I believe it was the first time you referred to anyone that way. I was wondering specifically why she came to your mind that way, since you have almost in the same breath testified that she was an active Communist—that is, a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. BUDENZ. I was endeavoring to identify her to some extent. Her name appears on a number of Communist-front lists.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean she is a person more active than the usual Communist in connection with Communist-front matters?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. In other words, there were some Communists who were full-fledged Communists, you might say and who were also members of groups that were referred to as Communist-front organizations?

Mr. BUDENZ. As I have said, to my knowledge 95 percent of the members of the Communist-front organizations are actually Communists, and the other 10 percent are thrown in there to give that appearance or that uncertainty of connection with the Communist movement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me, Mr. Budenz. You have 105 percent. Will you settle for 90 and 10?

Mr. BUDENZ. I would say it was 5 and 95 percent.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have anything to show Miss Gerlach's relations with the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. I have two letters from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

One letter is addressed to Miss Gerlach and sent to Edward C. Carter.

DEAR MISS GERLACH: As you know, I recently heard that Miss Cholmeley would like an invitation from the IPR to come to the United States for a short-time appointment. I cabled her an invitation some time ago. Today I received from Kweilin the following cable:

"Temporarily delayed owing Stevens State Department requesting assistance here.

"ELSIE CHOLMELEY."

Doubtless, I will have in due season further particulars by mail, but I thought you would want to know that she is not likely to turn up in the near future.

I am glad that she has a temporary appointment with a State Department official, because that should simplify her problem of getting the necessary visas to come here when she wants.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The other is a letter dated February 6, 1943, and marked "Private and confidential."

DEAR MISS GERLACH: Interestingly enough Miss Cholmeley, who, as you know, is a 200 percent Indusco fan, is working for Mackenzie Stevens, of Maryland University, who was sent out by the State Department for 3 months to aid in reorganizing CIC. Unless Stevens is a miracle man, I doubt if Indusco has much to fear from Stevens, now that he is apparently in Miss Cholmeley's hands.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evidence for the simple reason of showing the influence on the part of Miss Cholmeley without any comment whatever with respect to Mr. Stevens.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify Miss Cholmeley for us, please?

Mr. MANDEL. Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley is the wife of Israel Epstein, whose record we have previously testified about.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, as I recall, Senator Ferguson the other day asked for the immigration record on Israel Epstein.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read that record, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D. C., dated July 20, 1951:

DEAR SENATOR McCABAN: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 28, 1951, concerning Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Epstein, also known as Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley.

Your communication under reference advised that it was your understanding that both these aliens were subjects of investigation by this Service, and requested that you be informed regarding the disposition of these cases. In response thereto, I wish to inform you that Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Epstein were under investigation by this Service to determine whether or not they were deportable from the United States. However, prior to the completion of investigations, both aliens departed from the United States.

The records of this Service disclose that Mary Epstein departed on the steamship *Liberte* on November 11, 1950, destined for Plymouth, England. Israel Epstein departed on the steamship *Batory* on March 3, 1951. It may be of interest to you to know that prior to his departure from the United States, Mr. Epstein executed a document for the Service wherein he abandoned his domicile in the United States.

Upon the departure of these two aliens from the United States, this Service issued lookout notices throughout the United States in order to prevent the possible reentry of these aliens into this country at some future time.

Sincerely yours,

B. JOHN HARBERTON, *Commissioner.*

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, does that answer your question?

Senator FERGUSON. That covers the matter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Israel Epstein was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew that he was a Communist by official information, and from J. Peters, that he was engaged in Communist underground activities of an espionage character.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know his wife?

Mr. BUDENZ. I just heard her name. I did not hear any reports—that is, that I can remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call your attention to a document we introduced into the record the other day. It is from Edward C. Carter to Miss Anne Ford, publicity director, Little, Brown & Co.

It is dated June 12, 1947, wherein Mr. Carter endorsed the book by Epstein, *The Unfinished Revolution in China*.

I would like to make reference to it again at this time.

Senator O'CONNOR. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record the correspondence on Miss Talitha Gerlach, as well as the letter from the Immigration and Naturalization Service on Israel Epstein and his wife, Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley.

Senator O'CONNOR. That will be admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 159 and 160," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 159

NEW YORK, N. Y., February 6, 1943.

Private and confidential.

MISS TALITHA GERLACH,
Foreign Division, FWCA,

New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS GERLACH: Interestingly enough Miss Cholmeley who, as you know, is a 200-percent Indusco fan, is working for Mackenzie Stevens of Maryland

University who was sent out by the State Department for 3 months to aid in reorganizing CIC. Unless Stevens is a miracle man, I doubt if Indusco has much to fear from Stevens now that he is apparently in Miss Cholmeley's hands.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

NEW YORK, N. Y., February 4, 1953.

Miss TALITHA GERLACH,
Foreign Division, YWCA,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS GERLACH: As you know, I recently heard that Miss Cholmeley would like an invitation from the IPRI to come to the United States for a short-time appointment. I cabled her an invitation some time ago. Today I received from Kwellin the following cable:

"Temporarily delayed owing Stevens, State Department, requesting assistance here.

"ELSIE CHOLMELEY."

Doubtless I will have in due season further particulars by mail, but I thought you would want to know that she is not likely to turn up in the near future.

I am glad that she has a temporary appointment with a State Department official, because that should simplify her problem of getting the necessary visas to come here when she wants.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 180

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Washington 25, D. C., July 26, 1951.

HON. PAT McCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 28, 1951, concerning Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Epstein, also known as Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley.

Your communication under reference advised that it was your understanding that both these aliens were subjects of investigation by this Service, and requested that you be informed regarding the disposition of these cases. In response thereto, I wish to inform you that Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Epstein were under investigation by this Service to determine whether or not they were deportable from the United States. However, prior to the completion of investigations, both aliens departed from the United States.

The records of this Service disclose that Mary Epstein departed on the Steamship *Liberte* on November 11, 1950, destined for Plymouth, England. Israel Epstein departed on the Steamship *Batory* on March 3, 1951. It may be of interest to you to know that prior to his departure from the United States, Mr. Epstein executed a document for the Service wherein he abandoned his domicile in the United States.

Upon the departure of these two aliens from the United States, this Service issued lookout notices throughout the United States in order to prevent the possible reentry of these aliens into this country at some future time.

Sincerely yours,

BENJ. G. HARRINGTON,
Acting Commissioner.

Senator O'CONNOR. It had been agreed that we would suspend at this time because of certain commitments. So at this time the committee will adjourn until tomorrow morning at 10 a. m.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., the hearing was adjourned until Thursday, August 23, 1951, at 10 a. m.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424 Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Connor, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Representative Kersten; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.—
Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz at the termination of yesterday's session was identifying people associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations who were Communists. I would like to interrupt that process today and ask Mr. Budenz to discuss at some length the extent to which the Communists were able to influence our foreign policy, and we will commence our hearing today with that aspect.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, during the time that you were editor of the Daily Worker and a member of the national committee of the Communist Party, did you Communists endeavor to influence the Far East policy of the United States?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; that was one of our main assignments from the international Communist organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you succeed in influencing the policy of the United States?

Mr. BUDENZ. Successes were reported on a number of occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, would you tell us how you were able to influence the foreign policy of the United States?

Mr. BUDENZ. Through personal contacts here in Washington which had been laid over a series of years, through organizations like the Institute of Pacific Relations, which Browder had designated as an umbrella for Communist operations in this respect, and through other channels.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you could give us some specific details.

Mr. BUDENZ. There is an incident in 1942 which stands out.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe what happened at that incident, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. In the fall of 1942—it was sometime ahead of October 2, and I will tell you why I recall that date later—but sometime ahead of October 2 Earl Browder called me to his office and asked me to look over a rough draft of an attack upon the State Department.

This was an attack upon the anti-Soviet clique in the State Department, more specifically. I looked it over and made a few changes, which were not supposed to be changes in content but in editing, and returned it to him. Thereupon very shortly thereafter he gave me this document for setting up, for printing, in the Sunday Worker.

He was to deliver this message at a meeting, if I recall correctly, of the Young Communist League on October 2, 1942. In that message or speech or document he attacked very sharply the reactionary clique in the State Department which was favoring Chiang Kai-shek and injuring the Chinese Communists.

I do not mean by that to give the inference that there was aid given in a military fashion; I don't mean by troops, but otherwise.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean Mr. Browder came to you with this article which had been prepared already, and the substance of the article was that it was an attack on the people in the State Department who favored Chiang Kai-shek and were against the Chinese Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was directed to those who were opposed to the Soviet policy in the Far East. He stated incidentally that this document had been worked out by arrangement with Lauchlin Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify on that a little bit, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I can only quote his precise words. He didn't say how an arrangement had been made. He said that this had been prepared by arrangement with Lauchlin Currie in order to smoke out the anti-Soviet elements in the State Department. The reason that he mentioned that was to emphasize to me the importance of the document, even asking me to read the material both before it went into the paper—that is, into type—and also after it was in type.

That is why he gave it to me sometime in advance.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you a photostatic copy of the Daily Worker of October 4, 1942, and I ask you if that is the article to which you have testified?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; that is the article.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this article for us, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Worker of October 4, 1942, pages 1 and 5, prepared at my direction.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say this is the article that you saw in advance of its being printed in the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that article had been worked out by Mr. Browder and, according to Mr. Browder, had been worked out in conjunction with Mr. Currie?

Mr. BUDENZ. That the article had been prepared through arrangements with Lauchlin Currie to smoke out the people who were opposed to Soviet policy in the Far East in the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us dwell on that for just a moment. You say the article had been arranged by Mr. Browder through arrangements with Lauchlin Currie; is that right?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is what he said.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what Mr. Browder told you?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. He was emphasizing its importance and that I should be careful to see that there were no words that would give a distortion to the article.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened after that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, later on I saw Mr. Browder either in connection with the publication of a further statement on this matter or shortly afterward, but it was a discussion of the statement which appeared after Mr. Browder made a trip to Washington to see Mr. Sumner Welles.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, sometime after that is it your testimony, Mr. Budenz, that Browder then did go down to the State Department?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he went down to the State Department with Robert Minor.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us what happened at that meeting?

The CHAIRMAN. He went down to the State Department with Robert Minor?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify Robert Minor?

Mr. BUDENZ. Robert Minor then, I think, was assistant secretary of the party. At least he was technically second in command to Browder. I say "technically" because Jack Stachel was an important person, and we have to always remember that.

Mr. MORRIS. Was this visit to the State Department connected with the original statement which you have already testified about?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. There was much discussion of this matter. I just can't recall all of the discussion, but at any rate it was definitely in connection with this first article.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, inasmuch as you have a number of articles before you, Mr. Morris, I suggest that the first one to which you have referred and which was identified by the witness here be identified and inserted in the record or otherwise identified.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record the photostatic copy of the article in the Daily Worker of October 4, 1942, which was authenticated by Mr. Mandel.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and so designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 161" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 161

(From the Worker, New York, October 4, 1942)

BROWDER ACCUSES STATE DEPARTMENT CLIQUE - IT HAMPERS OUR WAR IN PACIFIC, EUROPE

(By Earl Browder)

Almost 10 months after the United States is fully committed to the war against the Axis we are being told that "the United States is losing the war, period."

Loss of this war means destruction of our Nation and slavery for our people. Yet we are told that we are losing this war. That would seem to be a matter to get excited about, something to call for action.

We are losing this war before we have well begun to fight.

Would it not be more accurate to say that we are losing this war because we have not yet begun to fight?

What is the matter? Whence comes this seeming paralysis which keeps our tremendous military potential idle at the moment our fate and the fate of the world is being decided?

Roy Howard, Hearst, and the Patterson-McCormicks, the chief newspaper spokesmen for the modern Copperheads, give the double-barreled answer that the people are not behind this war and that the President is bungling it. But they are liars, any they spread the lies that please Hitler. The people are behind this war to the end; they are ready for every necessary sacrifice; they are impatient to go ahead. The President is doing the best he can with advisers who keep joggling his elbow and holding back his arm; he can only be criticized for hesitating to sweep these mischief makers out of his councils, and for failing to crack down on the defeatist newspapers.

Let us frankly face the facts, however, that the defeatist poison penetrates and tends to paralyze the war policies of our Government in Washington. We must learn how to locate the seats of this poison, in order to eliminate them.

Look first of all at the Pacific front. Our Armed Forces in the Pacific have already demonstrated that they have a fighting spirit fit for any task given them. But what about the policies which direct that fighting spirit? They are not yet serious fighting war policies.

I charge that powerful appeasement forces in the State Department in Washington are deliberately withholding 1,000,000 of the most effective soldiers in Asia, keeping them out of the fight against the Japanese, and thereby releasing that many Japanese soldiers for action against our boys in the South Pacific.

I charge that it is on the advice of reactionary officials in the State Department that Chiang Kai-shek is keeping his best armies out of the war. The army under General Hu Chung-han, with 440,000 troops, is engaged not in fighting the Japanese but in blockading the Chinese Eighth Route Army in the north and northwest, and hampering that army in its fight against the Japanese; the army under General Tang En-po, with 500,000 troops, is engaged not in fighting the Japanese but in blocking the Chinese New Fourth Army in central and eastern China, and hampering that army in its fight against the Japanese.

These two Chinese armies, the best equipped and trained in all China, totaling almost a million men, are being confined to blockading the Chinese Communist armies and territories, because the State Department in Washington has informed Chungking's representatives that our Government would be displeased if complete unity was established in China between the Kuomintang and the Communists. These officials confine the old policy of "war against the Communists" in China; they tell Chungking it must continue to fight the Communists if it wishes United States friendship, and they thereby accept responsibility for withdrawing a million Chinese troops from the war against Japan, and keep China back from full unity in this war.

What suicidal nonsense is this, by which persons who speak for our own Government keep the best Chinese fighters out of the war and create a gap which must be filled by a million American boys?

This is not a way to fight a war of survival, this is a sure way to continue to lose the war.

Our attitude toward Europe is equally ambiguous. Our State Department continues to do business with Mannerheim Finland, Franco Spain, and Vichy France, three puppet regimes of Hitler, to feast the representatives of these Nazi agencies in the highest Washington society, to send vital materials to them, and to appease them in every way while they conduct active war against the United Nations.

This two-faced attitude of the State Department toward Europe finds its highest expression in the campaign being waged through the defeatist press against the opening of the second front in Western Europe. Of course it is impossible to carry on a policy of appeasement of Mannerheim, Franco, and Laval, and at the same time energetically prepare the immediate second front in Europe. Find those figures in our Government who push through this appeasement policy, and there you will find the high opponents of the second front. They are the men who keep our men, guns, planes, and tanks in idleness while our fate is being decided at Stalingrad where men, women, and children hold off the full might of a Nazi-occupied Europe without counting the cost to themselves.

The only way to stop losing this war is to begin seriously to fight it. And to fight it we must overcome the influence of Munichism, of appeasement, of defeatism, in the United States itself. This Munich influence is not among the

people, and it does not proceed from our Commander in Chief; it is entrenched in some high officials of the State Department, some members of the Cabinet, in a disorganized Congress, dominated by a clique of Vanderbergs, Wheelers, Brookses, and Dieses, several powerful industrialists, and above all in the newspapers of Patterson-McCormick, Hearst, and Roy Howard, which poison the mind of the country with defeatism day after day. The people must be roused and organize in support of the President against this cabal of the Munichmen.

These days we are being shown the most astonishing depths of depravity to which the defeatist newspapers will descend in their fight against the second front. I wish to impose upon you for a few moments to turn the microscope upon an example of this moral and intellectual rotteness. I pick up Roy Howard's newspaper for September 29, where this defeatist speaks through his hired scribbler, William Philip Simms. At the moment of crisis of the battle of Stalingrad, the miserable voice finds it possible to whine that we "would appreciate a little more cooperation from the Russians." In that phrase we can see the spirit of a Laval or Doriot, the spirit that rotted out the heart of the French Republic and delivered that nation over to Hitlerite bondage.

"A little more cooperation from the Russians," cries Roy Howard through the pen of Mr. Simms. At such a sound, every decent American should vomit, in revulsion at the monstrous thought that this could be America's answer to Stalingrad. "A little more cooperation from the Russians," while certain gentlemen from high places in the United States and Britain carefully calculate the last and final buttons on the uniforms of our boys which will make it safe to throw them into the battle.

Nothing could be further from the spirit of America's youth, in and out of the Armed Forces, than the rotten defeatism, appeasement, and cowardice expressed in this slogan of Roy Howard.

The spirit of our boys in the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force, is expressed in opposite slogans:

"Let's give some fighting cooperation to our heroic Russian allies."

"When do we begin to fight?"

"Open up the second front in Europe now."

Let us not drop Roy Howard's man Simms, however, without looking deeper into the cesspool of his mind. What kind of cooperation does he want from the Russians that he is not getting in the most magnificent battle for freedom in all history? "Perhaps this may require explanation," remarks Mr. Simms. Indeed it does. And what is Mr. Simms's explanation? He explains that he wants the Russians to teach the Americans and British how to fight. "The one place really to learn war is in war," says Mr. Simms and "Moscow still refuses" to permit Americans to learn how to make war in that "one place." That, says Mr. Simms, is why we have no second front. Our officers and soldiers don't know how to fight and the Russians refuse to teach them. Therefore there is nothing to do but wait until Timoshenko gets time and leisure to open up a school for us.

I wonder what American Army officers think of this kind of arguments? I think I know. I think the vast majority will "give the works" to anybody who tells them they cannot open up a second front because they do not know how to fight. They have already learned the great lesson the Russians have taught the world, that the way to fight is to fight, to push aside all the hesitators and appeasers and if necessary to shoot them, to go to battle and put everything you have into it, to engage the enemy, to kill him, to get into the battle without delay, to fight, fight, and fight again until the Hitler Axis is crushed.

Yes, it is true, the one place really to learn war is in war. But who is holding us back from learning war by making war? It is the Roy Howards, the Hearsts, the Patterson-McCormicks, and their fellow appeasers and one-time friends of Hitler, who now join together in their obscene outcries against the second front. The second front is the practical school in which British and American soldiers will learn how to smash Hitlerism. We are all learning and will learn from the mighty achievements of the Red army and the Soviet people, but we will not allow the worthy idea of learning from them to be used for the purpose of delaying our joint action with them in a two-front war.

Young people of America have no part or parcel of the appeasement conspiracies. Defeatism is the property of old and corrupt reactionaries and their hired men. No young person could possibly live in their stifling atmosphere. Young people are particularly immune to the counsels of cowardice and capitulation. A thousand times they prefer to risk their lives in combat with Hitler's hordes than to risk the living death of a Vichyized America, the slavery of a

Hitlerite world. Our young people are demanding the chance to fight. They are the front lines of the movement for a second front now. They will not permit their future and the future of the world to be gambled away by the Munichmen of appeasement and defeatism. They want to know: When do we begin to fight?

The Young Communist League, dedicating tonight its service flag, has as high a percentage of its members in the Armed Forces as any group of Americans. And this is not the first time the Young Communists have given their best members to the armed struggle against the Axis. Not less than one-third of the Lincoln Battalion composed of Americans who gave their lives to stop the Axis in Spain in 1936 to 1938 were from the Young Communist League. This first American expeditionary force against the Axis, defending the Spanish Republic from the Hitler assassins, gave their lives in order to prevent the present war; if their warnings and their example had been heeded and followed, the Axis would have been broken before it could challenge the entire world. But their blood was not spilled in vain. They left an imperishable and glorious tradition, fully in the spirit of the Stalingrad of today. They helped to hold the Axis hordes outside the gates of Madrid for 32 months. They were fully representative of the youth of America today, a youth which is ready and eager to strike Hitler's gangs now in Western Europe, and guarantee that they will not have to stop them on American soil later on.

There is no room for any issue in our country today except the issue of how most quickly and effectively to crush the Hitlerite Axis. There is no room for partisanship or special interests. There must be national unity of all men and women regardless of race, creed, or class, who are ready to subordinate all else to victory. There must be international unity among all the United Nations, who, win or lose, stand or fall together. And at this moment all this is summed up in one issue, whether our country can meet the crisis of war with honor, whether we win through to freedom or go down into slavery, whether we have the quality of victors or whether we shall be shamefully defeated without even having fought—all this is summed up in the one issue of the immediate opening of the second front in Europe.

We ask our Commander in Chief: When are we going to fight?

(The above article is based on an address delivered by Earl Browder before a second front rally of the Young Communist League in New York on October 2.)

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the upshot of the meeting in Washington? Who attended the meeting in Washington, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Mr. Browder stated to me, and so he published in the Daily Worker if my memory is correct, that the meeting was attended by Mr. Browder, Mr. Minor, Lauchlin Currie, and Mr. Welles.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened at that meeting?

Mr. BUDENZ. At that meeting an agreement was reached which was embodied in this statement.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "this statement," will you identify that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. This is the statement printed in the Daily Worker of October 16, 1942, headed, "Welles states United States policy on China. After interview with Under Secretary of State, Browder retracts charges against State Department officials." That is the article.

The CHAIRMAN. That has not been identified?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you should lay the foundation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate this?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Daily Worker of October 16, 1942, pages 1 and 2, the photostat being prepared under my direction.

The CHAIRMAN. It ought to be identified by a number so that we can go along and keep these separate.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced as the second exhibit introduced this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be identified by the proper number and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 162" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 162

(From the Daily Worker, New York, October 16, 1942)

WELLES STATES UNITED STATES POLICY ON CHINA—AFTER INTERVIEW WITH UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, BROWDER RETRACTS CHARGES AGAINST STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS

Earl Browder, general secretary of the Communist Party, at his office at 35 East Twelfth Street, New York City, made the following statement to the press yesterday:

"In the Worker of October 4, I made charges that persons whom I designated as 'reactionary officials in the State Department' were encouraging the maintenance of a situation in China harmful to the war effort of our country and its allies. I spoke of strained relations between Kuomintang and Communists, resulting in the immobilization of large numbers of the best troops of that country.

"Upon the invitation of Mr. Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State, I visited him in his office on October 12, in company with Mr. Robert Minor, and heard from him, and from Mr. Lanehlin Currie, administrative assistant to the President, a detailed refutation of my charges in this respect. The information received from Mr. Welles and Mr. Currie convinced me that my charges had been made on the basis of incomplete information. I believe it is established that no responsible official of the State Department is contributing to disunity in China, and that the policy of the United States Government is being exerted in the opposite direction.

"I am therefore more than happy to retract those charges without reservation. What I had thought of as a heavy door that needed pushing open proved to be but a curtain of lack of information. Since many persons in the United States and in China also are without that information which I lacked before visiting Mr. Welles, I believe our war effort will be benefited if I make public that portion of Mr. Welles' remarks which was given to me in written form."

Mr. Welles' memorandum follows:

"With regard to the specific charge that it is on the advice of reactionary officials in the State Department that Chiang Kai-shek is keeping his best armies out of the war, the simple fact is that the nearest approach to 'advice' given by any officials in the Department of State in this context has been an expression of an opinion that civil strife in China, at all times unfortunate, would be especially unfortunate at a time when China is engaged in a desperate struggle of self-defense against an armed invader. The implication of the expression of opinion was that the Chinese Government should try to maintain peace by processes of conciliation between and among all groups and factions in China. And, the course which Chiang Kai-shek has been pursuing is not 'keeping his best armies out of the war.' Both the armies of the National Government and the 'Communist' armies are fighting the Japanese. No Chinese armies are actively engaged in large-scale offensive operations against the Japanese. For the reason, principally, that there is lacking to all Chinese armies types and amounts of equipment which are essential to such operations; but this situation is one which both the Chinese Government and the American Government are endeavoring to remedy as equipment becomes available.

"With regard to the specific charge that the State Department in Washington has informed Chungking's representatives that our Government would be displeased if complete unity was established in China between the Kuomintang and the Communists, what this statement alleges is the exact opposite of the fact. The State Department in Washington has at all times taken the position, both in diplomatic contexts and publicly, that the United States favors 'complete unity' among the Chinese people and all groups or organizations thereof.

"With regard to the specific charge that 'these officials continue the old policy of "war against the Communists" in China, this Government has had no such policy, either 'old' or new. This Government has in fact viewed with skepticism many alarmist accounts of the 'serious menace' of 'Communism' in China. We have, for instance, as is publicly and well known, declined to be moved by Japanese contentions that presence and maintenance of Japanese armed forces in China were and would be desirable for the purpose of 'combating communism.'

"With regard to the specific charge that officials of this Government 'tell Chungking it must continue to fight the Communists if it wishes United States

friendship,' the simple fact is that no officials of this Government ever have told Chungking either that it must fight or that it must continue to fight the 'Communists'; this Government holds no such belief; this Government desires Chinese unity and deprecates civil strife in China; this Government treats the Government of China as an equal; it does not dictate to the Government of China; it does not make United States friendship contingent; it regards unity within China, unity within the United States, unity within each of the countries of the United Nations group, and unity among the United Nations as utterly desirable toward effectively carrying on war against the Axis Powers and toward creation and maintenance of conditions of just peace when the United Nations shall have gained the victory which is to be theirs."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you take some of the highlights and discuss them with us inasmuch as you were the editor of the Daily Worker at that time, the significance of that statement? I do not think it is clear to the committee as to the purpose of that statement.

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, this statement says that upon invitation of Mr. Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State, "I visited him in his office on October 12 in company with Mr. Robert Minor and heard from him and from Mr. Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to the President, a detailed refutation of my charges in this respect."

In other words, in regard to China. The charges that he made were:

In the Worker of October 4 I made charges that persons whom I designated as "reactionary officials in the State Department" were encouraging the maintenance of a situation in China harmful to the war effort of our country and its allies.

Browder had spoken of strained relations between the Kuomintang and the Communists resulting in the immobilization of large numbers of the best troops of that country. The assurance given by Mr. Welles, to make this brief, was that the policy of the State Department was not against the Communists in China and that there was to be no distinction made between the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek.

That was the understanding which led Browder on his part to make what he called a retraction.

Senator O'CONNOR. Could I interrupt you to ask whether or not any use was made of that by the Communists on that point?

Mr. BUDENZ. You can see in the first place how it is played up, and the Daily Worker gives directives to the Communists. It was used throughout the country as an indication that American policy was seeing eye to eye with Soviet policy in the Far East.

As a matter of fact, in a subsequent meeting of the Politburo which I attended, Browder said it was as important as an agreement between nations and that we should emphasize it throughout the country as something very fundamental, representing what he considered to be a great gain for the Communist cause.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Budenz, as I understand the gist of what you have just said, plus what you said yesterday, that the Daily Worker took its line from the Politburo and then passed that on, and the Daily Worker was in effect the instruction sheet to Communist organizations all over America?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is exclusively what it is. It is, as I say, the telegraph agency of the conspiracy.

Senator SMITH. So that when the Communists read something in the Daily Worker indicating what line is being taken by the Daily

Worker, that is the same as definite instructions to them to follow through on that line?

Mr. BUDENZ. Every time the Daily Worker arrives in the district office of the Communist Party it is read immediately by the district leader. He calls together his staff, and he assigns to them their tasks as a result of the Daily Worker articles and editorials.

Of course, that is supplemented by other things, mail sent out through mail drops and the like, but this is the constant source of directives.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Budenz, do you know whether the conference that is referred to in that article of the 16th of October was simply the successful fruition of a plan which started with the blast that was carried in the issue of the 4th or whether blast and conference, cause and effect, were all part of a single prearranged plan?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I can only cite Mr. Browder's words. I wouldn't want to put my own interpretation into that, but very strongly the impression was given that this was all arranged, that this was the complete picture; that Mr. Browder when he went to Washington understood that he was going to gain.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say, Mr. Budenz, that this statement, after it was promulgated by Mr. Welles, was used extensively by the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most extensively; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You say his statement, after it was promulgated by Mr. Welles. What statement do you refer to and what exhibit?

Mr. MORRIS. This is the statement in exhibit No. 162 that we have introduced this morning, "Welles States United States Policy on China."

Prior to that time, had there been any such statement on the part of the United States Government, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, you are not offering that exhibit as evidence that Mr. Welles made such a statement but only as evidence that the Daily Worker carried that story, that Mr. Browder attributed that story, statement, to Mr. Welles, are you not?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Watkins?

Senator WATKINS. I was going to ask if we have available the statement issued by Mr. Welles, the actual statement. I came in late, so I do not know what has preceded this, but it seems to me in view of what Mr. Sourwine has said that there ought to be some follow-up as to the statement actually issued by Mr. Welles.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a statement issued by Mr. Welles? The Senator is asking for it.

Senator WATKINS. The confirmation.

Mr. MORRIS. We have that, Senator, and we will bring it out in just a minute.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Budenz, do you know whether or not copies of the Daily Worker were circulated among employees of the State Department that were likely to be brought to the attention of Mr. Welles?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I wouldn't have knowledge of that. The Daily Worker though is pretty well examined by governmental officials, and that is a matter of public knowledge.

Senator SMITH. Did you receive any protest from Mr. Welles about the publication of these statements?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, no, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, was this statement, as it appears in the Daily Worker there, used as a basis for a campaign by the Communists to eliminate people who were anti-Communist from places of influence in the Government?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I intended to complete Senator O'Connor's question there along that line and had my thought interrupted, that is to say, the campaign began actually then against those who were considered to be against Soviet policy in the Far East. It began with an attack on Mr. Adolf Berle, who by the way was under fire from the Communists at that particular moment, very definitely and strenuously. It proceeded through the years until in 1944 or 1945 it broke out into an organized campaign.

I don't want to give an exact quote, but this is the essence of it, as the Communists express it, "To clean the State Department of all anti-Soviet elements."

Mr. MORRIS. You say that was a sustained Communist campaign all during the war period?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Of course, it had highlights, but it was sustained.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I offer you a photostat of an article that appeared in the Daily Worker of October 4, 1942. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate this, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Worker of October 4, 1942, page 5, the photostat being prepared at my direction.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and so designated. You are getting your exhibits a little confused, Mr. Morris, because your exhibits have been running along in a series from the beginning of the hearings, and now you are starting with a series of this date. I think it might be well to have it follow in sequence following your exhibits of former days.

Mr. MORRIS. That is true, Mr. Chairman. I just want to designate that as the third this morning so we will be able to distinguish.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 163" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 163

[From the Worker, New York, October 4, 1942, p. 5]

THE SINISTER A. A. BERLE—CHAMPION OF MUNICH, ANTI-SOVIET INTRIGUER IN OUR STATE DEPARTMENT

(By Adam Lapid)

WASHINGTON, October 3.—A few days ago Adolph Augustus Berle, Jr., was discussing the Spanish situation with an intimate group. The slight, saw-toothed Assistant Secretary of State expressed gratification that Franco, the puppet of Hitler and Mussolini, had crushed the Spanish Republic.

He said that the world situation would have been infinitely worse if "communism" had triumphed in Spain and then spread over Europe.

This incident is typical of the thinking of Adolph Berle, whom many informed observers here consider the nearest thing to an American counterpart to George Bonnet, the corrupt French politician, who was one of the principal architects of Munich.

As the last few months have passed without the opening of a second front, the voices of the Munichmen in Washington have grown louder.

Not only in Congress, but in the State Department, the War Department, and the War Production Board the men of faint heart have begun to speak up, to intrigue against the Soviet Union, to spread anti-Soviet rumors. Even speculation about a negotiated peace is no longer a rarity.

Try to trace down the anti-second front and the anti-Soviet talk in Washington, and you will find that an exceptionally high percentage emanates from room 200½, off the dark second floor corridors of the musty State Department Building, from the office of Assistant Secretary Berle.

Berle is no longer the boy wonder who graduated Harvard at 18 and was an adviser on Russian affairs to President Wilson at Versailles when he was 23.

He is now a cynical, power-hungry man of 47. He is a brilliant and fluent phrase-maker, but beneath the flowery verbiage is the hard inner core of his dominant passion: A bitter, last ditch hostility to the Soviet Union.

During the Munich crisis Berle wrote in a memorandum to the President that the United States should not be swung off base either by diplomacy or emotion.

The memorandum was quoted by Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, the Washington newspapermen, in the book which they wrote from a desk in Berle's office.

They saw Berle every day for several weeks, and they must know whereof they speak when they say that Berle pleaded "for the most hard-headed—even cold-hearted—approach to the Czechoslovak question."

Berle was an advocate of Munichism then. There is every reason to think that he still is.

He was one of the men who helped to strangle the Spanish Republic and today helps perpetuate the continued appeasement of France.

He was one of the most influential State Department officials to favor the shipment of war materials to Japan over several costly and long-to-be-regretted years.

He is an ardent advocate of appeasing Vichy France.

Around Berle gathered the more dangerous anti-Soviet element among the European emigres now in the United States.

The Assistant Secretary of State confers frequently with Alexander Kerensky, who has never forgiven the Russian people for turning on his Government in favor of the Communists.

Tibor Eckhardt, the Hungarian Fascist who claims that he is opposed to Hitler but is active in sponsoring anti-Soviet propaganda in this country, also sees Berle frequently.

Berle was active in trying to spike the conversations between former Soviet Ambassador Constantine Goumansky and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles.

The newspapermen who saw Berle in those days would almost invariably leave his office with a juicy anti-Soviet story.

The Assistant Secretary of State is frequently present at Mrs. Evelyn Walsh McLean's parties. Last New Year's Eve he was photographed there chattering with Finnish Minister Ujalmar Procope, Senator Robert Taft, the notorious Ohio defecist, and Ambassador Espil, of Argentina.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you identify this, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, we published this in the Daily Worker and the character of the article is indicated by the headline, "The Sinister A. A. Berle, champion of Munich, anti-Soviet intriguer in our State Department."

Mr. MORRIS. That is a sample of the campaign which was being sustained by the Communists at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is the campaign that was carried into every part of the United States, not only among the Communists but the organizations which they were infiltrating.

Mr. MORRIS. Did this campaign extend to other officials in the State Department?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us who the other officials were?

Mr. BUDENZ. Joseph B. Grew, Under Secretary of State; Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, not technically with the State Department but connected at least diplomatically with State Department relations; Eugene C. Dooman, who was head of the Far Eastern Division, if I remember correctly, at least he was in control of the details of the far eastern policy; and Gen. Patrick Hurley, Ambassador to China, who particularly was under attack from the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I think, Mr. Chairman, if we take these items one at a time it will be a lot clearer.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. In point of time, Mr. Budenz, which is the first one of these that we should discuss?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I think Under Secretary of State Grew is the first because as early as at least 1944 the Politburo laid plans against Mr. Grew, asking him questions, criticizing his policy, and the like.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us the first episode that you can recall in point of time, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, there were episodes before this, but the ones that I can recall occurred in 1945 and are the most vivid. Mr. Grew was attacked on two grounds, one that he didn't have the right policy in China, and secondly, as we approached the question of what to do with Japan, that he favored a soft peace with Japan.

The Communists wanted a tough peace just as there was to be the Morgenthau plan in Germany. They didn't hesitate in their own discussions to show that this would tend to drive the Japanese into the hands of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know they wanted a tough peace?

Mr. BUDENZ. They discussed it and planned it and discussed it in the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in aid of the testimony this morning I have here a folder full of exhibits which are extracts from the Daily Worker. By way of refreshing the recollection of the witness I would like to make those available to him while he is testifying to episodes that occurred in this campaign.

The CHAIRMAN. You may do so if he identifies them as articles published in the Daily Worker under his editorial supervision.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to present them in chronological order.

The CHAIRMAN. If he can identify them as publications in the Daily Worker under his supervision.

Mr. MORRIS. As each one is pulled out we can identify them.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I think that as the witness identifies it there should be an identifying mark on the exhibit to show what exhibit he is holding in his hand at the time. The clerk will see to that, please.

Mr. BUDENZ. The first exhibit is from the Daily Worker of June 4, 1945, page 4.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Mandel, was this photostat prepared under your direction?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. BUDENZ. This is a reprint of the statement made by the national board of the Communist Political Association, that being the temporary name, as you recall, of the Communist Party during a cer-

tain period. This statement was made on the eve of changing back to the Communist Party.

In the course of their general program they outline a far-eastern policy which, to make it brief, includes:

One, rout and defeat the advocates of a compromise peace with the Japanese imperialists and war lords. Guarantee a free democratic Asia with the right of national independence for all colonial and dependent peoples. Curb those who seek American imperialist control in the Far East.

Three, press for a united and free China based upon the unity of the Communists and all other democratic and anti-Japanese forces so as to speed victory.

There are other items, but those are the outstanding ones.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so designated and entered into the record. (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 164" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 164

[From the Daily Worker, New York, June 4, 1945, p. 4]

THE PRESENT SITUATION AND NEXT TASKS—RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL BOARD, CPA, ADOPTED ON JUNE 2, 1945

This resolution is submitted as a draft for discussion and action by the national committee and the entire membership of the Communist Political Association.

The vote on the resolution in the national board was as follows:

For: Morris Childs, Benjamin Davis, Jr., Eugene Dennis, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, James Ford, Wm. Z. Foster, Gilbert Green, Robert Minor, Robert Thompson, John Williamson.

Against: Earl Browder.

Abstained: Roy Hudson.

Absent: William Schneiderman.

PART 1

The military defeat of Nazi Germany is a great historic victory for world democracy, for all mankind. This epochal triumph was brought about by the concerted action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition—by the decisive blows of the Red Army, by the American-British offensives, and by the heroic struggle of the resistance movements. This victory opens the way for the complete destruction of fascism in Europe and weakens the forces of reaction and fascism everywhere. It has already brought forth a new antifascist unity of the peoples in Europe marked by the formation in a number of countries of democratic governments representative of the will of the people. It has also created the prerequisites for bringing about the speedy defeat of Japanese imperialism. Thus great possibilities have been opened up for realizing a durable peace.

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However, a sharp and sustained struggle must still be conducted to secure the complete destruction of fascism in Europe and throughout the world and to guarantee that the possibilities which now exist for creating an enduring peace shall be realized. This is so because the economic and social roots of fascism in Europe have not yet been fully destroyed. This is so because the extremely powerful reactionary forces in the United States and England, which are centered in the trusts and cartels, are striving to reconstruct liberated Europe on a reactionary basis. Moreover, this is so because the most aggressive circles of American imperialism are endeavoring to secure for themselves political and economic domination in the world.

With the ending of the war against Nazi Germany, important groupings of American capital, which were opposed to German imperialist world domination, are joining hands with the most reactionary and profascist circles of monopoly capital—with the profascist du Pont clique in the leadership of the NAM. Now

that Nazi Germany has been crushed, these big business circles which heretofore supported, though inconsistently, the war against Hitler, in order to eliminate their German imperialist rival are today frightened by the democratic consequences of that victory.

Like their British counterparts, they are alarmed at the strengthened positions of world labor, at the democratic advances in Europe and at the upsurge of the national liberation movements in the colonial and dependent countries. Therefore they seek to halt the march of democracy; to curb the strength of labor and the people. They want to save the remnants of fascism in Germany and in the rest of Europe. They are trying to organize a new cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union which bore the main brunt of the war against the Nazis, and which is the staunchest champion of national freedom, democracy, and world peace.

This regrouping in the ranks of American capital, reacting to the defeat of Germany, has been reflected in many recent actions of the State Department. It is evidenced by the fact that the majority of the American delegation at San Francisco yielded on certain issues to the extreme reactionaries. In so doing they departed from Roosevelt's foreign policy of Big Three unity as worked out at Tehran and Yalta.

This regrouping in the ranks of capital explains why, on most basic questions, Stettinius and Connally were influenced to join hands with Vandenberg—the spokesman for Hoover and the most predatory sections of American finance capital. This explains the seating of Fascist Argentina and the British-American reluctance to live up to the Yalta accord on Poland and Germany. This is the reason why the American delegation at San Francisco refused to join with the Soviet Union to pledge the right of national independence for mandated territories and colonies, and refused to give official recognition to the representatives of the World Labor Conference who spoke for 80,000,000 organized workers.

This shift in the position of certain big business circles explains the reactionary intervention at Trieste and the threat of armed force against our Yugoslav ally. This development also explains why Washington and London are pursuing the dangerous policy of preventing a strong, united, and democratic China, and why they bolster up the reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai shek regime which is obstructing an all-out war against Japan. It accounts, too, for the new campaign of anti-Soviet slander and incitement calculated to undermine American-Soviet friendship and cooperation which was the cornerstone for victory over Hitler Germany and is the indispensable key to attain postwar peace and world security.

On the home front the camp of reaction is blocking the development of a satisfactory program to meet the human needs of reconversion with its accompanying economic dislocations and severe unemployment. Reactionary forces—especially the NAM and their representatives in Congress—are planning a new open-shop drive to weaken or smash the trade-unions. They are trying to prevent the adoption of governmental measures which must be enacted at once if our country is to avoid the most acute consequences of future economic crisis. Likewise they are vigorously preparing to win the crucial 1946 elections.

If these reactionary policies and forces are not checked and defeated, America and the world will be confronted with new aggressions and wars and the growth of reaction and fascism in the United States.

3

However, the conditions and forces exist to defeat this reactionary threat, and to enable our country to play a progressive role in world affairs in accord with the true national interests of the American people. For one thing, the military defeat of Nazi Germany has changed the relationship of world forces in favor of democracy. It has enhanced the role and influence of the kind of socialism. It has strengthened those forces in our country and elsewhere which seek to maintain and consolidate the friendship and cooperation of the United States and the Soviet Union—a unity which must now be extended and reinforced. This is evidenced by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the American people, and in the first place labor, are opposed to reaction and fascism, support the foreign and domestic policies of President Roosevelt as embodied in the decisions of Tehran and Crimea, and in the second bill of rights.

This majority must now speak out and assert its collective strength and will. The united power of labor and of all democratic forces must express itself in a decisive fashion so as to influence the course of the Nation in a consistently progressive direction.

It is imperative that the American people resolutely support every effort of the Truman administration to carry forward Roosevelt's program for victory, peace, democracy, and 60,000,000 jobs. It is equally necessary that the people sharply criticize all hesitations to apply this policy, and vigorously oppose any concessions to the reactionaries. The camp of reaction must not be appeased—it must be isolated and routed.

Toward this end it is necessary, as never before, to decisively strengthen the democratic unity of the Nation. It is essential to weld together and consolidate the broadest national coalition of all anti-Fascist and democratic forces, including all supporters of Roosevelt's anti-Axis policies. To forge this democratic coalition most effectively and to enable it to exercise decisive influence upon the affairs of the Nation, it is essential that the working class—especially the progressive labor movement and the Communists—strengthen its independent role and activities and display far greater political and organizing initiative. It is imperative to develop the maximum unity of action between the CIO, the AFL, and the Railroad Brotherhoods and to achieve their full participation in the new World Federation of Trade Unions.

While cooperating with the patriotic and democratic forces from all walks of life, labor must, in the first place, strengthen its ties with the veterans, the toiling farmers, the Negro people, the youth, the women, professionals and small-business men, and with their democratic organizations.

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To achieve the widest democratic coalition and the most effective anti-Fascist unity of the Nation, it is vital that labor vigorously champion a program of action that will promote the complete destruction of fascism, speed victory over Japanese imperialism, curb the powers of the trusts and monopolies—advance the economic welfare of the people and protest and extend American democracy.

In the opinion of the Communist Political Association, such a program should be based on the following slogans of action:

I. Hasten the defeat of Fascist-militarist Japan!

Rout and defeat the advocates of a compromise peace with the Japanese imperialists and warlords.

Guarantee a free, democratic Asia with the right of national independence for all colonial and dependent peoples. Curb those who seek American imperialist control in the Far East.

Press for a united and free China based upon the unity of the Communists and all other democratic and anti-Japanese forces so as to speed victory. Full military aid to the Chinese guerrillas led by the heroic Eighth and Fourth Armies.

Continue uninterrupted war production and uphold labor's no-strike pledge for the duration. Stop employer provocations.

II. Complete the destruction of fascism and build a durable peace.

Cement American-Soviet friendship and unity to guarantee the fulfillment of Tehran and Yalta accords for an enduring peace and a world free of fascism.

Carry out in full the decisions made by the Big Three at Crimea.

Punish the war guilty without further delay. Death to all Fascist war criminals. Make Germany pay full reparations in labor and in kind for the reconstruction of Europe.

Strengthen the World Labor Congress as the backbone of the unity of the peoples and the free nations.

Support the establishment of an effective international security organization based upon the Dumbarton Oaks plan and the Yalta agreement.

Guarantee to all peoples the right to determine freely their own destiny and to establish their own democratic form of government. Put an end to Anglo-American intervention against the peoples, such as in Greece, Belgium, and Italy. Grant immediate national independence to Puerto Rico.

Break diplomatic relations with Franco Spain and Fascist Argentina.

Remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and reactionary officials.

Help feed and reconstruct starving and war-torn Europe. Reject the Hoover program based on reactionary financial mortgages and political interference.

Pass the Bretton Woods proposals and other democratic measures designed to promote international economic cooperation and expanding world trade. Grant extensive long-term loans and credits, at low interest rates, for purposes of reconstruction and industrialization.

III. Meet the human needs of reconversion—Push the fight for 60 million jobs.

Make the right to work and the Roosevelt second Bill of Rights the law of the land.

Increase purchasing-power to promote maximum employment. No reduction in weekly take home pay when overtime is eliminated.

For an immediate 20 percent wage increase to meet the rise in the cost of living. Establish an adequate minimum hourly wage on a national scale.

Establish the principle of the guaranteed annual wage.

For a shorter workweek without wage reductions, except where this would hamper war production.

Support Truman's proposals for emergency Federal legislation to extend and supplement present unemployment insurance benefits. Start unemployment insurance payments promptly upon loss of job and continue until new employment is found. Provide adequate severance pay for laid-off workers. Insure the re-training, education and reemployment of the young workers.

Prevent growing unemployment during the reconversion and post war period by starting large-scale Federal, State and municipal public works programs—slum clearance, low rental housing developments, rural electrification, the building of new schools, hospitals, roads, etc.

No scrapping of Government owned industrial plants. If private industry cannot operate these at full capacity for peacetime purposes the Government must.

Maintain and rigidly enforce rent and price control and rationing. Strengthen the law enforcement powers of the OPA. Smash the black market.

Utilize the Labor-Management Charter to press for the organization of the unorganized, to strengthen collective bargaining, to defend the trade-unions from all attacks by the open-shoppers, to raise living standards, and to promote the fight for 60 million jobs.

Prosecute the war profiteers. No reduction in corporate, excess profit and income taxes for the millionaires.

Pass the Wagner-Murray-Dingell social security bill.

Maintain equitable farm prices and assure adequate Federal and State aid to all needy farmers.

IV. Repay our debt to the men who fought for victory.

Guarantee jobs and security for all returning veterans regardless of race, creed or color.

Extend the scope and benefits of the GI bill of rights and eliminate all red tape from the Veterans' Administration. Guarantee adequate medical care to every veteran.

Press for the speedy enactment of legislation providing for substantial demobilization pay, based on length and character of service, and financed by taxes on higher personal and corporate incomes.

Insure full benefits of all veterans legislation to Negro veterans.

V. Safeguard and extend democracy.

Enforce equal rights for every American citizen regardless of race, color, creed, political affiliation or national origin.

End Jim Crow. Outlaw anti-Semitism. Eliminate all anti-Communist legislation. Pass a national FEPC. Abolish the poll tax and the white primary. End every form of discrimination in the Armed Forces.

Protect labor's rights, especially the right to organize and bargain collectively.

Outlaw and prohibit all fascist organizations and activities.

Curb the powers and policies of the monopolies and trusts which jeopardize the national welfare and world peace. Prosecute all violations of the antitrust laws, and all moves and acts to restore or continue the Anglo-German-American cartel system and practices. Protect and extend Federal aid to small business.

This program represents the most urgent interests of the American people and the Nation. It is not a program for socialism which alone can completely abolish insecurity, exploitation, oppression, and war. This is an immediate program of action around which all progressive Americans can unite today. It is a program of action which will advance the destruction of fascism, help realize a more stable peace.

(Continued on Page 5) etc.

CPA NATIONAL BOARD DECIDES UPON DISCUSSIONS ON RESOLUTION

The national board of the CPA, at its meeting of June 2, also adopted the following additional motions:

1. The national committee shall be convened within 2 weeks.
2. The discussion by the membership of the association on the resolution of the national board shall start immediately in the clubs and in other meetings.

of the association to be determined by each State committee. The discussion shall continue up to a date to be decided by the national committee, CPA.

3. For the period of the discussion, arrangements shall be made with the Daily Worker to publish a semiweekly discussion bulletin as a supplement to the paper. This bulletin shall be open to all members of the association.

4. State organizations may publish special discussion bulletins if they so desire.

5. During the entire period of the discussion, the policy and practical mass work of the association shall be governed by the resolution of the national board.

Mr. MORRIS. I might say that that exhibit is the fourth one we have introduced today.

Mr. BUDENZ. I am going by chronology rather than a rounded-out picture, but the picture will be given, Mr. Chairman.

The next one as far as I can see is dated June 26, 1945, page 9, headed, "One of Six Arrested Hits Clique in State Department."

The CHAIRMAN. That is of the issue of the Daily Worker of what date?

Mr. BUDENZ. June 26, 1945, page 9.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. BUDENZ. This refers to Andrew Roth, one of those arrested in the Amerasia case and the Daily Worker predicts:

Roth's forthcoming book, *Dilemma in Japan*, "dissects" the State Department's "past mistakes and current fallacies," in the author's words. It exposes Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew's predilection for Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Roth's arrest came after Little, Brown & Co. announced that the book would come out in September.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done and it will be received in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 165" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 165

[From the Daily Worker, New York, June 26, 1945, p. 9]

ONE OF SIX ARRESTED HITS CLIQUE IN STATE DEPARTMENT

Andrew Roth, on inactive status as senior lieutenant in the United States Naval Reserve since his arrest June 6, declared yesterday that charges against him "reflect the hopes of a powerful conservative clique in the State Department."

In a copyrighted article in the New York Post Roth warned that, should this clique have its way, "the end result will almost certainly be a China wracked by civil war, a Japan in which the roots of aggression have been left intact, and a sharp clash of American and Soviet interests in the Far East."

Roth expressed confidence that he would be cleared of the accusation against himself and five others, of having been party to a conspiracy to transmit confidential information to unauthorized persons.

Roth's forthcoming book, *Dilemma in Japan*, "dissects" the State Department's "past mistakes and current fallacies," in the author's words. It exposes Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew's predilection for Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Roth's arrest came after Little, Brown & Co. announced that the book would come out in September.

Mr. SCURWINE. To save time, could Mr. Mandel be asked whether these photostats which have been handed to the witness are all photostats of the Daily Worker, photostats prepared under his direction?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. BUDENZ. The next is an editorial in the Daily Worker of August 6, 1945, page 6, and reads:

It is for Under Secretary Grew to answer: Why are American guns being used to pursue civil war in China? What measures are being taken to halt such crimes and guarantee against their repetition?

This is an attack on Mr. Grew under the title, "Question to Mr. Grew."

Mr. MORRIS. I offer that into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 166" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 166

[From the Daily Worker, August 6, 1945, p. 6]

QUESTION TO MR. GREW

Far up in northern China, Chinese are fighting Chinese at this very moment—yet how is it possible that hardly a mention of this gets to the American people?

The Yenan radio has charged that American lend-lease guns are being used against the Chinese Communist guerillas by the armies of Gen. Hu Tsung-nan—yet the War Department and the State Department say nary a word.

We think this warfare in northern China is scandalous. And equally scandalous is the absence of any recognition by the State Department of American responsibility in this deadly serious affair.

For who gains when a Kuomintang soldier is ordered to attack a Chinese Communist guerilla? Only Japan, the common enemy.

And who profits by this silence from the United States? Only the Kuomintang dictatorship, which interprets silence as giving consent to its evil plans for the disunion of the Chinese nation.

The Yenan radio has twice appealed to Chiang Kai-shek, urging him to call off the attack of Kuomintang's Fifty-ninth Division. It is an appeal directed to Americans as well.

For the plain fact remains that American lives are being jeopardized if the Chungking regime is permitted to continue such policies.

And if such things can happen while the Kuomintang is supposedly liberalizing its dictatorship, while the Soong-Stalin discussions are about to be resumed—the American people can have no confidence whatsoever in the Chungking leaders and all their promises and plans.

It is for Undersecretary Grew to answer: Why are American guns being used to pursue civil war in China? What measures are being taken to halt such crimes and guarantee against their repetition?

Mr. BUDENZ. The next that I can find is the Daily Worker of August 13, 1945, page 5, headed "The Allied Reply and the Role of the Emperor," in which they state:

Our people knows, from a correct understanding of Japanese history, that the Emperor is the focus of the militarist-feudal-industrialist set-up in Japan responsible for the war and the oppression of Asia.

And they feel correctly that powerful capitalist forces, represented by such men as Under Secretary Joseph Grew and Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, want to preserve this particular Emperor's powers and the royal institution as such. They want to preserve as much of Japanese fascism as they can.

That is an editorial.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert that as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 167" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 167

[From the Daily Worker, New York, August 13, 1945, p. 5]

THE ALLIED REPLY AND THE ROLE OF THE EMPEROR—AN EDITORIAL

Reprinted from late edition of Sunday Worker

The four great powers have given their answer to Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam surrender declaration, in which the Japanese rulers asked for clarification on the Emperor's role. The world awaits the next developments while the war itself is being pressed forward on all fronts.

Faced with the overwhelming power of the United Nations, the vast American air and naval power, the atom bomb, the Soviet Union's rapid advances in Manchuria and Korea, the Japanese rulers were forced to accept the Potsdam terms.

The great powers have elaborated these terms to the extent that the Emperor will have to subordinate himself entirely to the Allied Supreme Command. He will have to carry out the Supreme Command's orders in compelling the Japanese troops to lay down their arms. The institution of the monarchy itself will ultimately be decided by the Japanese people.

If we remember that the Potsdam declaration provided a good basis for eradicating Japanese fascism, eliminating the possibility of renewed aggression and opening the path for democratic development in Japan, it is clear that the United Nations stand on the eve of an immense victory. The tremendous fact is that fascism in Asia as well as in Europe has at last been forced to its knees.

We do not know, and cannot know, all the factors which entered into the Big Four's reply. Certainly, one of them is the necessity of intimate unity among the great powers. For without such unity a common program for ending the war, occupying the strategic areas of eastern Asia, and beginning the destruction of fascist-militarism would be endangered.

This should be remembered, even though on the role of the Emperor himself the American people are understandably disappointed. He is continuing on the throne, even though he is a war criminal, and the people rightly want to treat him as such. Our public knows, from a correct understanding of Japanese history, that the Emperor is the focus of the militarist-feudal-industrialist set-up in Japan responsible for the war and the oppression of Asia.

And they feel correctly that powerful capitalist forces represented by such men as Under Secretary Joseph Grew and Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, want to preserve this particular Emperor's powers and the royal institution as such. They want to preserve as much of Japanese fascism as they can. The Vandenberg and the Taft unquestionably will attempt to use the royal house for desperate efforts to sabotage the impending United Nations victory.

That is why the American people must continue their vigilance—even though the war will undoubtedly end before the Japanese people have decided the ultimate fate of the royal house.

A great victory of epic dimensions is unfolding before the democratic world. It is a victory well earned. It is a victory for which heavy sacrifices have been made. It is a victory which must lead to the complete eradication of fascism, and for this task—the precondition of a long and real peace—the unity of the great powers is decisive.

The advance of democracy in China, the full independence of the colonial peoples is equally decisive. It is on all these issues that continued vigilance and struggle will be required.

Mr. BUDENZ. This is August 15, 1945, an editorial in the Daily Worker, page 2, which means it was given particular prominence.

The CHAIRMAN. As regards this last one that you just identified, you said it was an editorial in the Daily Worker. Were you the editorial writer at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. I was the managing editor of the Daily Worker. The writing of the editorials was assigned at each editorial board meeting to various editors on the board. This was very likely written by Joseph Starobin, although that wasn't always the case. It was written under the supervision of the editorial board.

This is entitled "Prevent Civil War in China," and at the conclusion states:

The State Department should be bombarded with messages demanding the recall of Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer, and the immediate cleansing of the people in the Department responsible for this suicidal policy.

That is, the policy which they were condemning.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that as the next consecutive exhibit in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be given its proper number and will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 168" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 168

[From the Daily Worker, New York, August 18, 1945, p. 2]

PREVENT CIVIL WAR IN CHINA—AN EDITORIAL

With Japan's surrender just around the corner, the danger of civil war in China assumes immediate and alarming proportions. During the last few days Chiang Kai-shek has clearly revealed his intention of launching the civil war immediately, using Central Government troops which have been held ready for this moment, as well as puppet troops which collaborated with the Japanese.

And especially disturbing to the American people, in the midst of their jubilation over the approaching end of the war, are the reports from Chungking that Fascist-fascist airplanes, troops, and munitions may be placed at the disposal of the Fascist-fascist clique in Chungking.

The calamity of civil war in China must be prevented. For should it take place the peace for which we have fought a long and hard war would be seriously endangered. The American people, as well as our allies, must not be cheated of the fruits of the global victory. Much less can we permit the continuation of government policies which give aid to a reactionary, Fascist clique, a clique which has stood aloof from the war against Japan since 1938, which has conspired with the collaborationist regime at Nanking against all the democratic forces of China and which now rushes to make open war against them.

CONFIRMATION IN UNITED STATES PRESS

The charges made by the Yenian radio against Chiang, accusing him of collusion with the puppet troops and of setting up a united front with the Nanking collaborationists for the immediate launching of the civil war, are fully confirmed by A. T. Steele's report to the New York Herald Tribune yesterday.

"It is no secret," writes Mr. Steele, "that many puppet officials and army officers are in league with Chungking and plan to declare allegiance to the Central Government when the time is ripe."

According to the same correspondent, Chiang "is counting on assistance from Chinese puppet troops in enemy-held areas." This was openly admitted by the Generalissimo when he forbade the Communist-led armies and guerrillas to disarm the enemy, and called upon the puppet armies to "maintain order."

In the tense and dangerous situation it is absolutely impermissible for Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer to place American material and men at Chiang's disposal.

According to reports from Chungking, the two top American representatives have been conferring with Chiang for the purpose of planning the rapid occupation by Kuomintang troops of key ports and areas which have already been largely liberated by the Yenian armies. It is reported that American planes are ready to transport Chiang's troops into sectors already occupied or soon to be taken by the Communist-led and guerrilla forces.

WORLD PEACE ENDANGERED

For Chiang to attempt to possess these areas would mean to oust the liberation armies and declare war upon the people. We cannot be a party to such nefarious and dastardly plans. They would endanger the prospects of peace in the Pacific and in the world.

For Hurley and Wedemeyer to participate in this scheme is to place our Government policy entirely at the disposal of the most reactionary and imperialist forces in our country who want to prevent a united and democratic China, and will stop at nothing to achieve their end.

The American people, especially the labor movement, should intervene directly, and at this very moment when the end of the war is at hand.

We do not want the continuation of the war in another form, in the shape of a civil war in China.

We want peace in the Pacific and in the world, and that means a democratic and united China. It means that the Chinese collaborationists, the Nanking puppets, and their Kuomintang traitors should be held strictly to account and made to suffer for their treachery.

Not a single American gun, soldier, plane or other war equipment must be placed at the disposal of the Fascist clique in Chungking.

The Chinese liberation armies, including the eighth and fourth route armies which did the major land fighting against the enemy, should be fully represented in working out the allied occupation of Japan and liberated areas.

As with the other main problems of the peace, American-Soviet cooperation must be maintained and extended in the process of preventing civil war in China.

The State Department should be bombarded with messages demanding the recall of Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer, and the immediate clearing-up of the people in the Department responsible for this suicidal policy. We want a durable and democratic peace.

MR. BUDENZ. Well, I have stepped out of the chronology, Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, but I will introduce this anyway.

THE CHAIRMAN. Very well.

MR. BUDENZ. This is the Daily Worker of July 24, 1945, an editorial, the chief editorial, "Mr. Grew Must Explain," in which they accuse the State Department under Mr. Grew's direction of playing up to the Japanese imperialists and appealing to them to surrender in time to save themselves.

MR. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that for the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

THE CHAIRMAN. It will be received and so designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 169" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 169

[From the Daily Worker, July 24, 1945]

MR. GREW MUST EXPLAIN

There is something very strange, very rotten, and very alarming in the way American policy toward Japan is developing. It is time the entire Nation realized what is going on, and what is at stake.

Early last week, the Herald Tribune's Washington correspondent reported that plans were being made to modify the unconditional-surrender policy. Japan was going to be told that her Imperial Government might remain if only she would subordinate herself to the United States and submit to a peace which would not necessarily destroy her feudal-militarist structure. The Navy and State Department were reported favorable to such a plan. But it was all a matter for the future, to be decided by President Truman himself.

Now it is disclosed that a direct Navy Department representative, Capt. E. M. Zacharias, has been broadcasting to Japan for the OWI. On Friday night he openly appealed to the Japanese industrialists to surrender in time. He said that American patience was running short, that unless the Japanese leaders surrender now, the peace may be complicated by the pressure of China, Australia, and perhaps also by the Soviet Union. Japan, unlike Germany, would be well treated under the terms of the Atlantic Charter. In other words, an open appeal to negotiate a peace.

Under Secretary Joseph Grew last week did not deny the Herald Tribune reports; he merely said that no official peace offers had been received, which could be an invitation for them. And Elmer Davis now discloses that Captain

Zacharias has already made 12 such broadcasts. Evidently, what was going to be a modification of policy in the future is already a fact—to this officer—and has been the basis of repeated broadcasts.

This is a scandalous situation. Both the Herald Tribune and the New York Times have in recent days devoted sharp editorials to it, which shows that while there is serious resistance to modification of the unconditional-surrender policy in the very highest circles, there is also plenty of fire to cause such smoke.

Both newspapers point out that this kind of thing is only prolonging the war. It is encouraging the Japanese to resist even more fiercely. Instead of shortening the war, this is literally costing American lives. The Tribune cites a commentator of the Japanese Broadcasting Co., Kuso Oya, who gleefully predicts an impending about-face by the United States, urging the Japanese to fight on until that happens. Of course, it is not only the fact that the war is being prolonged by such tactics. The very basis of a democratic Asia would be undermined if the State Department conception wins out.

Explanations to the American people are in order. The Navy Department should explain the case of Captain Zacharias. Mr. Grew should openly and frankly inform the American people whether and why the policy of unconditional surrender is being modified.

Mr. BUDENZ. The next two are from the Daily Worker of August 18, 1945, the first of them being on page 2 and being a news dispatch from Art Shields, the Daily Worker correspondent at that time in Washington. In the course of this article, which is headed "See danger of United States intervention for Chiang," it says:

Unfortunately America's declared policy, as laid down by Ambassador Patrick Hurley, is to help the Kuomintang and to isolate the popular resistance forces operating from Yenan. There is no evidence yet to show that Grew's designation means that the United States intends to follow the united policy urged by General Stilwell, before he was taken out of China at the request of Chiang.

That "designation" is a typographical error, it means "resignation" because they have just mentioned that Grew has resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that into the record as the next consecutive exhibit, Mr. Chairman.

The **CHAIRMAN.** It will be received and so designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 170" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 170

(From the Daily Worker, New York, August 18, 1945, p. 2)

SEE DANGER OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION FOR CHIANG

(By Art Shields)

WASHINGTON, August 17.—The resignation of Joseph C. Grew, long a foe of Chinese unity, from his strategic post as Under Secretary of State, might be seen as an encouraging token of American policy toward China if taken by itself. Unfortunately it cannot be taken by itself. And there is too little time to speculate hopefully on inconclusive data, while the danger of further American intervention in the civil war, which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is preparing, remains so obvious.

This intervention in the next few days may take a more active form than it has in recent months when the United States was merely equipping the Kuomintang armies, which were giving more attention to the blockade against the popular anti-Japanese resistance forces, led by the Communist General Chu Teh, than to fighting the enemy.

The best informed authorities on China in Washington, in talks with the Daily Worker, yesterday foresaw certain types of American military and naval intervention to help the reactionary dictatorship, as distinct possibilities for the very near future.

Military intervention could come if General Wedemeyer, commander of American forces in China, carried out his reported promise to Chiang to carry airborne

Kuomintang troops in areas where the Japanese are surrendering. In most of those areas the Japanese and puppet troops would otherwise be forced to surrender to Chou Teh's armies, which are engaging more enemy forces than Chiang's armies are engaging.

Such action, if it takes place, would constitute American military intervention on behalf of the Chinese reactionaries, who are plotting civil war. It would involve the loss of American lives and a breach of faith with the Chinese people. It would jeopardize postwar peace in Asia and the world.

Chiang has already appealed to the Japanese not to surrender to the democratic forces, in other words to continue resisting them until he can take over with American help, thus encouraging the Japanese to continue the war in violation of the Allied orders for immediate and unconditional surrender. He also has told the puppet troops under Japanese command that he will hold them "responsible for maintaining local peace and order."

This means that Chiang is seeking an alliance with foreign enemies and Chinese traitors against the people. And it means, says a statement from the people's government at Yenai, that Chiang is seeking to get possession of enemy arms for the purpose of launching large-scale civil war against the heroic anti-Japanese guerilla fighters and the Eighth and Fourth Route Armies led by the Communists.

NAVAL INTERVENTION

The danger of naval as well as military intervention may come in port cities like Shanghai. The democratic, anti-Japanese armies, not Chiang's are advancing on Shanghai and most of the other large cities. The people, not the Kuomintang, will take these cities unless America intervenes.

Unfortunately America's declared policy, as laid down by Ambassador Patrick Hurley, is to help the Kuomintang and to isolate the popular resistance forces operating from Yenai. There is no evidence yet to show that Grew's designation means that the United States intends to follow the unity policy urged by General Stilwell before he was taken out of China at the request of Chiang.

Authoritative observers of the Chinese scene here also point out that Americans should not develop hasty illusions from Chiang's recent request to Mao Tse-tung, Communist political leader in Yenai, to confer with him in Chungking.

Conferences that are intended as more than gestures are not called in such vague fashion, they declare. There must first be preliminary meetings of representatives of the two groups to prepare the ground before the principals sit down together. There must be understandings regarding the specific issues to be discussed. Chiang's florid but brief invitation to Mao does not provide such understandings.

And, most important, the invitation must be accompanied by such measures of good faith as the cessation of civil war by the Kuomintang, the lifting of the blockade against the border region, the release of political prisoners, and the establishment of democratic civil liberties.

TEMBORISTIC ATMOSPHERE

Chungking's present terroristic atmosphere is not conducive to the conference Chiang proposes.

America's first concern, however, is to tell our Government that there must be no intervention against the anti-Japanese fighters in China. No intervention on the side of a civil war plotter like Chiang, who, Yenai spokesmen have revealed, has set up a special Chinese brand of fascism—the brand called Comradore fascism, which is a reactionary dictatorship under the wings of foreign imperialism.

Mr. MORRIS. May I make it clear that we are reading these articles and editorials from the Daily Worker to show that the Communist Party, during this period, was carrying on an extensive campaign against the then Under Secretary of State Grew, because he was advocating a so-called soft peace for Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the case?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the Communist policy for Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was that of a tough peace for Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. And Mr. Grew was not carrying out that policy and therefore they were opposing him?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

We have here an editorial, *Stop the Monkey Business*, appearing on the same date, August 18, 1945, on the regular editorial page of the *Daily Worker*, page 6. This is the leading editorial, which concludes as follows:

Americans today are in no mood to take any wooden nickels. The dilly-dallying with the Emperor in Japan must stop, and, incidentally, Joseph Grew must really be retired from public life and in no case appointed to any post dealing with far-eastern affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Now was this campaign being carried on against anyone else in the Japanese Division of the State Department, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; it was carried on at the same time extensively by the party, much more than these articles in the *Daily Worker* indicate. They corroborate the campaign, but through communications of the Politburo it was also against Eugene C. Dooman, who I understand was then connected with the Far Eastern Division of the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any reference to Mr. Dooman in those articles?

Mr. BUDENZ. There are references which I don't see in these articles, but there were many. There is an announcement here that the State Department "retires soft-peace advocate," but this is a United Press dispatch played up in the *Daily Worker*. This is dated September 6, 1945, page 2. It indicates that the campaign against Mr. Dooman was meeting with success.

Mr. MORRIS. The campaign against Mr. Dooman was meeting with success?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have these introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be so received and so designated.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 171 and 172," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 171

[From the *Daily Worker*, August 18, 1945, p. 6]

STOP THE MONKEY BUSINESS

The American people are watching the spectacle of Japan's delayed surrender with very suspicious eyes. And when you take into account the treacherous policies of Chiang Kai-shek, and the rip-roaring appeal to the reactionaries of the entire world by Winston Churchill—you get a very strange picture indeed. The American people are in no mood for monkey business. And that's what they fear is afoot.

For example, there is today's report of a Japanese airplane attack upon our bombers, who were peacefully photographing Tokyo. The Kwantung army is still fighting.

The behavior of the Japanese Emperor is very strange, and all his rescripts read as though Japan still thinks she can make war again at some future time. At least three war criminals, members of the old Cabinet, have been reappointed to the new one; and one of these ministers even has the portfolio for "Greater East Asia," as though to say that Japan still expects to exercise imperialist control over the peoples of Indochina, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and Burma, and Thailand.

The Japanese Government explains to its people that the war was won "spiritually"; the Tokyo radio breathes insidious suggestions of revenge; there is no mention of the war guilt of the former Japanese Cabinet whatsoever.

And the Emperor's emphasis on the atom bomb makes it appear that Japan lost the war because of some scientific freak and not because she was forced to her knees. This is exactly the kind of propaganda to prepare for sabotaging the Potsdam declaration. We cannot share President Truman's complacency about it.

SURRENDER DELAYED

But the main thing is that the cease-fire order is being delayed. Russians and Mongolians—our allies—are still dying. And our own soldiers face treachery at every point. No wonder the American people are suspicious. It is as though the American supreme command is just as worried about a social and political crack-up inside of Japan as the Emperor himself. It is as though our State Department is trying to help the Japanese feudalists and industrialists to weather their internal crisis. That is none of our business. Any leniency to the Japanese along those lines contains the prospect of rupturing the Allies and laying the basis for future wars.

And then there is the crisis in China. The facts are brutally plain. Chiang Kai-shek is trying to keep the Japanese armies intact and fully armed until his own troops can get to Shanghai and Nanking. In other words, Chiang Kai-shek is afraid of the Chinese people who have suffered so long under the Japanese heel; he prefers to keep them under that heel rather than allow them to liberate themselves.

What does it mean, after all, when the Japanese puppet at Nanking publicly offers to hold the city with quisling troops until Chiang Kai-shek gets there? This is simple treachery. If it had happened in Europe, the country would be crying "sellout" from the housetops.

But how can Chiang Kai-shek dare to fly his troops into Shanghai and Nanking? Only because the American general, Albert Wedemeyer offers to help him with the services of American planes. In blunt language, this is intervention in the affairs of the Chinese people. It is encouraging Chiang to make civil war on all Chinese democrats. It is a dastardly game, and neither our soldiers nor our people want any part of it.

And finally, there is the Herbert Hoover of Great Britain—Winston Churchill. His speech in Parliament was much more than a challenge to the British Labor Government, although it was that, too, and we hope the British people and their leaders will know how to answer it. The speech was also a call to American reactionaries, urging them to treat Japan and to handle China in such a way as to prevent the victory of the democratic forces.

His reference to communism in Eastern and Central Europe, and his defense of the poor Germans in eastern Prussia is dangerous in itself, but most important, it bears immediately on the issues in Asia.

Americans today are in no mood to take any wooden nickels. The dilly-dallying with the emperor in Japan must stop, and incidentally Joseph Grew must really be retired from public life and in no case appointed to any post dealing with far-eastern affairs.

The United States must disavow Chiang Kai-shek's plans for civil war in China and give no support whatsoever to such a project. Vigilance of the Nation is required today, a responsibility which falls particularly upon the labor movement.

EXHIBIT No. 172

[From the Daily Worker, New York, Thursday, September 9, 1945, p. 2]

STATE DEPARTMENT REQUIRES "SOFT PEACE" ADVOCATE

WASHINGTON, September 5 (UP).—Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, shaping a stiff occupation policy toward Japan, today was replacing old-line Japanese policy-making officials in the State Department with experts on China.

Eugene Douman, special assistant to the director of the Department's Far Eastern Division, retired on August 31, it was revealed today, after 33 years of diplomatic service in the Japanese department. He was born in Japan and has been criticized by liberal publications for a "soft" attitude toward Japan.

He had held a key spot in formulating occupation procedure for Japan as chairman of a joint State, Army, and Navy Department committee responsible for occupation policy.

John Carter Vincent, chief of the State Department's Division of Chinese Affairs, was recalled hurriedly from his vacation to fill Dooman's place on the committee. Vincent also retained his China post.

OTHERS MAY GO

Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew's recent resignation, and Dooman's retirement intensified speculation that Byrnes would replace other old liners in the Japanese section. Mentioned prominently were Ballantine and Erie R. Dickover, Chief of the Japanese Section.

Observers regarded it significant that Vincent was the second China specialist to be appointed to a vital Japanese policy-making post within the last few days.

Byrnes yesterday appointed United States Minister to Thailand George Atcheson to be acting political adviser to Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Both Vincent and Atcheson have spent years in China and have seen the effects of Japanese aggression. Atcheson was aboard the U. S. S. *Panay* when the Japanese bombed it on December 12, 1937.

At his press conference Byrnes made it clear that United States policy toward Japan was more stringent than had yet been disclosed.

Asked if he had seen reports that the Japanese did not believe they had lost the war, he said the terms of the occupation would soon be presented to the Japanese and if they didn't bring defeat home to them he didn't know what would.

Mr. BUDENZ, May I state, Mr. Chairman, that I have one more exhibit, which while I have taken it out of order is slightly different, it indicates the continuation of the campaign against Mr. Grew in order to drive him completely out of public life, as the editorial of August 18 stated, and this is a very large display article playing up with a great deal of praise John Stewart Service for having been vindicated after he had allegedly taken State Department documents and given them to Philip Jaffe.

After his vindication and reinstatement in the State Department this says—

"So sorry," says Grew; State Department reinstates man he called spy.

There is a very prominent picture of John Service, and it says—

Mr. Grew, late but unlamented Undersecretary of the State Department, popped off, too.

Then they go on to indicate that Grew was compelled personally to apologize to one of the victims of the witch hunt, John S. Service, who was reinstated to his State Department job.

So there was nothing that poor Mr. Grew could do but echo the American equivalent of the Japanese "so sorry" which he learned after a long sojourn in Tokyo.

This is written up by a special writer for the Daily Worker and plays up Mr. Service, and of course belittles Mr. Grew.

Senator O'CONNOR. I would like to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.

Senator O'CONNOR. In view of your reference just made I am going to ask the question whether you considered Amerasia a Communist publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. Amerasia was organized, according to official information given to me, under complete Communist auspices. As a matter of fact, the first copy of Amerasia when it first appeared was presented to me before it ever appeared to get my opinion. This

was done, however, within the Communist apparatus and not by the Amerasia people.

After I passed on it it went back to the Politburo. They said it had been submitted to me first before publication.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean issue No. 1 of volume No. 1 was submitted to you for approval?

Mr. BUDENZ. For my comments as to whether it was going to perform its task.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce the previous photostat we were discussing into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 173" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 173

[From the Daily Worker, New York, August 24, 1943, p. 4]

"SO SORRY," SAYS GREW; STATE DEPARTMENT REINSTATES MAN HE CALLED SPY

(By John Meldon)

Yes, sir; it was all quite a mistake—but you won't find acknowledgment in those newspapers which screamed "Spy ring" a short time back.

You recall the case: Five men and a woman were arrested and the Scripps-Howard press and Dirty Willie's Journal American and Mirror, as well as the staid Times, ran the story in banner headlines. The six were accused—by the press and not the authorities—of conspiring a "spy ring" with "connections" with those awful Communists.

For several days the newspapers raved and ranted, and Mr. Grew, late but unlamented Under Secretary of the State Department, popped off, too. He hinted darkly that the six accused—three employees of the State Department and several editors and writers for the magazine Amerasia—had done everything but back a Mack truck up to the State Department and expropriate all sorts of "confidential" documents relating to the China situation.

Payoff came yesterday when Mr. Grew personally apologized to one of the victims of the witchhunt—John S. Service—who was reinstated to his State Department job by Secretary Byrnes. In putting Service back on the job, Mr. Byrnes praised Service to the skies for his excellent 12-year record with the Department. So there was nothing that poor Mr. Grew could do but echo the American equivalent of the Japanese "so sorry" which he learned after a long sojourn in Tokyo.

But do you think the newspapers which went to town on the "spy ring" phony had anything to say yesterday? Of course not. For that matter when, on last August 10 only three of the original group accused were indicted—not as spies, mind you, but on the far less serious charge of removing documents without permission—the newspapers buried the fact in little one-column stories somewhere back among the want ads.

However, don't get the idea Mr. Howard or Mr. Dirty Willie are sorry. They accomplished what they set out to do. They planted a terrific lie and some of it stuck. You see, the whole thing behind the story is that the accused group were fed up with Mr. Grew's policies toward our Chinese allies. So Mr. Grew and the big-circulation press called them.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony previously that the first issue of Amerasia appeared in 1937.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. While the campaign against Mr. Grew and Mr. Dooman was proceeding with respect to policy for Japan, was there a policy in the Communist Party councils also being carried out with respect to certain officials concerning our China policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; definitely. As we have indicated here it was against Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, against Ambassador and Gen. Patrick Hurley.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow the same procedure with respect to this folder. Mr. Mandel, will you testify as to the contents of that folder?

Mr. MANDEL. All copies from the Daily Worker appearing in this folder have been prepared at my direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Photostatic copies?

Mr. MANDEL. Some are photostated and a couple are typed.

Mr. MORRIS. I am forwarding this list to the witness, Mr. Chairman, so that it will refresh his recollection in testifying to the coming incidents.

Mr. BUDENZ. This first photostatic copy of the Daily Worker is linked up with the campaign on Grew to some extent in addition to the campaign on Hurley. It was engineered, to my knowledge, by the Communist Party—that is, by official reports that I have received. This was the statement by 21 prominent Americans urging President Truman to avert the serious danger of civil war in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt at this point to show that these 21 people who signed the statement, which according to the testimony of Mr. Budenz was signed to influence our foreign policy, that a great number of them were connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to go through that list with this in mind. Mr. Budenz, have you a copy of the list?

Mr. BUDENZ. It appears here in the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if we could linger here for a minute and I would like to ask you to read out the names.

Mr. BUDENZ. All of them?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. Dr. Phyllis Ackerman; F. A. Bisson, writer—

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that we have had testimony concerning Mr. Bisson's relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. BUDENZ. Mrs. Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Is she the wife of Edward C. Carter, the secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is my understanding.

Mr. MORRIS. Continue, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. Maurice P. Davidson, lawyer; Israel Epstein, correspondent.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that we have had testimony that Israel Epstein was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. BUDENZ. Frederick V. Field, member, executive committee, Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that speaks for itself, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BUDENZ. Melvin J. Fox; Talitha Gerlach, Young Women's Christian Association—

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that Talitha Gerlach, according to previous testimony, has been associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. BUDENZ. Freda Kirchwey, editor, the Nation; Lewis Merrill, president, United Office and Professional Workers of America;

Frederick N. Myers, vice president, National Maritime Union; Rev. Richard Morton, executive secretary, United Church Council for Democracy; Arthur Upham Pope, director, Iranian Institute; Martin Popper, executive secretary, National Lawyers Guild; Lawrence E. Salisbury, editor, Far Eastern Survey.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the Far Eastern Survey is the official publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Budenz, do you know Mr. Martin Popper?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have talked to him on the phone and my impression is that I have met him.

Senator SMITH. Do you know about his alleged trip to Russia in the spring of 1946?

Mr. BUDENZ. I don't recall that.

Senator SMITH. Did you know about that?

Mr. BUDENZ. I couldn't recall it offhand. His relations with the Daily Worker were of the closest.

Senator SMITH. I saw him in Europe myself, and it was alleged that he went from Nuremberg to Russia and I wondered if you knew about it.

Mr. BUDENZ. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that will be enough, Mr. Budenz.

The purpose of that, Mr. Chairman, was to show the high incidence of the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations which participated in that which Mr. Budenz described as a Communist maneuver.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a list on some document addressed to the President?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it arranged by the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of that?

Mr. BUDENZ. August 17, 1945.

Senator O'CONNOR. I do understand, Mr. Budenz, that you either are prepared to say or have said it that the telegram was signed by the individuals in their individual capacity? You did make reference to certain organizations such as the Young Women's Christian Association.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONNOR. I do not think you wanted to give any impression that they were speaking for the organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. No; but this is a typical Communist procedure, putting the organization down and giving the impression that they are linked up in some way. I might say that they call themselves the Friends of Chinese Democracy. It was a committee called that, so it was under the cover of that committee.

Senator SMITH. The same might be said with respect to the National Lawyers Guild, Mr. Martin Popper of the National Lawyers Guild?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I would prefer not to discuss the National Lawyers Guild today because I have to indict it and that would take quite a bit of time.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that all there is to this particular one?

Mr. BUDENZ. There is another name, Ilona Ralf Sues, writer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and given the proper designation.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 174" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 174

[From the Daily Worker, New York, Friday, August 17, 1945, p. 2]

AMERICANS IN PLEA TO TRUMAN ON CHINA

Twenty-one prominent Americans yesterday urged President Truman to avert the serious danger of civil war in China. They demanded immediate steps to prevent American planes and other military equipment from being turned over to the Chungking government.

Pointing out that Chiang Kai-shek has made a direct appeal to the Japanese troops "to retain their arms and equipment for the maintenance of public order," the telegram to Truman stated that "the only American policy which will avoid civil war is not to interfere with the surrender of Japanese troops to patriotic Chinese groups on the spot.

The message to President Truman noted that the Communist led Eighth Route and new Fourth Armies which Chiang Kai-shek is preparing to attack 'have borne the brunt of the Allied fight in North Central China.

SIGNERS

The telegram was signed by the following in their individual capacities (organizations listed for purpose of identification only):

Dr. Phyllis Ackerman; T. A. Bisson, writer; Mrs. Edward C. Carter; Maurice P. Davidson, lawyer; Israel Epstein, correspondent; Frederick V. Field, member, executive committee, Institute of Pacific Relations; Melvin J. Fox; Talitha Gerlach, Young Women's Christian Association; Freda Kirchwey, editor, the Nation; Lewis Merrill, president, United Office and Professional Workers of America; Frederick N. Myers, vice president, National Maritime Union.

Rev. Richard Morton, executive secretary, United Church Council for Democracy; Arthur Upham Pope, director, Iranian Institute; Martin Popper, executive secretary, National Lawyers Guild; Lawrence E. Salisbury, editor, Far Eastern Survey; Vincent Sheean, writer; Mrs. Edgar Snow, writer; Ilona Ralf Sues, writer; Richard Watts, writer; Dr. Max Yergan, director, Council on African Affairs, and Reid Robinson, president, Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, CIO.

A committee called The Friends of Chinese Democracy, is being formed, the purpose of which will be to press for an American foreign policy designed to support all efforts of the Chinese people for unity and democratic government, it was announced yesterday.

The full text of the message to President Truman follows:

"We are alarmed at the news that the Chungking government is planning to use American planes and other military equipment made available to them by General Wedemeyer and Ambassador Hurley to combat the perfectly legitimate efforts of patriotic Chinese forces in north and central China engaged in disarming enemy troops and liberating areas in which they alone have fought throughout the war.

"If these plans are carried out it can only mean civil war in China instead of Chinese democratic unity on which the security of the Far East depends.

"We are particularly disturbed by Chiang Kai-shek's recent order to Chinese puppet troops who have been serving the Japanese enemy and who now apparently are to be used by the Chungking and American Governments against patriotic forces.

"The latter, despite never having received any assistance from the United States or Chungking, have borne the brunt of the Allied fight in north and central China, cooperated with American military personnel and rescued almost 100 American airmen forced down in the vicinity of Peiping, Taiyuan, Hankow, Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong.

ENCOURAGES FOW

"Generalissimo Chiang, moreover, encourages continued resistance of the enemy by inviting them to police the areas which they hold at present, and by stating that they will be held "strictly accountable" for arms which they or their puppets "might surrender to any organization or party other than officers or men duly authorized by the Chinese (Central) Government."

If carried out, such a policy would violate the purposes of this war. It would seriously jeopardize the peace that has been won. Americans would not support a policy toward China similar to that of the British in Greece.

Under circumstances existing in China today we believe that the only American policy which will avoid civil war is not to interfere with the surrender to patriotic Chinese troops on the spot and simultaneously to encourage all Chinese efforts to a democratic government.

"Such action must be based on full agreement with Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

"In appealing to you, Mr. President, we reflect the views of thousands of Americans, including many of those serving in the Armed Forces in China."

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any other articles, Mr. Budenz, establishing the point that the Communists were then carrying on a policy such as you testified to?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Having disposed of Grew and Dooman, the campaign was laid before I left the party, and it was already under way, as you can see from these editorials to which I have referred, for attack on Ambassador Hurley, which was more prolonged than we have indicated here. I say, before I left the party because these copies of the Daily Worker are after I am out of the party.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Mr. BUDENZ. However, I recognize them as copies of the Daily Worker which I have read.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue your testimony on that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Just on that point, do you intend to follow up, Mr. Morris, as regards the attack on General Wedemeyer? If not I would like to ask a question or two. If you have it in the course of your presentation, all right.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you prepared to testify about the campaign against General Wedemeyer, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not in great detail. I just know that this campaign in the Daily Worker was carried out to the various sections of the Communist Party and was made the order of business for the Communists in other organizations.

The CHAIRMAN. I am interested in that phase of the campaign which seems to have been pointed toward General Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer was at that time, or at some time either prior to or subsequently sent under the auspices of the State Department to China, as I recall?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And was the representative of the State Department in China. Was it during that time that he was attacked by the Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is my impression. As a matter of fact, the Communists viewed General Wedemeyer as the enemy of the Soviet interests in the Far East.

The CHAIRMAN. General Wedemeyer's report was a controversial thing here for a long time and was refused to congressional committees even under subpoena when we issued subpoenas for the presentation of General Wedemeyer's report on China and the Far East.

I am just wondering why the attack was directed against Wedemeyer, if you know.

Mr. BUDENZ. The attack was directed against Wedemeyer from the Communist viewpoint because they consider him to be an enemy of Soviet policy in the Far East. The policy of the Communists was to work out a coalition government in which they could strangle those who coalesced with them. That was the phrase used in the discussion so that I am not straining the question.

General Wedemeyer's tendencies—I can't go into them in detail, were in opposition to that course—that is, at least to the extent that the Communists viewed him as one who would not go along fully with their program.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator WATKINS. With respect to General Wedemeyer, the public press reported him to have told about a time when he was appointed Ambassador to China and then his appointment was canceled because some interests in China objected. Do you know anything about that campaign about getting his appointment canceled?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not specifically. I know there was a general campaign against General Wedemeyer as one of those in our diplomatic service who was inimical to Soviet interests.

Senator WATKINS. Do you recall his testimony where he said he bought his clothing for that particular assignment?

Mr. BUDENZ. I read in the public press and that is the only knowledge I have.

Senator WATKINS. Were you connected with the party at that time? That goes back a number of years.

Mr. BUDENZ. That I am not sure of. I don't know the date of it, and I would want to be precise.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. When General Wedemeyer's report was held up, do you know, Mr. Budenz, enough about the influence of the Communists on anybody in State Department that tended to cause that report to be held up; and, if so, how was that worked out?

Mr. BUDENZ. Of my own knowledge I wouldn't know that. I wouldn't know everything about Communist activity. But I do know that the Communists relied very strongly on Service and John Carter Vincent in the campaign against Ambassador Hurley, for example.

Senator SMITH. Was a part of the campaign against General Wedemeyer to have his report suppressed, as it was indeed suppressed for several years?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Smith, it may be that Mr. Budenz' experience in the Communist Party terminated in 1945. Was not General Wedemeyer's report issued subsequent to that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is my impression.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, you have been testifying up to this point with regard to the people that the Communists planned to eliminate from the State Department because they interfered with Communist policy. What people were you relying on to put over your policy?

The CHAIRMAN. The policy of elimination?

Mr. MORRIS. The policy of elimination. Let's take the Japanese situation first. Did the Communist Party make use of Owen Lattimore or Owen Lattimore's writings with respect to Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes, we see that with respect to Japan policy and others.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you elaborate on that?

Mr. BUDENZ. His book, *Solution in Asia*, was it not?—was used by the Communists and other writings of his.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not testify about a certain press release yesterday?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is what I referred to just now.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify that, please?

Mr. BUDENZ. This press release we can see runs in line with the Communist charges here against everybody; that they are for the retention of vested interest in Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. To what press release do you refer when you say "this press release"?

Mr. BUDENZ. This was a press release which was introduced in evidence the other day issued in 1945. I don't say that I have any knowledge that Mr. Lattimore conferred with the Communists before making the statement. I do say that this statement was used extensively by the Communists to my knowledge, it was made a special order of business for the Communist Party to press it.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that supplemented the Communist campaign to eliminate Grew from the State Department?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And also in imposing a hard peace on Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Were any writings of Andrew Roth used for this purpose?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Dilemma in Japan was not only advanced by the Communists but it was submitted to the Politburo before publication.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Andrew Roth a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, from many official reports he was a Communist. These came up particularly in the Amerasia case and definitely Mr. Roth was described as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that Andrew Roth's book was used to supplement this Communist campaign?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most decidedly.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, was John Carter Vincent a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. From official reports that I have received, he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he went to China with Henry Wallace and Owen Lattimore?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear at that time in official Communist Party circles that John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore were members of the Communist Party traveling with Henry Wallace?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would elaborate on that.

Mr. BUDENZ. As I have stated, the trip by Wallace to China was followed by the Communists with a great deal of interest in discussions in the Politburo. In those discussions it was pointed out that Mr. Wallace was more or less under good influences from the Communist viewpoint, that is to say, that he had on one hand Mr. Lattimore and on the other John Carter Vincent, both of whom were

described as being in line with the Communist viewpoint, seeing eye to eye with it, and that they would guide Mr. Wallace largely along those paths.

The CHAIRMAN. To what are you referring, are you referring to publications or statements made in party conclave, or statements made by high officials of the Communist Party or to what are you referring when you say that it was stated that Mr. Wallace was under good influence?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was stated by Communist officials in the Politburo at that time, by Mr. Browder and Mr. Jack Stachel. This is also confirmed to some degree, not the Wallace business but the dependence on John Stewart Service and John Carter Vincent, that is confirmed by the Daily Worker's subsequent statement that they were responsible to a great degree for getting Mr. Hurley out of the State Department.

Senator O'CONNOR. Mr. Budenz, at that point could I ask you if you knew what position John Carter Vincent held at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. I could not. I know as yet he wasn't head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department and that he was subsequently placed in that Division.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that it was an official Communist Party secret shared by a few people that at that time John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Was one of the objectives of the Communists to put Mr. Vincent in the position he afterward acquired?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Communists were eager that Mr. Vincent advance and that he obtain a place in the State Department where he could get rid of Hurley and in addition to that could also influence policy.

Senator SMITH. Was that purpose achieved by his being put in the position that he was placed in?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Mr. Dooman was got out and he was put in his place.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read extracts from Henry Wallace's book at that time which elaborates on Mr. Budenz' testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. What was the name of the book and when was it published?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from the book entitled "Soviet Asia Mission," by Henry A. Wallace, published by Reynal & Hitchcock, the following two paragraphs on page 172.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you the date of the publication?

Mr. MANDEL. It was 1944 or 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. This is Henry Wallace's writing.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

We spent the night of July 4 at Chita. In the evening I had a long talk with Sergei Goglidze. He was curious about the Chinese situation. I replied in the spirit of the Chungking joint statement. Like other Russian officials Goglidze was concerned about the strength of the anti-Soviet elements in China. He was anxious that China remain united in the war against Japan and was conscious of the vital role the United States has in China's future. His feelings were revealed in telling incidents during our entire journey.

One night at dinner the Russian airman, Mazuruk, proposed a toast: "To the modernization of China." Goglidze immediately suggested a logical modification: "May China remain in the war." Without victory over Japanese militarism,

China could hardly have the necessary freedom for modernization. At dinner, after our return from China, Goglidze offered a significant toast to "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, is there anything in the previous paragraph that identifies who Goglidze was?

Mr. MANDEL. Goglidze, according to the same book, was a Georgian, an intimate friend of Marshal Stalin, president of the executive committee of Khabarovsk Territory, under which this far northern area is governed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like this introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit, this excerpt from Mr. Wallace's book. But I would like to ask Mr. Budenz a question on that last toast Mr. Goglidze proposed.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be inserted in the record and properly marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 175" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 175

SOVIET ASIA MISSION

(By Henry A. Wallace—Regnal and Hitchcock)

I was assisted by expert interpreters who accompanied me. They were, in addition to Mr. Lattimore: Mr. John Hazard, Chief Liaison Officer, Division for Soviet Supply, Foreign Economic Administration of Chinese Affairs, State Department (p. 21).

We spent the night of July 4 at Chita. In the evening I had a long talk with Sergei Goglidze. He was curious about the Chinese situation. I replied in the spirit of the Chungking joint statement. Like other Russian officials Goglidze was concerned about the strength of the anti-Soviet elements in China. He was anxious that China remain united in the war against Japan and was conscious of the vital role the United States has in China's future. His feelings were revealed in telling incidents during our entire journey.

One night at dinner the Russian airman, Mazuruk, proposed a toast: "To the modernization of China." Goglidze immediately suggested a logical modification: "May China remain in the war." Without victory over Japanese militarism, China could hardly have the necessary freedom for modernization. At dinner, after our return from China, Goglidze offered a significant toast to "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future" (p. 172).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you hear the toast that Goglidze proposed, "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future"? As an expert on the Communist movement, bearing in mind the fact that Mr. Goglidze was an intimate of Marshal Stalin and that he made that toast, would it have any significance to you?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think it speaks for itself. I think it speaks for itself that the Russians always make these toasts for political purposes. Of course, everybody they toast is not a Communist, but I think that they were definitely trying to establish the place of Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent in Mr. Wallace's mind for Mr. Wallace and also placing upon them the responsibility.

Mr. MORRIS. When Mr. Goglidze speaks of China's future he does it with what in view?

Mr. BUDENZ. Definitely he does it with the view of a Red China, that is no secret, that was told us long ago and was the whole program.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you any letters there showing John Carter Vincent's relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. John Carter Vincent—

The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading from?

Mr. MANDEL. I am reading from a list of attendance at the discussion conference held in Washington, D. C., of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations held December 9 to 10, 1943, and Mr. John Carter Vincent attended that conference. He was also a conference member of the Hot Springs IPR conference held January 6 to 17, 1945, according to a volume called Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, on page 159.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, is there anything showing when Mr. Vincent was a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. No, I do not have that.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you make that a part of the record later today?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

DECEMBER 27, 1944.

Mr. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,

Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: This is just a last minute reminder to you about the conference. According to our records, you are expected during the following dates: January 9 through 17.

I would urge you to carefully observe the following suggestions:

1. There are no additional copies of data papers available. This means that you should bring your data papers with you or have them sent to you care of room 250, which is the headquarters of the American delegation. Any papers so sent should get out as soon as possible in order for them to arrive by January 5.

2. Additional data papers, not previously distributed, are being mailed direct to Hot Springs and will be distributed to you upon arrival.

3. Prior to January 4, please notify us of any change in your schedule by telegram to this office. After January 4, please notify us of any such change by writing us at room 250, The Homestead, Hot Springs, Va.

The following is a listing we have for you in the conference who's who. If you have any changes, will you please let me know immediately:

"Chief, China Section, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State. Member, Board of Trustees, American Council, IPR."

I need not impress upon you again the importance of this meeting nor urge that you keep us informed of your plans.

Looking forward to seeing you at our sessions in Hot Springs, I am,

Very cordially yours,

RAYMOND DENNERT, *Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any letters, Mr. Mandel, that we can introduce at this time?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated February 4, 1944. It is really a memorandum headed "W. L. H.," presumably William L. Holland, "from M. S. F.," presumably Miriam S. Farley. It says: "Copy to H. M." That might be Harriet Moore.

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China.

The Ms. has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others. Vincent said (in confidence), with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive rewriting.

Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail.

That is an excerpt from the memorandum which is offered as an exhibit.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as the next consecutive exhibit and then I would like to ask Mr. Budenz a question.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record and properly marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 176" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 176

FEBRUARY 4, 1944.

W. L. H. from M. S. F.
(Copy to H. M.)

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China.

The Ms. has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others. Vincent said (in confidence), and with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail.

I am now editing the Ms. in the light of suggestions from Fairbank, Vincent and others. I have also to consider the author, who is not in favor of toning it down any more. Nevertheless I am making some changes along lines recommended by Fairbank, though not, likely, enough to satisfy him completely. My position is that I am willing, in fact, anxious, to go to any lengths to avoid offending Chinese sensibilities, provided this does not destroy the pamphlet's value for American readers. Our purpose in issuing it is to provide information for Americans, not to influence Chinese national policy. It would be useless for this purpose if it were written so subtly that ordinary Americans would not get anything out of it.

Personally I doubt that the China Council will leave the IPR because of this or anything else in similar vein. They have more to lose than the IPR by such action, though naturally they will use threats for what they are worth. I am inclined to agree with Max that they respect us more if we don't knuckle under to them.

The American Council is of course prepared to take full responsibility for this pamphlet and will quite understand if the Secretariat wishes to disown it. Nevertheless we should welcome your views. Perhaps I have assumed too much from the meagerness of your comments on the original Ms.; if so, please let me know. I shall be glad to show you the revised Ms. if you care to see it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, have you previously testified that Maxwell Stewart is a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I have met him as such.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that John Fairbank is a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; not by personally meeting him but by official reports, particularly in 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. You have already testified that John Carter Vincent was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Now I call your attention to the second paragraph in that letter, Mr. Budenz. Will you read that second paragraph? Mr. Budenz, the "Ms." stands for manuscript, I believe.

Mr. BUDENZ. "I am now editing the manuscript"——

Mr. MORRIS. The second paragraph.

Mr. BUDENZ. I beg your pardon.

The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others. Vincent said, in confidence, with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail.

Senator O'CONNOR. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator O'CONNOR.

Senator O'CONNOR. Mr. Budenz, I particularly note the parenthesis that John Vincent said in confidence and with a certain emphasis. Can you give any reason why any such statement should be made in confidence or just what significance that had?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. It certainly was part of the Communist plan to protect, as I have said, those who were in key and delicate positions and therefore what he would give would be in confidence so that his name could not be used extensively but for immediate purposes involved among those in whom he had confidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, from your own experience was it a practice before a manuscript was issued that it be looked over by members of the Communist Party for perfection?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you elaborate on that a bit for us?

Mr. BUDENZ. Of course, that doesn't prove this was looked over by Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. I understand.

Mr. BUDENZ. That was a practice; that is to say, frequently a pamphlet was referred to the Politburo or to someone immediately in charge of that particular work involved. He would then assign it to two or three people to look it over. I have looked over pamphlets and then people outside the immediate Communist apparatus would look over it for determination as to whether it stood up for the Marxist viewpoint, and to see whether it met the peculiar exigencies of the moment.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know with respect to this particular document, the author of which was Maxwell Stewart, read by John Carter Vincent and John Fairbank, that they were members of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a brief slip taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations that is undated, which is headed "E. C. C." and the name of Mortimer Graves is attached at the end. It reads as follows:

I have been asked by the Council of American Soviet Friendship to call together a few people in Washington for discussion of a Washington Information Center on the U. S. S. R. I can't spend any time on the matter myself but am quite willing to get a group together for lunch. Does this conflict in any way with Russian War Relief plans or anything of that sort? If so, of course, I won't participate. Hope to write something on the other matter tomorrow. Currie is waiting to see John Carter Vincent, just back from Chungking.

Mr. MORRIS. That is signed "Mortimer Graves"?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be so inserted and identified.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 177" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 177

E. C. C.:

I have been asked by Council of American-Soviet Friendship to call together a few people in Washington for discussion of a Washington Information Center on the U. S. S. R. I can't spend any time on the matter myself but am quite willing to get a group together for lunch. Does this conflict in any way with Russian War Relief plans or anything of that sort? If so, I won't participate. Hope to write something on the other matter tomorrow. Currie is waiting to see John Carter Vincent, just back from Chungking.

MORTIMER GRAVES.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you have any comments to make on that particular memorandum?

Mr. BUDENZ. I don't think so. I don't think so unless you want to ask me some question about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the Council of American-Soviet Friendship a Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was a Communist front. That was a duplicate, if I may use the word duplicate here, because of many other organizations involved, founded by the Russian apparatus all over the world. They were first known as Friends of Soviet Russia and then became the Council of American-Soviet Friendship, completely controlled by the Communists, as it was created by them.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the staff of the Russian War Relief made up of Communists, Mr. Budenz, to your knowledge?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; at least to my knowledge. I don't know that I can detail them at the moment.

Mr. MORRIS. Generally would you describe it?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Russian War Relief was organized by the Communists. It was organized under orders of the Soviet Embassy, at least from the statements made in the Politburo that they had received instruction to see that Russian War Relief was not only organized but made efficient and this matter was discussed on many occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you continue with your going through those exhibits there with the view toward supplementing your testimony on the point that Communists were influencing our foreign policy with respect to China?

Mr. BUDENZ. These are Daily Workers published after I left the Communist Party, but I recognize them as copies of the Daily Worker I have read, as I continue to read the Daily Worker up to the present day. This one is dated November 28, 1945, page 3, Hurley Out as Envoy to China, Backs War Policy in Far East.

The paragraph to which I wish to direct your attention here, the one at least in my opinion that should be given attention, reads:

It is well known that liberal elements like John Carter Vincent and John S. Service in the State Department have opposed Hurley's reappointment. The former Ambassador continually sought to bypass them in his one-man rule of the Embassy in China.

It is a significant reflection of his mentality that all his critics are called Communists—

By the way, the Communists made particular point of attacking Hurley's mentality, representing him as a crude fellow. I could, if I had time, give you many examples, but they wouldn't be profitable.

It is a significant reflection of his mentality that all his critics are called Communists, and his main fire was centered on "the considerable section of our State Department which is endeavoring to support communism generally as well as specifically in China."

This article is significant beyond being an article in the Daily Worker because it is a specially written article by Joseph Starobin, foreign editor of the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you managing editor of the Daily Worker at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. I was not.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you describe the significance of the language there, "liberal elements like John Carter Vincent and John S. Service in the State Department"?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is generally used, liberal and progressive, for those who are Communist or pro-Communist. It doesn't necessarily mean that, however, but I think these speak for themselves.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you know about John Stewart Service, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I might add that those who are allies of the Communists, and some may be unconsciously, are designated as liberals. Progressives are always identified as Communists, so when the Communists speak of liberals they mean those that go along with Communist policy either because of their own self interest or because of being in line with the Communist views.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, in this case I notice they use the term "liberal" in connection with John Carter Vincent.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Yet at the same time you knew that Vincent was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes; the stressing of Vincent and Service as "liberal" by Starobin the moment Hurley is thrown out is significant. They are being recommended as people who stand for the things that the Daily Worker stands for.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, before you introduce that, did you want this one introduced?

Mr. MORRIS. That is the one I referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been identified by the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the one the witness referred to?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record and properly designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 178" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 178

[From the Daily Worker, New York, November 23, 1945, p. 2]

HURLEY OPE AS ENVOY TO CHINA, BACKS WAR POLICY IN FAR EAST

(By Joseph Starobin)

Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley resigned yesterday from the post of Ambassador to Chungking with a statement indicating an all-out drive of the Hoover Republicans and American imperialists to encourage the Truman administration's headlong intervention in China.

Hurley's inflammatory 1,500-word statement was essentially the voice of those American imperialists who are openly anti-Soviet and call everything democratic in Europe and Asia a manifestation of "Communist imperialism."

At the same time, it was a criticism of American support for British imperialism in Asia in the sense that Hurley feels American capital should be getting more out of support for Britain than it is now getting.

The decision not to return as Ambassador in China came after weeks of a varied criticism of Hurley's policies from liberal experts on China, from the labor movement, from six progressive west coast Congressmen and even from the Republican independent paper, the New York Herald Tribune.

BLATANT POLICY SEEN

The White House immediately announced the appointment of Gen. George G. Marshall, who resigned last week as Chief of Staff.

This choice of a conservative military man gave no indication that American policy is today concerned with conciliation or peace in China.

Hurley, while criticizing the professional diplomats in the State Department—that is, the civilian pro-Roosevelt elements who have been increasingly worried by where our policy is going—nevertheless associated himself completely with President Truman and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.

Major political interest was focused yesterday on the Hurley resignation, since it indicates the various personal, factional, and political conflicts within the administration. These in turn reflect the great popular alarm with the administration's course.

The way to take advantage of these conflicts, of course, is not to bank on their stopping the Truman-Byrnes policy, but to redouble pressure on all elements in the administration.

HURLEY LANGUAGE

Hurley used the characteristic language of the Hoover-Vandenberg crowd. He claimed to be favoring "democracy and free enterprise" against "imperialism and communism."

He was full of praise for the Atlantic Charter and was bitter at the "professional Foreign Service men," who, he said, were sympathetic to the "Communist armed party in China."

It is well known that liberal elements like John Carter Vincent and John S. Service in the State Department have opposed Hurley's reappointment. The former Ambassador continually sought to bypass them in his one-man rule of the Embassy in China.

It is a significant reflection of his mentality that all his critics are called Communists, and his main fire was centered on "the considerable section of our State Department which is endeavoring to support communism generally as well as specifically in China."

STEP UP "QUIT CHINA" FIGHT IN CONGRESS

(By Art Shields)

Washington, Nov. 27.—Ambassador Patrick Hurley's resignation, and his replacement by General Marshall, will not stop the congressional campaign to end America's intervention in China.

"Regardless of who is the ambassador to Chungking, we will press for the passage of our anti-intervention resolution until the Marines and GIs and transports are taken out of China," declared Representative Hugh DeLacy (Democrat, Washington), the leader of the group.

The stop-the-intervention drive will be pushed at two meetings on Capitol Hill tomorrow.

At 4:30 p. m., a number of congressmen are expected to meet in the Indian Affairs Room to press for action by the Foreign Affairs Committee.

DeLacy, Charles Savage, (Democrat, Washington), John M. Coffee (Democrat, Washington) and Ellis E. Paterson, Ned R. Healy and Helen Gahagan Douglas, California Democrats who sponsored the resolution, will be joined by others.

At 2 p. m. DeLacy is calling a meeting of representatives of the CIO, the AFL, Americans United, the Young Men's Christian Association and other groups.

Representative Savage told this reporter yesterday:

"Trade unions, farm organizations and many individuals are writing me daily against the intervention. We are getting more letters on the China issue than on anything else except army demobilization."

"We expect early action by the Foreign Affairs Committee. The pressure for such action will continue."

Hurley's leave taking must be followed by an exodus of Hurley's policies, said DeLacy today.

"The resignation of Ambassador Hurley," he said, "presents the Secretary of State with a great opportunity."

Mr. BUDENZ. We have here November 22, page 9, an article in the Daily Worker written by Helen Simon, who to my knowledge was a very important member of the staff of the Daily Worker and also engaged in Soviet underground international work through Mexico and other places.

The CHAIRMAN. November 22 of what year?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1945, excuse me, Senator, page 9.

This article deals with "Social Workers Get the Truth About China." It is carrying forward clearly the Communist campaign on this question.

Mr. MORRIS. May I see that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that in this article the following people were mentioned and these people have been identified by this committee as Communists and as associating with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Paragraph 2 reads:

Gunther Stein, Christian Science Monitor correspondent in China and author of Challenge of Red China, making his first public appearance in New York since his return, painted a picture of the feudalism that has been China's centuries-old curse.

Do you know that Gunther Stein was a member of the Communist Party, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, and also that he was engaged in Soviet undercover work.

Mr. MORRIS. And I think, Mr. Chairman, we have put into the record his associations with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. At a later paragraph in the same article, Mr. Budenz, we find the following:

Israel Epstein, who represented the New York Times on the American correspondents' trip to Yenan last summer, contrasted the genuine cooperatives in Yenan areas to the so-called credit cooperatives in Kuomintang areas which serve to line the landlords' pockets, and "cooperative hostels" where ragged workers are not allowed.

Did you know that Israel Epstein was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Israel Epstein was emphasized as one of the most important Communists in regard to Far East affairs. There was great solicitude in getting him into this country, and J. Peters said he was also engaged in Soviet undercover work.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced evidence of his association with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Later in the article, Mr. Budenz, it reads:

Chu Tong, an editor of the New York China Daily News, rounded out the picture.

Then it goes on to say :

The feudal evil is allied with foreign imperialism, he explained, outlining the 100-year history of Anglo-American intervention which "has always been on the wrong side."

Did you know that the New York China Daily News was a Communist publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and properly identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 179" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 179

[From the Daily Worker, New York, November 22, 1945, p. 9]

SOCIAL WORKERS GET THE TRUTH ABOUT CHINA

By Helen Simon

The CIO social service workers who attended Local 19 forum on the crisis in China Monday night were outraged and angry. The speakers, outstanding experts in the field, presented the facts and the union members felt that now they were better armed to fight America's undemocratic intervention and to get their men folk home.

Gunther Stein, Christian Science Monitor correspondent in China and author of Challenge of Red China, making his first public appearance in New York since his return, painted a picture of the feudalism that has been China's centuries-old curse.

FEUDALISM CITED

The Chungking government is based on the identical feudal landlords, money lenders, parasites who had to be ousted from power in 18th and 19th century Europe to make way for industrialization, Stein said. The oriental village, with its thankless primitive toil, its exorbitant rents and innumerable taxes, is the key to China's problem.

Chiang Kai-shek's central government is "corrupt and inefficient;" its control is limited to the Chungking area and based elsewhere on compromise with local chieftains. It is incapable of developing industry—which would be to the interest of American investors—because it does not consider raising mass purchasing power. It is interested in using American loans for a new war industry, for a dumping-export industry—but not for consumption.

This is the feudal set-up which Washington supports, Stein charged. And this is the set up which the Communists undertake to replace.

Stein spoke of rent and tax reduction in Yen-an areas; of the first successful program anywhere in the Orient of village self-government; of doubling farm production and creating ingenious factories despite the blockade.

"The Chungking feudal regime can never win," Stein concluded.

Israel Epstein, who represented the New York Times on the American correspondents' trip to Yen-an last summer, contrasted the genuine cooperatives in Yen-an areas to the so-called credit cooperatives in Kuomintang areas which serve to line the landlords' pockets, and "cooperative hostels" where ragged workers are not allowed.

He compared "trade unions" in Kuomintang China—many of which have no right to strike or bargain collectively—to Yen-an unions which have full rights, even sharing in the planning of government-owned industries and fully responsible for spending the three percent social-security fund paid out by employers.

CONTRAST IN WAGES

As to wages, even official Kuomintang figures admit that real wages dropped 60 percent during the war. In Yen-an two equally beneficial wage systems apply: either the worker receives free rent, three suits a year, food, soap and other goods for himself and an additional one and one-half persons plus a money wage or else his wage is computed by the market price of a fixed measure of millet, the staple food.

There is no free medical care in Kuomintang China while all medical care is free in the north, Epstein reported.

Chu Tong, an editor of the New York China Daily News, rounded out the picture.

The feudal evil is allied with foreign imperialism, he explained, outlining the 100-year history of Anglo-American intervention which "has always been on the wrong side."

The Chinese-American editor demolished arguments currently used to justify the transportation of Kuomintang troops to Communist liberated areas and their armed support by American marines.

It's just to disarm Japanese? But the Japanese are not disarmed and are working alongside Kuomintang, puppet and American troops against Communist-led forces.

We must back the legal government? Was this so of Spain's Republican government? Should Lafayette have helped George III rather than Washington?

WARNS OF UNITED STATES ROLE

We must protect the lives of Americans? But we are risking them by becoming involved in China's civil war. And this traditional excuse for intervention was used by the Japanese, too.

Remember that United States General Wedemeyer said that we must make North China a military base to prevent Russian expansion, Chu Tong warned. Remember that some United States monopolists may be interested in China as an economic colony.

The room teemed with questions when the speakers stopped. What is Russia's role? Russia is not intervening, is withdrawing as promised from Manchuria.

Why was General Stilwell replaced? Because he opposed corruption and inefficiency in the Kuomintang armies and sought cooperation with the Communist-led armies.

RAP INTERVENTION

How do Chinese groups other than Kuomintang and Communists stand? All demand withdrawal of United States troops.

The meeting unanimously passed a resolution condemning United States intervention (see box) and determined to circulate a petition. One girl, to strong applause, urged mass action - meetings, parades, demonstrations.

The wife of a marine now stationed in Tientsin added a note of desperate urgency:

"Our boys don't understand what's happening to them. They are being wine-d, dined, corrupted by the Kuomintang mayor of Tientsin. We've got to get to them somehow and explain how terribly wrong it is to fight against the democratic peoples of China."

Mr. MORRIS. You say this was part of the Communist campaign to influence foreign policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. I can say that definitely because this campaign was organized ahead of time, not with Gunther Stein, but ahead of time for a great number of organizations which were not necessarily Communist organizations but were infiltrated with Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue?

Mr. BUDENZ. This is another article, November 29, 1945, which I have here, page 2, written by Joseph Starobin and, therefore, of very high standing in Communist directives and information, and it says:

State Department career men like Raymond T. Ludden had visited Yenan and brought back favorable impressions; there was an American mission in Yenan, headed by Col. David Barrett, whose reports were also favorable. Newspapermen like Brooks Atkinson, Harrison Forman, and Israel Epstein, who knew China better than Hurley, were telling the truth about both the Kuomintang and the Communists.

Then they go on. This is an attack upon General Hurley, it is quite evident, to belittle Hurley as a man who liked Cadillac cars.

This accounts for his spleen against the "career men," whom he considers "college fellers" and pro-Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry, proceed.

Mr. BUDENZ. "College fellers," by the way, is in quotations to indicate that Hurley is not coherent.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent do you know the Communist affiliation of those people?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know Israel Epstein. I know the close association of Harrison Forman with the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he was intimately connected with the Communist Party; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Raymond Ludden?

Mr. BUDENZ. Raymond Ludden I only know in this way: That the group around Stilwell were constantly referred to as those relied upon to help advance the Communist cause in China. I wouldn't want to indict one individual of that group, although Mr. Ludden is one of them, but the discussions did not refer to individuals.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that, when you were talking about people that the Communists could rely on, the reliance was on the whole group around General Stilwell and not to any one individual?

Mr. BUDENZ. The group around Stilwell, in persuading him to antagonism toward Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. That completes this.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 180" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 180

[From the Daily Worker, New York, November 29, 1945, p. 2]

HURLEY'S COLORFUL CAREER PAINTED IN OIL

(By Joseph Starnin)

Sympathetic newspapers always use the word "colorful" to describe men like Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley. It is part of big business mythology about democracy and free enterprise that such oil speculators (preferably with plenty of gold braid on their shoulders) should run the foreign policy of the United States.

Yet Hurley has colorfully succeeded in master-minding the present warfare in China. The result is that American boys are dying—3 months after V-J day—to bolster a dictatorial regime which the Chinese people themselves don't want.

Who is Hurley, and what do his resignation statements mean?

It does not say enough to call him an imperialist, for so are Byrnes and Truman. For that matter, Roosevelt who appointed and tolerated Hurley, also wanted to advance the specific American interest in Asia.

Hurley is first of all a big-business man, with the typical concern for direct money interests, with the special streak of a frontier background in the old Choctaw Indian territory of Oklahoma, where he was born 62 years ago. He served as attorney for the Choctaw Indians and saw action in the First World War, becoming a colonel by the end of it.

RIG GILMAN

Hurley assisted in organizing the United States Chamber of Commerce in 1912, and was chairman of the Oklahoma Republican State convention in 1926. He did big business in oil development, and was instrumental in forcing Mexico to indemnify the oil interests when their imperialist properties were seized.

And he became, as a reward for services rendered, the Secretary of War in Herbert Hoover's administration, serving from 1929 to 1933. He was in office when Gen. Douglas MacArthur shot down the bonus marchers in 1932. He is, incidentally, a great friend of John L. Lewis.

Hurley's prewar mentality can best be seen from a speech on November 11, 1935, to the Overseas Masonic Lodge at Providence, R. I.

Hurley proposed that western civilization should be saved by an alliance between Germany and Great Britain, impossible as that might seem, he added.

Otherwise, the gates will be opened to an avalanche of orientalism, namely Soviet Russia, he said, from which it would take western civilization a century to recover.

This fear of orientalism sounds funny, doesn't it, in view of Hurley's supposed love for China. What he meant, however, was clear.

He was bitterly afraid of the Soviet Union, afraid that the war might develop in such a way as to let the Soviet Union share in the victory. And he sought some way to reconcile the Anglo-German struggle.

But he was an America Firster enough to stress that we should not intervene in Europe and should develop a cash-and-carry trade with France and Britain.

The reason why the Republicans and all the former isolationists now rush to embrace Hurley is that they recognize the former Republican isolationist in him.

GLOBE-TROTTER

He favored victory over the Axis, not because he opposed fascism as such but because he wanted the United States to cash in on that victory by pursuing an and Soviet course simultaneously with a policy of forcing Britain to shell out to the USA. Only if you see this in Hurley can you understand his opposition to Communist and colonial imperialism.

During the war he was sent to all corners of the globe as Ambassador to New Zealand, as special emissary in the Near East, as observer in Moscow during the critical days of 1942. And finally, he bobbed up with Donald Nelson's economic mission in China in the late summer of 1944.

In China, Hurley's flamboyant self-advertising methods were notorious; he was strongly attracted to Chiang Kai-shek for he recognized the man who might build a reactionary China subservient to a strong imperialist America—at the expense of the Soviet Union and Great Britain as well.

Hurley's first bit of "colorfulness" was to maneuver Gen. Joseph Stilwell and the former Ambassador, Clarence B. Gauss, out of China. Stilwell had been critical of the way Chiang was saving American lend-lease weapons for the ultimate civil war; Gauss knew more about Kuomintang corruption than anyone else.

When Chiang demanded Stilwell's scalp, Hurley said to "Vinegar Joe": "I have only two stars to your four, but I'm going to tell Washington one of us has to leave."

From November 1944 until April 1945 Hurley put on a big show of trying to bring about Kuomintang-Communist unity. He even thought a personal visit to Moscow last April would solve all problems in China. Hurley, who knew nothing about China, acted very much the prima donna. He tried to trick the Chinese Communists into an abject surrender to the Kuomintang. When that finally failed, he became openly pro-Chiang and bitterly anti-Communist.

IRKED BY CRITICS

What irked him just as much as his failure to force a Chinese settlement was the fact that well-informed American opinion among experts and journalists was very critical of the Kuomintang and of Hurley's methods.

State Department career men like Raymond T. Ludden had visited Yenan and brought back favorable impressions; there was an American mission in Yenan, headed by Col. David Barrett, whose reports were also favorable. Newspapermen like Brooks Atkinson, Harrison Forman and Israel Epstein (who knew China better than Hurley) were telling the truth about both the Kuomintang and the Communists.

Hurley was the kind of man who could arrange for a specially designed Cadillac to be flown in from India to Chungking. He insisted on wearing his uniform in performing civilian duties, although he was not entitled to do so. Roosevelt had to tell him point blank to cut it out. This kind of man had no use for the pro-China experts, and succeeded in forcing them out of the Chungking Embassy one by one.

This accounts for his spleen against the "career men," whom he considers "college fellers" and pro-Communists. Actually they are only the last of the pro-Roosevelt Moldicans in a Department which is increasingly dominated by the Byrnes type of political ignoramus.

Now Hurley resigns with a big bang, which is completely in keeping with his bang, bang career.

The moral of the tale is this: when Truman and Byrnes broke with the Roosevelt policy and backed Chiang Kai-shek's civil war plans, they naturally had to rely on Hurley more and more—for he expressed the logic of their position and, moreover, carried it out in practice.

So it is in every phase of foreign affairs. Wherever American-Soviet understanding is abandoned and an attempt is made by Democratic politicians to embark on world domination, the Hurley Republicans will make the most of it. They will go the Truman-Byrnes type one better. They will rapidly drive this country to an internal coup d'état and external aggression in other people's affairs.

Mr. BUDENZ. This was written while I was still in the Communist Party, and I recall it. It is a special dispatch by Virginia Gardner and Art Shields, Communist correspondents here in Washington, Daily Worker correspondents in Washington. It is headed Washington Notes, and says:

With the assistant to Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Eugene Dooman, who was chairman of SWINK, the powerful interdepartmental committee representing State, War, and Navy, and former acting Secretary Joseph Grew out, the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti-imperialist were strengthened.

That is found on page 2 of that issue.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 181" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 181

[From the Worker, October 7, 1945, p. 2]

WASHINGTON NOTES

(By Virginia Gardner and Art Shields)

WAR DEPARTMENT DIVISION ON JAPANESE POLICY; UNITED STATES CHAMBER ADVISES OPTIMISM WITH HUMOR

The recent rebuke to Gen. Douglas MacArthur's policies given by Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson was the culmination not only of a split in the State Department but in the War Department itself.

With the assistant to Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Eugene Dooman, who was chairman of SWINK, the powerful interdepartmental committee representing State, War, and Navy, and former Acting Secretary Joseph Grew out, the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti-imperialist were strengthened. They were able to push through certain directives which had been held up in committee theretofore, so that the set of directives for treatment of Japan which the White House recently released were even better than the original directives which had been blown over to MacArthur and apparently lay ignored somewhere on his desk or thereabouts.

But in the War Department itself there developed what amounted to virtually a revolution. Among those most alarmed and exercised by the MacArthur policies and the complete lack of carrying out of directives from the State Department was Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. In fact, McCloy is said to be determined that the new directives shall be carried out even if he has to go over to Japan and take a look-see himself.

Yet Senator H. Stryker Bridges (Republican of New Hampshire) continues to attribute to Washington officials who represent "the leftist thinking of the Nation" the wave of criticism against MacArthur.

You don't hear much these days in Washington about what a good administrator President Truman is, since MacArthur has flouted the directives sent him and the Ways and Means Committee declared a lockout on all unemployment compensation legislation. In all the years during which the late President Roosevelt took such a beating as a poor administrator, there never was quite such contempt shown for legislation he recommended or directives sent to any part of the Government by a constituted authority.

The United States Chamber of Commerce determined to be sunny, even if it hurts. So in a piece which underlines with a note of grimness its advice to business to exude confidence the Chamber of Commerce Business Action for September 24 says: "If we read the signs aright, the great mass of the population is ready to welcome an active, aggressive leadership by business * * *. But labor is afraid of unemployment, just as business fears it * * *. Some believe the answer is to be found in the Murray (full employment) bill. The sharp, forceful movement behind that measure is a manifestation of fear * * *. The formulas have got to be achieved on the local or industry level, or more specifically on the individual level."

Then, in italics: "This is the time for businessmen to think, talk, plan and act in forceful tones of optimism, with the confidence which they are fully justified in feeling—and with a sense of humor."

What amounts to an actual conspiracy to build up an anti-Communist labor movement in Germany under official United States auspices is under way. Spark plug in it from Washington is Irving Brown, who along with many of his former associates in the Labor Section of the War Production Board had a Social-Democratic orientation.

For 3 months he did little else but busily recruit candidates on the basis of such refined qualifications as their devotion to the cause of Red-baiting. Among others he has picked are Joseph D. Keenan of the AFL, Vice Chairman for labor production of WPB, Paul Porter, Wisconsin Socialist, who has been kicking around the Government for years now trying to retrieve his standing with labor after the fiasco he pulled at the airframe wage hearing he conducted early in the war, and David Saposs of the WPB Labor Section, who is a natural for the assignment. In Germany as a result they are dealing only with non-Communist elements in the labor movement, and actively encouraging anti-Communists in the unions being established or revived.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that terminates the phase of Mr. Budenz' testimony concerning the Communist effort to infiltrate and influence American foreign policy. I would like to get back to Mr. Budenz' identification of people who were associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations and their Communist affiliation.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know James S. Allen?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; Mr. Allen was well known to me. He was foreign editor of the Daily Worker for a considerable period of time while I was managing editor, and then he had a sort of special assignment as foreign adviser to the Daily Worker.

Prior to that he was Communist International representative in the Philippines with all the powers of a Communist International representative in the islands.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record Mr. Allen's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations on a previous occasion.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Abraham Chapman?

Senator SMITH. Is this Mr. Allen the man who wrote a review of some books or the review of an attack on some of the Southern States and was part of a group to incite the Negroes down there?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. That is not involved here now, however.

Senator SMITH. He was a Communist at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. He held a high place in the Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. He was a very much trusted man, and this is shown by the fact that he was the Communist representative in the Philippines, sent on a special mission there and directing the Philippine Communist Party.

In addition to that, he was the leading authority on foreign affairs for the Daily Worker, and even when he resigned as foreign editor to do special writing he continued to be foreign affairs adviser and was closely in touch with many International agents. I can say that from his own statements and from my knowledge of what a foreign editor of the Daily Worker does.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Hilda Austern was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. From official reports.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce into the record evidence of Miss Austern's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Hilda Austern was also known as Mrs. Bretholz.

The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading from?

Mr. MANDEL. Her associations with the Institute of Pacific Relations are taken from War and Peace in the Pacific, a Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR on Wartime and Postwar Cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East, page 162 being the proceedings of the Mont Tremblant, Quebec, conference of December 4 to 14, 1942.

In that volume she is listed as a member of the international secretariat and as having participated in the 1936 and 1939 conferences as assistant treasurer.

Mr. MORRIS. Assistant treasurer of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Next I read from Handbook for the Sixth Conference of the IPR at Yosemite National Park, Calif., August 15 to 29, 1936, page 62, where Hilda Austern is listed as a member of the international secretariat and conference staff and also a member of the finance committee.

I read from Security in the Pacific, a Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held at Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to 17, 1945, page 160, where Hilda Austern is listed as a member of the international secretariat. She is again so listed in the proceedings of the Virginia conference, Virginia Beach conference, held November 18 to December 2, 1939, and she is also there listed as assistant treasurer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like those references made by Mr. Mandel incorporated into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be so incorporated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 182" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 182

MISS HILDA AUSTERN

International secretariat (also known as Mrs. Bretholz): Miss Hilda Austern (1936, 1939). Assistant treasurer. (Source: War and Peace in the Pacific (A Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR on Wartime and Postwar Cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East), Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 4-14, 1942, p. 162.)

International secretariat and conference staff, finance committee; Minute secretary, Hilda Austern. (Source: Handbook for the Sixth Conference of the IPR, Yosemite National Park, Calif., August 15-29, 1936, p. 62.)

International secretariat: Hilda Austern (1936, 1939, 1942). Assistant treasurer, IPR. (Source: Security in the Pacific (A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations), Hot Springs, Va., January 6-17, 1945, p. 160.)

International secretariat: Hilda Austern, assistant treasurer (1936). (Source: Problems of the Pacific (Proceedings of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Virginia Beach, Va., November 18-December 2, 1939, p. 274.)

Mr. MANDEL. I have here an item from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated September 1, 1941, being a letter marked "Strictly Confidential," addressed to Miss Hilda Austern from Edward C. Carter. I will read excerpts from this letter as follows:

DEAR HILDA: Would you like to tackle the following research job for the War Department? You would be on the international secretariat payroll, and I do not propose to charge the Army anything for this service.

The project has to be done if possible in a fortnight, and the aim is to discover what the possibilities would be of finding suitable space for landing fields, preferably 4,000 feet long, but with an absolute minimum of 3,500 feet, on the following islands.

Then there is a list of islands in the Pacific which is given.

Supplementary information which would be required would be:

Then there is a list given such as prevailing winds, possibilities for landing supplies, and so forth.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that letter introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom is that signed?

Mr. MANDEL. Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Addressed to Hilda Austern, about whom we were talking.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record and properly identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 183" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 183

LEE, MASS., September 1, 1941.

Strictly Confidential.

Miss HILDA AUSTERN,

Office.

DEAR HILDA: Would you like to tackle the following rush research job for the War Department? You would be on the international secretariat payroll and I do not propose to charge the Army anything for this service.

The project has to be done if possible in a fortnight, and the aim is to discover what the possibilities would be of finding suitable space for landing fields, preferably 4,000 feet long, but with an absolute minimum of 3,500 feet, on the following islands:

Palmyra	Baker
Enderbury	Christmas
Samoa (British and United States)	Fiji group
New Hebrides	New Caledonia
Howland	Jarvis
Johnson	Canton
Loyalty	

Supplementary information which would be required would be:

- (a) Prevailing winds, storms, monsoons, etc.
- (b) Possibilities for landing supplies by steamer.

(c) Natural defenses, i. e., would the fields be far enough inland or, if near the sea, protected by higher ground from, say, the gunnery range of submarines that might emerge from the sea nearby.

(d) Health conditions, i. e., mosquitoes, malaria, or other diseases.

(e) Local food supply.

(f) Local labor supply.

(g) Local government and its political orientation.

(h) Local police or military organization, if any.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD O. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that that last letter was introduced for the purpose of showing that Miss Austern was on the payroll of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the general nature of some of the work that she performed for that organization.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know Abraham Chapman?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he is a veteran Communist, also known as John Arnold.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "John Arnold" is that his party name?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, he wrote under these different names and was sometimes known in the party as John Arnold. It was a party name. He was on the editorial board in connection with Freiheit, which is the Communist daily paper in New York, published in the same building as the Daily Worker. Therefore I conferred with Mr. Chapman many times and know him as a Communist. He has a very high position so far as the regard of the Communist Party leaders in the Communist movement.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce into the record the associations of Mr. Chapman with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a memorandum found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated May 9, 1947, headed, "Research and publication program of the American Institute of Pacific Relations," and listing books and research projects and studies under way for 1946-47. It lists Philippine Nationalism Today, by Abraham Chapman.

Then I have here a list of articles written for the Far Eastern Survey by Abraham Chapman. There are four articles. It is to be noted also, however, that Abraham Chapman is coauthor with Earl Browder of a pamphlet entitled "The Meaning of the Palestine Partition," published in 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. But the first four articles were?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like Mr. Mandel's notation showing Abraham Chapman's relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. These are notations, Mr. Mandel, as I understand it, from instruments that you found in the records, these notations were made by you or notations that you found?

Mr. MANDEL. They are notations in the first case from the memorandum of the Institute of Pacific Relations and in the second case from the actual volumes of the Far Eastern Survey, the official organ of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Who made the notation?

Mr. MANDEL. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You examined the volumes yourself?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 184" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 184

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION PROGRAM OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
PACIFIC RELATIONS—BOOKS AND RESEARCH PROJECTS

Studies under way 1946-47: Philippine Nationalism Today, by Abraham Chapman.

Abraham Chapman, author of American Policy in the Philippines (Far Eastern Survey, June 5, 1946).

Abraham Chapman, author of Hawaii Seeks Statehood (Far Eastern Survey, June 17, 1946).

Abraham Chapman, author of Pacification in Central Luzon (Far Eastern Survey, August 17, 1946).

Abraham Chapman, author of Notes on the Philippine Election (Pacific Affairs, June, 1945, p. 193).

Abraham Chapman, coauthor with Earl Browder, of pamphlet, The Meaning of the Palestine Partition (1937).

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Kathleen Barnes?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew of her, I did not meet her personally.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know she was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I will not say that I knew it through the whole 10 years I was in the Communist Party, but I heard it mentioned at various times.

Mr. MORRIS. So you do know that at one time she was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I would say a couple of times. She did not receive the constant reference that some of the other names that you have mentioned received.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you tell us of Mrs. Barnes' association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the files of Pacific Affairs and the Far Eastern Survey, both organs of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and is a long list of articles by Kathleen Barnes which is here submitted for the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you indicate the number of articles in each publication, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. For Pacific Affairs, 8, and for Far Eastern Survey, 23.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that compilation introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that compilation made by, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. By actual consultation of the volumes of both publications.

The CHAIRMAN. By yourself?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you had the volumes in your possession?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, it will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 185" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 185

KATHLEEN BARNES

Member of board of directors of the American Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union, Inc., 56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York City.

The following articles by Kathleen Barnes appear in Pacific Affairs:

Eastward Migration Within the Soviet Union, December 1934 (pp. 395-405).

Review of Project for the Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the U. S. S. R., December 1934 (pp. 470-471).

Review of Birobidzhan'sy na Amure (The Birobidjans on the Amur) by M. Goldstein, September 1935 (pp. 507-508).

Review of Soviet Journey by Louis Fischer, June 1935 (pp. 254-256).

Comment and Opinion of Another Perspective, September 1935 (pp. 477-481).

Review of Soviet Communism: A New Civilization by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, June 1936 (pp. 294-296).

Review of The Soviets by Albert Rhys Williams, December 1937 (pp. 490-492).

Review of Over the North Pole, by George Baidukov, June 1938 (pp. 274-275).

Review of Great Soviet World Atlas, volume 1; edited by A. E. Gorkin, et al., September 1940 (pp. 354-355).

The following articles by Kathleen Barnes appear in the Far Eastern Survey:

Industrialization of the Soviet Far East, April 10, 1935.

Japanese Soviet Friction, September 25, 1935.

The Soviet Economic Stake in the Orient, January 29, 1936 (p. 19).

Siberia—From Mongolia to the Arctic, May 6, 1936 (p. 93).

The Clash of Fishing Interests in the Pacific, November 18, 1936 (p. 243).

The Agricultural Foundation of Siberia's Economy, February 17, 1937 (p. 37).

Tanna Tova Showing Signs of Industrial Activity, March 17, 1937.

Siberian Gold Production Tops Previous Figures, May 12, 1937.

New Bed of Radio Active Ores Found in Central Asia, June 23, 1937.

Overcoming Obstacles to Rubber Control, August 4, 1937 (p. 177).

Alaska Salmon in World Politics, March 2, 1938.

Japanese Government Given Blank Check, April 6, 1938 (p. 79).

Asiatic Russia, Storehouse of Mineral Wealth, July 13, 1938 (p. 157).

Soviet-Japanese Relations Still Hanging Fire, January 5, 1939 (p. 1).

Komsomolsk—Pioneer City on the Amur, February 15, 1939.

Japan Seeking Larger Contribution From Her Mandate, March 15, 1939.

Outer Mongolia on the World Stage, August 30, 1939, (p. 207).

Soviets Promoting Migration to Siberia, October 25, 1939.

Soviets Hope for Rubber Self Sufficiency by 1942, November 8, 1939.

Soviet Union Improving Railway Network, December 20, 1939.

Pacific Islands Double Phosphate Output, May 22, 1940.

Soviets Stress Program for Far Eastern Section, July 17, 1940.

Fisheries, Mainstay of Soviet-Japanese Friction, March 27, 1940 (p. 75).

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any letters from the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mrs. Barnes?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here two letters taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the letterhead of the Council of the U. S. S. R., Institute of Pacific Relations, one dated April 16, 1938, addressed to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes from E. V. Harondar, who has been previously designated as an official of the U. S. S. R. Council of the IPR.

DEAR MRS. BARNES: Could you kindly obtain and send us on an exchange basis the following publications which we urgently need for our work here: (1) Annual Report of the Governor of the Panama Canal, (2) Official Handbook of the Panama Canal, and (3) Panama Canal Record. We would like to get all these data for the last 3 years. Thanking you in advance for this favor.

Sincerely yours,

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that written from?

Mr. MANDEL. From Moscow, 20 Razin Street, April 16, 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. Who signed that first letter?

Mr. MANDEL. E. V. Harondar,

Mr. MORRIS. Who is he?

Mr. MANDEL. He is an official of the U. S. S. R. Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Then we have another letter dated August 29, 1939, to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes on the same type of letterhead from the same individual, E. V. Harondar, as follows:

DEAR MRS. BARNES: Referring to your letter of June 14 and July 6, I take pleasure in informing you that all books mentioned therein have been received. We note that there will be some delay in obtaining some of them. However, The United States in World Affairs, 1938, has already been received. We have recently sent you an English edition of the papers published in connection with the Eighteenth party congress under the title, The Land of Socialism, and an English edition of the History of the Communist Party. Today under separate cover I am sending you a book of statistical information on Soviet agriculture. Our librarian is collecting a new set of books on the Soviet Union which will be forwarded to you shortly. We would appreciate it if you could include in the next shipment of books the following publication: Panama Canal and Its Ports, United States War Department, United States Army Corps of Engineers, revised 1938.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this introduced into the record. The purpose of introducing this exhibit, these two exhibits, would be to show the functions being carried on by the Institute of Pacific Relations, particularly by Kathleen Barnes, who has been identified by Mr. Budenz as a member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 186" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 186

COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
Moscow, August 29, 1939.

Mrs. KATHLEEN BARNES,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City, N. Y., U. S. A.

DEAR MRS. BARNES: Referring to your letter of June 14, and July 6, I take pleasure in informing you that all books mentioned therein have been received. We note that there will be some delay in obtaining some of them. However, The United States in World Affairs, 1938, has been already received. We have recently sent you an English edition of the papers published in connection with the XVIII Party Congress under the title The Land of Socialism and an English edition of the History of the Communist Party. Today under separate cover I am sending you a book of statistical information on Soviet Agriculture. Our librarian is collecting a new set of books on the Soviet Union which will be forwarded to you shortly. We would appreciate it if you could include in the next shipment of books the following publication: Panama Canal and Its Ports. U. S. War Department, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Revised 1938.

Sincerely yours,

E. V. HARONDAR.

COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
Moscow, April 16, 1938.

Mrs. KATHLEEN BARNES,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City, N. Y., U. S. A.

DEAR MRS. BARNES: Could you kindly obtain and send us on an exchange basis the following publications which we urgently need for our work here: (1)

Annual Report of the Governor of the Panama Canal, (2) Official Handbook of the Panama Canal, and (3) Panama Canal Record. We would like to get all these data for the last 3 years. Thanking you in advance for this favor.

Sincerely yours,

E. V. HARONDAR.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any comments on that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I would like to call attention to the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I don't know what the date of this letter is.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of that letter, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1939. If I am correct, this is an advance copy before the American Communists got it. We must understand the significance of this book, that it is the foundation stone today of Communist doctrine.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "this book"?

Mr. BUDENZ. The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Bolsheviks, to which he refers, which is now fully credited to Josef Stalin. It is required reading by every Communist and is used as a basis of their thought and action. This was not got out in the United States until after this was sent.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a modern edition of Marxism?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is Stalin's rendition of Marxism-Leninism under the guise of history. It shows the necessity for violent revolution, the overthrow of the bourgeois government, and the importance of a Communist Party devoted to revolution, a party of a new type, in order to bring about this overthrow of these governments.

Senator SMITH. Is that available here now?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is available in the English translation, gotten out by the Communist Party through the International Publishers, headed by Alexander Trachtenberg.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I refer to a previous exhibit already introduced, exhibit 58, and I read one paragraph of that exhibit, being a memorandum on Personnel in Connection With Soviet Studies. It is marked "confidential, not for distribution outside the office."

This is dated August 10, 1934, and the last paragraph reads as follows:

The fourth group—

That is, the people engaged in these studies—

consists of the few people who are already familiar with the institute's record in the Soviet Union, or who could be made so. Harriet Moore and Kathleen Barnes are about the only ones already familiar, and they both have the advantage of being good students who have not got the academic jitters about bolshevism. With Harriet, a further period of language study, which she may at present be contemplating, would probably be essential. This could be arranged, however, or you could decide to start from the beginning and send some young person of promise to Moscow to train him for the job.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Harriet Moore—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. By whom was that signed?

Mr. MANDEL. This has no signature.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently it is addressed to somebody?

Mr. MANDEL. It is evidently an interoffice memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Harriet Moore identified in that document as a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think I identified her yesterday as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had evidence that Kathleen Barnes was the first wife of the Joseph Barnes who has been identified before this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. I have another letter here from the S. S. *Chitral* dated January 24, 1935. The document comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and is addressed to Frederick Field from E. C. Carter, and I read:

DEAR FRED: Here is the list which the Institute of Oceanography in Moscow gave me, indicating precisely what American fisheries publications they already have. As I have already written you, I told them that you or Mrs. Barnes would undertake to get sent to them any glaring omissions, and that, in addition, you would see what could be secured from commercial firms engaged in any aspect of the fish business.

I am sending this letter by air mail with a typed copy of the list which our friends in Moscow gave me. I am sending the original list by ordinary mail, by way of confirmation.

The CHAIRMAN. That is signed by whom?

Mr. MANDEL. As I understand, by E. C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is addressed to Frederick Field. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record again as an example of the type of work being carried on by Kathleen Barnes.

The CHAIRMAN. This is already an exhibit, is it not?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 187" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 187

STEAMSHIP "CHITRAL,"
January 24, 1935.

F. FIELD,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City, U. S. A.

DEAR FRED: Here is the list which the Institute of Oceanography in Moscow gave me, indicating precisely what American fisheries publications they already have. As I have already written you, I told them that you or Mrs. Barnes would undertake to get sent to them any glaring omissions, and that, in addition, you would see what could be secured from commercial firms engaged in any aspect of the fish business.

I am sending this letter by air mail with a typed copy of the list which our friends in Moscow gave me. I am sending the original list by ordinary mail, by way of confirmation.

Sincerely yours,

E. C. CARTER.

Send all stuff to Oceanography people via Kantarovich.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here some quotations from Mrs. Barnes' actual writings in the magazine of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in *Pacific Affairs*. The first is reviewing a book called *The Soviets*, by Albert Rhys Williams.

The *Soviets*, by Albert Rhys Williams, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes; "The *Soviets* is absorbing reading and bears impressive witness to the achievements of the country under consideration."

From *Pacific Affairs*, December 1937, page 492.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Albert Rhys Williams is a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know Albert Rhys Williams personally, and he is a Communist.

Mr. MANDEL. Then next is a review of Soviet Journey by Louis Fischer.

Soviet Journey, by Louis Fischer, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes, page 255: "Agitation in foreign countries is not likely to be productive of revolutionary results until such time as the workers of these countries can see that life under bolshevism is better in every way than under capitalism. Is that time coming? What will result from this burgeoning activity in the U. S. S. R.? This question is implied in the short last chapter of Soviet Journey."

From Pacific Affairs, March 1935, page 255.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment to make on that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I didn't catch it fully. I was distracted by the spelling of Albert Rhys Williams' name.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Soviet Communism, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes, page 294 ff: "Slowly and with care the study proceeds to the consideration of the 'good life' at which the Soviets are aiming. 'The worship of God' is replaced by the 'service of man.' Such is the Webbs' appraisal of Soviet communism."

From Pacific Affairs, June 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like those excerpts made by Mr. Mandel incorporated into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 188" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 188

KATHLEEN BARNES

The Soviets, by Albert Rhys Williams, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes: "The Soviets is absorbing reading and bears impressive witness to the achievements of the country under consideration" (Pacific Affairs, December 1937, p. 492).

Soviet Journey, by Louis Fischer, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes, page 255: "Agitation in foreign countries is not likely to be productive of revolutionary results until such time as the workers of these countries can see that life under bolshevism is better in every way than under capitalism. Is that time coming? What will result from this burgeoning activity in the U. S. S. R.? This question is implied in the short last chapter of Soviet Journey" (Pacific Affairs, March 1935, p. 255).

Soviet Communism, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes, page 294ff: "Slowly and with care the study proceeds to the consideration of the 'good life' at which the Soviets are aiming. 'The worship of God' is replaced by the 'service of man.' Such is the Webbs' appraisal of Soviet communism" (Pacific Affairs, June 1936).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know Angus Cameron to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; from official reports.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any dealings with Angus Cameron?

Mr. BUDENZ. None at all.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the nature of the official reports, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The official reports had to do with the conduct of the Communist Party in Massachusetts, with which I was very closely in touch; that is to say, I was in Massachusetts a great deal as a member of the national committee of the Communist Party, perhaps more than in any other State. It repeatedly was called to my attention

at State committee meetings the important part that Angus Cameron was playing in the Communist Party.

Secondly, and more important than that, he was called to the attention of the Politburo by Alexander Trachtenberg as having committed himself to the Communist cause and also with the statement by Alexander Trachtenberg that Little, Brown & Co. was being made into the international publishers of the Communist front.

I said the other day that Communist leaders didn't use the words "Communist front"; that was one time that Trachtenberg in a sort of jesting way used the term. The work of Angus Cameron in getting published the works of those who were pro-Communist but not necessarily known publicly as such was commended by the Politburo and his plans particularly for doing that in the future.

Mr. MORRIS. What firm was he associated with, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Little, Brown & Co. in Boston.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of that testimony was to show the nature of this publishing firm which did put out quite a few books of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I understand that there has been a reorganization of the firm recently.

Senator SMITH. Little, Brown & Co.?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator SMITH. That is one of the oldest firms in America, a publishing firm; is it not?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; Mr. Budenz just testified to that.

Do you have any comments to make, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Little, Brown & Co. had a high and distinguished record as publishers and maintains it by some of the works they publish and some of the authors they bring forth. That was, of course, of great value to the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. You did know of many Communist publications which were gotten out by Little, Brown & Co.?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know that was the plan, and I know that many people in Communist fronts have had their books published by them. I can't say that I know specifically that it was all arranged, because I wasn't present.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, you previously testified that John K. Fairbank was a member of the Communist Party to your knowledge?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have any letter at this time that we can introduce showing Mr. Fairbank's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. John K. Fairbank is listed as a member of the board of trustees of the American council of the publication IPR News, in a letter dated March 1950. We have had previously testimony that he was chairman of one of the subcommittees of the Mont Tremblant conference.

Mr. MORRIS. He is presently a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is he not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. I have here a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated April 29, 1944, and I read a section of this letter as follows:

If Wellington Liu visits India, perhaps he can help in forwarding the manuscripts to New York, but it would be best to have them brought back by some American or sent in a diplomatic bag, perhaps to Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 189" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 189

April 20, 1944.

Message for Prof. Chien Tuan-sheng,
Southwest Associated University, Kunming, or care of
Lt. Robert W. Barnett, Headquarters, Fourteenth Air Force,
Kunming Airfield.

DEAR MR. CHIEN: I was extremely disappointed to receive your cable stating that you were discontinuing work on the study of Chinese government and politics. As you will know from my cabled reply of April 10, I had already sent you a message about the project in care of Professor Staley, asking him to leave it with Robert Barnett in Kunming. I do hope it has now reached you; but, in case it has not, here is what I said:

"Holland approves outline of project on Chinese government as described in Chien's letter of December 6. Holland is cabling approval on February 17, 1944. In addition to the \$300 already turned over to Professor Chou, Holland will arrange a further payment of \$600. Part of this might be paid with the help of Barnett if he agrees and informs his wife or Holland accordingly. Holland is also consulting Wong Shih-chieh about facilitating part of the payment. Holland hopes that a substantial part of the manuscript may be completed and in his hands by the end of September, so that portions of it might, if necessary, be used as a document for the IPR conference in January 1945. Holland also hopes that Chien or his colleague can make available part of the chapter on recent trends of the Kuomintang, which might be used as an article in the September issue of Pacific Affairs. This should reach New York by June 30 at the latest. If this topic is not convenient, an article on some problems of postwar political readjustment in China might be substituted. For safety's sake, Holland thinks that there ought to be at least three copies of the manuscript, but Chien can decide whether these shall be rough copies or clean copies. It might be wise to send Holland a copy of each chapter as it is completed. If Wellington Liu visits India, perhaps he can help in forwarding the manuscripts to New York, but it would be best to have them brought back by some American or sent in a diplomatic bag, perhaps to Mr. Fairbank.

It has not been as easy as I expected to send the money to you in the form requested, but I trust that by this time you will have already received an installment of \$200 from Barnett and more will be coming shortly.

I realize that with prices rising so fast the original fee I proposed may now be inadequate and it was for that reason that I suggested in my cable that you could increase the amount from \$800 to \$1,100. I most earnestly hope that you will not have to drop the project, as we have been counting on it very much. Even if it is not possible to complete the study on the original scale, I would urge you or Mr. Wang to prepare a short monograph and send it to me by October or November at the latest.

If there is anything else we can do to assist you in completing the study, please let me know. I realize that conditions for doing this kind of research work must be terribly difficult now, and I am anxious to do everything possible to facilitate matters for you. I am sure that Wellington Liu will be just as disappointed as we are if you do not produce a manuscript. As you know, your study has been included in the list of research projects announced by the China Council of the IPR.

With all good wishes and looking forward to hearing from you,

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

P. S.—Would you kindly tell Dr. Chiang Mon-lin when you see him that I have received his letter of April 11 with some errors for his book. We have tried two publishers so far but have not yet succeeded in getting the book accepted. It is now being considered by the Oxford University Press, and I hope to get a decision soon. One of the difficulties is the paper rationing.

Mr. MANDEL. We have previously introduced a letter signed by I. Epstein to W. H. Holland, from which I read a paragraph. This was exhibit 112.

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of it, I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. and Elsie.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that has already been introduced into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter dated March 10, 1944, addressed to John Fairbank care of Lauchlin Currie of the White House, Washington, D. C. I read:

Here is a letter to Liu Yu-wan which I should like to have sent by hand or via the A. P. O. in Chungking. Would you be kind enough to inquire whether John Davies can take it with him if he is likely to be going through to Chungking in the near future or alternatively whether it could be sent via A. P. O. to Mac Fischer or Jack Service or someone else whom you know to be in Chungking and willing to deliver the note? If for any reason you prefer not to do this, don't hesitate to tell me. I shall be down in Washington next Wednesday and probably Thursday also.

That is signed, "W. L. Holland."

The CHAIRMAN. Addressed to whom?

Mr. MANDEL. Addressed to John Fairbank, care of Lauchlin Currie, the White House, Washington, D.C.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Fairbank doing at that time? What was his job? Why did he get his mail at the White House?

Mr. MANDEL. I believe he was connected with the Office of War Information.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did he not get at the Office of War Information? Have you any records to show?

Mr. MORRIS. We do not have any records to show why. We will have to ask Mr. Fairbank that.

Mr. MANDEL. This is exhibit 106, previously used.

Senator FERGUSON. We notice quite a bit of this mail going through courier.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I have to go to the floor. I am in charge of a bill that is coming up. Senator Smith, would take over?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Max Granich was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know Max Granich very well, know him to be a member of the Communist Party and engaged in underground work. He is the husband of Grace Granich to whom I previously referred and a brother of Mike Gold, the Communist columnist of the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. You know he is a trusted member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very trusted, part of the very protected apparatus, or protective apparatus, the security apparatus.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a letter that will show the connection between Mr. Granich and the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. An exhibit that was previously used.

Senator FERGUSON. Might we get the time when he was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. All through the period of my membership, 1935 to 1945.

Mr. MANDEL. This letter is dated December 13, 1939, and is exhibit 54, addressed to Mr. Max Granich at China Today.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you listen particularly to this, please?

Mr. MANDEL. It is addressed to him at 168 West Twenty-third Street, New York City, and as I understand by Owen Lattimore. I read from the letter as follows:

I am afraid that my position as editor of Pacific Affairs makes it impossible for me to join the editorial board of China Today. I am a member of the international secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This means that one of my employers is the Japanese council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. There has already been a considerable kick about my being on the board of Amerasia. It is probably better for me not to invite extra kicks by going on the board of China Today, which is more partisan, and more obviously partisan, than Amerasia.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you have any comments to make on that particular publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. China Today was the Communist publication run by Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Philip Jaffe.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they run it under their own names?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; they ran it under the names of Frederick Spencer and J. W. Phillips or some such name. I think that is correct, J. W. Phillips.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Amerasia a Communist publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; Communist-created, but in order to have a certain different function than China Today. China Today was clearly Communist from its inception.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that account for the language that is used there about having a different slant?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. This letter, it seems to me, is very revealing. You will note Mr. Lattimore did not reject the policy of China Today, he just thinks it wouldn't permit him to function as well if he were connected with it. China Today was clearly a Chinese publication devised by the Communists in secrecy, to a degree, but with Communist policies very clearly defined for the purpose of influencing other agencies and organizations, penetrating them, and in that way working out the Communist program in the United States for China.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was more openly for the Communist cause than Amerasia?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes; that is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Reading that letter, Mr. Budenz, would you not say that Owen Lattimore knew the nature of those organizations when he used the term "one is more partisan than the other"?

Mr. BUDENZ. I can't see as an expert of the Far East how he could avoid knowing it because these were prominent publications in New York activity.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say the words "more partisan" meant more communistic?

Mr. BUDENZ. Decidedly.

Senator FERGUSON. As far as China was concerned and the Far East?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. If you are Communist in regard to China, you are Communist everywhere.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Philip Jaffe was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; both by official information and by personally being acquainted with Mr. Jaffe in his not too frequent but nevertheless several visits to the Politburo.

Mr. MORRIS. There is no doubt in your mind that Philip Jaffe was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know it definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. During the whole period that you were one?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Of course, during the whole period I didn't always see him personally, but from official reports. Not only may I say that he was a Communist, but he was a Soviet espionage agent from advice given to me by J. Peters, immediately following conversations of Peters with Jaffe.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I have here a photostat of the Daily Worker of December 3, 1945. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that document for us?

Mr. MANDEL. This photostat was made at my direction. It is a photostat of the Daily Worker of December 3, 1945, page 11.

Mr. MORRIS. I call your attention to the review of Joseph Starobin there of Jaffe's book on the Far East. I ask you if you will make comments on it, Mr. Budenz. You will note some part of it is underscored.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. Well, of course, Mr. Starobin—this by the way, was published after I was out of the Communist Party, but it is an issue I have read. Mr. Starobin begins by attacking Patrick J. Hurley all over again and says:

Militarists like Patrick J. Hurley are riled by the virtual unanimity of American intellectual opinion on the broad issues of the future of Asia. The writers, experts, journalists—and even career diplomats in the State Department—are almost unanimous in their judgment of the reactionary character of the Kuomintang leaders, in their sympathy for the Chinese Communist program, and their emphasis on the need for an independent, democratic India.

Then he goes on to say:

This has given rise to virtual renaissance of American writing and thinking on the Far East.

The renaissance in this case is evidence by Philip Jaffe.

Philip Jaffe's book is the latest contribution to this judgment of the experts. It follows a remarkable outpouring of progressive literature about Asia in the last 2 years. There was Owen Lattimore's *Solution in Asia*; Kate Mitchell's study of India, and Kunnar Gosha's work on the same subject. We have also had Lawrence K. Rosinger's *China's Crisis* and Andrew Roth's *Dilemma in Japan*—excellent statements from the younger men in the far eastern field. And then there were the two eyewitness reports on the Chinese Communists by Harrison Forman and Guenther Stein.

It goes on then with quite an acclaim of Jaffe's contribution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Kate Mitchell was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I met her as such at enlarged meetings of the Communist Party.

Senator SMITH. Is this Harrison Forman a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I am glad you asked me that question, Senator. Yesterday in the double question raised by Mr. Morris on Harrison Forman and Mr. Stein I said "Yes," they were Communists. Technically and legally I cannot say that Harrison Forman is a Communist. This is the situation: Harrison Forman was working with the Communists, knew he was working with them.

According to all official information I have he consented to have the Communists get out a special campaign for his book. He consented to have Joe North look over his book, and in addition to that was

referred to as one of "our people," but I have never heard him referred to as Communist specifically and I like to be meticulous about that.

I would like to make that sharp distinction. He was as close to the Communists as one could be without having been called such.

Mr. MORRIS. And he consciously worked with them?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, he consciously worked with them and arranged that the Communists should send out a secret memorandum which plugged his book and Gunther Stein's at the same time as required reading for all Communists and also as those books which should be pushed forward in non-Communist organizations.

Senator SMITH. Is he any relation to Dr. Clark Forman?

Mr. BUDENZ. He is no relation so far as I know. Dr. Clark Forman is another man.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Clark Forman to be a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. You read there that Kumar Goshal wrote a book. Did you know that Kumar Goshal was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have heard him referred to as such though not very emphatically.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record and given the next consecutive number.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 190" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 190

[From the Daily Worker, New York, December 3, 1945, p. 11]

JAFFE'S BOOK ON FAR EAST STRESSES NEED FOR DEMOCRACY, INDUSTRIALIZATION

(New Frontiers in Asia, by Philip Jaffe. Alfred A. Knopf, \$3. Reviewed by Joseph Starobin)

Militarists like Patrick J. Hurley are riled by the virtual unanimity of American intellectual opinion on the broad issues of the future of Asia. The writers, experts, journalists—and even career diplomats in the State Department—are almost unanimous in their judgment of the reactionary character of the Kuomintang leaders, in their sympathy for the Chinese Communist program, and their emphasis on the need for an independent, democratic India. There is probably no other phase of American policy on which there is such a broad agreement among well-informed people. This has given rise to a virtual renaissance of American writing and thinking on the Far East.

Philip Jaffe's book is the latest contribution to this judgment of the experts. It follows a remarkable outpouring of progressives literature about Asia in the last 2 years. There was Owen Lattimore's *Solution in Asia*; Kate Mitchell's study of India; and Kumar Goshal's work on the same subject. We have also had Lawrence K. Rosinger's *China's Crisis*, and Andrew Roth's *Dilemma in Japan*—excellent statements from the younger men in the far eastern field. And then there were the two eyewitness reports on the Chinese Communists—by Harrison Forman and Gunther Stein.

PROGRAM FOR ASIA

Jaffe's contribution is in the same tradition of scholarship; but in addition to presenting the facts as they are, Jaffe has attempted, like Lattimore, to couch his scholarship in the framework of a general proposition. This proposition is that the needs of American capitalism demand a large-scale program of industrializing China and India on the basis of democratic and progressive governments in those countries. Not only do the needs of America require such a pro-

gram but also the necessity of minimizing rivalry with Great Britain, securing a peaceful Asia and establishing a real basis for cooperation with Soviet Russia.

In reality, there are two separate aspects to the book: One is a detailed exposition of recent history in India and China, an excellent and rich library of information in itself. The other aspects, linked with the first but quite separate, is an essay on how the United States can solve the problems created by its enormous wartime productivity. The first aspect of the book is easier to appraise than the second.

SKILLFUL ANALYSTS

The discussion of India and China offer an excellent picture of what's what in both countries. The strategy of British imperialism in the Cripps proposal is exposed with great skill, and Jaffe makes full use of his detailed knowledge of the All India National Congress both before and after the August 1942 events.

He also uses the letters of William Phillips to the late President Roosevelt to good advantage, and what gives the passage on India particular depth is his treatment of her economic problems, the various proposals which have come from India itself for postwar economic development.

The discussion of China is probably the most elaborate single aspect of the book. It adds up to a damning indictment of the Kuomintang regime and a very firm statement on behalf of Communist China's achievements—or more exactly—"new China's" achievements.

These passages are jam packed with material of the greatest topical value to the layman and yet of equal academic value to the student of China. The full story of Kuomintang deception over the draft constitution is here; likewise, the hitherto unpublished summary of what really happened in Sinkiang, the details of General Hurley's antics and the meaning of the Stilwell-Gaues ousters a year ago. All this offers as fresh a background for today's headlines as one could hope for.

BRITAIN'S DILEMMA

I would have liked an equally thorough treatment of the Indonesian, Indo-Chinese and Philippine independence movements, and a greater differentiation in analyzing French as compared with British imperial policy.

On the other hand, one comes across rare material that is so little understood in this country—such as the story of Anglo-American rivalry in Siam. In general, one of Jaffe's strong points is his delineation of the British imperialist dilemma and the use which he makes of sidelights and comments from British sources. This enriches the entire discussion.

QUESTIONS ON ASIA

The second aspect of this book—the proposal for large-scale development of Asia—raises many more questions, and I can only indicate them here.

Jaffe does not say that American capitalists will accept his proposals; he does not regard them as inevitable in any sense, and in fact exhibits many doubts as to whether the United States will take the course he advises.

He is also quite well aware that the alternative to a program of democratic cooperation with the progressive forces of Asia is a policy of imperialist expansion and cut-throat rivalry with Great Britain.

Yet it is also true that his appeal has a certain one-sidedness. It does not analyze very sharply the actual possibilities of realizing his program. And of course, this discussion is entirely within the framework of the continuation of capitalism as such.

AMERICAN POLICY

I think that American Communists can certainly agree with the concept of American assistance in the industrialization of an Asia in which an independent India and a progressive, anti-feudal China would be the recipients of this aid.

But the immediate problem, as recent events show, is that American policy is blocking the independence movements of Asia and shows no inclination to accept or work with the anti-feudal, democratic program of the Chinese Communists.

It is this aspect of American policy which determines our approach to everything else about United States relations with the Far East. And this refusal to accept a democratic Asia is not sufficiently foreseen in Jaffe's discussion and even in his premises.

This was perhaps understandable since the bulk of the book was written in the summer of 1944. But when read today, it gives rise to illusions about the nature of American policy.

In all fairness, I see these faults only as an aspect of the book, and not necessarily the decisive aspect. For its factual material and its elaboration of the true issues inside of India, China, and Japan it ranks second to none in the growing library of progressive thought on the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice that this writing kind of lumped all these books together. Would you say that was a proper classification?

Mr. BUDENZ. These are some exhibits of those books which carried forward the idea of Communists represented by Mr. Browder in 1937; that the Chinese Communists should be represented as the democratic elements for the salvation of China.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you were to class the writings of this writer that we have been talking about would you class them the same as he did?

Mr. BUDENZ. Absolutely.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, we were discussing Philip Jaffe. I offer you there an article from the New Masses and ask you if that recalls anything to you.

Mr. BUDENZ. This article from the New Masses is its issue of October 12, 1937, with the chief article, the one to which you refer by Philip Jaffe, China's Communists Told Me, a Specialist in Far Eastern Affairs Interviews the Leading Men of Red China in Their Home Territory. This expedition, if you wish to call it that, under Jaffe's supervision to Yen-an was a Communist project so far as discussions in the Politburo showed.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew it was a Communist project from your position in the Daily Worker, is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. Not only in the Daily Worker, it was discussed with the editors of New Masses before the Politburo and was considered to be a very important mission to stimulate activity among intellectuals everywhere about Red China to bring out that which Joseph Stalin later pointed out that the intellectuals have been won to sympathy for Red China.

Mr. MORRIS. So you knew this was a Red project?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most decidedly.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any other excerpts that you care to comment on, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. We shouldn't take too much time on it. I think the significant part is the concluding part.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you read that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The part I shall quote is this:

Our visit to Yen-an was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the 1,500 cadet students of the People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University and about 500 from other schools.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Chu Teh?

Mr. BUDENZ. Chu Teh is one of the great leaders of the Chinese Communists. Bisson, he is identified as T. A. Bisson in other parts of the article. Lattimore is identified as Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs, in another part of the article.

Here are some questions asked of me. "What is the position of woman in the United States of America? How do American workers live and how developed is their movement? What are the results of Roosevelt's NRA campaign? What is

the present situation in the left literary movement in America? What do the American people think of our long march west?" And innumerable questions concerning America's attitude in the event of a Sino-Japanese conflict, the American attitude toward the war in Spain, and what Americans think of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation.

Then omitting one paragraph he concludes with Agnes Smedley's estimate of their trip—that is, of the trip of Bisson, Jaffe, Lattimore, to the Red Chinese areas. In this letter Miss Smedley says, or rather Jaffe says, that Miss Smedley indicates "better than I am able," how much hope and enthusiasm the visit of Americans evoked in the former Soviet regions.

This is Agnes Smedley now being quoted:

In my imagination I follow your journey from here, and my friends and I speculate as to your exact location day by day, and your exact occupation. I want to tell you that you left behind remarkable friends. I did not realize the effect of that meeting until 2 or 3 days had passed. Then it began to roll in. I have no reason to tell you tales. But the meeting, and your speech in particular, has had a colossal effect upon all people.

Then she goes on with other similar praises for the contribution made.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that article of October 12, 1937, in the New Masses magazine, incorporated by reference.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 191" and was filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. And I would like to have such extracts as read by Mr. Budenz completely incorporated into the record.

Senator SMITH. That will be done.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know Anthony Jenkinson?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew him personally, sir; Anthony Jenkinson.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he, according to his own statement to me, was sent here under instructions from Moscow to penetrate the conservative labor press with the Allied Labor News. I had a number of conferences in his office in mid-Manhattan on this question.

These conferences may I explain?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. BUDENZ. These conferences arose from the fact that the Daily Worker was having difficulty in getting full coverage from Moscow, and we wanted to get the help of the Allied Labor News and Anthony Jenkinson declared in a series of conferences I had with him that this was contrary to the instructions which he had received in England; that the instructions he had received from Moscow were to confine the Allied Labor News to the conservative labor press and to try to penetrate the American Federation of Labor newspapers under the guise of being merely a labor service on the international basis.

Later on, after further discussions and because in part the Allied Labor News didn't get into the A. F. of L. newspapers as they wanted—the A. F. of L. labor leaders have a remarkable ability to smell out Communist institutions—they did then relent in regard to the Daily Worker first by permitting the Daily Worker to quote the Allied Labor News, and then finally by allowing us, if I remember correctly—at least we were on the eve of that—to use its name, its byline.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt, then, that they were completely controlled?

Mr. BUDENZ. Completely controlled by the Communists. Not only do I know that from the Politburo but Jenkinson told me definitely he had been sent from England for that purpose. You must understand that a great many of the translations, for popular purposes, of Moscow publications at that time took place in London. They had over there at that time for that purpose a division of Communist International and he had received his instructions from the Soviet capital for that purpose.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he an English citizen?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is my understanding. He was even supposed to be titled.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, in connection with your statement that it was created by the Communist Party, I would like Mr. Mandel to introduce a certificate of incorporation of the Allied Labor News.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of the certificate of incorporation of the Allied Labor News, dated May 12, 1942, in which Anthony B. Jenkinson and Robert Terrall, T-e-r-r-a-l-l, are listed as the incorporators.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Robert Terrall?

Mr. BUDENZ. I don't recall him now.

Mr. MORRIS. But you do know that Anthony B. Jenkinson is a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. I notice he uses the address of 16 West Twelfth Street, New York City.

Do you know what address that is?

Mr. BUDENZ. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the home residence of Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. BUDENZ. It's near it; it's opposite the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate where that came from?

Mr. MANDEL. That photostat was made at my direction from the records of the county clerk.

Mr. MORRIS. Also the records of the secretary of state of New York?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator SWETT. That will be received as an exhibit.

Mr. MANDEL. To indicate the nature of the Allied Labor News.

Mr. MORRIS. Not on that, his association with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 192" and is herewith inserted.)

Mr. MANDEL. I have the following letters from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, one is dated February 2, 1942, addressed to Philip E. Lilienthal, from W. L. Holland, referring to Sir Anthony Jenkinson. I read the following excerpt:

The Shepherd book and the second volume of the handbook should be out this week and Bradley next week. We have added a new chapter on strategy to the Formosa book and that should be out in about two more weeks. Elizabeth is greatly excited at the colossal orders we continue to get from the War Department for our pamphlets, the latest being for 20,000 copies of a very brief, elementary affair, called Know Your Enemy, Japan, by Tony Jenkinson. We are expecting them to order 15,000 copies of your pamphlet.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this is to show that Anthony Jenkinson's book was the subject of interest of the Institute of Pacific Relations and also that the War Department had ordered 20,000 copies of his pamphlet.

May that be introduced in the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 193" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 193

NEW YORK CITY, February 2, 1942.

MR. PHILIP E. LILIENTHAL,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR PHIL: Many thanks for your notes of Friday and Saturday and the earlier note about Condliffe's approval of the Mitchell proofs.

I am not surprised that the Washington proposal smelled bad to you, but I thought I ought to let you know about it in case you had caught the prevailing yearning to be in the Nation's Capital. Personally, I should much prefer you here. Thus far Luce apparently has not been able to persuade the Government to give Bob Barnett passage to China on a bomber, so the whole business is still in suspense. Please don't feel bound to leave exactly on the 14th. I only suggested it because it was the end of the week. If you want to stay a week longer, please do so.

I wrote last week to Albany for a certificate of ownership for my car and hope the GMAC will send it to me soon. I am sorry to be giving you so much trouble over the car. I enclose a check for \$40 to cover part of the expenses you have been incurring, e. g., for Doreen's excess baggage and license plates. I am awfully grateful for all you did to help Doreen and hope the cleaning-up job has not been too awful. The laundry box arrived safely. We seem to have brought a few of Miss Stewart's things and have apparently left our electric kitchen clock behind, but I will write Miss Stewart about this when I return her things.

The first part of the Brock manuscript looks pretty good, and Hilda thinks the printer will be able to read the manuscript quite well. Parquhar was on a considerable bender in New York. Whether it was because of this or not I don't know, but Hilda was finally able to make a pretty remunerative deal with him on the Burma book which is now being reprinted by Haddon. We are actually going to get 10-percent royalties on it. I hope Sammy won't regret the agreement when he sobers up.

The Shepherd book and the second volume of the Handbook should be out this week and Bradley next week. We have added a new chapter on strategy to the Formosa book and that should be out in about two more weeks. Elisabeth is greatly excited at the colossal orders we continue to get from the War Department for our pamphlets, the latest being for 20,000 copies of a very brief elementary affair called "Know Your Enemy Japan," by Tony Jenkinson. We are expecting them to order 50,000 copies of your pamphlet.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Mr. MANDEL. This is the next letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated July 24, 1940, addressed to Chen Han-seng, care of the American Express Co., Hong Kong. He is addressed as "Dear Geoffrey," and I read a section of the letter, as follows:

In a little while I hope to be able to send Tony Jenkinson to China for a few months on behalf of the international secretariat. You will find him an invaluable friend.

That is signed by Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. By that he means the international secretariat of the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 194" and is as follows:)

New York, N. Y., July 24, 1940.

CHEN HAN-SENG, Esq.,

Care of American Express Co., Hong Kong.

DEAR GREGORY: Yesterday was certainly a real-letter day in the office, for I received two letters from you both dated the 8th of July. It is very exciting to be in direct communication with you again, for we have all missed you greatly and no one has missed you more than I.

What you have said about Pacific affairs is most timely. I have sent copies of your Pacific Affairs letter to Owen, Lockwood, Field, Porter, Holland, and others. I know that they will all enjoy it as much as I have.

I wish you would write me frankly your private estimate of the Far Eastern Survey. I assume that you get it regularly. Do you have time to read it? Is it of use (a) to you, (b) to any Chinese of your acquaintance in China or Hong Kong, (c) to any foreigners of your acquaintance in China or Hong Kong?

What is your reaction to Amerasia as at present operating? Does it fill the need of a monthly, or do you still feel that Pacific Affairs should become a monthly in competition with Amerasia?

I am glad that you have sent Bill Holland direct a copy of your other letter of July 8 reporting on your program of work. I am sure he will be glad to have this letter and will doubtless be writing you as to several questions in due course. I know he will be as excited as I am to be in direct communication with you again.

The next month is likely to be fateful for both Hong Kong and England. We hope that no damage will come to you and Susie or to Elsie or to Wellington and all of the members of his family.

We feel important here in the midst of the enormous, but undirected, latent power of the United States. The administration is preparing to be strong in a military way in 2 or 3 years, but is doing little to use its moral and material strength now when it is needed.

In a little while I hope to be able to send Tony Jenkinson to China for a few months on behalf of the international secretariat. You will find him an invaluable friend.

Linchbarger has written most enthusiastically of the help you gave him when he was in Hong Kong.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CLARKE.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter dated January 18, 1937, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Dr. James T. Shotwell. It comes from Frederick V. Field. I read:

DEAR DR. SHOTWELL: One of the secretaries of the British group at the Yosemite Conference was Sir Anthony Jenkinson, who has just been in my office and asked if I would be so good as to put him in touch with you. He is a young Englishman who, like a good many others, at first gives a good many people the impression of being superficial but who on longer acquaintance turns out to be exceedingly thoughtful, talented, and indeed quite brilliant. Three or four years ago he wrote a book called *America Came My Way*, which I am told had phenomenal sales in England.

Since the Yosemite Conference, Jenkinson has been traveling in Canada, gathering information for a book on that country. He has heard about the large study of the Canadian-American relations which you have organized, and is very anxious to know more about it. It is for this reason that he would welcome an opportunity to have a talk with you. I therefore told him that I would write you this note so that you would know who he was if he called for an appointment.

I hope you will forgive my taking this liberty on your time, but I think you will find that Jenkinson is well worth while.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have Mr. Field's letter of January 18, 1937, introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 195" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 195

JANUARY 18, 1937.

Dr. JAMES T. SHOTWELL,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR Mr. SHOTWELL: One of the secretaries of the British group at the Yosemite Conference was Sir Anthony Jenkinson, who has just been in my office and asked if I would be so good as to put him in touch with you. He is a young Englishman who, like a good many others, at first gives a good many people the impression of being superficial but who on longer acquaintance turns out to be exceedingly thoughtful, talented, and indeed quite brilliant. Three or four years ago he wrote a book called *America Came My Way*, which I am told had phenomenal sales in England.

Since the Yosemite Conference Jenkinson has been travelling in Canada gathering information for a book on that country. He has heard about the large study of Canadian-American relations which you have organized, and is very anxious to know more about it. It is for this reason that he would welcome an opportunity to have a talk with you. I therefore told him that I would write you this note so that you would know who he was if he called for an appointment.

I hope you will forgive my taking this liberty on your time, but I think you will find that Jenkinson is well worth while.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a list of writings, articles, by Israel Epstein, writing for the *Allied Labor News* and appearing in the *Daily Worker*.

I would like to incorporate that list into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be incorporated in the record?

Senator SMITH. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 196" and is as follows:)

ISRAEL EPSTEIN—ARTICLES FOR ALLIED LABOR NEWS

- Daily Worker, July 29, 1946.
- Daily Worker, January 30, 1948.
- Daily Worker, August 26, 1948, page 8.
- Daily Worker, August 27, 1948, page 8.
- Daily Worker, December 1, 1948.
- Daily Worker, August 18, 1949, page 6.
- Daily Worker, August 19, 1949, page 6.
- Daily Worker, September 5, 1949, page 6.
- Daily Worker, August 16, 1950, page 6.
- Daily Worker, September 11, 1950, page 6.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. William Mandel, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know him to be a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, I have met him both at the headquarters of the Communist Party and also up at the offices of *Soviet Russia Today*, or, yes, *Soviet Russia Today*.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know him to be a Communist of long standing, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he is a well-versed Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have anything to show Mr. Mandel's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. William Mandel, listed as a research associate of the American Russian Institute, IPR—no relative of mine—was the author of a paper on the Soviet Far East and Central Asia which was presented at the eighth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Mount Tremblant, Canada, in December 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, when you said "member of the American Council," do you mean the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. He is listed as a research associate of the American Russian Institute which is one of the organizations listed by the Attorney General and in the foreword to his study, had the following note:

This study, constituting part 2 of a larger work on the Soviets in the Far East, is to be published later by the IPR and is submitted by the International Secretariat—

Mr. MORRIS. Of the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. Of the IPR.

as a document of the eighth conference of the IPR to be held in December 1942. The author alone is responsible for statements of fact or opinion in his study that later appeared as a book entitled, "The Soviet Far East and Central Asia," which is listed as follows: "By William Mandel, research associate, American Russian Institute, IPR. Inquiry series, issued under the auspices of the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, the Dial Press, Inc., New York, N. Y., 1944.

Now, I have made some excerpts from the book which are worthy of note, and I read from the foreword:

During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. J. W. Dufoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his successors, Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Every member of the international secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell, and Miss Hilda Austern carried the major share of this responsibility.

Now, I have an excerpt from the book—

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel's book?

Mr. MANDEL. William Mandel's book. The author's preface might be worthy of note and I read:

The Soviet Union has stated its desire for continued neutrality vis-a-vis Japan. It feels that this neutrality is necessary in order finally to defeat Hitler and thus deprive Japan of the partner without which it cannot hope for victory. Its single-handed aid to China from the beginning of the Japanese attack in 1937, helped to prevent Japan from winning the Pacific war during China's 4 years of otherwise lonely struggle before Pearl Harbor. That neutrality means not only that Soviet forces in the Far East need not be replenished and supplied in active campaign, but that American lend-lease aid can continue to reach the Soviet Union without loss by submarine attack or aerial bombardment.

* * * For the most complete prewar data available, the reader is referred to Land of the Soviets, by Nicholas Mikhailov, a Soviet work available in English, and Soviet Asia, by R. A. Davies and Andrew Steiger.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce those excerpts into the record.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 197" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 197

THE SOVIET FAR EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA

(By William Mandel, research associate, American Russian Institute IPR inquiry series issued under the auspices of the international secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. The Dial Press, Inc., New York, N. Y., 1944)

FOREWORD

This study forms part of the documentation of an inquiry organized by the Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East.

It has been prepared by Mr. William Mandel, research associate, American Russian Institute.

During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. J. W. Dafoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his successors, Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Every member of the international secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell, and Miss Hilda Austern, who have carried the major share of this responsibility.

The purpose of this inquiry is to relate unofficial scholarship to the problems arising from the present situation in the Far East. Its purpose is to provide members of the institute in all countries and the members of IPR conferences with an impartial and constructive analysis of the situation in the Far East with a view to indicating the major issues, which must be considered in any future adjustment of international relations in that area.

(Pp. vii, viii, ix)

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary-General.

NEW YORK, May 15, 1943.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

The Soviet Union has stated its desire for continued neutrality vis-à-vis Japan. It feels that this neutrality is necessary in order finally to defeat Hitler and thus deprive Japan of the partner without which it cannot hope for victory. Its single handed aid to China from the beginning of the Japanese attack in 1937, helped to prevent Japan from winning the Pacific war during China's 4 years of otherwise lonely struggle before Pearl Harbor. That neutrality means not only that Soviet forces in the Far East need not be replenished and supplied in active campaign, but that American lend lease aid can continue to reach the Soviet Union without loss by submarine attack or aerial bombardment.

For the most complete prewar data available, the reader is referred to Land of the Soviets, by Nicholas Mikhailov, a Soviet work available in English, and Soviet Asia, by R. A. Davies and Andrew Steiger.

Industrial enterprises have been evacuated to, and erected in central Asia in such numbers during the course of the war as to have completely changed the basis of its economy. Refugees have been resettled en masse. They include not only Slavs, but large numbers of Jews, as well as persons from the Baltic states. As a result of the Soviet policy of safeguarding not only cultural institutions, but the creative individuals who are the bearers of culture, these evacuees include a large proportion of scientists, artists, writers, the personnel of the motion-picture industry, and the like.

(Pp. xii, xiv, xv)

WILLIAM MANDEL.

NEW YORK, September 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, two previous witnesses have identified Michael Greenberg as a member of the Communist Party. Did you know that Michael Greenberg is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew him from official communications to be a member of the Communist Party, yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have already shown Mr. Greenberg is connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, but I think we have one inquiry by Senator Ferguson which has not been answered.

Mr. MANDEL. Senator Ferguson asked about the naturalization of Michael Greenberg. Our files show that Michael Greenberg was naturalized in the United States District Court of Washington, D. C., June 8, 1944, certificate No. 6370908.

Senator SMITH. Where was he from?

Mr. MANDEL. England.

Mr. MORRIS. May the record so show?

Mr. BUDENZ, do you know Andrew Roth to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, from official communications. My impression is that I met Andrew Roth but I am not sure. He was very active, particularly during the Amerasia difficulties in sending suggestions to the Communist leaders.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know his book, Dilemma in Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This book, Dilemma in Japan, was submitted to the Politburo for reading before it was published.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your own knowledge?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I saw at least what purported to be a copy of it. It was to be given to several people and I didn't read it.

Mr. MORRIS. Who published Dilemma in Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think it is Little, Brown & Co.

Mr. MORRIS. It so states in that article?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was my remembrance.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you comment any further on Dilemma in Japan as used by the Communist Party, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, this particular photostat that has been given me, which is the Daily Worker of September 12, 1945—the date is obscure, but it's 1945—page 8, Seeds of New Pearl Harbor still in Japan, Writer Warns, by Samuel Sillen, was a leading article in order to focus attention on Japan, which the Communist leaders were on orders to advance everywhere they could. In this book, Lieutenant Roth attacks very sharply Under Secretary of State Grew, or rather former Under Secretary of State Grew, because Grew had resigned while this book was in the course of being prepared or published rather.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like this photostat, if it is authenticated by Mr. Mandel, to be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Daily Worker of September 12, 1945, page 8, which was reproduced at my direction.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 198" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 198

[From the Daily Worker, New York, September 12, 1945, p. 8]

SEEDS OF NEW PEARL HARBOR STILL IN JAPAN, WRITER WARNS

(By Samuel Sillen)

A new Pearl Harbor will threaten America unless sweeping changes are quickly effected in Japan's political and economic structure. The imperialist rulers of Japan have a carefully planned come-back strategy which calls for retention of their power within the country and for creating dissimilarity among the victor nations. If United States policy is not directed toward smashing this strategy at the outset, the blood of American boys will again redden the Pacific. This urgent warning is the theme of Dilemma in Japan, a book completed after VJ-day and published this morning by Little, Brown & Co.

Andrew Roth, the author, is one of the group of the Far East experts, who earned the displeasure of former Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, leading advocate of friendship with the Emperor both before and after Pearl Harbor. He is at present under indictment for allegedly making use of State Department documents marked "Confidential."

But there is nothing confidential in this book. The public record of tragically wrong-headed policy speaks for itself. And a review of that record—which prominently includes Mr. Grew's published diary, Ten Years in Japan—casts a disturbing light on the events of the past few days in Southern Korea, China, and Japan itself.

Mr. Roth rips away the unreal distinction between the moderates and extremists among Japan's rulers. The moderate elements—Emperor, navy, businessmen—on whom the State Department experts relied for peace, joined hands enthusiastically with the most rabid militarists in the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.

And today again, Roth warns, the group in Japan that will try most eagerly to please us will be our greatest danger.

"These self-proclaimed angels of peace," he writes, "will be the front men for the Zaibatsu, which is Japanese for plutocracy or moneyed groups."

In view of General MacArthur's announcement that he does not intend to interfere with Japan's internal economy, Roth's analysis of Japan's Big Four financial combines—Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda—assumes vital significance. Emphasizing that they boast a concentration of financial power unparalleled anywhere else in the world, Roth notes that "the relative position of the Mitsui or Mitsubishi concerns in the life of Japan is so important that beside them the role played by organizations like du Pont and Standard Oil seems small."

"During most of the modern period," he writes, "Japan's giant trusts have been important and willing partners of the militarists in the acquisition of new territories for exploitation, with quarrels restricted to the question of methods, division of spoils, and supreme power over the domestic economy."

A surrender that would leave these elements in power would fall far short of victory.

Like these imperialists, the Emperor should be tried as a war criminal, Roth believes. Hirohito, a wealthy landowner, is also a substantial member of the Zaibatsu, an integral part of the economic oligarchy. The occupying forces should encourage literature critical of the Emperor institution. The opponents of the throne, who favor popular sovereignty against imperial sovereignty, should be strengthened, he declares.

These anti-imperialist elements in Japan are described historically in one of the most important sections of Roth's valuable book. Japanese censorship has kept the world in virtual ignorance of popular resistance movements within the country, so that the average American thinks of Japan as one undifferentiated mass.

But the severity of Japanese reaction reflects, as in Germany, the imperialists' need to stomp out or siphon off the discontent of the people organized in trade-unions and democratic political movements.

Roth recalls that in the Diet elections of 1928, for example, the laborites won 8 seats with 438,000 votes, and the Communist-influenced Workers and Peasants Party won 2 seats with 188,000 votes.

STRUGGLE AGAINST WAR

The Japanese Communists have consistently fought against Japan's imperialist war even under the most savage repression.

"On July 8, 1937, the day after the beginning of the China Incident, the Communists issued a statement denouncing Japan's attack as an 'unjust robbers' war which every Japanese should oppose."

Roth cites dramatic evidence of labor resistance, under Communist leadership, even after Pearl Harbor.

The problem, says Roth, is to convert Japan's democratic minority into a majority. Working with the labor movement which has persisted, even if in rudimentary form, during the war is indispensable for achieving a peaceful and democratic Japan.

But Roth understands clearly that American monopolists, who certainly don't like to encourage labor at home, will be most reluctant to promote labor organization in Japan.

Under the slogan of working with the forces of "order" and "stability," American reactionaries will resist essential modification of the class structure in Japan. That way lies another Pearl Harbor for America.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I notice that we are introducing quite a few people, mentioning quite a few people, as Communists connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Was there ever any comment made in official Communist Party circles that you know of that indicated the degree of concentration by Communist writers and Communist members?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; there were a number of discussions within the Politburo that while they were pleased with the success that IPR was making in its contacts and in the infiltration and its influence in governmental agencies and in agencies of public opinion, they constantly criticized the Institute of Pacific Relations comrades for not spreading out more—that is, they felt that the institute was too much a concentration point for Communists; that control could be maintained without such a galaxy of Communists in it. These problems were presented to the Communist Party from time to time. This discussion, therefore, went on for several years, to my knowledge, and the constant criticism by the Communist leaders was that those within the Institute of Pacific Relations were too much concentrated in regard to Communist personnel.

Mr. MORRIS. Then they had too many Communists for their purpose?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right, they didn't need so many.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have anything else that would associate Andrew Roth with the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the official publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations. We find a list of books and articles by Andrew Roth, for example, French Interest and Policies in the Far East, coauthored by Andrew Roth. IPR Inquiry Series, 1941. I have here four articles, three articles by Roth and one a review of his book, Dilemma in Japan, taken from Pacific Affairs. Then there are three articles by Roth or about his book in the Far Eastern Survey.

I offer that for the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that compilation be introduced into the record and made a part of it with the next consecutive number?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 199" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 199

ANDREW ROTH

IPR BOOKS

French Interests and Policies in the Far East by Roger Levy, Guy Lecomte, Andrew Roth. IPR Inquiry Series, 1941. (IPR Books, New and Forthcoming Publications on the Far East and Pacific Area—IPR (p. 11)).

ARTICLES IN PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Japan Strikes South, 371-372 (Review 1941, volume XIV).

Review of Blood on the Rising Sun by Douglas G. Haring, 235-236, 1944, volume XVII.

Review of Our Japanese Foe, by Ian Morrison; My Life With the Enemy, by Phyllis Argall; Nippon: The Crime and Punishment of Japan, by Willis Lamont, 351-352, 1944, volume XVII.

Dilemma in Japan (review) 114, volume XIX, 1946.

ARTICLES IN FAR EASTERN SURVEY

War Leads to Sharp Rise in Soviet-United States Trade, October 1940.

Cotton for the Soviets, January 2, 1941.

Dilemma in Japan, Little Brown. Reviewed by Richard Watts, October 10, 1945.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, a press release from the Federated Press, Eastern Bureau, 30 Irving Place, New York City, sheet 2, February 19, 1941. The article is by Andrew Roth and at the top it says:

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the author?

Mr. MANDEL. Andrew Roth.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, could you tell us what the Federated Press was?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. As chairman of publications, Dick Sellers reported to me. He was in charge and afterward so was Mark Stone or Finestone, the brother of I. N. Stone, who reported to me. He was its business manager or manager and the Federated Press was completely controlled by the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any comments to make on the fact that Andrew Roth's book was released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by the Federated Press?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I must say that if someone who was a non-Communist in the American Council was responsible for that, he was very naive. Undoubtedly, it was due to Communist influence.

Mr. MORRIS. That was an article, not a book?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. The article was released in that fashion because the Federated Press by that time had a well-established reputation.

Mr. MORRIS. It was openly Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. It wasn't openly Communist but everybody in New York knew.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 200" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 200

LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

(By Andrew Roth, author of numerous articles on India and Indochina.)

Indochina has emerged from the obscurity of small items buried in the back pages of the American press into the full glare of front-page headlines.

Friction between the unofficial Anglo-American alliance and Japan has reached a new intensity. The fate of Indochina is a key to future developments in the area.

Indochina's importance is largely strategic. From northern Indochina, where Japan obtained bases last September, Japanese planes have taken off to bombard the Burma road and southwest China. In addition, Japan has taken steps to obtain Camrabb Bay, Indochina's partly developed naval base on the south-east coast, and Saigon, a smaller but completed base further south.

Possession of these bases would not only help Japan to outflank the defenses of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, but also bring Japan within 750 miles of Singapore—the British Gibraltar of the East.

It was largely because Indochinese officials refused to give up these bases that Japan encouraged Thailand to attack Indochina, paving the way for Japan to step in as mediator. The peace conference between Thailand and Indochina is now going on in Tokyo and Japan is expected to emerge as the winner, with the possibility of obtaining bases in Thailand—as well as Indochina—as payment for its mediation.

Most discussions of Indochina have ignored the fact that the nation's 23,000,000 inhabitants have aspirations of their own. As in China and India, the great mass of the Indochinese people are peasants, impoverished by a tremendous burden of high taxes and low returns. In Indochina the economy was largely owned by the Bank of Indochina, whose political representative in France was Paul Baudoin, foreign minister in the Reynaud cabinet and also in the early days of the Petain regime.

The development of the nationalist movement in China in the twenties and the effect of the depression of 1929 promoted agrarian discontent in Indochina. This culminated in an uprising of Indochinese troops at Yenbay in 1930, with sporadic fighting continuing into 1931. The rebellion was ruthlessly suppressed, but the basic cause—peasant poverty—was not removed.

That unrest still exists in Indochina was demonstrated by a series of riots and demonstrations which occurred throughout the state in November and December of 1940. In the Saigon area alone more than 1,000 rebels were arrested, 200 of them being lined up and shot at the Saigon airport. The desire on the part of the Indochinese to be free from the bondage of either the Japanese or the French may yet play an important part in southeast Asia, the Balkans of the Far East.

Mr. BUDENZ. The American Federation of Labor had publicly labeled it as Communist. I don't know the exact year, but it was on several occasions.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated September 26, 1940, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Owen Lattimore from Edward C. Carter.

DEAR OWEN: Andrew Roth, who has been doing a small but important monograph for the IPR inquiry is going on with his Far Eastern studies. He has completed his third year in the Chinese language, has started Russian, and has done a good deal on Chinese labor and nationalism, on Chinese postwar history, and also on Indian history.

He will be delighted to contribute to Pacific Affairs if you wish to appeal to him for help. You have already seen some evidences of his writing and will know better than I whether he will fit into your plan for Pacific Affairs

during the next 2 years. I think you know that he is rated very highly by Jessup and Peffer.

Mr. MORRIS. Who signed that?

Mr. MANDEL. It is signed by Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 201" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 201

SUNSET FARM,
LEW, MASS., September 26, 1940.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR OWEN: Andrew Roth, who has been doing a small but important monograph for the IPR inquiry, is going on with his Far Eastern studies. He has completed his third year in the Chinese language, has started Russian, and has done a good deal on Chinese labor and nationalism, on Chinese postwar history and also on Indian history.

He will be delighted to contribute to Pacific Affairs if you wish to appeal to him for help. You have already seen some evidences of his writing and will know better than I whether he will fit into your plan for Pacific Affairs during the next 2 years. I think you know that he is rated very highly by Jessup and Peffer.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. That is a recommendation of Andrew Roth showing other members of the IPR, and Jessup is Philip Jessup.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated May 23, 1940, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Mr. Holland from Mr. Carter, and reads:

Andrew Roth called to see me today as a result of your letter to him of May 10.

Then the last paragraph says:

Roth knows Barnett and Rosinger and is working under Peffer and Peuke at Columbia. He hopes to stay in the Far East field.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 202" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 202

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,
May 23, 1940.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,
Giannini Foundation, University of California,
Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR BILL: Andrew Roth called to see me today as a result of your letter to him of May 10. He is prepared to undertake to add the chapter that you have proposed; namely, to bring the history of French political and economic relations with China and Japan up to the present time, since Levy's report does not go beyond 1828. I have assumed that you want Roth to cover anything he can in 1939 and thus far in 1940.

I have told Roth that I hope he can finish his work by July 1 or July 15 at the latest.

As he is headed for a scholastic career, he is wondering what he can get out of this task professionally; that is, what sort of a byline he could get. I said I supposed there were three possibilities: First, that he might be mentioned in

the foreword as having contributed a chapter; second, that he might be mentioned on the title page as having contributed a chapter; and, third, that the book might be published as being written by Levy and Roth. I, myself, think that the latter would probably not be possible, but I told him that this was a matter that you would have to decide, and that I could not commit myself at all. Will you let me know what your reaction is?

Roth knows Barnett and Rostinger and is working under Peffer and Peake at Columbia. He hopes to stay in the Far East field.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL Next is a letter from the Department of the Navy, dated July 19, 1951, addressed to Hon. Pat McCarran, and reads:

In reply to your letter of 27 June 1951, the following data concerning Andrew Roth are submitted for your information.

Roth was enrolled in the United States Navy Japanese-language course at Harvard University as a contract employee on 28 August 1941. This contract was cancelled on 5 December 1941 when Roth enlisted in the United States Naval Reserve. On 8 September 1942, he was commissioned as an ensign in the United States Naval Reserve and was ordered to duty with the Department of the Navy.

On 6 June 1945, Roth was arrested by Federal authorities in Washington, D. C. The complaint charged Roth with conspiracy to violate subsections C and D of section 31 title 50, United States Code (revised under act of 25 June 1948, 80th Cong., as title 18, U. S. Code, sec. 793), and the violation of section 88, title 18, United States Code (revised as title 18, U. S. Code, sec. 371). On that date he was presented with an order signed by the Secretary of the Navy which relieved him immediately from active duty in the Navy.

At the August 1945 criminal term of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Roth was indicted with others for removing United States Government records from the files of various Government agencies and converting them to their own use. The charges against Roth were subsequently not-prossed by the United States attorney.

Roth's resignation from the United States Naval Reserve was accepted on 3 April 1947. Since that time, he has had no connection with the United States Navy.

That is signed by Dan A. Kimball, Under Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. MORRIS, Mr. Chairman, may that letter from Under Secretary of the Navy be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH, So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 203" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 203

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, July 19, 1951.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: In reply to your letter of 27 June 1951, the following data concerning Andrew Roth are submitted for your information.

Roth was enrolled in the United States Navy Japanese-language course at Harvard University as a contract employee on 28 August 1941. This contract was cancelled on 5 December 1941 when Roth enlisted in the United States Naval Reserve. On 8 September 1942 he was commissioned as an ensign in the United States Naval Reserve and was ordered to duty with the Department of the Navy.

On 6 June 1945 Roth was arrested by Federal authorities in Washington, D. C. The complaint charged Roth with conspiracy to violate subsections C and D of section 31, title 50, United States Code (revised under act of 25 June 1948, 80th Cong., as title 18, U. S. Code, sec. 793), and the violation of section 88, title 18, United States Code (revised as title 18, U. S. Code, sec. 371). On that date he was presented with an order signed by the Secretary of the Navy which relieved him immediately from active duty in the Navy.

At the August 1945 criminal term of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Roth was indicted with others for removing United States Government records from the files of various Government agencies and converting them to their own use. The charges against Roth were subsequently not-prossed by the United States attorney.

Roth's resignation from the United States Naval Reserve was accepted on 3 April 1947. Since that time, he has had no connection with the United States Navy.

Sincerely yours,

DAN A. KIMBALL,
Under Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter addressed to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, United States Navy, dated August 4, 1942, from Edward C. Carter, coming from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I read as follows:

DEAR SIR: I have known Andrew Roth for several years and have found him to be exceedingly intelligent and of pleasing personality and good judgment. I have the highest regard for his scholarship and knowledge of the problems of southeast Asia. He completed the research assignment made to him by the Institute of Pacific Relations promptly and in an entirely satisfactory manner. He is a tireless worker.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

This letter of August 4 is a response to a request from Andrew Roth dated July 28, 1942, addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, and found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

DEAR MR. CARTER: It was very good seeing you, if only for a moment. Knowing how busy you are, I thought that my contact with you would be restricted to hearing you over the radio as I have several times, including the Shostakovitch premiere.

I am nearing the end of the course, and I am increasingly happy that I chose to follow your advice. I feel that I can perform a useful function not only now but in the postwar world, should I be around to observe it.

As you may have guessed, this letter has an ulterior purpose. I am about to be elevated from the lowly rank of yeoman, second class, to lieutenant, junior grade, and I require letters of recommendation. I am sorry that the effectiveness of your past recommendations compels me to ask you for another.

Therefore, I should heartily appreciate it if you were to find time to write another. It should be addressed to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, but be sent to me and bear no reference to the particular division to which I expect to be assigned. Unfortunately for your secretary, the rules require the letter to be in triplicate. I should appreciate receiving a letter as soon as possible, because our applications are being held up until our letters of recommendation are in.

I put the whole letter into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Two letters?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like those two letters authenticated by Mr. Mandel as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH. First is the letter signed by Andrew Roth to Mr. Carter, and the second letter does not appear to be signed.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not introduce that into the record; did you?

Mr. MANDEL. No.

Senator SMITH. You are not introducing this last one?

Mr. MORRIS. Since this is part of the file, we will introduce it exactly for what it was, as a letter attached to the rest of the file.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. We will just introduce it as being an appendage to the other letter.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 204" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 204

120 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,
August 4, 1942.

CHIEF OF BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
United States Navy.

DEAR SIR: I have known Andrew Roth for several years and have found him to be exceedingly intelligent and of pleasing personality and good judgment. I have the highest regard for his scholarship and knowledge of the problems of southeast Asia. He completed the research assignment made to him by the Institute of Pacific Relations promptly and in an entirely satisfactory manner. He is a tireless worker.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

36 GRAY STREET, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
July 28, 1942.

DEAR MR. CARTER: It was very good seeing you, if only for a moment. Knowing how busy you are, I thought that my contact with you would be restricted to hearing you over the radio as I have several times, including the Shostakovich premier.

I am nearing the end of the course, and I am increasingly happy that I chose to follow your advice. I feel that I can perform a useful function not only now but in the postwar world, should I be around to observe it.

As you may have guessed, this letter has an ulterior purpose. I am about to be elevated from the lowly rank of yeoman, second class, to lieutenant, junior grade, and I require letters of recommendation. I am sorry that the effectiveness of your past recommendations compels me to ask you for another.

Therefore, I should heartily appreciate it if you were to find time to write another. It should be addressed to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, but be sent to me and bear no reference to the particular division to which I expect to be assigned. Unfortunately for your secretary, the rules require the letter be in triplicate. I should appreciate receiving the letters as soon as possible, because our applications are being held up until our letters of recommendation are in.

In the little spare time at my disposal, I have been doing some thinking and reading on postwar Japan, and have come near formulating a study on that subject. However, since I do not know whether my next tour of duty will admit of any research or writing, I cannot plan very definitively at this time. Perhaps I can discuss this with you on my next leave.

Sincerely yours,

ANDREW ROTH.

120 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,
August 4, 1942.

Mr. ANDREW ROTH,
36 Gray Street, Cambridge, Mass.

DEAR ANDY: Thank you for your letter of July 28. I was glad to hear of your impending promotion.

Enclosed is the letter of recommendation in triplicate with an extra copy for your own files.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you ever see Corliss Lamont at Communist meetings?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not at Communist meetings, but I have met him as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. You have?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes; and I have discussed with him on several occasions Communist affairs, with him as a Communist. You must understand that while Mr. Lamont, to my knowledge, was a Communist—that is, to my personal knowledge and in meeting with him as such and conferring with him, that he sometimes had little difficulties with the Communist viewpoint with some criticism, and on several occasions and specifically on one that I can remember, I was called upon by the Communist leaders to give him information that would straighten him out. This was with regard to James Burnham, now of New York, who had evidently made quite an impression on Lamont and whom I assured him was a Trotzkyite. Lamont was sending reports to Comrade Hathaway of his activities in the organization which he then represented, formerly known as Friends of Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Len DeCaux was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very well, and personally. I have met him on many occasions at secret Communist meetings and specifically in July 1940, though I could recall many more, but July 1940 at the national convention of the CIO in St. Louis. I recall that because just at that time I had become president of the corporation controlling the Daily Worker, and we commented on that. He attended secret meetings with Roy Hudson and other representatives of the Communist Party in regard to the role he was to play in the national office of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your knowledge that he is a highly placed Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew him as a Communist before he was in the CIO.

By the way, he was released from the CIO because he could not agree with Mr. Murray. I think that should be clear.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have already introduced into the record the fact that Len DeCaux was a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations as well as the man who was in charge of public relations for the Triennial Conference at Mont Tremblant in 1942.

Mr. Chairman, we have, I would estimate, about another half hour's work.

Senator SMITH. We will recess now until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 2:30 of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator SMITH. The hearing will come to order. We will proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record a book review of William Mandel's book, IPR Inquiry Series, New York, the Dial Press, 1944. This appeared in the Saturday Review of Literature, March 11, 1944, page 18. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate the authenticity of that?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostatic copy of a review appearing in the Saturday Evening Review of Literature for March 11, 1944, page 18.

Here we have a book review appearing in the New York Times of February 28, 1944, on page 16, also an opinion of the Library of Congress in a letter to Senator Pat McCarran, August 23, 1941, signed by Ernest S. Griffith, Director, Legislative Reference Service.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce those into the record and have them marked the next consecutive exhibits.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 205 and 206," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 205

[From the Saturday Review of Literature, March 11, 1944, p. 18]

THE RUMP OF THE BEAR

(The Soviet Far East and Central Asia. By William Mandel. IPR Inquiry Series. New York: The Dial Press, 1944. 151 pp. \$2.50—reviewed by Emil Lengyel)

The Soviet Far East is a huge land bordering on Japanese-held territory and the Pacific. William Mandel compares it to Canada and Alaska from Lake Superior to the Pacific Ocean, insofar as its size is concerned. The Yakut Republic itself—part of this territory—is as large as all of European Russia.

Most important region of the Soviet Far East is the Maritime Territory with the city Vladivostok on its southern tip. On the map this region looks like a finger thrust into the intestines of the Japanese Empire. It was bases there that attracted the envious attention of the world-traveling United States Senators, some of whom told the country that the Soviets should place those bases at our disposal.

This is a rich country and would be much richer if more manpower could be had. Oil is one of its most important raw materials in this mechanized world, and large quantities of it are found in the northern part of Sakhalin Island. The author points out that the Soviet Far East produces more than its quota of coal, pig iron, and cement. It exports large quantities of lumber, fish, and fur to the western Soviet Union. The known natural riches of the Far East sound like a list of chemical elements. In agricultural products it became self-sufficient a couple of years ago, and is now expected to provide an exportable surplus.

This vast territory is sparsely settled, most of its white inhabitants living along the Trans-Siberian Railroad and great river banks. The January average temperature of the city of Khabarovsk is 6 below zero Fahrenheit, while that of Verkhoyansk, in Yakutia, it is 58° Fahrenheit.

The Soviet Far East is the land of one railway, the author shows. That railway is the Trans-Siberian. The much talked about and little known Baikal-Amur Railway has not yet been completed, in the author's view. Rivers afford water transportation when open to navigation, which may not be more than an average of 8 months a year.

Obviously, Mr. Mandel made an effort to assemble most of the material available about the natural resources, economic and cultural development, population and land settlement, transportation and administrative divisions of the Soviet Far East. The available material is not rich, which may be judged by the fact that all of it is presented on not more than 85 pages, several of which are reprints of Soviet daily press articles, containing so few points of interest that they could have easily been presented in condensed form. Just the same, the material provided by Mr. Mandel will prove useful to Far East specialists.

Readers may be interested in Mr. Mandel's treatment of the importance of this region for the outcome of the war with Japan. The Soviets are at peace with the Mikado's empire, since, as the author points out, first they had to stave off Hitler's aggression. The Far East was turned into an arsenal for the forces fighting in the west.

In his interpretation of the Soviet policy in the Far East, Mr. Mandel does not seem to be consistent. He writes in his preface that the Far East's economic expansion was "determined by Soviet estimates of potentialities inherent in the position of the U. S. S. R. as members of opposition coalitions." On the other hand, he writes in a later chapter: "Any attempt to read into the regionalization of the economy of the Far East now proceeding, any special design arising out of the proximity of Japanese forces would not be borne out by the facts." Not only is this statement not consistent with the previous one, but it is hard to accept it in view of the constant state of preparedness characterizing life in Far East border districts.

Some 30 pages of this small book are devoted to a discussion of the vast Soviet Central Asiatic Republics. The author himself warns the reader that these chapters contain no rounded treatment. The title page of his book reads: "The Soviet Far East and Central Asia," while the other titles, on the jacket and elsewhere, simply call it: "The Soviet Far East." Had more material been available about the more eastern region, it would have been preferable for the author not to roam so far afield.

EXHIBIT No. 206

[From the New York Times, February 28, 1944, p. 16 of Book Review Section]

THE NEW SIBERIA

(The Soviet Far East, by William Mandel, 158 pp. New York: The Dial Press, \$2.50—by William Henry Chamberlin)

The Soviet Far East, the vast, bleak, sparsely settled territory between Lake Baikal and the Arctic and Pacific Oceans, is one of the least known regions of the world, so far as the developments of the last 10 or 15 years are concerned. Ever since the Japanese seizure of Manchuria the Soviet Government has regarded this area as an advanced military zone and has not extended facilities for detailed study to any foreign observer.

In the event that the Soviet Union should enter the war against Japan this region would assume great importance in American eyes. So it is useful to have a compilation of the information that is available from Soviet sources about economic development and settlement and population policies. This is what Mr. Mandel has prepared in this little book, which is one of the inquiry series prepared by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

While the author concentrates his attention on the Soviet Far East, he includes some material bearing on Soviet Central Asia. Here, as he shows, population has increased and cultural life has been enriched because of the mass evacuation of refugees from the Ukraine and other sections when the Germans invaded European Russia in 1941 and 1942.

Climatically and physically the Soviet Far East, as the author suggests, is similar in some respects to western and northwestern Canada. There are rich fisheries and timber and mining regions in the southern part of the area; but the greater part is an unbroken Arctic waste. Of the 4½ million people who lived east and north of Lake Baikal in 1933 nearly 4 million lived along the line of the Trans-Siberian Railway or in the valley, 50 to 100 miles wide, between the Amur River and the mountains. In Canada one finds this same ribbonlike distribution of population—though Canada, of course, has developed a much thicker network of railways and an infinitely higher standard of living than eastern Siberia.

The Soviet Government has tried to push the development of the Far East, both for military and for economic reasons. Discharged Red army soldiers have been settled in military farm colonies along the Manchurian border. Ardent young Communists have helped to establish a pioneer town, Komsomolsk, on the lower reaches of the Amur River and have helped to develop oil resources in the northern, Russian half of the island of Sakhalin.

While the reader will find interesting information on a little-known part of the world in this book, two limitations must be noted. The first (for which the author is, of course, not responsible) is the absence of first-hand foreign information. The second is Mr. Mandel's extremely uncritical attitude toward the Soviet regime. The czarist practice of sending political prisoners to Siberia is frequently mentioned; but there are no references to the much larger employment of forced labor under the Soviets. And it is highly questionable, to put it mildly, whether Soviet Uzbekistan is, in Mr. Mandel's words, "a State comparable to Sweden in economy, culture, and national statehood."

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, D. C., August 28, 1951.

HON. PAT McCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: We have examined the book, *The Soviet Far East and Central Asia*, by William Mandel (New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944). The book mentions the czarist practice of

sending exiles to the Far East but does not contain any references to Soviet slave-labor camps. It cites several cases of increases in the population of various localities due to new arrivals which are described in such terms as "the influx of settlers," "mass settlement of refugees," "influx of evenees," etc.

The two reviews of Mr. Mandel's book which accompany this letter comment upon its merit. The underlined portions contain the more critical remarks.

The map which we are sending contains the best information that we have on the location of forced labor camps in the Soviet Union. We have roughly sketched in on this map those regions comprising the Soviet Far East and Central Asia as delineated in the book by Mr. Mandel.

Sincerely yours,

ERNEST S. GRIFFITH,

Director, Legislative Reference Service.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.—

Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Agnes Smedley was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew it by official information. I also knew Miss Smedley many years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. There is no doubt at all about her being a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, no; not then or afterward.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Mildred Price is associated with the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I know that from personal knowledge, having met Miss Price several times at the Daily Worker. When I say several, not too many. Secondly, from her attendance on occasion at large national committee meetings of the Communist Party. At the Daily Worker on two occasions that I can recall she brought Chinese Communists up there, three of them at one time and two at another. This was during the forties, and I just don't recall the years.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall the names of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. I do not. I was introduced to them for an extensive period of time but my memory doesn't recall, at least at the present.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I show you a copy of a letter, our exhibit No. 99, which was introduced at the open hearing of August 14, 1951. This is a copy of a letter headed "The China Aid Council." I ask you if you know that organization to be a Communist-controlled organization? You will notice that Mildred Price was the executive secretary.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This was not just a Communist-controlled organization. It was a Communist-created organization, and was, therefore, also Communist-controlled. It is what is popularly known as a Communist front.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your own experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. We had that testimony from Miss Elizabeth Bentley last week, Mr. Budenz. Did you know Miss Bentley when you were in the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I was introduced to her by Jacob Golos in order that she could take down stenographically my reports intended for the Soviet secret police. He couldn't do it constantly. He had been my intermediary for years, but after he pleaded guilty to being a foreign agent without having registered, he felt that he shouldn't too frequently be in contact with me, and he asked that I meet Miss

Bentley. That was for a very short period of time, because my activities in that respect ended about 6 months after I first met Miss Bentley. I used to have to call her up under the name of Helen Johns.

Mr. MORRIS. J-o-h-n-s?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you testify to the fact that she held a high place in the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. She held a very important key position in the espionage apparatus of the Communist in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your own experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know it from my experience. I know it from Mr. Golos' introduction. He was chairman of the control commission of the Communist Party, and from my own personal knowledge and of course mountains of evidence in other proceedings, was also for many years engaged in espionage activities in the United States, using the World Tourist Agency, of which he was the head, for that purpose. He was the center of false passports and things of that character.

He introduced Miss Bentley to me as one who already had won her place in confidential work for the party and that I could rely upon her completely, tell her anything and that that was equivalent to telling it to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, Miss Bentley testified that Mr. Golos was one of the three-man control commission. You have now said he was chairman of the control commission. Can you tell us who the other members were at any time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I had many contacts with Mr. Golos as chairman of the control commission, since occasionally in addition to the secret work I was doing with the Soviet secret police, I also had the political responsibility of keeping watch over the staff of the Daily Worker and of other people in the publication field when the control commission demanded it. Consequently, I had many relationships with Mr. Golos. The control commission at that time was really more than three, but three were publicly named. That is publicly named within the party. They weren't publicly named so much outside for the general public, but I mean within the party. These three were generally named in the national committee with power to enlarge their numbers, which permitted them to make the control commission as large as they wished. But the three that were constantly named during that period were Jacob Golos, Charles or Clarence Derba (he used both names, and he spelled his name either D-i-r-b-a or D-e-r-b-a), and Dora Lipshitz.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, the name of John S. Service came up this morning. Will you tell us what you knew about John S. Service's connection with the Communist Party to be?

Mr. BUDENZ. John S. Service, at least from the official information I received, had many contacts with the party. He was designated as Lattimore's pupil in some of these discussions. He was designated as a man to be relied upon in the State Department, particularly in 1945 in the campaign against General Hurley. I have never heard him mentioned specifically as a Communist, but his relationship was certainly very close from all the official reports I received. You must understand that during a considerable period of time I was in the Communist Party, Mr. Service was in China and would not come so much directly to my attention.

Mr. MORRIS. But did you know that the Communist Party relied on John Stewart Service to put over their policy in the Far East?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most specifically. That is to say, it came out very sharply in 1945 and the names of John Stewart Service and John Carter Vincent were repeatedly mentioned as being dependable in the campaign within the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I interrupt at this point? You have a couple of times used the word "designated," Mr. Budenz. Did you make it clear for the record, do you think, by whom Mr. Service was designated?

Mr. BUDENZ. As what?

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned that he was designated in several capacities. He was designated. Do you recall?

Mr. BUDENZ. Designated as Lattimore's pupil?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BUDENZ. I have heard that expression several times. My memory is that it came from Earl Browder and Jack Stachel.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't use that word in the sense of an official appointment, but rather as a characterization of him?

Mr. MORRIS. That was a characterization in the discussion in the Politburo.

Mr. SOURWINE. By more than one member of the Politburo?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. At more than one time?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the same true with regard to our subsequent use of the word designation? You spoke of Mr. Lattimore in another capacity?

Mr. BUDENZ. Mr. Service, you mean?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Service.

Mr. BUDENZ. Being designated as a man who was reliable.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. This was used repeatedly. Perhaps if I search my memory further I could think of who these people were who mentioned him specifically, but it was within the Politburo.

Mr. SOURWINE. I simply wanted to clear up your connotation of the word designated, in your use of it, because otherwise the testimony might not be clear on that point.

Mr. BUDENZ. I see.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, yesterday you testified that at the time Owen Lattimore was with Henry Wallace in the Far East, you were approached by Jack Stachel and were told of his particular role, that is of Lattimore's particular role in the Communist organization. Was there any mention by Stachel at that time of John Carter Vincent's position in the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. So the testimony you gave this morning with respect to John Carter Vincent could be amplified by stating that Jack Stachel told you that on that particular occasion?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes; that is very definite.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you hear on other occasions of John Carter Vincent?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; particularly during the period of 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Nym Wales, who was the wife of Edgar Snow?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew her officially. During the past year I recall that I met her once, but I don't recall the occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't recall the occasion?

Mr. BUDENZ. No.

Mr. MORRIS. But did you know that she was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most decidedly. She was, so far as official reports went, a Communist before Snow was.

Mr. MORRIS. Before Edgar Snow was?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Is he the Snow who wrote the book, *People on Our Side*?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he did.

Senator SMITH. He also wrote *Red Star Over China*.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Can you recall anything about that book that would be of interest to this committee, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. He amended one edition of the book, as I recall, at the request of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, his first edition differed from the second edition?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I don't recall all the circumstances. By checking up on the book, I could, because I was in the midst of the discussions.

Mr. MORRIS. You participated in the discussion that led to the request on the part of the Communist Party to him to amend the first edition of his book?

Mr. BUDENZ. Either in those discussions or in subsequent discussions in which the matter was reviewed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you any letters in the files on Edgar Snow or Mrs. Edgar Snow that would be of interest to us now?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter dated May 27, 1940, addressed to Edgar Snow, Esquire, Worcester House, Baguio, the Philippines, from Edward C. Carter.

DEAR SNOW: Your very important letter of May 3 with several enclosures has just arrived. I am sharing your letter and that of Mrs. Chuan with the following:

Miss Ida Pruitt
Harry Price
John Hersey
Frederick V. Field
Robert W. Barnett

I want to read another section of the letter.

Your Saturday Evening Post article was invaluable. All of your writing helps. Your discriminating analyses of China and the Far East today are of the greatest value to the future both of China and the United States.

That is signed "Edward C. Carter."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH: So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 207" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 207

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, May 27, 1940.

EDGAR SNOW, Esq.,
Worcester House, Baguio, the Philippines.

DEAR SNOW: Your very important letter of May 3 with several enclosures has just arrived. I am sharing your letter and that of Mrs. Chuan with the following:

Miss Ida Pruitt
Harry Price
John Hersey
Frederick V. Field
Robert W. Barnett

You give me credit for more work on behalf of the industrial cooperatives than I am entitled to. I am afraid I have a one-track mind. For the past year I have felt that the only person in the world who could put the CIC on the map in the United States is yourself. I shall continue to do all in my limited power to get you to come to the United States for this purpose. You and you alone have the ability to raise money for progressive China from out and out capitalists. You are the only American who knows the CIC from the inside who at the same time has Nation-wide prestige in the United States.

I have done a little on behalf of Miss Pruitt, but it is discouraging, for she has been the personification of devotion to the cause, but does not inspire quite that confidence which is so desperately essential if things are to be done in a big way in this country.

Your Saturday Evening Post article was invaluable. All of your writing helps. Your discriminating analyses of China and the Far East today are of the greatest value to the future both of China and the United States.

Hoping that you can come to us soon, I am
Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is a review of Red Star Over China, by Edgar Snow. The review is by Edward C. Carter, published in Pacific Affairs for March 1938, pages 110 to 113. Mr. Carter:

The leaders of Red China represent to the peasants Franciscan simplicity, personal bravery, an abounding humor, and a strategic ingenuity of magical dimensions; but they represent, as well, a way of life that has convinced the masses that there at least are political leaders who will not betray them into the hands of the landlords and money lenders.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that excerpt from Edward C. Carter's book review of Edgar Snow's book be incorporated into the record?

Senator SMITH. It is so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 208" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 208

RED STAR OVER CHINA, BY EDGAR SNOW, REVIEWED BY EDWARD C. CARTER

The leaders of Red China represent to the peasants Franciscan simplicity, personal bravery, an abounding humor, and a strategic ingenuity of magical dimensions; but they represent, as well, a way of life that has convinced the masses that there at least are political leaders who will not betray them into the hands of the landlords and money lenders (Pacific Affairs, March 1938, pp. 110-113).

Mr. MANDEL. Quoting again from Pacific Affairs, of September 1937, page 247, in regard to Edgar Snow. He is called:

Edgar Snow—the first foreign newspaper correspondent to be given free access to the Red districts of China, spent 4 months in Soviet territory in 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. May that extract made by Mr. Mandel be incorporated into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 209" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 209

Edgar Snow—the first foreign newspaper correspondent to be given free access to the Red districts of China, spent 4 months in Soviet territory in 1936 (Pacific Affairs, September 1937, p. 247).

Mr. MANDEL. And finally a quotation from Pacific Affairs of September 1939 reviewing Inside Red China, by Nym Wales. The review is by Olga Lang:

It is curious how much of their good reputation abroad the Chinese Communists owe to one man—Edgar Snow * * * Nym Wales, as the wife of Edgar Snow, will inevitably have her work compared with that of her famous husband. * * * She is not impartial. She thoroughly approves of the Chinese Communists. * * * So she writes with gay excitement and eager partisanship.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that extract be incorporated into the record?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 210" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 210

INSIDE RED CHINA, BY NYM WALES

It is curious how much of their good reputation abroad the Chinese Communists owe to one man—Edgar Snow * * * Nym Wales, as the wife of Edgar Snow, will inevitably have her work compared with that of her famous husband. * * * She is not impartial. She thoroughly approves of the Chinese Communists. * * * So she writes with gay excitement and eager partisanship. (By O. L. (Olga Lang), Pacific Affairs, September 1939.)

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mary Van Kleeck?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have known her personally as a Communist and known her for many years.

Mr. MORRIS. You met her under circumstances indicating that she was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. She is Mary Van Kleeck, of the Russell Sage Foundation; that is, she is an officer of the foundation. That doesn't indict the whole foundation.

Mr. MANDEL. I have a letter here on the stationery of the International Industrial Relations Institute, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated January 22, 1937, addressed to Frederick V. Field, signed Mary Van Kleeck.

DEAR MR. FIELD: I am very glad to become a member of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I shall of course have a special interest in bringing about appropriate cooperation between the International Industrial Relations Institute and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that letter be introduced into the record to be marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of that is to show Miss Van Kleeck's membership in the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 211" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 211

INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INSTITUTE,
New York, January 23, 1937.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York.

DEAR MR. FIELD: I am very glad to become a member of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I shall, of course, have a special interest in bringing about appropriate cooperation between the International Industrial Relations Institute and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Sincerely yours,

MARY VAN KLEECK.

MR. MANDEL. I have a letter dated May 2, 1933, to Mary Van Kleeck, signed Joseph Barnes:

DEAR MISS VAN KLEECK: I am very glad, indeed, to sign the statement concerning the Soviet Union which you have sent me. I am afraid that I am very optimistic as to the possibility of such good advice being followed by Mr. Roosevelt, but I am glad that you are at least seeing to it that the idea is expressed to him as forcefully as possible.

I am enclosing my small contribution to the expenses of the project.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that letter be introduced into the record to be marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 212" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 212

MAY 2, 1933.

MISS MARY VAN KLEECK,
Russell Sage Foundation,
130 East Twenty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS VAN KLEECK: I am very glad, indeed, to sign the statement concerning the Soviet Union which you have sent me. I am afraid that I am very optimistic as to the possibility of such good advice being followed by Mr. Roosevelt, but I am glad that you are at least seeing to it that the idea is expressed to him as forcefully as possible.

I am enclosing my small contribution to the expenses of the project.

Very sincerely yours,

JOSEPH BARNES.

MR. MANDEL. Another letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the letter head marked "130 East Twenty-second Street, New York City," which is the Russell Sage Foundation where Miss Van Kleeck was employed, dated March 23, 1938, to Mr. E. C. Carter, signed Mary Van Kleeck.

DEAR MR. CARTER: You said that you wanted the manuscript of my radio speech of last night on the Moscow trials. I do not think that it can be of any real service to you, but I send it nevertheless by way of expressing my best wishes for your address tomorrow night. I hear that you are also giving a broadcast. I am sure that you will render fine service this week in the interest of a better understanding of this complicated situation.

With cordial greetings, I am,

Sincerely yours,

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 213" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 213

130 EAST TWENTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, March 23, 1938.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
The Inquiry,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: You said that you wanted the manuscript of my radio speech of last night on the Moscow trials. I do not think that it can be of any real service to you, but I send it nevertheless by way of expressing my best wishes for your address tomorrow night. I hear that you are also giving a broadcast. I am sure that you will render fine service this week in the interest of a better understanding of this complicated situation.

With cordial greetings, I am
Sincerely yours,

MARY VAN KLEECK.

Mr. MANDEL. On the same letterhead, dated April 20, 1938, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter from Mary Van Kleeck.

The full text of Newton D. Baker's statement on the Moscow trials at the Fourth Annual Women's Congress in Chicago in March 1937 was published in the April 1937 issue of *Soviet Russia Today*.

I am mindful of your request for a list of liberals present at the dinner with Mr. Troyanovsky and I shall send it as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, let me tell you how much I enjoyed your review of *Red Star Over China*. It seems to me a very fair appraisal and criticism of the book.

Have you seen the *Labor Monthly* published in London? The current issue is called the *Crisis Issue* and the comment on the Moscow trials is very interesting. Incidentally it supports essentially my remarks in the broadcast, a fact which I am glad to report to Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 214" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 214

NEW YORK CITY, April 20, 1938.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: The full text of Newton D. Baker's statement on the Moscow trials at the Fourth Annual Women's Congress in Chicago in March 1937 was published in the April 1937 issue of *Soviet Russia Today*.

I am mindful of your request for a list of liberals present at the dinner with Mr. Troyanovsky and I shall send it as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, let me tell you how much I enjoyed your review of *Red Star Over China*. It seems to me a very fair appraisal and criticism of the book.

Have you seen the *Labor Monthly* published in London? The current issue is called the *Crisis Issue* and the comment on the Moscow trials is very interesting. Incidentally, it supports essentially my remarks in the broadcast—a fact which I am glad to report to Pacific Affairs.

Sincerely yours,

MARY VAN KLEECK.

Mr. MANDEL. On the same letterhead dated May 26, 1938, to E. C. Carter from Mary Van Kleeck:

DEAR MR. CARTER: Will you be one of a group of 10 or 12 of different related professions to cooperate in giving a dinner on Tuesday, May 31, to Deputy Commissioner Vassily Bourzman, who is now in this country arranging plans

for the Soviet pavilion at the New York World's Fair? Mr. Bourgan sails Wednesday morning, so the plans are being hurriedly made. We shall also invite as our guest Mr. Constantin Oumansky, counsel of the Soviet Embassy.

* * * * *
The dinner will be at 7 o'clock, at the Cosmopolitan Club, 122 East Sixty-sixth Street * * *.

I have read excerpts from the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be introduced in the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 215" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 215

NEW YORK CITY, May 26, 1933.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR Mr. CARTER: Will you be one of a group of 10 or 12 of different related professions to cooperate in giving a dinner on Tuesday, May 31, to Deputy Commissioner Vassily Bourgan, who is now in this country arranging plans for the Soviet pavilion at the New York World's Fair? Mr. Bourgan sails Wednesday morning, so the plans are being hurriedly made. We shall also invite as our guest Mr. Constantin Oumansky, counsel of the Soviet Embassy.

The suggestion for this plan has been made to me by Mr. Simon Breibes, who is associated in the architectural planning of the building. He and I believe it is not too early to begin to plan the exhibits. Suggestions from American friends on this point will be welcome. The building will undoubtedly be a central point of interest for visitors, as was the Soviet building at the Paris exposition.

The dinner will be at 7 o'clock at the Cosmopolitan Club, 122 East Sixty-sixth Street, where a room will be reserved in my name as a member. The cost for each member of the group of hosts will be \$2.75.

As the time is short, I should greatly appreciate your telephoning or telegraphing your response tomorrow, Friday, to me at my office at the above address (GRainery 5-7000).

Sincerely yours,

MARY VAN KLEECK.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know Vilhjalmur Stefansson?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know from official reports that he is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know he was a member of many Communist-front organizations?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is where much of the discussion around him centers. He was a member of so many, I think the word countless can be used without exaggeration.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if the interruption may be permitted, the name that you are discussing is not a common one, but would it be improper to identify the particular Stefansson to whom you now refer?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Vilhjalmur, V-i-l-h-j-a-l-m-u-r, Stefansson, S-t-e-f-a-n-s-s-o-n.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the first name m-u-r or m-a-l?

Mr. MANDEL. m-u-r.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. He has been very much interested in the Arctic. In fact, his latest book on geopolitics, on the Arctic, with contributions by Mr. Lattimore to it, shows, although in a very involved and I should say semischolarly way, that Soviet Russia is impregnable because it has control of the heartland.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he an explorer, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he has been an explorer.

Mr. MORRIS. You are testifying that party discussions indicated that he was on many Communist-front organizations?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very many indeed.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that in addition to being a member of many Communist-front organizations, he was also a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. It was on the occasion of the Communist fronts precisely that I recall his association being officially brought to my attention.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you put into the record letters that will indicate Mr. Stefansson's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I have a letter here dated January 26, 1939, addressed to Philip J. Jaffe from Edward C. Carter, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

DEAR JAFFE: This is to express the hope that you and Mrs. Jaffe will attend the opening of the Arctic exhibition at the Natural History Museum on Sunday, February 5, at 3:30 p. m., under the auspices of the American Russian Institute. Stefansson, the great explorer, and Oumansky will both speak. The exhibit is on a very important subject. I will send you the details later.

Oumansky, by the way, is the Russian Ambassador.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 216" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 216

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 26, 1939.

PHILIP J. JAFFE, Esq.,

49 East Ninth Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR JAFFE: This is to express the hope that you and Mrs. Jaffe will attend the opening of an Arctic exhibition at the Natural History Museum on Sunday, February 5, at 3:30 p. m., under the auspices of the American Russian Institute. Stefansson, the great explorer, and Oumansky will both speak. The exhibit is on a very important subject. I will send you the details later.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a memo dated April 2, 1940, presumably Frederick V. Field, from ECC, presumably E. C. Carter. This memo says:

I have just had word from Cripps—
that would be the British Foreign Minister—

that he will accept my invitation for dinner on the evening of Thursday the 11th.

Then there is listed those who are invited, presumably the IPR, and among those is the name of Vilhjalmur Stefansson, along with Frederick V. Field and others.

Senator SMITH. Will you state where that came from?

Mr. MANDEL. From the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 217" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 217

APRIL 2, 1940.

F. V. F. from E. C. C.

I have just had word from Cripps that he will accept my invitation for dinner on the evening of Thursday the 11th. This takes the place of the dinner to which I had invited you for this week. I hope you can come.

Before I send out all of the invitations that I would like to, I wish you would glance through the list below and let me know what four or five people had better be eliminated and what four or five people are important to add from the American Council point of view.

The private room at the Gladstone only holds 20 at the outside and I had rather thought that a meeting of more than 20 might inhibit complete candor on Cripps' part.

Frederick V. Field, yes.
P. E. Corbett, yes.
W. W. Lockwood, yes.
W. B. Osgood Field, Jr.
Phillip C. Jessup, no.
Joe Barnes, no.
Harriet Moore, yes.
Mrs. Eliot Pratt, no.
Vilhjalmur Stefansson, yes.
Rose Rubin
Rose Somerville
Robert S. Lynd
Wm. W. Lancaster
Ruth Carter, yes.
Jack Shepherd, yes.
Kathleen Barnes, yes.

Robert W. Barnett, yes.
Ch'ao-ting Chl, yes.
Andrew Grajdanzey.
Edward C. Carter, yes.
Sir Stafford Cripps, yes.
Rossinger, yes.
T. A. Blisson, no.
Harry Price, yes.
Luther Tucker, no.
Sam Harper, no.
John Hazard.
W. D. C.
Faymonville, yes.
Geoffrey Wilson, ?
McCann, no.
Muhle, yes.

Mr. MANDEL. Finally I have a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated March 14, 1938, addressed to Mr. Frederick V. Field, from Edward C. Carter, as follows:

DEAR FRED: I have accepted Corliss Lamont's invitation to speak at the Hippodrome on the evening of Thursday, March 24, on the Soviet Union and present world events. The other speakers will be Troyanovsky and Stefansson. I am wondering whether there are any points that you would like me to make on behalf of the American Council. The meeting is held under the auspices of an ad hoc committee of which Corliss Lamont is chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that an ad hoc committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I believe it would be an ad hoc committee of the American Council of the Soviet-American Friendship.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 218" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 218

NEW YORK CITY, March 14, 1938.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
San Francisco.

DEAR FRED: I have accepted Corliss Lamont's invitation to speak at the Hippodrome on the evening of Thursday, March 24, on the Soviet Union and present world events. The other speakers will be Troyanovsky and Stefansson. I am wondering whether there are any points that you would like me to make on behalf of the American Council. The meeting is held under the auspices of an ad hoc committee of which Corliss Lamont is chairman.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew her very well indeed for a number of years.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Always she was during my membership in the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a long and trusted member of the party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very much so; engaged in the confidential work for the Communist International. That was told me by J. Peters and many others.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you any letters indicating that Anna Louise Strong was associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Her book is reviewed entitled "This Soviet World," in Pacific Affairs for December 1936, on pages 611 to 612. She has an article in Pacific Affairs for June 1941, on page 11, entitled "Eighth Route Regions in North China," and also an article "Dawn Out of China," appearing in Pacific Affairs for September 1949, on page 454.

Here is also an excerpt from Pacific Affairs for December 1936 appearing on pages 611 and 612 in the review of this Soviet World by Anna Louise Strong, the review being written by Owen Lattimore, and I quote:

Her book as a whole is good confrontation of the Soviet ideas of democracy, originality and individuality, and the foreign idea of regimentation.

Mr. MORRIS. May those references of Mr. Mandel be incorporated?
Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 219" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 219

ANNA LOUISE STRONG

Strong, Anna Louise, *This Soviet World*, 611-612, reviewed.

Source: Volume 8, December 1936, Pacific Affairs (p. 14).

Strong, Anna Louise, *Eighth Route Regions in North China*, 154-165, article.

Source: Volume 14, June 1941, Pacific Affairs (p. 11).

Strong, A. L., *Dawn Out of China*, 302.

Source: Pacific Affairs, Volume 22, September 1949 (p. 454).

This Soviet World, by ANNA LOUISE STRONG

(Reviewed by Owen Lattimore, p. 611-612)

"Her book as a whole is a good confrontation of the Soviet idea of democracy, originality and individuality, and the foreign idea of regimentation" (Pacific Affairs, December 1936).

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Ella Winter, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know of her by official declarations.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know she is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes, repeatedly and over my entire period of membership. She was a very active Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Is her membership in the Communist Party rather an open fact?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think it must be open. Many people know it.

Mr. SORWINE. When you say repeatedly, Mr. Budenz, you don't mean she was repeatedly a member. You mean that you repeatedly heard references to her within the party.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right, and official references. She was quite active and reports of hers or reference to her work on the west coast

and in other places came to the attention of the national headquarters repeatedly.

Mr. MANDEL. Ella Winter is the author of a book review appearing in *Pacific Affairs* in 1934, pages 473 and 474. In the March 1935 issue of *Pacific Affairs*, on page 87, we find the following quote in reference to Ella Winter, and her article *What Next in California*. And it says she speaks of the hard-hitting and hard-fighting minority that heads the workers' fight in California, the Communist Party.³

Then we have some letters here. One is a letter dated February 8, 1935, to Mrs. Ella Winter from Catherine Porter, who has been previously identified as a member of the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

DEAR MRS. WINTER: Thank you for your note of the 24th. Your editorial was received in ample time after all. The March issue of the magazine is now in the press and you will receive your copy shortly.

Enclosed is our check for \$25 in payment for the editorial.

I am somewhat embarrassed about the book review, especially since I see that Joe Barnes was quite indefinite about the matter in his letter of September 24. As a matter of fact, we do not pay for book reviews, and this has always been made quite clear to our reviewers * * *.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may this and the reviews mentioned by Mr. Mandel by Ella Winter be incorporated into the record?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 220 and 221" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 220

ELLA WINTER

Articles in *Pacific Affairs*: Book review, 1934, pages 473-474.

Ella Winter, *What Next in California*, speaks of "the hard-fighting and hard-hitting minority that heads the workers' fight in California, the Communist Party" (*Pacific Affairs*, p. 87, March 1935).

EXHIBIT No. 221

FEBRUARY 8, 1935.

Mrs. ELLA WINTER,
Box 855, Carmel, Calif.

DEAR MRS. WINTER: Thank you for your note of the 24th. Your editorial was received in ample time after all. The March issue of the magazine is now in the press and you will receive your copy shortly.

Enclosed is our check for \$25 in payment for the editorial.

I am somewhat embarrassed about the book review, especially since I see that Joe Barnes was quite indefinite about the matter in his letter of September 24. As a matter of fact, we do not pay for book reviews, and this has always been made quite clear to our reviewers. Ordinarily editorials are not paid for, either, but Mr. Lattimore made a special exception in your case as he was very anxious to have that subject treated by you. I am more than sorry that the question of fee for book reviews was not made clear to you earlier.

Sincerely yours,

CATHERINE PORTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Finally, I have a list of articles by Ella Winter which appeared in the *Daily Worker* with the dates and pages which I would like to introduce into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. And the purpose of this is to show that Ella Winter contributed to the *Daily Worker* and was at the same time a contributor to the Institute of Pacific Relations? Is that the purpose of that, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you accept that into the record, Mr. Chairman?
Senator SMITH. It is so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 122" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 222

ELLA WINTER

Following is a list of contributions to the Communist publication, the Daily Worker, and the Worker, by Ella Winter:

Worker. (See Daily Worker for December 24, 1931, p. 3).

Daily Worker. (See issue of June 25, 1934, p. 5, col. 1).

Worker. (See Daily Worker December 21, 1935, p. 3).

Daily Worker. (See issue of March 6, 1936, p. 5).

Daily Worker. (See issue of August 12, 1936, p. 1).

Daily Worker. (See issue of February 12, 1937, p. 2).

Daily Worker. (See issue of October 3, 1947, p. 6).

Daily Worker. (See issue of October 2, 1947, p. 6).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that when we had a discussion this morning about certain policies represented by the Daily Worker as being the policy of the United States State Department issued by Sumner Welles, we have nothing at this time to show what the State Department's official attitude was at that time. I suggest that we set in motion an inquiry to find out exactly what the situation was so that the record will be complete in that respect.

Senator SMITH. So that the record may carry a copy of whatever statement was made by Mr. Welles at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. In other words, I think the record should have the official statement.

Senator SMITH. I think so, too. We will follow up on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. In expanding on that, in fairness to the State Department might it be well if the committee requested the Department for a brief statement of what the Department's official policy was at that particular time and permit it to be entered in the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. May the order be made for entry of it at the point where reference was made in this morning's hearing?

Senator SMITH. Yes. It would seem to me that the statement which was printed in the Daily Worker, if that is called to the attention of the State Department, they can say whether or not they issued such a statement as was attributed to Mr. Welles. They either know or don't know whether or not such a statement was issued.

Mr. MORRIS. Our record has nothing to show that.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce at this time for the following probative value, letters from the Institute of Pacific Relations files by and concerning Sumner Welles. The purpose of introducing these letters is to show the degree of influence that the Institute of Pacific Relations was able to bear on Sumner Welles, who was for a period of time Under Secretary of State. I wonder if you will receive those letters into evidence at this time.

Senator SMITH. Not for the purpose—

Mr. MORRIS. For that particular purpose.

Senator SMITH. For that particular purpose only, yes.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter dated October 21, 1946, addressed to R. M. Fowler, 2279 Sun Life Building, Montreal, Canada, from Edward C. Carter.

Senator SMITH. Where was that found?

Mr. MANDEL. Found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I quote an excerpt from that letter:

DEAR BOB: I understand that Mr. Sumner Welles is going to be your guest shortly. As you know, he is really a very great man and a terrible loss to the United States State Department. You ought to know that consistently throughout the last 10 years whenever I have gone to Welles with any request on behalf of the IPR he has instantaneously and generously responded—cutting red tape—speeding the IPR on its way. He has always professed sincere admiration for the work of the IPR. A few months ago, he accepted the chairmanship of the Washington group of the IPR on the understanding that he couldn't give time actively for several months so we have not been making demands on him, but expect his help at a few key points during the coming winter. I am sure he will have greatly enjoyed his Canadian trip.

That is an excerpt from the letter.

Senator SMITH. What is the date?

Mr. MORRIS. October 21, 1946. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into the record for the stipulated purpose that I have indicated?

Senator SMITH. Yes. Have you identified the file?

Mr. MORRIS. It is significant, Senator. We want it introduced for that particular purpose, which I think is apparent from reading that letter.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 223" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 223

OCTOBER 21, 1946.

R. M. FOWLER, Esq.,

2279 Sun Life Building,
Montreal, Canada.

DEAR BOB: I understand that Mr. Sumner Welles is going to be your guest shortly. As you know, he is really a very great man and a terrible loss to the United States State Department. You ought to know that consistently throughout the last 10 years whenever I have gone to Welles with any request on behalf of the IPR he has instantaneously and generously responded—cutting red tape—speeding the IPR on its way. He has always professed sincere admiration for the work of the IPR. A few months ago, he accepted the chairmanship of the Washington group of the IPR on the understanding that he couldn't give time actively for several months so we have not been making demands on him, but expect his help at a few key points during the coming winter. I am sure he will have greatly enjoyed his Canadian trip.

If it is natural for you to do so, I hope you will draw him out a bit on the IPR—remind him that the Canadian Institute is the very honored Canadian section of the IPR and, if you get any reaction that would be helpful to me, be sure and let me know.

It would do no harm for you to place on one of your tables in your library at home in Montreal a copy of Windows on the Pacific and IPR books which I am mailing to you today under separate cover.

With all good wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter date June 6, 1946 to The Honorable Sumner Welles, from Edward C. Carter, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I read the last paragraph:

I was greatly intrigued by Walter Lippman's suggestion this morning that you become the American delegate on the Security Council. This would certainly be a great step forward and I hope Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes will so regard

it. Although my own personal preference would be to see you serving as Secretary of State, perhaps this is too ideal a solution to hope for.

Mr. MORRIS. May we introduce that into the record, and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 224" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 224

JUNE 6, 1946.

The Honorable SUMNER WELLES,

P. O. Box 4669, Anacostia Station, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. WELLES: Would there be any chance of your having half an hour free when Mr. Pollard and I could call on you at Oxon Hill any time on Tuesday, June 11, before 3:30 p. m.? I have to be at Mr. Justice Black's at 4 p. m. and then go to the station to take the train for Detroit. But any time in the morning or early afternoon would be convenient for me and Mr. Pollard.

Lord Inverchapel has asked that the dinner which we wanted to give him be postponed until the autumn. He apparently wants to get acclimatized before doing much speaking.

As example is frequently more persuasive than exhortation, I am wondering whether you would be able to consider making a contribution of \$1,500 this year to the over-all national budget of the American Council of 8250,000. Such a gift would carry great weight with others, both nationally and in the Washington area, and would be of great material aid in our plans for a more adequate service in Washington.

I was greatly intrigued by Walter Lippmann's suggestion this morning that you become the American delegate on the Security Council. This would certainly be a great step forward and I hope Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes will so regard it. Although my own personal preference would be to see you serving as Secretary of State, perhaps this is too ideal a solution to hope for.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated March 15, 1946, addressed to the Honorable Sumner Welles from Edward C. Carter.

DEAR MR. WELLES: This is to inquire the approximate date of your return to Washington. A few days after your return I would like to call to see you when you might conveniently spare an hour for an unhurried talk regarding IPR problems and policies. Demands on the IPR are steadily increasing, and we want sound advice as to which of the many calls are more important.

That is signed by Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 225" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 225

MARCH 15, 1946.

The Honorable SUMNER WELLES,

250 Via Bellaria, West Palm Beach, Fla.

DEAR MR. WELLES: This is to inquire the approximate date of your return to Washington. A few days after your return I would like to call to see you when you might conveniently spare an hour for an unhurried talk regarding IPR problems and policies. Demands on the IPR are steadily increasing and we want sound advice as to which of the many calls are most important.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a letter on the stationery of Sumner Welles dated April 22, 1946, to Mr. Carter, and signed by Sumner Welles:

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of April 19. Your letter of April 8, of which you have been kind enough to enclose a copy, crossed my most

recent letter to you in the mails. The information you send me with regard to the selection of a vice chairman of the Washington group is of course most agreeable to me. I do not know Mr. Graves personally, but I shall needless to say be delighted to be associated with him.

With kind regards, believe me, sincerely yours.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I introduce that into the record and ask to have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH. Where was this found?

Mr. MANDEL. That is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 226" and is as follows:)

OXON HILL MANOR, OXON HILL, MD.,
April 22, 1946.

EDWARD C. CARTER, Esq.,
Director, American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street,
New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of April 19. Your letter of April 8, of which you have been kind enough to enclose a copy, crossed my most recent letter to you in the mails.

The information you send me with regard to the selection of the vice chairman of the Washington group is, of course, most agreeable to me. I do not know Mr. Graves personally, but I shall, needless to say, be delighted to be associated with him.

With my kind regards, believe me
Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated June 30, 1942, addressed to Mr. Harold Young, Assistant to the Vice President, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C., from Edward C. Carter.

DEAR MR. YOUNG: This is to thank you for your letter of June 11, asking whether I could call to see you next time I visit Washington.

I am planning to be there all day Thursday, July 2, and would appreciate the privilege of talking with you. I am relatively free all day except that I am tied up from 12:30 to 1 with an engagement with Mr. Welles.

Ultimately I am anxious to talk about our proposed IPR conference with Mr. Wallace, but I can do this on some other visit after you and I have had our preliminary talk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

By way of explanation, Mr. Young was Mr. Wallace's secretary. Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. Is he referring there to Mr. Henry Wallace?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 227," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 227

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, June 30, 1942.

MR. HAROLD YOUNG,
Assistant to the Vice President,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. YOUNG: This is to thank you for your letter of June 11, asking whether I could call to see you next time I visit Washington.

I am planning to be there all day Thursday, July 2, and would appreciate the privilege of talking with you. I am relatively free all day except that I am tied up from 12:30 to 1 with an engagement with Mr. Welles.

Ultimately I am anxious to talk about our proposed IPR conference with Mr. Wallace, but I can do this on some other visit after you and I have had our preliminary talk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated June 29, 1938, addressed to Frederick V. Field. The letter is unsigned. It is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The letter reads as follows:

DEAR FRED: Upon advancing into Carter's office, your June 23 letter in hand, I was confronted with his air-mail letter to you of June 27, enclosing the letter to John Thompson. There is nothing more to add at the moment, though I know that Carter is keeping in touch with Welles and Duggan in the State Department and with any other contacts and suggestions that he can find, and would welcome any specific suggestions you might make as to how the Pacific Council could explore the possibilities more thoroughly. At present it appears that any contacts we might develop in that part of the world would have to be through individuals, as unofficial organizations in the field of foreign affairs seem to be nonexistent. Could you let us know exactly what the members of the American Council to which you refer would propose doing?

The rest is a comment I don't think it necessary to read.

Mr. SOURWINE. You spoke of that as a letter. As a matter of fact, it is a carbon copy of a letter; is it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The original letter may well have been signed and, for all you know, was signed; is that correct?

Mr. MANDEL. So it would appear.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether the original letter was sent?

Mr. MANDEL. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I note that the address on the letter is 129 East Fifty-second Street, which is the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Will you receive that into evidence, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 228" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 228

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York, June 29, 1938.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR FRED: Upon advancing into Carter's office, your June 23 letter in hand, I was confronted with his air-mail letter to you of June 27 enclosing the letter to John Thompson. There is nothing more to add at the moment, though I know that Carter is keeping in touch with Welles and Duggan in the State Department and with any other contacts and suggestions that he can find, and would welcome any specific suggestions you might make as to how the Pacific Council could explore the possibilities more thoroughly. At present it appears that any contacts we might develop in that part of the world would have to be through individuals, as unofficial organizations in the field of foreign affairs seem to be nonexistent. Could you let us know exactly what the members of the American Council to which you refer would propose doing?

With reference to your query about Saionji you will have already seen in Carter's long letter to Alsborg that he had invited Saionji to come over. We have now heard that it will be impossible for him to come, but that Takayanagi

will be coming in July to discuss the various problems raised for the Japanese Council by the secretariat inquiry. Carter will be writing you in detail about this point, so I won't elaborate.

I delivered the Brotholtz family, bag and baggage, at 24 West Fifty-fifth this morning. They are extremely pleased to be there, and we are planning to drink a suitable toast to the absentee landlord on Friday evening.

My regards to Edith and Lila and Gall.

As ever,

MR. MANDEL. I have here a letter, a carbon of a letter, from the Department of State, dated March 17, 1942. It comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, and signed by Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary, and attached is a small slip which says: "Please note that this is not to be published," with the initials "ECC" presumably E. C. Carter. This is the letter:

MY DEAR MR. CARTER: I have your letter of March 11, 1942, in which you inquire with regard to the practical value of the publications and activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The receipt is also acknowledged of similar letters addressed to other officers of the Department.

The importance of the development of an informed public opinion with regard to problems affecting foreign relations requires no special emphasis. In the development of such a public opinion, a valuable service is rendered by organizations which seek to present in readily accessible form studies by serious scholars of current problems and to stimulate an intelligent discussion of these problems. While for obvious reasons the Department of State has necessarily adopted the practice of refraining from endorsing or sponsoring any particular private organization, I am glad to say that in the opinion of officers of the Department who are especially familiar with the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the publications of the institute have been of interest and value, and the institute has been making a substantial contribution to the development of an informed public opinion.

I note and appreciate your statement that you propose not to use this letter publicly.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that and mark it as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 229" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 229

Please note that this is not to be published—E. C. C. [Typewritten note attached to letter.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., March 17, 1942.

MR. EDWARD CARTER,

*Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.*

MY DEAR MR. CARTER: I have your letter of March 11, 1942, in which you inquire with regard to the practical value of the publications and activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The importance of the development of an informed public opinion with regard to problems affecting foreign relations requires no special emphasis. In the development of such a public opinion, a valuable service is rendered by organizations which seek to present in readily accessible form studies by serious scholars of current problems and to stimulate an intelligent discussion of these problems. While for obvious reasons the Department of State has necessarily adopted the practice of refraining from endorsing or sponsoring any particular private organization, I am glad to say that, in the opinion of officers of the Department who are especially familiar with the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the publications of the institute have been of interest and

value, and the institute has been making a substantial contribution to the development of an informed public opinion.

I note and appreciate your statement that you propose not to use this letter publicly.

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. MANDREL. Next is a photostat of a letter on the stationery of the Department of State, dated July 2, 1940. This photostat was made at my direction from the document in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, signed Sumner Welles, Under Secretary.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Please accept my thanks for your courtesy in sending me, with your letter of June 28, 1940, a first draft of Mr. Lattimore's article "Empire Lies in the East." I have noted with interest the contents of the article and am bringing it to the attention of some of my associates here for their information."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that into evidence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 230" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 230

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 2, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Please accept my thanks for your courtesy in sending me with your letter of June 28, 1940, a first draft of Mr. Lattimore's article, "Empire Lies in the East."

I have noted with interest the contents of the article and am bringing it to the attention of some of my associates here for their information.

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES, *Under Secretary.*

Mr. MANDREL. The next is a letter, a copy of a letter from Harper & Bros., dated July 31, 1946, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Mr. Carter, E. C. Carter:

As I phoned your office today, we are to publish this fall a book by Sumner Welles to be entitled "Where Are We Heading?" which will deal with various aspects of the present international scene.

The book is to contain a few maps, one of which is to be a map of China showing the areas controlled by the National and Communist Governments. When we asked Mr. Welles for further details in this connection, which we could turn over to the professional map men, he replied, "I would suggest that the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, might be the best authority on the second map (that of China) and I have no doubt that Mr. Carter will take a personal interest in giving us all the help needed."

That is an excerpt from the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce this into the record, again for the same limited purpose?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

Mr. MORRIS. May it be marked the next consecutive exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 231" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 231

HARPER & BROS.,

New York, N. Y., July 31, 1946.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: As I phoned your office today, we are to publish this fall a book by Sumner Welles to be entitled "Where Are We Heading?" which will deal with various aspects of the present international scene.

The book is to contain a few maps, one of which is to be a map of China showing the areas controlled by the National and Communist Governments. When we asked Mr. Welles for further details in this connection, which we could turn over to the professional map man, he replied, "I would suggest that the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, might be the best authority on the second map (that of China) and I have no doubt that Mr. Carter will take a personal interest in giving us all the help needed."

Any information which you or your organization can give us will be greatly appreciated. You may think it wise to use shading to indicate not only the known controlled areas, but also disputed areas or regions where the boundaries are now in doubt.

We shall look forward to hearing from you in the matter.

Sincerely yours,

BEULAH HAGEN,

Assistant to Cass Canfield.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter to Miss Beulah Hagen, of Harper Bros., taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated August 1, 1946, from Edward C. Carter:

DEAR MISS HAGEN: Your letter of July 31 reached me this morning with Mr. Sumner Welles' suggestion that we cooperate in supplying your map maker with data showing the areas of China controlled by the Nationalist and Communist Governments. This is to assure you that we will do our best to give you the expert help Mr. Welles and you desire. It is somewhat of a tricky business because some of the marginal areas are in a constant state of flux.

Those of my colleagues who have the most precise data happen to be away from the office this week, but if you can wait until next week I think we can be of assistance.

Perhaps you will want to send up your map maker with such material as he already has, and then we can tackle the problem together.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into evidence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 232" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 232

AUGUST 1, 1946.

Miss BEULAH HAGEN,
Harper & Bros., New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS HAGEN: Your letter of July 31 reached me this morning with Mr. Sumner Welles' suggestion that we cooperate in supplying your map maker with data showing the areas of China controlled by the Nationalist and Communist Governments. This is to assure you that we will do our best to give you the expert help Mr. Welles and you desire. It is somewhat of a tricky business because some of the marginal areas are in a constant state of flux.

Those of my colleagues who have the most precise data happen to be away from the office this week, but if you can wait until next week I think we can be of assistance.

Perhaps you will want to send up your map maker with such material as he already has, and then we can tackle the problem together.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. The next letter that Mr. Mandel is about to read I think will give significance to the last two, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated August 6, 1946, to Miss Beulah Hagan, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I read the next to the last paragraph.

Mr. MORRIS. Who wrote this letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is from Edward C. Carter to Miss Beulah Hagan, of Harper Bros.

Whether you will want to adopt our consultant's broader phrase for the Communists by calling the area Communist-Democrats is up to you and Mr. Welles. It has this advantage: that it gives cognizance to the fact that in many areas the sympathizers with the third party—the Democratic League—are working hard to bring about a coalition between the Communists and the Kuomintang.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, doesn't that further show something else? Would you read the preceding paragraph, too?

Mr. MANDEL. (reading:)

I think you can improve on the designation of the Times map by using the word "Kuomintang" at the top and the bottom in place of "Nationalists."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the idea there was to make the recommendation that the "Nationalists" be changed to "Kuomintang" and the term "Communists" be changed to "Communist-Democrats."

Do you have any comment to make on that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have not, except I think it speaks for itself.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 233" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 233

August 6, 1946.

MISS BEULAH HAGEN,
Harper & Bros., New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS HAGEN: My third consultant has just brought in this copy of the New York Times map of Sunday, July 28, with a few changes in ink.

He thinks that this is about as nearly accurate as you can get from this distance.

He has located Changchun, which I incorrectly on the phone this morning, thought the Times had put in the Communist area. But this is not the case.

The name "Changchun" at the spot indicated should certainly be included in Mr. Welles' map.

Then it is rather important to add to the map "Kalgan" and to show the cross-country railroad which my consultant has put in in pen.

I think you can improve on the designation of the Times map by using the word "Kuomintang" at the top and the bottom in place of "Nationalists."

Whether you will want to adopt our consultant's broader phrase for the Communists by calling the area Communist-Democrats is up to you and Mr. Welles. It has this advantage: that it gives cognizance to the fact that in many areas the sympathizers with the third party—the Democratic League—are working hard to bring about a coalition between the Communists and the Kuomintang.

If I get any further details I will let you know.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know Dona Ralf Sues?

Mr. BUDENZ. I do. I know her personally.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. She was a member of the Communist Party who, under Communist orders, entered the home of Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Entered the home of Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. She was a friend or attendant or secretary or something of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, if I remember correctly. At any rate she had very close relationships with Chiang Kai-shek. When I say "entered the home," I don't necessarily mean she lived there, though my impression is that she did.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean she had access to the family circle?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew her to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have met her personally as a member of the Communist Party and I have talked to her at some length about her experiences.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that she wrote Shark Fins and Millet?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you available now—

Mr. MANDEL. Not now.

Mr. MORRIS. May we submit the information on Miss Ilona Ralf Sues later in the record?

Do you know Andrew Steiger?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know him through official words in the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. According to my memory he wrote a number of pro-Communist articles some years ago. I mean for the Daily Worker. That is my remembrance.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz can testify more extensively along the lines that we are pursuing today, but we would like to develop our research a bit to keep pace with that, and we ask that Mr. Budenz, after a few final questions, be permitted to leave but stay under subpoena for a short period of time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if you are going to stop at this time asking Mr. Budenz questions about the names of persons, I would like to inquire. Mr. Budenz has now testified on 2 days with respect to a number of names. Do you know how many of the persons who have been established as associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations Mr. Budenz has now identified as Communists?

Mr. MORRIS. My count runs to 43, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Including the last name that was identified today?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were all of those names included in the list that was made a part of the record earlier, of persons who had connections with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. No; there are some additions. There are some we did not have on the original list of 32.

Mr. SOURWINE. That were brought out by Mr. Budenz yesterday or today for the first time?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Sourwine. One other thing, Mr. Budenz. One of the Senators asked me if you would expatiate just a bit on the official Communist policy adopted in official meetings of the Communist Party to bring about the conquest of China. One of the members of the committee asked if you would further develop that.

Mr. BUDENZ. Of course the Communist Party changed its tactics and

also its propagaunda in accordance with the instructions from Moscow. If I had known this question was going to be asked, I could have brought you exactly the period by dates, but from my memory I don't want to be too exact. Originally the Communists in China were represented as extreme revolutionists. They were establishing soviets. At the same time, though, China occupied in Communist activities and propagaunda a very prominent part always. From the very beginning of my entry into the party China was considered to be a key to world conquest. This is borne out by the constant emphasis of the Communist Party itself in demonstrations and in the publications on that score.

Now, as time went forward, particularly with the Communist Party in the United States, under the people's front policy, developing infiltration, and becoming more powerful in its influence in the country through its various agents, the policy in regard to China likewise was given a new twist, and as we see, the effort was to promote the idea of the Chinese Communists being a democratic force.

This was contrary to the previous propagaunda.

After that, there was developed a coalition government, and this began, of course, in 1943, but it takes some time for a line to develop. It came to fruition in 1944 and 1945. And after I left the party, the idea of coalition government was stressed very emphatically as a task put upon the American Communist Party to win the United States to the idea of coalition government in China.

It was pointed out that this was an application of the constant Communist tactic of the united front, whereby you united with those who wished to destroy. This coalition government was to be applied not only in China but in Poland and the eastern European states and was to be popularized in the United States. We were particularly to stress it, though, in regard to China, in order to bring about a Red China, as Earl Browder said in speaking to the national committee as early as the latter part of 1943, and again in 1944. The task given to the American party by Moscow was to so condition American opinion and the American Government as to assure a Red Poland and a Red China at that particular time, this under the banner of coalition government.

Senator WATKINS. How did they react to General Marshall's appointment as Ambassador to succeed Patrick Hurley?

Mr. MORRIS, Senator, may I say that that point came up this morning.

Mr. BUDENZ left the Communist Party in 1945, and I think at that time General Marshall had not assumed the position of Secretary of State.

Mr. BUDENZ. General Hurley had not yet resigned?

Senator WATKINS. In other words, the witness does not know how they officially reacted to it.

Mr. BUDENZ. I do not, except from reading the Daily Worker, and I could not inform you on that offhand.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz would like to restrict his testimony, and we are asking him to, to only those incidents that took place during the period of his membership in the Communist Party.

Mr. Budenz, will you supplement the testimony you have just given, namely, that the coalition government was the official Communist

Party policy, by going through your personal records and sending to the committee whatever additional documents you can give along those lines?

Mr. BUDENZ. I shall, very gladly.

Mr. MORRIS. And Mr. Sourwine, when you asked the question before about how many people were identified, I want to stress that that number did not include incidental names that turned up in the course of testimony that were not directly related to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

One name I had in mind is Louis Dolivet.

Mr. SOURWINE. I meant to inquire with regard to names that you had posed to Mr. Budenz for purposes of identification.

Mr. MORRIS. My figure includes only those who were associated directly with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

And Mr. Budenz, will you remain available to this committee, so that we can get these last bits of testimony straightened out?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

I would like to put on the record here in that respect, so that it won't be forgotten by me or the committee, that among these documents will be a statement by the Chinese Communist Party to the Communists, that while the Communists were to the outer world advocating coalition government, the Chinese Communists were telling the Communists of the world that they were for coalition government in order to destroy Chiang Kai-shek and impair American imperialism.

Senator SMITH. The hearing will recess now until further call of the chairman as to when the next meeting will be held.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 p. m., Thursday, August 23, 1951, the hearing was recessed subject to the call of the chairman.)

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Richard B. Robinson

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Anthony B. Robinson	18 West 12th Street NYC	1153 Broadway NYC
Robert Terrace	581 East 58th Street NYC	1153 Broadway NYC

In Witness Whereof, we have this 20th day of May 1951, made and signed this certificate.

Anthony B. Robinson
Robert Terrace

State of New York, County of New York

On this 12 day of May 1951 before me personally appeared Anthony B. Robinson and Robert Terrace

to me known and known to me to be the individuals described in and who executed the foregoing certificate and they acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

Alfred J. ...

My commission expires on ...

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State of New York

County of _____

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- Wilhelm Röpke* Die Freier der Penelope
- Hede Massing* Richard Sorge, der fast vollkommene Spion
- Wolfgang Paul* . . . Architektur in Mitteldeutschland
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- Stefan Andres* Die alte Babe (Erzählung)
- Fritz Diettrich* Demeter. Ein Sonettenkranz

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HANS ZURLINDEN

Zeitgemäße europäische Betrachtungen

I

Der denkende Mensch sieht sich zwei fundamentalen Erkenntnissen gegenüber, die den Verlauf der Zivilisationen und Kulturen entscheidend beeinflussen haben.

Einerseits nimmt er um sich die Welt, das Weltall, das Universum in ihrer unfaßbaren Größe und Unendlichkeit wahr, den Sphärenraum, in dessen grenzenlosen Weiten Nebelstreifen und Staubwolken, die wir Sternenhimmel nennen, samt unserem Sonnensystem mit Planeten, Fixsternen und unserer Erde in geheimnisvollen und doch berechenbaren Bahnen kreisen. Diese kosmische Weltanschauung des Erdballs als Stäubchen inmitten großartigster Beziehungen und Überdimensionen, die zunächst auf jeden Menschen einen erschütternden zwiespältigen Eindruck der Erhabenheit und der Demut macht, wurde von den Naturwissenschaften, der Physik, der Astronomie durchdacht und erforscht, und der jeweilige Stand und Umfang der intuitiven Eindrücke und der wissenschaftlichen Ergebnisse bilden zusammen das, was wir Weltanschauung nennen.

Andererseits nimmt der Mensch in sich sein eigenes Wesen, sein Fühlen, sein Denken, seinen Willen, seine Seele, sein Gewissen nahezu als ebenso unergründlichen uferlosen Bereich wahr und fragt sich für seine Person: Woher, warum, weshalb, wozu, wohin? Das ist, was wir Lebensanschauung nennen.

Der denkende Europäer hat sich dauernd um Weltanschauung und um Lebensanschauung bemüht, was mit andern Worten seine kulturgeschichtliche Entwicklung ausmacht. Solange ihm der letzte endgültige Sinn des Ganzen verborgen bleibt, wird seine Weltanschauung auch Weltangst, seine Lebensanschauung auch Lebensangst enthalten. Nach Abwegen und Irrtümern ist er immerhin den Höhen nahegekommen, von denen aus eine klärende Rundschau im Bereich des Möglichen liegt.

Über Weltanschauung und Lebensanschauung wurde geschichtlich erst außerhalb des Abendlandes philosophiert. Es sind vor allem die Chinesen und Inder, die Hervorragendes geleistet haben. Was uns hier vor allem angeht, ist aber die europäische Kultur, die allein schon die Sicht auf ein derart weites Feld eröffnet, daß wir, bevor wir auf ihren heutigen Zustand eingehen, uns damit begnügen wollen, uns zunächst die zwei allen Weltkulturen gemeinsamen Hauptmerkmale zu vergegenwärtigen.

Die eine Erkenntnis lehrt, daß alle Weltkulturen, auch die europäische, Lebewesen mit Werden, Wachsen, Blühen, Reifen, Verwelken und Vergehen sind, wie die Blumen auf dem Feld. Der Weg aller Kulturen geht vom Morgen zum Mittag, zum Abend, zur Nacht, von Sonnenaufgang zum Sonnenuntergang, von Geburt zum Tod. Zudem verläuft der Lebensweg jeder Kultur geschichtlich gesehen in gleichen biologischen Stufenfolgen.

Auf dieser Erde sind mancherlei Kulturen aufgegangen und dahingegangen, Mannigfaltigkeit und Buntheit der Sorten ist offenbar Prinzip. Im Lauf der Zeit vollzieht sich der Sinn ihres Daseins: zu entstehen, zu blühen, zu vergehen, wobei die Lebensdauer jeweils etwa dreitausend Jahre beträgt. Auch die europäische Kultur hat in etwa dreitausend Jahren diesen Weg durchgemessen und zurückgelegt. Daß Europa altersmüde ist, ist kein Geheimnis mehr. Wir stehen in den letzten Sonnenstrahlen und schauen bereits die Schatten der Finsternis.

Der Mensch und die Völker kommen und gehen. Aber ihre kulturellen Leistungen sind ewigen Lebens.

Die andere kulturphilosophische Erkenntnis, die sich ebenso aus der Betrachtung aller Weltkulturen ergibt, betrifft das Wesen ihrer ruhelosen Dynamik und Vitalität, solange sie existieren. Ihre endgültigen und ewigen Errungenschaften kristallisieren sich aus einem fortgesetzten immerwährenden Schmelzprozeß des unaufhörlich glühenden und brodelnden Lebens- und Weltgeschehens heraus, dessen Prinzip die stete Wandlung, die Verwandlung, die Metamorphose ist. Der Mensch blickt wohl in die tiefen Schächte der letzten Fragen hinab. Aber es fehlen ihm die Maßstäbe. Er verspürt nur den Pulsschlag des Alls. Es ist darum kein Wunder, daß allen Kulturmenschen ein höchstes und letztes Wort auf die Zunge gekommen ist, das ihre Lebens- und Weltanschauung krönt. Es ist der Gottesbegriff.

II

Zur heutigen Situation Europas übergehend, liegt es nahe, sie aus dem Verwandlungsprinzip, aus den immerwährend fortlaufenden Metamorphosen und Transfigurationen als gegenwärtig neuzeitlichen Zustand deuten zu wollen. Wiederum geht etwas Umwälzendes vor, ein Vorgang gewaltigen Formats, der das Erbe von Generationen und Jahrtausenden erschüttert, wie der Lebenslauf unsres Kontinents bereits schon mehrere große Erschütterungen und Wandlungen hervorgebracht und ertragen und überwunden hat. Das heutige Europa ist von zwei tödlichen Gefahren bedroht. Die eine droht von innen, die andere von außen.

Die Gefahr von innen besteht darin, daß die Lebensdauer der europäischen Kultur im biologischen Sinne abgelaufen ist. In der Tat stellt sich in der Gegenwart das Problem mit akuter Heftigkeit, ob die europäische Kultur zeitlich und inhaltlich in einen Alterszustand gelangt ist, der nach Jahrhunderten des Wachsens und Gedeihens und Reifens einer lendenlahmen, greisenhaften Epoche entgegentreibt, die das Absterben einleitet; ob der Weg vom geschichtslosen Bauerntum, das mit dem Bo-

den verwachsen ist und am Anfang jeder Kultur steht, zum abgebrühten intellektuellen Großstadtmenschen und zum wurzellosen Massenpöbel, die beide am Ende jeder Kultur anzutreffen sind, wieder einmal zurückgelegt ist; ob dem heutigen Zeitgenossen nichts anderes übrig bleibt, als der unabwendbaren Wandlung von fruchtbarer Kultur in sterile Zivilisation fatalistisch unterworfen zu sein und den endgültigen Zerfall und Untergang zu erwarten. Nebenbei ist nicht zu übersehen, daß der Gang von der Höhe und dem Glanz des vorigen Jahrhunderts zum heutigen Zusammenbruch nicht aus heiterem Himmel erfolgt ist. Die Entwicklung vollzog sich in kausalen Übergängen und Schattierungen. Längst hatten sich die Horizonte getrübt.

Eine solche Beurteilung des europäischen Kulturverlaufes ist nicht etwa nur eine subjektiv hingeworfene Meinung. Es handelt sich um eine Ansicht, die seit einem Jahrhundert von führenden Köpfen vorgebracht worden ist. Nur einige Namen: Jakob Burckhardt, Bachofen, Spitteler, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Huizinga, Ortega y Gasset, Eliot, Spengler, Albert Schweitzer, Renan, Flaubert, Baudelaire, Strindberg, Ibsen, Kierkegaard.

Wenn der tiefste Gehalt der europäischen Kultur in der Entfaltung des Wertes der Individualität besteht, deren Meisterleistungen geschichtlich und vor der Ewigkeit einzig von Bedeutung sind – es genügt auch, daß sie lediglich ein ehrliches Wesen, eine gewissenhafte Überzeugung, einen integren Charakter verkörpern – dann degenerierte in den letzten hundert Jahren dieses Ideal der hochwertigen Persönlichkeit zum Götzenkult der Vermassung. Qualität, Humanismus, christlicher Glaube wurden von Quantität, Materialismus, Anarchie, Nihilismus und Atheismus überflutet.

Nachdem Europa seit über einem Jahrhundert degenerierte und seit 1914 unter Wilhelm II., Mussolini, Hitler, Lenin und Stalin selbstmörderisch buchstäblich 90 Millionen Menschen getötet hat, ist es so weit, daß es seine Weltstellung verloren hat. Es gibt heute nur noch zwei Großmächte, die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika und die Sowjetunion, deren außereuropäische Gigantomachie um die Weltherrschaft einzig und allein von entscheidender Bedeutung für die Zukunft geworden ist.

Es ist eine törichte Denkweise, die beiden Weltkriege für den Niedergang und die Verwüstungen im jetzigen Europa verantwortlich zu machen. Die beiden Weltkriege sind im Gegenteil lediglich Symbole der seit anderthalb Jahrhunderten allmählich erfolgten allgemeinen Zersetzung, Auflösung, Verdummung und Verrohung der abendländischen Geistesverfassung, die heute an galoppierenden Altersschwachsinn grenzt.

Die heutige Nachkriegsmentalität hat erst recht die ethischen Maßstäbe entwertet. Unverstand, Unvernunft, Verflachung, Nervosität, Gleichgültigkeit, Unverantwortlichkeit nehmen unter dem Mantel von scheinheiliger Heuchelei überhand. Unchrllichkeit, Lüge und Verrat werden als verzeihliche Fehler entschuldigt oder gar heldenhaft gepriesen. Für eine gewisse Presse sind Berichte über Verbrechen, Mörder und Hen-

ker der zugkräftigste Unterhaltungsstoff. Minderjährige Burschen, denen fünfzehn oder zwanzig Franken fehlen, inszenieren eine erpresserische Kindesentführung oder schlagen einen Chauffeur oder eine Großmutter tot. Höhepunkt der Lebensfreuden sind Rekordresultate im Sport, ein Velorennen, ein Boxkampf, ein Motorrad, eine Modeschau, Vereinsvergünstigungen, Barstuben, Rummelplätze, müheloser Gelderwerb und leichtsinnige Geldverschwendung. Das alles ist nicht mehr europäische Kultur, sondern internationale Unkultur, armseliger Zeitvertreib eines Plebejertums, das sich mit leeren Köpfen und leeren Herzen langweilt, weil es auf keiner höheren Warte mehr steht.

In der Politik sind an Stelle von Überzeugungen Interessen vorwiegend geworden. Junge Leute neigen entweder zu verstocktem Fanatismus oder zu Gleichgültigkeit. Das demokratische Prinzip selber wird sogar durch die fortschreitende unintelligente Vermassung der politischen Gesinnungen kompromittiert. Es ist doch lediglich eine einfache mathematische Überlegung, daß in einem staatlichen Gemeinwesen mit über 50% stimmberechtigten Dummköpfen die Demokratie selber zu einer fragwürdigen, ruinösen Institution werden muß.

In der Kunst versuchen chaotische und anarchistische Geister durch Mißachtung jeglicher Tradition bedenkenlos um jeden Preis etwas noch nie Dagewesenes zu schaffen.

Auf philosophischem und religiösem Gebiet macht sich nicht minder eine unüberlegende, hochfahrende Unfähigkeit und Ratlosigkeit breit. Nur der allgemeine geistige Abstieg kann es verständlich machen, daß der von Paris sich ausbreitende modische Existentialismus, dieser frivole Zwitter aus Atheismus und Nihilismus, überhaupt ernst genommen wird, daß die europäische Christenheit, statt sich auf ihre Grundlagen zu konzentrieren, ihr Ansehen durch Streitigkeiten der verschiedenen Kirchen, Konfessionen und Richtungen über nebensächliche Kleinigkeiten untergräbt, während die Massen dem Aberglauben verfallen.

All das sind Verfallssymptome, die den denkenden Europäer unglücklich gemacht haben. Schwermütig, melancholisch, seelenkrank, lebensmüde trägt er die Last der Weltangst und der Lebensangst mit dem Gefühl, daß es so nicht weitergehen kann. Er ist erschrocken, aufgewühlt, daß die Selbstzerstörung des Abendlandes von innen heraus, die Preisgabe der europäischen Kultur durch die Europäer selber, der eigene Rückfall ins Barbarentum nicht nur eine Betrachtung von akademischem Wert ist, sondern apokalyptische Aktualität.

Ebenso beunruhigend ist die zweite Gefahr, die Bedrohung Europas von außen. Das außereuropäische Barbarentum schickt sich an, die europäische Kultur zu überwältigen und auszurotten.

Aus der Geschichte wissen wir, daß auch das nichts Neues ist. Wie innerhalb der abendländischen Entwicklung im Altertum die römischen Legionen Griechenland vernichtet, die germanischen Barbaren das römische Reich zusammengeschlagen haben, so haben von außen im 5. Jahrhundert die asiatischen Hunnen unter Attila, im 8. Jahrhundert der imperialistische Islam das Europäertum zu erdrosseln versucht. Der An-

sturm der Hunnen wurde erst in Frankreich zum Stehen gebracht. Der Ansturm der Mohammedaner, die im Westen unter den Mauren über die Pyrenäen hinaus und im Osten unter den Türken bis Wien die Beute umkrallt hatten, scheiterte schließlich erst im 16. Jahrhundert an einer heldenmütigen Abwehr, die unter ungeheuren Opfern an Hab und Gut und Blut die Weiterexistenz Europas gerettet hat.

Daß in der Gegenwart die Barbaren wiederum vor den Toren Europas stehen und Überfall, Überwältigung und Vernichtung vorbereiten, kann auch die raffinierteste Tarnung kaum mehr vernebeln, nachdem gerade die abendländische physische und geistige Altersschwäche das Gelingen eines Sturmangriffs als verlockendes Unternehmen erscheinen läßt.

Es kann sich im Rahmen dieses Aufsatzes nicht darum handeln, auf das Wesen des Weltkommunismus, der sich in Marxismus, Leninismus, Stalinismus zu einem fanatischen terroristischen asiatischen Welteroberungsimperialismus entwickelt hat, näher einzugehen. Hier interessiert nur, daß diese intellektuelle Totalideologie, die radikal die Erschaffung einer prinzipiell neuen paradiesischen Welt mit menschlichen Mitteln erzwingen und mit der Diktatur der Proletarierklasse die geeinigte in Brot und Frieden und Glück aufatmende Menschheitsgemeinschaft ohne Grenzen, ohne Staaten herbeiführen will, entschieden davon überzeugt ist, daß die Ausrottung der westlichen abendländischen Zivilisation und Kultur samt und sonders hierzu die unerläßliche Vorbedingung ist.

Ob der üble, destruktive, geistig aus entartetem Westlertum stammende Welterlöschungskommunismus, brutal nach Rußland importiert und verpflanzt, für dieses Land mit seinen geographischen Unendlichkeiten, mit seinen historischen Hintergründen, mit seinen chaotischen, indolenten anarchistischen Bevölkerungsmassen, mit seiner manifesten zivilisatorischen und kulturellen Rückständigkeit nicht vielleicht doch ein prometheischer, verzweifelter, biologisch nicht unmöglicher Gewaltversuch zur Hebung des dortigen Volksniveaus darstellt, wollen wir dahingestellt lassen. Indessen unterliegt es keinem Zweifel, daß das bewußte Europäertum zu dieser barbarischen östlichen anti-europäischen Ideologie ebenfalls keine andere Haltung einnehmen kann als schärfste grundsätzliche Ablehnung.

Zur Begründung dieser Behauptungen sei Stalin selber zitiert. In der neuen Bibel, in der „Histoire du Parti Communiste de l'U.R.S.S.“ schließt Stalin das Vorwort mit dem Satze: „L'étude de l'histoire du Parti Communiste de l'U.R.S.S. a fourni en outre la certitude de la victoire définitive de la grande cause qui est celle du Parti de Lénine et de Staline, la certitude de la victoire du Communisme dans le monde entier“. Der Krenl zieht selbstverständlich die friedliche Welteroberung einer kriegerischen vor. Aber wenn nötig, wird er auch vor einer kriegerischen nicht zurückschrecken. In seinem Buche „Fragen des Leninismus“ schreibt Stalin sarkastisch über die Unabwendbarkeit der russischen Revolution, eine internationale Revolution herbeizurufen: „Sich von der Überzeugung beherrschen zu lassen, daß solch eine Revolution auf fried-

liche Weise innerhalb des Rahmens der bürgerlichen Demokratie durchgeführt werden kann . . . das hieße wahnsinnig sein oder jedes Verständnis für normale menschliche Begriffe verlieren.“

Über den Ausgang der Spannung zwischen Ost und West sind keine Weissagungen oder Prophezeiungen möglich. Gewiß ist nur, daß der Weltkommunismus seinem Ziele immer elementarer, wuchtiger und brutaler zustreben wird und daß zur Zeit das wehrlose Europa, dem der feste Wille zur Verteidigung noch fehlt, nur durch die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika geschützt ist.

So beängstigend der Gedanke ist, daß Europa vom Kommunismus bedroht ist und bei dessen Siege die endgültige Ausrottung der europäischen Zivilisation und Kultur erfolgt, muß er dennoch unter Europäern klar zum Bewußtsein gebracht werden. Bereits sind wir aus einer Epoche des geistigen Ringens um Weltanschauungen in die erschreckende Phase eines materialistischen Machtkampfes herabgesunken. Es ist auch nicht mehr möglich, die Augen davor zu verschließen, daß in diesem Machtkampf bereits ein Drittel des europäischen Territoriums verlorengangen ist.

III

Was sollen wir denn denken und tun, wenn wir die gegenwärtige Lage Europas so verzweifelt sehen? Schon die Frage ist immerhin ein Versuch, einen Schritt weiter zu gehen. Es gibt nun viele Europäer, die beim Anblick des inneren Zerfalls erstarren und gebrochen in Pessimismus versinken. Hoffnungslosigkeit, Skepsis, Passivität, Zynismus, Galgenhumor, Betäubung, Flucht in eine Einsiedelei, ins Kloster, auf eine Mittelmeerinsel, nach Amerika, in den Tod haben das letzte Wort. Das kann unser Weg nicht sein.

Es gibt nun auch viele Europäer, die angesichts der Bedrohung von außen resigniert zusammenbrechen, sich müde und unsicher in Unvermeidliches schicken wollen oder gar geistesgestört ins andere Lager übergehen.

Es gibt aber auch viele Europäer, die in irgendeiner Lösung eines besonderen Problems das Heil erblicken. Seit Goethe, der wohl als der letzte große Vertreter einer Universalbildung gelten kann, hat sich die geistige Entwicklung auf ein Spezialistentum beschränkt, das bei allem Fachwissen partiell einseitig und kurzsichtig nur das eigene Teilgebiet sieht. Diese engstirnige Verengung des Horizontes, von der auch der Universitätsbetrieb nicht ausgenommen werden kann, ist ein besonderes Zeichen unserer Zeit und vereitelt universelle Perspektiven. Um Europa zu retten, verlangen die Abstinente das Alkoholverbot, die Volkswirtschaftler die Aufhebung der Zollschranken, die Finanzleute eine europäische Geldwährung, die Generäle eine europäische Armee, die Prediger von Caux eine moralische Aufrüstung, die Sozialisten eine Verstaatlichung der Produktionsmittel, die Republikaner die Abschaffung der Monarchie, die Monarchisten die Abschaffung der Republik. Insbesondere ist der Bettlerglaube verbreitet, daß Europa nur noch durch ameri-

kanische Dollar wieder aufgerichtet werden könne. Das kann unser Weg nicht sein.

Es ist nun aber auch nicht etwa so, daß wir nach den dunklen Perspektiven jetzt schon ohne weiteres einen hellen erlösenden Ausblick folgen lassen könnten, der leichtgläubig und voreilig einer beruhigenden, aber trügerischen Luftspiegelung gleichen würde. In dieser schwierigen Situation gibt es zunächst nur gefaßtes Überlegen, einsichtiges Nachdenken, demütiges Hoffen, alles in allem – eine europäische Besinnung.

Wenn wir so auf die Frage: Was sollen wir denken, was sollen wir tun? mit dem Ruf nach europäischer Besinnung antworten, verlassen wir die Sphäre allgemeiner kulturphilosophischer, weltpolitischer Auseinandersetzungen und wenden uns der besonderen Lage des einzelnen Europäers zu. Denn besinnen kann sich anfänglich und zunächst nur der einzelne Mensch.

Nachdem wir den Gehalt der europäischen Kultur als in der Entfaltung des Wertes der Individualität bestehend hervorgehoben haben, liegt diese Wendung auch folgerichtig im Zusammenhang unserer Betrachtungen. Da das beschämendste Elend der Zeit darin besteht, daß den Europäern das europäische Kulturbewußtsein abhandengekommen ist, scheint es mir, daß heute der sich besinnende Europäer nur eine einzige vernünftige, anständige, charaktervolle Haltung einnehmen kann, die etwa folgendermaßen anzudeuten ist: „Ich bin Europäer. Ich weiß, daß die europäische Zivilisation und Kultur in ihrem Verlauf auf dieser Welt die höchsten Werte der Menschheit errungen hat. Für meinen Teil will ich wenigstens dieses Erbe von Generationen und Jahrtausenden festhalten und weiter vertreten. Selbst wenn Europa zugrunde gehen sollte: Ich bleibe Europäer.“

Ein derartiger, vorderhand rein persönlicher, psychologischer, paradoxer und irrationaler Schluß und Entschluß ist dasjenige, was uns vielleicht bis auf weiteres als einzig gangbare Möglichkeit bleibt. Im Zusammenbruch des Mittelalters haben die Europäer auch nichts anderes getan, als sich auf das Beste ihrer Vergangenheit zu besinnen, und haben mit der Wiederentdeckung und der Wiedererweckung der Antike, mit der Renaissance, das Weiterleben Europas gerettet. Was heute not tut, scheint mir eine neue Renaissance, eine neue Wiederentdeckung und Wiedererweckung der europäischen Kultur zu sein. Im Versuch, sich dessen wieder erneut bewußt zu werden, was wir als Europäer sind und besitzen, sehe ich die heilende Medizin unserer Tage. Bevor dem kranken Europa geholfen werden kann, muß sich erst die Krankheit des Europäers bessern. Der Europäer weiß um die Nichtswürdigkeit und Erbärmlichkeit des Menschengeschlechts. Er kennt aber auch alle Wonnen eines elementaren gesunden Lebensgefühls. Er weiß, daß eine letzte gläubige Zuversicht alle Ängste und Qualen des Daseins überwindet. Er weiß, daß das Äußerste des europäischen Menschen immer darin bestanden hat, trotz allem ein *Te Deum* anzustimmen.

Wir wollen nicht nur elegisch die Hände in den Schoß legen und klagen und jammern. Im Gegenteil: gegen die wachsende Unkultur, gegen

das wachsende Barbarentum, gegen den Zerfall und den Niedergang aufstehen, sich dagegen zur Wehr setzen, die Überwindung mit Leib und Seele versuchen, das ist, was wir wollen. Das Heilmittel, durch die Besinnung auf unvergängliches Europäertum wenigstens individuell wieder neue Lebenskräfte, neuen Lebensmut, neue Lebensfreude zu finden, ist zwar kein sensationeller schnellwirkender Zaubertrank. Es gibt aber auch gar keinen solchen. Wagen wir es darum vorerst einmal, entschlossen von der vorhandenen Medizin zu nehmen, die durch das verstärkte Bewußtsein dessen wirkt, was der Franzose Apollinaire in einem glänzenden Satze zum Ausdruck gebracht hat: „Le présent doit être le fruit de la connaissance du passé et la vision de l'avenir“.

Zu diesen Betrachtungen gehört indessen noch, sich um das Schwierigste zu bemühen: wenigstens in Grundzügen das Konkrete, das Inhaltliche, das Stoffliche der vorschwebenden europäischen Besinnung, wenn auch nur in Bausch und Bogen, zu definieren und zu präzisieren.

Eine solche summarische Übersicht ergibt, daß das wertvolle abendländische Erbe sich auf Leistungen und Errungenschaften, teils des Individuums, teils der Gesellschaft bezieht. Bei der ersten Kategorie, bei der Frage, welche Stellungnahme die europäische Kultur zum Einzelmenschen eingenommen hat, scheint es mir gegeben zu sein, daß die folgenden drei Standpunkte wiederum klar und bestimmt in unserem Bewußtsein erscheinen:

1. Besinnen wir uns auf den Wert der Individualität. Den Wert des einzelnen Menschenlebens entdeckt und vertreten zu haben, ist wohl überhaupt die Hauptleistung des Europäertums. Jeder Mensch ist etwas Einmaliges, Einzigartiges. Es ist seine Bestimmung, seine Originalität zu entfalten. Es ist sein Lebenswerk, zu werden, was er ist. Danach wird er gewogen und gewertet. Diese Überzeugung wendet sich gegen die Mißachtung des menschlichen Lebens, gegen die Geringschätzung der Persönlichkeit, gegen den Massenwahn.

2. Besinnen wir uns auf die Menschenrechte. Nicht die speziellen Menschenrechte der Französischen Revolution sind damit gemeint, sondern das allgemeine Recht des Individuums auf seine Existenz: das Recht auf eigenen Beruf, auf eigenen Besitz, auf eigene Lebensführung, auf eigene Handlungsfähigkeit, auf Freiheit in Geist, Wissenschaft, Kunst und Glauben, errichtet als würdiger Schutz des individuellen Menschen. Diese Überzeugung wendet sich gegen die Ausschaltung und Unterdrückung der privaten Lebenssphäre, gegen Gleichschaltung, gegen Unterjochung, gegen Tyrannei, gegen Sklaverei, gegen Diktatur in jedem Sinne. Sie ist das Manifest der Freiheit, der Würde, der Unantastbarkeit der Person, der Ehrfurcht vor dem Menschen.

Nun kommen ohne Kommentar wohlbekannte ehrwürdige, objektive, akademische Begriffe der europäischen Bildung zur Verwendung, von denen Grünschnäbel daherreden, daß es Gemeinplätze seien. Nun, um dieser Begriffe willen werden in der Gegenwart Tausende und Aber-tausende und Hunderttausende zur Flucht getrieben, mißhandelt, ge-

foltert, in Gefängnissen und Konzentrationslagern gefangen gehalten, vergiftet, zu Tode gequält.

Das Bekenntnis zu den historischen Wertbegriffen ist in diesem Sinne alles andere als ein Wiederkäuen überlieferter, aufgezäumter Wahrheiten. Es liegt ihm im Gegenteil die Gewißheit zugrunde, daß, wie in der Renaissance, das Wiederfinden verlorengegangener Güter, das erneute Erfassen vererbter Traditionen zu einer fruchtbaren Zeugung neuer, zeitgemäßer Lebensformen führt.

3. Besinnen wir uns auf die *Menschenpflichten*. Es versteht sich von selbst, daß die Pflicht die Kehrseite des Rechts ist. Die Menschenrechte bedingen die Menschenpflichten. Beides sind Begriffe, die korrespondierend miteinander steigen oder fallen. Sie sind Gewissenssache. Gegenüber sich selber fordern sie Selbsterziehung, Selbstbeherrschung, Bildung eines integren Charakters. Gegenüber den Mitmenschen verlangen sie im Minimum, daß nur das erlaubt ist, was die Menschen unter sich gegenseitig wollen, oder was den Mitmenschen nicht schadet. Im Maximum postulieren sie: „Alles für Andere, für sich nichts!“, wie es auf dem Grabstein Pestalozzis steht.

Diese Überzeugung wendet sich gegen Egoismus, gegen Menschenverachtung, gegen Verantwortungslosigkeit, gegen asoziales Denken und Fühlen und Handeln. Mit ihrer Tendenz zur Selbstzucht und zum hilfsbereiten Mitleid hat sie die Grundlagen der europäischen Ethik, der europäischen Moral geschaffen.

Bei der zweiten Kategorie, bei der Frage, welche Stellungnahme die europäische Kultur und Gesellschaft eingenommen haben, glaube ich, daß drei Standpunkte, die das politische, künstlerische und religiöse Erbe betreffen, in unserem Bewußtsein wiederum klar und bestimmt erstehen sollten.

4. Besinnen wir uns darauf, daß Europa in der *Politik* die menschenwürdigsten staatsrechtlichen, volkswirtschaftlichen und völkerrechtlichen Ideen, Formen und Normen aufgestellt und verwirklicht hat. Ein zu demokratischer Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit herangereiftes Volk ist ein rein europäisches Gebilde. Ein Rechtsstaat, der den Menschen gegen Eingriffe der Staatsgewalt schützt, der Ordnung und Sicherheit für alle gewährleistet, der den Bürgern gerechte Unterlagen seiner materiellen Existenz sichert und die Beziehungen zu anderen Staaten freundschaftlich gestaltet, ist eine rein europäische Institution.

Dieses politische Bewußtsein wendet sich gegen die Allmacht des Staates über den Menschen, gegen Interessenwirtschaft, gegen Parteiwirtschaft, gegen Bürokratie, gegen Gewaltherrschaft, gegen Imperialismus, gegen den aggressiven Krieg. Halten wir insbesondere als Schweizer fest, daß die Schweiz wohl der europäischste Staat ist, da die schweizerische politische Entwicklung mit der Lösung der Rassenfrage, des Sprachenproblems, der konfessionellen Gegensätze, der kulturellen Verschiedenheiten, der materiellen Existenzfragen, der föderativen Demokratie und der militärischen Neutralität bewährter Grundsätze aufgerichtet hat, die einzeln und zusammen das europäische Humanitäts-

ideal verkörpern, das als Lebensinhalt eines Volkes hinreichend Sinn und Aufgaben in sich trägt, das auch in der heutigen Welt seine Daseinsberechtigung ohne weiteres hat und das zu seiner Verteidigung selbst die Waffen rechtfertigt.

5. Besinnen wir uns darauf, daß Europa in der *Kunst* den wertvollsten Reichtum der Menschheit hervorgebracht hat, und daß der Umgang mit den unermesslichen Schätzen der Architektur, der Skulptur, der Malerei, der Literatur und der Musik zu den großen nährenden, befruchtenden und beglückenden Gegenständen der Seele gehört. Mag die europäische Kunst auch zu den Dingen gehören, die der Kommunismus radikal ablehnt – es ist etwas beängstigend, daß sich eine der größten und prachtvollsten Sammlungen europäischer Malerei, die dem Prado und dem Louvre ebenbürtig ist, einsam und verlassen in der Eremitage in Leningrad befindet – ist sie doch mit ihren Werken größter Vollendung als sichtbarer tatsächlicher Beweis der europäischen Kultur für den jetzigen Europäer ein herzstärkender Trost, eine erfrischende Aufmunterung.

6. Besinnen wir uns darauf, daß Europa im *Christentum* die höchste Stufe der Weltreligion erreicht hat. Wenn dessen Anfänge auch im Judentum liegen, das nicht zum europäischen Kulturkreis gehört – diese Feststellung ist nebenbei nicht im Sinn des Antisemitismus gemeint – hat der christliche Glaube doch erst auf europäischem Boden, in Griechenland, in Rom als Gemeinde, als Dogma, als Kirche Gestalt angenommen. Im Vergleich mit anderen Religionen haben höchstens die Chinesen, die Inder und die Juden die religiöse Erkenntnis zu großen Konzeptionen erweitert, während die vorderasiatischen Kulte, die Ägypter, der Islam übergangen werden können.

Es kann nun zwar nicht anders sein, als daß auch die christlichen Kirchen in den europäischen Niedergang mitgerissen worden sind. Die durch die Kirchengeschichte geprägten Einrichtungen und Institutionen sind vielfach zu ehrwürdigen Formen, Gebärden und Symbolen erstarrt, hinter denen das Lebendige gar nicht mehr steht. Über lauter Nebensachen ist die Hauptsache in Vergessenheit geraten. Die Streitigkeiten der Kirchen untereinander, der Konfessionen untereinander haben nur entfernt mit christlichem Wesen etwas zu tun. Die Not der Zeit will auch die Kirchen zur Besinnung bringen, vorgeschobene, verzettelte, unwichtige Positionen aufzugeben und alles Gewicht auf die Behauptung und Sicherung der Hauptfront zu verlegen, die vernachlässigt und gefährdet ist. Freilich ist es nicht leicht, mit wenigen Worten das Wesen des Christentums zu definieren, das nichts anderes sein kann als eine geistige Glaubensüberzeugung, ein lebendiger Geist, der dem göttlichen Geiste entsprechen will. Tastend versuchen wir zu sagen:

Der christliche Geist glaubt daran, daß die Menschheit durch die Nächstenliebe den ihr von Gott gegebenen Sinn verwirklicht. Zitieren wir aus der Bibel die wohl maßloseste und anspruchvollste Verkündigung, die je aus einem Menschenmund gesagt worden wäre, wenn sie sich nicht

in zwei Jahrtausenden als Offenbarung erwiesen hätte: „Ich bin der Weg, die Wahrheit und das Leben.“

„Himmel und Erde werden vergehen, aber meine Worte werden nicht vergehen.“ Dieser christliche Geist, der keine naturhafte rührselige Sentimentalität, keine lebensfremde formalistische Schauspielerlei, sondern ein heroisches weltüberwindendes Leben im Glauben an die frohe Botschaft Gottes ist, wendet sich gegen Aberglauben, gegen Atheismus, gegen Materialismus, gegen Existentialismus, gegen Kommunismus, gegen Nihilismus. Es ist an der Zeit, vor allem endlich zu begreifen, daß die mechanische Ideologie des Kremls mit ihrem atheistischen Proletariatsparadies auf Erden selber eine fanatische Religion, selber eine fanatische Kirche ist, die keine andere Religion, keine andere Kirche neben sich dulden kann und die den christlichen Geist als ihren natürlichen Todfeind hassen und verfolgen muß.

Bei dieser summarischen Übersicht über den hauptsächlichen Inhalt einer europäischen Besinnung wurde der verwegene Versuch gemacht, das vorhandene Erbe der abendländischen Kultur zu inventarisieren, und sozusagen eine gesamte Lebens- und Weltanschauung – die meinige – zu entwerfen. Bei Albert Schweitzer habe ich eine Stelle in einem seiner philosophischen Werke gefunden, die genau dasselbe, was uns hier beschäftigte, in wenig Worten ausdrückt. Er schreibt: „Dennoch ist uns keine Wahl gelassen. Wenn noch Rettung ist, dann nur, wenn vom Geiste wahrer Humanität eingegebene Kulturideale vertreten und verwirklicht werden. Nicht durch den Massenbetrieb von Organisationen, sondern durch tausendfaches Aufkeimen einer neuen Gesinnung in den Einzelnen.“

Alles in allem: Im letzten Grunde sind wir der Überzeugung, daß die großen Werte der europäischen Vergangenheit nicht nur historische Bedeutung haben, sondern auch für die europäische Zukunft einzig und allein noch verheißungsvoll sind, weil die versiegende europäische Lebenskraft kaum mehr zu neuen großen schöpferischen Leistungen ausreicht.

Große Skepsis oder großer Glaube sind dem Durchschnittsmenschen zuwider. Wir bekennen uns trotzdem zu einem noch gewagteren Standpunkt, der summa summarum große Skepsis und großen Glauben verbindet.

Am Anfang unserer Betrachtungen stand der Mensch, der um sich und in sich blickt und die Welt und sich selber als Epigone mißt. Jetzt, am Ende, möchte ich meine Überlegungen dahin zusammenfassen, daß dem heutigen denkenden Europäer, der sich auf sein eigenes ererbtes Kulturgut besinnt, trotz seines Epigontums, trotz der Bedrohung Europas von innen und außen, dennoch eine den Sinn und Wert des Daseins bejahende Haltung verbleibt: Weltanschauung als Weltbejahung, Lebensanschauung als Lebensbejahung.

Die Entwicklung der spanisch-arabischen Beziehungen

Die Beobachter des politischen Tagesgeschehens sind heute leicht geneigt, die spanisch-arabische Annäherung ausschließlich mit politischer Zweckmäßigkeit zu begründen. Zweifellos haben solche Erwägungen die gegenwärtige Forcierung der Annäherungsversuche bestimmt, nachdem Spanien von seinen umworbenen Tochnationen in Amerika insofern enttäuscht wurde, als es erkennen mußte, daß eine einheitliche politische Linie aller spanisch sprechenden Nationen nicht zu erreichen ist und auf eine ideelle Zusammenarbeit ziemlich akademischen Charakters beschränkt bleibt. Die Bande, die Spanien an die afrikanisch-arabische Welt knüpfen, sind kulturgeschichtlich nicht weniger eng und sehr viel älter – sie entstanden schon in der vorgeschichtlichen Zeit. Man muß sie deshalb seit ihrem Entstehen verfolgen, wenn man die gegenwärtige Arabien-Politik Madrids im rechten Licht sehen will.

Das vielfach mißverstandene Wort des Grafen Keyserling, Europa ende an den Pyrenäen, enthält die tiefe Wahrheit, daß Meere die Völker verbinden, Gebirge sie trennen. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt kann man etwa mit dem Begriff des „Mittelmeerraumes“ oder mit dem Begriff der „Atlantischen Gemeinschaft“ operieren, und unter diesem Gesichtspunkt öffnet sich das Tor Spaniens nicht nach Norden, sondern nach Süden, wo es die geographische Brücke Europas nach Nordafrika bildet.

Die Forschung hat erwiesen, daß es ein Irrtum ist zu glauben, die engen Beziehungen zwischen Spanien und dem nordafrikanischen Raum seien zur Zeit des arabischen Einbruchs in die abendländische Welt zu Beginn des 8. Jahrhunderts entstanden. Wohl hatte dieser Einbruch, der erst in Südfrankreich aufgehalten werden konnte, viel nachhaltigere und viel revolutionärrere Folgen als etwa der zweite Großangriff aus dem Osten, der türkische. Denn er sprengte endgültig die bis dahin einheitliche Mittelmeerwelt und verlagerte die Grenzen des Islam und des Orients bis in die Nordwestecke Nordafrikas. Ausgrabungen haben jedoch bewiesen, daß schon in vorgeschichtlicher Zeit die Kulturen beiderseits der Meerenge von Gibraltar weitgehend übereinstimmten. Diese Gemeinsamkeit erleichterte erst den Phöniziern und Karthagern, später dann den Arabern den Sprung über das Wasser und das Fußfassen auf spanischem Boden.

Die Bekehrung zum Islam war den Arabern nicht mehr als ein Vorwand für ihre Expansionspolitik; sie legten tatsächlich nach der Eroberung

rung keinerlei Wert darauf, und so lebten in Spanien Christen, Mohammedaner und Juden miteinander und nebeneinander, nur gestört durch die allmähliche Reconquista von Norden her und meist lokal begrenzte Kleinkriege.

Cordoba wurde zum bedeutendsten Kulturzentrum Europas, das Franzosen, Italiener und Deutsche anlockte. Unter dem Kalifen Alhákem umfaßte seine Bibliothek über 400 000 Bände. Cordoba war nicht nur das geistige Zentrum Europas, sondern auch der damaligen islamischen Welt. Und gerade dort konnte der Heilige Eulogius sein „Memoriale Sanctorum“ schreiben, das dem Christentum eine ausgesprochen militante Richtung gab. In Granada wurde Samuel Ben Nagrela Großwesir des arabischen Königreiches – die Araber bedienten sich so weit wie möglich einheimischer Beamter und Fachleute und führten auch erst um das Jahr 1000 ihre eigene Sprache für den Amtsgebrauch ein – und gründete eine berühmte jüdische Dichterschule. Alphons der Weise schuf im 13. Jahrhundert in Sevilla und Toledo Universitäten und Schulen, in denen das gesamte Kulturgut der damals bekannten Welt einen Sammelpunkt fand – ganz unbeeinflusst von den politischen Zielen der Reconquista.

Damals entstanden die Alhambra in Granada, eines der schönsten Bauwerke arabischer Architektur; Almansors Giralda – die Moschee in Cordoba – eine der glücklichsten Verbindungen arabischer Kunst mit dem Sevillaner Barock; die Gran Mezquita del Oriente; der Goldene Turm Cid-Abu-el-Olas; die Archive in Zaragoza und Sevilla, die noch heute für den Forscher unentbehrlich sind und über deren Verlust Abulbeccaklagt:

*Wo seid ihr, berühmte Könige des Yemen,
mit dem Glanz eurer prächtigen Hofstaaten?
Wo seid ihr, Sassaniden, die ihr
dem Iran so weise Gesetze gabt?*

„Oh, Málaga querida, auch dich kann mein Herz nie vergessen“, sang Abensaid, als er in Ägypten das Almogrib schrieb.

So war Spanien das geistige Zentrum der Welt, soweit sie damals erforscht war. Drang einerseits uraltes orientalisches Wissen, das weit fortgeschrittener war als das abendländische, nach Europa, so hat andererseits das Eindringen der Spanier in die arabische Herrscherschicht deren geistiges Leben befruchtet und erst zu höchster Blüte entwickelt.

Spanien und die arabische Welt waren so ineinander verflochten, daß es auch der fortschreitenden Reconquista nur schwer gelang, diese Fäden zu entwirren und zu zerschneiden. Selbst während der Kämpfe verbündeten sich arabische Fürsten mit den vordringenden Christen, waren die Fronten nicht streng geschieden. Erst mit der Eroberung Granadas und später mit der zwangsweisen Christianisierung der Juden und Mauren wurde das Band endgültig zerrissen. Freilich war auch dieser Reiß äußerlich; noch heute ist es oft unmöglich, etwa die geistigen Strö-

mungen, die damals ein Kunstwerk hervorbrachten, auf ein Hic Spanien – Hic Arabien zurückzuführen. Daß viele unersetzbare Werte aus dieser Zeit nicht der Reconquista und dem religiösen Fanatismus zum Opfer fielen, verdanken wir – so paradox es klingt – hauptsächlich den spanischen Klöstern. Und dadurch bewahrte Spanien für das nun hinabsinkende arabische Kulturreich eine Anziehungskraft, die, wie wir sehen, ihre Wirkung auch heute noch nicht verloren hat.

Durch die Einigung Spaniens unter Isabella von Kastilien und Ferdinand von Aragon und durch die Entdeckung Amerikas wurde die spanische Politik nun in eine neue Richtung gedrängt. Die Spanier setzten nicht den zurückweichenden Arabern über die Meerenge nach, wie die Katholischen Könige das an sich geplant hatten, sondern sie konzentrierten ihre Anstrengungen auf die neu entdeckten Erdteile. Politik und christliches Sendungsbewußtsein der jungen spanischen Weltmacht traten an die Stelle der künstlerisch-geistigen Ambitionen spanischer Regional-könige. Die Verfolgung der Araber und die Re-Christianisierung Nordafrikas – wie anders hätte die Geschichte in diesem Fall verlaufen können! – waren uninteressant geworden; man begnügte sich mit dem Stützpunkt Ceuta. Amerika lockte. Vier Jahrhunderte lang war der Blick Spaniens nach Westen gerichtet.

Dem Verfall des „Reiches, in dem die Sonne nicht unterging“, folgte die Emanzipierung Lateinamerikas; und als um 1800 in den arabischen Ländern die geistig-politische Renaissance einsetzte, deren Vorbild die kulturelle Blüte in der Zeit der Besetzung Spaniens war, und als 1898 die letzten Teile des spanischen Imperiums – Cuba und die Philippinen – an die USA verloren gingen, besann sich Madrid darauf, daß die beiden Säulen des Herkules und der Spruch „Plus Ultra“ in seinem Staatswappen ursprünglich als Wegweiser nach Afrika gedacht waren. Aber jetzt kam Spanien zu spät. In Nordafrika saß bereits Frankreich, und da Madrid die nötigen Machtmittel fehlten, mußte es wohl oder übel das Marokko-Abkommen 1911 anerkennen, das ihm in Afrika nach wenigen Schritten den Weg versperrete.

Damals trat der bedeutende Umschwung in der Marokko-Politik Spaniens ein, dessen Erfolge sich heute in aller Deutlichkeit zeigen. Die Lage in Nordafrika bot keine Möglichkeit mehr für eine territoriale Ausdehnung. Madrid war klug genug, dem „Plus Ultra“ einen neuen Sinn zu geben. In erster Linie waren es die Offiziere, die einen jahrelangen blutigen Kleinkrieg im Rif-Gebirge führten – unter ihnen auch Franco – die nun für eine Annäherung und für eine gutnachbarliche Durchdringung Marokkos eintraten. Während die Franzosen ständig Aufstände mit Gewalt niederwerfen mußten, trat im spanischen Protektorat in den zwanziger Jahren fast völlige Ruhe ein; zwischen spanischen Offizieren und arabischen Stammeshäuptlingen bahnten sich geradezu freundschaftliche Verhältnisse an. Tatsächlich ist Spanien heute in Gibraltar nicht zu Ende. Die spanischen Cordilleren setzen sich im Rif-Gebirge fort, Landschaft, Klima, Bau- und Lebensstil wandeln sich kaum.

Der erste größere Erfolg dieser Politik zeigte sich bei Beginn des Bürgerkrieges, als der Kalif in Tetuan sich sofort hinter die spanischen Afrika-Offiziere stellte, die gegen Madrid revoltierten. Franco entsagte allen Träumen von einer imperialistischen Auslegung des „Plus Ultra“ und setzte die Verbrüderung mit der arabischen Welt auf sein Regierungsprogramm.

Der Gegensatz der spanischen Afrika-Politik zu der Frankreichs war lange Zeit ein europäisches Drama. Denn es war kurzsichtig, sich angesichts der französischen Schwierigkeiten in Nordafrika hämisch die Hände zu reiben in der Annahme, der arabische Nationalismus richte sich ausschließlich gegen Paris, und in dem Glauben, die lächerlich dünne arabische Oberschicht sei willens und in der Lage, einen unabhängigen demokratischen Staat zu bilden. Auch die Vereinigten Staaten sehen das erfreulicherweise allmählich ein.

Eine gemeinsame französisch-spanische Afrika-Politik schien jedoch lange Zeit unmöglich, einmal weil Spanien mit zu vielen arabischen Reminiscenzen belastet ist, zum anderen ist das spanische Protektorat wesentlich kleiner als das französische; jenes verlangte laufend Zuschüsse, während dieses beträchtliche Einnahmen abwarf. Eine gemeinsame Politik schien in erster Linie Frankreich zugute zu kommen, das man in Spanien seit Richelieu und Napoleon als Erbfeind betrachtet. So sahen einflussreiche Kreise in Madrid keinerlei Grund, sich die maurischen Völker zum Feind zu machen, um Frankreich zu stärken.

Als der Sultan von Marokko im Herbst 1950 in Paris die Unabhängigkeit verlangte, hat Spanien noch deutlichere Töne angeschlagen und Frankreich über seine Linie keine Zweifel mehr gelassen. Das persönliche Verhältnis Francos zum Kalifen in Tetuan ist ausgezeichnet. Die Parteien, die im französischen Protektorat unterdrückt werden, dürfen im spanischen ungehindert arbeiten (eine Diktatur gewährt in ihrer Kolonie die demokratischen Rechte, die sie im eigenen Land verweigert!). Die Spatzen pfeifen es von den Dächern, daß der Führer der Istiqlal in Spanisch-Marokko, Abdejalak Torres, mit dem Hochkommissar Garcia Valiño über die Unabhängigkeit verhandelt; allerdings hat es Madrid nicht sehr eilig, seine Versprechungen zu erfüllen. Nach den Zusammenstößen des vergangenen Jahres in Tanger, bei denen die Spanier wieder in die Stadt einrückten, trat Madrid in einer Weise für die maurischen Völker und gegen Frankreich ein, daß orientalische Politiker erstaunt feststellen mußten, es gebe einen europäischen Staat – noch dazu einen treuen Verbündeten des Vatikans – der die arabischen Interessen besser vertrete als manches Mitglied der Arabischen Liga.

Erst in den letzten Monaten hat sich hier eine Wandlung vollzogen. Seit der damalige Außenminister Schuman sich auf der Lissaboner NATO-Tagung Madrid gegenüber versöhnlicher zeigte, seit Spaniens Aufnahme in die Atlantische Gemeinschaft nicht mehr außerhalb jeder Diskussion liegt und seit die amerikanischen Stützpunktverhandlungen mit Franco zu einem Übereinkommen führten, ist Spanien auch in der Marokkofrage gegenüber Paris etwas zugänglicher geworden. Die Armee

hat die Frankreich-feindliche Afrikapolitik nie gebilligt, die darauf spekulierte, daß ein französisches Fiasko das Gewicht Spaniens in Nordafrika verstärken würde. Auch Franco hat in letzter Zeit deutlich zum Ausdruck gebracht, daß Marokko für einen plötzlichen Übergang zur völligen Selbstverwaltung noch nicht genügend vorbereitet sei und daß übersteigerter Nationalismus und eine übereilte Unabhängigkeitsentwicklung eine Gefahr sowohl für Nordafrika als auch für Europa darstellten. Das spanisch-französische Abkommen über die Koordinierung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in den beiden Protektoraten zeigt jedenfalls, daß in diesem Punkt das europäische Denken in Madrid das nationalspanische überwunden hat und daß die Regierung zu einer realistischeren und weniger von Ressentiments beschwerten Politik als bisher zurückgefunden hat. Franco hat dadurch in der islamischen Welt nicht an Prestige eingebüßt, denn sehr maßgebende Marokkaner stehen bezüglich der Nordafrika-Frage auf dem gleichen Standpunkt wie er.

Im Frühjahr 1952 bereiste Außenminister Artajo mit der Tochter Francos, dessen Schwiegersohn und einer starken Delegation die arabischen Länder – seit dem Ende der Reconquista das erste Mal, daß Spanien eine solche Gesandtschaft in die mohammedanische Welt schickte. Wenn auch vielleicht die greifbaren politischen Erfolge dieser Reise nicht den spanischen Erwartungen entsprachen, so wurden dabei doch kulturelle und andere Fäden geknüpft, die überhaupt aufzunehmen sich ein anderer Staat schwerlich die Mühe gemacht hätte. Aber die Spanier wissen, wie man mit Arabern verhandelt; die Ergebnisse sollten eigentlich manchen anderen Staat zum Nachdenken veranlassen.

War die Bedeutung Spaniens als Zentrum der arabischen Kulturblüte zwischen dem 9. und dem 15. Jahrhundert nie verlorengegangen, so wurde sie in den letzten Jahren durch einen erhöhten Zustrom arabischer Studenten an die spanischen Hochschulen noch vergrößert. Staatsstipendien hier wie dort tragen ebenso dazu bei, den kulturellen Austausch weiter zu intensivieren, wie das arabische Institut in Madrid. Man kann geradezu von einer Renaissance des mohammedanischen Kulturlebens in Spanien sprechen.

Die Frage, die offen bleibt, ist, was das heutige Spanien mit dieser Politik beabsichtigt. Ist sie zweckgebunden oder ist sie emotional bedingt?

Wie bei jeder politischen Aktion und bei jedem Bündnis zwischen Staaten steht der erste Gesichtspunkt hier im Vordergrund, jedoch ist das Emotionale – wie wir zu zeigen versucht haben – kein scheinheiliger Vorwand. Spanien ist von den arabischen Staaten sozusagen angezogen worden, weil diesen andere politische Freundschaften in Europa fehlen und diese Freundschaft, vom historischen und kulturellen Standpunkt betrachtet, die nächstliegende ist. Andererseits brauchte Franco den arabischen Block in den internationalen Gremien, die ihn nach 1945 boykottierten. Die Araber haben damit auf europäischem Boden einen zunächst wenigstens ideellen Bundesgenossen, dessen schlechteste außenpolitische Beziehungen die zu Frankreich und England sind – die beiden

Großmächte, gegen die heute die arabischen Staaten ihrerseits eine Reconquista beginnen.

Wird Spanien den arabischen Ansprüchen genügen können? In kultureller Hinsicht zweifellos; auch wirtschaftlich scheint es möglich, nachdem Spanien Industrie-Erzeugnisse zu exportieren beginnt und dafür landwirtschaftliche Produkte und Rohstoffe aus dem Orient einführt. Politisch ist Spanien vorläufig ein zwar nationalbewußter und verteidigungsbereiter, aber ein schlecht bewaffneter Freund; sein Hauptwert liegt hier im Moralischen. Kann Spanien aber auf der einen Seite für den Westen ein wichtiger Vermittler zum Orient sein – und die Bereitschaft hierzu hat es bereits angedeutet – so können seine Bindungen dorthin in dem Augenblick von großer Bedeutung für das Abendland werden, in dem es selbst ein wahrhaftes Glied der europäischen Gemeinschaft geworden ist. Und darin sieht Franco seine große Chance.

Politische Broschüren

Von den politischen Broschüren der letzten Zeit verdienen folgende eine besondere Erwähnung:

„*The Prague Trial. Its Anti-Jewish Implications*“. The Woburn Press, London, W. C. 1.

K. W. Böttcher: „*Europa ruft!*“ Herausgegeben von der Europa-Union.

„*Recht gegen Willkür*“. Gesamtbericht über den Internationalen Juristen-Kongreß. Hrsg. vom Internationalen Juristen-Ausschuß.

„*SBZ von A-Z*“. Ein Taschen- und Nachschlagebuch über die Sowjetische Besatzungszone Deutschlands. Hrsg. vom Bundesministerium für Gesamtdutsche Fragen.

Die Freier der Penelope

Der moderne demokratische Verfassungsstaat ist von der mehr oder weniger klar formulierten Vorstellung ausgegangen, daß es neben dem, was man das Gesamtinteresse nannte, keine legitimen Sonderinteressen geben solle. Das heißt, daß der Staat dieses Gesamtinteresse ungeteilt und ungebrochen zur Geltung zu bringen habe und daß das Gesamtinteresse durch das Zusammenspiel einer Exekutive, die traditionell eine Art von souveräner Unparteilichkeit repräsentiert und im Beamtentum verkörpert ist, mit Parteien zu gewährleisten sei, die sich eher nach Ideen als nach materiellen Interessen scheiden. Es ist eine Vorstellung, die man die Idee des *monistischen* Staates nennen könnte, nach der berühmten Formel der Französischen Revolution: „La république une et indivisible“. Auf der einen Seite erscheint der Staat als der unparteiische und mit der Autorität des keinen Sonderinteressen Verpflichteten ausgestattete Wächter des Gesamtinteresses, und auf der anderen Seite wird nach der strengen demokratischen Doktrin vorausgesetzt, daß der Staat einem Volkswillen entspricht, der durch das Ringen von Ideeparteien und nicht von Interessenparteien ermittelt wird.

Es ist bekannt, daß die tatsächliche Entwicklung dieser idealen Vorstellung keineswegs entsprochen hat. Wenn man heute nicht zu Unrecht von einer Krise der Demokratie spricht, so meint man nicht zuletzt die Tatsache, daß Parteien und Staatsgefüge mehr und mehr unter den Einfluß von Machtgebilden und Interessengruppen geraten sind, die ihre Sonderwünsche gegenüber dem Parlament und gegenüber der Bürokratie mit verschiedenen Mitteln zur Geltung zu bringen verstehen. Damit verwandeln sie einerseits die Parteien mehr und mehr in Vertreter materieller Sonderinteressen dieser oder jener Gruppe oder Klasse, während sie gleichzeitig in dem Maße, wie sie sich den Staat sowohl über das Parlament wie durch unmittelbaren Einfluß auf die Bürokratie dienstbar zu machen verstehen, seine innere Autorität und seinen Anspruch, Vertreter des Gesamtinteresses zu sein, zunehmend untergraben. Der monistische Staat der demokratischen Doktrin wird in diesem Prozeß mehr und mehr zum *pluralistischen* Staat der demokratischen Wirklichkeit. Zur geschriebenen Verfassung, die die Theorie proklamiert, tritt der ungeschriebene Einfluß der Sondermacht, wie sie in den kapitalkräftigen Unternehmungen, in ihren mehr oder weniger monopolistischen Zusammenschlüssen und in den unübersehbar gewordenen Gruppenverbänden und Interessenorganisationen verkörpert ist. Erst diese Durchdringung von formellem Verfassungsrecht und materiellem Gesellschaftsgefüge

ergibt die nüchterne Wirklichkeit des modernen Staatslebens. Erst aus diesem Gegenspiel von verfassungsmäßigen Institutionen einerseits und Wirtschafts- und Sozialmacht andererseits geht das moderne Staatsgefüge hervor. Es leuchtet ein, daß dieses Auseinanderklaffen von demokratischer Idee und harter Wirklichkeit den demokratischen Staat der Gegenwart schwer erschüttern muß. Die Idee selber erscheint kompromittiert, während eine verantwortungsbewußte Staatsleitung alle möglichen Wege prüfen wird, um sich gegen die pluralistische Zersetzung des Staatsgefüges zu Wehr zu setzen.

Dieser Prozeß hat die Entwicklung des modernen demokratischen Staates von seinen Anfängen an begleitet, und schon Benjamin Constant, der große Theoretiker des Konstitutionalismus, hat vor mehr als hundert Jahren besorgt und warnend darauf hingewiesen. Erst im letzten Viertel des 19. Jahrhunderts indessen ist er durch Ausmaß und Tempo wirklich auffallend geworden, bis er in unserer Zeit einen für die Demokratie schlechthin kritischen Grad erreicht hat, natürlich mit Unterschieden von Land zu Land, die wohl beachtet werden müssen.

Dieser Vorgang, den wir als *pluralistische Zersetzung des Staates durch Wirtschafts- und Sozialmacht* bezeichnen, ist so bekannt, daß er im einzelnen nicht mehr geschildert zu werden braucht. Jeder halbwegs Unterrichtete weiß, daß alle diese Machtgebilde – die Großunternehmungen, die großen Organisationen der Wirtschaft, und neuerdings immer stärker die Gewerkschaften – eine Stellung im Staatsleben gewonnen haben, die, ohne von der Verfassung auch nur mit einem Wort erwähnt zu werden, in der Praxis der Staaten gewohnheitsrechtlich anerkannt zu sein pflegt. Diese parastaatlichen Machtgruppen, wie man sie bezeichnen könnte, stehen ohne Ausnahmen in persönlichen und finanziellen Beziehungen zu den Parteien, und auch unter diesen als Empfängern dürfte es keine Ausnahme geben. Kein Akt der Gesetzgebung, kein Zolltarif, kein bedeutungsvoller Akt der Verwaltung entgeht, wenn er irgendwelche Interessen berührt, der Aufmerksamkeit der Machtgruppen und ihrem mehr oder weniger erfolgreichen Versuch, das Handeln des Staates zu ihren Gunsten zu wenden.

So allgemein die Kenntnis dieser Dinge, so verbreitet ist auch die Überzeugung, daß es sich um einen sehr beklagenswerten Vorgang handelt, dem wirksam zu steuern zu den größten, aber auch schwersten Aufgaben unserer Zeit gehört. Man kann sich diese Überzeugung kaum rückhaltlos und nachdrücklich genug zu eigen machen. Aber es ist zu hoffen, daß man damit heute nur offene Türen einstößt. Um so notwendiger dürfte es sein, diese so heilsame Allgemeinüberzeugung mit einigen Bemerkungen zu umrahmen, die ihr größere Genauigkeit und Bestimmtheit geben.

Zu allererst ist eine *Abgrenzung und Unterscheidung* notwendig. Sie zwingt sich schon dadurch auf, daß, während wir bis hierher von „Pluralismus“ in einem herabsetzenden Sinne gesprochen haben, dieser selbe Ausdruck in der angelsächsischen Staatslehre einen durchaus positiven Sinn hat, um das heilsame Bestehen von Gegengewichten gegenüber der

Übermacht des monistischen Staates der demokratischen Doktrin zu bezeichnen. Und hat nicht auch Montesquieu von den „corps intermédiaires“ gesprochen, die notwendig sind, um das starre Staatsgefüge durch geographische oder beruflich-ständische Sondergruppen aufzulockern und zu durchlüften? Entspricht es nicht auch unserer eigenen Überzeugung, daß der zentralistisch-monistische Staat das Gegenteil eines Ideals ist und es zu den Merkmalen eines gesunden Staatswesens gehört, daß es möglichst viel soziales und politisches Eigenleben neben dem Staate gibt, staatsfreie Sphären, Selbstverwaltung und Autonomie in Land, Kanton und Gemeinde, private Kreise mit ihren Sonderinteressen und Sonderrechten? Ist das nicht höchst erstrebenswert zur Eindämmung des Machtstrebens des Staates selber, ganz besonders des demokratischen, der in dieser Hinsicht deshalb so gefährlich ist, weil er sich dabei als Vollstrecker des Volkswillens ausgibt? Wenn wir also den „Pluralismus“ brandmarken, verwickeln wir uns dann nicht in einen heillosen Widerspruch?

Der Widerspruch löst sich, wenn wir zwischen zwei Arten des Pluralismus unterscheiden, einem legitimen und einem illegitimen, einem gesunden und einem kranken. Wir meinen einen *gesunden* Pluralismus, wenn wir es mit dem Fall von Sondergruppen zu tun haben, die sich gegen den um sich greifenden Machtanspruch des Staates verteidigen und ihn damit heilsam begrenzen. Der *kranke* Pluralismus aber, den wir hier im Auge haben, ist das Gegenteil davon. Er ist nicht defensiv, sondern offensiv. Er begrenzt nicht den Staat, sondern er sucht ihn für seine eigenen Zwecke zu erobern und ihn sich dienstbar zu machen, indem er die Staatsmacht nach den Interessen der privaten Machtgruppen lenkt und beeinflußt. Dieser illegitime, offensive Pluralismus der Wirtschafts- und Sozialmacht wendet sich nur dann gegen den Staat, wenn er seine Interessen kreuzt, aber im übrigen schütet er sich nicht, seine Macht zu benutzen, nach dem Spruch des Nachwächterliedes von Chamisso:

Und der König absolut,
Wenn er unseren Willen tut.

Die ungeheure Gefahr dieses Pluralismus besteht also darin, daß die Interessentengruppen den Staat zur Beute machen – als die modernen Freier der Penelope. Je weiter die Kompetenzen des Staates und je größer seine Macht, um so wertvoller ist diese Beute. Je weniger Gruppen sich in diese Beute zu teilen haben, um so besser für die Teilhaber an diesem Beutezuge. Das Ideal dieses Pluralismus muß also darauf gerichtet sein, die Macht des Staates im Wirtschaftsleben auf ein Maximum zu treiben und die Zahl der sich um ihre Eroberung Streitenden auf ein Minimum herabzusetzen. Dieses Ideal ist im kollektivistisch-totalitären Staat erreicht.

Aus diesem Wesen des *offensiven Pluralismus* erklärt es sich, daß er während der letzten Generationen genau in dem Maße erstarkt ist, wie der liberale Kurs der Wirtschaftspolitik durch die interventionistisch-planwirtschaftliche verdrängt worden ist. In demselben Maße hat aber auch der entgegengesetzte, defensive Pluralismus an Gewicht und Ein-

fluß verloren, Staatsmacht einerseits und Wirtschafts- und Sozialmacht andererseits sind fortgesetzt gewachsen und mehr und mehr miteinander verbunden. Die Gegengewichte gegen diese doppelte Machtzusammenballung aber – Föderalismus, Gemeindeautonomie, Familie, Marktwirtschaft, Privatinitiative auf allen Gebieten, Autonomie der Universitäten, kurz alle staatsfreien Sphären und „corps intermédiaires“ – sind in dieser selben Zeit zunehmender Machtkonzentration immer leichter geworden.

Zu diesen Opfern gehört nicht zuletzt auch die *Währung*. Während der Herrschaft der Goldwährung war sie als eine der wichtigsten „staatsfreien Sphären“ dem – in der Regel inflatorischen – Einfluß der Staatsmacht und der großen Machtgruppen entzogen. Jetzt aber, im Zeitalter der manipulierten Papierwährung, ist sie zum knetbaren Objekt des Staates geworden, soweit sich nicht die Zentralbank noch eine gewisse Selbständigkeit bewahrt hat. Die „schleichende Inflation“, die zur chronischen Krankheit unserer Zeit geworden ist, hat hier ihre tiefe Ursache. Um dem Vorstellungs- und Erinnerungsvermögen einer darin bedenklich stumpf gewordenen Gegenwart nachzuhelfen, sei das, was in dieser Hinsicht früheren Generationen als selbstverständlich gegolten hat, durch zwei Vorkommnisse der französischen Finanzgeschichte illustriert. Als Gambetta Ende 1870 den Widerstand Frankreichs in Tour organisierte, stellte er an den Vertreter der Bank von Frankreich das Ansinnen, ihm in seiner verzweifelten finanziellen Lage durch Notendruck zu helfen. Gambetta, der allmächtige Feuerkopf, beugt sich vor dem Widerstand der Bank von Frankreich selbst in dieser Stunde höchster nationaler Not und verzichtet auf eine damals schlechthin unerhörte Forderung. Noch mehr: einige Monate später bezeugen selbst die sozialistischen Führer der Commune in Paris ihren heiligen Respekt vor der Unantastbarkeit des Geldes und weigern sich, inmitten des Tobens der Revolution, den Goldbestand der Bank von Frankreich und die Notendruckstöcke, auf die sie nur die Hand zu legen brauchen, ihren Zwecken dienstbar zu machen.

Das Übel wird nun noch dadurch gesteigert, daß der Zusammenschluß der Interessenten in wohlorganisierten Gruppen zu einer Erscheinung führt, die man als „*Pluralismus der zweiten Potenz*“ bezeichnen kann. Das soll heißen: Es entsteht eine berufsmäßige Verbandsbürokratie, die, auf ihre Aufgabe spezialisiert und dafür bezahlt, dem Interessenkampf nicht nur besondere Stoßkraft verleiht, sondern auch die Interessen ihrer Gruppe mit einer Verbissenheit verfehlt, die die von ihnen Vertretenen eher zu mildern bereit wären. Da es außerdem das eigene berufliche Interesse dieser Funktionäre ist, die Interessen in einer Weise zu verfechten, die ihre Existenzberechtigung immer wieder aufs neue und möglichst sichtbar beweist, so neigen sie dazu, ihren Mandanten Forderungen einzureden, die sich zwar gut für eine kollektive Durchsetzung eignen, aber dem echten Interesse der Auftraggeber keineswegs zu entsprechen brauchen. Nur so ist unter anderem die Politik der Gewerkschaften vieler Länder zu begreifen.

Diese *Funktionäre der Machtgruppen* werden, wie wir leicht erkennen, selber zu einer Machtgruppe mit einem bestimmten gemeinsamen Interesse, das die Verständigung der von ihnen Vertretenen untereinander auf dem Rücken der Allgemeinheit in bedenklicher Weise erleichtert. Dieses Zusammenspiel der Machtgruppen vermindert erheblich die an sich nicht unberechtigte Hoffnung, daß sie sich gegenseitig ausgleichen und neutralisieren könnten. Wir beobachten vielmehr immer wieder ihre Neigung, auf dem Rücken der Allgemeinheit, d. h. aller weniger straff Organisierten, Kompromisse abzuschließen, mit einem Wort, auf Kosten der Sparer, der Konsumenten, der Rentner, der freien Berufe, der Selbständigen in Handel und Gewerbe, der Hausbesitzer, kurzum aller derjenigen, die das Unglück haben, zu keiner der Baronien dieses Neufederalismus zu gehören.

Daß eine der mächtigsten dieser Baronien in unserer Zeit gerade die Gewerkschaften geworden sind, ist eine schneidende Ironie, auf die nach allem bisher Ausgeführten kaum noch hingewiesen zu werden braucht. Es ist aber hinzuzufügen, daß diese Machtgruppe, wenn nicht immer und überall die mächtigste, so doch sicherlich eine der gefährlichsten ist, und zwar deshalb, weil in diesem Falle der Sozialmacht gewöhnlich die Bremse fehlt, die im Falle der Wirtschaftsmacht immerhin noch wirksam zu sein pflegt: die Bremse des eigenen schlechten Gewissens und das Mißtrauen der öffentlichen Meinung, das zur Zurückhaltung und zur Verschleierung nötig ist. So ist es denn jüngst der Führung der deutschen Gewerkschaften vorbehalten geblieben, den Anspruch auf die Vorherrschaft im Staatsleben mit brutaler Offenheit zu verkünden, als ob es sich um eine Macht- und Interessengruppe handelte, die aus der Rekordzahl ihrer Mitglieder Sonderrechte ableiten dürfte, über die die Verfassung schweigt. In Wahrheit ist natürlich ein syndikalistischer Totalitarismus nicht besser als irgendein anderer, der den demokratischen Rechtsstaat aus den Angeln hebt und uns an die Weisheit des Wortes von Cavour erinnert: *La peggiore delle Camere è preferibile alla migliore delle anticamere* (Die schlechteste Abgeordnetenkammer ist immer noch besser als das beste Vorzimmer).

Das Beispiel der Gewerkschaften beweist, daß das große Problem der Macht im Staate nicht mit homöopathischen Methoden gelöst werden kann, d. h. nicht dadurch, daß der zunehmenden Konzentration der Machtgruppen eine noch konzentriertere Macht entgegengesetzt wird. Wirkt die Vielzahl der Machtgruppen trotz allem noch einigermaßen ausgleichend und auflöckernd, so bedeutet die zusammengeballte Macht – sei es der Gewerkschaften, sei es irgendeiner anderen Gruppe, sei es vor allem auch des Staates selber – nur eine äußerste und unerträgliche Steigerung der Gefahr, gegen die uns nicht einmal die besten Absichten und noch weniger die menschenfreundlichsten Proklamationen schützen können. Ist das Problem der Macht im Grunde ein solches ihrer zunehmenden Konzentration, so kann seine Lösung nur in der entgegengesetzten Richtung der Dezentralisation gefunden werden. Was das im einzelnen bedeutet, muß bei anderer Gelegenheit auseinandergesetzt werden.

JÜRGEN PECHEL

Die Kosten der Krankheit – der Preis der Gesundheit

Die Weltgesundheitsorganisation tritt für vorbeugende Maßnahmen ein

In den letzten Jahren hat die Weltgesundheitsorganisation der Vereinten Nationen in ständig wachsendem Maß ihre Tätigkeit von dem helfenden Eingreifen beim Ausbruch von Seuchen auf die Unterstützung einer vorbeugenden Gesundheitspflege verlagert. Immer wieder wurde anlässlich der WHO-Tagungen die Ansicht geäußert, die Regierungen sollten – statt erst das Auftreten einer Krankheit abzuwarten – durch vorbeugende Maßnahmen ihren Ausbruch verhindern oder diese Gefahr durch eine ständige, unentgeltliche Gesundheitskontrolle zumindest verringern. Diese Ansicht klingt gleichermaßen vernünftig wie verlockend. Und in einigen europäischen und nordamerikanischen Ländern ist es auch heute schon selbstverständlich, daß sich ein Bürger auf Kosten des Staates hinsichtlich ansteckender oder sonst gefährlicher Krankheiten untersuchen und beraten lassen kann.

Immerhin wird auch an diesen staatlichen Präventivmaßnahmen des öfteren Kritik geübt. Man spricht von einer „kalten Sozialisierung“ des Arztberufes oder von einem Abgleiten zum Wohlfahrtsstaat und behauptet, daß die gewiß hohen Ausgaben für diese vorbeugende staatliche Gesundheitskontrolle in keinem Verhältnis zu ihrem Nutzen für die Gemeinschaft stünden. Darüber hinaus können sich aber die unterentwickelten Länder Afrikas, Asiens und Lateinamerikas, in denen zwei Drittel der Menschheit leben, nicht einmal die bescheidensten Ansätze für eine staatliche Gesundheitspflege leisten – sei es aus wirtschaftlicher Armut, sei es auf Grund des Mangels an geschultem Personal oder des Fehlens der hierfür erforderlichen technischen Vorrichtungen. Für diese Länder ist aber auch ein langfristig geplantes, öffentliches Gesundheitsprogramm notgedrungen nur ein Teil des allgemeinen wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Aufbaus.

Denn welchen Nutzen hätte es beispielsweise, in einem Dorf eines unterentwickelten Landes eine groß angelegte DDT-Aktion zur Ausrottung des Malaria-Erregers durchzuführen, wenn man aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen nicht imstande ist, den Sumpf in der Nachbarschaft des Dorfes – in dem die Mosquitos wachsen und gedeihen – trocken zu legen? Früher oder später werden die Mosquitos in das Dorf zurückkommen. Die DDT-Aktion kann also nur vorübergehend helfen. Und das gleiche gilt für alle anderen Krankheiten. Sie können nur dauerhaft beseitigt werden, wenn die den Krankheitskeim in sich tragende Umgebung verändert wird – das heißt die Wohnverhältnisse, die Ernährung, die Ar-

beitsbedingungen und sonstigen Lebensverhältnisse auf ein menschenwürdiges Niveau gehoben werden.

Dieses Ziel können die unterentwickelten Länder aus eigener Kraft nicht erreichen. Sie bedürfen hierfür der Hilfe der wirtschaftlich, technisch und wissenschaftlich hochentwickelten Länder. Die Weltgesundheitsorganisation hat sich seit ihrem Bestehen die Aufgabe gestellt, diese Unterstützung zu gewinnen. Sie will dabei im Zuge ihrer allgemeinen Aufklärungskampagne beweisen, daß die Hilfe für die unterentwickelten Länder nicht nur eine humanitäre Forderung ist, sondern gleichzeitig auch ein Gebot wirtschaftlicher Vernunft. Das heißt, daß die heute den unterentwickelten Ländern gewährte Hilfe in einiger Zeit wirtschaftlichen Nutzen auch für den Helfenden bringen wird.

Zu diesem Zweck wurde kürzlich eine gut fundierte Studie des Professors für öffentliche Gesundheitspflege an der amerikanischen Yale-Universität Dr. C.-E. A. Winslow von der Weltgesundheitsorganisation veröffentlicht, die den Titel „Die Kosten der Krankheit und der Preis der Gesundheit“ trägt. Professor Winslow verweist in seiner Studie zunächst auf den tödlichen Kreislauf zwischen Armut und Krankheit, der jährlich zum vorzeitigen Ableben vieler Millionen Menschen führt. So betrug 1939 das durchschnittliche Einkommen pro Kopf der Bevölkerung in den Vereinigten Staaten 554 Dollar, die durchschnittliche Lebenserwartung 62 Jahre; in Deutschland im gleichen Jahr 520 Dollar und 60 Jahre, in Großbritannien 465 Dollar und 60 Jahre. Demgegenüber drei Beispiele unterentwickelter Länder; ebenfalls 1939: Mexiko 61 Dollar und nur 57 Lebensjahre, Brasilien 46 Dollar und 39 Lebensjahre – und schließlich Indien mit 34 Dollar pro Kopf und Jahr bei einer durchschnittlichen Lebenserwartung von nur 27 Jahren! Diese Zahlen zeigen, kommentiert Winslow, daß Menschen krank werden, weil sie arm sind; sie werden noch ärmer, weil sie krank waren; und noch kränker, weil sie ärmer geworden sind. Das ist das Lebensgesetz, unter dem fast 1 500 000 000 Menschen stehen.

Noch einige von Winslow angeführte Zahlen aus der Nachkriegszeit. Wie das amerikanische Staatsdepartment 1948 bekannt gab, entfallen auf die hochentwickelten Länder in Europa und Nordamerika – in denen ein Fünftel der Menschheit lebt – ein jährliches Einkommen von 461 Dollar pro Kopf der Bevölkerung, täglich 3 040 Kalorien Lebensmittel, sowie auf 100 000 Einwohner 106 Ärzte und eine durchschnittliche Lebenszeit von 63 Jahren. In den unterentwickelten Ländern hingegen: durchschnittliches Jahreseinkommen 41 Dollar, 2 150 Kalorien täglich, pro 100 000 Einwohner 17 Ärzte und eine durchschnittliche Lebenserwartung von 30 Jahren.

Welche katastrophalen Auswirkungen diese frühe Sterblichkeit auf wirtschaftlichem Gebiet zeitigt, legt eine von Winslow angeführte Untersuchung des Wirtschafts- und Sozialrates der UN klar: in Ländern wie China, Ägypten oder Indien werden nur 54 von 100 Kinder älter als 15 Jahre. Das heißt, knapp die Hälfte aller Kinder dieser Länder erreicht ein Alter, in dem sie produktiv in den Wirtschaftsprozeß ein-

treten können. Nur 15 von 100 Menschen der unterentwickelten Länder erreichen das in Westeuropa oder Nordamerika übliche Lebensalter von 60 Jahren – alle anderen 85 werden arbeitsunfähig oder sterben, bevor sie die normale Arbeitszeit von etwa 45 Lebensjahren vollenden konnten. Im Gegensatz hierzu die Ziffern aus den hochentwickelten Ländern: nur acht Kinder von 100 sterben vor dem 15. Lebensjahr, und 70 von 100 Menschen sind bis zu ihrem 60. Lebensjahr uningeschränkt arbeitsfähig.

Winslow erwähnt sodann einige besonders eindrucksvolle Beispiele für die wirtschaftlichen Schäden dieser schlechten gesundheitlichen Verhältnisse. Indien erleidet beispielsweise jährlich allein durch die Malaria, der etwa eine Million Menschen dort zum Opfer fallen, einen Produktionsverlust von annähernd einer Milliarde DM. In Ägypten verursacht die „Bilharzische Krankheit“ (Bilharziasis) einen jährlichen Produktionsausfall von 33 v. H. in den betroffenen Gebieten und damit einen Verlust von über 250 Millionen DM. Auf den Philippinen erkrankten bis 1947 bei einer Gesamtbevölkerung von 17 Millionen Einwohnern jedes Jahr 2 Millionen Menschen an Malaria, von denen etwa 10 000 starben, und 1,3 Millionen leiden an Tuberkulose bei einer jährlichen Sterblichkeit von 35 000 Menschen. Der wirtschaftliche Verlust, der den Philippinen allein durch diese beiden Krankheiten zugefügt wurde, ist auf 2 770 Millionen DM jährlich geschätzt worden.

Aber auch in den hochentwickelten Ländern gehen jährlich Milliardenbeträge durch Krankheiten verloren. Auf Grund jüngster Erhebungen in den Vereinigten Staaten wird dort der wirtschaftliche Verlust durch vorzeitiges Ableben auf jährlich 11 Milliarden Dollar geschätzt, der durch völlige oder teilweise Arbeitsunfähigkeit verursachte Verlust auf zusammen 22 Milliarden, und die Einbußen durch kurzfristige Krankheiten auf 5 Milliarden Dollar. Insgesamt also ein jährlicher Ausfall von etwa 38 Milliarden Dollar oder rund 160 Milliarden DM.

Dieses ist die eine Seite des Problems, die Kosten der Krankheit. Es liegt daher auf der Hand, welchen ungeheueren wirtschaftlichen Wert vorbeugende Maßnahmen haben würden. Winslow führt auch dafür einige Beispiele an. In Detroit in den Vereinigten Staaten wurden im Rahmen eines fünfjährigen Programmes jedes Jahr 200 000 Dollar für die Kontrolle der Tuberkulose ausgegeben. Während dieser Jahre konnten dank der rechtzeitig einsetzenden Behandlung von Tb-Erkrankten – verglichen mit den Vorjahren – allein 1,4 Millionen Dollar jährlich an Kosten für Krankenhausaufenthalte und stationäre Behandlung eingespart werden. Nettogewinn dieser Aktion für die Stadt Detroit also 1,2 Millionen, nicht eingerechnet der Gewinn an Arbeitszeit.

Ein anderes Beispiel: von 1911 bis 1925 wendete die „Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.“, eine der größten amerikanischen Versicherungsgesellschaften, über 20 Millionen Dollar für die Aufklärung der bei ihr versicherten Personen über Gesundheitspflege sowie für deren rechtzeitige Untersuchung und Behandlung auf. Sie machte dabei die erstaunliche Entdeckung, daß während dieses Zeitraums die Zahl der Todesfälle

unter ihren Versicherten um über 30. v. H. zurückging – das heißt doppelt so sehr wie bei der gesamten amerikanischen Bevölkerung. Die Gesellschaft konnte hierdurch 43 Millionen Dollar einsparen, die sie sonst bei Todesfällen hätte auszahlen müssen.

Endlich noch ein Beispiel aus Europa: in Griechenland gab es im Jahre 1942 zwei Millionen an Malaria erkrankte Menschen. Die Regierung war daher gezwungen, ein Fünftel der gesamten Weltproduktion an Chinin im Werte von 1,3 Millionen Dollar zu kaufen. Dank wiederholter DDT-Aktionen konnte die Zahl der Erkrankten auf ein Vierzigstel von 1942 gesenkt werden – 50 000 Malariafälle – bei einem Kostenaufwand von 300 000 Dollar. Ersparnis also: eine Million Dollar.

Darüber hinaus wuchs Griechenlands Produktionsvolumen dank der Reduktion der Malariafälle um den Gegenwert der Arbeit von 150 000 Personen pro Jahr. Das Bruttoeinkommen der Familien in den zuvor von der Malaria heimgesuchten Landesteilen verdoppelte sich, die Anbaufläche wuchs um 67 v. H. Als „Nebenprodukt“ der DDT-Aktion, die außer den Mosquitos auch zahlreiche andere Insekten tötete, erhöhte sich die Eierproduktion ganz beträchtlich, und die Milchproduktion stieg um 15 bis 20 v. H.

Es könnten noch viele Beispiele für die Ansicht der Weltgesundheitsorganisation angeführt werden, daß Vorbeugen – langfristig gesehen – wesentlich billiger ist als Heilen, und dies sowohl im Leben des Einzelnen wie im Leben der Völker. Hier bietet sich der Menschheit dank dem Fortschritt der medizinischen Forschung ein Weg, der möglichst bald beschritten werden sollte.

Bei Lebzeiten und ein halb Jahrhundert nach dem Tode für einen großen Geist gehalten werden, ist ein schlechter Beweis, daß man es ist; durch alle Jahrhunderte aber hindurch dafür gehalten werden, ist ein unwidersprechlicher.

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing

MAX GORDON

Englische Erziehungsstätten

Wenn es richtig ist, daß sich in dem Erziehungswesen eines Volkes die nationalen Charakterzüge widerspiegeln, dann ist das englische Erziehungswesen typisch für den englischen Individualismus. Ein deutscher Lehrer, der vor einiger Zeit nach England kam, um das Erziehungswesen zu studieren, gestand, daß er nach vierwöchigem Besuch verschiedener Schulen nicht herausgefunden hatte, wie das System arbeite.

„Sie haben doch keine Ordnung in Ihrem System“, seufzte er. Für einen Deutschen, der gewohnt ist, den Lehrplan von dem Ministerium vorgelegt zu bekommen, mag die scheinbare Unordnung im englischen System – wenn man von einem „System“ überhaupt sprechen kann – unverdaulich sein, aber für den Engländer wäre das deutsche System gleichfalls unverdaulich.

Die „Unordnung“, die dieser deutsche Lehrer im Auge hatte, betrifft die verschiedenen Schul-Typen, die fröhlich nebeneinander bestehen.

Freiheit, wie sie der Engländer versteht, bedeutet, daß der Bürger von dem Staat so wenig wie möglich beschränkt wird. Theoretisch kann jeder Lehrer, wenn er das nötige Kapital hat, eine Volksschule oder ein privates Gymnasium aufmachen. Die „Education Act“ von 1944 stellt jedoch die Bedingung, daß er sich von den staatlichen Schulräten (H. M. Inspectors) inspizieren lassen muß; und wenn die Inspektion zeigt, daß seine Schule nicht den staatlichen Richtlinien entspricht, dann kann sie im äußersten Falle geschlossen werden, aber so lange seine Schule „efficient“ ist, dann kann der Staat ihn nicht hindern, die Schule weiterzuführen.

Freiheit im englischen Sinne bedeutet auch, daß der Lehrer die Lehrmethode anwenden kann, die er für die richtige hält, solange er beweisen kann, daß sie erfolgreich ist. Ein Beispiel aus meinem eigenen Leben mag dies erläutern. Seit elf Jahren bin ich an einem Gymnasium (Grammar School) als Altphilologe angestellt. Seit elf Jahren habe ich Latein und Griechisch in allen Klassen der Schule gelehrt. In der ganzen Zeit ist mein Direktor noch nicht ein einziges Mal in meinen Klassen gewesen, um zu sehen, ob mein Unterricht auch wirkungsvoll ist. Das bedeutet nicht, daß er nicht weiß, wie es in meiner Klasse zugeht. Er sieht es an den Resultaten der Prüfungen, die in jedem englischen Gymnasium mindestens einmal im Jahre erfolgen. Er weiß es von den Resultaten der großen unabhängigen Prüfungen, wie des englischen Abiturs, die von Examens-Syndikaten jährlich vorgenommen werden. Schließlich sind da die Eltern, die es den Direktor schnell genug wissen lassen, falls nach

den Erzählungen ihres Sprößlings oder nach dem Zeugnis, das die Kinder dreimal im Jahre nach Hause bringen, der Lehrer nicht seine Schuldigkeit getan hat.

Im großen und ganzen läuft der Schulapparat ohne Reibungen. Das Labyrinth von unabhängigen (independent), halb-abhängigen (aided) und abhängigen (controlled) Schulen ist irgendwie zu einem System zusammengeschweißt worden. Der Schweißer ist die *Tradition*, ein ungeheuer wirksamer Arbeiter in England.

Ein kurzer Blick auf die Geschichte des englischen Erziehungswesens wird dazu beitragen, dieses Labyrinth besser zu verstehen.

Bis zum 19. Jahrhundert ist die Erziehung in England das Privileg einer Minorität gewesen. Die Grammar Schools waren seit dem Mittelalter das Rückgrat der englischen Erziehung. Da die Kirche im Mittelalter das Haupterziehungsorgan war, wurden die Grammar Schools eingerichtet, um den kirchlichen Nachwuchs sicherzustellen. Hierbei muß betont werden, daß der Name „Grammar Schools“ nicht bedeutet, daß diese Schulen Volksschulen in unserem Sinne waren. Sie waren „Berufsschulen“ im weiteren Sinne. Sie waren eine Vorbereitung für die Universität (was sie heute noch im wesentlichen sind). Jeder junge Mann, der Geistlicher werden, sich der Verwaltung widmen oder die Rechte studieren wollte, mußte die Universität besuchen. Er wurde nicht immatrikuliert, wenn er nicht vorher die „Grammar School“ absolviert hatte. Im 16. Jahrhundert gab es in England etwa dreihundert Grammar Schools. Die größten hatten zwischen hundert und zweihundert Schüler, viele konnten nicht mehr als fünfzig aufweisen, einige wenige bestanden aus vier oder fünf Schülern.

Es ist nicht allgemein bekannt, daß die sogenannten „Public Schools“, die heute der Stolz Englands sind (wobei man darauf hinweisen muß, daß der Name „Public Schools“ irreführend ist, da diese Schulen alles andere als „public“, d. h. öffentlich sind), aus den Grammar Schools hervorgegangen sind. Die meisten dieser berühmten Schulen, wie z. B. Harrow, wo Winston Churchill seine Erziehung empfing, sind viel jünger als die englischen Grammar Schools. Eine Ausnahme hiervon machen Eton, Winchester und Westminster. Die Blütezeit der „Public Schools“ fing im 18. Jahrhundert an.

Im Jahre 1728 veröffentlichte Daniel Defoe sein berühmtes Buch: „The Compleat English Gentleman“. In diesem Buch erwähnt er die Schulen in Eton, Winchester, Westminster, Felsted, Bishop Stortford und Canterbury, „wo die Kinder, nein, besser, die ältesten Söhne der besten Familien in England erzogen werden“. Er nennt diese Schulen „The Great Schools“. Eine bessere Reklame hätten sich diese Schulen nicht wünschen können. Von da an war das Ansehen dieser Schulen gesichert. Die besten Familien sandten nun ihre Söhne auf diese Schulen, auch wenn sie es bisher nicht getan hatten. Dies wurde zu einer Frage des „social prestige“.

Für die Masse des Volkes wurde auf dem Gebiete der Erziehung sehr wenig getan. Man hatte wohl „Chantry Schools“, die von der Kirche ge-

leitet wurden, und auch eine Menge von „local day schools“, aber kein geordnetes System von Volksschulen. Am Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts gab es in England nur sehr wenige Kinder aus armen Verhältnissen, die mehr als zwei oder drei Jahre Ausbildung in einer privaten Volksschule aufweisen konnten. Sogar die Philanthropen, die Privatschulen für arme Kinder leiteten, waren der Meinung, daß man Kinder nicht zu viel lehren dürfe. Kinder waren dazu da, so dachte man, um zu arbeiten. Sie wurden in Fabriken beschäftigt und unerbittlich ausgenutzt. Die Lage wurde so schlecht, daß der Staat eingreifen mußte. Im Jahre 1802 wurde vom Parlament ein Gesetz beschlossen (Peel's Factory Act), wonach jeder Arbeitgeber verpflichtet war, seinen Lehrlingen Lesen und Schreiben beizubringen. Dieser Unterricht mußte nach dem Gesetz täglich gegeben werden und durfte nicht vor 6 Uhr morgens oder nach 9 Uhr abends beginnen. Daraus kann man ersehen, wie lange die jungen Menschen (und Lehrlinge in jener Zeit waren Kinder, nicht Halbwüchsige) arbeiten mußten. Während dieses Gesetz nur sehr unzureichend ausgeführt wurde, hatte es doch eine gute Folge. Das öffentliche Gewissen begann sich zu regen. 1808 und 1811 wurden zwei große Organisationen gegründet: „The British and Foreign School Society“ und die „Society for Promoting The Education of The Poor In The Principles of The Established Church“. Während Privatpersonen und Organisationen sich der Volksschulerziehung annahmen, zeigte der englische Staat nur geringes Interesse. Volksschulzwang wurde erst 1870 eingeführt und Staatskontrolle über die Erziehung sogar erst 1899.

Wenn wir in Betracht ziehen, daß Friedrich Wilhelm I. Volksschulzwang 1716 einführte und daß in den meisten deutschen Staaten eine regelrechte Volksschulbildung im 19. Jahrhundert eine festgewurzelte Einrichtung war, werden wir verstehen, warum in England diese Mischung zwischen privater und Staatserziehung noch so vorherrschend ist; denn eine wirksame Staatskontrolle über alle Arten der Erziehung ist in England erst durch die Education Act von 1944 hergestellt worden. Selbst dieses Gesetz läßt viele Hintertüren für Privaterziehung offen.

Erziehung in England liegt heute in den Händen der Gemeinden, die den größten Prozentsatz des Erziehungswesens leiten. The Local Education Authority mit dem Director of Education als ausführendem Organ hat etwa 80% der gesamten Schulen in Händen. Der Erziehungsminister führt die Oberaufsicht durch seine Schulräte, die in den Schulen mehr oder weniger regelmäßige Inspektionen durchführen. Die besten und ältesten Grammar Schools sind jedoch unabhängig geblieben. In ihnen hat der Direktor fast uningeschränkte Macht. Ein „Board of Governors“ stellt die rechtliche Autorität dar.

Wie sich die Erziehung in England praktisch gestaltet, kann man am besten an dem Schulgang eines typischen englischen Jungen, den ich *John* nennen werde, darstellen.

Mit seinem 5. Geburtstag wird John schulpflichtig. Seine Mutter hat ihn schon lange vorher bei der nächsten Volksschule angemeldet, da im Augenblick mehr Kinder als Schulplätze vorhanden sind. Hier wird er

nach den modernsten Methoden mit Lesen, Schreiben und Rechnen vertraut gemacht. Tafeln gibt es nicht mehr, dafür Bleistift und Papier, und Malen spielt bei den Kleinsten eine große Rolle. Während der nächsten Zeit wird ein wachsameres Auge auf das herannahende 11. Lebensjahr gehalten. Wenn John 10 Jahre alt geworden ist, muß er sich einer Prüfung unterwerfen, die seine ganze Zukunft bestimmt. Von dieser Prüfung hängt es ab, ob er mit 11 Jahren aufs Gymnasium (Grammar School), eine Technische Schule oder eine Realschule (Modern Secondary School) kommt. Alle Eltern wünschen natürlich, daß ihr John für das Gymnasium zugelassen werden wird, wohin die klügsten Kinder gesandt werden. Der Grad der Klugheit wird durch einen oder zwei „Intelligence Tests“ festgestellt. Da so viel auf dem Spiele steht, ist es klar, daß jedes Jahr, nachdem die Resultate bekanntgegeben worden sind, tausende von Briefen an die Zeitungen geschrieben werden, in denen sich die Eltern über die Unzulänglichkeit des Systems beschweren. Es muß aber gesagt werden, daß dieses System im großen und ganzen gut funktioniert und gerechter als jedes andere System ist, das nur auf gute Ergebnisse in Rechnen und English Wert legen würde.

Wenn Johns „Intelligence Quotient“ hoch genug für eine Gymnasialaufbahn ist, dann kann er sich ein Gymnasium wählen, und vorausgesetzt, daß genügend Plätze frei sind, tritt er im folgenden Jahre, d. h. wenn er 11 Jahre alt geworden ist, ins Gymnasium ein.

Nach der Education Act von 1944 ist seine Erziehung frei. Schulgeld wird nicht erhoben, auch Bücher und Schreibmaterial werden ihm geliefert. Wenn er die Prüfung nicht besteht, dann können ihn seine Eltern trotzdem in eines der unabhängigen Gymnasien aufnehmen lassen, vorausgesetzt, daß sie bereit sind, das nicht unbeträchtliche Schulgeld (zwischen 40 und 65 Pfund im Jahr) zu bezahlen. Für die meisten Eltern ist das jedoch eine große Belastung, ein weiterer Grund, warum die Eltern das Resultat dieser Aufnahmeprüfungen mit so großer Ungeduld erwarten. Die Mindestdauer der Gymnasialausbildung beträgt sechs Jahre. Viele Schüler bleiben aber drei und vier Jahre in der Vith Form (der Prima). Auf dem Gymnasium lernt unser John Latam, Französisch, Englisch, Geschichte, Erdkunde, Mathematik, Physik und Chemie als Hauptfächer. Später kann er auch Deutsch oder Griechisch lernen oder höhere Mathematik.

Der Unterricht beginnt morgens um 9 Uhr und endet etwa um halb Eins. Nach der Mittagspause geht es weiter bis Vier oder halb Fünf. Die meisten Schulen haben keinen Sonnabend-Unterricht. Andere haben etwa drei Stunden am Sonnabend, wofür ein Nachmittag in der Woche frei oder „Games“ gewidmet ist. Auf jeden Fall sind einmal in der Woche „Games“. Dies bedeutet Cricket im Sommer und Fußball (meistens Rugger) im Winter. Turnen im deutschen Sinne ist sehr wenig bekannt. Leichtathletik kommt einmal im Jahre beim Sportfest zur Geltung.

Das Ziel der Gymnasialausbildung ist, John das Abitur bestehen zu lassen, eine Prüfung, die aus drei Graden besteht (ordinary, advanced

und scholarship level) und die von ungefähr sechs großen Syndikaten, die mit verschiedenen Universitäten verbunden sind, abgehalten wird.

Wenn John den ersten Grad dieser Prüfung bestanden hat, dann wird er gewöhnlich in die Prima versetzt, obwohl die Praxis in einzelnen Schulen verschieden ist. In der VIth Form (der Prima) studiert John nur zwei oder drei Spezialfächer, entweder Mathematik, Altphilologie, Moderne Sprachen, Englisch oder Physik oder Chemie; denn nun hat sich John entschlossen, was er werden will. Sein Bestreben ist, eine „University Scholarship“, eine Art Stipendium, zu gewinnen, Oxford oder Cambridge sind die begehrtesten. Die Anforderungen der Universitäten für eine Scholarship und die damit verbundene Ehre sind sehr groß. Scholarship bedeutet, daß der Student auf der Universität keine oder nur geringe Gebühren zu bezahlen hat. Diese Scholarships sind meistens vor Jahrhunderten von reichen Philanthropen ausgesetzt worden. Mit den Zinsen dieser ausgesetzten Summen werden die Gebühren bezahlt. Jede Scholarship hat ihren Namen nach dem Gründer, und die Gesamtzahl ist natürlich gering, wenn man bedenkt, daß tausende von jungen Leuten aus ganz England um die berühmten Scholarships von Oxford und Cambridge kämpfen.

Um das englische Abitur zu bestehen oder eine Scholarship zu gewinnen, muß John während der letzten drei Jahre seiner Schulzeit sehr hart arbeiten. Den Ausgleich zu dieser harten Geistesarbeit findet er auf dem Sportplatz. Jeden Sonnabendnachmittag trifft sich das „School team“ und kämpft friedlich gegen teams von benachbarten Schulen. Hier kann John zeigen, daß er seinen Körper nicht vernachlässigt. Wenn er sich beim Fußball oder Cricket auszeichnet, wird er bald ein Held der jüngeren Generation in der Schule. Die Schule selbst zeichnet ihn aus, daß ihm das „Cap“ der ersten Mannschaft verliehen wird. Er darf dann einen besonderen Schal und ein spezielles Jacket tragen.

Alles dies trägt dazu bei, ein Zusammenhängigkeitsgefühl unter den Schülern herzustellen. Was John auch im Leben erfährt, er wird seiner Schule immer die Treue halten. Von der Universität kommt er regelmäßig zurück, um seine Lehrer aufzusuchen und die jüngere Generation beim Sport zu beobachten. Diese Treue und Anhänglichkeit zur Schule sind ein besonderes englisches Merkmal. Es hält nicht nur die Schüler zusammen, es gibt auch den Lehrern Mut und Kraft, ihr Bestes zum Wohle der ihnen anvertrauten Jungen und Mädchen zu geben.

Richard Sorge, der fast vollkommene Spion

Dr. Richard Sorge war – soviel wir heute wissen – der größte Spion des Zweiten Weltkriegs, der in seiner Doppelrolle als Presseattaché der Deutschen Botschaft in Tokio und kommunistischer Spion Stalin unschätzbare Dienste geleistet hat. Es dürfte keine Geheimsache im Verkehr zwischen Berlin und Tokio gegeben haben, von der er nicht wußte, und seine Informationsquelle waren keine Putzfrauen und Küchenmädchen, sondern der Botschafter selbst. Nachdem Sorge Ende 1941 gefaßt worden war und eingesehen hatte, daß weder die Deutsche Botschaft noch die Sowjetische Regierung ihn vor dem Galgen retten würden, schrieb er ein Geständnis im Umfang von 32 000 Wörtern nieder. Der nachstehende Bericht stützt sich auf dieses Geständnis und auf die Unterlagen der japanischen und – nach dem Kriege – amerikanischen Untersuchungen des Falles Sorge sowie auf meine persönliche Freundschaft und Zusammenarbeit mit Richard Sorge. Während der Jahre 1922–1935 traf ich ihn in verschiedenen Ländern und wurde 1929 von ihm für den Sowjetapparat angeworben, für den ich bis 1937 arbeitete.

Sorge ist 1895 in Baku geboren, wo sein Vater die Ölfelder reorganisierte. Seine Mutter war Russin. Er war noch ein Kind, als der Vater die Familie nach Deutschland brachte. Bei Kriegsausbruch 1914 meldete Richard Sorge sich freiwillig und kam nach nur sechswöchiger Ausbildung an die Front. Er wurde zweimal verwundet, dienstuntauglich geschrieben, meldete sich erneut freiwillig und wurde wiederum, diesmal durch ein Schrapnell, verwundet. Diese Verletzung war für das leichte, fast unmerkliche Hinken Sorges verantwortlich.

In seiner Lazarettzeit kam er mit Ärzten, Schwestern und Verwundeten in Berührung, die ziemlich kommunistisch eingestellt waren. Dies trug ebenso wie seine halbbrussische Abkunft und seine Ablehnung des „imperialistischen Krieges“ dazu bei, daß er selbst sich immer stärker nach links orientierte. Der Kommunismus und der entstehende sowjetrussische Staat schienen ihm einen neuen Lebensinhalt zu versprechen.

Sorges Laufbahn in der Kommunistischen Partei begann an der untersten Stufe. Gleichzeitig fing für ihn ein Doppelleben an, das bis zu seinem Tode nicht mehr aufhören sollte. Tagsüber war er Student an der Kieler Universität, abends schlich er sich als Propagandist in die Marine-Baracken. Bei der Meuterei der Hochseeflotte am 29. Oktober 1918, dem ersten kommunistischen Erfolg in Deutschland, spielte Sorge seine kleine, aber nicht unwichtige Rolle. Späterhin war er auch als Bergarbeiter im

Ruhrgebiet tätig – nicht um Kohlen zu graben, sondern um die Moral der Kumpel mit kommunistischen Reden zu untergraben. 1920 promovierte er an der Hamburger Universität zum Dr. phil. Im folgenden Jahr nahm er mit Zustimmung der Partei einen Lehrauftrag an der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Frankfurter Universität an. Da trat der erste Umstand ein, der ihn rasch die Stufenleiter der Partei hinaufsteigen ließ. Bei einer Polizeiaktion gegen die KP wurde er, dessen Neigungen damals der Polizei noch nicht bekannt waren, ausgewählt, um geheime Dokumente und Mitgliedlisten der Frankfurter Parteiorganisation zu verstecken. Er verbarg die Unterlagen in seinem Zimmer und in einer Bibliothek, und ein großes Paket stopfte er in einen Kohleneimer in der Universität. Das Material blieb unentdeckt, und Sorge wurde von seinen Vorgesetzten belobigt.

Bald darauf trat ein weiterer für ihn günstiger Umstand ein. Aus Moskau kamen vier hohe Delegierte zu einem Frankfurter Parteitag der deutschen KP, darunter drei frühere Mitglieder des Polizeibüros – Manuilski, Losowski und Kuuisen. Die Frankfurter Parteiorganisation brauchte nun einen Mann, der für die Polizei unverdächtig war und sich deshalb während des Aufenthalts der vier Russen um sie kümmern konnte. Die Wahl fiel auf Sorge. So lange der Parteitag dauerte, war er täglich mit den Russen zusammen, die sich eine so hohe Meinung von seiner Entschlossenheit und Energie bildeten, daß sie ihn aufforderten, mit nach Moskau zu kommen. Im Januar 1925 traf er dort ein, und zu gleicher Zeit wurde er von der deutschen KP zur russischen überscriben.

Nach einjähriger Ausbildung in kommunistischer Spionagetätigkeit – Codebenutzung und Weltpolitik, Sabotage, Geographie und militärischer Organisation – erhielt er seine ersten Aufträge. Sie waren noch nicht weiter aufregend: es handelte sich meist um innerparteiliche Zänkereien in Norwegen, Schweden, Dänemark und England, über die Moskau Klarheit zu erhalten wünschte. Bei seiner Rückkehr nach Moskau im Jahre 1929 wurde er als Agent von der Kommunistischen Internationale zum Vierten Büro (Geheimdienst) der Roten Armee überstellt. General Olitski, der damals das große Büro in der Bolshaja Semejnowski 14 leitete, überließ Sorge die Wahl, auf welchem Kontinent er arbeiten wollte. Er entschied sich für Asien, ein Gebiet voll Schwierigkeiten und Gefahren, wo Entdeckung oft gleichbedeutend mit Tod war, aber er glaubte – und zwar leider mit Recht – daß dort doch große revolutionäre Umwälzungen bevorstanden.

Drei Jahre lang arbeitete er in einem internationalen Spionagering in Schanghai. Wiederum fand seine Arbeit Anerkennung, und bei seiner Rückberufung nach Moskau im Januar 1933 wurde ihm der Rang eines Generalleutnants der Roten Armee verliehen.

Es war derselbe Monat, in dem Hitler in Deutschland an die Macht gelangte. In kurzer Frist kam die Arbeit der deutschen KP praktisch zum Erliegen, weil die meisten ihrer Führer entweder verhaftet wurden oder emigrierten.

In dieser Situation machte Sorge Moskau einen ungewöhnlichen Vorschlag. Er wollte nach einer Abwesenheit von acht Jahren nach Deutschland zurückkehren und sich als bekehrter Nationalsozialist aufspielen. Als Nazi getarnt, wollte er dann nach Japan gehen und dort den ersten großen kommunistischen Spionagering aufzuziehen. Dieser Plan war so gefährlich, daß die Rote Armee Einspruch erhob. Sorge war zu wertvoll, um ihn aufs Spiel zu setzen. Aber bis zum Frühjahr 1933 hatte er das Vierte Büro überzeugt und erhielt seinen Auftrag.

Seine Lage unterschied sich grundsätzlich von der der wenigen Kommunisten, die als Agenten in Naziorganisationen tätig waren, deren kommunistische Vergangenheit aber niemand kannte. Denn von 1919 bis 1925 war er in Deutschland als Revolutionär tätig gewesen, was hunderte seiner früheren Genossen wußten. In den Jahren, die er im Ausland verbracht hatte, hätte seine Tätigkeit leicht von der deutschen Gegenspionage entdeckt werden können – sei es in Moskau oder während seiner Reisen nach Skandinavien und England oder in Schanghai. Überdies hatte er in Moskau zwei Bücher über den Kommunismus veröffentlicht, die in Deutschland eine weite Leserschaft gefunden hatten. Und schließlich kam er sogar unter seinem richtigen Namen nach Deutschland zurück.

Zur damaligen Zeit war ich als deutscher Agent für Ignaz Reiß, den Chef der OGPU in Westeuropa, tätig. Meine Aufgabe war es, die Verbindung zwischen Nazideutschland und der Tschechoslowakei aufrechtzuerhalten und deutsche Kommunisten herauszubringen, die auf der Schwarzen Liste der Gestapo standen. Als amerikanischer Staatsbürger konnte ich die Grenze in beiden Richtungen relativ leicht überschreiten. Eines Tages, ich glaube, es war in Wien, ließ Reiß mich wissen, daß Sorge Hilfe brauchte.

In früherer Zeit hatten wir gelegentlich Agenten als Auslandskorrespondenten der „Frankfurter Zeitung“ untergebracht. Selbstverständlich hatten die Redakteure dabei keine Ahnung von deren wirklicher Aufgabe. Die Reorganisation der „Frankfurter Zeitung“ hatte uns alle früheren Zugänge versperrt, aber glücklicherweise hatte Dr. Max Geisenberg, ein überzeugter Nationalist, die Säuberung überlebt. Wir waren Bekannte, und er hat nie Verdacht geschöpft, daß ich Kommunistin sein könnte. Ich schrieb ihm nun einen langen und freundlichen Brief, der Dr. Sorge einführen und als Auslandskorrespondenten empfehlen sollte. Denn wenn man nichts von seinen kommunistischen Verbindungen wußte, hatte Sorge wirklich beachtenswerte Qualifikationen aufzuweisen. Der Schachzug gelang, und weder Reiß noch ich waren allzu überrascht, als wir erfuhren, daß er zum Tokioter Korrespondenten der „Frankfurter Zeitung“ ernannt worden war.

Die schwierigste Hürde blieb noch zu überwinden. Um überzeugend als Nazi auftreten zu können, mußte er in die Partei eintreten. Und das bedeutete eine Überprüfung durch die Gestapo. Tatsächlich lag auf der Gestapo ein Konvolut, das fein säuberlich die Aufschrift „Sorge“ trug.

Trotzdem wurde seine Aufnahme in die Partei nicht beanstandet. Denn Moskau hatte im rechten Moment eingegriffen: Ein anderer sowjetischer Agent, der innerhalb der Gestapo arbeitete, konnte vorübergehend alles Belastungsmaterial beiseite schaffen. Sorge erfuhr den Namen dieses Mannes niemals, der auch in den kommenden Jahren eine schützende Hand über ihn hielt. Denn 1939, als Sorge von Botschafter Ott zum Presseattaché ernannt wurde, suchte die Gestapo wiederum nach etwaigen Unterlagen über ihn, und wieder lag nichts vor.

Mit seinen Papieren als Journalist und dem Parteibuch der NSDAP in der Tasche, ging Sorge im Sommer 1933 in Japan an Land. Sein Auftrag war, so schrieb er in seinem Geständnis, "... die politische Situation zu beobachten ... Informationen über die japanische Wirtschaft zu sammeln ... und militärische Informationen beizubringen". Er ging mit aller Sorgfalt vor, um diese Aufträge zu erfüllen. Er wollte nichts mit der japanischen KP zu tun haben und keine Verbindungen zur Sowjetrussischen Botschaft aufnehmen (außer in Fällen größter Not). Er brauchte Mitarbeiter, von denen natürlich keiner Russe sein durfte.

Seltene Verschiebungen von Kommunisten vollzogen sich jetzt in allen Teilen der Welt – sogar bis nach Japan. Einer der ersten, der dort eintraf, war Branco de Voukelitch, ein damals 28jähriger, großer und kräftiger Jugoslawe, der in Paris gelebt und dort für eine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft gearbeitet hatte. Aus Los Angeles kam Miyagi Yotoku, ein schwindstüchtiger Künstler, der keinen Groschen besaß. Als wichtigsten Assistenten suchte Sorge sich Ozaki Hozumi aus, einen 32jährigen japanischen Journalisten und Politiker, der gewandt war und über gute Verbindungen verfügt. Er war Kommunist, gehörte aber zu keiner Zeit der KP an. Sorge kannte ihn aus seiner Zeit als Spion in Schanghai. Er war der Überzeugung, daß Ozakis genaue Kenntnis der japanischen politischen Verhältnisse und seine Freundschaft mit Fürst Konoye, einem führenden Staatsmann und entfernten Verwandten des Kaisers, ihm gute Dienste leisten würden. Er sollte nicht enttäuscht werden. Als Fürst Konoye Premierminister wurde, ernannte er Ozaki zu seinem Inoffiziellen Kabinett-Berater.

Voukelitch, Miyagi und Ozaki – diese drei Männer stellten den engsten Kreis des Spionagerings dar, der schließlich noch neunzehn weitere Mitarbeiter umfaßte, die alle unter der Leitung des geschickten Tokioter Korrespondenten der „Frankfurter Zeitung“ arbeiteten.

Zur Vorbereitung ihrer Arbeit unternahm Dr. Sorge jetzt einiges, was völlig sinnlos erschien. Statt Dokumente zu stehlen und Safes aufzubrechen, hielt er sich in Galerien und Museen auf. Statt unsichtbare Tinte anzurühren, entwickelte er sich zu einem Meister japanischer Kochkunst. Statt einen Dolch oder einen Überwurfmantel zu kaufen, legte er sich eine Bibliothek von 800 bis 1000 Bänden über japanische Geschichte, Industrie, Kunst und Religion an und verbrachte seine Zeit damit, diese Bücher zu lesen. Sofern er seine Wochenenden nicht über der Lektüre oder mit der Vorbereitung von Geselligkeiten verbrachte,

fuhr er mit dem Motorrad oder trampelte er über die japanischen Inseln. Er lernte Bauern und Fischer, Förster und Geishas kennen. Nach einer Weile hielt er sogar selber Vorlesungen über japanische Kunst im Deutschen Club.

Während seiner beiden ersten Jahre in Tokio hielt er diese Lebensweise aufrecht – dann begann sie sich auszuzahlen. Die Beziehungen zwischen Gemälden und Schlachtschiffen, zwischen dem Shintoismus und Kriegsplänen waren enger, als jeder andere – außer Sorge – angenommen hätte. Bis 1935 hatte er sich durch seine verblüffende Kenntnis der japanischen Verhältnisse einen Namen als gewandtester und bestinformierter Ausländer gemacht. Das war die Basis, von der aus er mit seiner Spionagetätigkeit beginnen konnte, denn sie versetzte ihn in die Lage, mit den bedeutendsten Japanern Gespräche auf gleicher Ebene zu führen. Je mehr er wußte, desto mehr sagte man ihm.

Wohl am meisten beeindruckt von dem Auftreten des Nazijournalisten war der stellvertretende deutsche Militärattaché, Oberstleutnant Eugen Ott. Während Ott zum Botschafter aufrückte, festigte sich seine Freundschaft mit Sorge. Allmählich gewöhnte er sich daran, ihm alle Dokumente zu zeigen und seine Arbeit mit ihm durchzusprechen. Dieses Vorgehen machte bei den anderen Attachés Schule, selbst bei dem Vertreter der Gestapo, Oberst Joseph Meisinger. Einzig der Marineattaché Wennacker hielt sich zurück. Er mochte Sorge nicht.

Als Beispiel für Richard Sorges Selbstbeherrschung sei nur erwähnt, daß von all diesen Männern, mit denen er jahrelang ständig zusammen war und mit denen er Abend für Abend trank, keiner jemals Verdacht schöpfte, daß er ein Wort Russisch könnte.

1938 machte Botschafter Ott Sorge den Vorschlag, sich von der Zeitung Urlaub geben zu lassen, um im Auftrag des Auswärtigen Amts nach Manila und Hongkong zu fahren. Sorge benutzte die Gelegenheit, um sich mit einem russischen Kurier in Hongkong zu treffen und ihm geheime Mikrofilme zukommen zu lassen. Als im Jahr darauf der Krieg ausbrach, brauchte Ott für seinen Stab einen Presseattaché. Es war nahelegend, daß er sich für Dr. Sorge entschied, der von diesem Augenblick an nicht nur mehr Geld bekam, sondern auch als deutscher Beamter erheblich an Prestige und Einfluß gewann. Der Botschafter und die anderen Attachés waren von seiner Arbeit angetan. Er selbst war zufrieden, und Moskau nicht minder.

Zwischen Konferenzen, Frühstückten beim Botschafter und inoffiziellen Unterhaltungen sah und erfuhr Sorge jede deutsche Geheimsache. Auf Otts Wunsch nahm er an den Verhandlungen über das Militärbündnis zwischen Deutschland und Japan teil. Manchmal setzte er sogar den Text für die Berichte auf, die der Botschafter an das Auswärtige Amt sandte.

Mehr als das: er war selbst imstande, die ganze deutsche Botschaft ohne ihr Wissen für Moskau arbeiten zu lassen. Wenn er auf Anweisung des Vierten Büros über irgendeine Frage eingehende Information

benötigte, ließ er sich das Material einfach durch den entsprechenden Attaché beschaffen.

Zu gleicher Zeit ermittelte sein erster Assistent, Ozaki, auf japanischer Seite alle wesentlichen Vorgänge. Als Inoffizieller Berater des Kabinetts leitete er jedes geheime Dokument, das zu seiner Kenntnis kam und das er auswendig lernen oder abschreiben konnte, an Sorge weiter. Ein ganzer Schwarm japanischer Spione arbeitete wiederum für Ozaki. Allein dreißig Mann von ihm saßen im Abwehrdienst der japanischen Armee in Manschukuo, und durch sie erfuhr er rechtzeitig von allen Truppenbewegungen und Mobilmachungsplänen.

Miyagi, der kalifornische Künstler, hatte sich inzwischen Verbindungen zu anderen Militärkreisen geschaffen. Er freundete sich mit dem Privatskretär von General Ugaki an, der in dieser Zeit Premierminister und Außenminister war. Während der Amtszeit Ugakis verschaffte Miyagi sich Zugang zu den geheimsten Regierungsdokumenten.

Was Sorge, Ozaki und Miyagi vielleicht noch entging, ermittelte Branco de Voukelitch. Als französischer Staatsbürger und angeblicher Korrespondent war er in alliierten Kreisen unverdächtig und gern gesehen. Generalmajor Piggot von der Britischen Botschaft, James M. Cox, ein wichtiger englischer Journalist, und Eugene H. Dormann, Botschaftsrat bei der Amerikanischen Botschaft, zählten zu seinen Freunden.

Alle Spionagetätigkeit aber bleibt wertlos, wenn der Staat, für den man sie leistet, die Nachrichten nicht schnell, regelmäßig und ohne Zwischenfall bekommt. Sorge standen drei Verbindungswege nach Sowjetrußland offen: Funk, Kuriere und direkter Kontakt mit der Sowjetischen Botschaft.

Für Funkverbindung hatte er Max Klausen, das zweite deutsche Mitglied des Spionagerings. Klausen, ein Hamburger, der sich schon in den Docks als ein KPD-Draufgänger bewährt hatte, war 1929 von der Partei auf die Punkschule nach Moskau geschickt worden und nach Aufträgen in China zu Sorge nach Japan gekommen. Auch er unterstand direkt dem Vierten Büro und war Major der Roten Armee. In Tokio gründete er eine Maschinenfirma, die M. Klausen & Co., die nicht nur seine Existenzberechtigung nachwies, sondern auch als Kanal für die sowjetischen Geldmittel diente. Der japanische Polizeibericht spricht anerkennend von Klausens technischer Begabung, weil er einen Sender gebaut hatte, der die 800 Meilen zwischen Tokio und Wladiwostock überbrücken konnte und trotzdem so klein war, daß man ihn in einen Koffer stecken konnte. Er arbeitete in einem dichtbewohnten Stadtteil, weil das die Peilgeräte der japanischen Abwehr irritierte. Seine Sendungen wurden nie gestört. Allein während der Kriegsjahre sendete der Ring:

1939	60 Sendungen	23 319 Worte
1940	60 Sendungen	29 179 Worte
1941	21 Sendungen	13 103 Worte

Geschickt gewählte Chiffren benachrichtigten die Empfänger jeweils, wann die nächste Sendung zu erwarten war.

Was nicht auf dem Funkweg übermittelt werden konnte, brachten Kuriere aus Japan heraus, die sich mit ihren sowjetischen Gegenspielern meist auf dem asiatischen Festland trafen. „Treffpunkt, Uhrzeit und technische Einzelheiten wurden durch Funk festgelegt“, gestand Sorge. „Wenn die Kuriere einander nicht kannten, wurden besondere Erkennungszeichen, Lösungsworte und Erkennungssätze vorher bestimmt.“

Das Material, das hinausgeschafft wurde, bestand aus Mikrofilmrollen, die mit der Leica oder einer selbsttätigen Kamera aufgenommen waren. Die Dokumente und Berichte wurden meist von Sorge in der Botschaft fotografiert und von Voukelitch in einer Dunkelkammer, die er sich eingerichtet hatte, entwickelt. Die Filmstreifen rollte man dann so fest wie möglich ein, weil manchmal bis zu 25 und 30 Rollen Mikrofilm – etwa 1000 Textseiten entsprechend – versandt wurden. Die Frau von Max Klausen, Anna, fuhr viermal nach Schanghai mit 30 bis 40 Rollen in einem Gürtel, den sie sich fest um den Leib gewickelt hatte. Jedesmal nahm sie 5000 Dollar von dem russischen Partner in Empfang.

Moskau bezahlte übrigens einen lächerlich geringen Preis für die unschätzbaren Informationen. Die durchschnittlichen Kosten betragen nicht mehr als 8000 Dollar im Jahr; denn nur ein einziges Mitglied des Spionageringes war gekauft, alle anderen arbeiteten freiwillig und aus Liebe zur kommunistischen Sache.

Nach Kriegsausbruch 1939 wurde es für die Mitglieder des Ringes zu gefährlich, nach China zu reisen. Schwere Herzen hat Sorge Moskau um eine direkte Verbindung zur Sowjetischen Gesandtschaft, die dann auch über Helge L. Vutokevitch, einen sowjetischen Konsul in Tokio, hergestellt wurde.

Seine größte Belastungsprobe erlebte der Spionagering im Jahre 1941. Schon am 20. Mai, mehr als einen Monat vor dem deutschen Angriff, hatte Sorge das Datum des Überfalls nach Moskau melden können, das er von Botschafter Ott erfahren hatte. Während die russische Front unter den deutschen Schlägen zusammenbrach und die deutschen Armeen durch die Weiten Rußlands vorrückten, gab es für Rußland nur noch eine Reserve: an der sibirischen Grenze standen 300 000 Mann voll ausgerüsteter und gut ausgebildeter Truppen Gewehr bei Fuß. Stalin konnte nicht wagen, diese Truppen abzuziehen, solange die Gefahr eines japanischen Angriffs bestand. Seit langem war die Rede davon gewesen, daß Japan auf Grund seines Militärbündnisses mit Deutschland im entscheidenden Moment Rußland im Rücken packen würde. Jetzt kam es darauf an, Japans wirkliche Absichten zu erfahren – keine Gerüchte, keine Meldungen vom Hörensagen, sondern die wirklichen und unumstößlichen Tatsachen. Und Stalin erwartete von Sorge, daß er ihm diese Tatsachen berichtete. Eine Fehlinformation in diesem Augenblick hätte leicht das Ende der Sowjetunion bedeuten können.

Im Juni berief Botschafter Ott eine Konferenz ein, zu der auch Sorge kam. Unter dem Eindruck der ersten Siegesnachrichten aus Rußland herrschte allgemein die Überzeugung, daß Japan die günstige Gelegenheit ergreifen und in Sibirien einfallen würde, so daß der Zweite Welt-

krieg ein rasches Ende fände. Nur Wennecker, der Marine-Attaché, war anderer Ansicht. Er glaubte, daß Japan nach Süden vorstoßen würde – gegen Indochina, Niederländisch Indien und die Philippinen. Sorge leitete einen Bericht über die Konferenz auf dem Funkwege nach Moskau und setzte hinzu, daß seiner Meinung nach Wenneckers Auffassung zuträfe.

Schon im Juli ließ die japanische Begeisterung für einen Angriff auf Sibirien nach. Über Ozaki erfuhr Sorge, daß Kaiser Hirohito auf einer geheimen Sitzung des Thronrats zu verstehen gegeben hatte, daß Japan nach Süden vorstoßen würde – daß es aber gerüstet bliebe, um die Sowjetunion anzugreifen, wenn die äußeren Umstände sich noch günstiger entwickelten. Sorge konnte Moskau auch darüber unterrichten, daß General Tojo, der Kriegsminister, nur an einem Vorstoß nach Süden interessiert war.

Während die japanische Mobilmachung anlief, ging der deutsche Vormarsch weiter, und die Sowjetunion war am Weißbluten. Aber die Truppen an der sibirischen Grenze mußten für den Fall eines japanischen Angriffs stehenbleiben.

Im August hatte Sorge eine aufschlußreiche Unterhaltung mit Wennecker. Der Marineattaché hatte in Erfahrung gebracht, daß die Ölvorräte der japanischen Marine für zwei Jahre ausreichten, die der Armee und der Wirtschaft aber nur für ein halbes Jahr. Das war wichtig, denn es bedeutete, daß die Marine bereit stand zuzuschlagen, daß aber an eine größere Landoperation nicht zu denken war. Wennecker glaubte – und Sorge stimmte dem bei – daß die Marine auf die Olfelder Sumatras und Borneos vorstoßen würde. Vier Monate später sollte sich diese Voraussage bewahrheiten.

Ende des Monats konnte Sorge nach Moskau funken: „Beim Abschluß der Mobilmachung standen etwa dreißig Divisionen in der Mandchurei. Das entspricht einem Drittel der neu aufgestellten Einheiten. Diese Divisionen sind erst nach dem 15. August in Marsch gesetzt, also zu spät für einen Angriff auf Sibirien vor dem Einbruch des Winters. Demnach wird Japan nicht Rußland angreifen, sondern Amerika und England im Süden.“

Am 15. Oktober funkte Sorge seine letzten Meldungen. Er war glücklich, berichten zu können, daß Japan sich endgültig entschlossen hätte, nach Süden anzugreifen, so daß alle Gefahr für die Sowjetunion vorüber war. Damit hatte er seine Aufgabe erfüllt, und der Krcml handelte jetzt ohne Verzug. Die sibirischen Divisionen wurden auf die Bahn geworfen und rollten nach Westen, auf Moskau zu. Am 4. Dezember waren deutsche Vorausabteilungen in den Vorstädten Moskaus, und Hitler glaubte, den Endsieg schon in der Tasche zu haben. Zwei Tage darauf, am 6. Dezember, erfolgte der erste Gegenstoß der durch frische Truppen aus Sibirien verstärkten Sowjetrussen.

Mit seiner historischen Meldung vom 15. Oktober empfand Sorge seine Arbeit als abgeschlossen. 23 Jahre lang hatte er sein Leben im Dienste der bolschewistischen Weltrevolution aufs Spiel gesetzt. Jetzt

wollte er nach der Sowjetunion zurückkehren und die Früchte seiner Arbeit genießen. Auch seine Mutter, die er aufrichtig liebte, lebte in der Sowjetunion. Die Sowjetregierung hatte ihm bereits ein Haus zur Verfügung gestellt, das seinem Generalsrang entsprach. Aber die Meldung, mit der er um seine Abberufung einkommen wollte, ging nicht mehr ab.

Denn die japanische Polizei hatte ein Glied aus dem Spionagering herausgebrochen.

Vor ein paar Monaten hatte sie Ito Ritsu verhaftet, einen japanischen Kommunisten, der von Moskau den Auftrag erhalten hatte, die zerschlagene und verbotene Partei neu zu organisieren. Unter den Leuten, an die er sich dazu um Unterstützung gewandt hatte, war eine Näherin mittleren Alters, Kitabayashi Tome, die früher Kommunistin war. Sie lehnte Ito Ritsus Ansinnen glatt ab. Sie sagte ihm freilich nicht, daß sie Miyagi, den kalifornischen Künstler aus dem Sorge-Kreis, gelegentlich mit Informationen versorgte und nur deshalb nichts mit der kommunistischen Partei zu tun haben wollte, weil Sorge allen Mitarbeitern jede Verbindung dieser Art streng untersagt hatte.

Als Ritsu nun verhaftet war, wurde er im Gefängnis, wie der Polizeibericht es vorsichtig ausdrückt, „streng“ behandelt. Er schwor dem Kommunismus feierlich ab – was allerdings nicht ehrlich gemeint war, denn er ist heute an führender Stelle in der japanischen KP tätig. Aber er verriet der Polizei auch, daß die kleine Näherin eine frühere Kommunistin war. Als die Polizei diese verhaftete, brach sie prompt zusammen und gab Miyagis Namen an. Am 10. Oktober wurde das Haus des japanisch-amerikanischen Künstlers durchsucht. In seiner Aufregung beging Miyagi den Kapitalfehler, einen Selbstmordversuch zu unternehmen. Das brachte die Polizei erst auf die Idcc, daß er viel schwererer Verbrechen schuldig war, als sie bis dahin anzunehmen Ursache hatte. Während Miyagi im Gefängnis saß, benutzte die Polizei sein Haus als Falle für etwaige Besucher. Am 14. Oktober kam einer. Die Polizisten waren nicht wenig überrascht, als sie Ozaki, den Inoffiziellen Berater des Kabinetts, erkannten. Er wurde im selben Augenblick verhaftet, als er auf den Klingelknopf drückte.

Sorge wußte immer noch nichts, aber er begann unruhig zu werden, als die beiden am folgenden Tag nicht zu einem verabredeten Treffen kamen. Er besprach sich mit Klausen, und sie entschlossen sich, vorerst zu warten, bis sich herausstellte, ob etwas geschehen war. Es dauerte nicht lange. Am 17. wurden Sorge, Klausen und Voukelitch in ihren Wohnungen verhaftet.

Weder die japanische Öffentlichkeit noch die Presse erfuhren zunächst etwas von dem Skandal, einzig die Deutsche Botschaft wurde unterrichtet, als die japanische Polizei dort auftauchte, um ihre Untersuchungen durchzuführen. Botschafter Ott wollte nicht glauben, daß sein Presseattaché und Freund kommunistischer Spion war, und setzte alle Hebel in Bewegung, um ihn freizubekommen. Er war überzeugt, daß die japanische Polizei wieder einen ihrer Fehlgriffe getan hätte, für die sie be-

rühmt war. Aber die Japaner zeigten sich eisern. Und für Ott erhob sich die unangenehme Frage: Was war, wenn die Geschichte stimmte? Wenn sein Freund wirklich Spion war – was konnte das für ihn für Konsequenzen haben?

Um sich selbst zu decken, gab er einen kurzen Bericht von Sorges Verhaftung nach Berlin, in dem er seine eigenen Beziehungen zu Sorge überging. Zu seinem Glück ließ Berlin die Angelegenheit zunächst auf sich beruhen. Aber Anfang 1942 erfuhr ein Agent der deutschen Spionageabwehr in Charbin in China aus Tokio von dem Skandal und gab die Meldung nach Berlin weiter. Außenminister Ribbentrop forderte daraufhin in scharfem Ton von Ott nähere Auskünfte. Die Gestapo suchte wiederum in ihren Unterlagen, aber diesmal hatte der sowjetische Agent nicht rechtzeitig Wind davon bekommen, und die Gestapo entdeckte die vollständigen Berichte über Sorges frühere Tätigkeit – acht Jahre zu spät.

Ott mußte gehen, seine Karriere war ruiniert. Da man ihn nicht gut durch die englische Blockade hindurch nach Deutschland schaffen konnte, mußte er das Kriegsende in Peking abwarten.

Nach bemerkenswert loyal durchgeführten Verhören wurden die einzelnen Mitglieder des Spionagerings getrennt und unter Ausschluß der Öffentlichkeit vor Gericht gestellt. Im Mai 1942 wurde lediglich eine knappe Meldung über die ganze Angelegenheit der Presse zugänglich gemacht. Im September 1943 wurden in Tokio die Urteile gefällt. Von den 33 Männern und 2 Frauen, die angeklagt waren, wurden 17 für schuldig befunden, darunter auch die beiden Frauen, die drei bzw. fünf Jahre Gefängnis bekamen, aber nach Kriegsende von den Amerikanern freigelassen wurden. Miyagi starb noch während des Prozesses. Für Voukelitch und Klausen lauteten die Urteile auf lebenslänglich. Aber der Franzose starb 1945, und der Deutsche wurde von den Amerikanern am 9. Oktober 1944 aus dem Gefängnis Akita entlassen. Es ist nicht eben beruhigend, daß der gegenwärtige Aufenthaltsort dieses kommunistischen Spions unbekannt ist.

Zwei wurden aufgehängt: Richard Sorge und Ozaki Hozami. Der Kabinettsberater hatte zwar immer gewußt, daß seine Tätigkeit ihm das Leben kosten würde, aber angesichts des Todes schlug ihm doch das Gewissen. Aus dem Gefängnis schrieb er eine Reihe ergreifender Liebesbriefe an seine Frau. Sie wurden nach dem Krieg unter dem Titel „Die Liebe war wie ein fallender Stern“ veröffentlicht und hatten durchschlagenden Erfolg. Als alle seine Mitarbeiter redeten, schrieb schließlich auch Sorge sein Geständnis.

Am 7. November 1944 wurden die Hinrichtungen vollzogen. Ozaki starb zuerst. Als die Reihe an Sorge kam und man ihn nach seinen letzten Wünschen fragte, sagte er nur zu dem Gefängnisdirektor: „Ich danke Ihnen für all Ihre Freundlichkeit.“ So endete Richard Sorge, ein Deutscher, Kommunist, Doktor der Philosophie, Bergarbeiter, Kunstkritiker, Generalleutnant – und ein verblüffend erfolgreicher sowjetischer Spion.

Autorisierte Übertragung aus dem Englischen von Klaus Hohe

Architektur in Mitteldeutschland

„Der große Stalinsche Plan zum Aufbau des Kommunismus spornt die sowjetischen Architekten an, neue schöpferische Höhen zu erreichen, eine sowjetische architektonische Klasse zu schaffen.“ (S. Tschernyschow, Verantwortlicher Sekretär des Bundes der Sowjetarchitekten.)

Die Integration Mitteldeutschlands in das Sowjetimperium ist nicht nur ein wirtschaftliches, politisches, militärisches und kulturelles Phänomen unserer Zeit. Auch die Umgestaltung des äußeren Erscheinungsbildes der Landschaft mit ihren Städten und Dörfern gehört dazu. Damit sind nicht allein die rein propagandistischen Elemente gemeint, die nach einer Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands rasch entfernt werden könnten, sondern auch die architektonischen Versuche, zum Beispiel Städte wie Dresden oder Eisenach in Abziehbilder russischer Provinzstädte umzuwandeln.

Das Bauwesen in Mitteldeutschland führte ein Schattendasein, solange die Reparationsansprüche der Sowjets den Baumarkt fast vollkommen in Anspruch nahmen. Jahrelang wurden Baumaterialien jeder Art, von Rohziegeln bis zu hölzernen Fertighäusern, in die Sowjetunion transportiert. Auch die Fabriken, die Baumaterial erzeugten, mußten schließlich abgebaut werden, um irgendwo in der Sowjetunion wiedererrichtet zu werden. In den kriegsverwüsteten Städten und Dörfern, auf den Schlachtfeldern von Brandenburg, Ostsachsen und in den schlesischen Restgebieten, die Sachsen eingegliedert wurden, haben die Einwohner mit den rückschrittlichsten Mitteln versucht, das Zerstörte zusammenzuflicken.

Einige Versuche, in größerem Stile aufzubauen, wurden rasch gebremst. So legte die Stadt Dresden 1946 einen Aufbauplan vor, der die Wiedererrichtung der verwüsteten Innenstadt in zehn Jahren vorsah. Heute, acht Jahre nach der Kapitulation, steht allein das Rathaus auf einer weiten, freien Fläche, die einmal bebaut werden soll.

Die Sowjets und ihre deutschen Bediensteten haben zwei Gründe, die verhinderten, daß die Initiative fleißiger Menschen, qualifizierter Architekten und tüchtiger Bauhandwerker sich durchsetzte. Einmal durfte die Sowjetzone nicht vor oder zur gleichen Zeit mit der ebenfalls kriegsverheerten Sowjetunion wieder aufgebaut werden. Der Sieger konnte sich nicht vom Besiegten beschämen lassen. Zum anderen sollte der Aufbau der Städte kein „Wiederaufbau“ sein, sondern Teil des sowjetischen

Planes der Einbeziehung Mittelddeutschlands in den Sowjetraum. Wenn also schon Dresden wieder einmal eine Großstadt werden sollte, dann eine nach dem Vorbild von Minsk oder Smolensk.

Für diesen Prozeß aber brauchte man die Sicherheit, die eine „Staatsmacht“ sowjetdeutschen Gepräges verleiht. Seitdem diese „Staatsmacht“ sich etabliert hat, ist auch die Bahn für die „sowjetische Klassik“ frei. Denn wie kann sich ein Architekt gegen diese Architektur aussprechen, wenn er nicht zugleich sich als Staatsfeind entlarvt?

Seit 1952 ist auch der Klärungsprozeß innerhalb der mitteldeutschen Architekten so gut wie abgeschlossen. Die sowjethörigen Kräfte haben sich durchgesetzt. Sie haben diejenigen Architekten, die nach 1945 sich wieder dem Dessauer Bauhaus verpflichtet fühlten, entweder korrumpiert oder ausgeschieden. In Weimar hatte zum Beispiel der Architekt Hermann Henselmann einen Kreis von Bauleuten um sich versammelt, die alle einem zeitgemäßen Bauen verpflichtet waren und gegen den nationalsozialistischen Neo-Klassizismus die nüchterne Struktur eines unpathetischen Stiles setzten.

Es ginge über den Rahmen dieses Berichts hinaus, wenn hier auf die Kämpfe zwischen den verschiedenen Kreisen eingegangen würde. Der westdeutsche Leser kann jederzeit in den zum Teil wieder aufgebauten Städten studieren, ob er der Restauration oder der modernen Sachlichkeit den Vorzug geben will. Wichtig ist jedoch bei der Betrachtung des Aufbaues in der Sowjetzone, daß hier weder die Restauration noch die Sachlichkeit vom Staate verlangt wird. Man will etwas ganz anderes, einen „Baustil“, der absolut fremd und falsch für die Struktur dieser Landschaft ist: den Sowjet-Klassizismus.

Ein Beweis für das schlechte Gewissen, das auch Könner wie Hermann Henselmann heute haben müssen, ist der immer wieder zu beobachtende Versuch, Schinkel als Vater des Sowjet-Klassizismus hinzustellen und sich so eine historische Absolution zu verschaffen.

Was soll der Sowjet-Klassizismus ausdrücken?

Prof. Henselmann, der heute als „Nationalpreisträger“ die Entwürfe für die Ausgestaltung der Ostberliner Frankfurter Allee, zur Zeit Stalin-Allee genannt, verantworten muß, nachdem er sich für das SED-Regime entschieden hat, schreibt in Heft 4 der sowjetzonalen „Deutschen Architektur“ (Henschel-Verlag, Berlin-Ost):

„Die Bauten an der Stalin-Allee... sind Ergebnisse jenes schöpferischen Prozesses, welcher der Anwendung der Methode des sozialistischen Realismus entspricht. Diese Methode bestimmt nicht nur das Entwurfsergebnis, sondern auch das Herangehen an die Gestaltungsaufgabe, also die gesamte architektonische Praxis. Sie hat die *Einsicht* zur Voraussetzung, daß die praktisch-künstlerische Form der Aneignung der Wirklichkeit einen speziellen Grad *böherer* Bewußtheit verlangt, der die Möglichkeit schafft, Erkenntnisse durch künstlerische Bilder zu vermitteln.“

Deutlicher ausgedrückt soll das heißen: Der Sowjet-Klassizismus will nicht die tatsächliche Wirklichkeit des soziologischen Gefüges widerspie-

geln, sondern ein „Traumbild“ schaffen, das „Erkenntnisse durch künstlerische Bilder vermittelt“. Anders gesagt: die zur Macht gelangte Funktionärsschicht der Arbeiterschaft will Häuser bauen, die ihren Wunsch erfüllen, nicht mehr in Hütten, sondern in „Palästen“ zu wohnen. Der kleinbürgerliche Wunschtraum des Arbeiters nach der Wohnung, die rein äußerlich „schöner“ ist als diejenige, aus der er kommt, soll erfüllt werden.

Da dabei das Hauptgewicht auf die scheinbare „Repräsentation“ gelegt wird, also auf die Fassade, verzichtet man auf eine moderne Innenarchitektur, wie sie der Mitte unseres Jahrhunderts entsprechen würde. Beim Bau der Häuser an der Stalin-Allee werden also die Fassaden durch falsche dorische Säulen, die Häuserfluchten durch klassizistische Tore und die Dächer durch unpraktische Türme „verschönert“. Man verzichtet auf große Fenster, um Platz zu haben für Säulen, peinliche Ornamentik und stumpfsinnige Reliefs.

Da zum Klassizismus die Kolonnade gehört, wird sie an die Häuser gebaut, obwohl im nordöstlichen Deutschland Kolonnaden zu keiner Zeit größere Bedeutung hatten. Winzige Balkone sind wie Schwalbennester an die Fassaden geklebt worden, obwohl der Mensch in der Großstadt gerade für seine Wohnung Balkone verlangen müßte, die ihm den Garten ersetzen.

Kurios und bezeichnend eine scheinbare Kleinigkeit: die Wohnblocks an der Stalin-Allee besitzen geradezu winzige Fenster, obwohl man heute möglichst die Außenwand eines Zimmers vollständig aus Glas herstellen möchte. Ursache: „Als Ausgangspunkt für die Maßeinheit des Fensters wurde ein in Berlin traditionelles Fenstermaß gewählt, wie es auch Schinkel im ‚Feilner-Haus‘ verwandelte.“ (Prof. Heuschmann)

Diese geradezu sklavische Anpassung an Schinkel und seine Zeit zu Ungunsten der Wohnsituation im technischen Zeitalter ist bezeichnend. Hier zeigt sich, daß der Sowjetstaat reaktionär ist und kein Interesse an wirklich guten, hygienisch einwandfreien Arbeiterwohnungen hat. Denn die Stalin-Allee ist ja nur eine Kopie russischer Neubauten der „Stalinschen Epoche“.

Die einzige Erinnerung an etwas Phantasie sind das „Kinderkaufhaus“, das im Erdgeschoß eines Hochhauses errichtet werden soll, und ein „Café für Kinder“ – wahrscheinlich für Thälmann-„Pioniere“ – das neben einem Tanz-Café auf dem Dach Besucher anziehen soll. Diese Naivitäten sind das einzige, was von „schöpferischer Phantasie“ übriggeblieben ist.

Genug von der Stalin-Allee. Es ist überflüssig zu erwähnen, daß im Inneren der Häuser der kommunistische Hausobmann die eingehende Post, die Telefonvermittlung usw. kontrolliert. Die Aktivisten und „Verdienten“ Anhänger des Systems, die dort einziehen, haben nichts zu lachen.

Die Planung für die anderen Städte in Mitteldeutschland sieht einheitlich folgendes vor: einen Aufmarschplatz, der von einem SED-Parteihaus möglichst in Wolkenkratzerformat beherrscht wird. Dann eine

Straße mit „repräsentativen“ Wohnblocks für die „Elite der neuen Gesellschaft“. „Kulturhäuser“ in den Bezirken als Zentren der „Unterhaltung und Schulung“.

In Rostock, dem wichtigsten Seehafen der DDR, will man den Sowjet-Klassizismus durch hanseatische Bauelemente anreichern. In Dresden wurde kürzlich der erste Spatenstich für den Wiederaufbau des Altmarkts getan. Die wunderbare, weltberühmte Silhouette der Dresdner Türme wird durch einen SED-Wolkenkratzer vernichtet, der mit 76 Metern höher als die Katholische Hofkirche oder gar die zerstörte Frauenkirche Georg Bährs (die man aufbauen will) sein wird. Damit würde, wenn der Plan durchgeführt werden kann, Dresden seine frühere Schönheit, die durch Luftbombardements schwer in Mitleidenschaft gezogen wurde, endgültig verlieren.

Aber dies sind vorläufige Projekte, die viel Geld, Zeit und Talent erfordern. Sie stehen wie Gespenster vor einer Bevölkerung, deren Wohnbedürfnisse fast gar nicht berücksichtigt werden und die sich in Häusern einrichten muß, für die kein Geld zu Reparaturarbeiten vorhanden ist.

Krampfhaft versucht man, Rohstoffschwierigkeiten zu beheben. So erhielten zum Beispiel verschiedene neue Wohnblocks Entwässerungsleitungen aus Glas. Der Bewohner einer Küche hat also das „Vergnügen“, beobachten zu können, wie das schmutzige Wasser, das er ausgießt, abläuft. Auch die Toiletten sind mit den Abflußrohren aus Glas kein erbaulicher Anblick; ganz abgesehen von den Verstopfungen, die in diesen Glasrohren häufig auftreten.

Der Kampf gegen den „Formalismus“, diesen „Todfeind der nationalen deutschen Kultur und damit des ganzen deutschen Volkes“ ist heute in der Sowjetzone beendet. Die „Deutsche Bauakademie“ und die Professoren Liebknecht und Collein projektieren und bauen autark, nur gelegentlich vom Zentralkomitee der SED auf „neue Bahnen“ gewiesen, die irgendein SED-Funktionär bei einem Besuch der Sowjetunion entdeckte.

Der Architekt in Mitteldeutschland ist heute nicht mehr selbständig schöpferisch tätig. Er arbeitet nach der Norm, die ihm befohlen wird. Er ist Funktionär des Systems, wie der Funktionär des Staats-Apparats. Natürlich gibt es auch Ausnahmen. Aber jene Architekten, die nur beim Zusammenslicken halbzerstörter Häuser mitwirken, haben keine Gelegenheit mehr, ihre eigenen Ideen zu vertreten. Es gibt auch für den Architekten nicht mehr die Wahl zwischen der Restauration und der Moderne. Ihm ist aufgetragen, den Sowjet-Klassizismus in Mitteldeutschland nachzuahmen.

Dieser aber ist den Potemkinschen Fassaden zu vergleichen, die einmal das Gespött der westlichen Welt hervorriefen. Denn hinter diesen Fassaden verbirgt sich nicht nur das Elend der Menschen, die dem Regime dienen müssen, sondern auch die Leere eines kommunistischen „Paradieses“, das jede schöpferische Gestaltung erstickt hat.

Pablo Casals – ein großer Musiker und Mensch

Wer sich die Plattenaufnahmen vom Casals-Musikfest 1951 kaufte, bekam zu seiner Überraschung eine Platte gratis dazu, auf deren einer Seite ein Cellosolo von Casals war, während die andere in seiner Handschrift folgenden Leitsatz eingeprägt trug: „Den Wesenskern jedes bedeutenden Unternehmens, jeder Tätigkeit müssen Würde und Güte bilden.“

Eine ungewöhnliche Persönlichkeit steht hinter dieser einmaligen Platte. Pablo Casals hat als Cellist nie einen ernstzunehmenden Rivalen gehabt, und kaum jemals hat ein Mensch in solchem Maße musikalisches Genie mit sittlicher und geistiger Führerschaft in sich vereinigt.

Das Casals-Musikfest ist eine Veranstaltung, die alljährlich in dem Städtchen Prades am französischen Nordhang der Pyrenäen stattfindet. Dort lebt Casals jetzt; und jeden Juni versammeln sich hier Musiker und Musikfreunde aus aller Welt, um mit ihm zu musizieren, und ihn zu feiern.

Musiker, die einmal als Gäste dort waren, sind hinterher wie entückt – als wenn sie aus einem mystischen Quell getrunken hätten. Dabei ist Casals ein gedrungener kleiner Mann mit rundlich-kurzen Händen, dicken kreisrunden Brillengläsern und einem völlig kahlen Kopf, über den er sich zum Schutz gegen die Hitze einen knallroten Sonnenschirm zu halten pflegt. Betrachtet man sein Gesicht genauer, so findet man darin eine große Sensibilität und auch eine unerhörte Kraft. Auf den ersten Blick sieht er jedoch eher wie ein Gemüsehändler denn wie ein Musengott aus.

Pablo Casals wurde am 29. 12. 1876 in der katalanischen Ortschaft Vendrell geboren, die 48 Kilometer von Barcelona entfernt liegt. Sein Vater war Organist an der dortigen Dorfkirche, in deren Chor auch Pablo mitsang. Außerdem aber machte er schon als kleines Kind auf jedem Instrument Musik, das ihm in die Hände fiel – auf dem Klavier, der Flöte, Gitarre und Geige. Seine manuelle Geschicklichkeit, die ebenso erstaunlich war wie sein musikalischer Instinkt, bewog seinen Vater, ihn zum Tischler des Ortes in die Lehre zu geben.

Aber seine Mutter, die von Musik zwar nur wenig verstand, hatte das Genie in ihm erkannt: sie beschloß, daß auch die Außenwelt davon erfahren müsse, gab ihre mühsam ersparten Peseten dran und brachte den Sohn nach Barcelona, um ihn die höhere Schule besuchen zu lassen. Schon mit zwölf Jahren verdiente er sich nebenher etwas als Klavierspieler in einem Caféhaus. Bei dem Besitzer des Cafés hatte er sehr bald durch-

gesetzt, daß er wöchentlich einmal abends klassische Musik spielen durfte – Darbietungen, die in den musikalischen Kreisen der Stadt großes Aufsehen erregten.

Pablos Ruf wuchs, als er sich dem Cello zuwandte; in ihm hatte er im selben Augenblick, als er zum erstenmal mit dem Bogen über die Saiten strich, „sein“ Instrument erkannt. Mit siebzehn war er in Madrid und spielte vor der Königin-Mutter Maria Christina von Spanien.

Es war indessen nicht sein Musizieren allein, was die Königin-Mutter für ihn einnahm, sondern auch die reine Gutartigkeit (es gibt keinen anderen Ausdruck dafür), die aus seinen Augen leuchtete. Maria Christina setzte ihm ein Stipendium zur Fortsetzung seines Studiums aus und nahm ihn fast als Familienmitglied in ihre Hausgemeinschaft auf; so wurde er Gesellschafter des nachmaligen Königs Alfonso XIII.

Wenn Casals auch bekennt, seinen königlichen Gönnern zu großem Dank verpflichtet zu sein, so betont er doch ausdrücklich, daß „der Umgang mit den ‚Großen dieser Erde‘ keinen Einfluß auf sein Denken und seine Haltung“ gehabt habe. Er ist bis in die Fingerspitzen Demokrat und überzeugter Anhänger der Freiheitsidee. Dasselbe gilt von seiner Mutter, die nach zwei Jahren des Wohllebens in bevorzugter Stellung eines Morgens plötzlich erklärte: „Es ist Zeit für einen Wechsel!“

„Was für ein Charakter!“ bemerkt Casals dazu. „Wieviel verdanke ich ihr!“

Auf Vorschlag des Ratgebers der Königin, des Grafen Morphy, zog man – wiederum mit einem Stipendium des Hofes – nach Brüssel, wo Casals am Konservatorium studieren sollte. Der Direktor schickte ihn in die Cellistenklasse zu Professor Edouard Jacobs. Unauffällig trat Casals dort ein und setzte sich bescheiden in eine der hinteren Reihen. Er sah nicht nach viel aus, mit seinem kurzgeschnittenen Haar, während damals alle Musiker, die etwas auf sich hielten, es fast schulterlang trugen. Als Professor Jacobs ihn fragte, was er vorspielen wolle, sagte er schlicht: „Was Ihnen beliebt.“

Die professoralen Brauen hoben sich erstaunt: „Nun – da scheinen Sie ja wirklich bemerkenswert zu sein!“ Die Klasse lachte. „Können Sie zum Beispiel das und das spielen?“ fragte er und nannte ein sehr schwieriges Stück.

„Ja“, antwortete Casals.

„Gut also – ich schlage vor, Sie spielen das *Souvenir de Spa*. Und jetzt, meine jungen Herren, machen Sie sich auf einen Hochgenuß gefaßt, den Ihnen dieser beachtliche Jüngling bereiten wird, der alles spielen kann, was uns beliebt!“

Auf einem geliehenen Cello trug Casals die wenig bekannte und schwierige Komposition so glänzend vor, daß Klasse und Lehrer wie gebannt dasaßen.

Als Professor Jacobs sich wieder gefaßt hatte, forderte er Casals auf, bei ihm zu studieren, und verhiess ihm auf dem Fleck den ersten Preis im Schülerwettbewerb des laufenden Jahres. Aber der hochmütige Emp-

fang hatte Casals gekränkt, und er sagte, ihm sei nichts dran gelegen zu bleiben. Diese Entscheidung kostete ihn sein Stipendium, denn der spanische Hof bestand darauf, daß er in Brüssel studieren solle.

Statt dessen ging er nach Paris – zusammen mit seiner Mutter und zwei jüngeren Brüdern, ohne einen Sou, ohne Kenntnis der fremden Sprache und ohne einen Bekannten dort zu haben. Es waren nur geringe Ersparnisse vorhanden; die Mutter nahm Näharbeit an und saß darüber bis tief in die Nächte hinein. Als die Lage einmal ganz kritisch geworden war, verkaufte sie sogar ihr schönes Haar für ein paar Francs. Er selbst bekam einen schlecht bezahlten Posten als zweiter Cellist an den *Folies Marigny*. Zweimal täglich mußte er zu Fuß von der winzigen Wohnung in einem der Außenbezirke bis ins Zentrum der Stadt und wieder zurück – morgens zum Unterricht, abends zur Arbeit – und dabei sein Cello auf dem Rücken mitschleppen.

„Was Elend ist, haben wir damals am eigenen Leib erfahren“, sagt er selber. Aber der Preis dieser Lehre war zu hoch: Casals wurde krank, und so mußte man den Wunschtraum einer Ausbildung im Ausland aufgeben und nach Barcelona zurückkehren.

Dort war das Glück ihm wieder günstig. Sein alter Musiklehrer ging nach Argentinien und hinterließ ihm seine Schüler. Bald hatte er sich auch wieder mit der Königin ausgesöhnt, und mit einundzwanzig Jahren war er bereits in ganz Spanien und Portugal berühmt. Als Dreiundzwanzigjähriger kehrte er mit seiner Mutter und zwei Brüdern nach Paris zurück. Was er inzwischen erspart hatte, reichte für sie alle zum Leben; außerdem hatte er vom Ratgeber der Königin ein Schreiben an den berühmten französischen Dirigenten Charles Lamoureux mitbekommen, der damals gerade eine Konzertreise für die Wintersaison vorbereitete.

Der große Mann war ungehalten, als Casals ihm den Brief überreichte – er schätzte es nicht, in der Arbeit gestört zu werden. Casals aber stimmte sein Instrument besonders sorgfältig und mit jener Gelassenheit, die neben Würde und Güte zu seinem Lebensgesetz gehört. Als er dann zu spielen anfang, fuhr Lamoureux beim ersten Ton auf seinem Stuhl herum. Ein körperliches Leiden machte ihm jedes Aufstehen beschwerlich – aber als Casals mit seinem Spiel zu Ende war, stand der große Dirigent vor ihm und sagte: „In meinem ersten Konzert werden Sie spielen!“

Sein Pariser Debüt im Orchester Lamoureux wurde zu einem Ereignis in der Musikgeschichte.

Heute leitet Casals lieber selbst ein Orchester, statt als Solist neuen Ruhm zu ernten. Zudem hat er als Dirigent viel mehr Freude an den Proben als an der eigentlichen Aufführung. Was er liebt, ist das „Musikmachen“ an sich und – andere darin zu unterweisen.

Bei einer Klettertour im Gebirge wurde eines Tages der Zeigefinger seiner rechten Hand von einem herabrollenden Felsstück getroffen und, wie es zuerst schien, völlig zerquetscht. Zum Erstaunen seiner Begleiter rief Casals aus: „Gott sei Dank, daß ich nun nie wieder Cello spielen

muß!“ Er erwies sich jedoch zum Glück für seine Mitwelt als schlechter Prophet.

Was er aber damit gemeint hatte, war: „Jetzt kann ich mein Leben ganz der höchsten Form der Musik widmen.“ Denn für ihn ist ein Orchester, von gemeinsamer Bereitschaft beseelt und im Streben nach höchster Leistung geschult, etwas sowohl sozial wie musikalisch Vollkommenes. Seine Musiker empfinden für ihn eine tiefe Verehrung. In Barcelona hieß es schon vor Jahren von ihm: „Er macht aus einem Caféhaus einen Konzertsaal, und der Konzertsaal wird durch ihn zum Tempel.“

Während er als Cellist zur Höhe des Weltruhms emporstieg, verwendete er Teile seines Einkommens – im Wert von etwa 2½ Millionen Mark – zum Aufbau eines „Volksorchesters“ in Barcelona – des ersten der Welt. Um dessen Darbietungen der ganzen Bevölkerung zugänglich zu machen, schuf er eine Arbeiter-Konzertgesellschaft mit Jahresbeiträgen von etwas über vier Mark und gab für die Mitglieder Konzerte zu stark ermäßigten Eintrittspreisen. Da er fest entschlossen war, daß Ruhm und Wohlstand ihn seinen früheren Bekannten nicht entfremden sollten, kehrte er alle Jahre für zwei bis drei Wochen nach Vendrell zurück, um wieder bei seinen alten Freunden zu sein, dem Zimmermann, dem Schmied und dem Schuhhändler. Besondere Freude machte es ihm, mit den einheimischen Musikern zusammenzukommen und mit ihnen auf dem Marktplatz ein Konzert zu veranstalten.

Während all des Unheils, das im Laufe seines Lebens über die europäischen Staaten hereingebrochen ist, hat Casals stets unbeirrbar seinen Standpunkt gewahrt, ohne Rücksicht auf die Opfer, die es ihn kostete: auf der Seite der Freiheit und der Menschenrechte. Im alten Rußland war er ungeheuer beliebt gewesen und hatte riesige Summen mit seinen Konzerten verdient; als aber nach der Revolution die Bolschewisten angingen, politisch Andersdenkende hinzurichten, lehnte er alle Einladungen zu Konzertreisen in Sowjetrußland ab.

„Meine einzige Waffe ist mein Cello“, sagte er. „Vielleicht nicht gerade eine tödliche; aber immerhin – sie kämpft doch auf seiten der Freiheit.“

Als Hitler begann, die Gegner seines Systems unnachgiebig zu verfolgen, brach Casals zu Deutschland ebenfalls seine Beziehungen ab und dehnte diesen Boykott auch auf Italien aus, als Mussolini Hitlers antisemitische Politik übernahm. Dann riß in Spanien Franco die Macht an sich; Casals verließ daraufhin das Land und bezog in Prades drei Zimmer in einem Bahnwärterhäuschen.

Dort lebt er nun schon vierzehn Jahre, mehr wie ein frühchristlicher Heiliger als wie ein weltberühmter Musiker. Ringsum im ländlichen Kreise hat jedermann das Gefühl, stets bei ihm vorsprechen zu dürfen, um ihn um Rat oder Hilfe anzugehen oder ihm auch nur eine Familienneuigkeit mitzuteilen – die Geburt eines Kindes oder die guten Zeugnisse, die ein Kleiner in der Schule bekommen hat.

Ihn beglücken die Menschen, weil er sie liebt. Er findet Zeit, Hunderte von Briefen handschriftlich zu beantworten – sechshundert waren es im

Sommer 1952 nach dem Musikfest. Alle Briefe, die er jemals erhalten hat, bewahrt er auf. Erwähnt ein Besucher „den Brief, den mein Vater Ihnen vor ein paar Jahren geschrieben hat“, so geht Casals an seine Ordner und kommt kurz danach mit diesem Brief wieder.

Wenn er auch stets bereit ist, sich an alle zu verschwenden, die wirklich seiner bedürfen, so wird sein Blick doch weder durch Leichtgläubigkeit noch durch sein Wohlwollen getrübt. „Niemand führt ihn hinters Licht“, sagen seine Schüler. Und nur wenige Freunde schließt er ganz in sein Herz: diejenigen, die er „gut“ nennt.

Diese Gutartigkeit umfaßt für ihn zugleich Selbstzucht in allen ihren Formen. Casals ist im höchsten Maße impulsiv und leicht erregbar – aber er explodiert nie. Er benimmt sich nie wie eine Primadonna. Nur wenn er den Bogen über die Saiten führt, läßt er seinen Gefühlen freien Lauf. Sie scheinen ihn über die irdische Welt hinauszuhoben. Die Leichtigkeit und der freie Fluß seiner Bewegungen haben etwas Wunderbares – als ob eine übernatürliche Macht von ihm Besitz ergriffen hätte.

Des Rätsels Lösung ist seine lebenslang geübte Selbstbeherrschung. Zwölf Jahre studierte er Bachs Cello-Suiten, ehe er es unternahm, sie öffentlich vorzutragen. Aber er arbeitet heute noch an ihnen. Vor aller großen Musik sieht er in sich selbst nur den Lernenden. Und begeistert kann er zuweilen verkünden, einen neuen Fingersatz für eine Passage gefunden zu haben, die er schon seit fünfzig Jahren spielt.

Als sich eine Schülerin bei ihm beklagte, sie habe ein Stück vergessen, das sie doch gut gekannt und oft gespielt habe, sagte er: „Gut so! Alles sollte Ihnen jedesmal völlig neu sein, wenn Sie es spielen!“

Einmal hörte ich, wie eine hervorragende Schülerin ihn mit einem griechischen Weisen verglich; was sie damit gemeint hatte, begriff ich, als ich ihn dann beim Unterrichten beobachtete. „Seien Sie impulsiv – schwärmen Sie!“ sagte er zu seinen Schülern. „Lassen Sie die Musik so frei aus sich herausströmen, als sprächen Sie. Aber denken Sie daran, daß Freiheit nicht Unordnung ist...“ Dann eine lange nachdenkliche Pause. „Das ist etwas, was in unserer Zeit für vieles gilt.“ Neue Pause. „Seien Sie ursprünglich und doch beherrscht. Das ist es, was Sie lernen müssen.“

Zu dieser Ursprünglichkeit gehört für Casals die innere Freiheit, sich dem Ausdruck zarter Empfindungen zu überlassen: „Die Hauptsache im Leben ist, das Menschliche nicht zu scheuen. Wenn etwas so schön ist, daß Sie darüber weinen möchten, so weinen Sie doch!“

Als Sechundsiebzjähriger nennt sich Casals oft einen alten Mann. Aber sobald er sein Cello ergreift, geht eine Wandlung mit ihm vor, die wie das Wunder einer Wiedergeburt wirkt. Ein angesehener Musiker, der im vergangenen Jahr am Musikfest in Prades teilnahm, wandte sich, als Casals sein Spiel begann, zu seinem Nachbarn und flüsterte: „Ja, aber – er spielt ja noch besser als früher?!“

Die Lebensregel dieses Mannes – Gelassenheit, auf Würde und Güte gegründet – hat sich an ihm bewährt.

Deutsch von Peter Dülberg

ROLF SCHOTT

Schriftsteller und Dichter

Der italienische Schriftsteller Massimo Bontempelli, einst Faschist, später Kommunist, beide Male sicherlich mit Vorbehalt – es ist schade um ihn; denn er ist ein bedeutender Kopf, wenn auch kein Dichter – hat einmal in einer seiner klugen „Randbemerkungen“ darauf hingewiesen, daß das Wort „Dichter“ als soziale Berufsbezeichnung lächerlich und unmöglich geworden ist, obwohl das nicht immer so war und obwohl man sich ohne weiteres als Maler oder Bildhauer bezeichnen kann, ohne zur komischen Figur zu werden. Der Dichter, auch der wirkliche, sieht sich genötigt, bei der Berufsbezeichnung „Schriftsteller“ stehen zu bleiben. Denn, meint Bontempelli, „jemanden als ‚Herrn Soundso, Dichter‘ zu bezeichnen, hieße dasselbe wie ihn als ‚Herrn Soundso, Genie‘ zu bezeichnen: denn der Dichter beginnt mit dem Genie“.

Bontempelli mag recht haben, aber die ganze Erwägung hat etwas Erschreckendes und wirft ein bedenkliches Licht auf unsere Zeit. Man halte uns nicht entgegen, die Scheu vor dem Wort „Dichter“ sei ein besonders edles Zeichen für die geistige Keuschheit unserer Zeit. Gesetzt, gewisse Dichter lebten noch und stünden im Adreßbuch, etwa so: Li Tai Pe, Schriftsteller, oder Bertran de Born, Schriftsteller, oder William Shakespeare, Schriftsteller – würde die Zusammenstellung mit der uns zeitgemäßen Berufsbezeichnung nicht noch viel komischer und abgeschmackter wirken, als wenn es vorgekommen wäre, daß in einem Adreßverzeichnis Mallarmé oder Rilke oder George als Dichter figurirt hätten? Nein, es handelt sich hier gewiß nicht um übertriebene Achtung vor dem Wort „Dichter“, sondern vielmehr um eine Wortentwertung, die sehr ernste Hintergründe hat. Seien wir doch ehrlich: der Dichter ist beinahe zu etwas geworden, das man, je nachdem, lästig oder lächerlich oder unheimlich findet und deshalb abschaffen oder wenigstens in die Vergangenheit abschieben will. Gewiß, nicht alle Menschen denken so, aber die meisten denken doch so, wollen es nur sich und den anderen nicht immer unverblümt eingestehen. Sie glauben jedenfalls, den Dichter recht gut entbehren zu können, gleichgültig, ob er unserer Zeit oder der Vergangenheit angehört. Aber den Schriftsteller möchten sie kaum vermissen; liefert er ihnen doch in seinen vielfältigen Spielarten den Roman, den Zeitungsartikel, das Filmdrehbuch, die Formulierungen für die Radio-Ansager und vieles andere, was Massenmenschen und auch viele wirkliche Individualitäten kaum mehr entbehren können.

Was ist es nun, das den Dichter unerwünscht sein läßt? Daß er „Gedichte“ macht, also in einer gebundenen Sprache schreibt, die kein Mensch spricht und demgemäß etwas Unnatürliches und Unwirkliches zu sein

scheint? Aber Cervantes und Jean Paul haben fast nur Prosa geschrieben und waren doch echte Dichter, die vermutlich deswegen, wenn sie heute lebten, keinen Verleger finden dürften, der es wagt, ihre Sachen zu drucken, nicht etwa, weil sie unmodern wirken, sondern weil sie zu dichterisch sind. Was aber ist das Dichterische, und warum ist es so unbeliebt geworden, obgleich es weiterhin gepriesen und oft nicht ohne ein Gran Heuchelei verherrlicht wird; obgleich alle möglichen Staaten, Interessenverbände und Private es ihrem Ansehen schuldig zu sein glauben, Dichterpreise zu stiften und auszuteilen an echte und vermeintliche Dichter, die ihnen doch mehr oder minder Hekuba sind.

Eine Vorstellung von dem, was ein Dichter und was das Dichterische ist, läßt sich eigentlich nur dadurch gewinnen, daß man feststellt, was sie nicht sind. Es gibt einen Roman von Theodor Fontane, den auch die wirklichen Verehrer des ausgezeichneten Mannes nicht so recht zu schätzen wissen, weil er ihnen zu sehr nach Fabelsprüchen und märkischem Kirchturmpatriotismus zu schmecken scheint. Es scheint aber nur so. Das Buch ist wundervoll und reich an Einfällen, wenn auch Fontane von sich als Dichter meinte, er sei keine große und keine reiche Dichternatur, es „drippele“ bei ihm eigentlich nur. Dieser Roman also, mit dem Titel „Vor dem Sturm“, mit dem an der Schwelle des siebenten Jahrzehnts die herrliche Serie der wirklichen Meisterwerke eines im Vergleich zu seinen Gedichten in den Romanen weit „dichterischeren“ Dichters beginnt, ist, wie immer bei Fontane, am reizvollsten in der Dialogführung. In diesem Roman ist einmal die Rede von einem Barnimer Lokaldichter, dem Pastor Schmidt von Werneuchen. Es sagt Marie, eine Hauptfigur mit stellenweise mignonhaften Zügen:

„... er ist kein Dichter, weil er nichts als Wirklichkeit kennt... Der Dichter soll ein Spiegel aller Dinge sein. Schmidt aber spiegelt nichts: er gibt nur die Natur selber.“

„Gut, gut“, fiel Turgany ein, „ich habe mehr als eine Untersuchung gelesen, die zurückbleibt hinter diesem kritischen Debut. Der Schmidtsche Spiegel, wenn ich recht verstanden, ist gar kein Spiegel, sondern nur ein Spiegelrahmen, und die Bilder, die er gibt, sind nichts anderes als eingefasste Stücke leibhaftiger Natur. Natur, wie wir sie vor uns haben, wenn wir, zurücktretend, auf drei Schritt Entfernung durch ein offenes Fenster sehen...“

Mit der noblen Verhaltenheit, die Fontane gemäß ist, wird hier in wenigen Zeilen ausgedrückt, was auszudrücken oft ganze Bände von Ästhetiken nicht zustande bringen, weil diese das aristotelische Dogma, welches das Wesen der Poesie als schöne Nachahmung der Natur definiert, nicht loswerden können. Es handelt sich aber in der Tat um Spiegelung, die etwas gänzlich anderes ist als die Nachahmung. Die beiden sind so verschieden voneinander, wie sich ein stiller Bergsee, der die Umwelt der dunklen Tannen und der schweigenden Steinhöhen mit dem unergründlichen Himmel darüber sammelt und widerspiegelt, von einem Affen im Tiergarten unterscheidet, der die hilflosen Torheiten seiner Betrachter nachzumachen versucht. Die äffische Nachahmung ist ja nichts

anderes als jenes Beginnen mit dem leeren Spiegelrahmen; in beiden Fällen wird der nachgemachte oder eingerahmte Teilaspekt des Universums, das ja auch im Einzelnen immer das Ganze ist, nicht wirklich erfaßt, sondern zerschnitten und zersplittert. Ein fleckenloser und vollkommener Spiegel aber zerschneidet und zersplittert nichts. Daher muß die Seele des Dichters einen hohen Grad von Reinheit und Unerschütterlichkeit, Fassungskraft und Universalität besitzen, muß mit einem Wort Genialität haben, um untadeliger Spiegel sein zu können, der immer das Ganze spiegelt, immer die Allwelt imaginär in sich hat.

Wie gut und treffend das Bild mit dem Spiegelrahmen ist, habe ich vor Jahrzehnten überdeutlich vordemonstriert bekommen. Es war in einer der damals sehr beliebten Berliner Charrell-Revuen mit ihren schauerlich sinnlos aneinandergereihten, üppig ausgestatteten Bühnenbildern. Einmal ging der Vorhang auf und enthüllte einen geschickt karikierten, gräßlich prunkvollen Großverdiener-Salon. An den Wänden hingen protzige Goldrahmen mit lebenden Kitschbildern. Die Bilder waren nämlich nicht gemalte, sondern von Statistinnen gestellte Nuditäten. Es war eine schauerhafte und zugleich ungemein lächerliche Gegenständlichkeit. Der Begriff des Kitsches hätte nicht besser eindrücklich gemacht werden können.

Es ist aber der Fluch der bloßen, vom ewigen Gottesfeuer dichterischer Genialität nicht durchloderten Schriftstellerei, daß sie den Spiegelrahmen der mehr oder minder (meistens minder) beherrschten Schriftsprache um ein Stück leibhafter Natur herumstellt, in dem Versuch, das eingefangene Bild unter Zuhilfenahme von allerlei Beleuchtungskünsten wiederzugeben. Sie verwechselt immer das Wesen mit der Dinghaftigkeit, immer auch die Schönheit mit den für schön geltenden Dingen. Früher, etwa im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, als das seltsame Wohlgefallen am Schrecklichen und Häßlichen noch nicht allgemein verbreitet war, hatte sie es schwerer. Sie mußte, da sie sie ja nicht zu spiegeln vermochte, Schönheit nachmachen. Sie mußte, da doch immer noch viele Leser eine dunkle Sehnsucht nach dem Guten und Wahren verspürten, das Gute und Wahre, ohne deren Wesen spiegeln zu können, nachzumachen versuchen. Das war schrecklich schwer, vielmehr unmöglich. Und deswegen ist diese heute weit seltener versuchte Kitschliteratur als solche leicht zu erkennen. Seitdem aber eine allgemeine Neigung, den positiven Pol des Daseins gleichsam vernachlässigen und vergessen wollend, auf den negativen geradezu manisch und amoklaufend fixiert ist, hat es die bloße Schriftstellerei weit leichter. Sie kann sich in der Ausmalung der Schrecken des Erdenlebens nicht genug tun, wobei ihre Darstellung notwendigerweise immer zum Greuelmärchen entartet, weil ihr ja das ganze Wesen der Seinspolaritäten verschlossen bleiben muß, der nur das Ingenium des Dichters ein ungetrübter Spiegel sein kann.

Es ist anzunehmen, daß auch unsrer Zeit der Dichter nicht versagt worden ist. Und wenn man den Reklameagenten der Literatur Glauben schenken könnte, gibt es ganze Legionen von Dichtern. Dem ist natürlich nicht so. Nie mußte sich der Dichter so sehr in die Höhle seiner un-

endlichen Einsamkeit flüchten und dort verbergen wie jetzt. Man will ihn nicht, man hat eine metaphysische Angst vor ihm, man verleugnet ihn, weil man das Wesen nicht will, es fürchtet und platterdings verleugnet. Man hat sich den Slogan „Gott ist tot“ so lange in die Ohren schreien lassen, bis man an ihn glaubte und alle schrecklichen Erlebnisse zu Beweisen dieses Glaubensbekenntnisses verarbeitet. Wie sollte man da den Dichter, den wahren Gottesfreund, ertragen können, wenn man das von ihm gespiegelte Wesen zur Leiche deklariert hat? Wie sollte sich der Dichter nicht verbergen müssen, da er doch spiegelt, was man nicht ertragen mag, weil es zu gewaltig ist, weit gewaltiger als alle apokalyptischen Schrecken dieser Zeit? Man kann nur den Teil, das tote Splitterwerk ertragen, nicht das gesamte Wesen der Daseinspolarität. Man glaubt nur glücklich zu sein, wenn man im Massenstrudel des Splitterwerkes und der „Wirklichkeit, wie sie ist“ untertaucht. Und so werden die Schriftsteller, die nicht müde werden, das Gewimmel und Gewusel und Gehudel einer das Wesen des Menschen, seine individuelle und einzigartige Gotteskindschaft leugnenden und verdammenden Erdenhölle mit allen Asphaltfarben der Unterwelt zu malen – so werden diese Schriftsteller, welche glauben, die Klippe des Kitsches umschiffen zu haben, weil sie nicht schöne, sondern häßliche Dinge in ihren Spiegelrahmen setzen, zu Dichtern ernannt. Es ist das letzte, völlig reizlos gewordene Stadium der materialistischen Orgie.

Noch ein anderer Umweg, das Erlebnis des Wesens zu vermeiden, ist möglich, der Umweg des Nihilismus, welchen die vor dem eigenen inneren Wesen zurückschreckende Individualität zu gehen geneigt ist. Das ist die letzte Schlußfolgerung aus der Willkür des Egoismus. Von den „poetischen Nihilisten“ hat Jean Paul in seiner „Vorschule der Ästhetik“ gesagt: „Der Verächter des Alls achtet nichts weiter als sich, und fürchtet sich in der Nacht vor nichts weiter als vor seinen Geschöpfen.“ Dieser Weg führt in die grauenvolle Öde der absoluten Langeweile. Wenn die Hölle überhaupt ein Wesen hat, so ist es die Langeweile; denn ihr ist das Schöpferische versagt, und das ist entsetzlicher als alle Qualen, die Dante im ersten Teil seiner Komödie geschildert hat. Was wunders, wenn die Langeweile des Nihilismus in der integren Spiegelwelt des Dichters nicht möglich ist? Denn das vom dichtenden Gottesfreund gespiegelte Wesen der Allwelt, seine grenzenlose Unterhaltsamkeit, ist nie erlahmende Schöpfung aus Liebe. Die Langeweile eines abstraktistischen Nihilismus offenbart sich in dichterisch oder auch nur schriftstellerisch gemeinten Sprachwerken viel unmittelbarer als in den Künsten, wo ja die nämliche Not herrscht und der wirkliche Künstler in einer ähnlichen Einsamkeit und Abgeschiedenheit leben muß wie der Dichter. Die abstraktistischen Spielereien des Nihilismus und Egozentrismus sind in der Malerei, der Bildhauerei, der Architektur, der Musik nicht so rasch in ihrer bodenlosen Nichtigkeit und Langweile zu erkennen wie eben in der Sprache. Was eine Zeitlang anderswo möglich sein mag, ist in der Poesie nicht möglich. Sie erträgt die Langeweile des Nihilismus nicht; denn sie ist, wie Giovanni Papini schön gesagt hat, die göttlichste der Künste.

Nun soll mit alledem keineswegs einer Schriftstellerei, die nicht den Anspruch erhebt, Dichtung zu sein, der Krieg erklärt werden. Besonders dann nicht, wenn sie einem echten Erlebnis der Sprache entblüht, womit sie freilich schon beinahe Dichtung geworden ist. Das mindeste aber, was man von ihr unerbittlich verlangen muß, ist, daß sie sprachlich korrekt ist, also Achtung und Ehrfurcht vor der Sprache bekundet, die anzuwenden sie sich zutraut. Das Urwort, der schöpferische Logos, spiegelt sich geheimnisvoll wider im irdischen Sprachausdruck. Die Worte unserer Sprachen und ihre sinnvolle und gesetzmäßige Zusammenfügung sind das edelste Material, über das zu schalten und zu walten dem Erdenmenschen vergönnt ist. Er muß sie geradezu als die Paramente eines im höchsten Sinne magischen Ritus ansehen. Den Worten wohnt eine gewaltige Zauberkraft inne. Deswegen hat schlechte Schriftstellerei, welche die Sprache verhudelt, immer etwas von schwarzer Magie an sich. Hitler wäre nicht Hitler gewesen, wenn er nicht so eine erbärmliche Sprache gesprochen und geschrieben hätte. Es ist klar, daß die gegenwärtige Hingewendetheit zur Nachtseite des Daseins Sprachverhudelung und -verhunzung in einem bisher noch nie gekannten Ausmaß begünstigt. Ich frage mich, ob es in der Hölle überhaupt Syntax und Grammatik gibt. Dort kann es allenfalls die Jammerlaute der schlechten Schriftstellerei geben. Ein Volk, das nicht in allererster Linie auf die Reinheit seiner Sprache hält (die mit dem Kampf gegen Fremdwörter wenig, fast nichts, zu schaffen hat), hat noch keine Kultur, nämlich Bildung, oder hat sie bereits verloren. Es handelt sich nicht darum, daß diese Sprache gesprochen und geschrieben werde, sondern darum, *wie* sie gesprochen und geschrieben wird. Darum ist allemal ein Buch deswegen schädlich, weil es schlecht geschrieben ist. Zwischen moralischen, ästhetischen und Wahrheitswerten einerseits und sprachlichen Werten andererseits besteht eine geheimnisvolle Symbiose. Man kann sich nicht genug hüten vor Büchern, die „glänzend“ geschrieben sind. Besser noch würden sie schlecht geschrieben sein; denn die Hohlheit des Glanzes ist die Widersacherin der Güte.

Daß die Sprache einer endemischen Korruption fast erlegen ist, hängt tief mit der Entwertung aller Werte zusammen, an welcher der zeit- und hirnräufende Massenbetrieb diesseits und jenseits des Eisernen Vorhangs seine diabolische Freude hat. Laufen wir Gefahr, daß nicht nur die Dichtung, sondern auch die sprachgewissenhafte Schriftstellerei sterben muß? Aber das Menschliche am Menschentier stirbt bereit dahin, wenn die Dichtung gestorben ist. Und so weit ist es noch nicht, so weit darf und wird es nicht kommen. Gerade die wenigen Schriftsteller, denen die Sprache ein Heiligtum geblieben ist, bereiten den feierlichen Augenblick vor, an dem der Dichter wieder aus der Höhle seiner Abgeschiedenheit hervortreten wird, um ein Spiegel des Wesens und damit aller Dinge zu sein; um zu verkünden, was ist, und nicht, was zu sein scheint.

Gabriela Mistral, Dichterin menschlichen Leids

Einsam erhebt sich das Genie über die weite Masse der Mitmenschen und bleibt doch stets seiner Zeit und seinem Milieu eng verbunden, so weit es auch auf den Flügeln der Phantasie fliegen mag. Es ist Zentrum eines Kreises, den viele verwandte Geister bilden. Der gleiche Strom fließt in allen, so fern sie einander auch sein mögen. So ist auch Gabriela Mistral, Nobelpreisträgerin und Ruhm Chiles, nur der tiefste Ausdruck des Sehns, das in den bedeutenden und weniger bedeutenden Dichterinnen Hispaniens lebendig ist.

Ihre Kunst war für sie nie eine Position. Nie nahm sie an, allein in gesuchten oder gekünstelten Worten läge der Wert des Schöpferischen. Alles Dekadente wurde von ihr abgelehnt. Die Worte und Sätze flossen ihr mühelos in die Feder und formten sich zu lebendigen und ergreifenden Bildern, die ihr Milieu umreißen. Dabei findet das Kastellanische in ihr neue Töne, die aus dem araukaischen Blut, das in ihr fließt, kommen mögen. Sie ist stets frank und frei, manchmal kühn und gewagt. Jedes Thema, das sie bewegt, findet in ihr seine Meisterin. So tief religiös sie auch ist, ihre Dichtungen bleiben diesseits. Sie liebt und sie haßt. Ihr Christus mag eher dem des Apostel Matthäus gleichen, der, so erhaben er ist, doch einfach und menschlich bleibt, als dem eines Johannes. Alle sozialen Fragen und Nöte unserer Zeit bewegen sie. Ich denke nur an ihre eindringliche Botschaft, die sie 1948 an die Konferenz Pro Paz in Mexiko sandte, in der sie aufrief, die europäischen Emigranten ohne jede Xenophobie aufzunehmen.

„Große Massen werden von Europa nach Südamerika emigrieren . . . diese Menschen, so klug wie unglücklich, müssen unsre Völker frei von jeder Xenophobie finden . . . es scheint mir eine tragische Narrheit, daß ein Wesen seinen Nächsten haßt oder verspottet seiner Haut wegen, wegen der Farbe seiner Augen, seines Wuchses oder seiner Sprache . . . Die menschliche Gattung lebt gerade von der Ehre seines Namens, und wenn dieser beginnt faulig zu werden, wird die Welt zu einem Alpdruck. Was wir schon heute erleben, ist das Chaos, sorgen wir dafür, daß es so nicht weiter geht . . . Wir sind verantwortlich für das Leben und das Glück der Emigranten, für ihr Brot und ihr wirkliches Eingehen in unsre zwanzig Staaten. Dieses Hineinwachsen können nicht Gesetzschriften erreichen, sondern nur die mit Liebe entgegenkommenden Volksgewissen.“
Schönere Worte fand in diesen Jahren kaum ein anderer, und sie ließ den Worten die Taten folgen und nahm überall Stellung, wo sie nationale Unduldsamkeit sah und erlebte.

Mütterlichkeit und Einfachheit sind die beiden starken Eigenschaften, die in Gabriela Mistral lebendig sind. Mit fünfzehn Jahren bereits veröffentlichte Lucila Godoy, wie die chilenische Dichterin eigentlich heißt, Gedichte in den Zeitschriften ihrer Provinz. Sie haben einen melancholischen Klang. Als Volksschullehrerin in einer südchilenischen Kleinstadt erlebt sie die Tragik einer tiefen aber unglücklichen Liebe. All die Höhen und Tiefen dieses Jahres 1907 spiegeln sich in dem Gedicht „Encuentro“ – Zusammentreffen – wider. Der tiefe Schock dieses Liebesträumens erzeugte das literarische Wunder ihrer Dichtung „Dolor“ – Schmerz. Es ist der Aufeinanderprall des Traumes mit der Wirklichkeit. „Dolor“ wird so zu einem autobiographischen Fragment ihres Weges von der großen Erwartung bis zur herben Enttäuschung, von der jubelnden Freude bis zum wehen Aufschrei des verwundeten Herzens. In „Dolor“ ist das herrliche „Sonett an den Tod“, in dem verhaltene Leidenschaft ernst aufklingt.

Dieses Buch bezeichnet den Anfang von Gabriela Mistrals Aufstieg. Es war 1914, als die Künstler- und Schriftstellergesellschaft von Chile bei den „Juegos Florales“ am 22. Dezember für diese Verse einer bisher unbekanntten Frau die Lorbeerkrone und die goldene Medaille zuerkannte. Um so neugieriger wurde die Öffentlichkeit, da sie den Preis nicht persönlich in Empfang nahm. Zeitungen und Zeitschriften suchten nun ihre Mitarbeit. Schwer waren ihre Gedichte, die so ganz mit den herkömmlichen Formen brachen und mit ungewohnter Ehrlichkeit – ohne je zu einer schamlosen Beichte zu werden – von der Leidenschaft, die in ihr glühte, die ihr Herz und Körper verbrannte, sprachen.

In „Dolor“ steht die kleine Dichtung „Die Bitte“, in der sie für den Geliebten, der sich religiöser Auffassung zuwider das Leben nahm, um Gnade fleht:

Du sagst mir, streng, unwürdig sei der Bitte,
dessen fiebernde Lippen nicht nahmen das Öl,
der jenen Abend ging, ohne deines Zeichens zu warten,
zersplitternd die Schläge wie dünnes Glas.

Ich aber, mein Herr, ich sage dir, ich habe berührt,
gleicherart wie das Haar seines Hauptes
sein ganzes zartes, gequältes Herz,
und es hatte die Seide der werdenden Knospe!

Und sie malt mit diesen wissenden und rührenden Worten das Bild ihrer Liebe:

Und lieben – gut weißt du es – ist bitterer Dienst;
es heißt, die Lider von Tränen feucht,
benutzt von Küssen die Bänder des Gewands,
und darunter die Augen verzückt.

1922 brachte Federico de Onis die Sammlung „Desolacion“ in New York als Buch heraus. Die Welt spanischer Zunge berauschte sich an diesen vibrierenden Tönen und tiefen Gefühlen, die aus den Versen Gabriela Mistrals sprachen. Dichter begeisterten sich, Kritiker studierten

das Werk. Es bildeten sich Parteien, man nahm für oder gegen sie Stellung. Sie wurde zum Brennpunkt der literarischen Diskussion in der Sphäre der kastilischen Sprache.

Die Themen Gabriela Mistrals berühren die verschiedensten Aspekte, die Liebe und die Natur, das Elegische und das Lyrische. Die Liebe findet bei ihr einen neuen, pathetischen Ausdruck und Inhalt. Liebe zu Gott schwingt bei dieser tiefreligiösen Frau in allen Arbeiten mit. Vor allem aber tritt sie in Gedichten wie „Das Kreuz von Bistulfi“ oder „Sprechend zum Vater“, die in der Sammlung „Ternura“ enthalten sind, hervor. In allen ihren religiösen Liedern klingt die zarte Stimme der Teresa auf, wenn auch deren tiefer mystischer Hauch nicht erreicht wird.

Die Kinderliebe verraten die kleinen Gedichte ihrer Sammlungen „Desolacion“, „Ternura“ und „Tala“. Vor allem haben ihre „Rondas“ die Liebe der Kinder gefunden und werden von ihnen gesungen:

Reich mir die Hand und laß uns tanzen,
reich mir die Hand, und du wirst mich lieben.
Gleich einer Blume werden wir sein,
gleich einer Blume nur und sonst nichts . . .

Du nennst dich Rosa, und ich Esperanza;
aber deinen Namen wirst du nun vergessen,
denn ein Tanz nur werden wir sein
auf dem Hügel und sonst nichts . . .

Von der Mütterlichkeit Gabriela Mistrals kündeten ihre Wiegenlieder. Welch tiefe Ethik in ihrer intuitiven Schau „Gedicht einer betrübten Mutter“. Lehrerin von Beruf, hat sie nie die Liebe zu diesem herrlichen Beruf verloren, dessen hoher Aufgabe sie in so manchem Gedicht gedenkt. „Die Dorfschullehrerin“, „Der leuchtende Chor“ zeigen ihre Liebe für die Erzieher. In „Dorfschullehrerin“ heißt es:

Die Lehrerin war arm. Ihr Reich war nicht von dieser Welt,
(So wie der dulddende Sämann in Israel.)
Sie trug braunes derbes Gewand und nicht geschmückt die Hand,
doch war ihr ganzes Herz ein einzig Diamant!

Die Natur in der Dichtung Gabriela Mistral ist stark durch ihr Temperament beeinflusst. In ihrer ersten Periode, etwa von 1912-1922, es ist die Zeit, da „Desolacion“ entsteht, erscheint die Natur pathetisch und trüb. Es ist die Landschaft um die Magalhaensstraße, die ersteht. Die Vision der verkrüppelten, verkümmerten Bäume, des Dorns. „Herbst“, „Der tote Baum“ und andre sind zu dieser Gattung zu rechnen.

In „Tala“, einer Sammlung, die 1938 herauskommt, ist diese Epoche überwunden. Ihre Naturschilderung hat an Farben und Tönen gewonnen, sie kennt nun ganz Lateinamerika. Höhepunkt sind wohl die zwei Hymnen „Tropensonne“ und „Cordillera“. Geschichtliche Reflexionen klingen an, sie hat die Tradition der amerikanischen Erde, der Erde der Indios aufgefunden. – 1945 wird ihr der Nobelpreis verliehen.

Obwohl das Lyrische das ganze Werk von Gabriela Mistral durchzieht, spielt es doch auf einzelnen Seiten ihres Werkes eine beherrschende Rolle. Es wird dann ganz subjektiv und innerlich. In „Desolacion“ finden wir das Gedicht „Leben“, in der Sammlung „Tala“ die Poesie „Saudade“, und „Alucinacion“. So subjektiv es aber auch bei Gabriela Mistral wird, wie etwa in den Gedichten „Die unfruchtbare Frau“, „Die starke Frau“ u. a., nie verliert sie das Maß für das Ästhetische, sondern gibt jedem Gedanken eine introspektive Form.

Wie schön und tief leuchtet die kleine Perle des Poems „Riqueza“ – Reichtum:

Ich habe das Glück treu
und das Glück verloren,
das eine gleicht der Rose,
das andre einem Dorn.
Wessen man mich beraubte,
wurde ich nicht beraubt;
Ich habe das Glück treu
und das Glück verloren,

so bin ich reich an Purpur
und an Melancholie.
O, welch Geliebter ist die Rose,
und wie geliebt der Dorn!
Gleich dem doppelten Umriß
einer Zwillingssfrucht,
ich habe das Glück treu
und das Glück verloren.

Den Männern haben wir soviel seltsame Erfindungen in der Dichtkunst zu danken, die alle ihren Grund in dem Erzeugungstrieb haben, zum Beispiel die Ideale von Mädchen. Es ist schade, daß die feurigen Mädchen nicht von den schönen Jünglingen schreiben dürfen, wie sie wohl könnten, wenn es erlaubt wäre. So ist die männliche Schönheit noch nicht von denjenigen Händen gezeichnet, die sie allein mit Feuer zeichnen könnten. Es ist wahrscheinlich, daß das Geistige, was ein Paar bezauberte Augen in einem Körper erblicken, der sie bezaubert hat, sich ganz auf eine andere Art dem Mädchen im männlichen Körper zeigt, als es sich dem Jüngling im weiblichen entdeckt.

Mir ist es allemal angenehm, wenn ich von einer neuen Dichterin höre. Wenn sie sich nur nicht nach den Gedichten der Männer bildeten, was könnte da nicht entdeckt werden!

Georg Christoph Lichtenberg

RUNDSCHAU

Asiatische Sozialisten Anfang des Jahres, vom 6. bis 15. Januar, fand eine asiatische Sozialistenkonferenz statt, und zwar in Rangoon, der Hauptstadt Burmas, wo die Sozialisten Regierungspartei sind. Aus Israel, dem anderen asiatischen Staat, wo dies der Fall ist, kam der Außenminister persönlich. Im übrigen waren die Teilnehmer Vertreter sozialistischer Gruppen, die in ihren Ländern in der Opposition stehen und zum Teil recht schwach sind. Nur der kleinere Teil der asiatischen Staaten war vertreten. In vielen dieser Staaten, und zwar keineswegs nur in den kommunistisch regierten, gibt es überhaupt keine sozialistischen Parteien. Aus diesem Grund fehlte die Türkei und fehlten die meisten arabischen Staaten. Die ordentlichen Kongreßmitglieder beschränkten sich auf Asien, wozu man hier auch Ägypten zählte. Doch waren auch die anderen alten Erdteile vertreten: Afrika außer durch Ägypten durch Beobachter aus Tunis (Neodestur-Partei, die nicht als sozialistisch gelten kann) und Uganda, Europa durch „brüderliche Delegierte“ aus England, Frankreich und Schweden und Gäste aus Jugoslawien. Die Jugoslawen, nämlich der stellv. Staatssekretär des Äußeren Bebler und der Parteithcoretiker und Propagandaleiter Djilas, erfreuten sich besonderen Ansehens. Sie bekennen sich freilich zum Kommunismus. Man weiß aber, daß Jugoslawien gern eine führende Rolle innerhalb der Moskau-freien Welt, soweit sie ihre Staatsführung auf marxistischen Lehren aufbaut, übernehmen möchte. In diesem Sinne hatten die Jugoslawen schon früher mit den beiden sozialistischen Parteien Japans, den Sozialisten Indiens und Burmas Verbindung aufgenommen. Mit Burma bestehen sogar enge Beziehungen von Staat zu Staat. Hier war es die Aufgabe der Jugoslawen, nicht den Kommunismus, wie sie ihn verstehen, in Gegensatz zum Sozialismus zu stellen, sondern vielmehr die Asiaten über den Stalinismus aufzuklären; sie taten dies auch und arbeiteten insofern in Rangoon für den Westen. Die übrigen Europäer vertraten nicht ihre Länder, sondern gemeinsam die *Sozialistische Internationale*.

Dennoch wurde selbstverständlich der Franzose wegen Tunis, der Engländer wegen Kenya und Malaya angegriffen. Mr. Attlee, der auf dem Kongreß eine hervorragende, aber im Ergebnis doch fast tragische Rolle spielte, hatte ja vor einigen Jahren selbst die Emanzipierung dreier asiatischer britischer Reichsteile zu selbständigen Staaten durchgeführt, er hatte den Abfall Burmas aus dem Reichsverband geduldet, aber sein Land führt noch immer in Malaya einen Kolonialkrieg und besitzt eine Reihe asiatischer Kolonien und Protektorate. Innerasiatische Streitig-

keiten störten die Konferenz, aber sprengten sie nicht. Die Vertreter aus Ägypten und Libanon wollten mit dem Außenminister des Landes, mit dem das ihre noch im Kriege lebt, nicht zusammenwirken, fanden sich aber schließlich ab. Israel bildet in einer asiatischen Gemeinschaft einen ideologischen Fremdkörper, was es freilich nicht gelten lassen will. Aus ganz anderen Gründen steht das Industrieland Japan außerhalb der Reihe der übrigen asiatischen Länder. Gleichwohl wurde eine gemeinsame Basis für alle gefunden. Die Frage, ob es einen Weltsozialismus gibt, wurde hier jedenfalls praktisch-organisatorisch verneint. Gerade hierin lag die Niederlage, die Attlee davon trug, der auch sonst von dem geringen Hervortreten neuer und konstruktiver Ideen sich enttäuscht zeigte.

Es wurde entschieden, sich nicht als regionale Gruppe der Sozialistischen Internationale anzuschließen, sondern eine selbständige Asiatische Sozialistische Internationale mit eigenem ständigem Büro und eigenen regelmäßigen Tagungen zu gründen. Allerdings soll mit der Sozialistischen Internationale Fühlung gehalten werden. Das ehemalige Minderwertigkeitsgefühl der kolonisierten Völker, deren Vertreter sich heute ängstlich scheuen, Anhängsel eines im wesentlichen als europäisch empfundenen Verbandes zu sein, verbindet sich hier mit dem neuen asiatischen Selbstbewußtsein, eigenes Gedankengut auch selbständig politisch verarbeiten zu können. Vor allem scheut man sich, in das Schlepptau der westlichen Orientierung der europäischen Sozialisten zu kommen. Denn bei aller Distanzierung vom Kommunismus, den man als die große, machtmäßig unendlich überlegene Gefahr empfindet, wollen sich die asiatischen Sozialisten nicht auf die andere Seite im kalten Krieg stellen. Sie reden einer nach ihrer Ansicht möglichen und notwendigen asiatischen Neutralität das Wort und treffen sich hier vielfach mit ihren Regierungen auch dort, wo sie innenpolitisch deren Feinde sind. Aber außerdem wurde klar herausgearbeitet, und darin liegt vielleicht das wichtigste Ergebnis des Kongresses, daß der asiatische Sozialismus etwas Besonderes ist. Ein zusammenhängendes Lehrgebäude dieser Sonderart können freilich Konferenzbeschlüsse nicht schaffen. Allgemein darf man wohl sagen, daß der asiatische Sozialismus, hier sich mit dem britischen berührend, mehr aus ethischen als aus rationalistischen wirtschaftlichen Wurzeln erwächst. Denker wie Tolstoi und Ruskin sind für ihn wohl wichtiger als Karl Marx. Aber auch die Soziallehren des Islam und die der Inder, die Lehren und praktischen Schritte Gandhis und seiner Nachfolger für die Reform des indischen Dorfes sowie die Erfahrungen der Kooperativen verschiedener Typen in Israel üben hier ihre Einflüsse.

Viel entschiedener als gegen den Kommunismus waren die Beschlüsse gegen den Kolonialismus. Die Erkenntnis, daß ein Wegfall des Kolonialherrn leicht zu kommunistischer Fremdherrschaft oder zum Rückfall in despotische Unfreiheit führen kann, ist, wie sich deutlich zeigte, kaum eine Bremse gegen die Entschlossenheit, sich der europäischen Herren auf jeden Fall zu entledigen. So war denn der Trennungsstrich zu Europa schärfer als der zum Kommunismus. Was der Kongreß beschlossen hat,

setzt sich angesichts der Schwäche der Sozialisten in Asien nicht gleich in politische Wirklichkeit um. Aber die Beschlüsse drücken noch weit mehr die Meinung von Asiaten als von Sozialisten aus.

Island Kritische Stimmen gegen die militärische Anwesenheit der Amerikaner auf Island sind aus allen Lagern zu hören: aus der Sowjetunion, deren Presse geradezu von einer militärischen Besetzung der Insel durch die USA spricht; aus den USA, wo neuerliche Bestrebungen, die ausländischen Stützpunkte zu vermindern, auch Island meinen; endlich aus der Insel selbst, wo man diese Gäste nicht durchweg gern sieht. Die Amerikaner sind seit 1951 auf Island auf Grund eines Vertrages, der auf die Mitgliedschaft der Inselrepublik im Nordatlantikpakt zurückgeht. Vorher waren sie schon einmal 6 Jahre lang da, von 1941 bis 1947, als Beschützer gegen einen befürchteten deutschen Angriff, der als „Unternehmen Ikarus“ auf dem Papier vage geplant, aber niemals ernstlich vorbereitet worden ist.

Damals waren die Amerikaner zwar die Nachfolger, aber nicht die Rechtsnachfolger der Briten. Denn wenn diese, im Mai 1940, als Gegenschlag gegen den deutschen Einmarsch in Dänemark, überraschend und ohne vorher zu fragen, gelandet waren, was einen offiziellen Protest der Regierung zur Folge hatte, so war es mit der amerikanischen Besetzung anders. Der britischen Mitteilung im Juli 1941, die Truppen würden zurückgezogen, folgte sofort das Angebot der damals neutralen USA an das ebenfalls neutrale Island, den militärischen Schutz zu übernehmen, was dieses ausdrücklich annahm. Darüber, ob dies die erste Kriegshandlung der USA war, läßt sich streiten. Jedenfalls steht das Einverständnis Islands außer Frage. Übrigens zogen auch die Engländer ihre Hand nicht ganz ab; ihre Flotte behielt eine Marinebasis, ihre Flugwaffe einen Luftstützpunkt den ganzen Krieg über. Aber ebensowenig wie die Engländer tasteten die Amerikaner während des Krieges die Freiheit der Isländer auch nur im geringsten an. An deren äußerer politischer Freiheit nahmen sie sogar ein aktives Interesse, und als sich Island 1944 zur selbständigen Republik erklärte, beeilten sich die USA, als erstes Land den Staat in seiner neuen Form anzuerkennen. Auch in den „besatzungsfreien“ Jahren zwischen 1947 und 1951 hatten sich die USA vertraglich ein Sonderrecht ausbedungen: sie durften auch in dieser Zeit den berühmten Flughafen Keflavik, einen der wichtigsten, größten und bestausgestatteten der Welt, für Zwischenlandungen von Militärflugzeugen benutzen. Die Gesellschaft, die den Flughafen betrieb, hatte im wesentlichen amerikanisches Personal. Insofern sind die Amerikaner seit 12 Jahren ununterbrochen ein Faktor im Lande. Die Beziehungen beider Länder beruhen im übrigen auf geographischen und historischen Umständen. Island öffnet sich der See nach Westen; es sieht gewissermaßen ebenso nach Amerika wie das Denkmal des Leif Eriksson, das auf einem Hügel in Reykjavik steht. Dieses Denkmal des Wikingers, der nach der Überlieferung im Jahre 1000 nach Amerika fuhr, stellt ein Geschenk der USA an Island dar. Es wurde 1930 zur Erinnerung an den Tausendjahrestag

des isländischen Althing gemacht und sollte ausdrücken, daß die Amerikaner sich einem Land, das sich rühmt, vor tausend Jahren eine Republik gegründet zu haben, nahe verbunden fühlen.

All das hindert aber nicht, daß die bewaffneten Gäste, ihre Zahl und ihr Auftreten, im Lande vielfach sehr unwillig empfunden wurden und werden. Man denke nur daran, daß ihre Zahl im Krieg auf viele Zehntausende answoll, so daß es in dem Lande mit nur 140 000 Einwohnern zeitweise wesentlich mehr junge Amerikaner als junge Isländer gab. Auch heute stellt diese politisch-wirtschaftliche Enklave, dieser Staat im Staat mit den extraterritorialen Rechten seiner Mitglieder, für viele Isländer ein Ärgernis dar, ein Übel, das sie nur murrend als notwendig anerkennen. Könnte sich Island nicht selber verteidigen? Einige 10 000 Mann Landesschutz aufzustellen, wäre dem Lande gewiß möglich. Aber die Isländer machen keine Anstalten in dieser Richtung. Ihre überlieferte Abneigung gegen jeden Militärdienst hält sie davon ab. Sie halten ihre passive Beteiligung am Atlantikpakt-System, dem sie also lediglich ihr Land als Flugzeugträger zur Verfügung stellen, für genügend. Die Amerikaner ihrerseits sind übrigens nicht allein um Island willen anwesend. Mit 14 Flugstunden von New York und 4 von Großbritannien ist die Insel ihrer einstigen Isolierung, der sie allein ihr verhältnismäßig geschichtsloses Dasein verdankt, endgültig beraubt.

Island hält verschiedene Rekorde. Es hat den größten Prozentsatz seiner Bevölkerung in seiner Hauptstadt, nämlich 40%. Es hat mit 1,4 Einwohnern pro qkm die geringste Siedlungsdichte Europas. Es ist der kleinste unter den Staaten, welche die Segnungen des Marshall-Planes empfangen haben. Es hat trotz oder infolge Trockenlegung den stärksten Alkoholverbrauch pro Kopf. Endlich hatte es während des Zweiten Weltkrieges die im Verhältnis zu seiner Bevölkerung stärkste Besetzung durch fremde Truppen und hierunter von allen am wenigsten gelitten. Der Krieg hat im Gegenteil Island zu großem wirtschaftlichem Aufschwung verholfen. Allerdings mußte es die hohen Löhne der Besatzungszeit mit einer bösen Inflation bezahlen, und mit seinen wirtschaftlichen Nachkriegsproblemen wird es schwer fertig. Das 100 000 qkm große Land ist zu drei Vierteln unbewohnt und unfruchtbar. Es hat kein Holz, keine Metalle, keine Steinkohle. Die Quelle seines Lebens liegt außerhalb des Landes, im Meer. Die Abhängigkeit von der Fischerei, die auch eine namhafte Verarbeitungsindustrie ins Leben gerufen hat, ist gefährlich. Die Fangergebnisse schwanken von Jahr zu Jahr stark; der Absatz von Fischen und Fischereierzeugnissen ist sehr konjunkturrempfindlich. Mit ERP-Hilfe sind große Pläne in Angriff genommen, um von dieser Abhängigkeit loszukommen, aber die Decke ist offensichtlich zu kurz. Manche der Pläne sind zu groß oder nicht wirtschaftlich. Wie Island auf die Dauer seine trotz sinkender Geburtsrate infolge sehr viel stärkeren Absinkens der Todesrate gewaltig angeschwollene Bevölkerung ernähren kann, ist eine Frage. Man kann sie eher politisch als wirtschaftlich beantworten; die westliche Welt braucht Island als Glied ihrer Verteidigung. Im Schutze dieser billigen, aber darum nicht weniger richtigen Formel,

von der auch andere Länder zehren, wird sich Island weiter entwickeln. Aber auch sein Charakter als ein kräftiger USA-Stützpunkt hat, solange die Weltlage sich nicht entscheidend ändert, alle Aussicht fortzubestehen.

Die Malediven Zu Beginn dieses Jahres wurde das Sultanat der Malediven in eine Republik umgewandelt und gleichzeitig das staatsrechtliche Verhältnis der Inselgruppe zu Großbritannien und zu Ceylon verändert. Die Malediven liegen so abgelegen und ihre internationale Bedeutung ist so gering, daß dieser Vorgang für uns kaum mehr ist als eine hübsche Kuriosität. Es lohnt aber doch, sie zu beachten. Königin Elisabeth sandte dem Präsidenten dieser jüngsten Republik innerhalb des Britischen Reiches eine Glückwunschbotschaft; darin heißt es, sie hoffe, daß die Bande der Kameradschaft und des gegenseitigen Interesses, welche die beiden Inselvölker – nämlich das britische und das maledivische – auf so natürliche Weise geeint hätten, in Zukunft nur immer enger würden. Sie wünsche „good luck, fair winds, and calm waters“. Der Ministerpräsident von Ceylon sagt in seiner Botschaft, Ceylon und die Malediven hätten seit langen Jahren enge Bindungen gehabt; er freue sich, die neue Republik in der Familie der freien Nationen ihren Platz einnehmen zu sehen.

Über die neue Wendung in den Malediven gibt ein Artikel in den „Times“ vom 7. 1. 1953 aus der Feder von Sir Ivor Jennings Auskunft, der eine große Rolle in der Verfassungsgeschichte Ceylons gespielt und auch die neue Verfassung der Malediven ausgearbeitet hat. Neben dieser Verfassung, welche die Staatsform der Malediven ändert, liegt ein neues Abkommen zwischen der jungen Republik und der Britischen Regierung vor. Selbstverständlich ist dies nur der Form nach ein Vertrag unter Gleichen. Auch hat die kleine Inselgruppe, deren tausend oder mehr Inseln im Umkreis von 400 Seemeilen nur 300 qkm Gesamtfläche und 100 000 Einwohner haben, natürlich nicht etwa dominionähnlichen Status erreicht. Vielmehr handelt es sich nach wie vor um ein Schutzverhältnis, das die Souveränität der britischen Krone voraussetzt. Dieses Schutzverhältnis wurde förmlich erst 1887 durch Vertrag begründet. Damals verzichtete der Sultan, wie dies immer der Hauptgegenstand derartiger Verträge ist, darauf, in vertragliche Beziehungen zu anderen Mächten zu treten, es sei denn durch die Vermittlung „des Beherrschers von Ceylon“. Die britische Regierung übernahm dafür den Schutz und versprach, sich in die inneren Verhältnisse nicht einzumischen. Der neue Vertrag, dessen Wortlaut wir nicht kennen, dürfte den Grundsatz nicht ändern, vielmehr ihn einfach auf die Staatsform der Republik anwenden, die hierdurch anerkannt wird. Interessant aber ist hierbei das Dreiecksverhältnis im Hinblick auf Ceylon. Großbritannien wurde früher den Malediven gegenüber stets durch den Gouverneur von Ceylon vertreten. Als 1948 Ceylon innerhalb des Commonwealth unabhängig wurde, trat der britische High Commissioner an diese Stelle. Auch jetzt ist offensichtlich kein unmittelbares Verhältnis zwischen Ceylon und den Malediven begründet. Die Sachlage kam im Zeremoniell zum Ausdruck: Der britische

High Commissioner, nicht etwa ein Vertreter Ceylons, unterschrieb auch den neuen Vertrag. Anwesend hierbei aber war der parlamentarische Staatssekretär im Ministerium Ceylons für Verteidigung und Auswärtiges, also die Verwaltungsgebiete, auf denen Ceylon selbst besonders eng an Großbritannien gebunden ist. Nicht zufällig waren auch Vertreter der britischen Flotte, der britischen Luftwaffe und der ebenfalls königlich britischen Flotte Ceylons zugegen.

Der neue Präsident wurde von der Bevölkerung, die auch die Verfassung durch Plebiszit annahm, fast einstimmig gewählt. Er heißt Amin Didi und gehört der Familie an, die seit 1759 regelmäßig die Sultane gestellt hat. Der Präsident kann nach der neuen Verfassung gleichzeitig Premierminister sein. Praktisch wird er die Machtfülle ausüben, zu der ihn seine Familientradition und seine Persönlichkeit befähigen. Die Sultane hatten übrigens ihre Herrschaft über die Bevölkerung, die aus Singalesen mit arabischem Einschlag besteht und schon im 12. Jahrhundert aus ehemaligen Buddhisten zu Mohammedanern wurde, mit Glück ausgeübt. Seit einem halben Jahrhundert gab es keine Aufstände mehr. Auch gibt es zwar eine winzige maledivische Armee, aber keine Polizei. Amin Didi ist ein bewußt moderner Mann, der auch als Sportsmann hervortritt. Durch die Verfassungsänderung hat er diese moderne Auffassung offenbar bekunden wollen. Er tritt auch sonst für den Fortschritt ein; u. a. hat er vor einiger Zeit den Schleier der Frau beseitigt.

Die Inselgruppe liegt auf einem Schnittpunkt der arabischen und der indischen Welt; die Islamgeschichte verzeichnet die Tatsache, daß der berühmte Weltreisende des 14. Jahrhunderts, Ibn Battuta, hier eine zeitlang Richter war. Die Bewohner haben im 16. Jahrhundert einmal die Portugiesen, als diese in Ceylon und Südindien Kolonialmacht waren, besiegt; die Holländer kamen während ihrer Herrschaft über Ceylon mit ihnen nicht in kriegerische Berührung. Im übrigen empfahlen sich gute Beziehungen zum jeweiligen Beherrscher von Ceylon von selbst, und das britische Schutzverhältnis wurde nicht als Last gefühlt. Die Ereignisse zu Jahresbeginn sind ein Versuch, sich der neuen Zeit anzupassen und doch die Kontrolle über die wachsenden fremden Einflüsse nicht zu verlieren.

**Zum 50. Todestag
Malwida v. Meysenbugs
(26. April 1903)**

Welch einzigartige Erscheinung, welche Synthese scheinbar unvereinbarer Widersprüche! Eine Aristokratin, Tochter eines Hofmarschalls, herangewachsen in der Hofgesellschaft deutschen Dodezfürstentums – dennoch erfüllt von brennender Leidenschaft für demokratische Freiheit und hierdurch gezwungen, ein heiß geliebtes Vaterland zu fliehen, um in hartem Exil neue Heimat, auch seelische und künstlerische Heimat, zu suchen. Eine Natur von tiefer Religiosität, die aus quälendem Suchen nach dem wahren Sinn des Christentums kompromißlose Freidenkerin wird. Eine Frau von grenzenloser Liebesfähigkeit, die unvermählt und kinderlos starb, deren ganzes Wesen Mütterlichkeit ausstrahlte und die den verwaisten Kindern ihres Freundes

Alexander Herzen vorbildliche Mutter wurde. Eine kühne Vorkämpferin für die Gleichberechtigung der Geschlechter, die späteres Gemeingut um viele Jahrzehnte vorausdachte und deren bescheidenes, zurückhaltendes Auftreten ihr dennoch in jedem Kreise als Persönlichkeit eigener Prägung Geltung verschaffte. Sie war nie schön, aber ihre besetzte Anmut übte starke Anziehungskraft auch auf Künstler aus, wie z. B. auf Franz Lenbach, der ihr bekanntes Porträt schuf. Ein kränkliches Kind, ein zartes, schwachsichtiges Mädchen, das in Bewahrheitung des Wortes „Es ist der Geist, der sich den Körper baut“ es vermochte, ein Dasein rastloser Arbeit, erstaunlich vielseitiger Bildung und Belesenheit, umfangreicher eigener Produktion, zu der man auch ihre viele Bände umfassenden Briefe an bedeutende Menschen zählen muß, bis zum Alter von 86½ Jahren auszubauen, klar und gütig bis zuletzt.

Sie war hingebende, geliebte Freundin heterogenster Persönlichkeiten, wie, um einige zu nennen: Carl Schurz, Gottfried und Johanna Kinkel, Garibaldi, Mazzini, Alexander Herzen, Richard Wagner, Marco und Laura Minghetti, Nietzsche, Romain Rolland . . . All dies kann ihren Reichtum nur andeuten, nicht erschöpfen. Für Malerei begabt, mußte sie dieser Kunst ihrer schwachen Augen wegen entsagen; wertvolle Bleistiftporträts von der Hand ihrer Schwester Laura bezeugen eine überdurchschnittliche künstlerische Familienbegabung.

Die große Liebe ihrer Jugend galt Karl Theodor Althaus, Sohn des Detmolder Superintendenten, um 6 Jahre jünger als Malwida, dem hochbegabten, glühenden, religiösen und politischen Reformator. Mit ihm einte sie auch die lodernde Begeisterung für den Rausch des 48er Jahres, der Glaube an ein neues Deutschland – und doch endete das Idyll in Enttäuschung und Entsagung. Alle Bitterkeit überwindend, vermochte Malwidas Herzensgröße Freundschaftstreue zu halten. Als der verfolgte Revolutionär eingekerkert und später hoffnungslos krank aus dem Gefängnis entlassen wurde, erhellte sie die letzten Lebenstage des kaum Dreißigjährigen.

Als Demokratin und Mitglied der freien Gemeinde von der Polizei bespitzelt und mit Gefängnis bedroht, blieb Malwida, wie vielen Gleichgesinnten, nur die Flucht nach dem freien England. Dürftiges Leben bei aufreibender, schlecht bezahlter Arbeit als Sprachlehrerin war ihr Los in London, aber es brachte ihr auch menschliche Bereicherung durch den Verkehr mit führenden Freiheitskämpfern verschiedenster Länder.

Zu der Emigrantenkolonie jener Tage zählten u. a. die Ungarn Kosuth und Pulszky, die Italiener Garibaldi und Mazzini, die Franzosen Ledru, Rollin und Louis Blanc, der Russe Alexander Herzen, der nach schweren Schicksalsschlägen – er hatte einen Sohn und die Mutter bei einer Schiffskatastrophe und bald darauf die heißgeliebte Gattin verloren – mit seinen 3 überlebenden Kindern Asyl in London suchte.

Viel Freundschaft war Malwida geboten worden, auch Heiratsanträge, darunter einen aus den Vereinigten Staaten von Julius Fröbel, hatte sie abgewiesen. Aber sie stand im Grunde allein und glaubte einsamer Zukunft entgegenzugehen. Die Bekanntschaft mit Herzen änderte

ihr ganzes Leben, gab ihr eine Wahlfamilie. Namentlich die kaum zwei-jährige Olga erweckte ihre heiße Liebe, so daß sie es fortan als ihre Aufgabe ansah, dem verwaisten Kind Mutter zu werden. In schweren Kämpfen, insbesondere auch gegen fremde, russische Einflüsse, blieb sie Siegerin, es entstand das schönste Mutter- und Tochterverhältnis, ihre gesammelten Briefe an Olga, später veröffentlicht unter dem Titel „Im Anfang war die Liebe“, geben davon Kunde.

Nach Jahren in England hatte Malwidas Weg nach Paris geführt, dort ward sie Zeugin von Richard Wagners musikalischen und persönlichen Kämpfen, und die Freundschaft währte bis zum Tode des Meisters. Sie allein war neben Hans Richter anwesend bei der Eheschließung Wagners mit Cosima Liszt in Tribschen. Sie wurde ein ständiger, nie störender Gast im Haus Wahnfried, heißgeliebt von den Kindern, besonders von Siegfried. Einzig ihre schwankende Gesundheit, die Wärme und Sonne verlangte, bewog sie, die Einladung, für immer in der Familie Wagner zu bleiben, abzulehnen.

Rom ward nun ihre dauernde und letzte Heimat. Große Sprachbegabung erleichterte ihr allenthalben das Heimischwerden. So vollkommen hatte sie Englisch und Russisch erlernt, daß sie russische Werke für die Veröffentlichung ins Englische übersetzte, ihre „Memoiren einer Idealistin“ schrieb sie zuerst in französischer Sprache, auch Italienisch wurde ihr vertraut. In ihrem Heim in Rom suchten geistig Hochstehende, selbst als sie schon in hohem Alter stand, wie Hans von Wolzogen es ausdrückte, „den warmen Zauber echter Menschlichkeit, die unendliche Güte und Reinheit“. Friedrich Nietzsche, so schwer zugänglich und schon am Beginn seiner Erkrankung, widmete ihr jahrelang wärmste Zuneigung und nennt sie „die beste Freundin der Welt“. Romain Rolland, mehr als ein halbes Jahrhundert jünger als Malwida, verdankte ihr Rückhalt, Förderung, Liebe und hat seinem heißen Empfinden nach ihrem Tode in seinem „Dankesang an Malwida“ Ausdruck verliehen. Hier einige der schönsten Stellen: „Was sie mir offenbart hat, ist die innerste Verwandtschaft des wahren Frankreich in seiner Verborgenheit und des wahren Deutschland, dessen Stimme nie laut wird, des besseren Deutschland.“ „Nie kannte ich einen Geist, der so jung, so unerschläft allen Atemzügen der Jugend sich erschloß, der das Hoffen der Jünglinge grüßte, stets bereit, ihren großen Plänen Glauben zu schenken, aufstrahlte bei ihren Erfolgen, sie aufrichtete, wenn sie fielen.“

Im Vorwort zu ihren Memoiren schrieb einst Malwida: „Als ich, eine Geächtete damals, die deutsche Erde verließ, gelobte ich mir, ich wolle das Vaterland nicht wieder sehen, ehe es zu einem neuen, des deutschen Geistes würdigen Leben erstanden sei.“

Welch Glück, daß die Idealistin keine Sehergabe in die Zukunft besaß. – Ist uns wohl genug Idealismus geblieben, um solch ein Deutschland zu erhoffen – trotz Alledem und Alledem?

**Deutsche literarische
Kostbarkeiten in London**

Mittelalterliche deutsche Handschriften, Inkunabeln und Erstdrucke aus elf Jahrhunderten, und sämtlich aus eigenem Besitz, wurden im Januar zum ersten Male vom Londoner Britischen Museum öffentlich zur Schau gestellt. Mit Ausnahme Heinrich von Kleists, von dessen Werken dieses größte Museum der Welt eigenartigerweise nicht eine Erstausgabe besitzt, gibt es kaum einen deutschen Autor von nationaler Bedeutung, der in dieser Schau nicht durch mindestens einen Erstdruck vertreten gewesen wäre. Was immer in Deutschland geschrieben wurde, hat hier seinen Niederschlag gefunden. Die Reformationszeit war nicht nur durch fast sämtliche Erstausgaben der Werke Martin Luthers, einschließlich eines Exemplares der 95 Thesen und einem Manuskript Melancthons, sondern auch durch zahlreiche Gegenschriften repräsentiert, und von den Autoren des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts fehlten ebensowenig Hans Sachs, Hofmannswaldau und Grimmelshausen, wie von denen des 20. Jahrhunderts Thomas Mann, Hermann Hesse oder Theodor Heuss. (Auf die in phototechnischen Verfahren hergestellte Monstre-Ausgabe von Hitlers „Mein Kampf“ hätten die meisten Besucher der Ausstellung in diesem Rahmen wahrscheinlich gern verzichtet.) Höhepunkte der Ausstellung bildeten die Erstdrucke der deutschen Klassiker; dem „jungen Goethe“, der „Faust-Literatur“ und Schillers „Wilhelm Tell“ waren eigene Vitrinen gewidmet – und vor allem die mittelalterlichen Handschriften und Inkunabeln. Sowohl an Schönheit wie an Wert übertrafen die ausgestellten Handschriften und Wiegendrucke alles, was je an deutschen Schätzen dieser Art gezeigt worden ist.

Zu den ältesten der Handschriften gehört ein mit feinen Miniaturen ausgestatteter Psalter aus dem 9. Jahrhundert, den einst Kaiser Otto I. seinem Schwager, dem englischen König Athelstan, zum Geschenk machte, sowie ein anderer, der mit goldenen Buchstaben auf Purpurgrund geschrieben ist und aus dem Besitz Heinrichs des Löwen stammt. Diese historischen Reliquien werden an Schönheit weit übertroffen von den herrlich illustrierten Bibeln und Evangelien aus dem 11.–14. Jahrhundert, die einstmals Eigentum von Klöstern in Trier, Koblenz, Echternach und Würzburg gewesen sind. Die meisten der religiösen Handschriften deutschen Ursprungs haben lateinischen Text; nur zwei sind auch ihrer Sprache nach deutsch: die eine ist die Übersetzung des Hoheliedes durch Abt Williram des Klosters Ebersberg (11. Jahrhundert), die andere eine Übertragung der Geschichte der Heiligen 3 Könige aus dem frühen 15. Jahrhundert. Die größte Seltenheit und das auch literarisch wertvollste Manuskript ist ein anderes Buch in deutscher Sprache: die einzige erhaltene gebliebene Abschrift des vollständigen Heliand-Gedichtes in Altsächsisch aus dem 10. Jahrhundert. Ihm an Wert gleichzusetzen sind die Schätze des Museums an deutschen Inkunabeln. In einer Vitrine beisammen lagen die 42zeilige Gutenberg-Bibel von 1456 aus dem Besitz Mazarins, die wahrscheinlich zwischen 1458 und 1461 in Bamberg gedruckte 36zeilige Bibel und der erste Psalter, zugleich das erste gedruckte Buch, das sowohl den Namen der Hersteller – Fust und Schöffer – als

auch das genaue Erscheinungsdatum, den 14. August 1457, enthält. In einem anderen Glasschrank 2 andere Kostbarkeiten: deutschsprachige Bibeln aus der Zeit vor Luther, fußend auf der Übersetzung eines Unbekannten: die eine in Mittelhochdeutsch, 1470 bei Mentelin in Straßburg, die andere in Niederdeutsch, 1493 in Lübeck erschienen. Und daneben in 4 andern Vitrinen vieles von dem, was von der deutschen Literatur des Mittelalters erhalten geblieben ist, vor allem zwei Werke Wolframs von Eschenbach – der „Tristan“ und der „Titurel“, der „Sachsenspiegel“ und Sebastian Brants „Narrenschiff“.

Das Denkmal des unbekanntenen politischen Gefangenen Das Institute of Contemporary Arts in London schrieb im vergangenen Jahre den Wettbewerb für das „Denkmal des unbekanntenen politischen Gefangenen“ aus, an dem sich die Bildhauer aller Nationen beteiligen sollten. Unter den 262 Modellen, die von deutschen Künstlern für diesen Wettbewerb eingereicht wurden, wählte die deutsche Jury 12 Arbeiten aus, die nach London geschickt wurden, um dort mit den Arbeiten der Künstler anderer Länder zu konkurrieren. Diese Jury setzte sich aus Prof. Dr. Grohmann, Prof. Dr. Hildebrandt, Dr. Linfert, Dr. Péc, Prof. Scharoun und Dr. Skutsch zusammen. Dr. Jannasch nahm an ihr als Vertreter der deutschen Preisstifter teil. Die Preise der Bundesregierung, des Berliner Senats und der Industrie wurden den Bildhauern Bernhard Heiliger, Egon Altdorf und Hans Uhlmann zugesprochen. Außer den Entwürfen dieser Künstler werden die Arbeiten von Karl Hartmann, Hans Jannasch, Fritz König, Franklin Pühn, Richard Raach, Erich Reuter, Louise Stamps, Zoltan Szekessy und Hans Wimmer nach London geschickt. Die gesamte Kollektion der 262 Entwürfe wurde zu Beginn des Jahres im Westberliner Ausstellungshaus am Waldsee in Zehlendorf dem öffentlichen Urteil zugänglich gemacht.

Löste schon der erste orientierende Rundgang Beklemmungen aus, so steigerten sich diese bei längerem Verweilen in der Ausstellung zu Trauer, Scham, ja zu Empörung. Wie gering war die Zahl der Arbeiten, die um ihres Ernstes willen auch einer Beachtung wert waren. Und wieviel Spielerei im Vergleich zu dem wenigen Guten! Dadurch, daß sich eine Anzahl bekannter deutscher Bildhauer vom Wettbewerb fernhielt (z. B. Albiker, Gies, Lehmann, Marcks, Mataré, Mettel, Scharff, Scheibe, Stadler) verschoben sich die künstlerischen Maßstäbe. Und es wäre völlig verfehlt, die Summe der Arbeiten dieses Wettbewerbes auch nur ganz von fern als einen einprägsamen Niederschlag der künstlerischen Bemühungen unserer Zeit anzusprechen zu wollen. Einem großen Teil der Arbeiten fehlt jedes künstlerische und geistige Verantwortungsgefühl, wodurch sie sich von vornherein jedem sorgfältig wägenden Verstehenwollen auch des Nachsichtigsten entziehen. Bei einer ganzen Anzahl von Denkmalsentwürfen läßt sich der Eindruck nicht verwischen, daß die Hersteller dieser Machwerke ohne Gefühl, Können und Disziplin und ohne jede Achtung vor dem Betrachter etwas „auf modern“ modellieren wollten. – Einwände der Art, daß man bei einer bestimmten Zusammensetzung der

Jury einfach „Hypermodernes“ einreichen müsse, um überhaupt eine Gewinnchance zu haben, sollten – da sie das redliche Bemühen der Jury um Erkenntnis des Wesentlichen zumindest mit einem Fragezeichen versehen – tunlichst unterbleiben.

Der Londoner Wettbewerb bot die Möglichkeit, sich mit der Frage des Denkmals in unserer Zeit schlechthin auseinanderzusetzen. Wenn die Geste der Figur sofort Assoziationen zum Denkmalthema erlaubt und dessen geistigen Inhalt allgemeinverständlich zu vergegenwärtigen weiß, wie steht es dann mit den „abstrakten“, „konstruktiven“ Gebilden, den gebauten, nicht gewachsenen? Haben diese bereits Symbolkraft oder sind sie in ihrem Ausdruck noch ganz an die zufällige Reaktion des ästhetisierenden Intellekts gebunden? Würde man zwei Senkrechte, die von einer Horizontalen durchbohrt werden, als Denkmal des unbekanntem politischen Gefangenen ansprechen, wenn einem der Titel der Arbeit nicht bekannt wäre, oder jenen Balanceakt auf dem rechten Knie, bei dem die rückwärts zusammengebogene Fuß- und Handgelenke einen Knoten bilden?

Es wurde geäußert, daß das Thema des Wettbewerbs ein literarisches sei und kein bildhauerisches Problem anspreche. Mit dieser Feststellung sollte vielleicht ausgedrückt werden, daß mit dem Worte „politisch“ – dem im Thema des Wettbewerbs eine zentrale Funktion zugewiesen wird – Bezirke der Lebensäußerung angesprochen werden, deren Erlebnis den plastischen Begriffen fremd ist. Von dieser Erlebnisebene ausgehend wären die Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten genau so vielfältig und immer nur Teil, wie es deren erfahrene Inhalte sind, Griff die Unfreiheit nicht zu stark in das Bewußtsein jedes Einzelnen, als daß er sich diesen subjektiven Erlebnissen entziehen dürfte, um sie im vagen Gebilde, das keinen Symbolwert hat, geformt zu sehen? Wie wenige Künstler bemühten sich, ein plastisches Zeichen für etwas zu finden, das uns alle erschüttert – und wie viele fanden sich bereit, uns durch formale Attraktionen zu verwirren.

Nachdem nun die Londoner Jury ihr Urteil gesprochen hat – den Preis erhielt der junge englische Bildhauer Red Butler für eine Drahtkonstruktion, die er als „Eisernen Käfig“ bezeichnete – ist es doch noch recht zweifelhaft, ob sich der ursprüngliche Plan, das preisgekrönte Werk in kirchturmhoher Ausführung auf den Kreidefelsen von Dover aufzustellen, ausführen lassen wird. Denn inzwischen sind von vielen Seiten lebhaft Widersprüche geäußert worden, die bereits zu einer Anfrage im britischen Unterhaus geführt haben.

Die Kirche in der Sowjetzone

Die Verhaftungen von Pfarrern der evangelischen Kirche innerhalb der sowjetischen Besatzungszone hatten sich in den letzten Wochen so gehäuft, daß man fragen muß, ob dort nicht schon in Wahrheit der Kampf gegen die Kirche begonnen hat. Durch Vergleiche mit der Kirchenkampfzeit von 1933 bis 1945 kann man verschiedene Phasen feststellen, die fast parallel liegen. Wie die Sowjets 1945 in den Pfarrern nur die Vertreter des Wider-

standes gegen das Naziregime sahen, so erblickten die Nazis 1933 in der evangelischen Kirche den Gegner Roms, versuchten sie zu gewinnen und gegen den Katholizismus auszuspielen. Das mißlang. Der Widerstand der Pfarrer entbrannte an der Rassenfrage und dem Arierparagraphen. Aus dem Pfarrer-Notbund wurde die Bekennende Kirche. Gleich in den Anfang fiel der Kampf um die Eingliederung der evangelischen Jugend in die HJ. Man muß nur diese Vorgänge aus dem Dritten Reich betrachten, um zu wissen, weshalb der Osten auf die Junge Gemeinde und die Jugendpfarrer ein so scharfes Auge hat. Die totalitären Staaten werben um die Jugend, weil die Jugend einmal die Soldaten stellen wird.

Nach der zwangsweisen Überführung der evangelischen Jugend in die HJ kam das Stadium des Kompromisses mit den Kirchnausschüssen, in denen Bekennende Kirche und Deutsche Christen friedlich miteinander arbeiten sollten, wie die Pfarrer der sowjetischen Besatzungsmacht jetzt dafür gewonnen werden sollten, sich an den Friedensausschüssen zu beteiligen. Der Großkampf einst begann mit der Ermordung Dr. Weisers durch die Gestapo. Er hatte eine Broschüre gegen verschiedene von Hitler aufgestellte Grundsätze verfaßt. Er wurde verhaftet und in Oranienburg totgetrampelt. Der Krieg brachte den totalen Kirchenkampf, aus dem die Kirche mit schwer gelichteten Reihen hervorging, um 1945 trotz allem wieder ein festes Gebäude neu zu errichten. Dabei wurde sie zunächst von den Sowjets unterstützt, die glaubten, sich ein gleiches Instrument schaffen zu können, wie es die griechisch-orthodoxe Kirche ist, die sich als reine Kultkirche im Laufe des Krieges ganz dem Staat und seinen Machthabern zur Verfügung gestellt hat.

Die starke Position der christlichen Kirchen wurde in den folgenden Jahren schrittweise wieder abgebaut, da auch in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone der Kampf um die Jugend begann, hinter dem insbesondere die östliche Besatzungsmacht steht. Statt der Begriffe „Blut und Boden“ wurde der christlichen Idee die Friedensidee entgegengesetzt und, wie seinerzeit bei den nationalsozialistischen Kirchnausschüssen, den Pfarrern nahegelegt, in die Nationale Front und die Friedenskomitees einzutreten. Auch dies mißlang. Man versuchte, in Einzelgesprächen zwischen Regierungsstellen und Superintendenten, Persönlichkeiten aus den Reihen der Kirche herauszubrechen – vergebens. Nachdem der Versuch, die Kirche von oben auseinanderzusprennen oder von den Gemeinden zu trennen, ebenfalls nicht zum Erfolg führte, begann ein neues ernstes Stadium, das Walter Ulbricht in seiner Rede im Juli 1952 schon ankündigte. Damals wurden die ersten unverhüllten Drohungen gegen christliche Kreise ausgesprochen, die sich nicht einordnen wollen. Der Führer der Freien Deutschen Jugend, Honecker, griff namentlich die Junge Gemeinde an.

Die Periode der Gewalt ist nun seit dreiviertel Jahren im Anlaufen. Sie wird einerseits auf der administrativen Seite angewandt, indem Zugangsgenehmigungen für Vikare und Prediger nicht erteilt werden und man den Theologiestudenten den sowjetzonalen Ausweis entzieht, sobald sie nur ein Semester außerhalb der DDR studiert haben. Aber auch

damit ist es noch nicht genug. Eine letzte Verschärfung hat die Situation durch den Beginn einer vorläufig noch mäßigen Verhaftungswelle erfahren. Pfarrer Gestrich aus Brandenburg erhielt 12 Jahre Zuchthaus; Pfarrer Schumann aus Sachsen 6 Jahre. Beide wurden wegen sogenannter „Boykottheze“ verurteilt. Die Landesleitung Sachsen hat in einer Abkündigung von sämtlichen Kanzeln zu dem Urteil gegen Schumann Stellung genommen und erklärt, daß die Kirche geschlossen hinter ihm stehe. In Wirklichkeit wurden diese beiden Pfarrer in der Wahrnehmung des Rechtes, von der Kanzel „zu verkünden“, vom Staat behindert und dafür bestraft.

Die Zahl der Verhafteten ist inzwischen angestiegen. Pfarrer Hamel aus Halle, Pfarrer Winterhaber aus Rathenow, Pfarrer George von der Marienkirche in Ostberlin und zuletzt Prof. Aland aus Halle sind verschwunden oder verhaftet.

Es handelt sich hier meist um Männer, die in der Kirche eine Rolle spielten und in der Ökumene arbeiteten. Pastor George war neben Propst Grüber Hauptpfarrer der bedeutendsten Kirche Ostberlins. Der SSD verweigert, wie üblich, jede Auskunft. Kenner der Verhältnisse können daraus ersehen, daß eine neue Phase des Kirchenkampfes ihr Anfangsstadium begonnen hat. Die Kirche soll sturmreif gemacht werden. Am Ende dieser Phase würde stehen, was am Ende des Dritten Reiches geschah, und auch der katholischen Kirche würde das gleiche Schicksal drohen. Sie ist nur noch nicht so in den Mittelpunkt der Angriffshandlungen des Ostens gerückt, weil sie zahlenmäßig eine geringere Anhängerschaft hat und daher vorläufig an zweiter Stelle rangiert.

So dilettantisch und primitiv die Methoden der Ostzone sind, die denen des Dritten Reiches fast gleichen und vielleicht auch dasselbe Fiasko erleiden werden, so ernst müssen sie genommen werden, denn ein solcher Kirchenkampf bedeutet eine Summe von Leid, von seelischen Opfern und von Toten.

Sowjetische „Germanistik“ Die deutsche Sprache und Literatur, die als Folge der Nazipolitik und des Zusammenbruchs von 1945 in der Welt zurückgedrängt wurden, beginnen seit 1950 mählich ansteigend wieder Interesse und Geltung zu finden. In diesem Zusammenhang muß der Germanisten in USA, die sich durch keine politische Konjunktur in ihrer Forschung und Förderung des deutschen Geistesgutes beirren ließen, mit Dankbarkeit gedacht werden. Heute ist die Zahl der amerikanischen Studenten, die Deutsch lernen und sich mit deutscher Philosophie und Literatur beschäftigen, beinahe wieder so groß wie vor 1933. Ähnliches gilt für Schweden. Auch in Südamerika, Kanada, Australien und Neuseeland ist ein wieder wachsendes Interesse für das deutsche Geistesleben zu beobachten, und Westeuropa beschäftigt sich mit den wenigen wirklich bemerkenswerten Erscheinungen unserer Kunst und Wissenschaft.

Sollte angesichts dieser Entwicklung das „Land der selbstgefälligen Superlative“, die Sowjetunion, etwa zurückstehen? O nein! Die Moskauer

Staatsuniversität hat in den letzten beiden Jahren eine größere Zahl Philologen mit germanistischen Aufträgen versorgt. Wie sieht das aus? Da ist erst einmal der Genosse Walentin Dewekin, dessen Dissertation – Erich Weinert (I) gewidmet ist. Dewekin hat darin „schlüssig den Nachweis erbracht, daß dessen begeisterte Kampfpoesie ihrem Ideengehalt nach zutiefst progressiv, ihrer Form nach voll Neuerergeist immer die Interessen des deutschen Volkes verfochten hat“. (Das Deusch stammt von der [Ost-] Berliner Zeitung.) Eine Doktorandin Olga Kuklina hat 4500 „neue“ deutsche Wörter untersucht, welche „die demokratische Umgestaltung in Deutschland von Mai 1945 bis Oktober 1949“ widerspiegeln. Aufgabe dieser Dissertation war es, „ausgehend von Stalins genialer Forschungsarbeit ‚Der Marxismus und die Fragen der Sprachwissenschaft‘“ das Kauderwelsch des sowjetdeutschen Journalismus „lexikonreif“ zu machen. Zum Troste ihrer deutschen Zeitgenossen versichert die Genossin Olga freilich, daß „der grundlegende Wortschatz der deutschen Sprache im wesentlichen erhalten bleibt“. Schließlich hat eine sowjetische Professorin der Germanistik, S. Rosanowa, den Versuch eines modernen deutschen Literaturabrisse unternommen, der den bezeichnenden Titel „Der Kampf um eine deutsche demokratische Literatur“ trägt (Neue Welt, Heft 19/1952).

Danach gibt es ernsthafte deutsche Schriftsteller nur im Sowjetbereich Mitteldeutschlands. Die rund eintausend westdeutschen Schriftsteller werden auf den 25 Druckseiten der Frau Rosanowa freilich auch einmal genannt und zwar als ein geschlossenes Kollektivum, das sein „Ohr der Stimme ihrer Kollegen (in der Sowjetzone) nicht verschließt“. Besonders aufgeschlossenen Ohren scheinen Ernst Penzoldt, Georg Schwarz und J. Tralow zu sein. Sie werden namentlich „ausgezeichnet“. Ansonsten spielen in der Darstellung der sowjetischen Germanisten die Beschlüsse der SED-Parteitage, die Äußerungen der Ulbricht, Pieck und Grotewohl zum Thema „Literatur“ eine wichtigere Rolle als diese selbst. Die Darstellung im einzelnen entbehrt nicht der Komik. Die deutsche Literatur während der Nazizeit z. B. ist einzig von den bekannten Moskau-Emigranten, einigen Rotspanienkämpfern und den kommunistischen Literaten in Frankreich und Mexiko „repräsentiert“ worden. Daß in Deutschland Hauptmann, Hesse, Oskar Loerke, R. A. Schröder, Bergengruen, Edzard Schaper, August Scholtis, Gerhart Pohl u. v. a., die keine Nationalsozialisten waren, und in der Emigration Thomas Mann, Leonhard Frank, Alfred Neumann, Hermann Kesten u. a., die keine Kommunisten sind, unter schweren Bedingungen die Überlieferung der deutschen Literatur fortzusetzen versucht haben, weiß Frau Rosanowa nicht. Sie nennt nur die bekannte Schema-Reihe des deutschen Stalinismus von Abusch bis Arnold Zweig.

Dieser wird wegen seines „bedeutenden Beitrages zur Entlarvung des deutschen Imperialismus und Militarismus“ gefeiert, muß jedoch für seinen neuen Roman „Das Beil von Wandsbeck“ den Tadel einstecken, er sei ein Fatalist und zeige „Widersprüche in seiner Weltanschauung“. Die Stalinpreisträgerin Anna Seghers hingegen „entspricht am vollständig-

sten und konsequentesten den Forderungen, die von der SED in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren an die Kunstschaffenden gestellt wurden“. Die zeitliche Einschränkung ist interessant. Sie bedeutet ein Abrücken von dem behandelten Roman „Die Toten bleiben jung“, der noch konsequent antimilitaristisch war, was den Rüstungstendenzen des Ostblocks heute zuwiderläuft.

Geradezu grotesk ist die Darstellung der Thälmann-Biographie des unseligen Willi Bredel. Dieser Altkommunist, Landsmann und Freund des ermordeten KPD-Führers vor 1933, hat sich jahrelang gewecigert, das fälscherische Buch zu schreiben. Er weiß zu genau, daß Stalin durch seine westeuropäischen Handlanger versucht hat, Thälmann in dem Nazi-KZ ermorden zu lassen, um einen Propaganda-Schlager für seine eigene – äußerst verfahrenere – Sache zu gewinnen. Die Himmler-Leute fielen darauf nicht herein, und wenn Thälmann schließlich doch noch ermordet wurde, so ist dafür allein der heraufdämmernde Zusammenbruch des Dritten Reichs entscheidend gewesen. Diesen beklagenswerten Mann als „echte Größe der Nation“ und – natürlich – „treuen Freund der Sowjetunion“ darzustellen, der „gegen die heutigen Hitleristen in der Bundesrepublik“ (gemeint ist eindeutig die Bundesregierung) gewesen wäre – das hat selbst die Korruptionsfähigkeit Bredels überstiegen. Folgerichtig ist sein Thälmann-Buch, das auf Parteibefehl kurzfristig niedergeschrieben wurde, ein miserables Machwerk. Die sowjetische Germanistin aber lobt „seine gewaltige ideelle und erzieherische Rolle“. Überhaupt findet sie „die Errungenschaften der deutschen Literatur in den ersten Jahren des demokratischen Aufbaus beträchtlich“. Zum Beweis wird u. a. die Schrift eines Reporters der sowjetischen „Täglichen Rundschau“ über die Hochwasserkatastrophe im Oderbruch herangezogen – ein ideologisch verbrämter, im übrigen papierener Bericht ohne jeden literarischen Wert. Der Altkommunist Eduard Claudius wird zunächst scharf gerügt, weil er in einer Erzählung die SED als einen „Haufen von Gaunern und Abenteurern“ (!) dargestellt haben soll, und danach zum nationalpreiswürdigen „Genius“ erhoben, weil er – in einer zweiten Fassung derselben Erzählung – den nämlichen häßlichen Haufen in „Agenten eines amerikanischen Diversionsszentrum“ verwandelt habe.

Einem Herrn Pollatschek, der aus der Bundesrepublik in das „demokratische Berlin“ übergesiedelt sei, wird bescheinigt, daß wenigstens der erste Teil seines Romans „Herren des Landes“, „scharfe wahrheitsgetreue Beobachtungen“ enthalte. Dabei erfährt man nebenbei, daß der Ort der Handlung ein Dörfchen namens – Friedlos sei, das in der – amerikanischen Besatzungszone liege, und sagt belustigt: Aha... So geht es über tausend Zeilen fort – eine ununterbrochene Ancinanderreihung von Falschem, Dummem, ja Groteskem. Das Schlimmste daran ist, daß es gar nicht anders sein kann. Die sowjetische Germanistik muß wie alle geistige Arbeit im Schatten des Kremls der „ideologischen“ und imperialen Propaganda dienen. So verflüchtigt sich die Substanz und damit – jeder Wert.

Krieg als Idylle? Große Ereignisse werfen bekanntlich ihre Schatten voraus. Die Wehrdebatten im Bundestag und die Aussicht auf die Wiederbevölkerung der westdeutschen Kasernenhöfe lassen so manchen Konjunkturwitternden nicht mehr ruhig schlafen. Auch in einigen deutschen Verlagen sucht man in Archiven nach verstaubten Ledenhütern, putzt sie neu auf und läßt sie, vorsichtigerweise als „völlig unpolitisch“ getarnt, auf die nichts ahnende Leserschaft los. Das geschah beispielsweise im Falle der „Verlorenen Kompanie“ von Heinrich Eisen (Freiburg i. Br., Dikreiter-Verlag, 487 S. DM 12,80), eines Bestsellers aus der Zeit vor 1945.

Da wird uns von einer deutschen Infanteriekompanie berichtet, die während des ersten Rußlandwinters von ihren rückwärtigen Verbindungen abgeschnitten und dadurch gezwungen wird, einen frisch-fröhlichen Partisanenkrieg hinter der feindlichen Front zu inszenieren. Das sieht nach Heinrich Eisen so aus, daß unter der Führung ihres geliebten Chefs die Soldaten sich in das Innere eines Waldes zurückziehen und dort ein gut getarntes Blockhüttendorf errichten. Ein zackiger Dienstbetrieb sorgt für die nötige Bewegung. Wird die Fourage knapp, so schickt man einige Stoßtrupps los, die in der Nähe liegende russische Proviantlager leeren, natürlich ohne dabei jemals erwischt zu werden, um dann mit allem zurückzukehren, was ein deutsches Landserherz begehrt, vom Büchsenfleisch über die frischen Eier bis zum Sekt. Das perlende Getränk wird vorausschauend requiriert; eine wackere Rote-Kreuz-Maid hat sich zu der Heldenschar gellüchtet, und um sie entbrennt zwischen den Chargen ein hitziger erotischer Kleinkrieg, der, wie vorauszusehen war, mit dem Siege des Rangältesten endet und demgemäß natürlich auch mit Sekt begossen werden muß. Wer beschreibt die Freude des strahlenden Brautpaares und seines schwerbewaffneten Anhangs, als just vor ihrer „Haustür“ eine deutsche Aufklärungsmaschine notlandet! Der fehlende Spirit wird dem Piloten in einem tollkühnen Handstreich vom benachbarten russischen Flugplatz besorgt, so daß der Befreiung der Kompanie durch deutsche Panzerstreitkräfte nach 487 Seiten nichts mehr im Wege steht. Hauptmann Rott kann es freilich auch dann noch immer nicht fassen: „Er steht breit da, als müsse er sich mit den Füßen am Boden festklammern. Sein Kopf ist vorgereckt und leicht gesenkt. Sein linker Arm hängt durchsiebt und zerschmettert herab und das Blut läuft wie ein Brunnen. Er starrt auf die Toten und er starrt auf die Lebenden. Auf seine herrliche Kompanie. Sein ganzer Körper wird von einem lautlosen Schluchzen geschüttelt. Ein leises Summen ist in der Luft. Am Höhenrand heben sich zwei Panzerspähwagen vom lenzblauen Himmel ab.“

Es sind nicht allein die faustdicken militärischen Unwahrscheinlichkeiten, gegen die wir uns wenden wollen. Es ist vielmehr die verlogene Sentimentalität und billig-schmierige Gefühlshascherei, mit welchen der erbarmungslose Schrecken des Rußlandkrieges als eine romantische Kriegsspielerci dargestellt wurde. Heute ist es darüber hinaus eine taktlose Unverfrorenheit gegenüber den Tausenden noch in russischer Gefangenschaft befindlichen ehemaligen deutschen Soldaten, wenn in dem

Roman ein deutscher Offizier seine Untergebenen auffordert, sich ruhig freiwillig in Gefangenschaft zu begeben. Man würde sich schon nach Kriegsende wiederschen. Nein, ein Buch, in dem das Grauen des Krieges als eine Art vergrößertes „Räuber und Gendarm“-Spiel, als ein abenteuerliches Vergnügen für „männliche“ Naturen hingestellt wird, hat im Deutschland des Jahres 1953 (noch?) nichts verloren. Bleibt nur zu fragen, wer an derartigen Spekulationen mit der Leichtgläubigkeit der Leser eigentlich ein Interesse hat?

Da werden Weiber zu Hyänen

Die Sittenverwilderung, welche uns die Hitlerzeit beschert hat, möge im folgenden an zwei Urteilen des Karlsruher Bundesgerichts besonders anschaulich aufgezeigt werden.

Im ersten Fall stehen Schwiegermutter und Schwiegersohn schlecht miteinander, wie das öfters vorkommen soll. Sie will ihm einen recht empfindlichen Streich spielen, ohne sich selbst dabei zu exponieren, und kommt auf die Idee, dazu die Stellung des Schwiegersohnes zu benützen. Er ist Unteroffizier und Flugzeugwart bei der deutschen Luftwaffe. Da schreibt sie, es ist im Jahre 1943, also mitten im Zweiten Weltkriege, an seinen Vorgesetzten, der Schwiegersohn treibe Sabotage, er nehme Handgriffe an Flugzeugen vor, damit sie abstürzten, er gehöre an die Wand gestellt. Der Schwiegersohn wurde daraufhin von der Geheimen Feldpolizei verhaftet und blieb 15 bis 20 Tage in Haft. Vom Kriegsgericht wurde er dann freigesprochen, da sich die vollkommene Haltlosigkeit der Beschuldigung herausstellte.

Diese infame Tat der Schwiegermutter fand ihre Sühne erst im Jahre 1952. Wegen wissentlich falscher Anschuldigung konnte die Frau nicht mehr bestraft werden, weil diese Tat verjährt war, aber die Staatsanwaltschaft wußte sich zu helfen, sie erhob Anklage wegen schwerer Freiheitsberaubung. Der Laie wird stutzen; denn die Freiheitsberaubung, die Inhaftsetzung des Schwiegersohnes hatte doch die Militärbehörde vorgenommen und nicht die Schwiegermutter. Aber die Rechtssprechung hat entschieden, daß Täter ist, wer den Erfolg des gesetzlichen Straftatbestandes *verursacht*, auch wenn er den Erfolg durch das Handeln eines anderen herbeiführt. Das hat die Schwiegermutter getan.

Das Schwurgericht Traunstein hatte diese deshalb wegen schwerer Freiheitsberaubung zu 15 Monaten Gefängnis und 3 Jahren Ehrenrechtsverlust verurteilt. Das Bundesgericht hat die dagegen eingelegte Revision verworfen.

Im zweiten Fall gab ein deutscher Soldat, welcher den Zweiten Weltkrieg schon im dritten Jahre mitmachte, seinem Unmut wiederholt durch Schimpfreden auf die führenden Persönlichkeiten des Dritten Reiches und der Partei *seiner Frau gegenüber* Ausdruck. So äußerte er zu ihr im Herbst 1944: „Wenn die Russen kommen, kriegen die Saukerle die Hälse heruntergeschnitten. Goebbels ist ein Lump. Wenn der 20. Juli geglückt wäre, wäre der Krieg aus.“ Einer seiner Briefe an seine Ehefrau

enthielt u. a. die Wendung: „Wenn Hitler kriecht, wäre der Saustall am Ende.“

Die Ehefrau, die sich mit anderen Männern eingelassen hatte, wollte ihren Ehemann loswerden und denunzierte deshalb seine Äußerungen unter Beifügung von Briefen einem SA-Sturmbannführer. Als trotzdem nichts geschah, denunzierte sie ihn zum zweiten Male. Darauf wurde der Mann verhaftet und wegen „Wehrkraftzersetzung“ – einem Delikt nationalsozialistischer Erfindung – angeklagt. In der Hauptverhandlung wies der Vorsitzende die Ehefrau wiederholt darauf hin, von ihrem Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht Gebrauch zu machen, da auf Wehrkraftzersetzung Todesstrafe stehe. Die Ehefrau lehnte dies aber ab, machte und beschwor ihre Aussage. Ihr Mann wurde daraufhin vom Kriegsgericht zum Tode verurteilt. Das Urteil wurde nicht vollstreckt, der Verurteilte blieb jedoch in Haft, bis er im April 1945 zu einem Truppenteil abgestellt wurde und mit diesem in Gefangenschaft geriet.

Nunmehr ist diese herzlose Ehefrau wegen versuchter vorsätzlicher rechtswidriger Tötung und Freiheitsberaubung angeklagt worden. Das Schwurgericht Würzburg hat die Angeklagte jedoch *freigesprochen*, weil es der Ansicht war, daß die vom Kriegsgericht gegen ihren Ehemann ausgesprochene Todesstrafe rechtmäßig gewesen sei; denn wegen Wehrkraftzersetzung konnte eben damals auf Todesstrafe erkannt werden.

Dagegen wendet sich das Urteil des Bundesgerichts; denn zur Verhängung dieser schwersten Strafe war hier kein Anlaß, da der Schuld- und Unrechtsgehalt der abzuurteilenden Tat nur als gering angesehen werden kann.

Das ergangene Todesurteil kann nur dadurch erklärt werden, daß sich das Kriegsgericht in seinem Spruch den damals von der Staatsführung gewünschten und geforderten Bestrebungen nach gewaltsamer Unterdrückung jeder ihr abträglichen Äußerung und Gesinnung gebeugt hat, um ohne Rücksicht auf Art und Maß der Schuld die Strafe als Mittel zur politischen Einschüchterung der Bevölkerung zu mißbrauchen.

Eine aus solchem Motiv heraus verhängte Strafe muß als rechtswidrig angesehen werden. Waren aber die Verhängung des Todesurteils und die Anordnung der Haftfortdauer widerrechtliche Maßnahmen, so waren die für diesen Erfolg ursächlichen Tatbeiträge der Angeklagten ebenfalls widerrechtlich. Daran ändert der Umstand nichts, daß es – worauf das Schwurgericht hingewiesen hat – das gute Recht jedes Staatsbürgers ist, den Strafverfolgungsbehörden Anzeige vermeintlich strafbarer Handlungen zu erstatten.

Das Verhalten der Angeklagten ist selbstverständlich für sich allein noch kein Mordversuch und keine Freiheitsberaubung. Aber ohne ihre Anzeige hätte kein Gerichtsverfahren stattgefunden und wäre kein Todesurteil gefällt worden. Dieser Zusammenhang ist entscheidend für die Rechtmäßigkeit oder Rechtswidrigkeit auch ihres Verhaltens.

Welche Folge ihrer Anzeige hat die Angeklagte gewollt? Sie ist auf die Möglichkeit eines Todesurteils hingewiesen worden, wenn das Gericht durch die Beidigung ihrer Aussage die Überzeugung von deren

Wahrheit gewinnen würde. War sich die Angeklagte bewußt, daß ein auf ihrer Aussage beruhender Richterspruch rechtswidrig sein mußte? Die Unterlassung dieser Frage erklärt das Bundesgericht für den entscheidenden Fehler des Urteils. Es hat die Sache deshalb zurückgewiesen. Ein neues Schwurgericht wird nun darüber entscheiden, ob die Angeklagte durch ihre Strafanzeige und Zeugenaussage sich in mittelbarer Täterschaft des versuchten Mordes schuldig gemacht hat.

Rudels Schande Es ist ein altes Gesetz des Seemanns, daß er sein Schiff nicht verläßt, wenn es in Not gerät. Als unser aller Schiff, Deutschland, 1945 dem Untergang nahe war, als es so aussah, als bräche das Chaos über uns herein, als man für jede helfende Hand dankbar war, retteten sich einige Ratten auf das sichere Aus-Land. Solange das Reich Ehren und Ehrenzeichen zu verteilen vermochte, hatte man ihm gedient, als es aber in Not geriet und vielleicht von eben denjenigen, denen es so viel gegeben, Hilfe erhoffte, da schieden sich die Helden von den Maulhelden. Die einen arbeiteten und versuchten zu retten, was zu retten war, die anderen türmten. Zu diesen anderen gehört auch ein Herr Rudel. Er war während des Krieges oft erwähnt worden. Zwar hatte er nicht mehr riskiert als jeder Soldat in der Kampflinie, da kein Mensch mehr zu riskieren vermag als sein eigenes Leben, aber er hatte es verstanden, sein Leben mit größerem Nutzeffekt einzusetzen als die anderen. Darum stieg er im Rang, wurde mit Ehrenzeichen überhäuft und mit Recht oft genannt.

Dieser Herr Rudel hat in seiner wohlbestallten und sicheren Stellung im Ausland eine Broschüre fabriziert, die er schlicht „Dokumente der Schande“ betitelt. Es ist darin jenes Gesellschaftsspiel vorexerziert, mit dem man sich gelegentlich zum Fünfuhrtee die Zeit vertreibt. Man nimmt ein Thema, wie die Liebe, die Moral oder den Alkohol, man nimmt einen Autor, wie z. B. Goethe, und versucht dann nachzuweisen, daß man mit Zitaten desselben Mannes praktisch alles beweisen kann, für und wider die Liebe, für und wider die Moral und für und wider den Alkohol. Herr Rudel griff zu den Nachkriegsmemoiren, schnippelte fleißig Zeile um Zeile und schnitt so eine Art von Zitatenschatz zusammen, mit dem er klipp und klar beweist, daß der Krieg eine sichere Sache war und man hätte nur die Hand auszustrecken brauchen, um ihn zu gewinnen. Daß er dennoch verloren ging, war einzig Schuld der bösen Verschwörer vom 20. Juli, die dem, ach, so gütigen und feldherrlich begabten Führer in die Arme fielen. Und all das aus Zitaten zusammengepuselt. Alles ist eindeutig, nur der Titel nicht. Man weiß nicht recht, ob die Zitate oder das Pamphlet als „Dokumente der Schande“ gelten sollen.

Man weiß nach der Lektüre der „Dokumente“ aber auch nicht, welches Gefühl in einem stärker ist, der Ärger, der Ekel oder die Beschämung. Ein bißchen mischt sich auch die Trauer hinein darüber, daß der einst „tolle Kerl“ Rudel uns damit den letzten Rest der Bewunderung nimmt, die man vielleicht für ihn hatte. Er begibt sich in die Rolle des

Jahrmarktboxers, der, k.o. geschlagen, immer von der ersten Runde spricht, nach der er „eigentlich hätte gewinnen müssen“. Rudel und seinesgleichen fehlen die Fairneß und der Sportgeist. Sie können nicht verlieren, ohne auch das Gesicht zu verlieren, sie wollen und können nicht glauben, daß der Krieg mehr ist, als ein noch so mutiger kleiner Oberst zu übersehen vermag, und daß nicht einmal der Erste Weltkrieg allein auf dem Schlachtfeld gewonnen werden konnte. Die Zeiten, in denen mit Hurrageschrei und Draufgängertum Schlachten und damit auch Kriege zu gewinnen waren, sind vorbei. Kriege von heute sind ein Kreis, dessen Sektoren u. a. Diplomatie, Wirtschaft, Naturwissenschaften, Forschung, Produktion und Rohstoffe heißen. Der Sektor „Soldaten und Schlachten“ ist wichtig, aber lange nicht mehr so ausschlaggebend, wie er es in früheren Zeiten war. Hitlers Krieg gegen die zivilisierte Welt so hinzustellen, als ob er überhaupt je hätte gewonnen werden können, ist eine böswillige Demagogie. Die Männer des 20. Juli wollten nichts anderes als 1918 Hindenburg, dessen historische Bedeutung nicht mit dem Sieg bei den masurischen Seen gekoppelt ist, sondern vielmehr damit, daß er wußte, wann er die Waffen zu strecken hatte. Hätten wir 1942 gleichdenkende militärische Führer gehabt, dann hätten wir keine Ruinen über und Hunderttausende junger Deutscher als Tote unter der Erde. Tausende gesunder Menschen wären nicht zu Krüppeln geworden und tüchtige Haudegen wie Rudel wären nicht als Emigranten im Ausland, sondern Mitaufbauer eines neuen Reiches. Wir hatten aber keinen Hindenburg, sondern nur ein großes Rudel kleiner Rudel, deren Ideal nicht ein starkes Deutschland im Bunde der europäischen Länder ist, sondern die verbrannte Erde, verweste Leichen, ausgebrannte Häuser und das spießige Gefühl, gleich, was geschieht, wir tun „unsere Pflicht“ bis zuletzt.

Der Zitatenschatz des Herrn Rudel und seinesgleichen beweist nur, daß die Demokratie gegen ihre Feinde unbarmherzig und hart sein muß, so wie ihre Feinde unbarmherzig und hart sind. Es sollte denen, die statt aufzubauen Dolchstoßlegenden fabrizieren, das Handwerk gelegt werden. Denn die Dummen sterben nie aus, und die Spießer, die nur auf solche Pamphlete warten, leben ewig. Sie sind dankbar für solche Schriften, in denen sie hehr und heldisch gezeigt werden, weil sie darin in ihrem Glauben an sich selbst bestärkt werden und wieder einmal den Beweis zu erhalten glauben, daß sie die eigentlichen Sieger hätten sein müssen.

Die alte Babe

Erzählung

Die alte Babe war über sechzig alt, dürr und abgeblättert wie ein Besen aus Birkenreisern, als ihr nach allerlei vergeblichen Versuchen unter den Marktweibern in ungeahnt höherem Maße gelang, was keinem Prediger, keinem Stadtkommandanten, keinem Bürgermeister vor ihr gegeben war, nämlich: neun Tage lang ihre Stadt in Atem zu halten, in einem einzigen, ängstlichen Atemzug, der die Stadtmauern von Görlitz wie ein zu eng gewordenes Wams zu sprengen drohte.

Sie kam von Deutsch-Ossig die Landstraße längs der Neiße herein, beladen mit einer gewichtigen Weissagung und beladen mit einem Korb, in dem ein Huhn schurrte und gelegentlich, wenn der Weg zu schlecht wurde und der Korb schwankte, einen Seufzer steigen ließ, der zwischen Kopf und Kropf irrte, ein verllorener Ton. Die alte Babe ging vorsichtig und gedankenvoll, auf Eiern ging sie, auf den gebratenen und gesottenen Eiern, die das Huhn, das sie von ihrem Sohne in Deutsch-Ossig erbettelt hatte, noch legen würde. Und derweil ein Eierkuchen wie eine Sonne vor ihr tanzte, seufzte sie, aber nicht vor Lust, sie seufzte in tiefer Trauer, denn der Eierkuchen wurde braun, dann rot, und schließlich platzte er und schüttete Feuer herab. Der Eierkuchen und die Sonne, sie tanzten beide, tanzten durcheinander, wurden eins und wurden wieder zwei. Wenn das Huhn sehr fleißig legte, konnte es noch zu einem Eierkuchen kommen, zu einem – nicht mehr! In neun Tagen wird die Sonne platzen und in heißen Scherben auf die Erde fallen! Wenn das Huhn nicht gut legte, aß man lieber gleich das Ei, ungekocht, warm, das hielt die Lebensgeister frisch, sagte man. Aber wozu Lebensgeister, und die alte Babe seufzte und das Huhn schurrte und die Sonne stach und die alte Babe nickte vorwurfsvoll zu dem schwellenden Himmelsapfel und wollte es nicht verstehen.

Wenn sie von fern jemand einherkommen sah, lief sie in das wüste Feld und hielt dem Huhn den Schnabel zu und duckte sich hinter den Hecken. Ach, Korn war wenig gesät, das stand so rar wie die heilen Dörfer und Menschen. Aber die Hecken sind nicht rar, die wachsen von selber und sind gut zum Auflauern und zum Verstecken. Das wäre noch schöner, wenn so ein Landstreicher, Liedermann, Dieb, so ein schwedischer Dragoner, Schelm oder hinkender Kriegstummelmann das Huhn in ihrem Korb bemerkte! Der Herrgott ist vergessen, wenn sie auch seinetwegen einen ewigen Krieg führen, und gestorben ist man schneller, als ein Huhn ein Ei legt, und es sind schon mehr eines Huhnes wegen in dieser Zeit überfallen worden als um ihrer Tugend willen!

Aber so oft sie sich verstecken lief, war sie auch versucht, auf den Mann zuzulaufen, gegen die Sonne zu zeigen und die brennende Weissagung weiter zu sagen: „In neun Tagen!“

Siebenmal war sie schon mit dem Huhn hinter die Hecken geflüchtet, die ängstliche Prophetin, siebenmal ihrem Auftrag untreu geworden, da tauchten in der Ferne die Türme auf, die Nadel des Mönchs, der gemästete Kaisertrutz und der Reichenbacher. Ach, und der Finger überm Rathaus – da wollte sie bald sein – und auch den Finger aufheben – indem kam ein Trab – o Gott, hinter ihr her; aber sie seufzte erleichtert, das sah sie mit ihren blöden Augen noch, das war der lahrende Schimmel des Stadtphysikus, ja, der Schimmel lahnte, weil der Herr Stadtphysikus neuerdings so einen kotzmächtig schweren Trottel vom Schweden bekommen hatte; früher hatten die Bürger keine Trottel, aber Pferde und Geschirr, das auf eine Meile blind macht, o welche Zeiten – neun Tage noch – und da lief sie an die Straße, hob den Finger gegen den Himmel, und der Herr Stadtphysikus erfuhr es auf der Stelle, er nahm vorerst eine Prise, und dann noch eine, nieste und blickte gedankenvoll die Sonne an. „Dann muß ich noch heut meinem Grabmetzen Bescheid geben!“ sprach er und fuhr eilends davon.

Vor der Stadt sprach sie den Seiler an: „Laßt nur das Seilen – in neun Tagen!“ Der Seiler rief seinen Gesellen Feierabend zu, obgleich die Sonne noch stand. „Gott sei Dank!“ rief er, „endlich, das Scilespinnen war kein redlich Handwerk mehr! Nur noch für den Henker und den Kriegsknecht gearbeitet! Und beide lohnens nicht.“ Der Neißewirt aber trat an den Schanktisch, wies auf die alte Babe und sprach zu den Zechern: „Hört ihr's? In neun Tagen! Was nützt da alles Sparen!“ Da er aber das Bier trotz der unverlässlichen Sonne nicht umsonst ausschenkte, schwoll seine Geldkatze noch an diesem Abend, als hätten die Zecher allesamt den Heckpfennig auf der Peterstreppe gefunden.

Als die alte Babe auf den Marktplatz kam, es dämmerte schon, wunderte sie sich sehr, weil da alles lief und stand und durcheinanderquirlte wie brutzelndes Öl in der Pfanne. Ach, der Eierkuchen! Sie wußte nicht, sollte sie zuerst nach Hause gehen und das Huhn besorgen oder sollte sie zuerst aufs Rathaus. Da sie eben unschlüssig den Platz überquerte und doch geschwind noch einer Nachbarin das Schreckliche mitteilen wollte, lachte die: „Ach, das brauchst du mir zu sagen, das wußte ich schon heute morgen!“ Da stellte die alte Babe den Korb hin und schüttelte zuerst den Kopf. Aber dann lachte sie ihrerseits, schrie: „O, du abgeklappertes Besenstiel, heute morgen wußtest du das? Warst du in in Deutsch-Ossig? Hast du mit dem schimmelgrauen Mann gesprochen, am Birnbaum über der Neiß?“ Und sie gerieten beide so in Zorn, daß sie sich in die Haare fuhren. Das gab Auflauf, und die Scharwache kam und nahm sie beide mit.

Im Rathaus, da war der Herr Stadtphysikus bei den Räten. Und als er die alte Babe sah, rief er: „Da kommt sie ja!“ Die alte Babe blickte die Nachbarin höhnisch von oben an: „Hörst du, da kommt sie ja! Und du willst es heute morgen schon gewußt haben. Da muß dich der Teufel

hin- und hergetragen haben, du alte Gake!“ Und sie erzählte, was der graue Mann ihr mitgeteilt hatte. „In neun Tagen!“ Man fragte sie, wie er ausgesehen habe. Grau war er, schimmelgrau, grau wie ein Esel, wie ein Mehlsack, wie ungebleichtes Linnen, ganz grau! – Ob er einen Bart hatte? – „Ja, einen grauen Bart hatte er, grau wie Graphit, wie Staub! Er war sehr alt.“ Und was er genau sagte, der graue Mann? „Genau? In neun Tagen wird die Sonne platzen und in Stücken auf die Erde fallen! Alles wird verbrennen, alles!“ Und sie zählte alles auf, was verbrennen sollte.

Der Rat hörte zu, und jeder machte ein ernstes Gesicht, wie immer, wenn etwas zu beraten war. Schließlich fragte der Bürgermeister, was da zu tun sei, es müßte doch etwas getan werden. Der Hauptpastor schlug Bußgottesdienste vor, die nützten auf jeden Fall. Wenn der göttliche Entschluß nicht wie bei Ninive geändert werden könnte, so doch das unbußfertige Herz des Sünders.

Ein Tuchermeister schlug vor, angesichts der Möglichkeit, daß vielleicht nicht die ganze Welt, sondern nur ihre Stadt untergehen sollte, möchte man versuchen, die bewegliche Habe ins Gebirge zu bringen, wohin das Feuer vielleicht nicht käme. Vor allem aber müßte man es heimlich tun und die Schweden und überhaupt das Bettlerpack nicht benachrichtigen, sondern in der Stadt zurücklassen, das sei ein Rat für alle Fälle. Dieser Rat fand größeren Beifall. Die alte Babe aber schüttelte den Kopf: „Der graue Mann sagte: die Welt geht unter! Nicht die Stadt Görlitz! Ich muß es wohl wissen!“ Und es stieß ihr ein Hungerwölkchen auf, ihr Magen rollte, das war ein drohender Donner. Sie schluckte artig, schwieg und blickte sich mit heimlicher Neugierde im Rathause um. Ja, die alte Babe – daß sie einmal im Rat sitzen sollte! Der Herr lenkt des Menschen Läufe wie Wasserläufe.

Der Jesusbäcker, ein frommer Mann, an dessen Haus eine der vom seligen und strengen Bürgermeister Emmerich vor grauer Zeit schon errichteten Kreuzwegstationen zum heiligen Grabe angebracht war, dieser Jesusbäcker, der seiner Hausfront alle Ehre machen wollte, schlug vor, man sollte es sich die letzten Tage gut sein lassen und alle Armen mit Brot und Fleisch sättigen, die Schweden in Bier schwimmen lassen und so ein freudiges Jerusalem der herunterfallenden Sonne bereiten. Er wollte von sich aus 250 Laib Mischelbrot und 100 Laib Kornbrot dazu stiften. Die alte Babe dachte: und ich mein Huhn, das wär etwas! Und sie lachte hinten im Halse. Das Huhn stand neben ihr und schurrte. Vielleicht hatte es eben ein Ei gelegt, oh, sie hatte Hunger!

Der Wirt aus dem Braunen Hirschen erbot sich, drei Fuder Wein aufzulegen, wenn die andern Wirte diesem Beispiele folgten, schlug aber vor, einen Sechser fürs Maß zu erheben, um der Unbändigkeit zuvorzukommen und auch für alle Fälle. „Denn“, so schloß er, „sollte der höchste Herr seinen Entschluß ändern, wäre der Verlust zu groß, und bei der allgemeinen Unsicherheit des Handels und Wandels müßten wir auf einen teuren Weinkauf ausgehen!“ Die alte Babe schüttelte nur den

Kopf, dann erhob sie sich und wollte gehen. „Weil meine Worte ja nur auf taube Ohren stoßen!“ sagte sie.

Draußen hatte sich ein großer Lärm erhoben. Die Stimmen prasselten wie ein Sturzregen über dem Pflaster, und manchmal hörten die Ratsherren einen Choral unter dem Geschrei.

Als die alte Babe so gesprochen hatte, erhob sich Gregor Gobsch, seit einigen Jahren schrieb er sich Gregorius Gobius, er schüttelte die Perücke einmal heftig und stand in einer Gloriole von Puder da, er zupfte die französische Brokatweste unter seinem allbekannten roten Rock, räusperte sich und sprach: „Wie denn, hochlöblicher Rat, ist es möglich, daß die Sonne, wenn sie zerbrechen sollte, unsere kleine Erde, welche Kleinheit die Gelehrten erwiesen haben, mit ihren Scherben treffen kann! Treffen doch aus den trefflichsten Kartaunen die wenigsten Schüsse, wie aus den vielen Erfahrungen auf den Mauern unserer Stadt wir wissen. Und überdies wissen wir, daß die Sonne nicht einmal zielt, wie unsere Richtleute zielen!“ Der Hauptpastor zupfte geschwind an seinem weißen Latz, aber er sagte nichts. Die alte Babe wiederholte: „Ich gehe!“ Gregorius Gobius aber sprach in die Richtung, wo der Hauptpastor saß, mit seiner christlichen Stimme: „Und sind überdies die Zeichen erfüllt, die der Erde das Ende verkünden? Hat der Antichrist schon sein Reich errichtet?“ Da schrie der Hauptpastor: „He, hört den Ungläubigen, den Zauberer und Geldmacher, ich glaube, er ist in der Stille Papist, wie könnte er sonst das Reich des Antichristen verkennen; der da sitzt in Rom und mit seinen jesuitischen Heuschreckenschwärmen das gelobte Land das Evangelium überfällt. Aber wir wissen, daß Herr Gobius aus geheimen Büchern eine gewisse Kunst betreibt, vor allem die Kunst, Leichname zu balsamieren, welcher Frevel sich gegen das Gebot des Herrn richtet, daß wir aus Staub sind und wieder zu Staub werden sollen. Oder steht geschrieben, daß wir zu Mumien werden sollen wie die Isis-anbeter?“ Die alte Babe nickte. Als aber nun Gregorius Gobius auf den Hauptpastor mit scharfen Worten eindrang und sein Recht, Leichen einzubalsamieren 1. aus dem Naturrecht, 2. aus der Bibel, 3. aus dem Brauch der Völker, 4. aus der Ehrfurcht vor dem Tempel des Heiligen Geistes, welcher ist der Leib des Christus, mit langer Rede bewies, so lang, daß die Kerzen dreimal geschneuzt wurden, da fühlte die alte Babe in ihrem Magen eine Schwäche, die bei jedem Punkt des Herrn Gobius zunahm, bis sie schließlich, als er beim Tempel des heiligen Geistes angekommen war, sanft vom Sessel sank. Und während der erschrockene Rat sie mit fünfzig Händen und mehr noch umdrängte, von denen nur einige an sie gelangten und auf den Sessel zurückhoben, und während sie immerfort seufzte: „O Gott, o Gott, in neun Tagen!“, rief der Herr Hauptpastor, rief immer wieder, bis seine Stimme sich überschlug: „Jerusalem, Jerusalem, daß du die Tage der Heimsuchung erkennst!“ – Da er aber an die Stelle kam: „wie eine Henne ihre Küchlein versammelt“, fuhr die alte Babe auf, suchte neben sich, vor sich, hinter sich und rief: „Wo ist mein Korb, wo ist mein Korb!“ Und als sie den Korb erblickte und gestand, ein Huhn von ihrem Sohn aus Deutsch-Ossig sei

darinnen, da lachte Herr Gobius: „Beim Huhn der Prophetin, laßt uns auseinandergehen!“ Aber da wurde der Hauptpastor noch zorniger, Herr Gobius gab wieder Antwort, und diese denkwürdige Sitzung endete damit, daß der Hauptpastor die Gobiussche Perücke in der Hand hielt, wohingegen die rechte Backe des Hauptpastors die fünf Finger des Gobius abgebildet trug. Und da der übrige Rat Partei nahm, war eine große Spaltung entstanden, eine linke und eine rechte Seite. Die Gobiussche Seite war nicht recht überzeugt vom Weltuntergang, die Seite des Hauptpastors aber beschloß, jeden Tag zum heiligen Grab von Görlitz zu gehen, bis zum neunten Tag, wenn der Herr auf den Wolken erscheine.

So endete der erste Tag. Am zweiten Tage wurde es in Görlitz über die Maßen heiß, und die Bußprozession ließ Stapfen von Schweiß hinter sich; seit hundert Jahren, so hieß es, sei kein so heißer Tag über Görlitz gewesen. „Am Nordpol ist Eis und Schnee“, sagte Gregorius Gobius getrost im Braunen Hirschen, wo sich alle seine Anhänger versammelten.

Am dritten Tage geschah es, daß ein Hirtenmädchen von einem Schwein in die verborgene Höhne geführt wurde, unterhalb der Landeskronen. Da sei der graue Mann gewesen und habe gesagt: „In neun Tagen!“ Gobius aber spottete: „Scht, wir haben zwei Tage Frist hinzubekommen!“

Aber es geschah doch ein seltsames und bedrücktes Saufen in allen Gewölben, die Hitze ließ auch an den folgenden Tagen nicht nach, und es war, als wollten die Zecher ein unauslöschliches Feuer in ihren Eingeweiden tilgen.

Im Braunen Hirschen geschah es am vierten Abend, daß ein schwedischer Leutnant sich vermaß, und zwar in Gegenwart des herbeigerufenen Hauptpastors, sich in seinen Degen zu stürzen. Da er aber stich- und kugelfest war, durch seinen Mansfelder Taler am Halse, der das Bild des Drachentöters Georg auf der einen und das Schiffelein Christi auf der andern Seite eingepreßt trug, wollte er mit dieser spitzigen und gefährlichen Probe dartun: wenn der Zauber nicht hält, geht die Welt unter. Aber die Welt geht nicht unter, denn der Zauber hält! Und obgleich ihm Gobius nahelegte, man lebe in der Zeit der Falschmünzerei (was er gegen den Hauptpastor hin sagte) und es sei nicht erwiesen, ob der Mansfelder Taler gut sei – der Leutnant zwängte seinen Degen zwischen Bank und Gefäß, nahm lachend einen Anlauf und lag dann jämmerlich im eigenen Stahl, der ihm plötzlich wie ein Dorn aus dem Rücken wuchs.

Da war am fünften Tage die Prozession zum heiligen Grabe größer geworden und das Häuflein im Braunen Hirschen kleiner.

Zum Hause der alten Babe aber kamen die Frauen den ganzen Tag. Sie ließen sich den grauen Mann beschreiben, den Platz, wo er gestanden, die Worte, die er gesagt hatte. Und viele schrieben sich alles auf einen Zettel und legten ihn unters Kopfkissen. Und die Frauen vergaßen das Kochen und Putzen und Bettenmachen, sie standen vor den Haustüren, blickten gegen die Sonne und sprachen den ganzen Tag. Die

Männer aber schimpften und wollten zu essen haben, die Kinder weinten und verstanden nicht, warum ihre Milch sauer und ihr Brei angebrannt war.

Die alte Babe aber lebte in Hülle und Fülle. Das Huhn legte alle zwei Tage ein Ei, und die Frauen, die kamen, brachten der frommen Prophetin Braten, Weißbrot und Wein. Jetzt wäre es schön gewesen, wenn man hätte sagen können: „In neun Tagen!“, aber es waren ihrer nur noch drei, zwei, und dann kam der letzte.

In den ersten Tagen war der Jammer im Volke groß gewesen, in den folgenden waren die Tränen verbraucht und die Kehlen rauh und die Worte alle zum tausendsten Male wiederholt. So kam es denn auch, daß die Prozession am achten Tage die geringste Beteiligung hatte, es gingen mit dem Hauptpastor nur einige Prediger und Kinder und Vetteln. Am neunten Tage machten die Männer zur Probe nun gleichsam allesamt ernst. Nur Gobius und einige Hartgesottene ließen sich nicht herbei. Der Bürgermeister aber ließ sich vom Hauptpastor herrichten und gab Anordnung, am neunten Tage Gobius und seine Gesellen in den Turm zu sperren, weil er dem gläubigen Volke Ärgernis gebe und ein Zauberer und Ketzler sei. Die Schweden wollten ihn zwar aus dem Turm holen, er aber bat, ihn und seine Anhänger in Sicherheit zu lassen, denn der Turm sei feuerfest, und so überlebe er mit seinen Getreuen das Ende der Welt. Während man nun auf Beschluß des Rates die andern Gefangenen aus den Verliesen in den Abend hinausließ und die Scharwache durch die Gassen strich, um Ordnung im großen Gedränge und Wehklagen zu halten, stand der Hauptpastor inmitten der Choral Sänger im vollen Ornat auf dem Marktplatz am Brunnen. In den Lauben saß auf hergerichteten Bänken geduckt der Rat und die Honoratioren, die Menge stand wie ein Kornfeld Halm bei Halm und wogte und wisperte; die Uhr vom Mönch schlug zwölf, ach Gott, nun waren es nach der Ratsuhr noch sieben Minuten, denn der Mönch ging sieben Minuten vor nach altem Brauch. Da kam ein Mann durch die Brüderstraße heraus, ging zum Brunnen hinüber, wo der Hauptpastor sich aufgestellt hatte, und er sagte: „Verzeiht, Herr Primarius, aber es ist besser für Euch, wenn Ihr nach Hause geht!“ Als ihm der Hauptpastor die Lampe ins Gesicht hielt, schrie er auf: „Ketzler bis zuletzt! Weh Euch, der Herr kommt!“ Der Mann zuckte bedauerlich die Schulter und sagte: „Ob ich ein Ketzler bin, Herr Primarius, wollen wir morgen sehen!“ „Morgen?“ Der Hauptpastor stotterte über diese Gottlosigkeit und den Hohn, den er in der Stimme des Schusters Böhme zum tausendsten Male entdeckte. Und zur Laube, wo der Rat saß, rief er: „Führt diesen Mann fort, er glaubt nicht an die Wiederkunft Christi!“ „Es ist der Böhme-Schuster!“ tuschelte es unter den Lauben und im Volk. „Ich glaube an die Wiederkunft Christi“, rief die klare, sanfte Stimme über den lichternden Markt, der plötzlich still war, als seien die Köpfe reglos und tote Pflastersteine geworden. „Christus kommt wieder in jedem Menschen zu jeder Stunde, wenn er zur Sonne Gottes Ja sagt – ihr aber macht aus der Wiederkunft eine Possel!“ Der Primarius schrie. Aber der Böhme-Schuster blieb stehen und

lächelte. Dann ging er auf die Rathhaustreppe und rief: „Geht schlafen, morgen ist auch noch ein Tag!“ Aber alle blieben stehen, und der Markt murrte. Da kam die Scharwache, vom Rate geschickt, und holte den Böhme-Schuster von der Treppe und führte ihn in den Turm, wo Gobius mit den Scinen zechte. Und Jakob Böhme trank in dieser Nacht, bis der Morgen graute und die Sonne stieg.

Denn wieviel Choräle auf dem Markt auch gestiegen waren, es wurde Mitternacht und Morgen und nichts geschah. Die Herren vom Rat atmeten auf, und alle, die das Zipperlein hatten, fluchten auf das duckmäusige Stillsitzen unter den Marktlauben, und es fiel auch ein Stück des ratlichen Murrens dem Hauptpastor vor die Füße. Da dachte der an die Prophetin, sagte es laut, und alle wiederholten nachdrücklich und mit Befehlsstimme: „Die alte Babel!“ Die Scharwache fand sie auf ihrer Stube, schwimmend in einer funkelnden Lache Wein. Nun, da sie die dickgeschlafenen Augen auftat und die blinkenden, gezackten Hellebarden über sich sah, duckte sie sich, denn sie nahm das in der Morgensonne funkelnde Eisen für heiße Sonnenscherben und wimmerte ihr Sterbegebet.

Noch in der Morgenstunde stand sie vor dem Rat, neben sich den Korb und das Huhn darin. Der Hauptpastor wollte sie wegen arglistiger Blendung des christlichen Volkes in heiligen Dingen zum Tode verurteilen lassen, aber Gobius, der zum Rate wieder erschienen war, ließ ein säuerliches Rülpsen steigen und sagte: „Die Welt ist voll alter Baben. Wenn man sie alle köpfen wollte, gäbe es keine Aufregungen mehr. Und uns, fürwahr, so denke ich doch, ist die Nacht gut bekommen!“

Da schauten sich einige Herren vom Rat verlegen an, und das rettete dem Weibe das Leben. Sie wurde aus der Stadt verbannt. Am Reichenbacher Tor aber gab ihr Gregorius Gobius die Hand und ließ sie der heiligen Dreifaltigkeit schwören, daß sie ihm ihre Leiche zur Einbalsamierung überlassen werde. Und als sie es geschworen hatte, sagte er: „Dann schneide ich dir den Bauch auf, und in deinem Herzen finde ich es, wer der graue Mann war!“ Da reckte sich die alte Babe und rief: „Gott steh mir bei, grau war er, grau wie ein Esel, wie mein Haar so grau, aber ich weiß nicht mehr, ob er sagte: neun Tage oder neun Jahre! Wahrhaftig, ich habe es vergessen! Aber die Welt wird untergehn, glaubt es mir, ganz gewiß! In neun Wochen oder neun Monden – ich habe es vergessen!“ Und sie schob ihren Korb, in dem das fleißige Huhn schurrte, unter den andern Arm und schritt zornig zum Tore hinaus.

FRITZ DIETRICH

Demeter – Ein Sonettenkranz

*Theodor Däubler zum Gedächtnis**Das Meistersonett dieses Sonettenkranzes stammt von Theodor Däubler*

WOHLHABEND

Athenern brachte Demeter den Frieden:
 Sie tritt zum Herde, wo die Ehe glückt,
 Ihr Weiheheim bleibt gabenreich geschmückt,
 Denn Wohlstand ward den Auen mitbeschieden.

Sie weilt auch gerne bei zufriednen Schmieden,
 Hat ihren Hang zum Harnisch rasch entrückt,
 Für jüngste Pflüge Hämmernde entzückt:
 Bescheidne Geister kreisen nun hienieden.

Sie tritt bei Töpfern in die warmen Stuben.
 – Verschleiert oft – am Ernste drum erkannt.
 Sie bringt den Ton aus ungenannten Gruben,

Erfindet ein Gefäß mit leichter Hand.
 Der frohe Mann blickt fromm, verstummt die Buben:
 Die fremde Frau beschattet keine Wand!

Theodor Däubler

I

Athenern brachte Demeter den Frieden.
 Sie lähmt den Mann in seinem Trutzigsein
 Und flößt den Frauen ein Vertrauen ein,
 Daß sie sich für ihr höchstes Amt entschieden.

Für eine Feier war der Markt zu klein,
 Weil auch die Männer, die sie lang gemieden,
 Sich mitgebeugt und scheu am Feldweg knieten,
 Der von Eleusis führt zur Stadt herein.

Nach fürchterlichen Taten, kaum zu schildern,
 Wird lebenswerter dieses Leben sein,
 Die ernste Göttin steuert dem Verwildern
 Und setzt die Frau in ihre Rechte ein.
 Indes die Feldmark sich in Frieden schmückt,
 Tritt sie zum Herde, wo die Ehe glückt.

II

Sie tritt zum Herde, wo die Ehe glückt
 Und ihr zum Lob die Feuer nicht erkalten.
 Wir danken es der Göttin stillem Walten,
 Daß unsre Lust nicht taube Blüten pflückt.

Schon wird die Wiege in den Raum gerückt.
 Der Strom des Lebens ist nicht aufzuhalten
 Und überschwemmt mit phallischen Gewalten
 Das dumpfe Warten, das die Frau bedrückt.

Sie staunt, wie draußen schon das Feld gesegnet
 Mit schweren Halmen sich zur Erde bückt
 Und bald der Baum im Garten Früchte regnet.
 Ist ihr, nur ihr kein Siegel aufgedrückt
 Der Göttin, die der ganzen Welt begegnet?
 Ihr Weiheheim bleibt gabenreich geschmückt.

III

Ihr Weiheheim bleibt gabenreich geschmückt
 Von solchen Frauen, die im Stillen leiden,
 Indes die andern ihre Herde weiden,
 Mit jedem Jahre reichlicher bestückt.

Will sich ein Zorngebirge vorbereiten,
 Das auf Verschmähte seine Blitze schickt?
 Schon grollt der Mann, beginnt die Frau zu meiden,
 Die, lange schlaflos, weinend eingenickt.

Halt ein! Die Göttin, die sich ihr verschlossen,
 Verheißt vielleicht den größten Mitbesitz
 An aller Welt für den versagten Sprossen,
 Freu dich an fremden Herden, fremden Frieden
 Und lähme nicht durch deines Neides Blitz
 Den Wohlstand, der den Auen mitbeschieden!

IV

Denn Wohlstand ward den Auen mitbeschieden,
 Wenn sich der Pfründner nicht im Glück vergaß.
 Es leiht der Herr den Knechten seinen Frieden,
 Erweist sich die Gerechtigkeit als Maß.

Wohlhabenheit erfordert ernste Taten;
 Dazu bedarf es einer Künstlerhand,
 Die, mild und streng, vom Herzen wohlberaten,
 Im fremden Stoff ihr eignes Schicksal fand.

Droht Überfluß die Ehrfurcht zuzuschütten,
 Flammt Hybris auf und jagt uns übern Rand,
 Dann zieht die Göttin in bescheidne Hütten,
 Wo sie seit je die frömmsten Diener fand,
 Auf mühevолlem Segen ruht ihr Frieden.
 Sie weilt auch gerne bei zufriednen Schmieden.

V

Sie weilt auch gerne bei zufriednen Schmieden,
 Die viel zu lang ins Joch des Mars gespannt.
 Denn tödlich war das Eisen, das sie glühten,
 Und die Erfindung, die sie darauf verwandt.

In jedem Aufbruch kriegsbereiter Geister
 Ist einem Mann die Rüstung Goldes wert,
 Und alle Hoffnung ist dem Waffenmeister
 Und seiner Kunst abgöttisch zugekehrt.

Doch wenn die Mächte an sich selbst ermatten,
 Weil Demeter den heiligen Schoß verschloß,
 Dann wappnet sich die Übermacht der Satten
 Und spannt den Hunger ein als Kampfgenoß.
 Und auch Apoll, der seinen Pestpfeil zückt,
 Hat ihren Hang zum Harnisch rasch entrückt.

VI

Hat ihren Hang zum Harnisch rasch entrückt
 Die hohe Göttin, deren Schmerz ich künde,
 Entwindet sich dem Kriegsherrn das Gesinde,
 Das längst von seinen Freveln abgerückt.

Durch solche Opfer Mütter so zu kränken
 Und zu vergeuden ganzer Stämme Blut,
 Läßt mich voll Sorge an die Göttin denken,
 Die wie erstarrt in dunkler Höhle ruht.

Vom Jammer übermannt, denkt sie der Pflichten.
 Nach jedem Blutrausch wird die Waffe schwer.
 Sie schleppt geborstne Harnische daher,
 Sie vor bedrückten Schmieden aufzuschichten.
 Hat Demeter, eh sie dem Blick entrückt,
 Für jüngste Pflüge Hämmernde entzückt?

VII

Für jüngste Pflüge Hämmernde entzückt,
 Hat der Beschluß der Göttin. Und nun dienen
 Ihr harte Männer, die ihr Unwerk sühnen,
 Wenn sie im Schmiedefeuer umgeknickt

Zu Feldgeräten die verfehnten Waffen.
 Schon lauern Bauern, daß der Segen quillt,
 Der durch Geduld der Erde zu entrafen
 Und im verstörten Volk den Hunger stillt.

Mit Nestbegierde wird das Kind berochen,
 Das sich aus der Geborgenheit verlor
 Und wiederkehrt. So holt man Brot hervor
 Ganz andachtsvoll in diesen Kummerwochen
 Und schließt mit der gekränkten Göttin Frieden.
 Bescheidne Geister kreisen nun hienieden.

VIII

Bescheidne Geister kreisen nun hienieden
 In strengen Bahnen um den Wesenskern.
 Der Göttin sich als Mysten anzubieten,
 Ziehn viele hin. Eleusis ist nicht fern.

Was hat die Eingeweihten so durchschauert?
 Birgt die verschlossne Lade einen Keim,
 Der alles Leid der Erde überdauert?
 Nichts dringt heraus. Die Botschaft bleibt geheim.

Will unsre Weisheit mit der Göttin ringen?
 Unweise wärs! Sie weicht ins Feld zurück
 Und bringt die Schnitterinnen dort zum Singen,
 Durchglänzt die schwangre Frau mit sanftem Blick;
 Verlaufnes Lamm lenkt sie zum Hirtenbuben
 Und tritt bei Töpfern in die warmen Stuben.

IX

Sie tritt bei Töpfern in die warmen Stuben
 Als Nachbarin und freut sich am Geruch
 Des feuchten Tons, den hinterm Erlenbruch
 Tagtäglich wählerisch die Mägde gruben,

Die Scheibe kreist und eine Hand vollendet
 Amphoren, Kannen, Schalen mannigfalt,
 Darein die Göttin ihren Segen spendet.
 Formkraft besiegt der Klumpen Ungestalt.

Doch sich! nun tritt aus roher Töpfererde
 Die Göttin selbst mit Ähren in der Hand,
 Dem Meister glückt die segnende Gebärde,
 Auch ihr Gesicht, dem Hades zugewandt.
 Dort sucht ihr Blick der Tochter Totenfährte –
 Verschleiert oft – am Ernste drum erkannt.

X

Verschleiert oft, am Ernste drum erkannt,
 So schau auf uns die Mütter, seit die Erde,
 Die schwer verletzte, um und um gekehrte,
 Sich in den Krämpfen vieler Kriege wand.

Ward ihre Mahnung in den Wind geschlagen,
 Die in Elcuisis furchtbar widerhallt?
 Wir sind nicht klug und dennoch sind wir alt,
 Vernunftgespenster, die auf Gletschern tagen –

Sind wir verhärtet, nicht mehr umzukneten?
 Schon drängen wir die Göttin: „Schlage zu!
 Versenk dich wieder in die heilige Truh
 Und laß den Wind mit unserm Staube reden!“
 Sie überhörts wie ein Geschrei von Buben
 Und bringt den Ton aus ungenannten Gruben.

XI

Sie bringt den Ton aus ungenannten Gruben,
 Da Hermes ihr, der Seelenhirte, treu
 Zur Seite steht. Mit jedem Tage neu
 Stößt sie mit Macht in Auferstehungs-Tuben.

Auch zählt die Göttin nie, was sie verlor,
 Wenn sie durchdrungen wird von Lichtes Pollen.
 Gewaltig drängt sie, daß wir kommen sollen.
 Grabkammern bersten, Kore tritt hervor.

Vergiß nicht: in Elcuisis wird gesät,
 Gilt nur als Saattuch jedes Prachtgewand
 Dem Schöpfer, der die Lebensscheibe dreht
 Und dem die Göttin liebend zugewandt.
 Er greift zum Ton, indes sein Atem weht,
 Erfindet ein Gefäß mit leichter Hand.

XII

Erfindet ein Gefäß mit leichter Hand!
 Was schließt es ein? Was wagt es auszusagen?
 Nach außen schön, geläutert durch den Brand:
 Zusammenklang und Spiel in allen Lagen.

Der Hingerißne überhört die Klagen
 Des Künstlers, in den Hintergrund verbannt.
 Das Werk verschleiert seinen Marterstand
 Und seufzt geheim: Komm, Göttin, hilf ihm tragen!

Doch statt zu helfen, plagt sie ihn noch mehr
 Und treibt ihn an, den Töpfer an der Scheibe.
 Gleich einem Weib ist er ohn Gegenwehr,
 Die kreißend liegt mit überreifem Leibe.
 Doch überstülpt das Glück die Wochenstuben:
 Der frohe Mann blickt fromm, verstummt die Buben.

XIII

Der frohe Mann blickt fromm, verstummt die Buben,
Wenn junges Leben sich von reifem reißt.
Die je Lebendiges zum Lichte huben,
Sie pflichten bei, wenn man die Göttin preist.

Ein Weib, das zitternd dich willkommen heißt,
Um die Bastion des Lebens zu besetzen,
Will, daß dein Mund in die Granatfrucht beißt
Und du der Göttin dienst in Liebesnetzen.

Ihr Tödliches liegt jedem Kuß zugrunde
Und füllt dich aus mit Erde bis zum Rand.
Macht Demeter im Dunklen ihre Runde,
Verascht die Glut. Zu vorbestimmter Stunde
Wägt sie dich wie die Frucht in ihrer Hand.
Die fremde Frau beschattet keine Wand!

XIV

Die fremde Frau beschattet keine Wand
Wie der Geliebte, der ins Licht erhoben.
Sie nimmt ihn mit. Wir stehen wie gebannt.
Noch ist die Sicht von Tränenflor umwoben.

Wir haben es erkannt nach vielen Proben:
Die Gattenwahl der Göttin hat Bestand.
Geläutertes fährt unbeschwert nach oben,
Und seine Glut kennt keinen Aschenrand.

Uns, denen in der Hülle dagelassen
Viel Irdisches, das man Erinnerung nennt,
Wir stehen vorm Altar, der ewig brennt,
Um feurig neue Opfer zu umfassen –
Und bußbereit wie damals, als hienieden
Athenern brachte Demeter den Frieden.

LITERARISCHE RUNDSCHAU

Wotan mit der Opiumpfeife

Der jüngste Ernst Jünger

Wir haben dem „*Besuch auf Godenholm*“, Ernst Jüngers zuletzt erschienenem Werk (Frankfurt a. M., Verlag Vittorio Klostermann), gerne eine gewisse Laufzeit gegönnt, um nicht in den Verdacht zu kommen, heißspornige Kritik anzusetzen. Wir haben uns die literarische Beurteilung dieses Werkes mit dem gebotenen Ernst zu Gemüte geführt, waren aber verwundert, daß man der Ehrfurcht vor dem Namen des Verfassers zuliebe auch dann eine etwas gepreizte Vorsicht übte, wenn man ernsthafte Bedenken hatte und sogar, in Einzelfällen, das schmale Büchlein ablehnte. Bevor sich dieser Zustand verhärtet, sei diesem letzten Werk Jüngers eine Behandlung gewidmet, die aufzeigen soll, was Jünger dem nichtsahnenden Zeitgenossen hier zumutet.

Ohne viele Umschweife und mit jener eleganten „*désinvolture*“, die Jünger in den literarischen Zirkeln von Paris aufgelesen hat, verläßt er die zivilisierte Welt und die christliche Stimmung, der er in den „*Strahlungen*“ und dem Roman „*Heliopolis*“ nahe schien, und entführt uns ins nordische Nebelreich, wo hochgewachsene Lichtsöhne und -töchter hausen, deren Namen einem urzeitliche Schauer über den Rücken laufen lassen: Einar, Ulma, Erdmüthe, Sigrid, Frigga, und der etwas ulkige Gaspar. Sie leben nach dem „*mythischen Vorbild der Götterdämmerungen und Weltbrände*“, brechen in Schwarmzeiten im Gefolge eines Waffenfürsten auf, fahren „*mit wickender Bewegung*“ über die Fjorde, fischen nahe den Holmen den roten Berggilt, während in den Rauhnhäuten oder an Frau Bertas Tag „*der Fenriswolf anschlägt*“, „*das Band Gleipnir sich lockert*“ und „*Heimdal die Wacht hält*“. In Stunden, die „*etwas Stiftendes*“ haben, sitzt man auf einsamen Berghöhen in der mythisch-schummerigen Halle und ißt „*Julbrod, dem Fros Eber mit buchenem Model eingedrückt ist*“.

Zwei junge Männer, ein Arzt und ein Vorgesichtsforscher, die einander als Offiziere kennenlernten, folgen einer Einladung in dieses nordische Land und besuchen Schwarzenberg, den Alten vom Berge, den großen Magier, auf seinem Sitz Godenholm. Es sind zwei suchende Seelen, denen nach Deutschlands Niederlage die innere Welt aus den Fugen geriet. Schwarzenberg, der aufgenordete magische Lehrmeister Nigromontanus aus „*Heliopolis*“, genießt bei Eingeweihten den Ruhm eines eschatologischen Tausendsasas. Sein Faktotum ist Gaspar, und da

Jünger in überraschender Ehrlichkeit – oder macht er sich über den Leser lustig? – von Schwarzenberg sagt, „im Personal werde seine primitive Seite am deutlichsten“, darf man füglich aus dem Wesen Gaspars einige Schlüsse ziehen: auf dem tätowierten Körper sitzt ein Totenkopf mit enzianblauen Augen, er spricht verschiedene Sprachen durcheinander, schweifte, die Opiumpfeife rauchend, durch Asien usw. „Wie Schwarzenberg geistig, so bewegt Gaspar sich physisch durch die Welt.“ Dies klingt wie ein Indiz, als wollte Jünger auf die schwachen Seiten des Zauberers weisen.

Tatsächlich wird die urgermanische Stimmung jeweils präziös zugespitzt und dadurch unfreiwillig ironisiert. Wenn Gaspar sagt, daß er seinen Schmiß einem „Charognard“ zu verdanken habe, das ist, einem Angeber in den Strafbataillonen der Steinbrüche von Meknes, dann kann es nicht überraschen, wenn in dieser julischen Urigkeit sogar „artesisische Punkte“ erreicht werden, wenn in dieser famosen Gegend nicht Zigaretten, sondern Cigaretten geraucht und Waffen aus Bronze, nicht Bronze gesammelt werden. Man spürt das Courths-Mahlerische Monokel und wird leicht verstimmt.

In einer zentralen Szene bemüht sich Schwarzenberg nun, die beiden jungen Männer völlig umzuformen und zu heilen. Schwarzenberg selbst hat den Kopf eines Patriziers, der „den Eindruck bestimmter und unbezweifelbarer Macht erweckt“. Dies hebt ihn, man staune, über das Niveau von Offizieren, hohen Richtern und Unternehmern und läßt ihn in die Verwandtschaft des Oberförsters (in der Sprache Jüngers: Hitler) aufrücken, allerdings die Macht ins Gute wendend. Schwarzenberg hat sich in diesem „phantasmagorischen Land“ angesiedelt, um den Mächten des Lebens näher zu sein. Sie werden nun heranbemüht, um Menschen umzustülpen. Dies führt zu folgendem Vorgang: in der altväterlichen Halle auf Godenholm empfängt Schwarzenberg seine Gäste eines Tages, wie gewöhnlich in langem Gewande in einem großen Lehnstuhl sitzend, ein Stirnband ums Haupt geschlungen, stundenlanges Schweigen und bittere Düfte füllen den Raum; Schwarzenberg verbreitet einen „pythagoreischen Glanz“, und es scheint, daß sich „von seinem Geist feine Teilchen ablösen und den Raum mit wirksamer Kraft erfüllen“. Es ist ein Geist, der dem trockenen Begriff „indogermanisch“ ein neues und unbekanntes Licht verleiht, sagt Jünger, eine lebendige Spannweite also, die vom roten Berg gilt bis zur Opiumpfeife reicht.

Dieser Hochspannung verbreitende Geist füllt lauernd die Halle aus, während draußen „die wilde Jagd“ tost. Die Spannung wird unerträglich, als die sehulichst erwartete Kunst der urtümlichen Mächte angekündigt und untermalt wird durch plötzlich einsetzende Musik von – Grieg, aus der Halle des Bergkönigs. Eine kleinbürgerlich-romantische Geschmacklosigkeit; dem hereinbrausenden Wotan werden gleichsam Plüschmöbel zum Sitz angeboten. Nun aber läßt sich die Götterdämmerung nicht mehr aufhalten: der schweigende Magier entzündet Stäbchen, deren Rauch in kunstvoll wirbelnder, zwirbelnder Bewegung die feinsten Figuren den erstauten Jüngern vor die Augen zaubert, eine weite Flutung

dringt von allen Seiten in den Raum, ein köstliches Gewässer reißt eine unendliche Vielfalt von Schlangen, Fischen und Raupen heran, die „Parade“ hat metaphysischen Ursprung und metaphysisches Ziel, als sei ein tropisches Aquarium zu unendlichen Dimensionen ausgebuchtet – der Angsttraum eines Ichthyologen.

Von den beiden Jüngern wird jedoch nicht so gedacht, sie empfinden diesen Opiumrauch als „günstigen Augenblick horoskopischer Natur, der sich zu reinem Schicksalsstoff verdichtet“, und sind nach diesem Erlebnis, über das also nicht mehr ausgesagt wird, völlig verwandelt. Vergeblich fragt man, was der eigentliche Sinn des Vorgangs, der Keim der Verwandlung sei. Des Zauberers Hut ist leer, sagte mit Recht ein Rezensent.

Die Frage ist nur, ob unser Betrübniß am Platze ist. Spielt Jünger nicht ein wenig mit dem Leser? Ist es wirklich ernst gemeint, wenn Schwarzenberg sich als großer Verwandler und eschatologisches Strahlungszentrum bekundet, indem er eines Abends mühelos die Insassen der letzten Straßenbahn nach Treptow in atemlose Spannung versetzt, ohne sich auch nur zu rühren? Was wird uns zugemutet, wenn zum Beweis, daß die Wandlung der Jünger zu höheren Wesen gelungen ist, diese Geschichte erzählt wird: auf der Heimreise suchen sie in einem überfüllten, eleganten Hotel Unterkunft, der Portier will sie abweisen, aber in seiner notorischen „Welt“-Erfahrung spürt er das Fluidum der ewigen Mächte aus ihren Gesichtern strahlen – und gibt ihnen ein Zimmer mit Bad im ersten Stock zum einfachen Preis. Man erkenne den neuen Adel „an der Augen wahrer Glut“, sagte Stefan George, hat dies aber nicht als praktischen Rat für Hotelportiers gemeint. Doch tilgt diese Geschichte jeden noch bestehenden Zweifel.

Die Art, dem Menschen wiederum einen Standort im All zu geben, ihn also religiös zu vertiefen, hat tatsächlich, wie Ernst Jünger wiederum zugibt, „das Komische, den Lachreiz, der sich aufdrängt wie eine unziemliche Annäherung“. Uns scheint der Lachreiz im Falle des „Besuchs auf Godenholm“ wirklich ziemlich und geziemend, ja zwingend. Ernst Jünger, solchermaßen die Alraune im Gefolge Martin Heideggers, der heroische „Waldgänger“, dessen nordisches „Personal“ so unerwartet die „primitive Seite“ des präziösen Bildungsnobs deutlich werden läßt, der Wortan, der im Opiumrausch Urväterhallen mit Tiergespenstern kosmischer Aquarien bevölkert, müßte das nicht wirklich eine komische Figur abgeben – wenn eben nicht Unfug mit religiösen Bedürfnissen des Menschen eine sehr ernste Sache wäre? Was uns der große Kenner der Insekten, Pflanzen, Fische, der seltsamen Parfüms, der alten Waffen und der tropischen Spezereien hier zu bieten hat, ist reiner Zimmert. Wem dies zu prosaisch schmeckt, sage es mit des Dichters seherischen Worten: „Ein Anflug aus dem Nichts.“

Karl Josef Hahn

Charles Sealsfield

Das reich illustrierte, umfangliche Werk *Eduard Castle: „Der große Unbekannte. Das Leben von Charles Sealsfield (Karl Postl)“* (mit 34 Bildern und 1 Stammtafel, Wien-München, Manutiuspresse, 728 S. DM 23,-) behandelt das wechselvolle Leben, das politische Wirken und literarische Schaffen dieses rätselvollen Mannes mit wissenschaftlicher Gründlichkeit unter Ausschöpfung vieler neuentdeckter Quellen. Anschaulich schildern die ersten Kapitel Kindheit und Jugend des am 3. März 1793 geborenen Schriftstellers, der im mährischen Dorf Poppitz aufwuchs, mit neun Jahren auf das Gymnasium zu Znaim, der Grenzstadt gegen Böhmen, kam und auf Drängen seiner bigotten Mutter zum geistlichen Studium das Kreuzherrnstift zu Prag bezog, wo der später berühmte Philosoph Bolzano den stärksten Eindruck auf den Theologiestudenten machte. Obwohl er schon mit zweiundzwanzig Jahren durch das Vertrauen des General-Großmeisters Köhler zu dessen Sekretär aufrückte, war er bald mit dem damals überaus verflachten kirchlichen Betriebe zerfallen und litt mit allen freigesinnten Männern Österreichs unter der Tyrannei des Kaisers Franz. Seine Flucht aus Prag, die mit Hilfe von wohlhabenden jüdischen Freimaurern im Frühjahr 1823 gelang, erregte in den kirchlichen und politischen Kreisen der Monarchie einen Skandal. Mit Hilfe der Logenbrüder in Stuttgart flüchtete er vor den Schergen Metternichs nach Zürich, wo er als Karl Postl spurlos verschwand; er hatte der dortigen Loge „Modestia cum libertate“ das feierliche Gelöbnis gegeben, „als ein ganz anderer Mensch unter fremdem Namen so fern wie möglich wieder aufzutreten, stets ein Unbekannter zu bleiben“. Die Tragik seines ganzen Lebens war, daß er sich an diesen Eid gebunden fühlte und nun, losgerissen von seiner Familie, seiner Heimat, seinem Stande, sich allmählich von diesem angehlichen Bruderbund der Freimaurer enttäuscht, ja in seinen Handlungen und Überzeugungen gefesselt sah. Zunächst verdankte er der Loge die Möglichkeit, Europa zu verlassen und unter dem Namen Charles Sealsfield „Bürger von Nordamerika“ zu werden; nach testamentarischer Ueinstimmung mußte ihm dieser „Ehrentitel“ auf den Grabstein bei der kleinen Nikolauskirche in Solothurn gesetzt werden, nachdem er dort am 26. Mai 1864 gestorben war. Zwischen die-

sem Datum und der ersten Landung in der Neuen Welt zu New Orleans im Herbst 1823 liegen Jahrzehnte voll unglaublicher Schicksale. Postl, sprachlich begabt, ehrgeizig, mit den besten Empfehlungen versehen, eignete sich rasch eine eindringende Kenntnis zunächst der Südstaaten einschließlich Mexicos, späterhin Neu-Englands an, die er während des ersten schweizer Jahrzehntes von 1832 bis 1842 für seine Werke über die Verhältnisse in den USA mit plastischer Anschaulichkeit in englischer Sprache schilderte. Nach vorübergehendem zweiten Aufenthalt in den Vereinigten Staaten kehrte Postl als ein vermögender Mann endgültig im August 1858 in die Schweiz zurück, um zunächst ein unstatetes Wanderleben zu führen, bis er sich in Solothurn ankaupte, wo er seinen Lebensabend als „der große Unbekannte“ in wachsender Vereinsamung zubrachte.

Eduard Castles Fleiß ist anerkennenswert, jedoch verführt er ihn zu sold sei-tenlangen, übermäßig breiten Exkursen über die damaligen Zeitverhältnisse, daß man wünscht, das Werk möchte in neuer Auflage um die Hälfte gekürzt erscheinen. Im allgemeinen steht er mit kritikloser Bewunderung seinem Helden gegenüber, und nur manchmal läßt er durch Äußerungen von Postls wenigen echten Freunden dessen sehr bedenkliche Charakterzüge durchscheinen, entschuldigt aber seine berechnende Kälte und seine Plunkereien mit der „Maske“, zu der er durch die Loge gezwungen war.

Castle zitiert mit Genugtuung eine gelegentliche amerikanische Pressestimme, die Sealsfield als „the greatest american author“ bezeichnet; aber wenn er, ähnlich wie Nadler, Postl als deutschen Dichter hochschätzt und ihn mit Stifter vergleicht, so können wir ihm nicht zustimmen. Allerdings hat er gewisse weltgeschichtliche Entwicklungen prophetisch vorausgeschaut, so wenn er genau vor hundert Jahren von der Nichtigkeit sämtlicher Großmächte im Vergleich zu der alle überflügelnden nordamerikanischen Union sprach, neben der er nur noch Rußland gelten ließ.

Friedrich Seebaß

Götterlieder und Balladen

Der 1885 zu Riga geborene, jetzt in Zürich lebende Dichter *Bruno Goetz* wird von unseren Literarkritikern zu wenig beachtet. Auf dem Thema, das Goetz außerordentlich eindrucksvoll anschlägt, lastet heute ein mehr oder minder po-

litisches Tabu. Wenn wir von Göttern, zumal germanischen, singen hören, vermuten wir ein anachronistisches Weltbild mit einem Geruch von literarischem Blut und Boden. Doch Bruno Goetz gehört nicht zu der geistig unbedarften Clique gewisser Reichs- und Nazi-Dichter. Er liefert keine Konjunkturware, sondern er macht Aussagen, an die er leidenschaftlich glaubt. Das zumindest läßt sich gültig feststellen. — die überaus schwierige Frage der Aktualität und Überzeugungsmacht eines Göttermythos post Christum natum soll hier nicht erörtert werden.

Sowohl in den Balladen (*„Der Gott und die Schlange“*, Zürich, Bellerive-Verlag, 78 S.) als auch in den *„Götterliedern“* (Zürich, Origo-Verlag, 89 S.) geht es Götz darum, die Lebensmächte feierlich zu beschwören und ihren religiösen Charakter darzutun. Die Götter, mag er ihnen griechische oder germanische Namen geben, sind für Goetz keine gelehrten Erinnerungen. Sie verkörpern ihm in ihren wechselnden Gestalten das ewig-gleiche Seinsgeschehen, das im schärfsten, immer wieder formulierten Gegensatz zur augenblicklichen Zeit als kosmisch-geistiges Ereignis begriffen und angerufen wird. Eben der Anruf des Dichters gehört wesentlich mit in das Geschehen: Im „heilen“ Wort wird auch die „Welt“ ins Heile gebracht Goetzens geistige Herkunft von George und Hölderlin wird in solch hoher Auffassung vom Dichtertum deutlich.

Mit seinen Balladen stößt Goetz kühn durch die längst morsch gewordene Schicht der historischen und moralisierenden Balladen hindurch. Er sucht die ursprüngliche, im Kultus verwurzelte Balladenform neu zu beleben. Konsequenter bekommt bei ihm der Keimer als rhythmischer Ausdruck der innerhalb der Vergänglichkeit sich offenbarenden Ewigkeitsstrukturen seine tragende Bedeutung zurück. Die alte Fabel vom Spielmann etwa, der vor dem Galgentod noch einmal zu fiedeln begehrt, gewinnt vom Rhythmus her durchschlagende Gewalt; die Ballade wandelt sich in ein Preislied des elementaren Lebens, das in jenem „heiligen Nu“ gipfelt, von dem Goetz mit solcher Inbrunst sprechen kann. Auf die tragischen Zwiespälte des Lebens und die immer wieder aufgebene „Einigung“ zielen die großen Balladen *„Wodes Gesang“* und *„Der Gott und die Schlange“* — Deutungen

der Welt aus dem Geist uralter Religiosität.

Die achtzehn Götterlieder, die mit je einem archaisierenden Holzschnitt Werner Gotheins konfrontiert sind, preisen in freien oder antikkischen Rhythmen das rätselhafte, vielgestaltete Wesen der Gottheit. Es gibt hier keine moderne Zweifelsbewegung. Selbst in „sinkender Zeit“, im „Grauen des Nichts“ lebt das verborgene Göttliche; der Mensch hat immer die Chance, neu davon entzündet zu werden; der „ewige“ Mensch setzt das Göttliche geradezu in Gang, allen voran der Dichter, dem im „Nu der Erleuchtung“ alles „Verlorene“ „Gesang“ wird. Ein großartiger Schwung, dem Gestaltung Umgestaltung ist und der zwischen Gott und Mensch eine elementare Liebe walten sieht, befeuert die weit-hinrollenden und dennoch klar konturierten Verse Bruno Goetz. Im Lobgesang, gerichtet an den Meergott, in dem Lied vom Flügelgott Eros, überall bekundet sich eine kraftvolle Lebensfrömmigkeit, die im Abendland eine alte, unvergessene Tradition hat und die man nicht von vornherein als un- oder gar widerchristlich ablehnen sollte.

Franz Norbert Mennemeier

Drei Dichtertinnen und eine problematische Frau

Einen Frauenroman mit starkem poetischem Ehrgeiz legt *Barbara Seidel* vor. Sie läßt uns *„Die ungeduldigen Jahre“* Ruchs erleben, einer jungen Schweizerin, die nicht das Alltägliche will, sondern nur das Hohe (Zürich, Origo-Verlag, 343 S.). Sie leidet an der Krankheit des Wartens, bis endlich, nach vielen Um- und Irrwegen, der Tag erscheint, der Mann kommt, an dem und in dem sich ihr Leben erfüllt. Der Roman, der namentlich in Naturschilderungen und bei der Aufdeckung seelischer Vorgänge zur Dichtung wird, kann freilich wohl nur von denen geduldig gelesen und empfänglich genossen werden, die des etwas altmodischen Glaubens leben, daß das Glück eines Menschen nicht minder wertvoll und gewichtig ist als das Schicksal der Welt.

Ihm gehen die vier historischen Erzählungen *„Das versunkene Reich“* von *Illa Andreae* nach (Heidelberg, Kerle, 168 S.). Die mit einer Ausnahme bereits früher veröffentlichten Arbeiten geschichtlicher Miniaturkunst behandeln Gestalten und Ereignisse aus der Zeit der

Münsterschen Wiedertäufer, aus dem Verhandlungen über den westfälischen Frieden, aus dem Rokoko des großen Erzbischofs und Kurfürsten Clemens August und aus dem Kampf um die Befreiung vom napoleonischen Joch. Das Reich, um das gerungen wird und dessen Name heute für viele verdächtige Ansprüche zu erheben scheint, bedeutet hier das ersehnte Reich des Friedens, in dem Gottes Ordnung gilt und die Macht des Satans gebändigt ist. Die Verfasserin verfügt über historischen Blick und schreibt knapp und kräftig.

Aus unfänglichen gelehrten Arbeiten über die russische Kultur des 19. Jahrhunderts ist *Alja Rachmanowa* die romanhafte Schilderung der Liebe Turgenjews zu der großen Sängerin Pauline Viardot erwachsen: „*Die Liebe eines Lebens*“ (Frauenfeld, Huber; aus dem Russischen von Dr. A. v. Hoyer; 399 S. 2 Abb.). Die Bücher der Verfasserin sind in zwanzig Sprachen und in Hunderttausenden von Exemplaren erschienen, Beweis ihrer Beliebtheit. Auch dieses sogar mit wertvollen Literaturangaben versehene Buch verdient dankbare Leser, denn es ist reich an farbigen kulturgeschichtlichen Bildern. Freilich fließt, wahrscheinlich aus milderer Quelle stammend, manchmal eine Stelle ein, welche die Dichterin oder der Übersetzer besser getilgt hätten: „Madame Viardot befahl dem Diener Jean, der in seiner schwarzen Atlaslivree einen höchst eleganten Eindruck machte, und auch die tiefe Verbiegung, die er machte, stand im Einklang mit der hoheitsvollen Haltung, die seine Herrin zeigte...“ Das ist nicht Dichtung, sondern Reportage.

Eine problematische Dichterin ist die Französin *Paule Regnier*. In ihrem Roman „*Versuchung*“ behandelt sie die Frage der nach katholischer Auffassung unauflösbaren Ehe. Ein Dichter und Schriftsteller, der mit seiner Persönlichkeit und seinem Werk zu den Stützen der Religion und der Kirche zählt, gerät in die Gefahr, der Versuchung des Glücks zu unterliegen, und würde in dem Kampf zwischen Neigung und Pflicht seine Sendung verraten, wenn nicht die Frau, der sein Herz anheimgefallen ist, die Kraft der Entsagung für sich und für ihn aufbrächte. Der Roman (Heidelberg, Verlag Kerle; 270 S. DM 9,80) leidet daran, daß man die Bedeutung des Mannes als großen Poeten auf Treu und Glauben hinnehmen

muß, denn die zitierten Proben seines Schaffens sind zu bruchstückhaft, um zu überzeugen. So lebt das Ganze weniger in der Wirklichkeit als im Literatentum.

Das Literatenhafte, wie es sich in intellektuellen Diskussionen auszusprechen pflegt, hängt auch dem Band an, in dem derselbe Verlag zwei Bücher Paule Regniers vereinigt hat, „*Das verschleierte Antlitz*“ und das „*Tagebuch*“. Der gemeinsame Titel „*Am Schmerz geschertert*“ (548 S. DM 14,80) enthüllt die Tragödie der Verfasserin, die den Atheisten allzu religiös, den Christen nie religiös genug erschienen ist, die in hellen Stunden erkannte, daß es keine Hoffnung gibt als die christliche und die in der Angst vor der bedrohlichen Zukunft die Flucht aus dem Leben angetreten hat. Sie ringt um den Glauben, der ihr in der irdischen Gestalt der Kirche doch nur als ein Entwurf der ewigen Religion erscheint, und erkennt den Schmerz als notwendig zum Heil und zum Glück an. Er ist ihr ein Ausdruck der Liebe Gottes, und indem sie ihn in seiner Vielfalt zu erkennen trachtet, schreibt sie ein ergreifendes Kapitel auch über den Schmerz der Tiere. Sie enthüllt die Grausamkeit des Menschen, wie er sie in der Parforcejagd, im Stierkampf, in der Vivisektion übt, und stellt fest: „Wer mit den Tieren kein Mitleid hat, ist auch seinen Brüdern gegenüber ohne Mitleid.“ Die Kriegs- und Nachkriegsereignisse greifen in das Leben, Denken und Fühlen der Regnier ein. Mit Schauer beobachtet sie den Haß ihres Volkes gegen Feinde und Verräter, einen Haß, der immer neuen gebiert und der das Erbarmen, das eigentlich und allein immer recht hat, erwürgt. Eine problematische Frau, die sich und uns Schwierigkeiten macht und uns am Ende doch gewinnt, denn sie hat ein Herz. *Paul Weiglin*

Drei Neuerscheinungen aus Griechenland

Niko Kazantzakis ist in Deutschland kein Unbekannter mehr. Die „*Griechische Passion*“ (vgl. D. R., Jg. 78, S. 203) erregte seinerzeit berechtigtes Aufsehen. Sein Roman „*Die letzte Versuchung*“ bestätigt sein großes dichterisches Talent, zeigt auf der anderen Seite aber auch die ihm gesetzten Grenzen auf. (Berlin 1952, Herbig, 515 S.) Im Mittelpunkt steht die Gestalt Jesu Christi. Hatte Kazantzakis in der „*Griechischen Passion*“ versucht, das Christusbild aus der Überlieferung der Bibel zu lösen und in einem

modernen Gleichnis wiedererstehen zu lassen, so zeichnet er hier die Gestalt des Erlösers vor dem überlieferten geschichtlichen Hintergrund als die eines schwachmütigen Epileptikers. Die Wundertaten werden als Wachträume der Evangelisten, die übermenschliche Leidenskraft Christi am Kreuz durch eine unmittelbar nach der Kreuzigung eingetretene Ohnmacht zu erklären versucht. Die auch in diesem Werk unbestreitbare sprachliche Meisterschaft des Dichters reicht jedoch nicht aus, seiner materialistischen Darstellung den blasphemischen Beigeschmack zu nehmen.

Dafür offenbart der „Alexis Sorbas“ des gleichen Verfassers (Braunschweig, Otto Erich kleine, 1952, 404 S. 12.80 DM) das wirkliche Können des Dichters. Außerlich die Geschichte eines kreischen Sommers, die ein Schriftsteller in Gesellschaft eines abgewandenen Abenteurers auf Kreta verlebt, handelt es sich in Wahrheit um einen glutvollen lebensbejahenden Gesang auf die Schönheit der Natur und das menschliche Dasein, wie er in solcher Kraft in der modernen, zum Nihilismus hin tendierenden Literatur selten geworden ist. Alexis Sorbas, der trotz seines hohen Alters ungebrochene Vagabund, und seine Partnerin, die quicklebendige Madame Hortense, die ein merkwürdiges Schicksal auf die einsame Felseninsel verschlagen hat, gehören zu den wenigen unvergesslichen Gestalten unserer Gegenwartsdichtung; keine papiernen Schemen, sondern lebendige Menschen, an denen ein Maupassant seine Freude gehabt hätte.

Neben diesen beiden Werken wirken die Geschichten der jungen Erzählerin Kay Cicellis „Flut und Ebbe“ (Köln, Kiepenhauer und Witsch, 265 S. DM 9,80) recht zerbrechlich in ihrer traumhaft fließenden Gestaltung, die keine greifbaren Konturen erkennen läßt. Ihren Individuen, die vergebens der menschlichen Gemeinschaft zu entrinnen versuchen, fehlt ein Schuß jener Vitalität, wie sie dem Alexis Sorbas eignete. Ihre nervöse Sensibilität und das fehlende Selbstvertrauen reiden meist nur zu dem müden resignierenden Verzicht auf ein eigenes Leben aus. Resignation als der Weisheit letzter Schluß scheint mir aber trotz der unleugbaren künstlerischen Feinfühligkeit der Verfasserin nicht unbedingt die dichterische Botschaft zu sein, nach welcher der heutige Leser in der Dichtung unserer Zeit sucht.

Jürgen Eyssen

„Hotel L'Ancien Europe“

Die Welt der Imagination, mit erst magisch-mystischen Vorzeichen, war schon in Walter Jens' letzter Novelle *Der Blinde* die stützend leitende Kraft für ein Weiterleben. In seinem neuen Roman, „Vergessene Gesichter“ (Hamburg, Verlag Rowohlt, 276 S. DM 10,80) ist die Imagination zur Kraft geworden, welche „die Sehnsucht nach der menschlichen Freiheit . . . in die Bescheidung und das Glück der Geborgenheit verwandelt“. Und die Kunst wurde dabei das Medium dieser fast religiösen, verwandelnden Sphäre. – Für dieses Dutzend Menschenschicksale im Maison Savarin, dem Altersheim für Schauspieler, ist die Vergangenheit zur Gegenwart und Zukunft und damit ihre einstigen Bühnenrollen zum Schicksal geworden. Und da sie dieses Schicksal, das ihnen zuteil wurde, auch zu bestätigen suchen, ist ihnen eine letzte Rolle von dem einstigen Gründer des Heimes, des Grafen Oreste Savarin, in dem altertümlichen Spiel vom Tod und dem kranken Mann zugewiesen. Mit dieser Verpflichtung zur letzten Rolle wird ihnen die Freiheit zugleich genommen, „die ihnen nichts nützte, sondern nur quälte“. Oreste Savarin wollte sie glücklich sein lassen, in dem er sie lehrte, „sich mit ihren Bildern und Träumen zu begnügen. Er forderte einen Verzicht und gab ein großes Glück“. Zugleich ist dieses Spiel auch die Bestätigung der erlösenden, befreienden Kraft der Kunst für den Menschen.

Gegen diese Integrität der Kunst und des künstlerischen Lebens wirken die gesellschaftsironischen Züge des Romans wie eine trauernde Burleske. Und wenn die Stiftung schließlich geräumt werden muß auf Betreiben geschäftstüchtiger Intriganten hin, die ein amerikanisches Touristen-Hotel, l'Ancien Europe, etablieren wollen, schlägt diese Ironie in Selbstmitleid, Tragik – ja Pathos um. Wie verführerisch ist das Bild, wenn Le Grand Auguste, der Leiter des Heims, in das angezündete Haus, zurück in den Flammen auch sein Ende sucht. Und wie menschlich-heroisch ist die am feinsten ausgeführte Gestalt des alten Negers, der als einziger revoltiert und voll Sehnsucht nach dem Ende, den Anfang seines Lebens vernichten möchte. – Von diesen symbolisch-psychologischen Seiten und den zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen her wird alle Bindung an das Vergangene – die des Lebens wie die des Geistes – zu einem Schicksalsgesetz, das Walter Jens zwar nicht werten,

aber doch anzuerkennen sucht. Und es ist dann der Ausdruck einer Menschensicht, die sich bemüht, das Dasein zu erkennen und zu akzeptieren wie auch Bindung an den Menschen zu finden; diese Worte, die Le Grand Auguste in den Mund gelegt sind, klingen wie ein Selbstbekenntnis, wenn er von den alten Schauspielern und ihren gegenseitigen Beziehungen sagt: „Ich kenne sie alle genau und auch ihre Schwächen; aber eben wegen dieser Schwächen liebe ich sie. Und wie sollten sie keine Schwächen haben, da sie doch nur im Gestern und dem Morgen leben, in der Vergangenheit und in der Nähe des Todes?“

Und wer kann hier sicher sein, daß diese Stimme nicht eine leise, verborgene ahnende Resignation schon ist, die vorgibt, Lebensgesetze zu suchen, und keine Verteidigung mehr kennt, die vielleicht nur einen wehmütigen Schmerz des Untergangs offenbart? *Günter Klingmann*

Christliche Parapsychologie

Es werden in der letzten Zeit vermehrte Versuche und Anstrengungen gemacht, die Parapsychologie in den Rang einer Wissenschaft zu erheben, d. h. ein gesichertes Erfahrungsmaterial beizubringen und dieses auch theoretisch zu verarbeiten. Allein, so gut der Wille sein mag, der hinter diesen Bestrebungen vorhanden ist: die Resultate des ganzen, oft von seinen Urhebern selbst als „bahnbrechend“ bezeichneten „Wissenschafts“-Betriebes sind bis heute so dürftig, daß man wohl der Meinung sein kann, daß sie auch weiterhin im Zustand der Dürftigkeit verharren werden. Daß unsere Schau des Menschen durch die Parapsychologie vertieft werde, ist bloß ein Traum der Adepten, und kein schöner; die vorliegende Broschüre von *Georg Kronert: „Parapsychologie und Religion“* (Zürich 1952, Origo Verlag, 54 S., DM 2,80) ist bemüht, auf parapsychologischer Grundlage Beiträge zur Religionswissenschaft zu liefern; in einer recht problematischen Deutung biblischer Berichte sowie neuzeitlicher Forschungsergebnisse versucht der Verfasser seine Lehre zu entwickeln, verstrickt sich hierbei in unentwirrbare Fragenkomplexe, aus denen immer wieder „Bekanntnisse“ den Ausweg schaffen müssen. Man kann sich eines gewissen Bedauerns nicht erwehren, wenn man redliche Bemühung sich auf unfruchtbarem Felde verbrauchen sieht.

Josef Ratner

Deutsch-russische Passion

Auf *Theodor Plieviers* „Stalingrad“ ist jetzt „Moskau“ (München, Kurt Desch-Verlag, DM 16,80) gefolgt. Während Plievier in „Stalingrad“ sich noch mehr oder weniger streng an die dokumentarisch belegten Schicksale hielt, die er in einer großangelegten Reportage zusammenfaßte, sprengt er in seinem zweiten Roman über den Krieg in Rußland die Fesseln der Reportage und dringt in die Weiten visionärer dichterischer Schau vor. Die Parallele zu Tolstois „Krieg und Frieden“ bietet sich an. Ohne jedoch die dichterische Kraft und Vollendung Tolstois zu erreichen, erweist sich Plievier als eindrucksvoller und virtuoser Schilderer eines elementaren Geschehens. Grandios in seiner Furchtbarkeit ist das Bild des Geschehens, das der Autor entwirft, erschütternd und jeden unmittelbar anrührend die Schilderung des Zusammenpralls zweier gleichgearteter Systeme, denen auf beiden Seiten die Menschen letztlich nur in Zahlen und „Gefechtsstärke“ ausgedrücktes Material bleiben, das hemmungslos dem Tod und Verderben preisgegeben wird, wenn das Weiterbestehen des Systems und der kleinen machthungrigen Cliguen in Berlin und im Kreml es zu erfordern scheint. Plievier zeigt denn auch vornehmlich die Menschen, mit denen agiert wird, deren Schicksal ohne ihr Zutun in dem Orkan des deutschen Vormarsches auf Moskau im Herbst 1941 geformt wird, die schutzlos als Opfer einer übermächtigen Maschinerie verzweifelt zu überleben versuchen. Wohlmerkt: auf beiden Seiten der sich bewegenden, ineinander verzahnten Front, denn anders als in „Stalingrad“ zeigt Plievier hier nicht nur die deutsche, sondern auch die russische Seite. Und wer wäre besser dazu berufen als er, der den deutschen Sturm auf Moskau auf der „anderen“ Seite miterlebte? Deshalb ist „Moskau“ mehr als eine bloße Schilderung eines grandiosen Geschehens, eine dichterische Vision der beginnenden Apokalypse der deutschen Ostfront – es will zur Besinnung aufrufen, es appelliert vor allem an diejenigen, die in deutscher Uniform den Marsch auf Moskau mitgemacht haben, einmal die Gegenseite zu betrachten und zu erkennen, daß das furchtbare Morden des Winters 1941 – und das Morden von Stalingrad – unnötig gewesen wären, hätten deutsche Soldaten als Menschen

und nicht als Werkzeuge einer verbrecherischen Führung handeln können.

Es ist das Verdienst Plicviars, uns das Bild des russischen Menschen auf der anderen Seite gezeichnet zu haben, des russischen Menschen, der von den deutschen Eindringlingen die Befreiung von Stalins Joch erwartete, den die Deutschen auf Befehl Hitlers auf das bitterste enttäuschten und dadurch erst in die Arme der stalinistischen Diktatur zurücktrieben. In Plicviars Buch gibt diesen oft wiederholten und variierten Gedankengängen ein Dorf-Alter gültige Form, einer jener ehrwürdigen, weißbärtigen Greise mit den gütigen und seltsam weblickenden blauen Augen, die jeder kennt, der einmal in Rußland war. Er sagt angesichts des deutschen Kommandanturbefehls, der das Weiterbestehen der Kolchose verkündet: „Wir liegen immer unter den Füßen der anderen. Wozu brauchen wir da die Fremden, es können dann ebensogut unsere eigenen sein, die über uns wegtreten.“ Damit ist alles gesagt. Hier liegt auch die echte Tragik des deutschen Einmarsches in Rußland, der, einmal begonnen, eine Freundschaft der beiden Völker in Freiheit hätte begründen können und statt dessen zur sinnlosen Hin Schlachtung der Besten führte.

Die Passion der Menschen des deutschen und russischen Volkes geschildert zu haben, jene Passion, die am 22. Juni 1941 begann und heute noch keineswegs beendet ist, das ist das Verdienst Plicviars, das nicht dadurch geschmälert wird, daß vielen Lesern, die durch die Vielzahl der Gestalten und Bilder verwirrt werden, das tiefste Anliegen dieses Buches unverstänlich bleiben wird. P. E. P.

Spanische Impressionen

Je tiefer ein Schriftsteller in die spanischen Verhältnisse eindringt, desto verwirrt wird er. Germanen und Mauren, Kelten und Römer, Juden und Jesuiten, Habsburger und Bourbonen, Monarchie und Republik haben einen Menschenschlag geformt, dessen an Anarchie grenzender Individualismus stets zum Pro oder zum Kontra zwingt. Eine objektive Wertung der Gegenwart ist bisher keinem gelungen, weil jedes Urteil immer nur für den Augenblick zutreffend und begrenzt richtig sein kann. Diesem Dilemma konnte sich auch Peter Schmid nicht entziehen, wenn er auch versucht, sich auf „Spanische Impressionen“ (Stuttgart, Deutsche Ver-

lagsanstalt) zu beschränken. Er hat alle Landesteile bereist und mit allen gesprochen: mit Falangisten und Priestern, Königstreuen und Separatisten, Gelehrten und Dirnen, Bauern und Zigeunern. So entstand ein Buch, das in seinem schriftstellerischen und psychologischen Tiefgang zu den besten Spanien-Veröffentlichungen zählen kann, wenn auch die blumige spanische Diktion etwas sehr auf Schmidts Stil abgefärbt hat. Wir tun tiefe Einblicke in die Mentalität dieses Volkes, die sich in allen Lebensbereichen für uns oft unverstänlich niederschlägt; über den Sinn des Stierkampfes beispielsweise haben wenige Schriftsteller so ernsthafte Überlegungen angestellt. Aber man darf nicht erwarten, nach der Lektüre ein Urteil über Spanien fällen oder sich ein komplexes Bild machen zu können. Zu Spanien führt nur eine Brücke: die Liebe zu ihm. *bjn*

Marschall Mannerheim

Im Atlantis Verlag (Zürich und Freiburg i. Br.) sind in der Übersetzung von H. v. Born-Pilsach die Erinnerungen einer der wenigen in sich geschlossenen Persönlichkeiten der letzten Zeit erschienen, des Marschalls Mannerheim (G. Mannerheim: „Erinnerungen“. 560 S. DM 27,-). Es war ein wechselvolles Leben, das den jungen Kadetten auf den höchsten Platz seines Landes geführt hat. Diese Erinnerungen sind nicht nur für den Marschall selber, sondern für die bewundernswerten Qualitäten des finnischen Volkes ein starkes Zeugnis. In einem Leben voller Pflichttreue und höchster Verantwortung gegenüber den großen Gütern der Menschheit und dem eigenen Volk ist Mannerheim von den höchsten Höhen durch die tiefsten Tiefen mit seinem Volk wieder zu neuem Aufstieg gegangen. 1882 trat er in das finnische Kadettenkorps ein, und 1946 legte er sein Amt als Präsident der finnischen Republik nieder, als der Friede mit Sowjetrußland geschlossen werden mußte. Er hat dann ein otium wahrlich cum dignitate in der Schweiz verlebt bis zu seinem Tode im Jahre 1951. Der Verlag hat für die deutsche Ausgabe nur wenig fottgelassen, die Stellen nämlich, die sich ausgesprochen an die finnischen und skandinavischen Leser wenden. Es ist ein Buch, daß unsere Überzeugung in jeder Zeile bekräftigt: daß zu einem großen Politiker neben allen Fähigkeiten der Charakter gehört, ein Charakter,

den Männerheim wie nur wenige be-
sessen hat.

R. P.

Denken und Leben

Das Buch des Amerikaners *Ernst Dimmet* „Die Kunst des Denkens“, neu herausgegeben von *Karl Holzamer*, übersetzt von *Clotilde T. Schweiger* (Frankfurt a. M. 1951, Verlag Josef Knecht, 243 S. DM 7,80) erscheint schon in der 3. Auflage (10.–13. Tausend), und man kann wohl sagen, daß es diesen Erfolg und einen noch größeren verdient. Es ist ein inhaltlich und schriftstellerisch ausgezeichnetes Buch, das nicht einfach eine Theorie des Denkens gibt, sondern zeigt, wie das Denken aus den realen Zusammenhängen des Lebens unaufhörlich hervorwächst und welche Möglichkeiten der Übersicht und Ordnung in ihm enthalten sind. Dabei vermeidet dieses Buch ganz jenen billigen Pragmatismus, der bei manchen amerikanischen Büchern theoretischer Art auf den Europäer so störend wirkt. Dimmet hat etwas von einem Künstler an sich, eine Fähigkeit der künstlerischen Einfühlung in die komplexen Lebenszusammenhänge und die zarten Übergänge von Gefühl und Gedanke. Er zeigt, wie sich der Gedanke bildet, wie er abgelenkt und entwertet wird, welche Hilfsmittel zu reineren Formen des Denkens es gibt, wie man sich Gelerntes möglichst leicht und haftend einprägt und wie man schließlich zu einem selbständigen oder gar schöpferischen Denken kommt. Und das alles entwickelt er nicht abstrakt, sondern immer im Zusammenhang mit erlebten Situationen des menschlichen Daseins. Es ist kein Zweifel, daß dieses Buch auf viele Menschen, junge und alte, anregend und fördernd wirken kann.

Karl Holzamers eigenes Buch „Grundriß einer praktischen Philosophie“ (ebenda 1951, 184 S. DM 7,20) ist wohl als eine Art Fortführung und Ergänzung des Werkes von Dimmet gedacht, nach der Seite der praktischen Anwendung der Philosophie, der Ethik hin, mit besonderem Hinblick auf die staatsbürgerliche Praxis mit den in ihr wirkenden Kräften und Ideen: Freiheit, Toleranz, Sittlichkeit und Ressentiment. Das Vorwort des Buches sagt, daß der Autor sich mit dieser Veröffentlichung „ebenso an den Laien wie an den philosophisch bereits Versierten“ wendet und daß „der Stil und der gegliederte Aufbau dem interessierten Laien weit entgegenkommen“. Hier scheint der Autor als Fachphilosoph doch die

Schwierigkeiten seines Stoffs für den Laien zu unterschätzen. Das Buch bleibt, im Gegensatz zu dem von Dimmet, ganz in den Bereichen der theoretischen Erklärung und bedient sich durchaus der hier üblichen Fachsprache, was ja auch z. B. bei einer Kritik des Kantischen Formalismus nicht zu vermeiden ist. Für den ausgesprochenen Philosophie-Interessierten und besonders auch den Philosophie-Studenten wird dieser „Grundriß einer praktischen Philosophie“ mit seinen knappen Formulierungen und übersichtlichen Gliederungen wertvoll sein.

Während dieses Buch von *Karl Holzamer* die Einwirkung des Gedankens auf die Gefühls- und Willenssphäre des Menschen zu verdeutlichen sucht, geht das große Werk von *Konrad Zucker* „Vom Wandel des Erlebens. Eine Seelengeschichte des Abendlandes“ (Heidelberg, F. H. Kerle Verlag, 648 S.) den umgekehrten Weg. Es will jene Schicht erschließen, die vor jeder Gedankenoperation liegt, die Gefühlsschicht, die Schicht der unbewußten und halbunbewußten Reaktionen. *Konrad Zucker* versteht den Untertitel seines Buches nicht so, daß er die Seele als ein geschlossenes Wesenheit meint und etwa einen Nachweis dieser Seelensexistenz im primitiven und im christlichen Sinne erbringen will. Was er geben will, ist vielmehr eine Geschichte des menschlichen Erlebens schlechthin. Der erste bis jetzt vorliegende Band behandelt die Welt der Primitiven, das Erwachen des Numinosen, die Ethik im primitiven Erleben, die ersten Denkverknüpfungen, sodann die Bildung des Ichbewußtseins (Iran, Indien, China) und schließlich die Formung der Götter- und Gottesvorstellungen in Griechenland und Israel. Ein zweiter Band wird von der Gnosis über die germanische Religiosität der Völkerwanderungszeit und die mutterrechtlichen Kulturen des Mittelmeeres, mit Einschluß von Rom, zu dem katholischen Lebensgefühl der vorhumanistischen Zeit führen, das in Thomas von Aquin gipfelt. Die Seelenwelt, die hier dargestellt wird, ist voll von Geheimnissen und wird es immer sein, aber es ist ein Verdienst, die bis heute vorliegenden Deutungen zusammenzufassen und zu erweitern und damit der Zukunft ihre Problemfelder abzustecken. *Fritz Usinger*

Neue List- und Fischer-Bücher

Einer der großartigen Romane von *Sinclair Lewis*: „Mantrap“ ist als 13.

Band der List-Bücher erschienen – unterhaltsam, spannend und voller Lebensweisheit, wie immer bei Sinclair Lewis. – Als Band 14 wurde in die Reihe ein eigenartiges Büchlein des so verblüffend vielseitigen *Ludwig Reiners* aufgenommen: „*Fräulein, bitte zum Diktat!*“ Der Untertitel: „Hand- und Wörterbuch der Sekretärin“ besagt schon, was Reiners im Sinne hat: der Sekretärin und Stenotypistin ein kleines Buch in die Hand zu geben, in dem sie sich über alle Fragen ihres Berufes unterrichten kann. 90 Seiten sind einem Wörterverzeichnis, einer Art komprimiertem Duden, gewidmet, der Rest enthält wirklich brauchbare, geschickt zusammengestellte Ratschläge und Bemerkungen. Alles in allem: ein Buch, das jeder Sekretärin ihren Beruf erleichtern dürfte. – Nach dem Beispiel von *rororo* bringen auch die List-Bücher jetzt ein Gratisbändchen: *Fred v. Hoerschelmann* „*Eine Stunde Anwesenheit*“ – eine nicht besonders gewichtige, aber unterhaltsame Erzählung. Verdienstvoll ist es, daß als Band 15 ein schmaler „*Taschenatlas der Welt*“ aufgenommen wurde, denn ein Atlas für DM 1,90 ist immer hin ungewöhnlich, wenn auch die Karten notgedrungen einen recht großen Maßstab aufweisen. – Band 16 bringt eine Ausgabe von *Robert Precht's* Roman „*Titanenskurz*“ unter dem neuen Titel „*Der Untergang der Titanic*“. Die Überarbeitung und Kürzung – es wird allerdings nicht gesagt, ob sie noch der vor drei Jahren verstorbene Autor selbst vorgenommen hat – haben dem Roman gut getan. – *Charlotte Köhn-Behrens'* Buch „*Du bist dein Schicksal*“ kommt als Band 17 – der Untertitel „*Wege zum Erfolg in Leben und Liebe*“ deutet den Inhalt an.

In der Fischer-Bücherei, von der sich immer deutlicher zeigt, daß sie alle parallelen Buchreihen durch ihre Qualität aussucht, sind vier neue Bändchen veröffentlicht worden: als Band 23 *Henry Williamsons* dichterischer Fischroman „*Salar der Lachs*“, der schon bei seinem ersten Erscheinen in Deutschland vor 17 Jahren große Beachtung gefunden hat. – Als Band 24 erschienen unter dem Titel „*Sokrates im Gespräch*“ in einer Zusammenstellung von *Bruno Snell* Platons Dialoge „*Die Apologie des Sokrates*“, „*Kriton*“, „*Phaidon*“ und „*Das Gastmahl*“. *Bruno Snell* hat zu der Sammlung ein instruktives Nachwort geschrie-

ben und sie mit wichtigen Anmerkungen versehen. – Band 25 bringt eine Auswahl aus dem Werk *Hugo v. Hoffmannsthal's* unter dem Titel „*Reitergeschichte*“ mit erzählender und essayistischer Prosa. Der 26. Band schließlich enthält *Aldous Huxleys* weltberühmten Zukunftsroman „*Brave New World*“, diesmal unter dem (dritten) deutschen Titel „*Schöne neue Welt*“ in der Übersetzung von *Herbert E. Herlitzsch's*. Es ist erfreulich, daß nun auch dieses Buch, das inzwischen für eine Unzahl von Zukunftsromanen als mehr oder minder unverhohlenen benutzte Vorlage gedient hat, in einer billigen Ausgabe erhältlich ist. Der 27. Band bringt „*Antigone*“ von *Claire Sainte-Soline*, jenen reizenden „Roman auf Kreta“, in dem die Autorin der „*Spinne im Netz*“ in glücklicher Form das Schicksal zweier moderner Menschen in einer griechischen Dorfgemeinschaft darstellt. – Einer der Gesellschaftsromane von *Edward von Keyserling*: „*Beate und Mareile*“ ist als Band 28 erschienen. Die Geschichte von dem zwischen zwei Frauen stehenden Grafen von Tarniff wird heute wie eh und je ihre Leser finden, und *Keyserling's* Sprachkraft hebt sie über das Niveau der meisten ähnlichen Erzählungen hinaus. *D. R.*

Eine neue Taschenbuch-Reihe

Nach Rowohlt, Fischer, List und anderen hat nun auch der *Alfons Bürger-Verlag* eine 1,80-DM-Reihe herausgebracht, die zwar in der Qualität der technischen Ausführung zum Teil nicht ganz an die Vorgänger heranreicht, jedoch ist das Verlagsprogramm nicht weniger bemerkenswert. So erschienen bisher *Neumann's* „*Teufel*“, *Koestler's* „*Sonnenfinsternis*“, *Orwell's* „*1984*“, *Cronin's* „*Dame mit den Nelken*“, *Robinson's* „*Kardinal*“ – alles Werke, die wir dem Leser nicht mehr vorzustellen brauchen.

Ein bisher unbekannter Roman ist jedoch darunter, dessen Autor *M. Y. Bergavriel* – dem deutschen Zeitungsleser bisher nur als politischer Kommentator und aus gelegentlichen Feuilletons bekannt – größte Beachtung verdient: „*Frieden und Krieg des Bürgers Mahaschavi*“ ist der Titel. Die Handlung spielt in Palästina um die Zeit des Zweiten Weltkrieges und schildert die Abenteuer eines tiefgründig-humorigen Weltverbesserers, der stellenweise das Format eines jüdischen *Don Quijote* hat – leider nur stellenweise, denn oft rutscht der

Held vom Niveau des hintergründigeren Moralisten auf die Ebene des allerdings liebenswerten und köstlichen Späsmachers ab. Auf jeden Fall stellt sich Ben-gavriel mit diesem heiter-satirischen Roman als Erzähler von Format und Phantasie vor – einen „modernen Märchenerzähler aus 1001 Nacht“ nennt ihn die Ankündigung – dessen Bücher „Der große Osmann und seine Bande“ und „Das Mädchen Tamara“, die der Bürger-Verlag demnächst herausbringen will, man mit Freude und Spannung erwarten darf.

Der Bürger-Verlag hat sich mit dem Programm dieser Taschenausgaben ein großes Verdienst erworben. Es kann gar nicht genug derartige Reichen geben, wenn sie dem Publikum wertvolle Literatur zu erschwinglichen Preisen zugänglich machen.

hjn

Geschichte der Geschichtsschreibung

Eine Geschichte der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtswissenschaft war das letzte große Werk des Wiener Historikers *Heinrich Ritter von Srbik*. Es ist in zwei stattlichen Bänden unter dem Titel „*Geist und Geschichte vom deutschen Humanismus bis zur Gegenwart*“ (München, F. Bruckmann, und Salzburg, Otto Müller. Bd. I: 437 S. DM 28.–, Bd. II: 421 S. DM 36.–) erschienen. Eine Geschichte der Geschichtsschreibung ist in doppelter Hinsicht reizvoll und aufschlußreich: einmal als Überblick über die Entwicklung einer Wissenschaft, wobei nicht nur an das damit verbundene fachliche Interesse zu denken ist, sondern auch daran, daß Geschichtsschreibung eine geistige Potenz ist, die weithin in unsere gesamte geistige Existenz, in unser „Weltbild“ ausstrahlt, wenn auch heute wohl weniger als im 19. Jahrhundert. Eine Geschichte der Historiographie hat aber – und das ist ihre andere, vielleicht noch interessantere Seite – auch zu klären, wie die Ereignisse der Zeit, der der Geschichtsschreiber selbst angehört, auf die historische Forschung und Darstellung einwirkten. Schon der Ausgangspunkt, die Problemstellung ist häufig, dem Historiker teils bewußt, teils unbewußt, dadurch beeinflußt. Oder, wie Srbik sagt: „Da nun alles historische Erkennen vom eigenen Erleben des Historikers ... mitbestimmt ist und da der Mensch als zugleich biologisches, geistiges und gesellschaftliches Wesen auch von den allgemeinen Strömungen der Zeit, des sozialen Wesens und des Ge-

meinschaftsgeistes ergriffen ist, da ferner die Traditionen, die dem Historiker überkommen sind, sein Schaffen entscheidend beeinflussen, ist immer wieder die Fragestellung an die Geschichte eine neue ...“

Daß Srbik diese Seite besonders im Auge hatte, ist schon in der Fassung des Titels „*Geist und Geschichte*“ ausgedrückt, übrigens eine für Srbiks Denken sehr charakteristische Zusammenstellung, und wird auch durch die Darstellung bestätigt. Allerdings ist es nicht immer und überall gelungen, in diesem Sinne „Geist“ und „Geschichte“ in ihrer Wechselwirkung aufzuzeigen. Neben glänzend geschriebenen, fast monographie-artigen Abschnitten wie z. B. über Niebuhr oder Ranke stehen mehr registrierende Aufzählungen von Historikern und ihren Werken, Ungleichmäßigkeiten, die zum Teil im Stoff selbst liegen, wobei jedoch auch dieses Stoffliche nicht nur für den Fachmann brauchbar ist, sondern immer wieder mit aufschlußreichen Zwischenbemerkungen belebt wird. Den Höhepunkt der Darstellung bilden die Kapitel über die deutsche Geschichtsschreibung in den Jahrzehnten vor der Reichsgründung, ein Zeitabschnitt, dessen Problematik Srbik als Forscher wie als Mensch, auch in seinem Irrten, besonders berührt hat. Doch verweilt der Blick nicht nur bei der deutschen Historiographie, sondern umfaßt die europäischen Zusammenhänge, das ganze geistige Gewebe, das die europäische Wissenschaft miteinander verbindet. So entsteht aus biographischen und wissenschaftshistorischen Darstellungen und der Schilderung politisch-geistiger Situationen ein überaus lebendiges Bild deutschen geistigen Lebens, bezogen auf die Geschichtsschreibung, aber weit darüber hinausgreifend in die allgemeine deutsche Entwicklung, zuweilen sehr persönlich gefärbt, dadurch aber auch an Leuchtkraft gewinnend.

Bernhard Knauß

Staatsbürgerliche Erziehung

Als maßgebend zur allgemeinen Orientierung und zum gründlichen Studium über das Wesen der Politik kann das Buch von *Adolf Grabowsky* „*Politik im Grundriß*“ bezeichnet werden (Frankfurt a. M., Dikreiter Verlag, 420 S., DM 16,80). Grabowsky, der in Deutschland unvergessen ist als Herausgeber der „*Zeitschrift für Politik*“ und als Dozent an der deutschen Hochschule für Politik, zieht hier die Summe aus der Arbeit eines reichen Lebens. Das Buch ist in

jeder Weise geeignet, das Problem der Politik in gemeinverständlicher Weise allen Lesern nahezubringen. Es hat den großen Vorzug, daß es kein trockenes wissenschaftliches Werk (bei aller wissenschaftlichen Standfestigkeit) ist, sondern mit vielen lebendigen Beispielen arbeitet und die Art Grabowskys deutlich zum Ausdruck bringt: Sachlichkeit, Unabhängigkeit des Urteils und gründliche Kenntnis aller bis ins letzte durchdachten Probleme. - Es berührt etwas eigenartig, daß dem Buch von Grabowsky, diesem eindeutigen Gegner jedes Totalitarismus, ausgerechnet ein Prospekt eines Buches von Edwin Erich Dwinger beigelegt ist, das im gleichen Verlag herausgebracht wurde!

Mit dem gleichen Problem beschäftigt sich die Schrift des früheren Reichsministers Hermann Dietrich *„Auf dem Wege zum neuen Staat“* (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 130 S.). Dietrich hat seine Aufgabe enger gezogen als Grabowsky, indem er die deutsche Aufgabe aus seiner intimen Kenntnis und großen Erfahrung darstellt und Wege weist, wie der neue Staat zu einem wirklich demokratischen Aufbau gelangen kann, unter besonderer Betonung der Wichtigkeit einer gesunden Landwirtschaft.

Einem besonderen Problem ist die Schrift von Theodor Eschenburg *„Der Beamte in Partei und Parlament“* gewidmet, erschienen als Heft 15 der Reihe „Kleine Schriften für den Staatsbürger“ (Frankfurt a. M., Alfred Metzner Verlag, 227 S. DM 6,80). Das Buch ist deswegen von besonderem Wert, weil hier ein Mann spricht, der, selber Beamter, ausgezeichnet ist durch unbedingte Zivilcourage und durch das Gefühl der Pflicht, auch höchst unbecome Wahrheiten zu sagen. Wir dürfen wünschen, daß gerade dieses Buch, das wirklich gewissend sein kann, möglichst große Verbreitung fände. R. P.

Stifterbibliothek

In unablässiger Folge erscheinen auf dem Büchermarkt neue Buchreihen - so zahlreich, daß ihre Kenntnis allmählich ein Spezialwissen wird. Eine recht große Zahl dieser Reihen ist überflüssig und verdankt ihre Existenz lediglich dem Geschäftssinn ihrer Verleger. Um so erfreulicher ist es, einmal eine Reihe anzugeben zu können, die in ihrer Zielsetzung und -soweit bisher zu übersehen - in ihrer Ausführung gleich begrüßenswert ist. Es

handelt sich um die in drei Abteilungen, „Klassiker der Staatskunst“, „Klassiker der Bühne“, „Fragen der Zeit“ erscheinende *Stifterbibliothek*, welche die Adalbert-Stifter-Gemeinde in Salzburg im Verlag Wilhelm Braumüller, Wien, ediert. Dieses verdienstvolle Unternehmen umfaßt bisher zu geringen Preisen Bändchen wie - um nur einige Titel zu nennen - *A. de Tocqueville: „Demokratie in Amerika“*; *Justus Möser: „Das Recht der ersten Mühle“*, eine Auswahl aus den „Patriotischen Phantasien“; *Edmund Burke: „Gedanken über die Revolution“* (aus den „Thoughts on French Affairs“); *Thomas Carlyle: „Goethe“*, eine Zusammenfassung seiner Aufsätze; *Wladimir von Hartlieb: „Zur Frage, ob Gott ist“*. In der Abteilung „Klassiker der Bühne“ erschien, in neuer Übertragung von Theodor von Zeynek, *Shakespeares „Hamlet“* mit einer kurzen Einführung von Max Mell. Zeynek, der bereits alle Werke Shakespeares neu übersetzt hat, hält sich mit seiner deutschen Fassung überraschend streng an die Form des Originals - ohne dadurch der Gefahr wörtlicher Übertragung zu erliegen. Vor allen Dingen vermeidet er die große Gefahr einer „Modernisierung“ Shakespeares, und man kann mit erheblicher Wahrscheinlichkeit annehmen, daß seine deutsche Fassung mindestens neben der Schlegel-Tiecksschen sich ihren Platz auf den Bühnen erobern wird.

Zu den meisten Bändchen der Stifterbibliothek haben namhafte Wissenschaftler erläuternde Vorworte geschrieben und so dazu beigetragen, das hier zusammengetragene wortvolle Geistesgut aus vielen Ländern einem großen Leserkreis nahezubringen. D. R.

Hinweise

In Heft 5/1952 brachten wir einen Aufsatz von Carl Haensel „Gefährdet das Fernsehen Theater und Buch?“ Es handelte sich dabei um einen Vorabdruck aus Car Haensels Buch *„Fernsehen - nah gesehen“*, das jetzt im Alfred Metzner Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., erschienen ist (214 S.). Das Werk stellt eine Einführung von sachkundiger Hand in das so schwierige Gebiet des Fernsehens dar, dessen Problematik mit dem Beginn regelmäßiger Fernsehsendungen in Deutschland nun auch für uns akut geworden ist.

Inzwischen ist auch der Band *„Ernst Barlach. Leben und Werk in seinen Brie-*

fen", herausgegeben von Friedrich Dross (München, Verlag R. Piper & Co. 268 S. DM 18,-) erschienen, auf den wir schon anlässlich des Abdrucks einiger Briefe in Heft 9/1952 hingewiesen hatten. Wir hoffen, daß diese wertvolle Veröffentlichung dazu beitragen wird, das Bild Ernst Barlachs als Künstler und Mensch einer breiten Öffentlichkeit vertraut zu machen, die bisher nur das eine und andere Werk, die eine oder andere Seite seines Schaffens und seines Wesens gekannt hat.

Josef Hofmillers „Letzte Versuche“, herausgegeben von Hulda Hofmiller, sind jetzt in der Nymphenburger Verlags-handlung, München, neu aufgelegt worden, nachdem sie fast zehn Jahre vergriffen waren (192 S.). Es ist zu begrüßen, daß diese wertvolle Sammlung, die u. a. meisterhafte Essays über Marie v. Ebner-Eschenbach, Hofmannsthal, Nietzsche und Stifter umfaßt, nun wieder erhältlich ist.

Vom Lernen

„Das Lernen ohne Heiterkeit kann zwar einen Lernbesitz auch hervorbringen, aber er wird innerlich weniger reich und beglückend sein.“ Dieser Satz steht in dem umfangreichen und gründlichen Buch Walter Gnyers, Direktors des Zürcher Oberseminars, über die Grundlagen des Lernens und Lehrens „Wie wir lernen“ (Erlenbach-Zürich 1952, Eugen Rentsch Verlag) nicht vereinzelt da, sondern bildet ein immer wieder spürbares Gegengewicht zu der notwendigen psychologischen und anthropologischen Erhellung des Gegenstandes. Spiel - Lernen - Arbeit, diese Stufendreiheit bleibt so als Einheit lebendig, statt in isolierte Phasen zu zerfallen. Jeder Lehrer, vor allem auch der Volksschullehrer, sollte die Möglichkeit haben, sich intensiv mit diesem Werk zu beschäftigen, das ganz unerschöpflich ist in der Fülle seiner Anregungen, seiner Hinweise auf die Lehrmeinungen der Weltpädagogik und durch die historischen Bezüge. Ausgewogenheit zwischen Theorie und Praxis, wie sie die klassischen pädagogischen Schriften kennzeichnen, ist hier erreicht. Wir lernen, indem wir erfahren, wie wir lernen, das Lernen und Lehren von Neuem und als etwas Unbekanntes kennen. W. G.

Gedichte

Gedichte sind die reinsten Kunstwerke der Sprache, erst auf die Tafeln der Zeit

geschrieben, bevor sie unzerbrechlicher Stein der Ewigkeit aufnimmt. Darum darf man an denen nicht vorübergehen, die heute unter uns entstehen. Einige Dichter haben wieder den lyrischen Ertrag vieler Schaffensjahre vorgelegt. Gottfried Kötters „Gedichte“ (München, Franz Ehrenwirth Verlag, 72 S. DM 6,-) preisen in Ehrfurcht die Wunder der Schöpfung im Anblick der bayerischen Landschaft. Der helle und heitere Ton der frühen Gedichte wandelt sich unter dem Eindruck der Kriegszerstörungen später in den Klagen des Elegikers („Münchner Elegien“), der trotzdem selbst in dem düsteren Memento mori seines Kerngedichtes „Wir Wehenden“ den Glauben an ein Unvergängliches nicht aufzugeben vermag. Kötter ist ein Lyriker von Geblüt, unliterarisch, dem Experiment abgeneigt. Was bei ihm glänzt, ist lauterer Gold.

Die Nähe zu den Menschen, die er dem geistlichen Amt verdankt, bewegt die Lyrik von Albrecht Goes („Gedichte 1930 bis 1950“, Frankfurt a. M., S. Fischer Verlag, 176 S. DM 8,50), ihre nicht kunstlose, aber unmittelbare Form, ihre Antwort auf die Rufe derer, die um Verstehen, Liebe oder Trost werben. Des Dichters Berufung steht hier im Einklang mit der des hilfreichen Menschen: „Erst im eigenen Verbrennen / Sind wir menschlich eingeweiht“, heißt es in dem Schlüsselgedicht „Die Kerze“, in dem Goes eine dichterisch tiefe Sinngebung des menschlichen Daseins gelungen ist.

Auf die „Achtzig Gedichte“, die Rudolf Alexander Schröder aus seinen „Weltlichen Gedichten“ ausgewählt hat (Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp Verlag, 125 S. DM 6,50), sei als eine ausgezeichnete Einführung in das lyrische Schaffen eines wahren Meisters der Formen hingewiesen. Schröder hat vielleicht erst in seiner späten Lyrik, die mit der „Ballade vom Wandersmann“ einsetzt, eine ganz eigene und unverwechselbare Form gefunden. Doch ist der Weg dorthin mehr als nur ein glänzender Umweg.

Will man einen Lyriker kennenlernen, dessen Gedicht sich bald geistig-heiter in einer ironischen Mittellage hält, bald in zärtlich gehobenem Rühmen oder Klagen melodisch verschwebt, so lasse man sich Peter Gans „Holunderflöte“ (Freiburg i. Br. und Zürich, Atlantis-Verlag, 221 S. DM 9,80) nicht entgehen. „Sinne geben und Sinn / Selig einander sich hin“ - das wäre wohl das Motto für ein ganzes Gedichtwerk, das in einem programmati-

schen Sinn, so sehr es auf sich gestellt bleibt, heute über den Kreis von Kennern hinauswirken müßte. Denn es zeigt, daß klar nicht nüchtern, schön nicht langweilig, tief nicht unverständlich zu sein brauche, und darin ist es schlechthin unvergleichlich.

Oskar Jancke

Deutsche Gedichte in Amerika

In Amerika erscheinen deutsche Gedichte! Verse eines österreichischen Emigranten. In irgendeiner der großen Städte sprechen vielleicht ein paar Menschen die Zeilen nach aus dem Bekenntnis „Von der Liebe zur Heimat“, das Ernst Waldinger in seinem Gedichtband „Glück und Geduld“ veröffentlicht hat (New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 139 S.). Vielleicht treffen die Klänge nur auf die

rechte Bereitschaft da, wo man fern der Heimat ist? Es ist für einen Rezensenten immer eine peinliche Aufgabe, Verse zu „besprechen“. Entweder sind sie schlecht, oder sie ergreifen. Dann liest man sie und fühlt sich ein wenig freier, ein wenig sicher in dem, was man selbst erlebt. So geht es mit dieser Gedichtsammlung. Ernst Waldinger, der sich mit dem Band „Der Gemmenschneider“ und seiner Sammlung „Aus kühlen Bauernstuben“ als Meister des Wortes ausgewiesen hat, ruft sich mit dem neuen Band (der auch ältere Gedichte enthält) erneut ins Gedächtnis derer zurück, die sich um die deutsche Sprache mühen. Es ist ein wichtiges Buch für alle, die sich der deutschen Lyrik zugehörig fühlen. Wann wird es eine Ausgabe in Deutschland finden? Karl O. Paetel

Mitarbeiter dieses Hefes u. a.:

Minister a. D. **Dr. Hans Zurlinden**, Bern, war bis 1950 schweizerischer Gesandter in Moskau. Wir haben bereits kürzlich auf seine beiden wichtigen Broschüren „Unterwegs“ und „Rußland und die Sowjetunion“ hingewiesen. – **Hede Massing**, gebürtige Österreicherin, war die erste Frau von Gerhart Eisler. Sie war bis 1938 für den kommunistischen „Apparat“ tätig und ist dabei oft mit Richard Sorge zusammengetroffen. – **Max Eastman**, ein erfolgreicher amerikanischer Publizist, hat eine größere Anzahl von Büchern über Fragen der Kunst und politische Tagesfragen veröffentlicht – **Rolf Schott** ist nach Italien emigriert. Zuletzt erschien von ihm der utopische Roman „Die Inseln des Domes“ im Origo-Verlag, Zürich.

Im nächsten Heft der Deutschen Rundschau lesen Sie u. a.:

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Dr. v. Knieriem, der selbst als ehemaliges Vorstandsmitglied und Chefjurist der IG-Farbenindustrie vor den Schranken des Nürnberger Tribunals stand, unternimmt in seinem Buche den Versuch, die dort getroffenen Entscheidungen kritisch zu durchleuchten. Seine Erörterungen stützen sich auf das gesamte Dokumentenmaterial aus den sogenannten 12 Nachfolgeprozessen u. a. gegen Beamte, Ärzte, Richter, Generale und Industrielle. Er gelangt zu der Feststellung, daß die Grundlagen der Nürnberger Rechtssprechung fragwürdig sind, die Durchführung der Verfahren Bedenken erweckt. Mit großer Gründlichkeit und Umsicht wird eine Reihe schwierigster rechtlicher und menschlicher Probleme untersucht, mit denen das internationale Richterkollegium nicht fertig zu werden vermochte. Dazu gehören die Fragen der Bindung an höheren Befehl, des Notstandes, der Pflichtenkollision, des gesetzlichen Unrechts und das dunkle Problem, ob man teilnehmen durfte am Bösen, wenn man glaubt, dadurch Schlimmeres verhüten zu können. Diese mit solcher Eindringlichkeit und Integrität bisher noch nicht zur Sprache gebrachten Fragenkreise werden formalrechtlich, völkerpsychologisch, politisch und bis hinein in die ethischen Tiefenbezirke der Betroffenen untersucht. Im Neuland der jüngsten Geschichte möchte dieses Buch unter dem Gestrüpp von alten Gesetzen und neuen Ordnungen den Pfad der Gerechtigkeit finden helfen.

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Wer trägt die Maske?

Offener Brief an Walter Ulbricht, Generalsekretär der SED.

Herr Ulbricht!

Sie kündigten auf dem zweiten Parteikongreß der S.E.D. die Zertrümmerung aller Restbestände westlicher Demokratie in der Sowjetzone an und fordern von den Kirchen, die „Maske der Neutralität“ aufzugeben und sich entschieden loszusagen von allen amerikanischen und englischen Agenturen. „Die Vertreter der Kirchen in der Sowjetzone dürfen keinerlei Anweisung von jenen Kräften annehmen, welche die Geschäfte der amerikanischen Okkupanten besorgen“, sagten Sie wörtlich.

Ihre Worte gaben uns Christen im Westen Rätsel über Rätsel auf. Wie mochten Sie das gemeint haben mit der Maske der Neutralität? Wer war unter den englischen und amerikanischen Agenturen zu verstehen? Wer sind die Kräfte, die die Geschäfte der amerikanischen Okkupanten besorgen und von denen die Christen der Ostzone Anweisungen entgegengenommen haben?

Hätten wir gleich nach Ihrer Rede diese Fragen an Sie gerichtet, so wären Sie um die Antwort nicht verlegen gewesen. Wir mischen uns, hätten Sie uns gesagt, nicht im geringsten in die inneren Angelegenheiten der Kirchen ein. Die Kirchen haben bei uns volle Freiheit, die Glocken zu läuten, ihrelieder zu singen, ihren Gott zu verklären. Schuster, bleib bei Deinem Leisten! Aber diese Schuster bleiben nicht dabei, sie mischen sich in die Politik, sie unterhalten Beziehungen zu unseren Feinden, sie sind ihre Befehlsempfänger. Das hört jetzt auf. Wer unsere Befehle übertritt, hat es sich selbst zuzuschreiben, wenn ihn die Faust der Werktätigen packt und ins R.Z. oder nach Sibirien schleudert, um ihm Gelegenheit zu geben, über die Pflichten eines Bürgers der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik nachzudenken.

Also, die Christen kommen nicht ins R.Z. wegen ihres Glaubens, o nein, sie kommen ins R.Z. oder sonstwohin, weil sie die schlechteren Deutschen, weil sie Volkseinde sind.

So hätten Sie uns gesagt, und wir hätten es glauben müssen, wenn . . . ja, wenn Sie nicht — oder Ihre Regierung, was ja dasselbe ist — selbst kurze Zeit darnach eine authentische Auslegung Ihrer Worte gegeben hätten, und zwar durch die Tat.

Wenige Tage nach Ihrer Erklärung ging die Nachricht durch die Presse, den 5000 angemeldeten Teilnehmern an der Lutherischen Weltbundtagung in Hannover und den 20 000 Teilnehmern am Evangelischen Kirchentag in Stuttgart seien die bereits zugesagten Pässe verweigert worden, und auf der Lutherischen Weltbundtagung in Hannover fehlten tatsächlich zum allgemeinen Schmerz diese Fünftausend. — Warum haben Sie oder Ihre Regierung — was daselbe ist — ihnen die Pässe verweigert? Warum entzogen sie vollberechtigten Gliedern Ihrer Deutschen Demokratischen Republik das elementare, von Gott verliehene und in Ihrer Verfassung verbriefteste Recht, ihren Glauben zu betätigen und ihren Brüdern aus aller Welt zu begegnen und mit ihnen Christus anzubeten? Warum bestrafte Sie die Fünftausend, noch bevor sie etwas verbrochen hatten? Warum begingen Sie die unmenschliche Grausamkeit, sie von einer wichtigen Quelle innerer Stärkung abzuschneiden? Sind die evangelischen Bischöfe, die in Hannover aus aller Welt versammelt waren, Agenten der englisch-amerikanischen Okkupanten? Nähmen die Christen, die in Stuttgart von Pfarrern und Laien das Wort Gottes gehört hätten, damit Anweisungen von Agenten des amerikanischen Kapitals entgegen? Sind die Verwandten und Freunde, denen sie begegnen wollten, englische Spione? Und sind diese Christen deswegen Volksfeinde? Nein, Herr Ulbricht, die Volksfeinde sehen anders aus und sie sitzen nicht in den Wohnungen der Christen und in den Pfarrhäusern, die sitzen in gewissen Büros und sind Tag und Nacht damit beschäftigt, Pläne auszuschmieden, um alles, was aus dem wirklichen Volk hervorzuwächst, auszutreten, die selbständigen Bauern, Handwerker und Geschäftsleute in Hörige zu verwandeln, Menschenraub und Spitzeltum zu organisieren.

Es ist nichts mit der Religionsfreiheit in Ihrer Demokratischen Republik, das beweist die Entziehung der Pässe. Sie machen lieber den eisernen Vorhang zur chinesischen Mauer, als daß Sie den Christen, der einzigen völkerverbindenden Macht der Welt, die Freiheit gönnen, zusammenzukommen.

Verfolgen Sie also ruhig die Christen als Agenten und Befehlsempfänger des Westens — kein Mensch glaubt Ihnen das mehr. Jeder-

mann sieht, das ist nur eine Maske, erfunden, um die Kirche als Kirche zu treffen und doch vor der Welt das Gesicht zu wahren. Wir wissen es, und Sie wissen es noch besser: Sie sagen den Christen den Kampf an, nicht weil sie schlechtere Deutsche sind, Agenten und Hörige westlicher Mächte, sondern weil sie Christen sind. Wir haben diese Methoden im Dritten Reich schon einmal am eigenen Leibe kennengelernt; wir sind hellhörig geworden.

Als wir von Hitlers Schergen unter dem Vorwand der Staatsfeindschaft ins Konzentrationslager geschickt wurden, da hat uns einer der prominenten Anhänger Ihrer Staatsweisheit anvertraut: „Wir haben von Hitler gelernt, wie man die Kirche bekämpfen muß: nicht auf plumpe, direkte Weise, sondern indirekt.“ Nach diesem Rezept verfahren Sie; Sie sind Ihrem angeblichen Todfeind verwandter, als Sie denken. Hitler ist eine Leiche. Wollen Sie seinem Geist zur Auferstehung verhelfen? Bestigia terrent!

Wir wissen nicht, ob Ihnen dieser Brief zu Gesicht kommt; wir fürchten, wenn er es tut, daß er taube Ohren findet. Aber wenn Sie schon fortfahren, die Kirche zu bekämpfen, so tun Sie es lieber offen unter Verzicht auf durchsichtige Vorwände; Sie verfallen damit nur dem Fluche der Lächerlichkeit. Denn es hat sich seit 2000 Jahren herumgesprochen: Die Christen lassen sich in ihrer Vaterlandsliebe von niemanden übertreffen, eben weil sie jetzt schon in ihrem himmlischen Vaterlande leben.

Vielleicht wundern Sie sich, Herr Generalsekretär, woher sich ein unbedeutender Mensch die Freiheit nimmt, ohne Amt und Auftrag zu diesen Dingen Stellung zu nehmen: Nun, einmal habe ich das Ihnen nicht unbekannte RZ Sachsenhausen um ähnlicher Sache willen längere Zeit von innen kennen gelernt. Und dann gibt es bei den Christen etwas, was nicht tot zu kriegen ist: ihr Gewissen, das ihnen eine Verantwortung auferlegt, die ihnen niemand abnimmt, und der sie selbständig folgen müssen, auch wenn sie keine äußere Befehlsstelle dazu auffordert. Aber vielleicht ist gerade dies der Grund, warum Sie die Christen nicht mögen: sie lassen sich keinen blauen Dunst vormachen!

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Gerade zur rechten Stunde kam das Buch heraus; die im Osten beginnende verschleierte Verfolgung zeigt, wie falsch das weitverbreitete Urteil war: der Kirchenkampf ist passé. Die Methoden Ulbrichts sind haargenau denen Hitlers abgeguckt. Wie können wir unseren Brüdern helfen, wenn wir unsere eigenen Erfahrungen so in den Wind schlagen?!

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Im „Kaufmännischen Zentralblatt“, Zürich, schrieb Karl Wilczynski:

„... Rudolf Pechel, der wie viele Tausende ein Leidtragender des hitlerschen Terrors war, hat nie geschwiegen und mutig gegen die Diktatur gekämpft. Aus ganzem Herzen ist er ein Demokrat und guter Europäer. Ein leuchtendes Zeichen dafür ist seine Zeitschrift, und die vorliegende Sammlung seiner Vorträge und Reden bezeugen es aufs Nachdrücklichste...“

Lutz Weltmann urteilte in der „AJR Information“, London:

„... Es ist bedauerlich, daß es nicht in einer billigen Ausgabe verfügbar ist und so vielen Lesern in Deutschland wie nur möglich zugänglich gemacht werden kann. Dieser echte Widerstandskämpfer der seine Feder als kraftvolle Waffe verwandte... hält den Geist des Widerstandes in kompromißloser Weise aufrecht, damit er nicht von jenen verwässert wird, für die er nur eine vorübergehende Modeerscheinung ist.“

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FIRST SESSION

AUGUST 9, 22, AND 23, 1951

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HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

(Based on Testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa and
Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby)

THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1951

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARING

The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to call at 10:30 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. Francis E. Walter presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Francis E. Walter, Clyde Doyle, Bernard W. Kearney, Donald L. Jackson, and Charles E. Potter (appearance as noted in transcript).

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael L. Nixon, director of research; John W. Carrington, clerk; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. WALTER. The committee will come to order. Is the interpreter here, Mr. Kuroda?

Mr. KURODA. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. Will you stand and raise your right hand, please.

Do you solemnly swear you will truly and accurately interpret into the Japanese language the questions propounded by the committee, and that you will make a true and accurate interpretation in the English language of the replies made by the witness in the Japanese language, so help you God?

Mr. KURODA. I do.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, before swearing in the witness, may I suggest that the young lady there be sworn in as a monitor. Due to the difficulties in translation of finding the exact equivalent in English of the Japanese, it has been the general practice for a monitor to be present also, to give her interpretation in the event of a difference.

Mr. WALTER. I think she should be sworn as an interpreter.

Do you solemnly swear you will truly and accurately interpret into the Japanese language the questions propounded in English by the committee, and that you will make a true and accurate interpretation in the English language of the answers made by the witness in the Japanese language, so help you God?

Mrs. KATSUYO L. TAKEHITA. I do.

Mr. WALTER. Will the witness please stand. [To Mr. Kuroda,] Repeat this, please.

I swear that in answering all questions propounded to me in the course of this hearing. I will state the truth according to my conscience, adding nothing and concealing nothing.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA (through Mr. Kuroda). Yes.

TESTIMONY OF MITSUSADA YOSHIKAWA

(THROUGH THE INTERPRETER, ANDREW Y. KURODA, ASSISTED BY THE MONITOR, MRS. KATSUYO L. TAKESHITA)

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state your full name, please?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yoshikawa, Mitsusada.¹

Mr. TAVENNER. Your name is Yoshikawa, Mitsusada?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Yoshikawa, you are at present in the United States on a mission of the Japanese Government, I believe; is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. You are a native of Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. When and where were you born?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was born in Tokyo on January 16, 1907.

Mr. TAVENNER. What position do you now hold with the Japanese Government?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I am the chief of the special investigation bureau of the attorney general's office.

Mr. TAVENNER. How long have you held that position?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. For about 3 years.

Mr. TAVENNER. What other official positions have you held with the Japanese Government?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was a prosecutor and also an official in the Ministry of Justice. I was holding those offices concurrently.

Mr. TAVENNER. I notice that the translation given was prosecutor. Have you held the position of procurator under the Japanese Government?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes. It is officially translated as procurator instead of prosecutor.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, according to An Outline of the Japanese Judiciary, by Masataro Miyake, published in Tokyo in 1935, page 4, a procurator has the following function:

To conduct searches, institute prosecutions, and supervise the execution of judgments in criminal cases and to act as representative of the public interest in civil cases of public concern.

Mr. WALTER. It sounds like duties of the nature of those of the Attorney General and the head of the FBI.

Mr. TAVENNER. The duties are even broader than that. Procurators are attached to district and appeals courts in Japan, as well as to the supreme court. The Library of Congress likens a procurator to a district attorney in the United States, but having much more power than a district attorney.

I would like to ask the witness if that is his understanding of the duties of a procurator.

(Representative Charles E. Porter entered hearing room.)

¹ In Japanese, it is customary to give last name first.

Mr. KURODA. He says that what is written here is right. However, he is not quite sure what it means, having much more power than a district attorney.

Mr. TAVENNER. When you were procurator, were you attached to the criminal courts of Tokyo?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. For a certain period I was.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was that period?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't remember exactly, but from around September 1938 for about 8 years.

Mr. TAVENNER. During the period you were procurator, were you assigned to the case of Richard Sorge in the performance of your duties as a procurator?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you describe very briefly the nature of your assignment to the case of Richard Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. A group—

Mr. TAVENNER. Just a moment, please. May I suggest that from this point on the interpreter interpret in shorter passages.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. A group of procurators was organized to make search and prosecute this case under Mr. Toneo Nakamura. Mr. Nakamura was chief of a division of the Tokyo district criminal court, the prosecution bureau, and under Mr. Nakamura I was appointed as the one primarily in charge of the prosecution. There were two persons appointed, and I was one of the two, and I was in charge of the prosecution of this case, and I used several procurators and engaged in the search.

Mr. TAVENNER. When you speak of being engaged in search, do you mean engaged in investigation of the case?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I personally conducted the investigation, and also I appointed other procurators to help conduct this prosecution, and also I ordered the police to help in the investigation.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state, please, what led up to the arrest of Richard Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I remember, I think it was around the spring of 1941, a woman called Tomo Kitabayashi came to Tokyo from America.

We received information that this woman Kitabayashi was doing some spy activities.

We ordered police to proceed in investigation.

Kitabayashi went to Wakayama.

We couldn't get any evidence against her.

But in October of that year—that is, 1941—I recall we received certain information, and therefore we arrested Kitabayashi.

Kitabayashi denied that she was a spy. However, she stated that a person called Yotoku Miyagi, who came from America, was doing some kind of spy activities.

Mr. TAVENNER. May I interrupt you at that point. Was Yotoku Miyagi an American citizen?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I am not sure, but I think he was an American citizen.

Mr. TAVENNER. Proceed, please.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. We arrested Miyagi and investigated him. He vehemently denied he was a spy. However, when we searched his house we discovered an odd object.

It was an English document.

It was a document conducted by the South Manchurian Railway Co., and it was regarded as secret material to the Japanese Government.

We thought it was strange that an artist had such kind of document.

Mr. TAVENNER. Miyagi was an artist; is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He was an artist, and he had some reputation as an artist in Tokyo. He painted American-style paintings.

Miyagi continued to deny that he was a spy. However, a certain thing happened.

He was being investigated on the second floor of the Tsukiji police station in Tokyo.

He attempted to commit suicide by jumping out of the window.

He wasn't injured, nor he died.

Police jumped after him and captured him.

After this incident, Miyagi began to state.

He began to state about a very important spy group; he began to state about the activities of a very important spy group.

Then he described the person who had closest connection with Miyagi was Hidemi Ozaki, who was regarded as the brains of the Konoye Cabinet.

Mr. TAVENNER. Excuse me. I did not understand what he said about Ozaki's connection with the Konoye Cabinet.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Premier Konoye had around him a group of brain trusters or advisers, and they formed a society called Breakfast Club, and Ozaki was one of the most brilliant advisers of Konoye.

As an illustration of his brilliancy, this can be stated: When the Marco Polo incident occurred, Ozaki said that the incident would become larger, extend larger. At that time people were confused whether the incident would be localized or extended. However, the development showed that Ozaki's prophecy was right, and his reputation increased.

(Representative Bernard W. Kearney left hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Then I understand Ozaki was very close to Prince Konoye, who occupied what position at that time?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. But what position did Prince Konoye hold at that time in the Japanese Government?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He was the Prime Minister at that time.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now if you will proceed.

Mr. KURODA. He asked if he may smoke.

Mr. WALTER. Yes, indeed.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. So we were very surprised when we found that Ozaki was involved in this case. We were not sure we could proceed in this case because of Ozaki's closeness to the Prime Minister. Then we found that behind Ozaki there were several foreigners also.

Moreover, among those foreigners we found there was Richard Sorge, who was the highest adviser to German Ambassador Ott, although he didn't have any official position.

My colleague procurator, Tamazawa, investigated Miyagi.

I examined the content of the investigation.

And finally we arrested Ozaki.

I investigated Ozaki personally.

I examined Ozaki at the Meguro police station, and he confessed the same day.

He disclosed the name of Shigeru Mizuno. Therefore we arrested Mizuno.

I began to examine Ozaki in detail.

We came to the conclusion we should arrest the foreigners, based on the examination of Miyagi and Ozaki.

The Konoye Cabinet was pushed into a difficult position and finally resigned.

It was before the forming of the Tojo Cabinet.

We were not particularly taking advantage of this situation, but we arrested Sorge and Klausen and Voukelitch.

I may correct my statement here. Tojo was scheduled to become the head of the Cabinet, and it was known that Mr. Iwanara, who was the Minister of Justice in the Konoye Cabinet, would stay in the new Cabinet; therefore, we received the approval of Mr. Iwanara and started arresting these people.

(Representative Clyde Doyle left hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. With regard to the people who were arrested at that time, I want to be certain we have their names listed correctly. You spoke of Klausen. Is that Max Klausen, K-l-a-u-s-e-n?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. And the person referred to as Voukelitch was Branko Voukelitch, B-r-a-n-k-o V-o-u-k-e-l-i-t-c-h.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Branko de Voukelitch, yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. You mentioned the name of Mizuno. Is that the same person as S-h-i-g-e-r-u M-i-z-u-n-o.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is the first name of Ozaki?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. H-i-d-e-m-i.

Mr. TAVENNER. We have in the record of the Sorge trial the translation of Ozaki's first name as H-o-z-u-m-i.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't know, but we called him Hidemi.

Mr. TAVENNER. There was only one Ozaki involved in the Sorge case?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Very well. Proceed, please.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. We arrested Max Klausen, his wife, Anna Klausen, and Voukelitch, and conducted a house search of these people.

What we wondered most was whether we could discover a radio transmitter.

Fortunately, we could discover the radio transmitter, and we impounded it. And also we found coded messages and messages which were to be coded, and also a code book, which was a German statistical yearbook.

We were afraid that Sorge might shoot at us with a pistol. We put Sorge's house under surveillance for several days. That morning a person from the German Embassy visited Sorge. After that person left we went in and arrested Sorge.

When he was arrested, Sorge insisted that he was a Nazi and held a very high position as an adviser in the German Embassy.

Mr. WALTER. About when was that?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In Tokyo.

Mr. WALTER. When? About what date?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I think it was November 1941.

Mr. WALTER. Did your investigation disclose that at that time both Germany and Russia knew of plans to make the attack at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It wasn't disclosed during the examination.

Mr. WALTER. Was it subsequently learned, as a result of those arrests and the investigation, that both Germany and Russia were informed of the plans for the attack?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The Pearl Harbor attack did not come up.

I would like to mention about intelligence activities later.

Sorge was brought to the Torisaka police station nearby.

After a physical examination, Sorge and Voukelitch were brought to a Tokyo detention house.

The following day the procurator started to investigate.

Mr. WALTER. May I interrupt at that point? Did the investigation disclose that the Japanese forces contemplated attacks and that this fact was known by the German and Russian Governments?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I am not sure exactly.

Since you asked me that question again, I will mention this. Sorge informed Russia 2 months before Germany attacked Russia about the German readiness of attacking. Sorge informed Russia that 150 divisions of the German Army were massed at the border, and the German high command was of the opinion that Petrograd, or Leningrad, would fall within 2 months.

Mr. TAVENNER. Proceed, please.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In connection with the investigation of Sorge, Klausen, and Voukelitch, I personally investigated Sorge.

As I said, I was in charge of the investigation of Sorge, and Mr. Hiroshi Iwo was in charge of Klausen. Another procurator was appointed to investigate Voukelitch. When I started the investigation of Sorge he vehemently denied.

After one week, and I think it was Saturday evening, Sorge finally confessed.

He wrote on a sheet of paper in German that "I have been an international Communist since 1925 and I am still," and then he confessed.

By that time Klausen and Voukelitch also confessed. This is the process up to the prosecution.

If you have any questions.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was there any coercion of any character used in obtaining the confession?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No.

Klausen first confessed that he was a spy for the Red Army.

And Voukelitch confessed that he was a spy for the Comintern.

And so a very serious ensuing search took place.

We couldn't tell the nature of this spy group until Sorge confessed.

I told Sorge that Miyagi and Ozaki confessed and showed evidence.

While we were repeating this, he confessed himself.

I have an opinion why Richard Sorge confessed.

The first reason is this: He thought that his arrest was too late. Sorge and his group had almost finished their spy activities and they thought they were very successful. A few days before the arrest Klausen and Voukelitch met at the house of Sorge and they were wondering why Ozaki failed to show up. They were talking that since

their activities were almost through they were going to get out of Japan and by all means go to Germany to engage in spy activities there.

Mr. WALTER. Did he know of a radio message that was sent in October?

Mr. KURODA. Mr. Chairman, when you said "he" you mean Mr. Yoshikawa?

Mr. WALTER. Yes.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't remember very exactly.

Mr. WALTER. Does he know about this message as a result of his investigation:

The American-Japanese talks have entered upon their final stage. In Konoye's opinion they will end successfully if Japan decreases her forces in China and French Indochina and gives up her plan of building eight naval and air bases in French Indochina. If America refuses to compromise by the middle of October, Japan will attack America, the Malay countries, Singapore, and Sumatra. She will not attack Borneo because it is within reach of Singapore and Manila. However, there will be war only if the talks break down, and there is no doubt that Japan is doing her best to bring them to a successful conclusion, even at the expense of her German ally.

I think I had better show you the message and ask if you know about this message [handing message to the witness and Mr. Kuroda].

Mr. KURODA. He says that he recalls about this message.

Mr. WALTER. So that there is no doubt but that Russia knew in advance of the plans on the part of Japan for aggression?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; and also, Russia would probably welcome a Japanese attack, instead of going north, going south.

Mr. WALTER. Exactly.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Along that line, Sorge was doing certain political maneuvering in addition to his spy activities.

Ozaki was also cooperating with Sorge.

Mr. WALTER. In other words, spies paid by the Russian Government were using whatever influence they had in order to promote Japanese aggression against the United States and the British?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. To a certain extent.

(Representative Clyde Doyle returned to hearing room.)

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In August of that year, 1,300,000 soldiers were mobilized in Japan, and Sorge was very much interested in obtaining the information to which direction, in which area, this number of soldiers would be used.

Mr. POTTER. In other words, he was anxious, I assume, to have the troops go south rather than north toward the Manchurian border; is that right?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He was very much anxious, and tried to get the information.

Miyagi frequented the eating and drinking places in Tokyo and tried to approach soldiers and tried to get information where they were headed. Ozaki tried to get the information from the higher echelon of the Government. However, the soldiers were wearing summer clothes instead of winter, so they thought the soldiers were headed toward the south instead of the north.

Mr. POTTER. Did Sorge, posing as a German or Nazi, use his influence on various policy makers in Japan to carry out the Communist wish to move the soldiers to the south as a threat to the British and

the United States, rather than to the north, which might be a threat to Russia? Did he use his influence to formulate that policy?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I think Sorge didn't have much connection with the high officials of the Japanese Government. What connection he had was rather with the army general staff of Japan.

Before the Russian-German war started high military officers came to Tokyo from Berlin.

And also an emissary of the German Admiral Canaries, who was in charge of antespionage activities, came to Tokyo.

When those people came from Germany to Japan they met, of course, Ambassador Ott, and they also met Sorge.

And they went to the Japanese Army general staff, the Japanese Army high officials, to see them with Sorge.

Ambassador Ott went to the Japanese Army general staff showing the German plan of attacking Singapore, and told the Japanese that if they followed that plan Singapore would fall very easily. At that time Sorge was an assistant to the German Ambassador.

Mr. TAVENNER. And that plan was prepared in the German Embassy, was it not, by Von Kretchner, and at that time all the German attachés were recalled for the purpose of that study?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I haven't heard about it.

Mr. TAVENNER. The plan that was presented was a plan for overland attack, just as it did occur finally?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. According to Sorge's confession, the Japanese staff officers were not particularly eager to accept that plan right away.

Mr. WALTER. May I interrupt at that point? I would like to get clear in my mind the connection between some of these individuals. Sorge and Ozaki were very close, were they not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Were more than close.

Mr. WALTER. They were both Communist agents; both agents of Russia; were they not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge started to use Ozaki as his assistant in Shanghai. At that time Sorge received approval from Russia. In Tokyo, too, when Ozaki was used in the spy ring in Japan, Sorge received the approval from Russia, and Ozaki was the closest assistant to Sorge. Ozaki was in a secret section of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

Mr. WALTER. And Ozaki was also at that time one of the leading Communists out there and was the political adviser to Prince Konoye?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. At the time Gen. Eugene Ott, German Ambassador to Japan, along with Richard Sorge, attempted to sell a plan of attack on Singapore to the Japanese general staff, do you know whether General Ott had taken that plan to Ribbentrop in Germany, where discussions were held between Ribbentrop and Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I am not familiar with what you state. However, Sorge sent important messages concerning Matsuoka.

Before Matsuoka went to Europe, Prince Konoye told Matsuoka that it would be all right to conclude a commercial treaty with Russia, however, don't do anything in Germany.

That message was sent by Sorge, therefore Stalin was waiting for Matsuoka.

What Matsuoka got from Stalin in the form of a treaty was actually more than what Kōnoye was expecting, however.

That was the information which Sorge sent to Moscow in regard to the trip of Matsuoka.

And so Matsuoka had only a hearty welcome in Germany and nothing more.

So I heard.

Mr. TAVENNER. The records of the conversations between Hitler and Matsuoka and Oshima were introduced in the trial of Tojo, were they not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't remember exactly.

Mr. WALTER. Then, if I understand correctly, even after or at the moment that Germany attacked Russia, Russia was concerned with endeavoring to have the United States become involved in hostilities with Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, from the fact that German Ambassador Ott showed plans of attacking Singapore even prior to the German attack on Russia.

Mr. WALTER. They probably were still concerned in endeavoring to have us involved somewhere throughout the entire conspiracy?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. From these facts I could say that Sorge was primarily interested in spy work and secondarily he was engaged in political maneuvering, trying to divert Japanese attention to the south instead of to the north.

Mr. WALTER. In other words, he was acting in a dual capacity?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He was telling the Japanese that the Russian Army was strong, and also Siberia was rather barren, so Japan could not get anything from Siberia, but in the south Japan could get important resources, and also it is easier to attack the south. That is what he was trying to convince the Japanese people.

Mr. POTTER. You stated that when the representatives of the German Government visited Japan with this plan to move the Japanese Army south, that there was some reluctance on the part of Japanese military officials to accept that plan. Do you know what the official position of the Japanese military was concerning what they should do with the troops? Did they envision sending their troops north?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I haven't investigated the Japanese Army General Staff, so I don't know.

Either right before or right after the war between Germany and Russia started, a secret emissary came from Germany and, with Ambassador Ott, went to the Japanese General Staff to persuade the Japanese Army to attack Russia.

The Japanese General Staff replied that when the German Army reached the Danube line, the Japanese Army might attack Russia.

Information like this centering around the German Embassy was lost in fire.

Mr. POTTER. Did the investigation you conducted bring out evidence to determine whose idea it was to strike at Pearl Harbor? Was that sponsored by Germany, or by the Communists, or was that the Japanese Army's own policy?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That didn't come out in the investigation.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the relationship between General Ott and Richard Sorge after the arrest of Richard Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Ambassador Ott and Mrs. Ott were very surprised and became very angry and put pressure on Tojo.

Ambassador Ott asked, through the Minister of Justice, to let the Ambassador see Sorge.

We were very much embarrassed, because the investigation was continuing at that time.

Fortunately, in 1 week Sorge confessed, and so after his confession I told him that the Ambassador "is anxious to see you. Would you like to see him?"

Sorge replied first that he would not like to see him.

Sorge told me that though their political opinions were different, they were personally good friends, and so I told him, "If I were you, I would see him. A Japanese in this kind of situation would see him to say the last farewell." Sorge said, "Then I will see him."

So I told the Minister of Justice about that, and Ambassador Ott, with Marchiter, Stahmer, and others, came to see Sorge.

After a brief interview, Sorge told Ott that this would be the last time he would see him.

Ott was stunned and changed his countenance.

So we closed the interview and took Ott in another room. Ott said that he would not do anything concerning this case any more, but asked us to finish the investigation as quick as possible and let him know about the results.

However, it appeared that the German Embassy tried to put pressure upon us, using the Japanese left-wing people.

And so we made a copy of the first chapter of the investigation of the Sorge case and sent it to the German Embassy through the Minister of Justice.

Mr. TAVENNER. May I ask a question at that point before you go into a further discussion of that matter?

Did information come to you, in the course of this investigation, to indicate whether or not General Eugene Ott, the German Ambassador, knew of the Communist affiliation of Richard Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No. Ambassador Ott was completely deceived.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the result of General Ott being deceived by Sorge, with regard to his relations with his own government?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I think if Ott had gone home he would have been killed.

Mr. TAVENNER. He was immediately replaced by Stahmer as Ambassador to Japan, was he not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That is correct. And instead of going home, Ott went to Peking and stayed in China.

This is not very reliable, but we heard, we had information, that after the death of Ott, his wife went to Russia.

Mr. WALTER. Did Sorge at any time give you information concerning the extent of Communist espionage in the United States?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He did not.

Sorge made comments on the American Communist Party.

Mr. WALTER. What were his comments?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The American Communist Party, according to Sorge, his comment was that the American Communist Party had many people of different racial backgrounds, with different languages—Italians, Germans, and Japanese—and one language could not be used; but in the course of time it may become stronger.

Mr. TAVENNER. Prior to the time of obtaining the confession of Sorge, did you show him, and use in obtaining his confession, the German Statistical Year book which had been used as a code in the transmission of messages by Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I didn't show it personally, but I told him that Klausen confessed the fact that the German Statistical Yearbook was used as the code book.

Mr. WALTER. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12:25 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:10 p. m., Representatives Francis E. Walter and Clyde Doyle being present, Mr. Walter presiding.)

TESTIMONY OF MITSUSADA YOSHIKAWA—Resumed

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Yoshikawa, at the time of adjournment I was asking about the knowledge that Richard Sorge had of the code that was used in the transmission of secret messages at the time of his confession.

I now want to ask you whether he was also familiar with the existence of the radio equipment that had been used for that purpose prior to giving his confession?

Mr. KURODA. I didn't quite get the question.

Mr. TAVENNER. I will break the question down.

Prior to Mr. Sorge giving his confession, was he told about the seizure of the radio equipment, or was he shown the radio equipment which had been seized?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Before the confession we didn't show any material to him. Therefore, we didn't show the radio equipment which was impounded.

May I continue?

There was an argument among the procurators because he didn't confess, an argument that we should show the radio equipment to him; but before we came to the point of showing the equipment, he confessed.

Mr. TAVENNER. Had you advised him that you had seized and impounded the radio equipment?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. And that was before he made his confession?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you proceed now and tell the committee how the confession was given?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I gave the committee an account about it before, but I will speak to you a little further.

I told you before that they were almost finished their work in Japan, and they had a sort of sense of relief after the successful completion of their job.

Many people were arrested at the same time.

And those people confessed, one by one, before Sorge did.

Various evidences came up—radio equipment, code book, coded messages, and so forth.

As for the code book, it was found in a study of the house of Klausen.

It consisted of three volumes.

I happened to pick them up and I found that there was a mark of much use.

And the figures of general statistics were there.

I immediately figured that it was a source book for the code.

In order to make decoding difficult, they added the figures on that page on the coded message.

So after we impounded the German Statistical Yearbook we asked Klausen about it, and Klausen confessed it was the key book for the code. He confessed it before Sorge did.

I told Sorge about those facts and he finally confessed.

We had no program at that time. We were wondering whether Sorge was really a spy for Germany and using Communists in Japan but actually spying for the Nazi regime in Germany. That was one question.

The second question was whether Sorge was a double spy for both Berlin and Moscow.

The third question was whether he was really a spy for Moscow, pretending to be a Nazi.

Therefore, we examined Sorge without preconceived opinion.

We took a very cautious attitude.

There was another question. If he were a spy for Moscow, we didn't know whether he was a spy for the fourth section, as Klausen said, or whether he was a spy for the Comintern, as Vonkelitch said.

Mr. TAVENNER. When you speak of the fourth section, do you mean the fourth section of the Red army?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. That was the intelligence section of the Red army?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Proceed.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Therefore, I never crossed him to get his confession.

I asked his explanation as evidences came up.

So, finally, at the end of the first week, he confessed, but at that time I was not expecting that he would confess.

About 4 o'clock my colleague, prosecutor Tamazawa, and a policeman went to see if his health would stand any further investigation, since that was Saturday.

Thus he finally confessed. Before he confessed he asked for a piece of paper and pencil.

And, as I told you before, he wrote down in German that since 1925 he was an international Communist, and handed it to me.

And he took off his coat.

And he rose and cried: "I have never been defeated since I became an international Communist. This is the first time that I was beaten," he said.

Mr. WALTER. At that time did he say that Ozaki was also an international Communist?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge was quite exhausted at that time, and so Mr. Tamazawa asked him whether he would continue investigation the following day. Sorge wanted to be continued on Monday. So

he didn't say that Ozaki was also an international Communist at that time.

Sorge, generally speaking, admitted that Ozaki and Miyagi and others were also international Communists.

And he consented that he would talk about it Monday.

(Representative Charles E. Potter entered hearing room.)

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. On Monday, from 9 in the morning until 3 in the afternoon, the police conducted investigation under my supervision. However, Sorge asked to be investigated personally by Mr. Yoshikawa.

So from 3 o'clock in the afternoon until night I conducted the investigation by myself.

And Sorge responded to my questions.

The police talked to me before the investigation, and after the investigation they reported about the content of the investigation and received direction from me.

When the policemen were conducting the investigation of Sorge, Klausen, and Voukelfitch, I went along and kept my eyes on the policemen on their way of conducting the investigation.

Before starting the investigation I talked with Sorge about the outline of the investigation.

I showed him the points I would cover in the investigation.

And Sorge also offered his wishes.

And when he offered any points, I adopted those points which were helpful in the investigation.

My German and English are both broken. I speak broken in German and English. It took time to conduct the investigation, but Sorge didn't want to have an interpreter. I asked him why, and he said an interpreter would make the story difficult.

So, whenever we came into difficulty in understanding, we used a sheet of paper and Sorge wrote on the paper and explained.

When we decided about the outline of the investigation, he took a piece of paper and, by means of the paper, he explained about those points. When I read what he wrote on the paper I asked him questions when I didn't understand; then he made further explanation on those points.

After several days, Sorge typed what we talked, in my presence. He corrected misprints. I read what he typed by aid of a dictionary.

At times the typing was not neat and not sufficient, so I asked him to retype. He offered to retype himself, since it was not neat and not sufficient. Thus the typed story increased.

Either March or April the investigation was completed.

On various important points I received special explanations from him. There were some points where I could not get full explanation. When the investigation was completed, Sorge took a sheet of paper and typed that this investigation was conducted by Mr. Yoshikawa, and signed his name.

Then an official interpreter was appointed. It was Professor Ikoma, of the School of Foreign Languages. Mr. Ikoma came to the detention camp and confirmed that the story Sorge typed was actually his.

After taking oath, Mr. Ikoma translated it into Japanese. A copy was made. And that copy, Professor Ikoma and I signed. And the translation and the typed story were put into a document.

The criminal bureau of the Ministry of Justice prepared the translation of his story into pamphlet form. Sorge asked me to make my own official document when he was talking about the activities centering around the German Embassy. He didn't want to type his own story when that story came.

After his typewritten story was completed and the translation was completed, I asked Professor Ikoma to come and investigate Sorge about that phase of his activities.

The official document of that investigation consists of about 38 volumes. At the end of each volume, Professor Ikoma translated it into German and asked Sorge whether there was any disagreement on it, and after he found it right he affixed his signature on each volume. Then Professor Ikoma and I signed on each volume, and also my secretary affixed his signature on it.

This is the official interrogation document based on law. Of the contents, I told you about a couple points in the morning session.

Therefore, Sorge's story consists of two parts. One is his typewritten story and the other is this official interrogation document.

There is another interrogation document which was made by a police officer, Ohashi. It took time for Ohashi to conduct his investigation. My recollection is that Ohashi's interrogation document was completed around April or May.

Mr. TAVENNER. Of what year?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. 1942. My official interrogation document was completed around June 1942.

The content of my official interrogation document contained information about the process by which Sorge approached the German Embassy.

I am going to expand about that now. I don't remember exactly the date, but Sorge came to Japan in 1934. At that time Ott was not the Ambassador. I think he was a colonel attached to a regiment in Nagoya.

At that time Sorge began to approach Ott.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was not General Ott at that time military attaché to Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't know about it, but maybe he was an attaché.

It was about the period of Von Kretchner that Sorge approached the German Embassy. By his information and judgment he gained the confidence of the staff of the German Embassy.

He gave General Ott political information. He joined the Nazi Party too. Then Ott became the Ambassador. It presented a very good chance for Sorge.

He frequented the Embassy, and though he did not have an official position in the Embassy, he was one of the highest advisers of the Ambassador. He also cooperated in the intelligence activities of the Embassy.

While he was cooperating, he also drew information from them. And, as I told you in the morning, there were many political diplomatic military personnel coming from Germany to Japan, and Sorge

got acquainted with those people. They were talking informally on many important matters. Therefore, while in Japan, he could get the information of Germany. Ott consulted with Sorge on very important matters.

So the information Ambassador Ott could receive from the German foreign office and from the Japanese foreign office went to Sorge. Not only the German foreign office, but diplomatic circles in Japan.

Sorge got the military secrets within the German Embassy. Therefore, the more the Japanese military men approached the German Embassy, the more information Sorge got out of them.

I heard this story. This is contained in my official interrogation document.

A Soviet General Rushikoff fled from the Soviet into Manchuria. And he was rescued by the Kwantung Army of Japan.

Rushikoff gave the information of the military positions and military forces of the Far Eastern Red Army and also Mongolia and Siberia.

The Japanese general staff was delighted to have that kind of information.

Rushikoff was the leader of an anti-Stalin bloc in Siberia.

The Japanese Army was so jubilant about it that they talked about it to Ott. Ott was also glad and reported to Hitler about it. And he sent a staff officer to Japan.

And after the Japanese examined Rushikoff, the staff officer from Germany examined Rushikoff himself. And he made a very minute report. That staff officer showed that report to Sorge.

Sorge asked him to leave that document with him for study, and he took a picture of the document and sent the film to Moscow.

Later the so-called Nomonhan incident occurred. The Japanese Army lost several divisions. By the mass artillery and tanks the Japanese lost a heavy casualty.

Mr. TAVENNER. The casualty loss was reported at 15,000, was it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not remember. It was like putting Japan's hand in a charcoal brazier.

Sorge also said that the anti-Stalin bloc in Siberia was also eliminated. The second document, which was the official interrogation document, contained that kind of information.

Unfortunately, no copy was made of this document, and I am afraid that the document was lost by fire.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you mean lost as a result of the bombing of Tokyo?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Possibly.

This is the first time that I talk about this, 10 years after the incident. During that period, Ambassador Ott was very pleased with Sorge and offered him a high position in the Embassy. Sorge declined.

Because he declined, his reputation increased. However, he told me that if he had become a member of the official staff he would have been investigated about his past in detail, and he was afraid of that. He told me about that.

Thus the official interrogation document was completed.

Mr. TAVENNER. I hand you four pages in Japanese script and ask you to identify those and state whether or not your name appears in connection with it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes. This is my seal.

Mr. TAVENNER. You are also pointing out, in addition to your signature, a seal placed beneath your signature?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. The seal also appears, half at the top of page 2 and half at the top of page 3, does it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

That is the way the Japanese official documents are made. They prove that the documents are official by putting the signature on the continuation pages.

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words, that is a method of identification, by placing what you call your "han" on the document?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. This document which has your signature and "han" attached is an affidavit, I believe, which you gave on February 19, 1949, is it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. The English translation is attached to your original Japanese affidavit?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer the document in evidence and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 1."

Mr. WALTER. Let it be marked as an exhibit and received in evidence.

(The document above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 1," is filed herewith.)

Mr. TAVENNER. I would now like to read the English translation of the document, which was translated by Minoru Endo, an official translator of Japanese documents in the employ of general headquarters, Far East Command.

(Reading:)

STATEMENT BY YOSHIKAWA MIYUSADA, GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL, BUTSUDO 1, DOJUNKAI Aoyama Apartments 1, 1 CHOME, Aoyama OYDEN, SHIBUYA-KU, TOKYO-10, FEBRUARY 19, 1949

I affirm that, according to my conscience, I will state the truth, adding nothing and concealing nothing.

I voluntarily declare as follows:

That in October 1941, I was a procurator assigned to the procurator's bureau of the Tokyo district criminal court; that on said date, in my official capacity I was assigned to conduct a procurator's examination of Richard Sorge who at the time was confined in the Tokyo detention house; that I did conduct that investigation until May 1942; that the investigation by me of Richard Sorge was conducted in the procurator's examination room in the Tokyo detention house; that during the proceedings Richard Sorge voluntarily made an offer to me to prepare and submit a statement on the general outline of his espionage activities; that as a result of this offer, Richard Sorge prepared such a statement in the German language in my presence and in the procurator's examination room; that the typewriter used by Richard Sorge for the preparation of said statement was his property which he used in his house before his arrest and had been confiscated as evidence; that after typing a chapter or a paragraph of said statement, Richard Sorge read the same in my presence and made deletions, additions, and corrections in my presence, and handed the same to me; that only one original copy of said statement was prepared by Richard Sorge; that because in said statement

the portion concerning his activities in Shanghai was not sufficient, Richard Sorge personally retyped said portion preparing anew said portion by supplementing that which was insufficient, and submitted said new portion to me; that I replaced said portion in the original statement; that the document attached hereto, consisting of 24 pages, is that portion which I deleted from the original document because I put in the original statement that portion which Richard Sorge later retyped as stated above; that said document is a portion of a statement which Richard Sorge first prepared and corrected in my presence in the procurator's examination room within the Tokyo detention house during October and November 1941 and handed to me; that said document does not bear the signature of Richard Sorge, the reason being that said document is no more than a portion of a statement prepared by Richard Sorge and that Richard Sorge affixed his signature at the end when the entire statement was completed and that he was not asked particularly to affix his signature on said document which was a portion of said statement; that said document has been in my possession from the afore-mentioned date until February 13, 1949, on which date it was turned over by me to Lt. Col. Paul Rensch, G-2, General Headquarters, Far East Command, United States Army, at said officer's request.

YOSHIKAWA MITSUSADA.

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—A seal bearing the name "Yoshikawa" appears over the bottom part of the signature. The same seal is also affixed overlapping the first and second pages.)

FEBRUARY 19, 1949.

I certify that I am an official translator of Japanese documents in the employ of General Headquarters, Far East Command, and that to the best of my ability, skill, and judgment, the within and foregoing is a true and accurate translation in the English language in two pages of the photostat of the original document attached hereto consisting of four pages which is the affirmation of Yoshikawa Mitsusada.

MINORU ENDO.

Mr. TAVENNER. The statement which you gave at that time over your signature and seal was true; was it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Your statement under oath refers to 24 pages attached to your affidavit as being the document which Richard Sorge wrote on his own typewriter in German?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. I will ask you to examine the 24 pages attached to your affidavit and state whether it is the document written by Sorge on his own typewriter in the German language.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The paper and typewriter impounded were used by Sorge.

Mr. TAVENNER. And this is a photostat which he attached to the same document?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you examine the document and state whether or not the corrections appearing therein were made personally by Richard Sorge in your presence?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That is true.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer this document for identification only at this time, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 2."

Mr. WALTER. Let it be marked for identification only.

(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 2" for identification only.)

Mr. TAVENNER. I hand you now a document written in Japanese consisting of eight pages, and ask you whether or not your signature and seal appear on that document?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

I dictated this document, but the signature and seal are mine.

Mr. TAVENNER. This is a sworn affidavit which you gave over your signature and seal; is it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. And does it bear date of April 1, 1949?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It does.

Mr. TAVENNER. Attached to your affidavit is the English translation; is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I desire to offer this document in evidence, both the Japanese and the English translation, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 3."

Mr. WALTER. For what purpose are they both offered?

Mr. TAVENNER. The main purpose is that it is really one exhibit. One is the translation of the Japanese. It is all one exhibit.

Mr. WALTER. It will be marked and received.

(The documents above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 3," are filed herewith.)

Mr. TAVENNER. I will read the English translation. [Reading:]

OATH

I hereby swear that I will state the truth according to my conscience, adding nothing and concealing nothing.

April 1, 1949.

/s/ YOSHIKAWA MITSUSADA. [SEAL]

STATEMENT

I, Yoshikawa Mitsusada, having taken the oath prescribed by Japanese law which appears on the attached sheet, do hereby make the following statement.

1. I am presently serving as Chief of the Special Investigation Bureau of the Attorney General's office. During or about 1941 and 1942, I was procurator in the procurator's office of the Tokyo District Criminal Court. I worked on the so-called international intelligence ring case involving Richard Sorge, Ozaki Hozumi et al., myself examining Richard Sorge, Kawai Teikichi, and others. Because of the serious nature of the case, and because of the implication of Ozaki Hozumi, a Japanese [of] comparatively high social position, and aliens like Richard Sorge, Max Klausen, and Branko de Voukeltich, ample consideration had to be given to its international repercussions. My investigations were conducted in strict secrecy, and I was careful not to libel the defendants and others involved. I exercised strict supervision over the judicial police who assisted me in the investigations, personally attending the investigations as a witness on frequent occasions to see that torture and other coercive methods were not employed. Of course, I never resorted to torture or other coercive methods in my own investigations of Richard Sorge and Kawai Teikichi, but assumed throughout as gentlemanly an attitude as possible.

At Sorge's request, I arranged to have the judicial police examinations in his case take place in the morning, and I myself examined him in the afternoon. At his suggestion, I investigated the broad aspects of the case, and I allowed him to type his statement in German before me. Following the completion of the judicial police investigations, I was with Sorge both in the mornings and in the afternoons. After he had finished the afore-mentioned statement, I examined him with respect to the concrete details of his intelligence activities, and, at his request, compiled the results into an interrogation record in the presence of an interpreter.

During the afore-mentioned investigations, Richard Sorge and Kawai Teikichi described the intelligence activities of Agnes Smedley in China, and Richard Sorge made a statement concerning the intelligence activities of Gnanther Stein in Tokyo. No changes were made in the facts stated by Richard Sorge and Kawai Teikichi with regard to Smedley and Stein during the course of the investigations by the police and procurators, the preliminary examinations, and the public trials.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1151

During the investigation, I realized that Smedley and Stein were key figures in the ring, but I was unable to arrest and indict them because they were not in Japan at the time. Had they been in Japan, I am convinced that, as a procurator, I would have arrested and indicted them.

The foregoing is a voluntary statement. I was notified before making it that it would be recorded and that it might be used as evidence.

April 1, 1949.

/s/ YOSHIKAWA MITSUSADA. [SEAL]

The translator's certificate is attached, which I will not read.¹

TRANSLATOR'S CERTIFICATE

I, Tadao Yamada, CWO, USA, W2141047, having been duly sworn, state that I am an official translator of the Japanese language employed as such by General Headquarters, Far East Command, since July 1947, and that the foregoing English translation of the statement executed by Yoshikawa Mitsusada, dated April 1, 1949, is a true and accurate translation to the best of my ability, skill, and judgment.

APRIL 19, 1949.

/s/ Tadao Yamada,
TADAO YAMADA,
CWO, USA, W2141047.

/s/ G. A. Hedley,
G. A. HEDLEY,

Captain (sic.), Infantry Summary Court.

That is a true and correct statement; is it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I now hand you a certificate over your signature and seal bearing date March 4, 1949, and I will ask you to identify that document and your signature and your seal.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. And to it is attached the English translation of the certificate, appearing over your signature and seal?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer the certificate, accompanied by the English translation, in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 4."

Mr. WALTER. It will be so marked and received.

(The documents above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 4," are filed herewith.)

Mr. TAVENNER. I believe your seal also appears under your signature on the English translation; does it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to read this certificate. [Reading:]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND,
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff.

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the two booklets listed below are printed reproductions prepared by the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice of accurate Japanese translations made by Translator Ikoma Yoshitoshi of original German notes written by Richard Sorge, whom I examined in my capacity as a procurator of the Tokyo District Criminal Court, and incorporated together with the original notes into the official case records; and that the contents of the booklets are identical with the contents of the said translation.

1. "Sorge case materials (2)" (pt. 1 of translated notes of Richard Sorge), February 1942, Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice.

¹ Printed for the record, but not read.

2. "Sorge case materials (3)" (pt. 2 of translated notes of Richard Sorge), April 1942, Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice.
March 4, 1949.

I shall not read the translator's certificate.¹

/s/ YOSHIKAWA MITSUSADA. [SKAT.]
Chief, Special Examination Bureau,
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

TRANSLATOR'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I am an official translator of Japanese documents in the employ of General Headquarters, Far East Command, and that to the best of my ability, skill, and judgment, the above is a true and accurate translation in the English language of the attached document.

/s/ Tadao Yamada,
TADA0 YAMADA,
CWO USA W2141047.

This certificate refers to two volumes [indicating another document]. I hand you a document in Japanese marked "Consecutive Exhibit No. 17," enclosure No. 2, and I will ask you if that bears the identification information of the first document which I read to you from your certificate?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The original, which was sent to the court, did not have the table of contents and index. The table of contents and index were made by the Criminal Affairs Bureau. The rest is an exact document.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer that document in Japanese listed as the first document in Yoshikawa Exhibit 4 for identification only, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 5."

Mr. WALTER. Let it be so identified.

(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 5" for identification only.)

Mr. TAVENNER. I hand you now another volume identified as consecutive exhibit 20-B, enclosure 2, which bears on the front certain descriptive data, and ask whether that is the same descriptive data as the second item in Yoshikawa exhibit No. 4?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. It is the same document to which you referred in your certificate?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Except that the table of contents and index were not in the original.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer this document for identification only, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 6."

Mr. WALTER. Let it be so identified.

(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 6" for identification only.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Yoshikawa, did you prepare and furnish the material which went into the composition of those two documents?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, I did; and Mr. Ikoma translated it.

Mr. TAVENNER. I want to ask you a very few questions relating to some of the individuals mentioned in the course of these reports.

You have previously referred to Miyagi. Do you know whether Miyagi was an American citizen? I believe I asked you that question before.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't have an exact recollection. However,

¹ Printed for the record, but not read.

Miyagi intended to go back after his mission was completed in Japan, therefore I thought that he was an American citizen.

Mr. TAVENNER. You mean back to the United States?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He said before his death that he wanted to go back to America.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did your investigation disclose the circumstances under which Miyagi first came to Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I didn't personally and directly investigate Miyagi. I only saw him several times.

Procurator Yoshioka was in charge of the investigation of Miyagi.

Also, a policeman investigated him.

I received their reports and gave them direction.

I don't have a clear recollection since it was an incident of 10 years ago.

I recall that Miyagi belonged to the Japanese section of the American Communist Party.

I recall that Miyagi stated that he received an order from the higher echelon of his organization to engage in the world revolution in Japan.

Mr. TAVENNER. World revolution?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. To do some important activities in Japan for the sake of the world revolution.

Miyagi told me that he belonged directly to the Comintern doing espionage activities.

That is what he thought.

I do not have an exact recollection about how he came to Japan.

But I recall the names Yano and Roy who are involved in sending Miyagi to Japan.

I do not recall where Miyagi met those people, whether in New York or in Los Angeles.

I recall also that Miyagi mentioned in addition to those people he met an American Jewish person, but I don't have a clear recollection on that.

He went to Japan with instructions to meet a person who put up a newspaper ad saying "Ukiyo e print wanted."

Mr. TAVENNER. Stating what?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. "Ukiyo-e print wanted."

According to Sorge's statement, he also had instructions to watch for the newspaper ad "Ukiyo-e print wanted," and he found that and found the person in Ueno.

Mr. TAVENNER. Ueno is a park in Tokyo?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

That is what I vaguely remember.

Mr. TAVENNER. In the course of the documents referred to there appears the name "Jacob." Did your investigation disclose who Jacob was or whether or not it was a name that was used as a code name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I asked Sorge about it, but Sorge said, "I know him as Jacob," but he didn't say whether he knew him or not.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did your investigation disclose whether or not he was an American citizen?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge said that he was an American newspaperman.

Mr. TAVENNER. Stationed where?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In Shanghai.

When Sorge went to Shanghai from Moscow, he met Smedley, and with the help of Smedley he got the cooperation of three Caucasians, three foreigners.

When I heard Sorge saying that, I asked him who they were. Sorge said he got the cooperation of three foreigners and not more. He got the cooperation of the Japanese and Chinese and only three foreigners.

When I asked who they were, Sorge told me Jacob was one of them. Sorge didn't give any information about Jacob any further, and so I asked him what kind of cooperation he got from those people.

He wrote by typewriter, "These kinds of information."

I couldn't get any information out of him any further.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was any statement made as to what newspaper or newspapers the man identified as Jacob was a representative of or correspondent for?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He didn't say.

Mr. TAVENNER. You spoke of three Caucasians, but you have told us just of the individual by the name of Jacob. Who were the other two?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Another person, he didn't disclose his name, but he was an American. He was a young person. He was on the staff of the American consulate.

Mr. TAVENNER. He was a member of the staff of the American consulate?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Located where?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In Shanghai.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was any further description obtained of the individual on the staff of the American consulate?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He didn't say anything about him, so I asked him what kind of information he got out of him.

(Representative Clyde Doyle left the hearing room.)

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He told me that the person was quite brilliant and was giving him information concerning the American foreign policy toward China and the Nanking government.

Mr. WALTER. Did he give the name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No. He laughed and did not disclose his name.

Mr. POTTER. What was the date?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't remember exactly, but it was around 1931 and 1932 when Sorge organized the so-called Shanghai group.

Mr. POTTER. How long did this group work for Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was for about 2 years.

And Sorge's successor was receiving information from that group.

Mr. POTTER. From that same group?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. This information from the American consular office in Shanghai was given to Sorge in 1931 and 1932; is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have given us information relating to two of these Caucasians whose assistance was given to Sorge. Who was the third one?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He said that it was a German woman.

Mr. TAVENNER. Can you give us further information regarding her?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I didn't get any information about her other than expressed in his own story.

Mr. TAVENNER. The name "Paul" and the name "John" appear in the course of Sorge's confession. Did your investigation disclose any further identification of those two persons?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The information I got concerning Paul appeared in Sorge's story, but when I instructed Procurator Iwo to investigate Sorge, he got further information about Paul; but, since I do not have the documents, I do not have a clear recollection.

While Sorge was working in Shanghai, Ozaki was recalled by a newspaper, Asahi.

Ozaki recommended his successor to Sorge, a Japanese man.

This Japanese was cooperating with Paul after Sorge left Shanghai.

This Japanese man was Funakoshi.

Mr. TAVENNER. You spoke of the giving of information, after Sorge left Shanghai, to Sorge's successor. Who was Sorge's successor?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Paul.

Mr. TAVENNER. The same person called Paul?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Paul was Sorge's successor.

Mr. TAVENNER. Can you furnish the committee with any identifying information as to the nationality, or any other information regarding Paul?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not know about the nationality of Paul, but he belonged to the fourth section of the Red army, and his rank was major general.

Mr. WALTER. Was he a German, do you know?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I am sorry, but I haven't conducted a full investigation about Paul.

Mr. TAVENNER. You spoke about the third Caucasian furnishing information to Sorge as being a German woman. Did your investigation disclose any connection on the part of a woman by the name of Regattenhein with the Sorge principals; that is, the principals in the Sorge ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. When Regattenhein appeared in Japan, she was in the Japanese group and not the Chinese group.

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words, this person by the name of Regattenhein had no connection with the Chinese phase of the Sorge spy ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't have any information about that. I didn't make any investigation of it.

Mr. TAVENNER. I assume from what the witness has said that Sorge knew of her presence in Japan?

Mr. KURODA. Regattenhein?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge said so.

Sorge said that Regattenhein is the girl friend of Guenther Stein. She was very cooperative with Guenther Stein, and she went to Shanghai as a messenger of the group.

She gathered information also.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was she arrested in Japan in connection with your spy investigation?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No. She wasn't in Japan when the arrests came. She left with Guenther Stein.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have any information as to what country she traveled to when she left Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't have any information about that. Since she disappeared, we lost interest in her. We heard Guenther Stein was going to Hong Kong, but really we didn't have any information about her.

Mr. TAVENNER. There is an incident related in the course of the confession by Richard Sorge regarding his traveling through the United States on his way to Tokyo.

It refers to the fact that while in New York an arrangement was made for him to go to Chicago, where he was instructed to meet a certain employee of the Washington Post at the Chicago world fair. Did you endeavor to ascertain the name of the individual whom Sorge was supposed to meet in Chicago?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I instructed Policeman Ohashi to get that information, and I recall that Ohashi gave me his report, and I tried to confer with Sorge about it when I talked to him. I also instructed Ohashi to find out who that person was. I also asked directly to Sorge who that person was, but Sorge did not disclose his name.

(Representative Clyde Doyle returned to hearing room.)

Mr. WALTER. In discussing his trip through the United States, did Sorge give you the names of any Americans who escorted him or with whom he came in contact?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He didn't disclose the names.

Before he formed a Chinese group and Japanese group, Sorge was vice chief of the information bureau of the Comintern.

Mr. WALTER. Did your investigation reveal any information with regard to an American named Willie Lehman?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He was chief of the Lehman group in China.

Mr. TAVENNER. What do you mean by the Lehman group in China?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't have an exact recollection about it, but it was either a group belonging to the fourth section of the Red army or belonging to the Comintern.

Mr. TAVENNER. By that do you mean a separate group from the Sorge group?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That is right.

I recall that Sorge told me that Sorge and Lehman were personally acquainted.

Mr. TAVENNER. What part of China was the seat of the activities of the Lehman group?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In Shanghai; so I remember.

I don't have an exact recollection.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have any recollection of the names of any American citizens who were connected with the Lehman group in addition to Lehman himself?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Concerning a group in which Americans had any connection, I recall the Harbin group in Manchuria.

This group existed as a mail box for Sorge while he was working in China, and this group belonged to the fourth section of the Red army.

Klausen was transferred to the Harbin group by order of the fourth section of the Red army.

I recall that Sorge himself also went to Harbin.

The radio transmitter was established in the American consulate in Harbin.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you mean the radio station that was used in the transmission of messages to Moscow?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were those messages transmitted in code?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sure; I think so.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did that occur?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. About 1931 or 1932 Sorge was using his Harbin group as a mail box.

Mr. TAVENNER. If a radio station in the American consulate in Harbin in Manchuria was being used to transmit messages to Moscow, who was it in the American consulate who permitted that use or himself engaged in the use of the radio for that purpose?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't remember the name.

I instructed Procurator Iwo, who was in charge of Klausen, to investigate that.

I recall that Mr. Iwo reported to me about the name of that American, but I don't recall exactly his name.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was there more than one American connected with the Harbin group of the fourth section of the Red army, as far as your investigation disclosed?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't have any recollection, so I cannot say.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether the confession of Max Klausen will throw light on the identification of the American in Harbin who cooperated with the fourth section of the Red army?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I think so.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Yoshikawa, you were engaged for a long period of time in the investigation of international communism in connection with the Sorge case.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you any observations or suggestions that you would care to make to this committee, which is a committee of the Congress of the United States, with regard to investigations of international communism?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The Sorge case revealed that the investigation of international Communist activities cannot be conducted successfully alone by any one country.

The free nations of the world should cooperate in helping each other to conduct the investigation.

Information should be exchanged.

National sectionalism is very harmful.

We have to keep secrets. However, we need cooperation; so I think.

My desire is that from now on, in the future, we would like to have cooperation and assistance from America.

The second point is: I have found that the spy network of Moscow covers all over the world.

On this point we would like to have American cooperation and assistance.

Mr. TAVENNER. Thank you very much.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Yoshikawa, I trust that your visit here to the United States has been a pleasant one and a profitable one.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Thank you.

Mr. WALTER. And I do feel that there should be cooperation between the Government of the United States and other governments of the world so that we may exchange information that will aid all of the free peoples of the world to understand what this conspiracy means.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Thank you.

Mr. WALTER. And I express the hope that your visit here has provided some sort of basis for the cooperation you have spoken of.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Thank you.

Mr. WALTER. And I assure you that we appreciate very much your cooperation with this committee.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As a person working in the Japanese Government, I would also like to express my appreciation to your committee.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Doyle.

Mr. DOYLE. I wish to thank the gentleman also. It is very encouraging. May I ask one question:

You stated that Sorge had confessed before you expected him to. Why did he do it so early?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was expecting that it would take a longer time, and if it had taken a longer time I thought I would be pushed in a difficult position because of pressure from the German Embassy as well as from the Japanese Army.

His collaborators were all rounded up, and also the evidences came up; so he realized that he had no chance.

Before he confessed we had this conversation:

I talked to Sorge and said to him that Klausen belonged to the Fourth Section of the Red Army. Voukelitch was of the Comintern. Ozaki and Miyagi were also members of the Comintern. And their statements were in discrepancy, and so I told Sorge, "I will explain to you about this question."

We were talking about this, and then he began to confess.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you. May I ask this question: About 3 weeks ago four gentlemen from Japan visited this committee. You were one of them. May I ask, when you go back home do you think of having a committee such as this in your own legislative body, or are you going to recommend something like this committee?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. About the establishing of a committee similar to this, we are going to study that very carefully, but for us the most important thing is that the people of Japan realize the menace of international communism.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you very much.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Potter.

Mr. POTTER. Mr. Yoshikawa, I, too, wish to thank you for your splendid testimony.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Thank you.

Mr. POTTER. Your telling us the story of your efforts in the Sorge case has been a dramatic example of how international communism works; so we are most grateful to you for giving us the benefit of your knowledge.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Thank you.

Mr. POTTER. I would like to ask one question.

I noted your statement that the Japanese people are aware of the conspiracy as contained in international communism. Do you feel that due to the awareness of the Japanese people the Government of

Japan has taken all adequate precautions to expose and eliminate the conspiracy from the country?

Mr. KURODA. My translation was: I understood him to say the important thing was to make the Japanese people realize more fully about the menace of international communism.

Mr. POTTER. Do you feel the Japanese people do realize the menace of international communism?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. And also they are afraid of it.

Mr. POTTER. Do you have any Communist members in your Japanese Diet?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. POTTER. How many, in proportion of the total membership of the Diet?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Twenty-five in both Houses.

There are about 25 Communists in both Houses, but this number is after the purge by the SCAP [Supreme Commander of Allied Powers]. Before the purge there were more Communist members.

Mr. POTTER. Do you feel that the Communist members in your Diet will decrease rather than increase in the future?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The number will decrease.

In Japan, members of the Communist Party, like members of other parties, have to register.

As of June last year, the members of the Communist Party registered were 110,000.

But the number decreased and now it is estimated at about 60,000.

In my estimation there are about 20,000 unregistered Communists in addition to those.

About 250,000 sympathizers are in Japan. They are not members, but are sympathizers.

Mr. POTTER. Do you have any trade-unions that are dominated by Communists?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes. There are trade-unions which are under the influence of the Communist Party.

Mr. POTTER. In what fields?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Metal and various industrial fields.

Also, the Communist Party has operatives operating secretly within the democratic organizations.

Once the Communist Party captured 2,500,000 votes, but now their following is dwindling.

The Communist Party membership is decreasing now.

Mr. POTTER. That is to the credit of the people of Japan, after a war when the Communists used that war to gain their end. That is a credit to the wisdom of the people of Japan.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Thank you, but the Communists are waiting for the next revolutionary wave.

Mr. POTTER. Both in Japan and in the United States.

Mr. WALTER. Anything further, Mr. Tavenner?

Mr. TAVENNER. No, sir.

Mr. WALTER. The committee will stand adjourned.

(Thereupon, at 4:25 p. m., an adjournment was taken.)

Institut für Zeitgeschichte – Archiv

HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

(Based on Testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa and
Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby)

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1951

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARING

The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to call at 10:45 a. m., in room 228, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood (chairman), Francis E. Walter, James B. Frazier, Jr., and Harold H. Velde.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Thomas W. Beale, Sr., assistant counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of research; John W. Carrington, clerk; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order, please.

Whom do you have?

Mr. TAVENNER. Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby.

Mr. Wood. General Willoughby, will you stand and be sworn, please? Do you solemnly swear the evidence you give this committee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General WILLOUGHBY. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you please state your name?

General WILLOUGHBY. Charles Andrew Willoughby.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your present position?

General WILLOUGHBY. Major general, United States Army, awaiting retirement for partial disability and length of service as a veteran of several wars, namely, World War I, 1917; World War II, 1941; the North Korean war, 1950; and the Chinese Communist war, 1951.

Mr. TAVENNER. Where did you last serve and in what capacity?

General WILLOUGHBY. I served as MacArthur's chief of intelligence since 1939 throughout the campaigns of the Southwest Pacific and the occupation of Japan, and in the same capacity throughout the Korean conflict.

Mr. TAVENNER. I understand you desire to make a general statement as the basis for your testimony in this hearing?

General WILLOUGHBY. With the permission of the chairman, I would request the privilege of stating my position throughout this entire hearing as follows:

Recent newspaper reports have developed a tendency to attribute sensational qualities to my impending testimony before certain congressional committees, under normal subpoena. I am described as "threatening a brand-new ruckus," as being "sore at the Pentagon," as "vowing to jar the Capital with spy tales." Yet, another enfant terrible of the press charges me with "promises to redden faces and to set off explosions," and as being "a thorn in the side of the Pentagon." These are pure journalistic exaggerations.

I have no direct issue with the Army or the State Department. The Army is sound. It was put to a most cruel test in Korea, and it has passed summa cum laude, as on many other historical occasions. After 41 years' service, since 1910, I leave the Army with a feeling of regret. The Regular service is a hard taskmaster, but it is also a delightful fraternal organization.

As regards the State Department, I have served as military attaché for many years in our embassies of Caracas, Bogotá, and Quito, in the period 1920-30. The field personnel is first class. The American diplomatic posts abroad are maintained with the dignity commensurate with a great nation. They operate in an atmosphere of sharp competition, since foreign establishments are maintained on a more or less lavish scale. Tokyo is a most conspicuous example.

The real subject matter of my presentation to Congress is in a field of international danger, in which all political parties could meet amicably, on grounds of common interest. Consequently, my proposed statements are completely devoid of any political motivation or purpose.

There are recognizable historical factors, the dangerous impact of which is only now beginning to be felt. The dead hand of the past rests heavily on a precarious present. We are still in the shadow of Cairo, Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam. Retribution has been swift and terrible. The victors of 1945 have created a Frankenstein that may yet slay them: the Red menace of international communism. It is only fair, however, to accept that the present administration is staggering under an intolerable burden which it inherited from its predecessors and did not itself create.

It fell within the purview of MacArthur's Intelligence Section to confront this menace in the Far East, and to unmask the grimacing face of the Red Medusa.

The story of Richard Sorge, Soviet master spy, became the vehicle of presentation. It has been covered initially by Drew Pearson, then by Walter Simmons and Alfred Kohlberg, and more recently, in its main features, by Newsweek and United States News & World Report. However, their stories merely scratched the surface. For a period of years, Tokyo has filed with the War Department a most extensive documentation on Sorge, contained in a number of consecutive exhibits, aggregating over a million words, with hundreds of plates, photostats, and illustrations.

While certain individuals emerge sharply in this report, they must be viewed against the sinister background of a world conspiracy, the

essential framework of which should be known to our legislators and to our people. In its unimpeachable and devastating evidence, this case should dispel carefully nurtured false notions on the responsibilities for the China debacle and place this controversial subject into proper focus. The real cause for the communization of China is the long-range subversive operation, over the last two decades, conducted by professional Communists under orders of the Kremlin-controlled Third Comintern.

The element which intrigued MacArthur's Intelligence was the immediate recognition that Richard Sorge's story did not begin or end with Tokyo, but was only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet strategy.

An investigation was opened into the Shanghai period and the Third Comintern "apparatus." In Shanghai, in the early 1930's, we are not dealing with the period of uneasy alliance with the Soviet, 1941-45, but with the more significant prewar years of 1929-39, in the heyday of the Third Communist International, prelude to the infamous Stalin-Hitler Pact, sole factor that made World War II at all possible.

We are dealing here with a conspiratorial epoch in the history of modern China. Shanghai was the vineyard of communism. Here were sown the dragons' teeth that have ripened into the Red harvest of today—and the spadework was done by men and women of many nationalities who had no conceivable personal stake in China other than an inexplicable fanaticism for an alien cause, the Communist "jihad" of Pan-Slavism for the subjugation of the western world.

Most of the old wheelhorses of the American Communist Party appear to have been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clandestine fraternity, as well as mere acolytes and dupes, flirting moth-like with the Red menace; such as Earl Browder, Sam Darcy, Eugene Dennis, Harry Berger, Gerhart Eisler, and many others.

My cumulative reports contain over 180 identities, surnames, aliases, and code designations, derived from court records authenticated by American lawyers, or from the fabulous dossiers of the French and British sections of the Shanghai international police. In protection of innocent people, a sharp distinction has been made by us between the "operators" and the "bystanders"—the "joiners" who did not quite appreciate the character of the organizations they helped support.

The exact degree of relationship or association ranges from direct espionage by Comintern "agents" to the twilight zone of fellow-traveling dupes and befuddled liberals—apparently unaware that they have drifted into an international conspiracy for the sole benefit of an alien and hostile Government. While this case applies primarily to Japan and China, it represents a recognizable pattern that is working in the United States today.

I have filed detailed evidence with appropriate Federal agencies and certain congressional committees. They are now in a position to follow up these leads. I am not a prosecutor. I am only a policeman and investigator. It is thus that I discharge a moral obligation toward the United States, which has received me as an immigrant boy and given me shelter and citizenship as a man.

I have no doubt that the hue and cry will start again, as it did in 1949. I expect to be attacked by the Communist press, from the China Digest in Hong Kong to the Far East Spotlight in New York City.

Orders will go out from the shabby loft building on 35 East Twelfth Street, New York. The Red cells will disgorge their indefatigable little workers. The pinko columnists will sharpen their quills. The smear brigade will swing into action. Some Red mouthpiece will prostitute the law of the land and sue me for libel, as before, and I will accept, as before. Yet, in the cacophony of frenzied accusations, I am reminded of an ancient saying:

It is better to fail in a cause that must ultimately succeed, than to succeed in a cause that will ultimately fail.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOOD. Any questions, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOOD. Proceed.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, stating as you do that the Richard Sorge story was only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet strategy, is it not your opinion that a full disclosure at this time of the ramifications of that story would be useful to the Congress and the people of this country in understanding the background and meaning of incidents which have occurred in this country and which likely may recur?

General WILLOUGHBY. I am in entire agreement with Mr. Counsel's opinion. There is no doubt that a disclosure or the development or tracing of links that exist between an international spy master and the present is of immediate practical value, and this committee is peculiarly appropriate to receive this testimony. Ten thousand miles away, while on duty in Tokyo over many years, I have followed with admiration the investigative work of this committee. Their record is unimpeachable, and I consider it a privilege to appear before you.

In this connection, I might pause to pay tribute to a similar committee which has taken its techniques and inspiration from the House committee, namely, the California State Legislature's Senate Committee on Un-American Activities, under the able Senator Jack Tenney.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, the problem of putting before the Congress and the people of this country the Sorge story so that they may see and understand similar incidents which have occurred, or incidents of somewhat like character, in this country, and so that they may be on guard as to the recurrence of such things, is one of the purposes of the committee in conducting this hearing.

I should also add that it is the immediate purpose of this committee, in looking into the Sorge case, to ascertain the nature and extent of participation in that great conspiracy of persons of United States citizenship, and what place, if any, those persons have in the Communist conspiracy in the United States as it exists today.

Those are the two major purposes of our hearing.

General WILLOUGHBY. I shall attempt to comply with your outline, Mr. Counsel. In the course of this presentation we will establish the link between Sorge, on the one hand, and the Shanghai operations, perhaps much more important, on the other hand.

We will also develop the similarity of techniques in penetration of political and social fraternal organizations, so-called fronts.

As stated in general outline in my introductory statement, these relationships will be developed. In other words, we are not treating

the Sorge report as a historical incident or as a repetition of something that has already been told. I will show you that in Sorge's fragmentary reports there are enough descriptive data of certain organizations in Shanghai which are of paramount interest now because American citizens, especially members of the American Communist Party, were active then. Had we known this, I am sure that in the last few years we would have been less tolerant, less patient, with these people.

Therefore, the purpose, as I see it, of your inquiry, is exactly as you have stated, to link the past with the present, and I feel confident that the consecutive questions and answers that will be presented here will accomplish this purpose before a committee which, as I have said, is especially qualified and peculiarly appropriate for this type of inquiry.

Mr. VELDE. May I ask a question at this point, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Velde.

Mr. VELDE. General, there is a lot of sentiment in this country, and a lot of people have said, that this is merely water over the dam, something that has happened in the past, and the ramifications are no longer important to the American people at this time. What is your idea on that issue?

General WILLOUGHBY. May I refer to my introductory remarks, which were designed as an outline or program of what the committee—and I consider myself a collaborative agent of this committee—hoped to accomplish.

I have said that "The element which intrigued MacArthur's Intelligence was the immediate recognition that Richard Sorge's story did not begin or end with Tokyo, but was only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet strategy." You will obtain a glimpse of Soviet international intrigue, the work of the Third Communist International, which is a tool of the foreign policy of the Kremlin. That will become crystal clear in the course of this presentation.

Likewise, you will find the activities of American Communists. The well-known Gerhart Eisler, who embarrassed the Justice Department through his escape, is present in Shanghai. He did the same thing then that he pulled on the *Batory*. There is your link with yesterday. Earl Browder and Eugene Dennis, the chief of the American Communist Party, appear in the Sorge Shanghai channel. So there is your connection. Your connection is a case history which presents certain operational details that were applied 15 years later, or 10 years later, by well-known Communist operators in the United States. Or, as I stated in my opening remarks, again—

Most of the old wheelhorses of the American Communist Party appear to have been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clandestine fraternity, as well as mere acolytes and dupes, flirting much like with the Red menace; such as Earl Browder, Sam Darcy, Eugene Dennis, Harry Berger, Gerhart Eisler, and many others.

Mr. VELDE. In other words, General, to simplify it a little bit, you feel that we have to study the manipulations of the Communist Party and the international Comintern over the past quarter century in order to get a clear picture of what their present manipulations might be?

General WILLOUGHBY. I feel that strongly, and I agree entirely with your view on that particular subject.

Mr. WALTER. You feel that the same forces at work then are still at work, toward the same objective?

General WILLOUGHBY. Indeed, I do.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, during your tenure in Tokyo, did you have occasion to further investigate the Richard Sorge spy rings which were operated in China and Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. A perusal of the Sorge reports, fragmentary or incomplete, indicated, nevertheless, and very plainly so, that his activities in Tokyo were connected with China, Manchuria, and the Siberian mainland.

Mr. TAVENNER. After looking into the Sorge case, were you led, as a result of this inquiry, to other localities?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. I became interested in Shanghai as a focal point of international intrigue and espionage, and specific data in the Sorge papers that the Soviet Third International, known as the Communist Third International, to be referred to hereafter as the Comintern, was operating in that city.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you subsequently determine that there was available in Shanghai information regarding the activities of Communist agents and sympathizers in Shanghai?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. I learned that the international police in Shanghai, especially the British and French political sections in the thirties, had developed a considerable volume of information regarding subversive activities of Americans and foreign nationals. In some instances these activities were connected with personnel of the American Communist Party.

Mr. TAVENNER. As one result of these investigations conducted by you, was there compiled by your command a group of 34 consecutive exhibits containing the records and results of the Japanese arrest, interrogation, and prosecution of Richard Sorge and other defendants?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are there also included in these exhibits subsequent interrogations and legal opinions compiled by your command after the occupation of Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. There are. May I give you a brief definition of this material? We use the phraseology "exhibit" as a matter of convenience. Actually, they are authenticated, notarized court translations, notarized by a battery of reputable American lawyers.

As this material is voluminous, aggregating hundreds of typewritten pages, I felt it my duty to assist this committee or any other investigative body, to prepare personally a brief, rarely exceeding two to three pages. These briefs to these exhibits are referred to as G-2 comment, number so and so. They are in your possession.

This is roughly a description of the material and the dispatch of these exhibits, if that meets your requirements, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I think I should state for the record that certified copies of the exhibits referred to by the witness were delivered by the Department of the Army to the staff of this committee at various times, the first delivery being made in March 1949 and the last delivery being made on the 15th day of February 1951.

I am advised that at substantially the same times, copies of the same exhibits were delivered to the FBI, CIO, and the State Department.

As a part of the investigation, the committee, on December 9, 1949, through one of its investigators, endeavored to obtain information as to the availability of Agnes Smedley, whose name appears throughout these reports, for the purpose of serving a subpoena upon her, and ascertained that Agnes Smedley left the United States for Great Britain on December 2, which was just 7 days prior to the making of that effort.

Now, the exhibits to which you and I have referred, General Willoughby, appear on the table next to you. I will ask you to examine them and state whether or not they are the exhibits which were prepared by your command and under your direction and supervision?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have examined these exhibits, Mr. Counsel, and identify them as being either originals or copies of the consecutive reports filed by us in Washington.

May I add a remark, sir? Your statement that you received these exhibits through the assistance of the War Department, I would heartily concur in, and say that the Intelligence Section, Department of the Army, under Major General Bolling, have been and are most cooperative in this entire enterprise.

What you said about Smedley and your attempt to summon her before this committee is news to me, and indicates that you had been aware of the implication of this case for a long time.

Mr. TAVENNER. Each of the exhibits is numbered. I believe you have them numbered consecutively, from 1 to 34?

General WILLOUGHBY. I believe so. To refresh my memory—[after examining documents] yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer these exhibits, not in evidence, but merely present them to the committee at this time and ask that they be marked for identification only in the same manner and in accordance with the same numbers that they now have, for the sake of clarity and future reference to them. In other words, they would be numbered "Willoughby Exhibits 1 to 34, inclusive."

Mr. WOOD. There is no objection on the part of any member of the committee, and they will be so marked.

(The consecutive reports above referred to were marked "Willoughby Exhibits Nos. 1 to 34, inclusive," for identification only.)

Mr. TAVENNER. As a further result of your investigation of the Sorge case, which led to your travels to Shanghai, were there compiled by your command certain documents relating to Communist activities of numerous individuals in Shanghai?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir. May I amplify this, please?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. I was able to track down and obtain a substantial portion—though not the complete file, a substantial portion—of the Shanghai municipal police files, with the assistance of British, French, and Chinese officials and the Central Intelligence Agency, with whom I had been on efficient and friendliest collaboration for a number of years.

Mr. TAVENNER. As a result of your efforts, you did obtain all of the files which were left intact?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. I refer you now, or show you, point out to you, two metal lockers. I would like for you to examine the lockers and their

contents and state whether or not they are the Shanghai police files to which you refer?

General WILLOUGHBY (after examining lockers and contents). Mr. Counsel, they are. In consideration of the extensive labor of this committee, and realizing that your research staff was probably limited, I have attempted to organize these files in the technique of a reference library in which the contents are systematically numbered, and alphabetical card indexes and cross-references have been prepared.

Mr. TAVENNER. I notice in the top of the trunk two typewritten lists. What are they?

General WILLOUGHBY. These are entitled "Indexes to Contents." They identify the contents both by title and reference number.

Mr. TAVENNER. These trunks were shipped to me, Frank S. Tavenner, as chief counsel of the Committee on Un-American Activities on May 7, 1951, from Tokyo, were they not?

General WILLOUGHBY. I concur.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to present to the committee the two trunks with their contents, and ask that they be marked "Willoughby Exhibits 35 and 36" for identification only.

Mr. Wood. So ordered.

(The two metal trunks above referred to, together with their contents, were marked "Willoughby Exhibits 35 and 36," respectively, for identification only.)

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, you will recall that this committee first contacted you relative to the subject of this inquiry in 1949. Subsequently, we requested you to prepare at your convenience a concise report on the Sorge case, embodying the essential parts of that case, particularly those of interest to the United States, in order that this matter might be presented more completely at a public hearing. Is that correct?

General WILLOUGHBY. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you able to fulfill that request?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, General Willoughby has filed a copy of his report with the staff. This report has been invaluable in the preparation of this hearing and in various investigations which the committee has from time to time conducted relating to these matters, and will be used consistently throughout the conduct of his hearing, both by the witness and by me as counsel.

General Willoughby, are you acquainted with Yoshikawa Mitsusada?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, I am, over a number of years. He is a brilliant Japanese lawyer, long in government service, and I congratulate the committee on having obtained his appearance here and his statement in the general premises.

Mr. VELDE. Would you spell his name, please, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. Y-o-s-h-i-k-a-w-a, surname, M-i-t-s-u-s-a-d-a; Yoshikawa Mitsusada.

Mr. TAVENNER. You are aware of the fact that he testified before this committee regarding certain affidavits which are included in the exhibits prepared by you?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; I was very happy to obtain this information through press reports, and consider his contribution, that is, his authentication, of correlated Sorge data as important, perhaps

supplemental to the equally important authentication by a battery of American lawyers in Tokyo.

Mr. TAVENNER. These affidavits were executed by Mr. Yoshikawa in 1949 at the request of your command, attesting to the authenticity of the Sorge interrogations and confessions which he personally observed. That is true, isn't it?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, indeed.

Mr. TAVENNER. A perusal of the exhibits, which are in the possession of the committee, indicates a quite extensive and sincere effort on the part of American authorities since the occupation to establish beyond any question of a doubt the validity of the Japanese trials of Sorge and his co-defendants, and the validity of the police investigations in the Sorge case, and the authentic character of the records which you have produced here.

With reference to this aspect of your investigation, what did you do to establish the validity of the trials, according to our concept of trials, and the authenticity of the records?

General WILLOUGHBY. I am very glad to take advantage of your question, Mr. Counsel, because juridical authentication, if presented at this time to the satisfaction of the committee, appears to me essential for the entire range of documentation that is submitted. We felt in 1949, although the reports date back to 1947, that that authentication was desirable because a question had been raised—primarily by Miss Smedley at the time, utilizing all the facilities of publicity so generously placed at her disposal—and that we should go over this case again and have the material notarized in the approved technical manner prescribed by American law.

Without going into details, I would like to go on record with reference to so-called exhibit 12, including the G-2 comments previously described, as follows—

Mr. VELDE. Before you go into that I would like to ask you what you meant by the statement you made with reference to Agnes Smedley and her use of the press and use of the fact that these documents were not authenticated?

General WILLOUGHBY. I get your point, Mr. Velde. We will have to go back to comparatively ancient history as far as I am concerned, namely, that when the report was published by the War Department in 1949, in February of 1949, Miss Smedley, assisted by Mr. John Rogge, her attorney, protested the entire publication, charged the contents as being false, untrue or illegal, and obtained, shall we say, a generous allocation of radio broadcast time and the full support of that portion of the American press which has been ascribed by reference to the coloration pink, fellow-traveling, or pale rose, as the case may be.

That statement by her was given, as you recall, extraordinary publicity at the time. Our response to that was probably one of acquiescence and a desire to go over the evidence once more, this time with the support of competent American legal opinion, which is the purpose of my reading.

My reaction personally at the time was to accept Miss Smedley's threat of suit for libel which she flung into the airways and which I unhesitatingly accepted at the time. She did not press her suit, or rather, her lawyer, I believe a Mr. John Rogge, did not press this suit, for obvious reasons.

Mr. VELDE. Was any suit filed by Agnes Smedley at all for libel?

General WILLOUGHBY. No. My reference to this legal opinion of authentication is related to your question. We felt that a report by an investigative agency should be good enough, considering that this agency has a record of long service, but we also felt that since reputable American legal advice was available in Tokyo, that we should call on them, and they are: Messrs. J. Woodall Greene, member of the Maryland Bar; Joseph S. Carusi, member of the Connecticut Bar; Franklin E. N. Warren, member of the Oklahoma Bar and member of the New Mexico Bar.

These men occupied high positions in the occupation headquarters, and are on duty there now.

In addition to this American talent, we also employed, because of the language element, the services of an international Japanese-British firm: Messrs. E. V. A. de Becker and R. Usami, member, Middle Temple, London; member, Inner Temple, London; member, Tokyo Bar.

Upon examination, item for item, and notarization of the documents, these gentlemen made the following signed summation statement:

We, the undersigned, fully realizing that certain processes and procedures are necessary for the authentication or verification of documentary evidence before they may be introduced in courts of record in the United States, or be used as a basis for evidence, have examined the methods and procedures used for the authentication and verification of the documents listed, and after having duly considered the testimony of witnesses and having examined their written statements and interrogations, together with their seals and signatures appended thereto, have arrived at the conclusion that the authentication and verification of the documents, including the statements from witnesses, is in accordance with existing laws and procedures.

We, therefore, certify that it is our opinion that the authentication and verification of each of the several documents mentioned—

And I am now speaking of this entire collection, both here and in the Shanghai files—

is legally sufficient to give legal standing to their full use within the scope of the rules of civil procedures for the courts of the United States, or foreign courts adhering to Anglo-American jurisprudence.

If the committee desires, there is additional opinion by the Judge Advocate of General Headquarters, Tokyo, Japan. With your permission I will file an abbreviated extract, if I may. This is taken from exhibit No. 14, one of these folders. It is entitled, "Opinion of Legal Section, Far East Command, Opinion of the Judge Advocate General, Far East Command and Related Matter." [Reading:]

In further support of the opinions of prominent American, British, and Japanese lawyers, currently employed in various civil sections, Headquarters Tokyo, there is enclosed herewith the opinion of legal section, Far East Command.

In this opinion, legal section, Far East Command, supports the conclusions of the Sorge Spy Ring report of December 15, 1947, and attests to the value of the documentary evidence on hand in G-2, Far East Command.

In their brief, legal section, Far East Command, points out and concurs in the general appraisal of evidence in this report, viz:

- (i) The evidence has definite probative value.
- (ii) Ample basis and justification for the report.
- (iii) Evidence is considered to have a rational probative force.
- (iv) It is considered acceptable to reasonable men.
- (v) It is of type employed in congressional investigation committees.

Apparently, as of the date of this opinion, which is 2 to 3 years old, we had a feeling, in our correspondence with this committee, that

sooner or later this material might become of more than local interest.
[Continuing reading:]

- (vi) There is strong evidence of careful Japanese investigation.
- (vii) No indication of employment of force or manufactured testimony.
- (viii) Statements of various accused are mutually corroborative.
- (ix) The G-2 report December 15, 1947, was justified and properly made.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to offer in evidence the exhibit formerly identified by Yoshikawa Mitsusada and marked for identification only as "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 2," and ask that it be marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 37."

Mr. WOOD. Let it be admitted.

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 37," is filed herewith.)

Mr. WALTER. Is that the exhibit that was marked when Mr. Yoshikawa testified?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes. This exhibit, it will be recalled, consists of the first draft in German of the Sorge confession and its English translation. According to the testimony of Mr. Yoshikawa, this confession was not accepted on the ground that it was inadequate, and Mr. Yoshikawa, in his individual capacity retained possession of this draft. Subsequently, Richard Sorge completed his confession and as the contents of this document are embraced within the completed confession, it will not be necessary to allude to it further.

General Willoughby, I now call your attention to a document entitled "Sorge Case Materials, Part I of Translation of Statement of Richard Sorge," dated February 1942, and immediately following that document, "Sorge Case Materials, Part II of Translation of Statement of Richard Sorge," dated April 1942, which appear in your report under these titles. These two documents appear also in the consecutive exhibits as 20-A and 20-B. Will you tell the committee the genesis of this document and what it comprises?

General WILLOUGHBY. Identified as classified by you, its full and official title, translated from the Japanese, is known as "Sorge Case Materials." It consists of two parts: "Part 1 of Translation of Statement of Richard Sorge" and "Part 2 of Translation of Statement of Richard Sorge." It was published by the Ministry of Justice in its Criminal Affairs Bureau.

The foreword, I believe, Mr. Chairman, describes its content. The foreword is contained on the first page of a special number, No. 191, and marked "Top secret," top secret at the time as applied to the Japanese Government, a very interesting sidelight, if I may digress.

When this ring was discovered and the members of the ring arrested, a very leisurely investigative process ensued, because the Japanese Government at that time was in a state of neutrality with Soviet Russia and did not wish to disturb this by the implication contained in this case. For that reason, the publications were marked "Secret" and were handled with very considerable delicacy. It was some years later when it became apparent to the Japanese Government that the Soviet neutrality would soon end. Then they proceeded with more vigor in this case, to the extent of condemning the principals Sorge and Ozaki.

I now proceed with the reading of the foreword, to comply with the request of counsel.

Mr. VELDE. General Willoughby, can you fix the period of this neutrality between Japan and Russia a little more exactly?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Our war entry is December 7, 1941. And, incidentally, Sorge will have something to say about this in his coded messages to Moscow. The Japanese Government felt it prudent, shall we say, or within the realm of their international purposes, to enter into a neutrality agreement with the Soviets.

Mr. TAVENNER. That was in April 1941 as Matsuoka was returning from Germany to Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; some months prior to our entry into the war.

Mr. VELDE. Approximately how long prior to our entry into the war was this period of neutrality, as you call it?

General WILLOUGHBY. Six months, roughly. Roughly 6 months would cover the period of negotiation, of weighing and balancing favorable and unfavorable factors and the decision to develop a neutrality pact with Russia.

Mr. VELDE. General, in your investigations did you find any evidence that the Russian Government was aware of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, Mr. Velde; and, if I am permitted the liberty of suggesting, the counsel has provided for that in a later question.

Mr. VELDE. I withdraw the question.

General WILLOUGHBY. And I am sure he will call your attention to it. Your question is well taken and is an important historical element. They did get the information. We will read, probably, the contents of that message later on. In other words, they knew in advance what was going to happen, and I wish I had known it in advance, too. We were then sweating it out in the Philippines, knowing that the Philippines would be a very probable target.

Mr. WALTER. May I ask a question at this point, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. Certainly.

Mr. WALTER. The Ozaki you mentioned was the political adviser to Konoye, and Ozaki was a Communist agent?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. He was the closest right-hand man to Dr. Sorge. It is a sort of astonishing piece of information that an intimate of the Prime Minister of Japan, with access to the secrets of the Foreign Office of Japan, should also be an intimate of a Russian-controlled espionage identity.

Mr. WALTER. He was more than an intimate; wasn't he the political adviser to Konoye?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. I think we will cover that later on, but I will be glad to outline it to you. Ozaki belonged to a group of political experts. He was rated as an expert on China and the Manchurian Railway, and as such he was a consultant to the Foreign Office; that was actually his official position. But he was more than that, because he developed an intimate personal relationship with the Prime Minister, who had around him what was then known as a group of bright young men around the Foreign Office who met with the Prime Minister at irregular intervals in an informal fashion at breakfast, and sometimes at dinner, and became known as the Breakfast Club. The Breakfast Club meant something to the Japanese, although it meant nothing to us until the development of the Sorge story. We

found there a local related group of consultants and Foreign Office officials who were to some extent responsible for at least the drafting of foreign policy, and this man was a member of this powerful and influential group. What he found he immediately relayed to his boss and associate, Dr. Sorge, who put it on his radio station which he maintained, and it was relayed to Khabarovsk, the Russian official relay station in Siberia, and then onward to Moscow.

So, this extraordinary man, this Dr. Sorge, had access on the one hand to the inner councils of the Japanese Government, and on the other hand to the inner councils of the German Government, because he occupied the position of press attaché to the German Embassy in Tokyo. In other words, he got it coming and going.

Mr. TAVENNER. Didn't he also have access to more or less a degree to the inner councils of the British Foreign Office?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. His ring involved an English subject, Guenther Stein, who was persona grata with the British Foreign Office in Tokyo.

He also had access at one time or another to American information through Smedley and her associates.

Mr. TAVENNER. May I suggest, General, that to go into the details of this matter now, which you are doing in response to my question, may rather interfere with the orderly development of the testimony; and I suggest, if satisfactory to the committee, that we proceed more or less in chronological order.

General WILLOUGHBY. Very good. Needless to say, I am delighted to respond to a question by Mr. Walter, but I was aware—

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, I asked the question about the British, and I realize we are getting deeply into testimony with which we will be concerned later.

General WILLOUGHBY. Indeed, sir.

In order to get back on the track, your last inquiry was the identification of Sorge Case Materials, and I suggested that the foreword of the document is self-explanatory. I will read this foreword, which should dispose of this important document:

The German Richard Sorge entered the German Communist Party in 1919, was sent to Comintern headquarters—

Russian headquarters—

In January 1925, immediately became a member of the Russian Communist Party, joined the staff of the Comintern intelligence department and engaged in espionage activities in the northern European nations, China and elsewhere. He was ordered to serve as a spy in Japan in 1933, went to that country as a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung, organized a secret espionage ring, including the German Max Klausen, a member of the German Communist Party and radio technician sent out by the same Soviet intelligence authorities; the Yugoslav and member of the French Communist Party, Brauko de Voukelitch, the United States Communist Party member Miyagi Yotoku, who had been sent to Japan by his party to perform espionage work—

I pause here to point out the significance of the international recruitment by which this man was furnished a member of the French Communist Party, a member of the American Communist Party, and a member of the German Communist Party as a part of his working staff. With reference to your question, Mr. Walter [continuing reading]:

the political adviser to the Chinese Communist Party Ozaki Hozumi, whom Sorge himself had recruited around 1930 in Shanghai—

In other words, Ozaki Hozumi, in the early part of the 1930's, irrespective of his future high official position with the Japanese Government, was also listed by Sorge as a political adviser to the Chinese Communist Party in 1930. There are many items I have either forgotten or that the detailed investigation has brought forth. [Continuing reading:]

and others, and directed and supervised the said ring in the collection and transmission to Soviet headquarters, either in writing or via radio, of information concerning military affairs, foreign relations, politics, economics, and other miscellaneous subjects.

The contents of the present printed document comprise part 1 of a translation of typewritten German notes prepared by Sorge in lieu of a statement at the direction of the Tokyo District Criminal Court.

Mr. TAVENNER. At this point, I desire to offer in evidence as "Willoughby Exhibit No. 38" the German notes and the English translation referred to as being a part of consecutive exhibit 20-A.

Mr. WOOD. It will be received.

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 38," is filed herewith.)

Mr. TAVENNER. All right; if you will proceed to part 2.

General WILLOUGHBY. Part 2 has an identical title. Its foreword merely consists of this description:

This document comprises the second and last part of a translation by the Procurator's Bureau of the Tokyo District Criminal Court of typewritten German notes prepared by Richard Sorge in lieu of a statement.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire at this time to offer in evidence so much of consecutive exhibit 20-B, both in the German text and in the English translation, as conforms to the witness' description.

Mr. WOOD. It will be received.

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 39," is filed herewith.)

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, these two documents, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 38" and "Willoughby Exhibit No. 39," are what is known as the Sorge confession; are they not?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; they are, though the correct title has been read by me now, namely, "Sorge Case Materials." We finally gave it a convenient title of our own out in Tokyo; namely, "Sorge's Own Story." Actually, it is a rather loose designation. They are not confessions; they are not really Sorge's own story; they are not a diary; but they contain elements of all three, and you are at liberty to refer to them as you choose. We have used those terms indiscriminately for some time.

Mr. TAVENNER. And the translation of the title of the document itself, the printed title which I read, is "Parts 1 and 2 of the Statement of Richard Sorge"?

General WILLOUGHBY. Sorge Case Materials.

Mr. TAVENNER. Let me put the question this way: There is no diary or confession by Sorge separate and apart from the document which I introduced a moment ago, previously marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 2," and these two documents, "Willoughby Exhibit 38" and "Willoughby Exhibit 39," which have just been introduced?

General WILLOUGHBY. There is none.

Mr. WALTER. As I understand it, when Yoshikawa put the story together and reduced it to typewritten sheets, they were submitted to Sorge and he initialed them; isn't that correct?

General WILLOUGHBY. I think he made corrections. The original I have seen shows ink entries of a leisurely, editorial, corrective process.

Mr. WALTER. Did he initial each page?

General WILLOUGHBY. I don't recall that point, but I have accepted this particular document at full face value.

Mr. WALTER. It is just as much a confession as though the entire thing had been written by his own hand?

General WILLOUGHBY. I think your point is well taken. The man wrote it and filed it juridically, and I believe you could accept that classification, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. This confession or statement by Richard Sorge, comprising exhibits 38 and 39, is very long. They are very interesting, Mr. Chairman. They go with great detail into the history of the Communist Party and the Comintern in the East; but, as they are exhibits, we will not undertake to read the documents. I would like, however, to question the witness more or less in a chronological fashion regarding matters that are set forth in the diary.

General Willoughby, I call your attention to page 14 of part 1 of exhibit 38, in which there appears chapter 4, entitled "The Writer's Espionage Group and Activities in China Between January 1930 and December 1932." Will you please give the committee the benefit of the information contained therein relating to the organization of this group? In referring to "the writer," I was referring to Richard Sorge.

General WILLOUGHBY. I think extracts from this very voluminous exhibit, which is available in totality, will give the story. For example, when he speaks of the organization of the China group he has this to say:

I came to China with two foreign coworkers who had been dispatched on orders from the fourth bureau of the Red army.

That is a rather significant line. They had been dispatched on orders from the fourth bureau of the Red army. The fourth bureau of the Red army is the intelligence section of the Soviet army, and Sorge says he came to China with two coworkers who had been furnished him by the fourth bureau of the Red army. That indicates he was working for the fourth section of the Soviet army; he was an operator, an agent, an under-cover agent, so to speak, of the intelligence section of the Soviet army.

Now, he says:

The only person in China upon whom I knew I could depend was Agnes Smedley, of whom I had first heard in Europe. I solicited her aid in establishing my group in Shanghai and particularly in selecting Chinese coworkers. I met as many as possible of her young Chinese friends, making special efforts to become acquainted with those who volunteered to cooperate and work with foreigners for leftist causes.

Then later on, to pick another significant fragment, he said:

I used the same method in obtaining foreign coworkers for my espionage group. At first I selected people from among Smedley's friends, approaching them by asking Smedley to introduce me to them and then waiting until I could negotiate with them directly.

Then this will interest Mr. Walter:

It was in that way that I met Ozaki, and I think Smedley was the one who introduced us. After that Smedley and I met Ozaki frequently at Smedley's home.

He goes on in the same vein in this lengthy description of his operations.

Mr. TAVENNER. I call your attention to page 15 of this same exhibit 28, where there appears subtitle C, entitled "Methods Used in Collection of Information by Japanese Members; Methods of Contacting Japanese Members," and ask you to tell the committee what Sorge had to say about his contacts with Japanese members.

General WILLOUGHBY. Here again I make some selective references to his statements because they are descriptive of his work. He said:

My meetings with Japanese members took place at restaurants, cafes or Smedley's home * * *. I felt most at ease when we met at Smedley's home, and I took Ozaki and Kawai there on many occasions.

May I pause here to identify this man Kawai, K-a-w-a-i? Kawai is a member of Sorge's ring, arrested, tried, and convicted, whom we released under the political amnesty following the occupation of Japan. We released a lot of people under the casual classification of political prisoners. The fact that they included convicted espionage agents and a slight assortment of murderers was incidental. We were too busy with the occupation of Japan to go into case histories. Later we got those people.

Kawai became important because he is an actual living eyewitness of this association with Smedley and others, has said so, his affidavit is available, and were funds available he could have been brought before this committee.

Mr. TAVENNER. In that connection, General, is it not correct that he is one of the two individuals of whom this committee wrote you regarding the taking of his deposition by this committee during April 1950 when a subcommittee was in Hawaii?

General WILLOUGHBY. Quite. I am glad you reminded me of it, Mr. Counsel, and it shows that this committee has been actually working on this case over a long period.

This affidavit was prepared in lieu of a personal appearance, and it has the same probative value.

In other words, if Smedley and her lawyers in her days—and she had to defend herself, of course; I had no objection then or now to this attitude—if she maintained this was a typical forced Japanese disclosure, it has been supported by witnesses of high standing willing to make that statement before an American investigative group such as this one. Kawai is in a more important category than Ozaki because you can summon him if you want to, though he has made a sworn statement, notarized, and so forth.

Mr. VELDE. You have mentioned meetings between Ozaki and Kawai in Smedley's home. Can you place the time they were held and where was Smedley's home?

General WILLOUGHBY. These conferences were in the city of Shanghai. Smedley and Stein were never active in Japan, and reference to her is as to her work as Sorge's assistant in Shanghai. Later on—and I did not know it at the time—our interest in the Sorge file brought confirmation of that in the Shanghai police records. A Japanese court record of an espionage ring points to activities in Shanghai, and that is confirmed by a later investigation of collateral supporting information of identical quality by a reputable international policing body, the Shanghai municipal police, which at that time was an extra-territorial enclave in China.

Mr. VELDE. You think the evidence such that it would satisfy almost any American court?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. I would accept it.

Mr. VELDE. What was the period?

General WILLOUGHBY. 1929 to 1934. Am I correct about that, Mr. Counsel? As a matter of fact, the counsel to this committee has become much more expert than I am on these files.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think the interrogation will indicate that these particular conferences took place in 1932 and the last one in 1933, so far as Kawai is concerned.

General WILLOUGHBY. I was tempted to throw into the hopper the Shanghai police document.

Mr. TAVENNER. Before you do that, you referred to Guenther Stein not having been involved in Japan.

General WILLOUGHBY. I take that back.

Mr. TAVENNER. Wasn't that an error?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. That was a slip of the tongue, an error. Smedley was not in Japan, but Guenther Stein was there. In fact, he ran a radio station for Sorge for a long time.

As to the relationship between the Sorge report, a Japanese report, and the report of the British and French concessions of the Shanghai municipal police, the committee holds in the Shanghai files a typical dossier containing an elaborate report and a typical index card on Smedley. This is a 5- by 3-inch index card, and it fixes the date.

"Shanghai municipal police" is written in the upper left-hand corner; file number; date, August 1933; American; age, 23/2/1892; height, 5 feet 6 inches; hair, brown; eyes, gray; face, oval. I would say a rather slipshod description.

Antecedents: Agnes Smedley, alias Alice Bird, alias Mrs. Petroikos, American citizen born in Osgou, Mo., United States of America, on February 23, 1892. Member of the following societies:

That is rather interesting. From 1933 to 1951 we have heard of such lists elsewhere, where fellow travelers and joiners join certain fronts. [Continuing reading:]

Friends of the U. S. S. R., Hindustan Association in Berlin, Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society, Noulens Defense Committee—

The "Noulens Defense Committee" is a forerunner of the Civil Rights Congress; it works in Shanghai on the same principle as the Civil Right Congress works in New York City now; namely, legal defense of Communists caught in the business.

Mr. WALTER. What is the American counterpart?

General WILLOUGHBY. The Civil Rights Congress. I will trace it from its noble birth to its American tendrils.

Mr. WALTER. Noble birth? I would say birth out of wedlock.

General WILLOUGHBY. I accept your fine genealogical nuance, Mr. Walter. [Continuing reading:]

All China Labor Federation, and the China League for Civil Rights. Speaks English, French, and German and is in possession of two passports—German and American.

I will show individuals with 15 passports. [Continuing reading:]

Arrived in Shanghai in May 1929 from Berlin as the correspondent of the German newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung.

That is the same cover Sorge had, who was also a correspondent for the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. [Continuing reading:]

She is in the service of the eastern branch of the central committee of the Communist International and is definitely known to have assisted local Indian seditionists on several occasions during the past few years. It is believed that her chief duties comprise the supervising of Communist organizations among workers and that she receives orders direct from the central committee of the Communist International in Moscow.

This is a statement by the Shanghai municipal police, who did not then know or have, of course, Sorge's record, known here as exhibit 38, but they had a fair knowledge of it. [Continuing reading:]

May 1929 to May 15, 1930—85 Avenue Duball. May 15, 1930, to October 1930—Canton, and French concession, Shameen. October 1930—72 Route Groushy—A Shanghai street. [Continuing reading:]

January 22, 1931, to March 5, 1931—Nanking. June 18, 1931, to July 5, 1931—Canton. December 1931—removed to apartment 102, I. S. S. Apartments, 1552 Avenue Joffre.

On May 17, 1933, she left Shanghai by rail for Peiping. Unconfirmed information is to the effect that she intends to proceed to Moscow. October 23, 1934—returned to Shanghai—

A lapse of 2 years. [Continuing reading:]

from the United States, in the S. S. *President Coolidge*—

And so forth and so forth.

Behind this brief, typical index card maintained by the Shanghai police, there is a more extensive file, but here is a rough fixation of the time period, views of the British police, her aliases and her associations, in broad outline, of which a more complete record is going to be filed by the counsel.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Willoughby, I call your attention to section F, page 16, part 1, of the document referred to—that is, exhibit 38—which is entitled, "Persons Directly Attached to Writer's Chinese Group," and by "writer" I am referring to Richard Sorge.

Will you tell the committee what Richard Sorge had to say about this subject?

General WILLOUGHBY. With reference to foreigners, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes. It is section F.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir. I have it. Here, again, I act as an assistant counsel in protecting the limited time of the committee and picking out what I know from my long experience to be the high lights. This is the type of comment he makes on his foreign associates. He has one by the name of Seber Weingarten:

Weingarten, the man in charge of wireless operations in my group, remained in Shanghai after I returned to Moscow. He was a graduate of the radio school in Moscow who had been ordered by headquarters to work with me.

He has this to say about Agnes Smedley, though he has other things to say in other parts of this document:

She was an American and a correspondent of the German newspaper *Frankfurter Zeitung*. She was used in Shanghai by me as a direct member of my group. She worked for me very competently.

Then there are a number of code and surnames. Some we have identified; others we suspect; and others we don't know who they are. One was John:

John—He was sent to Shanghai to work for me by the fourth bureau of the Red Army in 1931. Although he acted as my proxy in a few liaison

duties, he was chiefly concerned with code and photographic work. He was a Pole, a former member of the Polish Communist Party.

Here we have an interesting one. By cross reference to Sorge and the Shanghai police, we have been able to establish his identity:

Paul—He was designated as my successor by the fourth bureau of the Red Army. While I was in Shanghai, he was chiefly concerned with military matters, on which he was an expert. He became the leader of the group after I left.

Here, while the matter is covered more extensively later on, I would like to pause and read to you again one of those police identities, and it is in line with the purposes of this committee. In a general manner, this is what I said in my correspondence with Washington:

The significance of this material of yesterday is that it carries into tomorrow. Time in its issue of April 25, 1949, featured Eugene Dennis. There is no point in repeating this terse, well-written story of the growth and world itinerary of a Soviet agent; important, however, are certain connecting links with the Sorge case.

Dennis, who used to be Francis X. Waldron, obtained a fraudulent passport as "Paul Walsh" and traveled via Europe, South Africa to China. The world-wide ramifications of the Third International, with Shanghai as the far eastern operating center, are reflected in the itinerary of this prominent American disciple. Paul Eugene Walsh, alias "Paul" or "Milton," suddenly appears in the records of the Shanghai police.

The Shanghai police had the same type of card on him as I read to you on Smedley.

Mr. TAVENNER. And a person designated by the name Paul is said by Sorge to have been his successor at Shanghai?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Here I am quoting the Shanghai police report:

Name: Paul Eugene Walsh; alias Milton.
Date and place of birth: Unknown.
Address in Shanghai: 35-D, 643 Route Frelupt.
Particulars of passport: American Passport No. 331741 issued by the Department of State, Washington, D. C. on 12.12.1930.

When and how Walsh arrived in Shanghai are unknown, as are his previous activities. From December 1, 1933, until June 1, 1934, he resided at Flat 0, Gresham Apartments, No. 1224 Avenue Joffre. On May 30, 1934, the lease of Flat 34-D, Foncin Apartments, No. 643 Route Frelupt, was transferred to his name from Harry Berger—

This is important. Harry Berger is a well-known international Communist identity. [Continuing reading:]

with whom he was obviously on terms of good friendship. Walsh resided at the latter address from June 1, 1934, until October 9, 1934, when he secretly left Shanghai for Trieste on the S. S. *Conte Verde*. It has been established—

says the Shanghai police—

that Walsh was one of the master minds of the local machine of the Comintern, and as such was responsible for the collation of many important documents relating to the propagation of Communist ideas in the Far East.

Now, Sorge describes this particular Comintern machine, and we will read it shortly. Sorge does not always give complete identities. He was cautious, even in his story, because he hoped against hope, from 1941 to 1944, that the Soviets would intervene and rescue him from his predicament.

The cross-reference, Mr. Velde, is that this Comintern apparatus or machine with which the police associates him, and which is described fully by Sorge as to its purposes, was founded by Earl Browder,

the head of the American Communist Party. It was Dennis who took the place of Browder. That constitutes the value of this pseudo-historical tracing of fine lines of relationship which is one of the tasks of this committee and one of the tasks of the Tokyo intelligence system.

Mr. VELDE. Do I get you right that the corroboration consists of the Shanghai police reports, which mention the names of Browder, Dennis, and others, and they are also contained in the Sorge file?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; either in code name or surname.

Mr. WALTER. General, you stated that some of the names you merely suspected. Have you pursued all avenues of investigation to determine who they were, and do you think we might well look further for the identity of these persons?

General WILLOUGHBY. We have done practically all we could in the Orient, but when you encounter identities of persons, then the local investigative agencies, including your committee, would pursue this, and it is my understanding this is being done. American investigative agencies have become interested in these clues or leads or references, and this case might still be said to be open, in that whenever such unidentified or partially identified individuals appear the investigative processes are in course now. These sources are not available to me, since I left my post under dramatic circumstances 60 days ago.

Mr. TAVENNER. I might add to what you have said that, where the identities of persons in Japan have been made available to the committee, this committee is endeavoring to ascertain where they are now and what they are doing.

General WILLOUGHBY. May I compliment the counsel and this committee. I was surprised at the amount of information this committee has on persons whose names appear in the oriental files. I am sure this will be brought out in the course of these hearings. I have a feeling that a number of these identities are already known and have been investigated on parallel lines by this committee.

Mr. TAVENNER. There are some names we do not desire to disclose at this time.

General WILLOUGHBY. The committee controls the subject matter.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you completed your answer to the question relating to section F?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. I have picked a few of his comments.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you turn back to section F, page 17? I do not believe you have completed your testimony with regard to that.

General WILLOUGHBY. Your point is well taken, sir. Sorge lists a few more which are important, such as Max Klausen:

Klausen, who went to Shanghai before I did, handled wireless operations for his operator, a man known as Jim. He was attached to the Fourth Bureau of the Red Army in Moscow. I first met him in his role of wireless operator in Shanghai. He worked for me for quite a while at Canton, although not as an active member, after which he was transferred to a group in Manchuria. I knew he was an able man; so I proposed at Moscow in 1935 that he be sent to Japan.

Klausen, Sorge's radio operator, established radio stations both in Shanghai and Tokyo, used to relay messages to Khabarovsk, Siberia, which were then relayed to Moscow.

Klausen is well remembered by me because he was released in Tokyo under this political amnesty, and he disappeared. He disappeared with the assistance of the Soviet Embassy. That started me, actually, in tracking down this case. I felt if this individual, or any

individual of this crowd, was that important, that this thing was an international case. We found later on, as will be developed by the counsel in connection with exhibit 17, that an attempt was made to get this Sorge case in the International Tribunal in Tokyo, where it met strong opposition by the Russian member; again, to any trained intelligence or investigative officer, indicative of the importance of this material.

We will come to that later.

Mr. TAVENNER. It appears that after a discussion of the paragraph relating to Paul in Sorge's statement, you omitted the next three paragraphs. When you returned to the records relating to Paul you failed to pick them up. So, will you go back to the paragraph beginning "A German woman"?

General WILLOUGHBY. Oh, yes. We find an entry:

A German woman who was called "Hamburg." She offered us the use of her home and engaged in various liaison functions, such as performing messenger duties and holding materials for us.

The next entry relates to Jacob:

Jacob—a young American newspaper reporter. For the most part he gathered various kinds of political information from foreigners.

I have not been able to obtain an identification on this entry.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you been able to identify the newspaper for which the individual worked as a reporter?

General WILLOUGHBY. I am sorry to say, no.

Mr. WALTER. Does the record disclose his first name, his given name?

General WILLOUGHBY. Just "Jacob," which could be his code name or his surname. You find some names like "Hamburg," who is probably Miss Weitemeyer, and there is a great deal known about her. These were clues to descriptive activities, such as a spy-ring apparatus.

Mr. TAVENNER. There is still another paragraph.

General WILLOUGHBY. Which one?

Mr. TAVENNER. It begins with "A young employee."

General WILLOUGHBY. Oh, yes:

A young employee of the American consulate who brought in economic and political news.

Sorge then says:

I have forgotten his name.

Sorge hoped for 4 years that someone would "spring" him. He bragged to the Japanese: "I am an important Soviet operator; I hold the rank of colonel in the Soviet Army," and so forth. He played on the desire of the Japanese to have no friction with the Russians during the war years, the neutrality arrangement. So, we felt that his own statements were more or less influenced by this cautious, protective attitude. But the systematic interrogation of other members of his ring brought out other facts, and that shows the importance of your witness, Yoshikawa Mitsusada.

Mr. VELDE. As to this young employee of the American consulate, is there any corroborating evidence in the Shanghai police records?

General WILLOUGHBY. Our efforts were to try to grab the Shanghai files. Everything points to Shanghai as headquarters, with Tokyo an outpost. We tried to do that, but we were charged with the occupation of Japan, a nation of 80 million, and my job was not to pursue

these juicy morsels, but to keep a sort of FBI surveillance in Japan and to maintain tranquillity in Japan. So, we could not engage in activities in China.

I am continually charged with failure to obtain information elsewhere. It would be the same as if the FBI was giving you the records of the French Sûreté Nationale in Paris. We have done all we could to track down these "birds." Actually, I was less interested in getting the dope on Jacob than on Earl Browder, Eugene Dennis, and Gerhart Eisler. They were in the headlines, and I feel if that had been known Judge Medina's job would have been easier.

Mr. VELDE. Don't misunderstand me, General. I realize your jurisdiction was limited to Japan and the Philippine Islands, as I understand it.

General WILLOUGHBY. Quite.

Mr. VELDE. And you had no jurisdiction in Korea, either at that time?

General WILLOUGHBY. I did not. Of course, I had interest and picked up everything that was not nailed down.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Yoshikawa was asked the question whether or not effort had been made to identify the individual alleged to have been in the American consulate and furnishing information. His testimony was that they had been unable to establish his identity, but it is possible that the State Department has information that would lead to discovery of at least the names of persons in the consulate at that time, which is not your function, but probably our function.

General WILLOUGHBY. I feel that the committee is in a position to inquire from the State Department directly.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

Section J on page 23 of the same document, exhibit 38, is entitled "Other Groups in China." The first group listed thereunder is the "Jin" or "Lehman" group. What does Sorge report on this group?

General WILLOUGHBY. With an eye on Mr. Velde, now we come to a portion of Sorge's own story which, on perusal, led me, or us, the investigative intelligence groups, to try to obtain further data on the operations in Shanghai, and it is this portion of the Sorge story which, while cautiously worded, nevertheless gave us really the bird's-eye view of the international Comintern character of the organizations then in Shanghai. When you read this and put yourselves in our place, or my place, there was enough there—though Sorge, as usual, was conservative in his designations—enough of the purposes of these organizations to recognize a similar pattern in the United States. After we pursued this investigation which resulted in the Shanghai file and saw the picture that evolved from it, we felt that we then had a pattern recognizable in the United States.

For example, if we find Noulens is a type case of a protective legal defense of a captured convicted espionage agent which is an exact counterpart of the Civil Rights Congress, when we see that, we bring the report up to date.

When we find the same man—namely, Gerhart Eisler—operating in Japan, and find him later defended by—what is her name? Carol Wise?

Mr. WALTER. Carol King.

Mr. BEALE. Carol Weiss King.

General WILLOUGHBY. Then there develops a pattern which must be known by the legislators and the people so that they can understand and identify these things. For example, I notice Mr. Saypol—I am speaking as a reader of several papers, such as the New York Times—though I don't feel so kindly as to the Herald Tribune; as a matter of fact, I wonder why New York requires the Herald Tribune when it has the Times. Is the Times man here? And including that unmatched series of papers known as the Hearst papers, completely in favor for years, Mr. Sentner [addressing reporter].

When we see that Gerhart Eisler is defended by an organization headed by Miss King, and we find Eisler in Shanghai, and find Noulens defended in Shanghai in a similar manner to Eisler's defense in the United States, then we can trace the Kremlin-sponsored, Comintern-created so-called International Red Aid, which became the Labor Defense in the States, which became the Civil Rights Congress and the Association for the Defense of the Foreign Born; and that is a pattern which I think is of substance and value to the committee and the Congress and the people.

This is a departure from your question to introduce the importance of the description of these organizations. No doubt you will recognize them. They are operating in the States under some other name.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you read what Sorge had to say about the "Jim" or "Lehman" group?

General WILLOUGHBY. That will take us a bit of time.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then, Mr. Chairman, I believe this would be a good opportunity for a break.

Mr. WOOD. The committee stands in recess until 2:30.

(Thereupon, at 12:40 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. WOOD. The committee will be in order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY— Resumed

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, I refer you again to section J, on page 23, of exhibit No. 33. That section is entitled "Other Groups in China." The first group listed thereunder is the Jim or Lehman group. Will you examine the exhibit, please, and state what the Sorge statement shows on this unit?

General WILLOUGHBY. Mr. Counsel, I regard this section of the Sorge story as possibly the most important in this documentation, because it led us to believe that, while fragmentary, the descriptions of these international people then working in Shanghai for the purpose of communizing China were so descriptive in their functional outline that we might have something of value to the American people today. And, actually, as I read these, I would like to suggest that you put yourselves in our positions in Tokyo, groping with this uncrystallized information at the time, and at the end of the reading realize we would have had to go after the Shanghai record or to procure someone who would know about that activity.

Consequently, this represents a turning point in the process of investigation, in the sense that we had already disposed of Sorge, you might say, as an interesting specimen of international espionage somewhat in the manner of what was later disclosed in Canada; but these next two pages, written by an individual who was in the business, an expert in his line, gave us the clue to the existence in Shanghai of a number of bodies that looked very much like the Communist fronts everywhere in the world, including America.

Here, again, we go into that twilight zone of why and how a historical case, so to speak—because everything of 5 or 10 years ago is in the realm of historical research—can be linked to something that is of interest to the committee today.

I will link it, or the counsel, through his questioning, will develop it, and I will pause in one of these groups and trace it from 1935 until 1951, in a comparatively brief statement.

Mr. WALTER. Did your investigation develop a connection between that group and a group in the United States?

General WILLOUGHBY. It did, unmistakably and positively, and that is of value to your committee, to get that on the record.

Mr. TAVENNER. I suggest you read on page 23 the portion dealing with that group, that is, the Lehman group.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir. This is a series of groups or apparatus or front organizations described by Sorge.

The first is the Jim or Lehman group, code name of the person in charge. He said:

The first group to work in Shanghai was the Jim group, also known as the Lehman group. I had never heard of it until I had arrived in Shanghai. Jim had been sent out from the fourth bureau of the Red army, arriving in Shanghai slightly before me. His chief duty was to establish radio communication between Shanghai and other parts of China and Moscow. * * * When I arrived in Shanghai, he had already succeeded in establishing radio communication between Shanghai and Moscow and was trying to establish contacts with other districts in a similar manner. However, it seems that he was unsuccessful in the case of Canton. Jim employed Klausen—

who became Sorge's radio operator—

as his subordinate. Further, he employed a White Russian called Mischa or Mishin in Shanghai.

We do not know too much about Lehman. Does he appear in your files, Mr. Tavenner, L-e-b-m-a-n?

Mr. TAVENNER. Whether it is the same Lehman or not, I am unable to say.

General WILLOUGHBY. Nevertheless, the sense of this description is that Shanghai is a radio-transmitting station or relay station en route to Khabarovsk and then Moscow. The operator who appears here first, Klausen, later on used himself in establishing his own station in Tokyo.

Mr. WALTER. When was that, approximately?

General WILLOUGHBY. In Japan in the period 1935 to 1941, roughly.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you proceed to the next group listed there, known as the Harbin group?

General WILLOUGHBY. Sorge says about this group:

The next group with which I came into contact in the course of my work was the Harbin group, which had also been sent out by the fourth bureau of the Red army.

You have this recurrent reference to his job description, namely, an agent of the fourth bureau of the Red army, the intelligence section of the Red army. [Continuing reading:]

Its duty was to gather military information in Manchuria. As a sideline, it gathered political intelligence as well. The Harbin group acted as a letter box for me; I forwarded letters and documents from Moscow to it, and it sent them on. Money sent to me by Moscow also came through this channel. Liaison with the Harbin group was established in the following way: To begin with, somebody from the group came to Shanghai to confer on the technique of the letter-box communication system, and thereafter members of my group and members of the Harbin group took turns in serving as mail carriers and traveling between Harbin and Shanghai.

Klaason acted as contact for me on numerous occasions. I believe it was in the spring of 1932 that I myself carried mail to Harbin.

The significance here is the carrier or mail delivery method which occurs throughout the technique of Sorge, that is, how such a ring operates in a foreign country. And some of the names he mentioned earlier, in the main, were the ones he used again in Japan; and some of the names occurring now you will find recurring elsewhere as this presentation proceeds.

The next group—

Mr. TAVENNER. I believe you still have another paragraph to read in connection with the Harbin group.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes:

I met Ott-Gloenberg, chief of the Harbin group, for the first time in Shanghai. I called on him at Harbin to turn over the mail to him. I also met Frohlich, sometimes called Theo, who had formerly worked at Shanghai, at Harbin. I do not believe I met the radio technician, Artor, at Harbin, although I heard about him. Theo and Ott-Gloenberg left Harbin in 1932. I happened to meet them by chance and not in connection with my work in Russia in January 1933. My relationship with the Harbin group was strictly a letter-box affair. There was no administrative relationship at all.

The significance there is that these elusive names appear elsewhere. The Shanghai record will pick them up. They had them under surveillance. There is your bridge from Sorge to Shanghai today. I keep repeating that, but it is a very practical element in these proceedings.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now if you will describe the Frohlich-Feldmann group in Shanghai according to Sorge's statement.

General WILLOUGHBY. The next group reported on by Sorge is the Frohlich-Feldmann group in Shanghai. He said:

The Frohlich-Feldmann group was also operating in Shanghai in 1931. Like the others, it had been sent out by the fourth bureau of the Red army. Its duty was to make connections with the Chinese Red army and to gather intelligence concerning it.

Here Sorge reports on a staff, a group or front whose duty it was to do what? To make connection with the Chinese Red Army and to gather intelligence concerning it, an interesting sideline. [Continuing reading:]

It had its own radio connection with Moscow and therefore did not use our station. The chief of the group was Frohlich, also known as Theo, who held the rank of major general in the Red army. Feldmann was a radio technician and held the rank of lieutenant colonel. There was another man in the group, but I do not know who he was. Unable to fulfill their mission, these people left Shanghai during 1931. I had no working relationship with them and met them only by chance. Shanghai is such a small city that it was difficult to avoid such chance encounters. I did not receive instructions from Moscow to contact them. They had their own mission to perform and there was no formal connection between us.

All of this, fragmentary to some extent, nevertheless describes the mechanics of the operation, and describes their missions. The duty of the Frohlich-Feldmann group was to gather intelligence concerning the Chinese Red army. That is the same Red army which we are now fighting in North Korea. Therefore, any collateral relationship that will develop, as the case may be, may have found its origin in the reading of this, shall we say, slightly historical case known as the Sorge case. Without that we would never have been interested in Shanghai at all. After all, we had a lot of more pressing questions. But that development was enough to make Shanghai an irresistible target of investigation.

The next group is a key group. Always bear in mind that Sorge is not going to identify this group by name, he is not ready to do this when he writes this paper, but he tells enough about it that we are able to establish its identity later on.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is the name of the group to which you refer?

General WILLOUGHBY. He calls it the Comintern group in Shanghai. I will give you the correct identity later. Sorge says:

I met the Comintern group in Shanghai by chance in 1931. It consisted of a political branch and an organization branch, the latter comprised of Noulens—a name to which I invite your attention—

who became famous after his arrest, and one or two assistants. Karl Lesse later came to Shanghai to assume the post left vacant by Noulens. The organization branch had various duties to perform, but it was primarily concerned with the maintenance of liaison between the Comintern, the Chinese Communist Party and the political branch of the Shanghai Comintern group. Liaison duty was of three different types: (1) Personnel work, i. e., the movement of personnel between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party; (2) the transmittal of documents and letters; and (3) radio communication. The organization branch also assumed the duty of financial liaison between Moscow, the Chinese Communist Party, and the political branch; assisted in finding meeting places and houses for the organization branch and the Chinese Communist Party; rendered all kinds of technical and organizational assistance to illegal activities in China; took an active part in the exchange of secret materials between Moscow and China; and assumed responsibility for the safety of members of the political branch. In this last connection, it had the authority to issue orders to political branch members, restrict their movements, etc.

Now, this description of the job of this outfit is then later confirmed by the Shanghai files and other investigations which we conducted. Its name and personnel then is disclosed. Sorge did not disclose it except to refer to Noulens, which is a famous case quite similar to the defense of Gerhart Eisler, for the same reason and conducted by the same legalistic front which is used for such purposes, namely, the International Red Aid, a Communist-financed unit whose counterpart to the American organization will develop as we proceed.

Then Sorge describes the political branch:

The political branch consisted of Gerhardt—

Eisler; I will supply the last name—

whom I had known in Germany and worked with in my Comintern days, and one or two assistants. I did not meet the assistants.

Incidentally, Eisler's wife² appeared before this committee quite recently, I believe.

² Hede Massing, former wife of Gerhardt Eisler.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is correct.

General WILLOUGHBY. In her book, *This Deception*, she knew little about Eisler's China mission. I will put in a plug for Hede Massing's book, *This Deception*, published by Duell, Sloane & Pearce, because one of the Pearces of that company worked for me in Japan.

Sorge continues:

I chanced to meet Gerhardt [Eisler] in Shanghai and renewed our old acquaintance, but our work was absolutely unrelated. Gerhardt's duty, or rather that of the political branch, was to act as a spokesman for the political policy with respect to the Chinese Communist Party decided upon by the Comintern general conference. It also acted as an intermediary for the exchange of information between the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern and submitted reports concerning all the social problems involved in the labor movement in China. The reports were forwarded to Moscow through the organization branch. I must state here that these reports were never sent through my radio facilities or my other liaison channels. With the arrest of Noulens, Gerhardt's status in Shanghai became precarious, and he decided to return to Moscow in 1931.

He skipped, just as he did on the *Batory*. He is an internationally skillful dodger.

I would like to pause here. Knowing that the essence of this presentation is linked with today, this is too tempting an opportunity. Of course, we are now all familiar with the elusive Gerhart Eisler. I call your attention to an article in the *Saturday Evening Post*, in its issue of February 17, 1951. I pause, in fact, to pay tribute to the *Saturday Evening Post*, as this article is brilliant. The author, Craig Thompson, unknown to me, is a most skillful investigator of Communist fronts.

The title of the article is "The Communist's Dearest Friend," and its lead photograph shows one Carol King, smiling amiably, I suppose, and leading by the hand her protégé and client, one Gerhart Eisler.

Mr. VERDE. General, is there any question in your mind that the Gerhart referred to by Richard Sorge is one and the same as Gerhart Eisler?

General WILLOUGHBY. None whatever. We know he was in Shanghai. The Shanghai police said he was. His wife said he was. He was not there for his health. Furthermore, the story of Sorge tells what he was doing.

Mr. TAVENNER. For the purpose of the record, I would like to refer to an interrogation which took place before this committee February 6, 1947, of Ruth Fischer, a sister of Gerhart Eisler:

Mr. RUSSELL. When did you next learn of the whereabouts of your brother and what country was he in?

Miss FISCHER. * * * Eisler had been in disgrace during 1928, 1929, and 1930, and everybody of the Communist Party in Berlin expected his expulsion from the Communist Party of Germany because of his rebellion against Stalin at that time.

Then he was sent to a mission in China, with the GPU delegation, to purge rebellious Chinese Communists. At that time Eisler's mission was not a very high one, in China; he was one of a group of men sent there to carry out orders. In these Chinese purges he behaved so cruelly and carried out the orders so well that the report about him in Berlin said that he was really the hangman of the rebellious Chinese Communists, who were sentenced by the decisions of Moscow.

After the Chinese trip, he came back in 1930 or 1931 to Moscow, where he then married his wife, and where his daughter was born, and where he remained until 1933. What missions he carried out between 1931 and 1933 I do not know, but I want to repeat that he has not walked on German soil in these years.

General WILLOUGHBY. That is a very interesting interview, not known to me, and would merely confirm me in my current understanding.

Mr. TAVENNER. You were proceeding to discuss the article of Craig Thompson.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. This article, as of February 1951, covers the evaluation of organizations and the participation of Miss King in the development of a systematic legal defense for Communist agents that have run afoul of the American law.

The article says in 1925, in association with one Brodsky, who was the United States receiver of party funds from Moscow.

Mr. WOOD. Who is that? Brodsky?

General WILLOUGHBY. B-r-o-d-s-k-y. Together they helped organize and launch the International Labor Defense.

The records in Shanghai and elsewhere will show, in an organization chart which is included in my studies, that the International Red Aid is the Kremlin mother unit of defense bodies in all countries for the defense of this type of clientele.

So it became known as the Labor Defense in this country, and this article, with which I am in complete agreement, so states. The author, who knows his business, also says:

This effort had been preceded by a meeting in Moscow at which a directive, binding on Communist parties everywhere, was issued. It demanded: "The proletariat must gather and organize those lawyers and learned barristers in various countries who sympathize with the liberation struggle." From this was born a world-wide Communist bar association called International Red Aid. The International Labor Defense was its United States section.

Without going into details which are in this file, the International Red Aid, Soviet-Comintern sponsored, becomes the International Labor Defense, and the American Labor Defense becomes the Civil Rights Congress. And, incidentally, again Weiss, as an organizer, develops other agencies, such as the American Committee for the Defense of the Foreign Born, and several other organizations, all of which have been analyzed and commented on adversely by Mr. Morris Ernst, a reputable New York lawyer, who resented, apparently, ever having been mixed up with this group.

The coincidence that Eisler and Noulens find legal counsel, one in China and one in New York, all connected with the International Red Aid, is so impressive that an investigative officer dare not ignore it.

Pausing again, in order to tie this thing into a recognizable pattern, you will find that what Sorge cautiously called the Comintern group, is reported by the Chinese police much more specifically. It will be covered later on, but I dwell on it now. It is the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, abbreviated PPTUS, and its parent organization, the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau. They were the most important and highly organized apparatus for Comintern labor activities in the Far East during the late 1920's and early 1930's.

The PPTUS, set up in 1927 at a conference in Hankow, was attended by several prominent Comintern leaders, including Lozovsky, who, incidentally, has risen to a high position in the Soviet labor movement. Another member of the Hankow conference who later became first head of the PPTUS was the American Communist Earl Browder, who was assisted in his work in China by an American woman. Other Americans prominent in the affairs of the PPTUS were James H.

Dolsen, a journalist, and one Albert Edward Stewart, and Margaret Undjus.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you identify Jim Dolsen as one of the individuals connected with this organization?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. He was connected with the organization in the thirties.

Mr. VELDE. Will you spell that?

General WILLOUGHBY. D-o-l-s-e-n, James H.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, Jim Dolsen is the person who has been identified as a member of the Communist Party by Matthew Cvetic in his testimony on February 21, 1950, and is one of those arrested on August 17, 1951, in Pittsburgh.

General WILLOUGHBY. That is news to me. It again shows the efficacy of this committee's work in tracking down these people. This is why the Sorge and related matters could not be ignored. Here you have the case of an individual, Dolsen, trafficking in a Communist front in the thirties in China; he recurs in Pittsburgh in the forties, and this committee picks him up and reports on him in this fashion. If you were pressed for time and decided to terminate this meeting now, you would still have made your case, because the reference to Dolsen is only one of many others, almost repetitive in their similarity.

Mr. TAVENNER. In describing Earl Browder as the head of the Far East bureau, you referred to a person as his assistant who was an American woman, but did not give the name of the American woman.

General WILLOUGHBY. Perhaps an instinctive gallantry which is not applicable in this kind of meeting. I will now fill the gap. Her name, said he reluctantly, is Katherine Harrison, "K" as in cat, "H" as in house. I am likely to misspell words in six languages, so I occasionally get confused on the subject.

Since this committee is taking me from one surprise to another—pleasant ones, I must say, as in the case of Dolsen—do you also have something on Miss Harrison?

Mr. TAVENNER. The committee is in possession of information that she was the wife at one time of Earl Browder.

General WILLOUGHBY. A very interesting social relationship, I should say.

I have strayed afar a bit. The point I made is, I became interested in Shanghai through the slightly reluctant Sorge in describing these people in Shanghai, and began to spend funds furnished me by the benevolent Federal Government to find out some more.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have some further questions to ask you about the Noulens group, but inasmuch as some Americans are tied up pretty closely with it in the Shanghai files, I will wait until we reach that.

General WILLOUGHBY. Very well. I will agree with you that the Noulens case is very interesting. It is a prototype of the Eisler case with respect to the abuse of legal defense.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you proceed with the Japanese group that Sorge established in Tokyo in 1933, and will you tell the committee what the Sorge report shows as to how he obtained the members for his group in Japan? You will find it on page 6 of exhibit 38.

General WILLOUGHBY. I take it you are interested in some individuals that Sorge recruited for his Japanese ring?

Mr. TAVENNER. That is correct, but in addition, those who were assigned to him by Moscow

General WILLOUGHBY. We will go back to Shanghai. This is a closing item of Sorge's activity. To go back to his work related to Shanghai, he has this to say:

When the orders came through, I asked for a technical aide (radio man), a Japanese collaborator and a competent foreign assistant, and the services of Klausen, Miyagi, and Voukelitch were made available. I was authorized to recruit other personnel as necessary in the place where I was working.

Is this the item you are interested in?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. My idea of the significance of this comment is that Sorge, when he gets a job, applies to the head office and says, "I want certain technicians, a radio man, a Japanese collaborator, and a competent foreign assistant." If he were working for General Electric or some other reputable concern, they would look at their colored pins on the map of the world and say, "We will transfer our representative from Buenos Aires to some other place," and it would be done.

By analogy, the way the Kremlin-Moscow staff organization worked there was just as good. They pressed a button and summoned from a world-wide job distribution, Klausen—

Mr. TAVENNER. Where was Klausen obtained from?

General WILLOUGHBY. He had gone back to Russia, and they pulled him from there. The competent foreign assistant was Voukelitch, who was a French Communist in Belgrade at the time. They pulled him out, and these men converged and reported to their new jobs.

Mr. TAVENNER. From where did they get the Japanese assistant?

General WILLOUGHBY. They went to California and found a Nisei, a citizen technically but not in heart, and had him report to Tokyo.

Mr. TAVENNER. Does the report say Miyagi was a member of the American Communist Party?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Here is what Sorge had to say about Miyagi:

Miyagi's position was identical with that of Voukelitch. He, too, was a member of a Communist Party (American), he, too, was ordered through Moscow to participate in my activities, he, too, was a Comintern member in the broad sense, he, too, was registered with and accepted by some major Moscow organization as a member of my group, and in his case, too, it made absolutely no difference whether the agency in question was the Comintern, central committee of the Russian Communist Party, or the Fourth Bureau of the red army.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, does there appear as one of the 34 exhibits an interrogation of this individual, that is, Miyagi, relative to his knowledge of the American Communist Party?

General WILLOUGHBY. My recollection is that it does, and I believe you have custodianship of this exhibit.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes. I have before me exhibit 25, marked for identification only, and, Mr. Chairman, rather than introduce the whole document in evidence, I would like to read what I consider the pertinent portions of it. I am doing this because of its length.

The following are extracts from interrogations of Miyagi Yotoku conducted in March and April of 1942. This is from volume 4 of the procurator's records on Miyagi.

Question 3. The accused will describe his activities for the Communist cause during his stay in the United States.

Answer. In about September 1926, I purchased a house facing Los Angeles station, and in November I opened a restaurant there. My three business partners (Yabe, Noritsugu; Matayoshi, Atsushi; and Nakamura, Koki), two other

acquaintances and I began to meet once a week in the dressing room at the rear of the restaurant to exchange personal views on social sciences, philosophy, and art. This Social Problems Study Group, as we called it, gradually absorbed new members, among whom were an anarchist and close friend of Kotoku, Shusui, an intimate Communist colleague of Katayama, Sen, and several clergymen. In the course of time, our liberal sessions gradually veered toward the left, becoming completely leftist when Marxists Herbert Harris, a Russian, and Fister, a Swiss, who had joined the circle through the introduction of Communists Yada and Takahashi of West Los Angeles early in 1927, volunteered to lecture to us on Marxian theory.

Both Yada and Takahashi had joined our circle hoping to prevail upon the members of the working class who attended it to form a Communist study group. Our meetings, therefore, were the scenes of incessant wrangling between the anarchists and the Communist members. Yada and about 20 others bolted the group eventually, leaving me and about 10 others behind, set up their own Marxist study group, and established a temporary office on Weller Street in the Japanese section of Los Angeles. Their official organ, *Class Struggle* (*Kaikyusen*), became the *Labor News* (*Rodo Shinbun*) in about 1928.

It was around this time that Japanese Marxists began to join the American Communist Party and to participate actively in its work. At this stage, the *Labor News* moved to San Francisco, where Tatemono, Teichichi succeeded Yada as supervisor, and Post Street became more or less the headquarters of the Japanese division of the American Communist Party. I remained in Los Angeles and had no further association with that group.

In about 1929, I joined the Proletarian Art Society and the Japanese branch of the Red Relief Association (both organizations affiliated with the Japanese division of the Oriental People's Section of the American Communist Party). I lectured to the former on the history of fine arts, edited its magazine, and arranged exhibitions, while for the latter I helped collect money to aid Communists arrested by the authorities. When almost all the delegates to the party convention held in Los Angeles in 1930 were arrested, including seven Japanese who were served deportation notices, Hamakiyo, Yabe and I managed to gain asylum for our seven countrymen in the Soviet Union.

Toward the end of the 1930, I was visited in Los Angeles by a Communist named Yano who had just returned from Moscow with orders from the Comintern to build up an organization in the United States. Yano was on intimate terms with Sam Darcy, the organizer for District 13 (California). I kept in touch with him and in the autumn of 1931, he encouraged me to join the Communist Party. I objected on the ground that my previous record was sufficient reason for not doing so, but he said that I should be registered with the party, and that membership would facilitate my activities. I then agreed to join and assumed the party alias of Joe. Since I was not in good health, I was excused from party meetings and a number of other activities. My chief tasks were to study the distribution of Japanese farm workers and to analyze Chinese problems with the assistance of a party member named Yamada.

Though I went to assist the strikers when Yano informed me of the labor dispute at the Japanese-American News (*Nichibel Shimbunsha*) in San Francisco in about May 1933, my work was mainly invisible.

Question 4: Describe your current relations with the American Communist Party.

Answer: I do not think I am a member of the American Communist Party now. I said last time that Yano and a certain Caucasian approached me on the question of my returning to Japan toward the close of 1932. On that occasion, the Caucasian requested that I return within a month or so to the United States, my place of residence, which meant that I was being sent to Japan as a United States Communist Party member. He told me to contact Roy, a party member in Los Angeles whom I had known personally for some time.

Although I had consented to return to Japan, I continued to help strikers and roam about in search of suitable subjects for paintings. Roy urged me repeatedly to sail at an early date, and one day in September 1933, Yano and Roy called on me and informed me that I was to leave immediately. I embarked around the beginning of October with instructions from Roy to return in about a month, or 3 months at the latest. I left my baggage behind because I did not expect to be away for very long.

According to Mrs. Kitabayashi, Roy called on her and her husband several times after my departure to inquire about my whereabouts and my activities.

I believe he assumed that I was postponing my return indefinitely in order to engage in activities in Japan and arranged to have my name stricken from the register of the American Communist Party.

Question 5: The accused will describe his relations with the Comintern.

Answer: When I joined the United States Communist Party (i. e., the American branch of the Comintern) at Yano's request, I did not go through the usual formality of submitting a signed application; I entrusted all the details to Yano. Since he maintained direct contact with the Comintern as the party organizer in the United States, I am certain that he registered me with the Comintern under the alias of Joe, shortly after I gave him my acceptance. Since I have been engaged in espionage work for the Comintern as a member of the Sorge ring since my return to Japan, I believe my registration is still effective and that I am a member of the Comintern intelligence department.

Question 6: Were you given travel expenses and operating funds before you sailed for Japan?

Answer: Roy gave me \$200 to cover travel expenses just before my departure. In addition, he handed me a dollar bill which I was to use in contacting an agent in Japan. He told me that the other man, to whom I was to present the bill, would have in his possession a similar bill bearing a successive serial number. I carried it the first time I met Sorge, but we did not bother to make the comparison.

In describing further the Communist Party of the United States, Miyagi had this to say:

The headquarters of district 13 of the United States Communist Party, the California branch, is in San Francisco (organized by Levin Owen). Party organizations have been established in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Berkeley, Oakland, Sacramento, Fresno, San Jose, San Pedro, and other cities. Subordinate to the party organization are such unions, people's groups, and youth societies as the following:

1. Workers International Relief.
2. Friends of the Soviet Union.
3. Anti-Imperialist League.
4. Young Pioneers of America.
5. Young Communist League of America.
6. International Labor Defense League.
7. Marine Workers Industrial Union.
8. Trade Union Unity League.

Inasmuch as these organizations, as is the case the world over, are subject to Comintern policy and direction, I shall not discuss their activities.

Further, he stated:

Participation by Japanese in party activities.

Here he names several Japanese prominent in the Communist Party in the 1920's.

Then, the last I shall read in this interrogation is what occurred, according to his deposition, in 1930:

In this year, there were fresh developments in the party movement, the result of orders from American party headquarters calling for a new program of expansion and solidification and a more vigorous policy toward the masses. (Sam Darcy was made the organizer of district 13, the California branch.) In California, the party launched a campaign in the rural communities to enlist farm workers (particularly seasonal farm labor), sought to organize the marine workers, and work to strengthen the Young Communists League and Young Pioneers.

The Japanese division was absorbed by the Oriental Peoples Section and given the new mission of cooperating with the Chinese and Filipino membership. In 1930 the Japanese division adopted the popularization of the party as its watchword and embarked upon a concrete program designed to organize farm and fishery workers. It fostered strikes in the Imperial Valley against such large capital concerns as the Gerard Co. and the Sun Fruit Co. and agitated among the fishermen and fishing industry workers in San Pedro. (Except in

isolated cases, these efforts ended in dismal failure because of the firm intervention of the authorities.)

A movement was also started to boycott Japanese celebrities visiting Los Angeles, specifically Bunji Suzuki, Totsudo Kato, Toyohiko Kagawa, Tenko Nishida, Tokuzo Asahara, Shunji Tahara, Ki Kimura, and Deuo Oyama. (By arrangement with local Foreign Office officials and Japanese-language papers, these so-called celebrities made it a practice to defray their traveling expenses by charging admission to lectures at which they ostensibly enlightened the audience on the Japanese situation. To give a few examples, Bunji Suzuki collected several thousand dollars for three lectures delivered in Los Angeles while he was en route to an international labor conference, and Totsudo Kato and Toyohiko Kagawa each took from \$20,000 to \$30,000 from needy Japanese immigrants during a week of religious lecturing. These meetings were nothing but a cheap fraud.) Meanwhile, party members began campaigning on the streets.

The expansion of the party's sphere of activity to the streets merits praise in that it attracted public attention, but it was not without its adverse effects, one of the most noteworthy being the aggravation of the hostility of the local Japanese community toward the party. This blunder may be traced to lack of caution in evaluating the Japanese mind and the predominant position occupied by the traditional Japanese spirit.

As party activity started to get into full swing in May and June of 1930, the repressive hand of the American authorities tightened. In a mass arrest staged during a meeting of the Los Angeles branch in Long Beach, Comrades Hakomori, Fukunaga, Nishimura, Miyagi (Yosaburo), Nagahama, Shima, Matayoshi, Yoshio, and Teraya were taken into custody, and the Japanese division, deprived of its leading members, was brought to the verge of collapse.

General WILLOUGHBY. May I raise a question, sir?

I take it, Mr. TAVENNER, that you established by these quotations that a bona fide member of the American Communist Party who was a Japanese linguist was requested by Sorge, and he got him as a push-button request in such organization, and this man has been identified as a member of the American Communist Party from district 13, the California branch.

Mr. VELLER. Do you have any information as to where Miyagi Yotoku is now?

General WILLOUGHBY. My recollection is he died of illness, either in prison or shortly after our political amnesty in 1945.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think he died in prison.

General WILLOUGHBY. He was tubercular, I believe.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is right.

General WILLOUGHBY. I read this many months ago.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, to return to other members of the Japanese group, it would appear from Sorge's statement that other than the three individuals who he was advised would be available in Tokyo when he arrived there, the rest of his Japanese group was recruited in Tokyo by Sorge?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether that is the way in which Guenther Stein was recruited into the organization?

General WILLOUGHBY. It was.

Mr. TAVENNER. What does the record disclose as to the extent of Guenther Stein's activities in Sorge's Japanese group?

General WILLOUGHBY. That is a very interesting figure, this Guenther Stein. I would prefer to read the summation of the three American lawyers who passed on this documentation, although the documentation, meaning statements to the court, on the subject of

Guenther Stein, are also in your possession. This is a matter of preserving the time of the committee. This is what the record says:

Guenther Stein, special correspondent for a London newspaper, was a regular member of the Sorge spy ring. A notebook confiscated from Sorge listed six members of this ring, together with their aliases, and Stein was listed among the six. An intercepted radio message to Moscow referred to his code name. There is testimony by Max Klausen and Sorge that Klausen, a wireless operator specialist, erected a wireless transmission set in Stein's residence to forward reports to Russia. Stein not only was living on the premises at the time, but gave his consent. Being a correspondent for a reputable English newspaper, he had various contacts which permitted him to secure valuable information. This information, passed on to Sorge, was forwarded to Russia. Stein also acted as a courier for Sorge and carried photographs and microfilm to Shanghai where they were delivered to a liaison agent from Moscow at the Metropole Hotel. On one occasion Stein was instructed to, and did bring back from Shanghai a smoking pipe of extraordinary design, a woman's shawl, and a brooch. These items, given to him by a liaison agent from Moscow, were later used by Anna Klausen for identification purposes when she was sent to Shanghai in 1937-38 to deliver 20 to 30 rolls of film to the Moscow agent.

These are high lights. Each of the entries I have read is supported by a direct reference to a sworn statement in the course of the court interrogation.

I will add to this, again to link Stein with yesterday, as it were: When the original report was published in 1949, and prior to the protestation by Agnes Smedley, Guenther Stein disappeared. In other words, not knowing exactly what the outcome or implication of this report might be on either the public or official action, he felt it prudent to vanish.

Personally, I would be interested in how fast one can vanish. Apparently he procured both passport and transportation facilities to Europe in 24 hours, something which I challenge anyone of legitimate purposes and identification to accomplish.

Then he was not heard from for a couple years, until he got himself arrested by the French Police, Sûreté Nationale, for espionage. He later went to Poland, where he holds citizenship.

Here you have the case of a man who disappears to Europe and gets himself arrested once more for doing business at the same old stand; namely, espionage.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did he leave Japan prior to the breaking of the Sorge case?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, he left, prudently, prior to the breaking of this case.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did the procurator in Japan state that if he had remained in Japan he would have been indicted?

General WILLOUGHBY. He did.

Mr. TAVENNER. I regret that we cannot go further this afternoon. It will be necessary to call you back again tomorrow.

Mr. WOOD. The committee will stand in recess until 10:30 tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 4:30 p. m. on Wednesday, August 22, 1951, an adjournment was taken until Thursday, August 23, 1951, at 10:30 a. m.)

HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

(Based on Testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa and
Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby)

THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1951

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARING

The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to adjournment at 10:45 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood (chairman), Francis E. Walter, Clyde Doyle, and Harold H. Velde (appearance as noted in transcript).

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Thomas W. Beale, Sr., assistant counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of research; John W. Carrington, clerk; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.

Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Tavenner?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to recall General Willoughby as a witness this morning.

Mr. Wood. Very well.

Mr. TAVENNER. It will facilitate the handling of the introduction of the testimony if I also have Mr. Owens, an investigator of the committee, sworn in, and introduce some of the documents through him, and then call upon the witness for his comments.

Mr. Owens, will you take the stand, please?

Mr. Wood. Raise your right hand and be sworn, please, Mr. Owens.

You do solemnly swear that the evidence you will give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. OWENS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF COURTNEY E. OWENS

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your name, please?

Mr. OWENS. Courtney E. Owens.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you hold a position with this committee?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir; I am employed as investigator.

Mr. TAVENNER. How long have you been so employed?

Mr. OWENS. Three years.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Owens, will you select consecutive exhibit No. 13 from the documents in front of you and examine it and describe to the committee its contents?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir. Consecutive exhibit 13, as compiled by G-2, Far East Command, is entitled "Foreign Affairs Yearbook, 1942." From October 1941 to October 1942, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police—

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state again the nature of the document you have before you?

Mr. OWENS. This document is entitled "Foreign Affairs Yearbook, 1942." It was compiled by the Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice, of the Japanese Government.

From October 1941 to October 1942, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police compiled the formerly undiscovered records of the Sorge spy ring. Assembled from a great mass of official notes, interrogations, and so forth, the Japanese collated this material and included it in pages 398 through 600 of their annual publication of the Foreign Affairs Yearbook. That is to say, pages 398 to 600 deal exclusively with the Japanese results of their investigations and interrogations in the Sorge spy case.

Described by the Home Ministry officials, the Japanese Home Ministry officials, as a case "which may find no parallel in the history of espionage," the undercover system of the Sorge spy ring in China and Japan sought, found, and sent to Moscow over a period of 10 years top-secret plans and policies of the Japanese Government.

We have here the full English translation of that portion of the Foreign Affairs Yearbook.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, this Foreign Affairs Yearbook of 1942 identified by you, pages 44 through 141 of the English translation, deals with the information accumulated by Sorge and other members of his ring and forwarded to Moscow. The first listing of his information is that obtained by Sorge through his connection with the German Embassy, I believe. The following paragraph precedes the information Sorge received through the German Embassy, which I will read:

In addition to the agents working under him, Sorge had a rich source of news in the German Embassy, where he enjoyed confidence and respect. Some of the information he obtained through the Embassy is listed below.

And there appears a considerable listing of material, and this is the general subject upon which General Willoughby testified early in the hearing yesterday.

Some indication of the accuracy of his information is contained in paragraphs 18 through 22, dealing with the Russian-German relations prior to the German attack on Russia on June 22, 1941.

Will you please read to the committee the messages relating to these negotiations?

Mr. OWENS (reading):

In March 1941, he was told by Ambassador Ott—

Mr. TAVENNER. When you say "he," you are referring to Sorge?

Mr. OWENS. Richard Sorge, yes. [Continuing reading:]

He was told by Ambassador Ott that Foreign Minister Matsuo's trip to Europe was being made at Hitler's invitation, and that Matsuo was authorized by the Japanese Government to give Germany certain informal guarantees.

That is the basis of one message.

In the beginning of 1941, he learned from Ambassador Ott and a special German envoy sent to Japan that the envoy's mission was to find out whether or not there was any possibility of Japan's starting a war against the Soviet Union.

In the middle of April 1941, Ambassador Ott told him that he was surprised by the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact, because German circles had been expecting a crisis between Japan and Russia. Sorge was not surprised; he had already informed the Soviet Government by radio that one of the purposes of Matsunaka's trip to Europe was to conclude a pact with Russia.

On the occasion of Hess' flight to England in May 1941, he was told at the German Embassy that Hitler intended to make peace with England and to fight Russia, and that he had sent Hess to England as a last resort. Sorge judged that, in spite of the Russo-German Nonaggression Pact, a German attack on Russia was inevitable and even imminent.

About June 20, 1941, he was told by Military Attaché "Schöbl," who was proceeding from Germany to his new post in Siam, that Germany would launch a full-scale attack on Russia about June 20; that the main effort would be directed against Moscow; and that from 170 to 190 divisions were concentrated on the border. Colonel Kretschmar informed him that 175 divisions were concentrated on the Russo-German frontier.

Mr. TAVENNER. Just a moment. Kretschmar was the German military attaché attached to the German Embassy in Tokyo?

Mr. OWENS. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then, as a result of that information, Russia learned of the impending attack by Germany on June 22, 1941.

Does that complete the messages that appear at that point?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, you referred in the course of your testimony yesterday to certain messages that were received or sent to Moscow through this Sorge ring. But, before asking you to comment upon that, I want to ask Mr. Owens to refer to page 47, where there appears an interesting message dealing with the Japanese and German policies before the war with the United States. Do you have it?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you please read it?

Mr. OWENS. It actually involves four messages. The one you had particular reference to is the last one.

Mr. TAVENNER. And I would like for you also to read the message which was referred to in the testimony of Yoshikawa, when he testified here a week or two ago, so that we have the whole picture as complete as possible before General Willoughby comments upon it.

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

In June 1941, he (Sorge) learned from the members of the German Economic Mission to Japan, Wolf "Voss" and "Spinsler," that the upshot of the German-Japanese economic discussions was that Japan would receive munitions from Germany in return for rubber and petroleum and that the two countries would collaborate in the establishment of factories in Japan.

The next message:

In the beginning of July 1941 he (Sorge) was told by Ambassador Ott and Military Attaché Kretschmar that it had been decided at a conference before the throne that Japan would push forward her policy of expansion to the south, but that, at the same time, she would prepare to declare war on Russia when the opportunity presented itself.

The third message:

In July 1941, he (Sorge) learned from Ambassador Ott, from the military attaché, and others that the Japanese armed forces were saying that they

would enter the Russian war if and when Germany captured Moscow and Leningrad and reached the Volga; that the enthusiasm of the Japanese Army and people for a Russian war was waning; that Ota had had an unproductive conversation with Tojo because the latter was not interested in military problems in the north; and that Konoye had resigned and formed a third cabinet in order to oust Matsuoaka and open the way for a new agreement with America.

The fourth message:

During July and August 1941, after receiving information concerning Japan's large-scale mobilization from Ambassador Ota and the military attaché, he came to the conclusion that there would be no war against Russia that year. His reasoning was as follows: At the end of the mobilization, approximately 30 divisions were concentrated in Manchuria. This corresponds to only one-third of the newly mobilized forces. The divisions were sent out after August 15, which means that it is too late to start a war before winter. Therefore, Japan will not fight Russia but will challenge America and England in the south.

Now, the message you have reference to, that Mr. Yoshikawa testified about, was a radio sent in the beginning of October 1941, classified "State secret." Do you desire me to read that at this time?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, if you will read it again.

Mr. OWENS (reading):

The American-Japanese talks have entered upon their final stage. In Konoye's opinion they will end successfully if Japan decreases her forces in China and French Indochina and gives up her plan of building eight naval and air bases in French Indochina. If America refuses to compromise by the middle of October, Japan will attack America, the Malay countries, Singapore, and Sumatra. She will not attack Borneo, because it is within reach of Singapore and Manila. However, there will be war only if the talks break down, and there is no doubt that Japan is doing her best to bring them to a successful conclusion even at the expense of her German ally.

That was the message that Mr. Yoshikawa testified about.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, will you care to comment upon the action of the Sorge ring and the transmission of these messages to Moscow?

Mr. WALTER. Before you go into that, may I ask the General a question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Walter.

Mr. WALTER. General, as a result of your very careful consideration of these messages, are you of the opinion that when the attack came at Pearl Harbor it came as a result of a complete understanding between Germany, Italy, and Japan?

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY— Resumed

General WILLOUGHBY. That is a very difficult question, Mr. Walter. The relationship with Italy and Germany at that time was initially directed against the Third Communist International. It was a Comintern political understanding rather than a military one, if I interpret this series of messages correctly.

The fact, however, remained that at some time during the summer, under the phraseology of these messages, the Japanese Foreign Office veered away from an open military attack against Russia. And again referring to the trend of these messages over several months, you cannot take a single one and conclusively select it. You have to follow the trend of all of them.

The trend shows that an attack via Siberia was contemplated, and certain military divisions were made ready for it.

Then public and official military opinion changed, possibly in August, and the trend toward a movement in the south became progressively apparent. When I say "progressively apparent," Sorge of course did not have any split-second service of information. He had to rely on Ozaki, who was his leg man, into the Japanese foreign office, to keep him advised. And I notice that there are time lags of 2 to 3 weeks, even. So we may assume, then, that Sorge's mission was to determine in broad terms: Are the Russians, are the Japanese, utilizing the Manchurian or Kwantung army to attack Siberia, or is the military power of Japan going to be shifted south? That is the strategic question, and that is the one that affects us immediately.

Once decided that the Japanese would move south in the direction of Indochina, Malaya, and so forth, a collision with the United States and England, of course, became inevitable. And had we known this in August or September or October, it is of course historically demonstrable that that would have been in the nature of advance warning of the war; not advance warning toward a specific date of a specific month, but the general feeling that there is going to be a collision between the Japanese Empire and ourselves.

(Representative Harold H. Velde entered the hearing room at this point.)

And it is that report or the series of reports that are reflected in this message exchange, that brought this question forward and solved it; namely, as late as October 15, Sorge positively relayed to Moscow a general statement that "it is decided to move south, and all military preparations of the Japanese Empire are to that effect for that purpose and that intent."

Now, I take advantage of Mr. Velde's entry now in an amicable point of correction. Mr. Velde's question yesterday was practically the same as yours, Mr. Walter, this morning, except that he put it in terms of Pearl Harbor. Well, Pearl Harbor is a fixed date in a fixed month. And that does not appear in the Sorge message, and it is comparatively unimportant that it did not appear. The important thing is: Is the trend of Japanese military operations in the summer of 1941 directed to the south, meaning toward collision with the United States and England, or is it directed toward the north, in other words toward Russia? That was so important to the Russians, and inferentially would have been so important to us had we known it, that the Russians did not dare to remove the divisions then stationed in Siberia and transfer them to the west front, where they were badly needed, until Sorge furnished that assurance. That is the historical interpretation on a broad basis rather than a specific-date basis.

I am not sure, Mr. Walter, if that is a satisfactory answer.

Mr. WALTER. Yes, that is exactly what I wanted.

General WILLOUGHBY. Historically we can say, without reference to December 7 or December 12, a specific date, that if we had that information in September or October that the Japanese decision was to move south, I think it would have constituted an enormous political, economic, and military warning, in which we might have gone on an alert basis or at any rate we might have been perhaps better prepared to meet the attack on the date it actually took place.

Mr. VELDE. General, where were you stationed at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

General WILLOUGHBY. I was stationed in Manila, in the same job that I have been holding for the last 13 years, namely, MacArthur's intelligence officer. So, of course, this type of information was of vital importance to us. We were the outpost of America, and we were seeking desperately every clue, every nuance of public or other reputable opinion, in order to determine how close this menace would come. And therefore it is an acute perception in these particular months of the year or period of the year 1941 that I am talking about.

Mr. VELDE. But you had no idea at that time that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor?

General WILLOUGHBY. This cannot be answered by a clear-cut "yes" or "no." We had assayed, appraised, examined the position of Japan and their potential, and we knew that some movements had taken place on the Chinese mainland. But the final decisive report, like Sorge rendered to his master, Russia—he was not available to us, you see, in anything of that quality.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, to consider further Mr. Walter's question about the notice or knowledge that Italy and Germany may have had regarding the actual plans of attack on Pearl Harbor, I may say that that question was pretty thoroughly examined, and considerable evidence introduced in regard to it, in the trial of Tojo and others, and the actual message is in existence between the Japanese foreign office and its ambassador in Italy, calling upon Mussolini for his consent and approval of war with the United States, although Pearl Harbor was not mentioned in any way in connection with the message. And the documents also show that as early as December 2, conversations between the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, with Hitler, indicated knowledge of the general plan, but no mention of Pearl Harbor.

If the committee is interested, I am pretty certain I can get the exact judgment and finding of the international military tribunal on those matters.

General WILLOUGHBY. I think Mr. Tavenner's remarks are of great importance, since he was associated with the international military tribunal in Tokyo. His work there, his superior work there, is of course well known to me as a member of the Tokyo staff. He is probably as well informed on the factors which this international tribunal searched for, as any man available at this time.

Mr. WALTER. Of course, it was more than a mere coincidence that Italy was ready to declare war the moment the attack came. That is the point. In other words, they had committed themselves to make war on the United States in advance of the actual attack made by Japan. And that was merely the signal to Italy and Germany to declare war on the United States.

General WILLOUGHBY. May I ask Mr. Tavenner on this point: That came up in the tribunal. What was their decision, their verdict, on that point?

Mr. TAVENNER. I would not undertake, I believe, to state what the verdict was, without consulting the record. I am not certain that I understood the question exactly.

General WILLOUGHBY. While I am not familiar with the European situation, since I am fairly integrated in the Far East since 1938,

I would agree with you, Mr. Walter, that the military commitments between Italy and Germany on the spot, you see, called for military action together in the European theater of war, regardless of what the Japanese might or might not do in the Far East. Actually, the Japanese did not attack Russia. As you know, they sought instead a painful neutrality, letting us fight it out alone until 5 days before the end of the war.

Mr. TAVENNER. There is no doubt but what the terms of the tripartite pact between the three nations committed all three to join in military force in the event of a war with the United States.

General WILLOUGHBY. Of a universal war? I believe that is so.

Mr. WALTER. That is exactly the thing I was directing my attention to. So that no matter which one of the three powers made the attack anywhere in the world, the others were committed at the same moment to make an attack with joint forces.

Mr. TAVENNER. And by reason of the document which was discovered, as I mentioned a moment ago, Mussolini was questioned in advance to ascertain whether or not he would abide by the terms of the agreement in the event of such a war. And my recollection is that he gave unqualified approval.

Mr. VELDE. Again, you have had a lot of experience, of course, in the intelligence field. And as far as I know, the only definite information you have that Russia knew that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked was the message of October 15 between Sorge and the Russian Government.

General WILLOUGHBY. I dislike to correct a member of this committee, of course. The message does not mention Pearl Harbor.

Mr. VELDE. I realize it does not.

General WILLOUGHBY. The message mentions that a collision with America and England had become inevitable; their move south. Now, whether they would attack Manila first or Pearl Harbor first was still in the realm of the next 8 weeks after October 15.

Mr. VELDE. Well, the question I was going to ask you, General, was on the basis of your experience in the intelligence field, and it is in the nature of an opinion. Do you, in your own mind, feel that Russia knew that an attack on Pearl Harbor or any of our other possessions or Territories was imminent?

General WILLOUGHBY. I sympathize with your query, because Pearl Harbor was such a dramatic incident. But, after all, it was only one of many war actions. The collision would take place somewhere in the Pacific once the Japanese had decided to move south.

So I go back again to the broad historical interpretation of this message, which does not mention Pearl Harbor. And I stated then that it is unimportant that it did not mention Pearl Harbor. But it mentioned the fact that they were on a political international decision that would bring them into collision with the United States. And the first target, in our opinion, then, was the Philippines.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, in answer to these various questions, have you completed your comment as to the messages?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Yoshikawa, in his testimony before this committee, made it plain that in his opinion and from his study of the records in the Sorge case and his knowledge of Japanese affairs, the

Sorge spy ring not only performed its duties as an espionage group but it also acted in, at least in one instance, a political way.

This appears, I believe, from Sorge's own confession or statement.

I do not know whether you are well enough acquainted with it on the spur of the moment to refer to it or comment on it. Suppose that I read it first, and then you may make such comment as you desire.

General WILLOUGHBY. You have your fingers on it in the document.

Mr. TAVENNER. I read from exhibit 39 a section of the Sorge confession or diary or statement, as it has been variously called, as follows. It is section E:

The political work of my group. 1. General remarks. I was strictly forbidden by Moscow to engage in any nonintelligence activity, that is, to undertake any propaganda or organized functions of a political nature.

This appears on page 24.

This ban meant that my group and I were not allowed to make the least attempt to exercise any political influence on any persons or group of persons. We obeyed it faithfully, with one exception, that we worked actively on other people to influence their opinions of Soviet national strength. It was utterly impossible not to violate a general restriction which made no special provision for such cases. If Ozaki and myself as advisers, political experts and experienced advisers, had endorsed the prevailing derogatory opinion and underestimation of Soviet strength, our positions would have been directly endangered. It was for this reason that our group took a special stand in connection with the evaluation of Soviet strength. In doing so, we did not engage in propaganda on behalf of the Soviet Union, but endeavored to teach various persons and classes of society to evaluate Soviet strength with due caution. We encouraged individuals and groups not to underestimate Russian strength and to strive for a peaceful solution of the pending Soviet-Japanese problems.

Ozaki, Voukeltch, and I maintained this attitude for a number of years. When the cry for war with the Soviet Union became urgent, in 1941, I sent an inquiry to Moscow, prompted by conversations with Ozaki, in which he expressed the belief that he could successfully exceed the limits mentioned above and influence members of his group in favor of a positive peace policy toward the Soviet Union. He was confident that if he took a strong stand against a Soviet-Japanese war in the Konoye group he could turn Japan's expansion policy south.

The inquiry was very general, outlining the possibilities of positive action by Ozaki, myself, and other members of the group. The reply was negative, not forbidding such activities outright but labeling them unnecessary.

I want you to look at that particularly, that the reply was of a negative character, not forbidding the action but labeling it as unnecessary.

With tension ever mounting over the outbreak of the Soviet-German war in 1941, I felt that it was within my authority not to interpret the reply as a clear-cut prohibition. I imported a wider and more discretionary meaning to the word "unnecessary," refusing to construe it as an explicit ban on our participation in such activities. Accordingly, I did not restrict Ozaki's positive maneuvers within the Konoye group, nor did I hesitate to work on the Germans, particularly in view of the fact that my attitude had remained unchanged over the past several years. The maneuvers that my group and I attempted were confined to the scope and the political problems described on the two preceding pages. Not one of our members exceeded this restriction, because to have done so would have been to endanger our original and principal mission. I would like to emphasize this point thoroughly. What we did was not propaganda by any means.

The foregoing instance, in which we sent an inquiry to Moscow and received a negative reply, was the only one in which I learned of maneuvers on Ozaki's part. As far as I know, he began to work on his friends actively after our discussions. The argument which he employed was briefly as follows:

"The Soviet Union has no intention whatsoever of fighting Japan, and even if Japan should invade Siberia would simply defend herself. It would be a short-sighted and mistaken view for Japan to attack Russia, since she cannot expect

to gain anything in eastern Siberia or to wrest any sizable political or economic benefits from such a war. The United States and Britain would very likely welcome such a Japanese embroilment with open arms and seize the opportunity to strike at the nation after her oil and iron reserves were depleted. Moreover, if Germany should succeed in defeating the Soviet Union, Siberia might fall into Japan's lap without her raising a finger. Should Japan aspire to further expansion elsewhere than in China, the southern area alone would be worth going into, for there Japan would find the critical resources so essential to her wartime economy, and there she would confront the true enemy blocking her bid for a place in the sun."

Ozaki worked in this way to ease the tension in 1941. Whether he attempted any other maneuvers, I do not know, but I am sure that like myself he must have disagreed at times with superficial evaluations of the Soviet strength and the prevailing tendency to underestimate the enemy. In conversation he doubtless pointed out the lesson learned at Nomenheim and emphasized Hitler's miscalculation concerning the Soviet-German war.

That is Sorge's own story, or at least as much of it as he would tell, regarding the political effort made by his group, and leading Japan to the south instead of to the north.

General WILLOUGHBY. I take it, Mr. Tavenner, you would like my professional off-the-cuff comment on the value of this maneuver, as he termed it, Ozaki's maneuver?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. I think it is very clearly put that regardless of his instructions, he permitted his right-hand man, who had exceptional facilities and an exceptional position within the highest official quarters of the Japanese Government, namely, the Foreign Office—he permitted him, he encouraged him, to exercise whatever influence he could develop toward keeping Japan from attacking Russia, and to encourage them, conversely, to move south toward a collision with England and the United States. By so doing, and Ozaki felt he was successful in it or felt confident that he could accomplish it, they of course rendered Russia, in her war situation, a tremendously vital service. The mechanics used, as you remember—that has already been developed, I believe, or is available in the files—were the intimacy of Ozaki with the Prime Minister, Konoye, and his position as a consultant of the Cabinet.

Mr. TAVENNER. This statement by Sorge also shows that the Soviet Government was fully advised of the purpose and desire of Sorge and his associates to use such a political influence.

General WILLOUGHBY. Quite.

Mr. TAVENNER. Sorge's own statement also shows that the Soviet Government in its reply was not specific and was, by its very nature, would you say, an invitation to Sorge to proceed on his own responsibility?

General WILLOUGHBY. I would concur in your view, Mr. Counsel. A tacit encouragement is the term.

Mr. TAVENNER. Earlier in the course of the hearings, you have referred to the fact that an effort was made to place information concerning the Sorge ring in the Tojo trials before the international tribunal. Do you have any further statement you desire to make in regard to that?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, Mr. Tavenner. Your intimate acquaintance, of course, with the international tribunal is an introduction to this incident which I, at least, attach considerable importance to. It is practically proof of the commitment or involvement of the Soviet

Government in this spy mechanism, because they objected strenuously and seriously to having their case introduced into the international military tribunal in Tokyo.

Mr. WALTER. May I interrupt at that point, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. Is that because this spy mechanism, as you described it, is the same sort of mechanism that the Soviet has introduced into other nations all over the world?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, indeed, Mr. Walter.

Mr. WALTER. Including our own?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. And they are reluctant or were reluctant at such a dramatic public session as the international tribunal, to have this story brought to public attention. It would embarrass them.

Mr. WALTER. In other words, these Trojan-horse tactics have been and are being employed wherever it is possible, and it has been possible to employ them?

General WILLOUGHBY. That is my affirmative belief, sir.

Mr. VELDE. General, in that connection, I think you had a little difficulty, too, in introducing this evidence or getting the evidence reported to Secretary of the Army Royall. I understand that Secretary Royall repudiated the statements contained in your report. Would you care to comment on that?

General WILLOUGHBY. With your permission, may I comment on it later? Because, at the moment, to assist the counsel, I was about to cover the story of the international tribunal. But I will be delighted to defer to your wishes, of course.

Mr. WOOD. The question will be held for the time being.

General WILLOUGHBY. We will return to it, Mr. Velde. I have a definite thought on the subject.

I invite your attention, Mr. Chairman, to what is our exhibit No. 17. And the title is "The Sorge Case Before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East"—about as public a setting as could conceivably be devised. And the reaction to our proposal, meaning the tribunal proposal, is very significant, in my opinion.

Mr. Cunningham, one of the lawyers on the defense panel, attempted to introduce the Sorge espionage case (see case file No. 88456). In a record of 13 pages, there is a picture of an argument between Mr. Cunningham and the Russian General Vasiliev, a member of the court, on question of evidence.

Mr. WALTER. When was that, General?

Mr. TAVENNER. It was in September 1947.

And may I make a correction? General Vasiliev was the Russian prosecutor; not a member of the court. He was not a judge on the tribunal.

General WILLOUGHBY. A pertinent correction, sir.

Vasiliev entered 15 separate objections in keeping Mr. Cunningham's material out of the record. The Russian evidently could not afford to get this material in evidence. Mr. Cunningham would have brought out that Sorge worked for the Soviet Government.

Of course, this Russian high-ranking official would react as he did. But the inferential significance of this maneuver is that they just couldn't afford to bring this story out in their connection, which this committee has already clarified, namely, Sorge working for the fourth

bureau of the Soviet Red army. So they squelched or killed the attempt to introduce it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Owens, will you examine part 15 of the Foreign Affairs Year Book of 1942, pages 185 to 208, where there appears the notes or confession by Sorge as reported in that document?

On pages 201 and 202, a reference is made by Sorge to forged passports. We have at various times in this committee, in fact on many occasions, had testimony relating to forged passports, and this committee has made every effort to discover the sources of these frauds and how they have been set up. I would like you to read what Sorge says about fraudulent passports.

Mr. OWENS Yes. [Reading:]

When I went to the Soviet Union via the United States from Japan in 1935, the Communist Party contact man in New York gave me a forged passport. I used it to go to Moscow and destroyed it in Holland on my return trip. I used a forged passport because I did not want my real passport to show that I had been in Soviet Russia. Prior to that, when returning to Moscow from Scandinavia, I had also used a forged Scandinavian passport. In neither of these cases did I forge the passport; contact men gave them to me. I do not know, therefore, whether or not there is a special section in the Comintern which makes forged passports.

I used my real passport twice to go to Moscow; once when I first went there from Germany in 1924, and once when I returned from China via Siberia in 1933.

The passport I received in the United States was not new. It was an old one that had belonged to someone, but it bore my picture and description. The nationality was given as Austrian and the name was long and outlandish; I have forgotten it now. An Austrian visa had been stamped on it, so all I had to do in Paris was to get Czechoslovakian, Polish, and Russian visas. I had to go through the regular procedure just like any other traveler; I was not given any special privileges when I went to apply for my entrance and exit visas at the Soviet consulate.

When I was buying a ticket at a steamship office preparatory to going to Europe with the forged passport, I found that I had forgotten the outlandish name on it and had to take it out of my pocket to refresh my memory.

When I was leaving New York I had a suit tailored, giving the tailor my real name, and on my return trip I went to the same tailor and gave him the name in the forged passport. The tailor remembered me and noted that my name was different, but he was not interested in the change and made the suit for me. People in the United States do not think it strange if the same man uses two different names.

In this respect, the British are rather strict and their passport inspection is thorough. It is said that England knows more about spies than any other nation in Europe, but I am not in a position to make a definite statement, because I have made no special study of the subject.

I shall give an illustration of how loosely everything is done in the United States. I did not pay my exit tax and forgot to get a stamped receipt when I went on board the ship for Europe. Just as the ship was about to sail, a customs officer found out about it, and it looked as though he were going to take me off the ship, but I slipped him \$50, and the matter was dropped at once. Things are very flexible in the United States.

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words, according to Sorge's own statement, there must exist in this country a fraudulent passport mill from which he would receive the necessary assistance to accomplish his purpose.

Mr. OWENS. It would appear so.

Mr. TAVENNER. Since you have now gone into the subject of Sorge's itinerary through the United States, I would like at this time to present the results of the interrogation as to other experiences which Sorge had in the United States. I believe, Mr. Chairman, it will

facilitate matters if I were to attempt to read these excerpts, rather than to do it through question-and-answer form to the witness.

We have taken from the exhibits produced by General Willoughby, or rather through General Willoughby, an interrogation of December 21, 1941, of Sorge.

Question: Continue from where you stopped yesterday to your description of your mission to Japan.

Answer: As I stated yesterday, I left Moscow and went to Berlin. On July 14 or 15 I departed from Berlin for Paris, where, as previously arranged, I registered at the Neua Hotel. On the following day a contact man called me at the hotel, told me that a certain Voukelitch was already living in Tokyo in a large apartment house, and told me the passwords I was to use when meeting him. I might add here that back in Berlin I had been notified that a man was already in Tokyo. Voukelitch was that man.

The contact man instructed me to register at the Lincoln Hotel, East Forty-second Street, New York City. I stayed 4 or 5 days in Paris, sailed from Southampton, France, around August 1, 1933, arrived in New York—

apparently he has the geography mixed a little—

in about 5 days, registered at the Lincoln Hotel, and saw a contact man, who instructed me to meet a certain employee of the Washington Post at the Chicago World's Fair.

I spent around 8 days in New York, around 3 days in Washington, D. C., and around 4 days in Chicago. I met the man from the Washington Post in Chicago at the fairgrounds on the shore of Lake Michigan and he informed me that a certain Japanese would soon return to Japan, and told me how to get in touch with him.

I would like to turn to the interrogation of Miyagi also taken from the exhibits produced here, in which this question was asked:

Question 10. The accused will describe the circumstances leading to his participation in espionage activities.

Answer. As I have told the police officer during his investigation, Yano and a Comintern agent, a Caucasian, whose nationality I did not know, came from San Francisco to Los Angeles to see me sometime around the end of 1932, told me to return to Tokyo, said that I would learn the nature of my work when I got there. They said I should be back in about a month. I left America in about September 1933, and arrived in Yokohama in about the end of October. Using the method in which I had been coached by Yano, I was able to contact Sorge around the end of November.

Then, continuing again with Sorge's statement:

In December 1933 I called at the office of the Japan Advertiser, and as instructed by the American contact man inserted an ad in the Japan Advertiser and the Pan Pacific, its weekly publication, to the effect that I was collecting Yukdoi and books on art and wanted interested persons to reply to the Japan Advertiser. I ran the ad twice for several days in a row, called at the office of the Advertiser to pick up the replies, had Voukelitch arrange a meeting with our man, and finally met Miyagi at the Yuna Art Museum and brought him into the group.

General Willoughby, in the course of your investigation, did any knowledge come to your attention as to the identity of this person referred to as an employee of the Washington Post, who gave instructions to Sorge as to how he was to contact the Japanese in Japan?

General Willoughby. No, sir; it is one of those cases where there is reference in the files, in the records, to individuals whose identities, in spite of our efforts subsequently, were not identified by us—meaning Tokyo. It is one of those points of which we have been officially apprehensive, in the sense that there was at no time a desire to embarrass people who are associated with these agencies, these subversive

agencies, by accident or physical location. And we have leaned over backward, and I will continue to do so here within my limitations, to protect individuals whose appearance may have been accidental. When, however, the evidence is positive, then of course we made an effort to develop this clue or lead, in police language, further.

In general terms, I believe it is the sense of this committee, too, that that protective distinction is made wherever possible, and regardless of what the files really show. After all, the Shanghai police files are just that. They are not an arraignment. They are a series of reports that we have attempted to piece together. We found astonishing coincidences here and there. And in many cases we have drawn a blank. In that case we will give the individual the benefit of the doubt.

Mr. TAVENNER. But as to this matter, this is not a matter relating to the Shanghai police files. It is a matter that appears from Sorge's own confession or statement.

General WILLOUGHBY. Your point is well taken, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. WOOD. But at the same time, as I understand from your statement, General, you have been unable to so far obtain sufficient data on the identity of this individual.

General WILLOUGHBY. In this particular case, sir.

Mr. WOOD. Sufficient to venture a statement as to who he was.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, you were not present, but Mr. Yoshikawa testified before this committee several weeks ago that he had endeavored to ascertain from Sorge the identity of this individual but had been unsuccessful in doing so. So the matter had been brought directly to Sorge's attention, as to the identity.

Mr. WOOD. For what reason had he been unable to do so? Because Sorge refused to give him the information, or professed he did not know a man by that name?

Mr. TAVENNER. My recollection is that a police officer by the name of Ohashe obtained this information, and that the witness who appeared here directed him to go back and ascertain the identity of the individual. And as far as the witness was able to go, we must say he had been unable to get it. The record is not clear as to whether Sorge failed in his memory to identify the individual or whether he would not disclose his identity. The record is not clear on that. There is no record on that subject, and that is really what I mean to say.

Mr. OWENS, will you turn again to the Foreign Affairs Year Book of 1942, part 16, which contains the confession or statement of Max Klausen, who was Sorge's radio operator in Tokyo? The portion of Klausen's notes dealing with his first experiences in Shanghai?

Mr. WOOD. Before going into that, Mr. Counsel, I would like for the record to have it appear at this point that all facilities available to this committee have been utilized and exhausted to determine the identity of this person. And so far this committee has been unable to proceed further with it than the information here disclosed.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. OWENS, the portion of Klausen's notes dealing with his first experiences in Shanghai contains an interesting reference to an American citizen. Will you examine that and read it to the committee?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

* * * Around July 1929, as I was about to leave for Harbin, Miss Reb Bennett, whom I shall discuss later, arrived in town. I believe she came to Shanghai from the United States. Lehmann taught her how to encode and decipher messages, and after I returned from Harbin she gave me messages to be transmitted and I gave her incoming messages. She left Shanghai for Moscow via Dairen and Siberia around November. To the best of my knowledge, she was a member of the American Communist Party; I believe that she had been ordered by the party to proceed to Moscow and that she stopped at Shanghai to assist Lehmann. She was about 25 years old, about 5 feet 5 inches tall, of medium stature, and beautiful despite a large nose * * *

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the name, please?

Mr. OWENS. Reb Bennett.

Mr. TAVENNER. A portion of Klausen's notes deals with the 6 weeks that he spent in Harbin in July of 1929 on a mission to set up a wireless set for the Harbin Intelligence group, headed by Gloemberg-Ott.

Will you relate to the committee what Max Klausen writes about his experiences in Harbin on this particular mission?

Mr. OWENS (reading):

Nothing in particular happened on the trip to Harbin. The water police merely inspected our passports before we landed in Dairen. Like any other traveler, I bought a second-class ticket, boarded a train for Changchun (the present Hsinking), changed trains at Changchun carrying two suitcases containing spare suits and other necessities, and arrived in Harbin in the evening.

I registered at the Preston Hotel Moderne as directed by Benedict in a letter to Lehmann, met Benedict 2 days later, and took custody of the transmitter, which had been brought in by the diplomat. Soon thereafter, I moved to a lodging house near the broadcasting station.

Benedict introduced me to Gloemberg-Ott, who took me to his home, but, perhaps because his wife was a White Russian, refrained from discussing secret matters. Several days later, I accompanied Ott to a cafe operated by a White Russian and then, for the first time, he asked me to install the wireless set and gave me several hundred Harbin dollars so that I could buy parts for a receiver and defray incidental expenses.

He told me about Lilliestrom several days later. Lilliestrom was a big fat six footer about 50 years old. His house was a villa-type, two-story gray tile brick building with a large yard enclosed by a palisade. He went to work at the United States consulate from there.

Soviet-Chinese relations were rather tense at the time, with the result that the Chinese police were busily making secret inquiries into the affairs of White Russians and Russians living in China. Ott realized that the best way of escaping detection was to use the private home of the American vice consul, which was conveniently located, and that, needless to say, the easiest way of getting information was to gain Lilliestrom's confidence. I believe it was for these reasons that he won over Lilliestrom as a sympathizer.

After spending the first 2 weeks idly with Ott and Benedict in conferences and at eating places, I went to inspect Lilliestrom's home and decided to use two rooms (both were vacant; one was about an eight-foot room) on the second floor, one as a wireless operating room and the other as a technician's room. I bought an antenna and parts to transform a receiver into a short-wave set—

Mr. WALTER. Does the record show when that was, Mr. Owens?

Mr. OWENS. 1929 (continuing to read):

began installation operations, completed the work in about 2 weeks, tested the set with Wiesbaden for 2 days and delivered it to Ott * * *

Mr. TAVENNER. You referred, in the reading of those notes, to Max Klausen having received direction from Lehmann. On yesterday, General Willoughby described the Lehmann group, which was active in the promotion of Communist purposes. I will ask you to look at

page 225 of the year book and see if at that point or at some other point it fixes Max Klausen as a member of the Lehmann group.

First of all, can you establish the fact that Max Klausen became a member of the Lehmann group?

Mr. OWENS. I believe that part of his notes here will establish that.

Mr. TAVENNER. All right. Will you read it, please?

Mr. OWENS (reading):

* * * As a full-fledged member of the spy ring after my return from Harbin—

relating to the trip which I just read—

I now became its wireless technician. I still received coded messages from Lehmann and Miss Bennett and transmitted them. In contrast to the typed code messages that Sorge gave me in Tokyo, the messages I received from Lehmann and Miss Bennett were always written out in longhand. I am inclined to believe that the latter method is more accurate.

For 2 or 3 months after my return from Harbin, I used Lehmann's transmitter, but during that period I built and began to use a new Armstrong set. All of Lehmann's messages were short, consisting at the most of not more than 50-word groups. Up to the time I left for Canton, he sent a total of about 2,000 groups.

Meanwhile, I also took care of photographing documents and smuggling out the film. I photographed intelligence documents written in English or Chinese (they were typed and there were no photographs or maps) that Lehmann brought in from somewhere, working in my room with a Zeiss camera which they had previously given to me. It was postcard size (3 by 4 inches). I was able to take six documents in one roll of film. I delivered the photographs chiefly to Lehmann, but at times to Miss Bennett when so ordered by him. I suppose they sent them to Moscow through some connection.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, continuing with Max Klausen's notes, he states that in April of 1935 he returned to Shanghai, where he remained until September. He states that he was called in to department 4, where, in the presence of Sorge, "the chief of the Far East Department informed me that I was to accompany Sorge to Tokyo, and that as of that day I was assigned to the Far East."

Klausen further states that prior to proceeding to Tokyo he was authorized to rest up at Khimki.

On page 253 of the Yearbook, there appears a paragraph dealing with an association in Khimki. Would you turn to that page and read the portion that deals with the association?

Mr. OWENS. Page 253 of the Yearbook contains the following statement by Klausen, after he has dealt with having gone to Khimki to rest prior to his leaving for Tokyo. [Reading:]

I might add that at Khimki, Charlie, an American Jew, was my next door neighbor. He lived there with his wife and two children. I understood that he had served as wireless operator for a Shanghai espionage group for about a year around 1934. He was around 40 years of age, stood around 5 foot 6, and had dark hair; his only distinguishing feature was a big nose. I heard that before going to Shanghai he had operated a fair-sized amateur radio station in the United States, through which he had tried to contact the Moscow wireless school, but that his efforts, for the most part, were failures. Because of the distance between Russia and the United States, I believe that information is conveyed via the Russian Embassy rather than through radio contact.

Charlie presented me with a green buckskin belt with four pouches attached. I took it with me to Japan and used it for hiding film when I went to Shanghai on liaison missions.

Both Wefgart and my wife were friendly with Charlie and his wife. I do not know what became of them, since I left for Japan shortly thereafter, nor do I know the names of Charlie's comrades in the Shanghai espionage group.

I understood that Charlie taught foreigners at one of the branches of the wireless school, but the location of the school and the nationalities of the students were kept secret. * * *

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, do you have any comment to make upon this American identified only as "Charlie"?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir. This is an interesting case, though spotty evidence, in which a reference by one of Sorge's group fits into a collateral possibly supporting evidence in the Shanghai files. I present this merely as an incident in the technique of investigation. The conclusions are not necessarily final. But with this vague description and the coincidence of the year, the Shanghai files, in its abbreviated card index, have the following to say about Leon Minster, as follows:

Leon Minster, Russian Jew, born 1898 at Schidovo, District of Ekaterinoslav, became an American citizen in 1919. Holds passport No. 7152, of April 13, 1933, Washington, D. C.; home address: 167 Maple Street, Bridgeport, Conn., U. S. A. Arrived in Shanghai from America 17. 10. 1934, in the S. S. *General Pershing*. In November 1934 took over flat No. 6, Loriot, on a lease expiring in 1935. On December 4, 1934, rented a shop at No. 4 Voilon and started a business known as the Ellen Radio Equipment, which was established as a cover for the installation of a long-range radio transmitter. In March 1935, left for Yokohama to meet his wife, children, and his brother-in-law, Harry Kaban, who came from America in the S. S. *Empress of Canada*. They arrived in Shanghai on April 9th. Mrs. Bessie Minster is a sister of V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the People's Commissariat of the U. S. S. R. They have relatives, Robert Minster and his wife Emma, nee Kantor, who were connected with naval espionage in the United States in 1932 and were connected with Mr. and Mrs. Switz, concerned in Soviet espionage in France, in 1934. Minster left for Japan on May 21, 1935, in the S. S. *Shanghai Maru*. It is definitely known that Minster was connected with a foreign Communist known as Joseph Walden, who was arrested by the municipal police on May 5, 1934. The connection there is in Klausen's sworn statement, referring to this code name "Charlie."

I understood that he had served as wireless operator for a Shanghai espionage group for years around 1934. In Shanghai he had operated a fair-sized amateur radio station, and so forth, which fits the Ellen Radio Equipment Shop, which is set up and which the Shanghai police classifies as "no doubt established as a cover for the installation of a long-distance radio-transmitting station."

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, this is a convenient place for a break, if you have completed your answer, General.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; I have completed it.

I believe you have some collateral reference to Switz and to the Kantors on naval espionage in 1932; also, the Switz in Soviet espionage in France in 1934, in your own record.

Mr. WALTER. Where was this naval espionage in 1932?

General WILLOUGHBY. That I don't know, Mr. Walter. I felt that possibly the committee had better American references than I had in Tokyo.

I recall personally from reading the current newspaper at the time that this couple, Mr. and Mrs. Switz, were picked up in France in 1934, and we had some trouble in getting them out of there, and the naval espionage case centers around Robert Minster and his wife, Kantor. That is as far as I know.

The Shanghai police, of course, picks up that kind of juicy collateral information and records it. I presume it could be determined by further research.

Mr. TAVENNER. We have information on the subject, General Willoughby, but it is executive session testimony.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

I am prepared to answer Mr. Velde's question, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. TAVENNER. Due to another appointment that we have here in just 10 or 12 minutes, I believe that we had better wait until this afternoon for that.

Mr. WOOD. We will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. WOOD. Are you ready to proceed?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOOD. Let the committee be in order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY—
Resumed

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, during the course of your testimony you have brought out various facts relating to the association of Agnes Smedley with Sorge and other members of the Sorge ring. I think it would be well if I make as a part of the record of this hearing some of the actual interrogations of members of the ring with relation to Agnes Smedley's participation. Rather than burden you with the reading of it, I will refer to these items myself.

In the interrogation of Ozaki on March 5, 1942, we find the following:

Question. Now describe your relationship with Agnes Smedley.

That is, Ozaki's relationship with Agnes Smedley.

ANSWER. I began to pay occasional visits to the Zeitgeist Bookstore on Soochow Creek around the summer of 1929, became friendly with Mrs. Wiedemeyer, the manager of the store, and through her met Agnes Smedley around the end of 1929 or the beginning of 1930. Smedley, the Shanghai correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung and a well-known American writer, was contributing many articles to the American leftist magazine New Masses at that time. She also worked on behalf of the International Relief Society in Shanghai and devoted a great deal of time to the famous Noulens incident.

Through Mrs. Wiedemeyer, I met Smedley for the first time at her residence in the British Settlement, and at her request agreed to exchange information with her. At the time, we traded information mainly as newspaper reporters, but the fact that both of us inclined toward the left caused our conversations to tend in the direction of exposures of internal conditions in the Kuomintang. Not only did my relationship with Smedley continue after this, but it was she who brought about the establishment of my contact with Sorge.

Question. Describe the circumstances surrounding your affiliation with Sorge's espionage ring.

ANSWER. A man named Kito, Ginichi, began to come to see me around October or November 1930. He was connected with the American Communist Party and had come to Shanghai from the United States via Andam to engage in espionage activities. Soon after I became acquainted with him, he urged me to meet an American newspaperman named Johnson, but I did not yet trust him completely and felt that it might be dangerous to do so. I thought that I could find out about Johnson from Agnes Smedley; so I got in touch with her and told her what had happened. She looked extremely grave and asked whether I had discussed the matter with anyone else, to which I replied that I had not. She then said that she had heard of him but warned me strongly against mentioning the subject to anyone else. Shortly thereafter I met her again, and she told me that Johnson was a fine man; said that she herself would introduce me to him. She took me to a certain Chinese restaurant on Nanking Road and there presented me to the foreigner. This man who called himself "Johnson" was Richard Sorge.

Sorge asked me at that meeting to give him (1) the data on the internal situation in China which I was able to gather as a Japanese newspaperman and (2) information on the local application of Japan's China policy, and I agreed to cooperate in his espionage activities by doing so. Since I had originally been approached by Kito, Ginichi, a member of the United States Communist Party, and since I had been introduced by Smedley, an internationally famous leftist writer, I guessed at once that Sorge was a functionary of the International Communist Party engaged in espionage activities. My reason for deciding to cooperate with him was that, as I have stated, I believed in communism and had decided to become active as a Communist; I felt that I would be doing something of real importance by assisting Sorge in espionage work on behalf of the Comintern. From then until I left Shanghai in February 1932, I got in touch with Sorge about once a month at Smedley's room in a suburban apartment on Tsing-An-Sun Road, at Chinese restaurants inside Shanghai proper, and elsewhere, to turn over information and offer suggestions.

While my first assignment was as indicated above, after the outbreak of the Manchurian incident in September 1931, I was directed to take up such problems as (1) Japan's present and future Manchurian policy; (2) the effects of Japan's Manchurian policy on her relations with the U. S., S. K., and (3) Japan's present and future China policy, and was asked for information and opinions concerning them. I prepared reports on them, but I have forgotten most of the details now.

QUESTION. Describe the composition of the Shanghai Sorge spy ring.

ANSWER. While in Shanghai, I was not in possession of detailed information concerning the nature of the group with which Sorge was operating. I knew, of course, that Smedley was working with him, but I was not clear as to whose position was the higher, although I conjectured, from the manner in which they talked to one another and from the nature of the reports which were made, that Sorge was the superior.

Smedley was the only foreigner in Sorge's group with whom I was acquainted, but I knew that he had Japanese confederates. * * *

Another interrogation of Ozaki, taken on July 21, 1942, is as follows:

QUESTION. What was your impression of Sorge?

That question, of course, was asked of Ozaki.

ANSWER. Smedley introduced him as a reporter, but I was rather dubious about that. At the outset, I was inclined to believe that he was a member of Smedley's circle and associated with the Red Relief Association—

General Willoughby, I believe you will have something to say about the Red Relief Association a little later in your testimony. [Continuing reading:]

but his connection with the investigation of the Hankow flood damage in 1931 caused me to think it possible that he held a position of considerable importance within the Comintern. I therefore assumed that he was either connected with the International Relief Society or one of the top men in the Comintern's Far East section. Judging from the fact that Smedley was extremely respectful to him, I gathered that he held a position of considerable importance in the Comintern.

Then on July 27, 1942, this question was asked Ozaki and answer given:

QUESTION. Did you investigate and report to Sorge on the new American activity in China; that is to say, on new investments by Americans in Shanghai and America's steadily increasing role in China?

ANSWER. That is correct. I recall having investigated and reported on the matter. In 1930 or 1931, a group known as the Kemmeyer Committee was endeavoring to put the Nationalist Government's maladministered finances on a solid footing, and the relationship between China and the United States was becoming increasingly intimate. I investigated the committee's activities with Smedley's help and, at times, that of members of minority groups in the Nationalist Government, and submitted information to Sorge which was quite reliable.

Continuing with the interrogation of Ozaki, we find the following answer to a question propounded on August 12, 1942. The question related to Ozaki's leftist activities involving Smedley after he himself had returned from Shanghai. This is the answer by the witness Ozaki:

In the late autumn of that year (1932), I received a message from Smedley in Shanghai which contained her Peking address and said that she wanted to meet me in Peking to discuss certain matters. On a previous occasion, Smedley had asked me to come to China and I had replied that I would be able to go during my vacation in late December. Of course, that was the reason for the above proposal to meet me in Peking. I sailed from Kobe around December 25 without notifying my employers, arrived at Peking on December 31, got a room at the Te Kuo restaurant, and at once asked Smedley to come there. It developed that, in view of the vital importance now attached to the North China problem, she wanted to establish a Sino-Japanese intelligence agency to operate in and around North China. I had kept in touch with Kawai concerning my trip to Peking, and I proposed to Smedley that he be made the keyman in the group, inasmuch as she knew him she agreed, and I took him to see her at her Peking residence, a little rented cottage within a Chinese home.

At this point I would like to leave the interrogation of Ozaki. At this point the statement is made that Kawai was previously known to Smedley, so I want to turn now to the interrogation of the defendant Kawai relating to the earlier experience. In an interrogation conducted on November 9, 1941, in answer to a question relating to the witness' participation in espionage activities, Kawai replied as follows:

During the latter part of October 1931 I was, as previously stated, receiving instructions and training as a Japanese intelligence agent under the direction of Chiang of the Chinese Communist Party, which meant that I was a frequent visitor at Chiang's home. One day Chiang told me that he had some important work for me to do, and shortly thereafter he introduced me at his home to Ozaki Hozumi, Shanghai correspondent of the Osaka Asahi, whom I knew by sight. It was then that I first learned that Ozaki and Chiang were on close terms. It struck me as strange when I heard Ozaki, in making arrangements for this important task, tell Chiang: "Chiang, you're not going."

On the following day, I met Ozaki in front of the post office on North Szechuan Road. A caucasian lady was waiting in an automobile, and Ozaki and I got in. We got out of the car directly in front of a restaurant featuring Canton-style food in the neighborhood of Nanking Road, the name of which, as I recall, was the Hsing Hsa Low, entered it, and found a tall foreigner waiting.

The gist of the conversation between the tall foreigner and myself, which was interpreted by Ozaki, was as follows:

First, he asked: "I want you to go to Manchuria from North China. Can you do it?"

I will omit several paragraphs which appear unimportant from the standpoint that we are addressing ourselves to. After agreeing to undertake the mission, Kawai says:

Concerning the foreign woman—when I contacted Funakoshi Hisao, my superior during my Shanghai days, at Tientsin around January 1934, I was told for the first time that her name was Smedley.

Then there was presented to the witness a photograph of Richard Sorge, and the question was asked:

Is this the unidentified caucasian man to whom you referred?

Answer: Yes, it is. He is the one to whom Ozaki referred as Robinson Crusoe during my Shanghai days.

Question: What do you know about the spy ring identified with Sorge and his group?

Answer: I have already stated that when embarking on these spy activities in collaboration with Ozaki Hozumi, I felt it strange that there was no connection with Chiang, the man in charge of the intelligence activities of the

Chinese Communist Party. Later on, after being introduced by Ozaki to the Caucasians Sorge and Smedley, and after working with Smedley and a Chinese in North China, I gradually realized that we were working for the International Communist Party (Comintern). Since I had already accepted communism, and since I supported the Comintern and believed in the desirability of an international Communist society, I approved of the spy organization and continued my activities in its behalf.

That is the testimony showing the connection between Kawai and Agnes Smedley prior to 1932.

Now, continuing with the testimony of Ozaki at the place I departed from the text, we continue:

We asked for the names of some persons whom he could trust absolutely, and he listed two or three, among them Kawamura, whom I knew and endorsed. I recall that I approved the others with the remark, "If you have absolute confidence in them, they are all right with me," and asked him to arrange to get all of them together without delay.

Parenthetically, I should explain that this was a conference between Smedley, Ozaki, and Kawai. [Continuing reading:]

Smedley asked me to stay until the organization was completed, but I declined on the ground that I had not told my employers about the trip and, therefore, did not have the time. On January 3 I left Tientsin for Japan.

I learned from Kawai in the summer of 1933, when he paid me another visit at my home in Inagamura, that he had rounded up two or three persons, including Kawamura, parled with Smedley, and engaged in espionage activities both in North China and in Manchuria. His reports had been submitted through a Chinese contact man, but he had lost touch with him in April or June of that year and was completely unable to resume the contact, with the result that their activities had come to a standstill and he had come to ask me to do something about it. At the time, however, my correspondence with Smedley had been cut off completely because, as was revealed later, she had gone to convalesce at a sanitarium in the Odessa area of southern Russia.

Mr. VELDE. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to ask the general a question.

Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde.

Mr. VELDE. In view of the evidence that has been produced by you and sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, concerning the connections of Agnes Smedley with Soviet Russia, it is a little difficult for me to see why Secretary Royall would repudiate the statements made in your report, General. Can you explain that?

General WILLOUGHBY. Mr. Velde, in a public broadcast on February 21, 1949, I objected to what might be termed an inferential repudiation by the Secretary. It might be said that I had a grievance then, in 1949, but I feel differently today, in 1951. World events have moved so rapidly, this Red menace confronts all of us. I am reluctant to revive what might be termed interdepartmental wrangling, and I am prepared to absolve the Secretary with my pontifical blessing.

Mr. VELDE. I would like at this point in the record to read an article that was written by a former statesman, now a columnist, Harold L. Ickes. It is dated March 16, 1949, and captioned "Army tricks cover general's mistakes." He says:

The nonchalance with which a high-ranking, shoulder-shrugging Army officer smear a private citizen is truly alarming. I refer, of course, to the report given out recently by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, who is chief of G-2 on General MacArthur's staff in Tokyo. This report, handed out "inadvertently," to quote Kenneth Royall, Secretary of the Army, charged that "Agnes Smedley (a native-born American citizen) is a spy and agent of the Soviet Government," still "at large." No facts; no opportunity to be heard; no right to cross-examine witnesses on charges that came unexpectedly hurtling through the air

against a woman who denied them specifically and categorically and at once demanded a retraction. Secretary Royall, on the Meet the Press broadcast on February 25, when questioned about this Tokyo spy report, said that it was an "inadvertence." Except for this, he side-stepped questions relating to the incident. Was it an "inadvertence" in the sense that Miss Smedley was unjustly charged? If so, common decency, as well as official responsibility, would seem to call for an explanation and something by way of an apology. After all, neither a Secretary of the Army, nor a high-ranking Army officer, should be allowed to get away with what, as a matter of fact, is a cowardly act.

Do you feel that Mr. Ickes, or any of the others who wrote along similar lines, had any influence on Secretary Royall in making him retract the report that you made?

General WILLOUGHBY. Mr. Velde, while I was very anxious to make fraternal concessions to a former Secretary of the Army, I am by no means prepared to acquiesce silently in Mr. Ickes' classification of the work of Tokyo intelligence regarding Miss Smedley. In fact, while you have made perfect extracts in your quotation, may I be permitted to add another comment by this writer, referring to me, namely:

The nonchalance with which a high-ranking Army officer can smear a private-citizen is truly alarming. * * *

No one who knows Miss Smedley would ever suspect that this courageous and intelligent American citizen has stooped to be so low as to be a spy for any country—even for her own, to which she is deeply attached.

I presume the attachment of Miss Smedley is made in comparison to my own of 41 years of service, not without honor. He continues:

And who is this gallant soldier—

referring to your witness—

wearing two stars, who, without producing a scintilla of evidence, charges an American woman with being "a spy and agent of the Soviet Government" * * *.

And so forth, and so forth.

This fine flowering of American journalism is a classical example of reportorial Communist labor. Indeed, as I look upon my research, I am appalled at the thought of turning out a piece every 24 hours. I think this effusion has been amply refuted by Miss Smedley herself—may she rest in peace—by leaving her ashes to Chu-Teh, commander in chief of the Chinese Communist army with which the United States is now engaged in war in North Korea, and having her ashes placed, in a ceremonial gathering of the highest Communist hierarchy, in a special shrine in Peiping, the heartland of Asiatic communism.

However, if Mr. Ickes raised a historical question as to "No one who knows Miss Smedley would ever suspect that this courageous and intelligent American citizen has stooped to be so low as to be a spy," I would like to cite to this committee a letter by Harold L. Ickes, then Secretary of the Interior, to Robert Morss Lovett, dated April 25, 1941, on the subject of the League of American Writers:

The League is generally regarded as a Communist subsidiary. Its policies, of course, always parallel those of the Communist Party.

That letter was signed by Harold L. Ickes, who apparently was aware at that time, April 25, 1941, that Smedley served on the staff of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, the forerunner of the League of American Writers quoted in this inquiry by Mr. Lovett.

Mr. Lokes' memory evidently failed in the period 1941 to 1949; it lapsed, with which I am to some degree in sympathy in view of my own growing age.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, I believe you testified before another congressional committee regarding certain documentation affecting Agnes Smedley.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I do not want to repeat any testimony that you have heretofore given, unless it is absolutely necessary in our hearing, but I believe in connection with that you prepared a separate documentation entitled "Smedley and Associates: 1918-48."

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have it before me, and it is rather long, it is 17 pages in length, and I am inclined to offer it as an exhibit rather than ask you to read it, and make it a part of the hearing record. I introduce it in evidence and ask that it be marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 40."

Mr. WOOD. Is that for reference?

Mr. TAVENNER. No, sir, that is introduction in evidence, and to be made a part of the record.

Mr. WOOD. Very well. It is so ordered.

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 40," is as follows:)

WILLOUGHBY EXHIBIT No. 40
SMEDLEY AND ASSOCIATES: 1918-48

The Truth and Agnes Smedley

Smedley was not juridically charged with anything. No one suggested trial or prosecution. G-2 Tokyo merely reported Smedley's historical association with a Soviet espionage ring and filed proof. Testimony of living eyewitnesses was available. Collateral sources and court records were listed and officially filed in photostat copies. A bibliography appended to the original report was significantly or inadvertently omitted from the Army release; it would have convinced the average reader that ample, numerous documentary evidence was, in fact, available; it might even have convinced the Department of the Army Public Information Chief or made him pause in his bland but meaningless generalizations.

There is nothing in Smedley's career to justify or explain the Army's strange repudiation of one of its faithful henchmen. In simplest terms—if the public were really that naïve—the argument boils down to whom to believe! On this fascinating theme, Plain Talk found it necessary to editorialize and Congressman Judd considered the editorial appropriate for full insert into the Congressional Record.

Under the circumstances, one can hardly ignore a revealing bit of character tendency which Agnes Smedley herself admits with disarming frankness:

"* * * * It has been one of the greatest struggles in my life to learn to tell the truth. To tell something not quite true became almost an instinct. * * *"

This trend, if congenital, is also one of the most useful attributes of the clandestine fraternity and will have to be acquired by the undercover operator or espionage agent, in order to survive; it explains, in part, Smedley's smooth integration into all sorts of international intrigues.

Chronological organization of facts in Smedley's career show that throughout her adult life, she has thrown in her lot with social and political revolutionaries.

There is no specific evidence of Smedley's membership in the American Communist Party and she repeatedly denied it; however, her own writings contradict her habitual denials of Communist affiliations, the customary protective screen expected to be used by an experienced political agitator.

The Sorge report and Smedley's protestations

Agnes Smedley has dedicated her life to the political and geographical advancement of communism in China. It is one of the vagaries of Americana that this woman, born in the heartland of the United States, in Missouri, should have cast her lot with Mongoloid-Panslavism in the remote and alien Far East. Her intellectual evolution is an interesting "case history" of the development of a party worker and fellow traveler.

Life, in its issue of January 15, 1948, has published a brilliant and incisive essay that is like a flashlight beam in a darkened room: "Portrait of an American Communist" (with the disarming party name of "Kelly"). Agnes Smedley's career is more dramatic, more significant and colorful than Kelly's. As regards her public protests, coupled with the threat of a personal libel suit against MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence, it was inevitable that a noisy and highly publicized attempt at defense would be made because the issues accentuate the sinister ramifications of American communism in the international field, already brilliantly exposed by congressional investigations, particularly the House Un-American Activities Committee inquiry into the Whitaker Chambers case.

The fanatical beliefs of Communist converts permit no moral obligation to the State where they were born nor a grateful recognition of the civic protection and advantages they enjoy. Their ability to secure professional legal services, on call, is an index of the high moral order of American civilization, but it is also a symptom of the cynical arrogance of these ideological renegades, who are ceaselessly busy, termite-like, in destroying the foundations of the very order to which they scurry for legal shelter when the storm begins.

In the case of Agnes Smedley, her attorney is a former Assistant Attorney General, O. John Rogge, whose connection with the Department of Justice was abruptly severed. It is highly suggestive that Rogge demanded an end to the New York grand jury investigations into Soviet espionage activities. It is equally significant that he promptly appeared as the attorney of Anna Louise Strong.

Agnes Smedley has been one of the most active workers for the Communist cause in China for the past twenty-odd years. In her third book, *China Fights Back*, the dedication is "to my beloved brothers and comrades, the heroic dead and the unconquerable living of the Eighth Route Army of China" (the Chinese Red Communist army). This partisan vein runs through all her Chinese reports, revealing her as definite propagandist for the Chinese Communist Party, then with headquarters at Yenan.

Press reports from the United States have hinted at a link between Whitaker Chambers and Soviet espionage in the Far East in furnishing agents for Japan in the Sorge period. It is noteworthy that Whitaker Chambers served on the 1932 staff of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, in which Miss Smedley also served in 1933. The IURW was founded in Moscow, is Soviet dominated, and held its second conference in Kharkov, November 15, 1930.

Miss Smedley has also served on the staff of the League of American Writers, an offshoot of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers. This league is classified by the United States Attorney General as communistic, and is cited in the House record of the Seventy-ninth Congress.

The second report of the Joint Fact-Finding Committee for the fifty-sixth California Legislature, Sacramento, Calif., lists Miss Smedley as a member of the National Council of the League of American Writers, an affiliate of the IURW. This league was established at the First American Writers' Congress in New York; the committee reported on this congress thus (pp. 121-122):

"The committee is in possession of a photostatic copy of the proceedings of the First American Writers' Congress. The most naive spectator and quarter-witted participant of this first writers' congress could not have been deceived as to its Communist revolutionary character.

"A report by Moissaye J. Olgin, author of *Why Communism?* (one of the most inflammatory and revolutionary pieces of modern Communist literature in existence), was read to the congress. The report was on the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers, and glorified Karl Radek and Nikolai Bukharin, old Bolsheviks who were 'liquidated' by Stalin's purge in 1937-38."

The league is repeatedly cited as a Communist front by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities.

"The League of American Writers is generally regarded as a Communist subsidiary. Its policies, of course, always parallel those of the Communist Party."

(State Department, quoted in a letter from Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of Interior, to Robert Moses Lovett, dated April 25, 1941.)

"The League of American Writers was founded under Communist auspices in 1935. The overt activities of the League of American Writers in the last 2 years leaves little doubt of its Communist control" (Attorney General Francis Biddle, Congressional Record, September 24, 1942, p. 7686).

As regards Smedley's association with Sorge, documentary evidence is available in the intelligence files of Tokyo in the form of unauthenticated extracts from official court proceedings against the three principals in the Sorge Ring. Their statements establish conclusively that Smedley was heavily implicated in the general activities of this ring. Numerous exhibits, in this series, have established these points ad infinitum et nauseam.

There is nothing vindictive in the Sorge report; it is an impartial recital listing court records, eyewitness testimony and related judicial evidence. Agnes Smedley is merely shown as caught in the web of a scoundrelous international intrigue, through her own choice or her own indiscretions. She cannot complain that her gown is spattered by the mud of her surroundings. She walked in the shadow of dangerous companions, in a milieu of her own choice.

A semichronological review of her life, her activities and associations should make this point crystal clear; it is not the story of an average, law-abiding American citizen, but that of a restless spirit, devoted to alien and subversive causes, roaming in far places in the service of predominantly foreign interests.

Agnes Smedley: Chronology and biography

1894: Born in northern Missouri, eldest of five children of Charles H. and Sarah (Rallis) Smedley. At an early age she moved to southern Colorado where her father was employed as an unskilled laborer and her mother kept boarders. She did not finish grade school and never attended high school.

1911: Student in the normal school at Tempe, Ariz., supporting herself by working as a waitress.

1912: Married an engineer, Ernest W. Brundin, on August 25. Subsequently divorced. In her early twenties she went to New York where she spent 4 years. Worked during the day and attended lectures at New York University at night. She became involved with a subversive, Indian nationalist group, Friends of Freedom for India, operating in violation of current United States laws. Smedley kept their correspondence, their codes and foreign addresses, a significant early trend.

1915: Attended summer school at the University of California.

1918: Smedley was arrested (March 18/19) with Salindranath Ghose, an Indian political agitator, on charges of acting as an agent of a foreign government and aiding and abetting such actions in violation of section 8, title 8 of the Espionage Act, and section 332 of the United States Criminal Code. She was released on bail May 7 and the case was never brought to trial. A significant facet of this case was the appearance of German funds, reaching Indian Nationalist groups. Smedley was aware of the nature of these funds. It must be recalled that in those critical war years the German General Staff was notoriously engaged in fomenting subversive political movements throughout the world to damage the allied war effort. Rebellions flared up from north Africa to India. German secret agents stirred up the Berbers, the Touaregs and Senussi, the Kurds and Afghans. Subversive, nationalistic movements were tailor-made for this purely military enterprise.

On June 11, parallel indictments were returned by Federal grand jury in San Francisco against Salindranath Ghose, Tarak Nath Das, Kulin B. Bose, William Wotherspoon, Agnes Smedley, of New York, and Bluma Zainik, accusing them of attempting to defraud President Wilson through representations that they were on a accredited mission from the Nationalist Party of India. Smedley was not brought to trial in this action either. Wrote her first short stories, *Cell Mates*.

1919: She sailed from New York on a Polish-American freighter as a stewardess. Smedley jumped ship in Danzig and went to Berlin.

1920: In Berlin, she joined Virendranath Chattopadhyaya, an international agitator, with whom she lived informally for 9 years. They were never married. She characterized him as the epitome of the secret Indian revolutionary movement and its most brilliant protagonist abroad. He eventually became a Communist Party member.

1921: Smedley visited Moscow in June and attended a meeting of Indian revolutionaries held at the Hotel Lux. In commenting on this trip, she admits membership in the delegation from Germany. In October, Smedley was re-

ported to be in Geneva, Switzerland, and information was received that she was paid the sum of 5,000 marks by the Soviet Legation there for traveling expenses. In the same month, she attended the Congress of Syndicalists at Dusseldorf. At this meeting she used among several aliases that of Mrs. Petroikos.

1923: Left Chattopadhyaya twice to rest in the Bavarian Alps and later became very ill. She sought the help of an alienist who gave her psychoanalytic treatments for 2 years. Smedley then taught an English seminar at the University of Berlin and also lectured on Indian history. She entered the University of Berlin to study for her Ph. D. but lack of scholastic background forced her to drop this project before the end of the first term. Smedley wrote two works on Indian history which were published in German historical journals. She also joined a group of Republican, Socialist, and Communist physicians who were trying to establish the first birth-control clinic in Berlin.

1927: Smedley spent a number of months in Denmark and Czechoslovakia where she wrote her first book, *Daughter of the Earth*.

1928: Broke off her informal liaison with Chattopadhyaya and went to France. She later returned to Germany where she was hired as a correspondent for the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. Smedley made her way to China, stopping in Moscow and then traveling across Siberia. It is pertinent to note that the Soviet master spy, Richard Sorge, also used an assignment as a *Frankfurter Zeitung* correspondent as a convenient cover for his espionage activities.

1929: Smedley arrived in Harbin and after spending 3 months in Manchuria entered China through Tientsin. She spent some months in Peiping, visited Nanking and then went to Shanghai. It was here that she began to frequent leftist and Communist groups.

(a) *Arrival in Shanghai*.—Miss Agnes Smedley, also known as Alice Bird and Mrs. Petroikos, arrived in Shanghai in May 1929 as a correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, the official organ of the German Social Democratic Party. She had traveled from Berlin via Moscow, Harbin, Mukden, Tientsin, and Peiping on United States passport No. 1286 issued June 27, 1928, by the United States consulate in Berlin; she was known to possess an alternate German passport in addition. During her trip across the U. S. S. R. she stopped in Moscow in the period of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow in July and August 1928. Shanghai police report that Smedley was in the direct service of the far eastern bureau (FEB) of the Central Committee of the Third (Communist) International (Comintern), receiving orders directly from the central committee (ECCT) in Moscow but maintaining no direct connection with the local Soviet Communists in order to camouflage her activities.

(b) *Organizations*.—Agnes Smedley arrived in Shanghai when international Communist activities were becoming prominent again after the 1927 split between the Kwantung and the Chinese Communists and the subsequent rupture in diplomatic relations between China and the U. S. S. R. had caused a breakdown of the Comintern structure. The Comintern already had organized the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) as its major organ for agitation and propaganda in China, and a variety of collateral subversive organizations received support from this Comintern agency. The Shanghai municipal police soon placed Smedley under surveillance, on the grounds of being affiliated with the Far Eastern Bureau and of having been charged by the Comintern with the establishment of Communist organizations among workers, an undertaking similar to that of the PPTUS. Smedley's connections with Chinese radical movements, however, were considered more direct than those of the foreign-run PPTUS. Police considered her to be a member of the All China Labor Federation (Union Syndicate Pan Chinese), an ostensibly Chinese labor group which received considerable aid from the PPTUS and its parent body, the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau.

Smedley was an active member of the Shanghai branch of the notorious Noulens Defense Committee, a world-wide Communist-front organization set up by International Red Aid (MOPR) specifically to free Paul and Gertrude Ruegg, more commonly known as Noulens, the leaders of the Shanghai FEB, tried and convicted for espionage. With Harold Isaacs, she was a member of the China League for Civil Rights, and of the local Friends of the U. S. S. R., a Communist-front group, directed by the Comintern through local agents. When the Anti-War Congress, another front for the Comintern's League Against Imperialism, sent a mission to Shanghai in 1933, Agnes Smedley was listed prominently as one of the local supporters. As an erstwhile member of the Hindustan Association of Berlin and of the Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society, Smedley con-

tioned to devote considerable attention to the independence movement in India, a political agitation in which the Comintern took great interest. She was known to have been in touch with anti-British Indians in Shanghai, on several occasions to have edited anti-British propaganda on behalf of the Shanghai branch of the Indian Youth League, and to have given considerable financial support to Indian revolutionary organizations.

(c) *Publications*.—Agnes Smedley came initially to the attention of the Shanghai authorities through an article published in the Frankfurter Zeitung regarding alleged gigantic preparations taken by the Shanghai Municipal Council for the suppression of anticipated Communist disturbances in August 1929. The article was reproduced in Izvestia on December 8, 1929. In addition to acting as correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung, Smedley contributed articles to the China Weekly Review, a Shanghai publication with intermittent leftist trends. An article under her own name entitled "Philippine Sketches" was published in the June 1930 issue of New Masses, definitive American Communist Party organ, and an anonymous article was ascribed to her entitled "London Behind the Hangman Ching Kai-shek," which appeared in Rote Fahne (Red Flag), the organ of the German Communist Party September 5, 1931. In 1933 she appeared under her own name in International Literature, the foreign-language organ of the Comintern International Union of Revolutionary Writers, in an account of the Communist uprising in Kiangsi. Her book, China's Red Army Marches, an account of the Communist "Long March," was banned both by Chinese and Shanghai authorities shortly after its publication in 1934 because of its violently anti-Kuomintang tone.

(d) *Associations*.—Agnes Smedley was an associate of Harold Isaacs, and C. Frank Glass, locally classified as a card-bearing Communist. Isaacs was for some time the editor of China Forum, an English-language Communist periodical first published in 1932. She was also in close contact with the German woman, Irene Wiedemeyer (Weidemeyer), a secret Comintern agent and distributor of Communist publications, who was involved in the Sorge espionage case. Edgar Snow and his wife, who wrote under the name of Nym Wales, were associated with Smedley both in Shanghai and later in Peiping, where the Snows edited the publication, Democracy. Shanghai police authorities knew that she was closely connected with the Soviet propagandist, Anna Louise Strong, writing articles for her Moscow Daily News, and with known and suspected Shanghai Communists, often visiting Tass, the Soviet news and propaganda agency at their Shanghai offices. Her secret association with Sorge is not specifically covered here, as it appears in the Tokyo records elsewhere. Her house became the rendezvous of Sorge's ring; it was here that Ozaki and Kawai were given espionage missions and their reports were, in turn, received. The Shanghai police were on her trail, though they never caught up with either Sorge or Smedley though they came pretty close, through the Noudens case, which led straight into the heart of the Far Eastern Bureau (FEB).

Smedley came to the more serious professional attention of the Shanghai Secret Service when an arrested Comintern agent, Joseph Walden, was found to be carrying a typewritten document listing several local persons who were shadowed by detectives of the settlements, evidently a protective warning list. Agnes Smedley's name led a column of 12.

1930: She visited the Philippines and Canton where she professed to be concerned at the plight of workers in the silk industry. She was arrested in Canton at the insistence of the British secret police under a charge of traveling on a false passport and being a representative of the Communist International. Apparently she was released after protests were made by the German consul. Back in Shanghai, Smedley was introduced to Ozaki Hozumi, protagonist of the Sorge Spy Ring, by Irene Wiedemeyer (Weidemeyer), owner of the Zeitgeist Bookshop, a Communist front and mail drop for Comintern spies. At Smedley's request, Ozaki agreed to supply her with information. Later she became associated with Richard Sorge when he arrived in China and introduced him to Ozaki. Smedley became a member of the Soviet spy ring headed by Richard Sorge and became one of his principal and most trusted assistants. Her house was often used as a rendezvous for Sorge's agents.

1931: Active in aiding labor representatives in trouble with the Shanghai police. In this period the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury branded her a " bolshevik" and other publications openly charged that she was in league with the U. S. S. R. Local comments, based on intimate observations on the spot, are significant. The police records were simply confirmatory. She left the Frankfurter Zeitung, allegedly at the request of the British and other foreign interests

in China. She was introduced by Ozaki to Kawai Teikichi and Smedley persuaded him to become a member of the Shanghai spy ring. She joined the Noulens Defense Committee which was organized in behalf of Paul and Gertrude Rugg (alias Noulens) who were jailed by Chinese authorities for espionage activities, and tried and convicted as bona fide Comintern agents. Associated with Smedley on the committee was Harold Isaacs, as well as many other prominent leftists.

Conversely, the leading agitators in the movement were under orders of Moscow. The frantic efforts in behalf of the Noulens were, of course, inspired by and with the intervention of International Red Aid, the Soviet agency for the assistance of secret operators in trouble. What looked like a humanitarian gesture by the foreign colony in Shanghai was a brazen rescue scheme ordered by the Comintern. In this period she also published an article on the Communist uprising in Kiangsi in International Literature, organ of the Comintern's International Union of Revolutionary Writers.

Even had Smedley not been professionally trained or skilled as an agent or associate of agents, her experiences in Shanghai with the police would have made her especially cautious in covering her tracks. Following is a digest of some of her experiences in this connection:

" * * * I had been arrested by the Chinese police of Canton, acting upon a secret official document sent them by the British police of Shanghai; the document had charged that I was a Russian Bolshevik, traveling on a false American passport. When the German consul general intervened, the chief of police showed him the document from Shanghai. The American consul general also saw it, but equivocated when I asked about it * * * For weeks I lived under house arrest, with armed gendarmes wandering in and out of my apartment at will. If I went out, they followed * * * This Canton Incident was really the setting of Woodhead's attack on me. * * *

1932: Smedley and Isaacs with a group of leftist sympathizers were members of the first League of Civil Rights in Shanghai. This organization seems to have been a failure. Smedley also became a member of the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R., Shanghai Branch, whose roster included such Comintern agents as Irene Wiedemeyer. Smedley also became very friendly with a British Communist, C. Frank Glass, a suspected Comintern agent. With the aid of Ozaki, Smedley set up a spy ring in Peiping and Tientsin and put Kawai Teikichi in charge. This northern espionage organization operated until June 1933. She also enrolled Funakoshi Hisuo and met Nozawa Fusaji in the Shanghai ring.

1933: In failing health, she went to the Soviet Union, where she was at the Workers' Rest Center at Kislovodsk, in the Caucasus, a concession not usually granted to foreigners. She mentions close associations with Soviet and American Communists. It was here that she wrote her book China's Red Army Marches. It seems unlikely that she could have ever gotten the manuscript out of the country if it had not had official Soviet approval. Her previous books had been translated into Russian and were widely circulated. Smedley remained in the U. S. S. R. for 11 months. She again met Chattopadhyaya in Leningrad, where he was connected with the Communist Academy of Sciences. At this time, Smedley served on the staff of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, which had been founded some years earlier in Moscow. Whitaker Chambers had been on the organization's staff in 1933.

1934: Traveled through Central Europe and France and then returned to New York, where she unsuccessfully sought a correspondent's berth with an American publication. After visiting her family in the United States, she sailed for China. Her ship, the *President Cleveland*, stopped for a day (October 19) at Yokohama. She called on Ozaki at the Tokyo Asahi newspaper offices. He took her to see the Imperial Museum and dined with her. This was the period of Sorge's active operations in Tokyo.

1935: Smedley was back in Shanghai. Her name appeared on a list of 12 persons under Shanghai police surveillance. Amongst other incriminatory documents, the list was found in the possession of Joseph Walden (alias Maxim Rivosh), who was later sentenced to 15 years in prison for subversive activities.

1936: In the fall, Smedley went to Sian, and was there when Chiang Kai shek was kidnaped. Apparently it was here that she made arrangements for her later trip through Chinese Communist territory.

1937: In August, she went to the Chinese Communist capital, Yen-an, where she rapidly gained the confidence of top Red army leaders. Thereafter, Smedley gives every personal, intellectual, and literary evidence of supporting their

cause without reservation. She then went through Sanyuan to Sian, where she was treated for a back injury. In October she was in Taiyuan, where she met Chen Ba-lai. By late October Smedley was with the mobile headquarters of the Communist Eighth Route Army. It was there that she became friendly with Communist army leaders, Chu Teh and Peng Teh-hwei. She spent early November with units of Lin Pao's First Front Army of the "workers' and peasants' Red army from Kiangsi," a unit of the Eighth Route Army. Later in the month Smedley returned to Chinese Communist headquarters. At the end of November she was in Pingnanfu with fighting units. After another stay at Communist headquarters, she started back to Hankow just after the end of the year.

1938: During the early part of the year Smedley was in Tungkwán. Then at the request of Mao Tse-tung, head of the Chinese Communist Party, she went to Hankow to continue her work for the Communist cause. Here she did publicity for the Chinese Red Cross, lectured and wrote urging support for the Communist armies. She left the city before it fell to the Japanese (October 25) and started toward Chungking.

1939: Smedley visited units of the Communist New Fourth Army and made her way through Central China with various Communist guerrilla groups. She also visited certain Central Government units and finally rejoined the Communist irregulars in Hupeh Province toward the end of the year.

1940: In June she made her way to Chungking, where she lectured and worked for increased medical aid for the Communists.

1941: Flew to Hongkong, where she was treated for chronic illness and continued active in collaboration with leftist and Communist elements. She returned to the United States in midsummer.

1943: Smedley spent considerable time at Yaddo, Saratoga Springs, N. Y., a retreat for artists and writers. She left to lecture at Skidmore College.

1944: Smedley was working on a play about China and had in mind a revolutionary novel on the same subject.

1945-47: Lectured and wrote for periodicals, many of which were leftist. During this period she became active in the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, a Communist-front organization. Smedley became a member of the National Council of the League of American Writers, an affiliate of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers. The league has been branded a Communist-front organization by the congressional Committee on Un-American Activities and by the Attorney General's office.

1948: Moved to Pallsades, N. Y. She published articles on China in the leftist New York Star. Smedley was one of the supporters of the National Writers-for-Wallace Committee formed under the auspices of the National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions. Smedley also published an article in The Protestant, which is listed by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as a Communist-dominated publication.

1949: Embroiled in a controversy with the Chief, Military Intelligence, Far East Command, Tokyo, over release (by Washington) of a report, dated December 15, 1947, "The Sorge Espionage Case," she threatened to sue for libel, aiming at General MacArthur instead of General Willoughby, who was the responsible head of the department that compiled and prepared the report. Having gained the maximum amount of publicity from tying her name with that of the famous wartime commander, Smedley lapsed into discreet silence and made no motion to pursue her suit which would have brought to light the voluminous records of this case.

The Communist press, the world over, took up the case of Agnes Smedley. Her protest against the Army release appeared in the China Digest, March 1949, a mouthpiece for Chinese communism, published in Hongkong. At a distance of 10,000 miles, another Communist-front magazine, the Far East Spotlight, published in New York City, took up her cause on practically the same date. This perfect timing over vast geographical distances is an impressive example of split-second coordination of international communism. The propaganda efforts of the vacillating western democracies can hardly match this deadly precision. Inferentially, the solidarity of the Communist front in defense of Smedley speaks for itself.

Smedley's Red and pink associations

Not even a casual reader of Smedley's writings could fail to notice that she carefully omits reference to all of her Communist, fellow-traveling, and/or leftist associates whose work might be damaged by such publicity. Smedley did not

fully realize, however, despite her overt and covert attempts to protect her friends and associates, that the "Red net" in China was closely observed and the actions of many of its agents recorded by a number of intelligence, police, and other agencies, particularly the special branch of the Shanghai municipal police; that such tracks as she did not cover furnished interesting leads into the maze of Communist operations in China which fit neatly into an unmistakable pattern. The following list of Smedley's associates can hardly be explained away on the basis of purely journalistic contacts. For convenience, names are grouped chronologically according to the approximate period during which Smedley was associated, in varying degrees.

1920-28, Virendranath Chattopadhyaya: Indian revolutionary and one of the founders of the League Against Imperialism, a Communist organization. Smedley herself leaves no doubt about the personal quality of their relationship.

1929-31, Max Klausen: Active member of the Sorge spy organizations both in Japan and China.

1930, Richard Sorge: Communist master spy who headed an intricate espionage organization in China and later operated an immensely successful spy ring in Japan. Smedley worked as an active member of his organization in China.

Ozaki Hozumi: Sorge's principal assistant and source of much information both in China and Japan. In Shanghai, Ozaki often reported to Smedley rather than Sorge.

1930-36, Lu Hsun: Leftist writer, called "Gorky of China."

1930, Mao Tun: Leftist writer, pupil of Lu Hsun. Jou Shih, pupil of Lu Hsun, executed as a Communist.

1931, Willi Muenzenberg: German Communist leader who organized the Noulens Defense Committee.

Harold Isaacs: Publisher of the China Forum in Shanghai. He was associated with Smedley on the Noulens Defense Committee and the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R.

C. Frank Glass: British Communist.

Irene Wiedemeyer (Weidemeyer): Prominent Comintern agent who was the proprietor of the Zeitgeist Bookshop, which sold Communist literature. She was also a member of the Noulens Defense Committee.

Paul and Gertrude Ruegg (alias Noulens): Two Comintern agents who were apprehended, tried, and imprisoned by the Chinese authorities. Noulens was an official in the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat, then headed by Earl Browder, the American Communist.

Oswald Doenitz: A Comintern agent who was in Shanghai briefly after the arrest of the Rueggs.

Victor Franz Nauman: Who was associated with Comintern agent, Oswald Doenitz.

Mizuno Shige: Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai.

Yamagami Masayoshi: Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai.

Kawai Teikichi: Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai, who was a frequent visitor to Smedley's home.

Funakoshi Hisao: Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai briefly after the arrest of the Rueggs.

1932, Edmond Egon Kisch: Agent of the Third International and organizer of the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R.

Henri Barbusse: A member of the Comintern and publisher of the Communist journals L'Humanité and Le Monde.

Rolf Andouard: An associate of Edmond Egon Kisch.

K. A. Seehorn: Member of the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R., known to have been in close touch with Edmond Egon Kisch.

Victor Mussik: Czechoslovakian journalist, a close associate of Edmond Egon Kisch.

Harry Berger: alias Arthur Ewert, Arthur Ernst Ewert, Braun (Brown), George Keller, Ulrich Dach and Arthur Korner, an important agent for the Third International in the Far East.

1933-34, Rudolf Herman Richard König: Associate of Paul Eugene Walsh (Eugene Dennis). He acted as liaison agent for the Comintern Shanghai.

Fred Ellis: Staff artist for the Soviet newspaper Trud (Toil). He was also on the staff of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers with Smedley.

Harry Paxton Howard, alias Ivan Kuzlof, alias Frank Godwin: Communist reported to be an agent of the Third International.

Langston Hughes: American Communist and staff member of the International League of Revolutionary Writers.

Kawamura Yoshio: member of the spy group organized by Smedley and Ozaki Hozaumi in Peiping.

Nozawa Fusaji: In contact with members of Richard Sorge's Shanghai spy group; was recruited by Funakoshi Uisao.

F. H. Schiff: Member of the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R., and a close associate of Edinoud Egon Kisch.

1933-38, Ting Ling: Communist writer.

1933, Chou Chien-ping: Commander of the Tenth Red Army Corps who lived for a time in Smedley's home in Shanghai.

1934-35, Leon Minster: Operator a radio-equipment business in Shanghai, cited in police records as a blind for a long-distance transmitting installation. His wife, Bessie, is the sister of Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Politburo member.

1937-38, Chu Teh: Commander in chief of the Chinese Communist forces.

Mao Tze-tung: Secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party.

Peng Teh-hwei: Commander of the Front Red armies.

Chou En-lai: Vice chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and chief representative of the Chinese Communist Party in the United Front negotiations with the Chinese Government.

Jen Peh-si: Political commissar of the Eighth Communist Route Army.

Ting Hsiao-ping: Assistant to Jen Peh-si.

Kwang Keh-chin: Wife of Chu Teh and political worker with the Eighth Route Army.

Lin Piao: Commander of the First Division, Eighth Communist Route Army.

Nieh Jung-chen: Political director of Lin Piao's division.

Ho Lung: Commander of the Second Red Army Corps.

Liu Peh-cheng: Commander of the One Hundred Twenty-ninth Division of the Eighth Route Army.

Hsiao Keh: Political director of Second Red Army Corps.

Tso Chuan: Commander of the First Red Army Corps.

Chen Ken: Commander in Eighth Communist Route Army.

Chou Ping: Leader of the Communist guerrilla unit.

Mr. WALTER. General Willoughby, when was the authentication of the Sorge story completed?

General WILLOUGHBY. Mr. Walter, do you refer to the authentication by a battery of competent American lawyers and other technical assistants?

Mr. WALTER. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. It was done after the period in which Smedley's suit for libel would at least, if unchallenged, throw doubt in the public mind on the quality of this testimony. It was done—Mr. Tavenner, can you help?

Mr. TAVENNER. Offhand I am not able to state the date.

General WILLOUGHBY. I think I can find the date. The date is available.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think it appeared in connection with your testimony when you read the statement by the lawyers.

General WILLOUGHBY. May 18, 1949. Consecutive exhibit No. 14 is the opinion of the Legal Section, Far East Command, opinion of the judge advocate general, Far East Command, and related matter, and I think the three gentlemen of the bar, my benevolent collaborators at the time in this same time period.

Mr. WALTER. When did the Ickes article appear that you just read?

General WILLOUGHBY. I can find that for you, sir, though I did not find it necessary, as a literary gem, to keep it in my library.

Mr. WALTER. I was wondering if it was before or after the authentication.

General WILLOUGHBY. I have a photo offset of it. I must have been considerably annoyed, because I certainly would not keep it now. March 16, 1949. That is one, the one entitled "Army Tricks Cover

General's Mistakes." Then there are others, "Old Curmudgeon Thinks MacArthur Should Be Sued," and "Some Brass in Rather Than on Army Heads."

Mr. TAVENNER. You mentioned all this criticism in your report to the staff?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, indeed.

Mr. WALTER. It sounds like some of it might have been said by some of your junior officers?

General WILLOUGHBY. Quite possibly; quite possibly.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, the references to the Shanghai police cards referred to before are based on the Shanghai police records which are in the possession of the committee, and have been produced for identification as Willoughby exhibits 35 and 36. Will you assist us in the appraisal of these files and their relationship to the Sorge case, if you feel you have not already adequately covered the point?

General WILLOUGHBY. Being very anxious to assist this meritorious committee at all times, I might give you my notes under exhibit 34, which give you a glimpse of the genesis of the Shanghai files, as follows:

AMERICANS UNDER SURVEILLANCE IN SHANGHAI

Communist subversive activities in China drew the attention of Shanghai municipal police (British and French divisions) in 1916. Police raids over a 10-year period resulted in confiscation of tons of subversive literature and in the arrest of many Communist agents. Until 1929 these agents were principally Russian and Chinese with a smattering of German, Spanish, and French nationals involved.

In 1927 Americans entered the subversive picture. Earl Browder, Gerhardt Eisler, James H. Dolson, W. A. Haskell, M. Udjus, and a German woman, Irene Wiedemeyer, along with many others, arrived in Shanghai in the late 1920's to join the Soviet's Far Eastern Bureau (FEB) or the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS). The German woman, Irene Wiedemeyer, was closely associated with Smedley, Sorge, and Ozaki in the Zickgeist Bookstore operation, a mail drop and rendezvous of Sorge spy ring members, agents and leftist fellow travelers.

Here again, the pattern of Soviet Third International action is apparent. Working through trade unions, bureaus and other professional or labor-connected fronts, the Soviet wedge again drove smoothly into the economic and local government systems of the Chinese Nation. The objective, of course, was the ultimate destruction of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Far-sighted, insidious and viciously efficient, its success was evident in the Chinese debacle of 1949. Another nation and 500 million people entered the Soviet orbit.

This is the information contained in collateral reports known as the Shanghai municipal police file. For your information, Shanghai was an extraterritorial enclave which maintained its own police and had French and British police in the French and British municipalities. These were high official police officers, and I had made it a point of having interviewed the past high-ranking officials of that police where they were available, with the assistance of their governments, as, for example, the former chief of the British political section who is in Hongkong.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you give the committee the benefit of your compilation so far as we are prepared to make it public at this time?

General WILLOUGHBY. I am prepared to read selective points—though the full text is available to the committee—or salient points to show the international character of this apparatus or mechanism

or machinery that was working toward the downfall of the Chinese Nationalist Government, as a sample or pattern of how they operate elsewhere.

Mr. DOYLE. And when you say "elsewhere" do you include the United States?

General WILLOUGHBY. I include the United States, because we have already developed the presence of operatives then in Shanghai still in our midst—Earl Browder, Eugene Dennis, Gerhart Eisler, Jim Dolsen—in this interplay between the counsel and myself, where I furnished the oriental information and the committee had in its possession, to my pleasant surprise, some very specific collateral data.

Mr. Wood. Proceed.

General WILLOUGHBY (reading):

Miscellaneous records of the British and French Shanghai municipal police in the early thirties, open up an astonishing vista on a fantastic array of Communist fronts, ancillary agencies, and the vast interlocking operations of the Third International in China. It is in this particular period that the groundwork was laid for the Communist successes of today.

The role of Shanghai, a veritable witch's caldron of international intrigue, a focal point of Communist effort, is already apparent in the records of the Sorge trial and collateral testimony. The Zeitgeist Bookshop, rendezvous of Sorge and Ozaki, and its astute owner, Miss Wiedemeyer, appear again, viewed from a different angle, recorded this time by a reputable international police body.

There is more to the Shanghai municipal police files than an inferential accusation against Smedley. We are dealing here with a conspiratorial epoch in the history of modern China. Shanghai was the vineyard of communism. Here were sown the dragon's teeth that ripened into the Red harvest of today, and the farm labor was done by men and women of many nationalities who had no personal stakes in China other than an inexplicable fanaticism for an alien cause, the Communist "jihad" of pan-Slavism for the subjugation of the Western World.

The greater design of the Soviet conquest of the east is already clear in the confession of Sorge, Soviet master spy. It is again recognizable in the intricate pattern of the Third International apparatus. Shanghai was the focal point of sabotage and subversion, and to this mecca flocked the Communist operators of the world for training, for experimentation, for career investments.

In 1927 a conference was held in Hankow under the auspices of the Third International and attended by Tom Mann (Great Britain), Earl Browder (United States of America); Jacques Doriot (France), Roy (India), and a number of others. It was decided that Communist work in this part of the world would be conducted by the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, of which Earl Browder was made secretary (or chief). He soon afterward became active in this work in which he was assisted by Katherine Harrison alias Alice Reed, considered by the police as a convenient "menage-a-deux." Earl Browder and his female assistant continued their work in the following year (1928) and spent most of their time in Shanghai. They were joined in August that year by one W. A. Haskell who also was assisted by a woman named Emerson, presumably his wife.

Time in its issue of April 25, 1949, features Eugene Dennis, the boss of the American Communists, now on trial.

The language, of course, is a year old. The trial is past.

There is no point in repeating this terse, well-written story of the growth and world itinerary of a Soviet agent; important, however, are certain connecting links with the Sorge espionage case.

Dennis who used to Francis X. Waldron, obtained a fraudulent passport as Paul Walsh and traveled via Europe, South Africa to China. The world-wide ramifications of the Third Comintern, with Shanghai as the far-eastern operating center, is reflected in the itinerary of this American disciple. Paul Eugene

Walsh, alias Paul or Milton, suddenly appears in the records of the Shanghai police; his police card states:

"* * * From December 1, 1935, until June 1934, he resided at Flat 8, Gresham Apartments, No. 1224 Avenue Joffre. On May 30, 1934, the lease of Flat 34D, Fonelm Apartments No. 643 Route Frelupt, was transferred to his name from Harry Berger, with whom he was obviously on terms of good friendship. Walsh resided at the latter address from June 1, 1934, until October 9, 1934, when he secretly left Shanghai for Trieste on the steamship *Conte Verde*."

This is the important abbreviated statement by the police:

It has been established that Walsh was one of the master minds of the local machine of the Comintern and as such was responsible for the collation of many important documents relating to the propagation of Communist ideas in the Far East. * * *

I pause here to establish the link in this police investigation. Sorge mentioned the Comintern group in Shanghai. This we pick up as the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat since Noulens was arrested. Obviously this man Walsh, or Eugene Dennis, and his subsequent connection with Browder, establishes the strongest inference that he was associated with him then.

Further relationship between what we have established in the Sorge records is covered in paragraph 24. Incidentally, I took the title "The Shadowy Men With Changeable Names," from the report of April 24, 1949, on Walsh, which is a very good report, indeed (reading):

In 1930 a large host of agents of the Third International came to Shanghai and became associated with the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, and another important organ of the Third International, called the Far Eastern Bureau. The new arrivals included Lilaire Noulens—

I invite your attention to that name, as it will appear later, N-o-u-l-e-n-s [continuing reading]:

(or Paul Ruegg), and Mrs. Noulens, of unknown nationality, A. E. Stewart, Margaret Undjus, and Judea Codkind, Americans, and Irene Wiedemeyer—

Wiedemeyer spells her name sometimes W-i-e-t—

who was German.

Smedley was an associate of Irene's. Weltmeyer (Wiedemeyer) operated the Zeitgeist Bookshop in Shanghai, rendezvous of leftists and mail drop for espionage agents. Ozaki, Sorge's right-hand man, was introduced by Smedley in Weltmeyer's place.

I have already read Sorge's testimony and will not repeat it. [Continuing reading:]

The police card on Smedley states:

"* * * Agnes Smedley alias Bird and Mrs. Petroikos * * * Member of the following societies: Friends of the U. S. S. R.; Hindustan Association in Berlin; Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society; Noulens Defense Committee; All China Labor Federation and the China League for Civil Rights * * * In possession of two passports, German and American. Arrived in Shanghai in May 1929 from Berlin as the correspondent of the German newspaper *Frankfurter Zeitung*. She is in the service of the eastern branch of the central committee of the Communist International and is definitely known to have assisted local Indian seditionists on several occasions * * * her chief duties comprise the supervising of Communist organizations among workers, and that she receives orders direct from the central committee of the Communist International in Moscow. * * *

The Shanghai police observed and recorded these furtive men and women, often without direct accusations. Such things are a matter of cumulative surveillance, but dossiers are never opened without some reason. Somehow, these names are tainted.

The case of Hilaire Noulens (known as) Paul Ruegg is both interesting and typical: The clandestine fraternity, working under the aegis of the Comintern, or the Soviet Army, could always count on a variety of front organizations to rally to their defense, if they got into trouble. The principal agency for this defense was The International Red Aid (hereafter referred to as MOIP, the initials of its Russian name), created in 1922, known as International Labor Defense in America. Inferentially, whenever the defense swung into action it was a foregone conclusion that the chief protagonists were under orders of the Comintern. To the gullible outsider, the defense action might look like a legitimate civil liberty agitation even with some sentimental appeal; however, to the cognoscenti it was just another Red front mobilizing pink lawyers, agents, and fellow travelers.

Noulens arrived in Shanghai in 1930 under cover of a stolen Belgian passport as Fred Vandereruyzen to head the far eastern bureau. Fifteen months later, he was arrested for Communist activities linked with a French Communist, Joseph Dueroux also known as Serge LeFranc, then operating in Singapore. During the trial (and conviction) the authorities learned of his importance in the Comintern apparatus. This group operated on a very considerable scale; they maintained 7 bank accounts, rented 15 houses or apartments, a veritable political rabbit warren; Ruegg-Noulens used at least 12 names in Shanghai and carried 1 Canadian and 2 Belgian passports, while his wife used 5 names and 2 Belgian passports.

Here again, the Time article furnishes an interesting clue to identities. In a subparagraph headed "The Little Kremlin" it says—

I thought it was so good that I included it.

* * * All but the most secret Communist operations in the United States were and still are, directed from the ramshackle, nine-story loft building, on 35 East Twelfth Street, not far from Manhattan's Union Square. To its top-floor offices came the Communists' international 'reps.' the shadowy men with the changeable names like P. Green, G. Williams, A. Ewert, H. Berger * * * which in a wink of the eye might become Drabkin, B. Mikhailov, Braun, or Gerhart Eisler. These were Moscow's agents. From the ninth floor the word which they brought from Moscow was passed along to the faithful, to the party hacks on the Daily Worker and Yiddish-language Freiheit, to the cultivators of organized labor's vineyards, to men like Christoffel in Milwaukee. * * *

The interesting thing about Time's shadowy men with the changeable names like A. Ewert, H. Berger, A. Steinburg, and Gerhart Eisler, is that these same names and identities appear both in the Sorge records and the Shanghai police files. Their crooked paths meander on into the forties and into the United States—

As we shall shortly develop. [Continuing reading:]

Most of the old wheel horses of the Communist Party appear to have been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clandestine fraternity as well as the acolytes and dupes, who are flirting with the Red menace. And somewhere in the bistros of the French concession, in the furtive rendezvous of the Shanghai conspirators, you can hear the metallic tinkle of 30 pieces of silver.

I would like to pause here, Mr. Chairman, to make one point clear of mutual interest. The reference to the Shanghai name cards, as far as Tokyo was concerned, did not represent an arraignment, not even an indictment. There are in the list of these names—and of course we are not disclosing all of them—there are undoubtedly a number of people who were present by accidental association rather than by design, and, as stated in my introductory remarks at the beginning of this hearing, a constant effort has been made to protect innocent people and gullible people, and to distinguish between the joiners who might not have realized the character of the organization to which they belonged.

The quotations are not evaluations by G-2. They are the statements by this reputable investigative body.

Mr. WOOD. I gather from your statement that you make a distinction between a fool and a knave?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, indeed. It is not a very flattering distinction, but a protective one. [Continuing reading:]

The Comintern apparatus and Shanghai affiliates—

"Apparatus" is their own word. They seem to take pride in that pseudoscientific term. [Continuing reading:]

Other individuals, in variable degrees of implication with or commitment to the Communist movement, are covered elsewhere. All of them are understandable only in terms of their subservience to a foreign master; this relationship requires a background examination of the formidable world-wide machinery of the Comintern apparatus, Machiavellian tool of the imperialist expansion of the Soviets, who have made progress beyond the wildest dreams of Czarist ambition. In fact, it may be factually stated that the Soviets have taken up where the Czars left off and made further and more significant strides.

Comintern headquarters: The Moscow headquarters of the Third (Communist) International (Comintern) during the 1930's paralleled the organizational structure of the Soviet Government. Led by a world congress of Soviet and foreign Communists, who met at intervals between 1919 and 1933, actual control of the Comintern fell to the U. S. S. R. through its leadership of the world Communist movement and a Comintern organizational ruling which gave the largest representation to the nation playing host to the Congress—in every case the Soviet Union. The executive functions of the Comintern were vested in the executive committee of the Communist international (ECCI), which advertised several foreign members but was actually controlled by its predominant Soviet representation. Like the world congress, the ECCI met periodically, primarily to determine general lines of policy, but final control of the Comintern rested in the praesidium, which was made up, among others, of a politburo, several standing Commissions, and a political secretariat.

In the interest of time I will become selective. The material is here. [Continuing reading:]

"The Comintern was the nondiplomatic foreign arm of the U. S. S. R. Organized at Moscow in 1919, the Comintern was, until its alleged dissolution in 1943, a quasi-governmental body aimed largely at fostering Communist and Communist-front groups in the capitalist world in order to carry out such Communist strategy as the Government of the U. S. S. R. considered essential to the promotion of world revolution or, as conditions required, the protection of the Soviet Union.

There are also a number of auxiliary organizations I invite your attention to:

Only a few of the Moscow auxiliary organizations are of immediate concern here, although all of them, numbering about 13, had variable interests in Shanghai, operating through an extraordinary variety of channels:

Profintern: The Red International of Labor (Profintern) was created in 1919 in order to counteract the influence of the International Federation of Labor Unions of the Second (Socialist) International. The Profintern consisted of a headquarters apparatus controlled by the praesidium and of affiliated sections which in most countries outside the U. S. S. R. took the form of Red trade-union oppositions. In the field, the Profintern organized international propaganda committees for work among specific trades. In addition, the Profintern sponsored the creation of parallel labor union federations of which the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and the All China Labor Federation were important examples.

Krestintern: The Red peasants International (Krestintern) was founded in 1923 to break the resistance to communism of the peasantry in various countries. Although it enjoyed far less success than organizations devoted to the laborer and the intelligentsia, it directed local Communist groups which organized so-called peasants' unions including the Chinese Peasant League.

VOKS: The Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) was established in Moscow in 1923 to promote Soviet culture abroad as an instrument of political propaganda. The cultural attaché of each Soviet

Embassy abroad was in direct charge of VOKS and, as such, was charged with liaison with the BCCI in Moscow and with the formation of the so-called friendly societies. The activities of VOKS can be gaged from the sections of its headquarters:

Foreign relations; reception of foreigners; international book exchange; press; exhibitions, etc.—

I may say that personal observation of the embassy set-up in Tokyo recently revealed this trend. [Continuing reading:]

MOPR: International Red Aid (MOPR), created in 1922, has been characterized as the Red Cross of the Communist International, designed primarily to assist political prisoners, secret agents caught red-handed and other "victims of bourgeois reaction." International Red Aid, which functioned legally and illegally in 67 countries, was complemented by Workers International Relief, both directed for many years by the German Communist Willi Muenzenberg. Abroad not only International Red Aid itself but separate Communist-front groups organized for the defense of a particular case have played the leading role in assisting individual Communists jailed for subversive activities.

I pause here to establish the link. Gerhart Eisler was defended by an offshoot of International Red Aid. Noulens was defended by an offshoot of International Red Aid. And I previously called the committee's attention to a brilliant article in the Saturday Evening Post as of February 17, 1951, entitled "The Communist's Dearest Friend," by Craig Thompson. The lead picture shows Carol King escorting Gerhart Eisler, who later fled to Europe and became a high-ranking officer in Red Germany. This article traces International Red Aid into American Labor Defense, into Civil Rights Congress and other organizations in which Carol Weiss King has taken an active part.

Mr. Wood. I might interpose that she actually led him up the gangplank when he left the United States on the *Batory*.

General WILLOUGHBY (continuing reading):

The International Union of Revolutionary Writers was organized in 1925, probably under VOKS auspices, to enlist sympathetic literati abroad for the promotion of pro-Soviet and anti-Fascist and antiwar themes. In Moscow the IURW was responsible for the publication of the English-language Moscow Daily News and International Literature, a periodical devoted to the promulgation of Communist ideology abroad. At one time an American, Walt Carmon, was an assistant editor of International Literature.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like the record to show that Walt Carmon was subpoenaed before the committee in recent weeks and refused to testify relating to alleged Communist activities.

General WILLOUGHBY. I take it with the usual phraseology, on advice of competent lawyer refused to testify on ground of fear of self-incrimination?

Mr. TAVENNER. That is right.

General WILLOUGHBY (continuing reading):

Langston Hughes, the American Communist poet, and Agnes Smedley were contributors. Anna Louise Strong for years was editor of the Moscow Daily News, while another American, Fred Ellis, was employed as a cartoonist on the staff of *Trud*, the official organ of the All Union Council of Soviet Trade Unions. The printing of these foreign-language periodicals was done by the State Publishing House in cooperation with the International Book Publishing Association, both Soviet Government enterprises.

I pause here to invite the attention of the committee to an offshoot of this International Union of Revolutionary Writers in the American scenery, the League of American Writers; and it was in this connection that Mr. Lovett inquired from Mr. Ickes if he knew any-

thing about this outfit, and he described it as completely Communist-dominated, as you recall, knowing, probably, that Smedley was on the staff. I believe she was chairman. So was Whittaker Chambers on the staff in that period.

In order to further bring you the picture of what these associations really mean—

Mr. WALTER. General, before you go into that, I would like to ask Mr. Tavenner, this Walt Carmon didn't testify before this committee, did he?

Mr. TAVENNER. He appeared before this committee, but declined to answer questions other than those of the most casual character.

Mr. WALTER. Is that the same Carmon?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir; and the same one to whom Mr. Clubb took a letter of introduction allegedly from Agnes Smedley in July 1942.

Mr. WOOD. It wasn't alleged, was it?

Mr. TAVENNER. Alleged as to the character of the letter. There is no doubt that he took an envelope with a letter in it.

Mr. DOYLE. That was where the question was, of whether it was sealed or unsealed?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would cite the Second Report, Un-American Activities in California, 1945, Report of the Joint Fact-Finding Committee to the Fifty-sixth California Legislature, pages 119-120.

I have had occasion to refer to the California State Un-American Activities Committee, a brilliant example of what a State legislature can accomplish under the able direction of Senator Jack Tenney. Their reports are a must in the research library of investigative bodies.

In the report just cited, Langston Hughes is reported. Indicative of the character and membership of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers and its American offshoot, the League of American Writers, note the poem by Langston Hughes published in Literary Service, the monthly organ of IURW. I won't bore you with the entire poem. Its title is "Good-by Christ" and it begins:

Listen, Christ,
You did alright in your day, I reckon—
But that day's gone now.
They ghosted you up a swell story too,
Called it Bible—
But it's dead now.
The popes and the preachers've
Made too much money from it.

It is hardly worth while to take the time of the committee to read the rest of it.

Mr. DOYLE. On page 5 of your statement, under paragraph (4)—I think you read that paragraph?

General WILLOUGHBY. MOPR or IURW?

Mr. DOYLE. MOPR. In the last sentence you say:

Abroad not only International Red Aid itself but separate Communist-front groups organized for the defense of a particular case have played the leading role in assisting individual Communists jailed for subversive activities.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DOYLE. Because you were in the Far East so many years, I would like to ask you, what kind of subversive activities would cause

the arrest, say in China, of Communists? What would they do which would cause their arrest? What would be the evidence of their activities?

General WILLOUGHBY. That is an interesting question. To answer it, I would have to practically read an endless array of the material in the hands of your counsel. I will give you a brief of what they do: Public disturbances; public disorders; strikes; tie-ups of maritime and coastal traffic; aspersion of opposing or competing political organizations; disorder; subversions, political, fraternal, collective; the distribution of literature abhorrent to the existing government.

It is this cumulative picture which emerges from any study of their operations abroad. This, roughly, is the definition.

Mr. DOYLE. Then they would be arrested in China, in those days, the same as they might be in this country?

General WILLOUGHBY. Indeed.

Mr. DOYLE. And for the same causes?

General WILLOUGHBY. For the same causes. As an example, the police files of Shanghai are those of a highly organized political entity maintaining conservative business houses and an extraterritorial enclave. But their purpose was the same as any other, and it is this police upon whom I relied for the identification of subversives much more than the Chinese themselves.

We are not talking about the Chinese police, only incidentally. We are talking about a reputable police of prewar vintage composed of a French section and a British section, known as the international municipal police body. So their reactions, to me, viewed at this distance, are those of a law-enforcing agency maintained for the protection of the county or city in which they operate.

Mr. WALTER. Isn't it important to take into consideration also that the Nationalist Government was very sensitive to the things that were happening, and there were probably more arrests than was the case before the Nationalist Government was aware of what was going on?

General WILLOUGHBY. Your point is well taken. I do not attempt to disassociate the government at Shanghai and the Nationalist Government. They both worked against Soviet communism, not just communism.

In paragraph 26 I touch upon the types of Chinese organizations and Communist fronts. The indication is that the same thing happened in Czechoslovakia and Poland and Bulgaria. I describe them thusly:

On a national and sectional level the organs of the Comintern often began to lose their distinctive coloring, becoming Communist front groups in a host of forms. However, each auxiliary organization of the Comintern was represented abroad, often by apparently unconnected groups, which ranged from outright Communist to pseudo-liberal movements, which were organized or infiltrated by Comintern agents. In many cases, these national organizations could be traced to more than one Moscow group as activities impinged on the different fields of the Soviet Praesidium. Often they were temporary organizations or local movements designed to gain popular or mass support for an immediate aim; just as often, however, they were serious long-term projects. As these groups touched the Shanghai scene during the period of Smedley's residence there, they form an interesting and often highly interconnected web which requires relatively detailed treatment.

The first one, given this priority because of its intrinsic importance, is the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat and its parent organization,

the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau. [Continuing reading:]

The Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and its parent organization, the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau, were the most important and highly organized apparatus for Comintern labor activities in the Far East during the late 1920's and early 1930's. The PPTUS, set up in 1927 at a conference in Hankow, was attended by several prominent Comintern leaders, including Lozovsky, a Comintern agent who rose from secretary of the Profintern in 1928 to a transient position as leader of the Soviet labor movement. Another member of the Hankow conference who later became first head of the PPTUS was the American Communist Earl Browder, who was assisted in his work in Shanghai by an American woman, Katherine Harrison. Other Americans, including a journalist, James H. Dolsen, one Albert Edward Stewart, and Margaret Lindjus, were prominent in the affairs of the PPTUS as was the German woman Wiedemeyer.

Wiedemeyer is the same person whose house was a mail drop and rendezvous for the Sorge ring. [Continuing reading:]

Richard Sorge himself was suspected by the Shanghai police of having come on a mission for the PPTUS when he arrived in Shanghai in 1930.

Mr. WALTER. General, may I interrupt you at this point?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. Did you ever make an investigation, or was any made that you know of, of the files of the Shanghai police force for the purpose of determining whether or not they contained the names of members of the PPTUS?

General WILLOUGHBY. We took what we found, belatedly. The files were not complete but, roughly, 60 to 80 percent in some categories. This is not an apology for not having it, but actually the Far East Command is limited to Japan and the outlying islands. Where we were able without unusual exertions, we would either call on a sister intelligence agency to do something or grab it while grabbing was good.

On the whole, if we are able to pick up some prominent persons like Browder, Eugene Dennis, Dolsen, I think you have made substantial progress in tracing a pattern so that it will be picked up again when it makes its appearance. This is not a punitive enterprise for ultimate arrests, but rather a historical enterprise for educational purposes.

While your mind is on the PPTUS and Earl Browder, I would like to call your attention to the remarks of one of your colleagues, the Honorable Walter H. Judd, of Minnesota, made in the House of Representatives on Tuesday, July 18, 1950:

* * * The Daily Worker, September 7, 1937, reproduced three letters addressed to Earl Browder, who was then the head of the Communist Party of America; one was from Mao-Tse Tung, who signed himself as president of the Chinese Soviet Republic; one from Chu-Teh, leader of the Chinese Red Army, and one from Chou-En-Lai, now prime minister of the Communist regime in China. Chou-En-Lai began his letter to Browder: " * * * Comrade, do you still remember the Chinese who worked with you in China 10 years ago? We feel that when we achieve victory in China, this will be of considerable help to the struggle of the American people for liberation * * *."

Then Mr. Judd asks:

What had Earl Browder been doing in China in 1927? He was there with other leaders of the Communist hierarchy from all over the world to help the Reds seize complete control of China, as the Bolsheviks had done in Russia in the October revolution, just 10 years before. Chiang Kai-shek in China was scheduled to be what Kerensky had been in Russia—an interim leader to be overthrown by the Reds as soon as he had defeated the war lords.

Here, Mr. Doyle, is your purpose, your plan, your fraternal relationship. The Shanghai police files fully confirm Mr. Judd's views. American Commies, in fraternal correspondence with Chinese Commies—who are now fighting the United States in North Korea. It is these considerations that make these old files so alive today.

Mr. DOYLE. I was directing my question to you because of the assignment this committee has. I call your attention, if you haven't had an opportunity to read it recently, to the assignment this committee has. We are assigned to make investigations of—

(1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States; (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of Government as guaranteed by our Constitution.

That is why I directed the question to you. I, as a member of the committee, am interested in getting into the record as much positive evidence as there is of the actual existence of a world-wide conspiracy to overthrow not only our constitutional form of Government, but the constitutional governments of all free peoples. That is the point of my question to you.

General WILLOUGHBY. The point is well taken, Mr. Doyle.

Mr. DOYLE. I feel it very important that the world-wide knowledge of men like yourself, who got first-hand the conditions in other parts of the world, be given to us as proof, if you have it.

General WILLOUGHBY. Your point is well taken, and I trust that I have been able to contribute something to the committee by perhaps not tracing the entire picture in its detailed ramifications, but building a brief on the basis of which your research staff may proceed with its investigations.

Mr. DOYLE. I am sure you are being very helpful. A few weeks ago we had an undercover FBI agent who testified before us, who was a member of a Communist cell in Massachusetts. He heard discussions in the cell of means by which arms might be obtained.

I wanted to ask you very briefly, do you believe and feel, from your own personal knowledge, that that is the sort of revolution that is aimed at our Nation if and when the time comes, and under what conditions could that come in this country, a revolution with the use of arms? What conditions could bring that about? Is it possible the international conspiracy could ever bring about such a hellish thing?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, Mr. Doyle, I firmly believe that there is an international conspiracy; that there is a mechanism for its accomplishment; that these perhaps fragmentary disclosures here are the early glimpses of the framework of the conspiracy. We have seen nation after nation fall in the past 5 years. I call your attention to Czechoslovakia, which fell through this type of intrigue. There is no doubt that the economic conditions following a defeat in war—unemployment and all other social tensions—furnish the soil in which this type of thing grows rapidly. Fortunately, the United States is not in that condition. But they try. The perversion is in full swing. We are fortunate that it has not taken hold here as it has elsewhere.

Mr. WOOD. Wouldn't we be very foolish to assume that the efforts are going to be relaxed?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, indeed. This committee is the watch-dog duly appointed by Congress to recognize well in advance the trends, and I believe you have done a very good job. Here I come from the Orient with certain information, and find the committee has collateral, dovetailing information in the United States. I was very much impressed with this in the course of this presentation.

Mr. DOYLE. That should be pretty clear evidence of a proficient staff with an objective view of the whole thing.

General WILLOUGHBY. Indeed. You have heard me make complimentary remarks toward the California State Legislature. Of course, this committee is not only in a better position but its work has been much more far reaching from the standpoint of public knowledge than that of a State legislature.

Mr. DOYLE. I would like to ask you this question right at this point: Is there anything this committee should do, in your judgment, that it is not doing? For instance, part of our assignment is we are charged with recommending to Congress any necessary remedial legislation. Will you bear that in mind and tell us what, in your judgment, this committee should recommend in the way of remedial legislation. In other words, I have frequently asked the question, Should the Communist Party be outlawed?

General WILLOUGHBY. Your question is well taken; and, while it is presumptuous of me to advise the committee, I shall take this opportunity of making the following recommendations against the following background:

Japan is a nation of 80 million people. My section was charged with the organization in Japan of an organization something like the FBI. So, I am aware of the problems from the standpoint of density of population.

I had intended making those recommendations, by agreement with counsel, at the end of the session, but this is as good a place as any.

Mr. DOYLE. Then I will withdraw my question at this time.

General WILLOUGHBY. "Withdraw" means it will be cheerfully complied with at a later time.

Mr. WOOD. You will not withdraw it, but withhold it.

Mr. DOYLE. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. I have recommendations, and will present them with apologies, feeling I see eye to eye with this committee.

Mr. DOYLE. I was fearful, because I was not here yesterday, that point was not raised. I am on the Armed Services Committee also, and I was there all day yesterday; so I couldn't be here.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, I am aware of the fact you are anxious to complete your testimony today if possible.

General WILLOUGHBY. Not necessarily, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. There are several sections of this document which I am very anxious for you to read into the record. We can then introduce the rest without reading it, if that is agreeable to you.

General WILLOUGHBY. I am entirely in your hands, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. May I suggest you discuss the Noulens Defense Committee, appearing under paragraph b on page 7, and on the next page the Friends of China section, entitled "d". If you will do that first, we will then desire to ask you other questions.

General WILLOUGHBY. You have selected the Noulens case. I consider it completely analogous to the legal assistance given Gerhart

Eisler. The defense was simply given in two different cases. Eisler skipped Shanghai, or he would have been in the same fix as Noulens.

Sorge describes the Comintern group. He mentions two subdivisions. One was in charge of Eisler and one in charge of Noulens. Noulens was caught; and Eisler, as soon as the heat was put on, vanished.

We say, speaking of the Noulens Defense Committee:

International Red Aid (MOPR), as stated, has taken various forms abroad. In Shanghai MOPR played its most spectacular role during the early 1930's in the defense of the head of the FEB, Paul Ruegg, alias Hilaire Noulens, alias Hilarie Noulens, alias Ferdinand Vandereruyssen, and a host of other names. When Paul and Gertrude Ruegg were arrested June 13, 1931, the International Red Aid took charge of their defense. Willi Muenzenberg, German Communist wheel-horse and one of the Comintern's most efficient organizers of both Communist and front groups, formed a defense unit first known as the Noulens Defense Committee, the Shanghai branch being led by Harold Isaacs and boasting among its members Agnes Smedley, Irene Wiedemeyer (or Weltmeyer) and Mme. Sun Yeh-sen; the group continued efforts to free these Comintern agents for several years after they were finally sentenced.

The Rueggs, when arrested, posed as Belgian citizens named Heressens, and had used many aliases, such as Vandereruyssen, although the man had previously been known in Shanghai as Hilaire Noulens. Their claim to Belgian protection was disapproved, and the couple was handed over to the Chinese authorities for prosecution as Communist agents.

The League Against Imperialism and other Comintern groups protested that Noulens, as he was then known, was merely the paid secretary of the PPTUS.

That is the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat in which Browder took a leading part in its formation—

possibly a more easily defensible position than his actual post as leader of the FEB. Later in 1931 a collateral English defense group, apparently inadvertently, referred to him as "Ruegg." The ensuing investigation disclosed that Paul Ruegg was an active Swiss Communist who had been prominent a decade earlier in Switzerland and had come to police notice only sporadically after he had gone to Moscow in 1924. After the disclosure of Ruegg's identity, the international committee adopted his real name for their "Committee for the Defense of Paul and Gertrude Ruegg." The committee attracted or solicited known Communists, incidental sympathizers, and non-Communist humanitarians, listing Lion Feuchtwanger and Albert Einstein as German members of the committee—

probably without their permission—

and several sentimental Americans then at the height of their fame, including Floyd Dell, Sinclair Lewis, Theodore Dreiser, John Dos Passos, and Oswald Garrison Villard.

Despite MOPR efforts, the Rueggs were found guilty of seditious activities and imprisoned in Nanking. With the release of many political prisoners, when Nanking fell to the Japanese, the pair were liberated in September 1937 and have since disappeared. Ruegg is reported to have entered the United States in 1939 as Naum Katzenberg and another report claims that he again visited Shanghai in 1939, Chungking in 1940, and the Philippines in 1941.

You have a similar case in the movements of Guenther Stein. Guenther Stein was associated with Sorge. He disappeared. Suddenly he appears in France. He was arrested by the French police, who advised me of that fact.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is a very strong argument for continual watchfulness to follow up these people to see where they are and what they are doing and what part they are taking in communism today.

General WILLOUGHBY. Your point is extremely well taken, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now will you turn to section d.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. You have Friends of Communist Russia in the States. You have Friends of Communist China, also. Here is Friends of China. [Reading:]

Outside the original range of the friendly societies, but similar to foreign cultural groups, for the support of countries presently within the Soviet orbit, the International Friends of China was a front organization which capitalized on western sympathy for China and its defense against Japanese aggression, in order to promote the ends of the Chinese Communists. Like individual fellow-travelers, the Friends of China, founded in 1934 with offices in New York, London, and Paris, gave sole credit for Chinese resistance to the Chinese Communists and attempted to divert normal sympathy to support of one party in China.

Here you have a glimpse of the political purposes of some of these movements. The Chinese Communists claimed for a long time to have fought Russian communism. They did nothing of the kind. Actually, to my knowledge, the Chinese Communist commanders in western China had a tacit agreement with the Japanese to allow free passage into Hankow. [Continuing reading:]

Although its stated aims were lofty, the society tipped its hand when it claimed to have "done much to expose the collaboration of Chiang Kai-shek with the Japanese, British and American imperialists."

We are now getting into language similar to that of the New York Spotlight. [Continuing reading:]

Although the London and Paris branches engaged in relatively little activity, European members then included such respectable fronts as the Labour Party's chief whip in the House of Lords, Lord Marley and Bertrand Russell, long known for his interest in China, as well as Edmond Egon Kisch, classified as an active Comintern agent, and other known Communists. The New York branch, the American Friends of China, which included Earl Browder in its membership, was the most active. Affiliated with the Communist-front American League Against War and Fascism, the American Friends of China published its own monthly magazine China Today which was pro-Communist. The American group also sponsored a Shanghai publication of similar nature, Voice of China, published by Max and Grace Granich. This paper published from March 1936 until the latter part of 1937, although not overtly a Communist publication, portrayed the Chinese Communist as the only defenders of China's independence and resistance to the Japanese. The magazine was suppressed after more than 18 months of existence and the Graniches returned to the United States December 21, 1937.

One could go on and on with the description of similar fronts. They all have their ancillaries in foreign countries, including the United States.

Mr. TAVENNER. The pattern as you have shown it in China is very similar to that we have found in the United States with reference to the use of book clubs.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, indeed.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have a paragraph on that subject?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, indeed.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think it would be well for you to give us that at this time.

General WILLOUGHBY. The Attorney General, I see from reading the newspapers, has gone about a very laudable job, to classify certain organizations as Communist fronts. I suppose the committee had a hand in that. You have done a good job.

You find a number of book stores, Washington Book Shop, Cincinnati, and so forth. They are scattered from the east coast to the

west coast. You find these book shops 15 or 20 years ago. This is paragraph g, entitled "Zeitgeist Bookstore":

The Zeitgeist Bookstore, established by Irene E. J. Wiedemeyer (Weitmeyer) in November 1930, was part of a widespread and elaborate Comintern network operating from the International Union of Revolutionary Writers in Moscow.

You have had the quotation by our pal Langston Hughes which I threw into the arena. [Continuing reading:]

Prior to the advent of Hitler, the Zeitgeist Buchhandlung in Berlin, with a branch office of its own in Moscow, was an important Comintern cultural outlet, part of a syndicate headed by Willi Muenzenberg, who was also German head of the League Against Imperialism, of the Comintern's own bank in Paris, the Banque Commerciale Pour l'Europe du Nord, and a vast number of other Comintern organizations and enterprises until he was read out of the Comintern in 1933, 2 years before his suicide. The Shanghai branch of the Zeitgeist Bookstore was set as a focal distribution point of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, stocking Communist publications in German and English as well as more legitimate literature, mainly in German. The amount of business transacted by the Zeitgeist Bookstore was small and the shop closed in 1933, ostensibly due to its poor finances. A more likely reason was the destruction of the legalized German Communist Party since, after a trip to Europe in the autumn of 1933, Irene Weidemeyer returned to Shanghai on September 9, 1934, to set herself up in the book business again, this time as the Shanghai representative of International Publishers, of New York. The latter organization has long been the publishers of American Communist Party writings and the American distributor of international literature.

Although Miss Wiedemeyer acted as the agent of International Publishers, another Shanghai group was also known as the authorized agents for international literature. Mrs. V. N. Sotoff (Sotov), the wife of the head of the Shanghai agency of Tass, operated the American Book & Supply Co., which sold international literature; it is significant, however, that the American Book & Supply Co. and Miss Wiedemeyer's agency occupied offices in the same building at 410 Szechuan Road.

Miss Wiedemeyer had had some background in the Third International although there are gaps in information on her activities in Shanghai. She had married Wu Shao-kuo, a Chinese Communist, in Germany in 1925 and had studied the principles of revolutionary movements in Asia at the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow in 1926-27. In Shanghai she knew Agnes Smedley well and was a member of the Noulens Defense Committee and the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R. She, as well as Smedley and Isaacs during 1932, were reported to have been in close contact with John M. Murray, an American correspondent for the Pacific News Agency, a Vancouver organization listed as an outlet of the Comintern and possibly a front for the League Against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression of Canada. In any event the particular role of the leftist book shop was to operate as an outlet for revolutionary literature, rendezvous of espionage partisans and fellow travelers. Wiedemeyer's (Weitmeyer) Zeitgeist Bookstore is covered elsewhere in the Sorge trial records. Ozaki, Sorge's right-hand man, was introduced by Smedley in Weitmeyer's book shop, rendezvous of Shanghai leftists, mail drop for espionage agents. Later on, during his imprisonment in Sugamo, he (Ozaki) wrote a pathetic letter on June 8, 1943:

" * * * I might say that, in a more profound sense, my meeting with Agnes Smedley and Richard Sorge had been predestined * * * my subsequent decision to follow the narrow road was determined by my encounter with them * * * "

The little bookshop had done its bit as a recruiting station for the Fourth Bureau (Intelligence) of the Soviet Army—but the narrow road led to Ozaki's gallows.

This is as good a description of the character, purposes and operational quality of the so-called bookstores as outlets for Communist printed matter as I can give.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer in evidence the document prepared by General Willoughby from which he has been reading, and ask that it be marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 41."

General WILLOUGHBY. May I amplify this, Mr. Counsel? There are footnote references which are not shown in the mimeographed copy. There is not a single statement in this mimeographed abbreviated summary that is not backed by documentation.

At random, paragraph 8 is supported by SMP (Shanghai municipal police) file D-6480, November 14, 1934, to February 13, 1935, page 5, and so on.

Mr. TAVENNER. The copy which has been introduced in the record contains the full documentation.

General WILLOUGHBY. It was really for the benefit of the correspondents that I made that remark.

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted with the understanding it is adopted by the witness in toto as part of his testimony?

General WILLOUGHBY. I do.

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 41," is as follows:)

WILLOUGHBY EXHIBIT No. 41

THE SHANGHAI CONSPIRACY: 1929-49

22. *Shanghai police dossiers support Sorge records*

The element which intrigued MacArthur's intelligence research was the immediate and dramatic recognition that the Sorge story did not begin nor end with Tokyo, that it was no accident that Sorge served in Shanghai first, and that his later operations, localized in Japan, were only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet and Comintern international design. An investigation was opened into the Shanghai period and the Shanghai personages.

Miscellaneous records of the British and French Shanghai municipal police in the early thirties, open up an astonishing vista on a fantastic array of Communist fronts, ancillary agencies, and the vast interlocking operations of the Third International in China. It is in this particular period that the groundwork was laid for the Communist successes of today.

As in the Japanese court records, Smedley now appears in these independent documents, associated with well-known Comintern agents, leftists, and sympathizers; affiliated with or assisting in activities, most of which were Comintern-directed for the ultimate strategic benefit of Soviet Russia.

The role of Shanghai, a veritable witch's cauldron of international intrigue, a focal point of Communist effort, is already apparent in the records of the Sorge trial and collateral testimony. The Zeitgeist Bookshop, rendezvous of Sorge and Ozaki, and its astute owner, Miss Wiedemeyer (Weitmeyer), appear again, viewed from a different angle, recorded this time by a reputable international police body.¹ Smedley has attacked the Japanese court materials as "obtained under torture and duress"; this claim is, of course, a typical "red herring" and the customary smear-defense expected of a cornered individual. On the other hand, the files of the Shanghai international police can hardly be impugned as obtained under torture and duress, which Smedley slyly attributes to the "Japanese Fascists who were enemies of the United States." Communist strategic defense is often brilliant. This innuendo is a clever but futile defense maneuver. Smedley here manipulates both time and space. In Shanghai, in the early thirties, we are not dealing with the period of our uneasy alliance with the Soviets (1941-45), but with the prewar years of 1930-39, in the heyday of the Third International, prelude to the infamous Stalin-Hitler Pact, sole factor that made World War II at all possible.

¹ In early recognition that Shanghai was the focal point of Communist espionage and political subversion, F-2/Tokyo was lucky in acquiring substantial parts of these police records. Files had already been tampered with, especially reference to American personalities, but someone had bungled (or G-2 worked too fast); enough material remained to present an impressive continuity. Some of the Shanghai police officers were traced to Hong Kong, like Mr. J. Crighton, former chief detective-inspector, political intelligence group, Shanghai municipal police, who has a perfect recollection of Agnes Smedley, identified her as a Communist, working with the Communist Party in Shanghai, states she worked with the Noulens, and recalls that her police file was voluminous. His confirmation of the Shanghai files actually acquired by G-2 is collateral evidence from most authoritative quarters.

23. *Shanghai, focal point of Third International conspiracy*

There is more to the Shanghai municipal police files than an inferential accusation against Smedley. We are dealing here with a conspiratorial epoch in the history of modern China. Shanghai was the vineyard of communism. Here were sown the dragon's teeth that ripened into the Red harvest of today, and the farm labor was done by men and women of many nationalities who had no personal stakes in China other than an inexplicable fanaticism for an alien cause, the Communist "jihad" of Pan-slavism for the subjugation of the western world.

The greater design of the Soviet conquest of the East is already clear in the confession of Sorge, Soviet master spy. It is again recognizable in the intricate pattern of the Third International "apparatus." Shanghai was the focal point of sabotage and subversion, and to this Mecca flocked the Communist operators of the world for training, for experimentation, for career investments.

In 1927 a conference was held in Hankow under the auspices of the Third International and attended by Tom Mann (Great Britain), Earl Browder (United States of America), Jacques Doriot (France), Roy (India), and a number of others. It was decided that Communist work in this part of the world would be conducted by the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, of which Earl Browder was made secretary. He soon afterward became active in this work in which he was assisted by Katherine Harrison alias Alice Reed, considered by the police as a convenient "menage-a-deux." Earl Browder and his female assistant continued their work in the following year (1928) and spent most of their time in Shanghai. They were joined in August that year by one W. A. Haskell who also was assisted by a woman named Emerson, presumably his wife.²

Time, in its issue of April 25, 1949, features Eugene Dennis, the boss of the American Communists, now on trial. There is no point in repeating this terse, well-written story of the growth and world itinerary of a Soviet agent; important, however, are certain connecting links with the Sorge espionage case.³

Dennis who used to be Francis X. Waldron, obtained a fraudulent passport as Paul Walsh and traveled via Europe, South Africa to China. The worldwide ramifications of the Third Comintern, with Shanghai as the Far Eastern operating center, is reflected in the itinerary of this American disciple. Paul Eugene Walsh, alias Paul or Milton suddenly appears in the records of the Shanghai police; his police card states:

" * * * From December 1, 1933, until June 1934, he resided at Flat 6, Gresham Apartments, No. 1224 Avenue Joffre. On May 30, 1934, the lease of Flat 34D, Fochin Apartments, No. 634 Route Prehup was transferred to his name from Harry Berger, with whom he was obviously on terms of good friendship. Walsh resided at the latter address from June 1, 1934, until October 9, 1934, when he secretly left Shanghai for Trieste on the S. S. *Conte Verde*. It has been established that Walsh was one of the masterminds of the local machine of the Comintern and as such was responsible for the collation of many important documents relating to the propagation of Communist ideas in the Far East. * * *"

The Shanghai police classification lies in neatly with related fragments in the Sorge case; Sorge's assistants operated habitually under aliases or codes, usually their Christian names, viz: Paul, Max, Alex, John, etc. Significantly, a Comintern agent, under the code name of Paul took over the Shanghai station after Sorge's transfer to Japan.⁴

24. *The shadowy men with changeable names*

In 1930 a large host of agents of the Third International came to Shanghai and became associated with the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, and another important organ of the Third International, called the Far Eastern Bureau.

² G-2 Doc. No. 5: SMP File D-4825, May 2-16, 1935, p. 20. The presence of this prominent American Communist is significant.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 22. "During 1929, W. A. Haskell and Miss Emerson left Shanghai, but the ranks of the foreign Communist agents were by no means reduced, for Gerhart Eisler who lived in Wong Ka Shue Gardens between March 20 and November 30 and George Hardy and J. H. Dolson also visited Shanghai one after another."

⁴ There were plenty of other leads in the original G-2 report, converging on American Communists principally on the Pacific coast, the majority of Dennis. 18 names listing Communist agitators, agents, and suspects were reported as connected with the Sorge case and covered in the trial records (L. R. to M. D., Oct. 17, 1947).

⁵ Sorge: "Besides these two agents, Paul and John were dispatched from Moscow to work directly under Sorge." See also: G-2 Doc. No. 24: SMP File D-6227, June 15, 1933-August 5, 1934, pp. 8, 9.

Klausen: "I worked with Weizart. There were also Paul, Smedley, and Dr. Wood, all of whom I met in Shanghai. Paul succeeded Sorge as leader of the ring."

The new arrivals included Hilde Noulens (or Paul Ruegg), and Mrs. Noulens, of unknown nationality, A. E. Stewart, Margaret Undjus, and Judea Codkind, Americans, and Irene Wiedemeyer (Weit-meyer) who was German.⁵

Smedley was an associate of Irene's. Weitmeyer (Wiedemeyer) operated the Zeitgeist Bookshop in Shanghai, rendezvous of leftists and mail drop for espionage agents. Ozaki, Sorge's right-hand man was introduced by Smedley in Weitmeyer's place.⁶ Sorge testified:

" * * * As previously stated I first met Smedley in Shanghai, acquired her as a member, and through my recommendations, she was registered with Comintern headquarters. I do not know as to whether she was affiliated with the American Communist Party. Ozaki was also acquired in China. I reestablished contact with him after arriving in Japan, worked with him and recommended him to Comintern headquarters for registration. Thus I recommended both of them and offered myself as one of the two sponsors required for each new member. A member in Moscow consented to be the other sponsor on the strength of my recommendations and reports. * * *

The police card on Smedley states:

" * * * Agnes Smedley alias Alice Bird and Mrs. Perroikos * * * member of the following societies; Friends of the U. S. S. R.; Hindustan Association in Berlin; Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society; Noulens Defense Committee; All China Labor Federation and the China League for Civil Rights. * * * In possession of two passports German and American. Arrived in Shanghai in May 1929 from Berlin as the correspondent of the German newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung. She is in the service of the Eastern Branch of the Central Committee of the Communist International and is definitely known to have assisted local Indian secessionists on several occasions. * * * her chief duties comprise the supervising of Communist organizations among workers, and that she receives orders direct from the Central Committee of the Communist International in Moscow. * * *

The Shanghai police observed and recorded these furtive men and women, often without direct accusations. Such things are a matter of cumulative surveillance, but dossiers are never opened without some reason. Somehow, these names are tainted.

The case of Hilde Noulens also known as Paul Ruegg is both interesting and typical: The clandestine fraternity, working under the aegis of the Comintern, or the Soviet Army, could always count on a variety of front organizations to rally to their defense, if they got into trouble. The principal agency was The International Red Aid (MOPR), created in 1922, known as International Labor Defense in America. Inferentially, whenever the defense swung into action it was a foregone conclusion that the chief protagonists were under orders of the Comintern. To the glibble outsider, the defense action might look like a legitimate civil liberty agitation even with some sentimental appeal; however to the cognoscenti it was just another Red front mobilizing pink lawyers, agents, and fellow travelers.

Noulens arrived in Shanghai in 1930 under cover of a stolen Belgian passport as Fred Vandercruyzen to head the Far Eastern Bureau. Fifteen months later, he was arrested for Communist activities linked with a French Communist, Joseph Ducaux (also known as Serge Lefranc) then operating in Singapore. During the trial (and conviction) the authorities learned of his importance in the Comintern apparatus. This group operated on a considerable scale; they maintained 7 bank accounts, rented 15 houses or apartments, a veritable political rabbit warren; Ruegg Noulens used at least 12 names in Shanghai and carried 1 Canadian and 2 Belgian passports, while his wife used 5 names and 2 Belgian passports.⁷

⁵ C-2 Doc. No. 5; SMP File D 4825, May 8-10, 1933, p. 22.

⁶ Foreign Affairs Yearbook 1932. See XV, pp. 2-4 (Sorge).

⁷ G-2 Document No. 30; SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932. See also Sorge's Own Story (pt. 1, ch. 4, sec. J, par. 4). He is quite specific: "The Comintern group (FEB) consisted of two branches, the political branch (headed by Gerhart Eisler) and the organization branch (headed by Noulens); in the light of the current China debacle, the operational missions were significant: liaison between the Comintern (Soviet) and the Chinese Communist Party; political policy (decided upon by the Comintern) with respect to the Chinese Communist Party; exchange of information between the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern; financial liaison between the Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party; the movement of personnel between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party. Smedley's and Isaac's support of the Noulens Defense Committee or any other members must be viewed against the background of these international subversive missions.

Here, again, the Time article furnishes an interesting clue to identities; in a subparagraph heading: "The Little Kremlin," it says:

"* * * All but the most secret Communist operations in the United States were and still are, directed from the ramshackle, nine-story left building, on 85 East Twelfth Street, not far from Manhattan's Union Square. To its top-floor offices came the Communists' international 'Reps,' the shadowy men with the changeable names like P. Green, G. Williams, A. Ewert, H. Berger * * * which in a wink of the eye might become Drabkin, B. Mikhailov, Braun, or Gerhart Eisler. These were Moscow's agents. From the ninth floor the word which they brought from Moscow was passed along to the faithful, to the party hacks on the Daily Worker and Yiddish-language Freiheit, to the cultivators of organized labor's vineyards, to men like Christoffel in Milwaukee. * * *

The interesting thing about Time's shadowy men with the changeable names like A. Ewert, H. Berger, A. Steinburg, and Gerhart Eisler, is that these same names and identities appear both in the Sorge records and the Shanghai police files. Their crooked paths meander on into the forties and into the United States.

Most of the old wheel horses of the Communist Party appear to have been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clandestine fraternity as well as the acolytes and dupes, who are firing with the Red message. And somewhere in the bistros of the French concession, in the furtive rendezvous of the Shanghai conspirators, you can hear the metallic tinkle of 30 pieces of silver.

25. *The Comintern apparatus and Shanghai affiliates*

Other individuals, in variable degrees of implication with or commitment to the Communist movement, are covered elsewhere. All of them are understandable only in terms of their subservience to a foreign master; this relationship requires a background examination of the formidable world-wide machinery of the Comintern apparatus, machiavellian tool of the imperialist expansion of the Soviets, who have made progress beyond the wildest dream of Czarist ambition. In fact, it may be factually stated that the Soviets have taken up where the Czars left off and made further and more significant strides.

(a) *Comintern headquarters.*—The Moscow headquarters of the Third (Communist) International (Comintern) during the 1930's paralleled the organizational structure of the Soviet Government. Led by a world congress of Soviet and foreign Communists, who met at intervals between 1919 and 1935, actual control of the Comintern fell to the U. S. S. R. through its leadership of the world Communist movement and a Comintern organizational ruling which gave the

* G-2 Document No. 24. SMP File D-8227, June 15, 1933-August 5, 1936: A man of many aliases, when Paul Walsh appeared, it was Berger who rented his Shanghai apartment to him. Flat 35D Foneln Apartments No. 643. Route Frelupt. Berger left Shanghai for Vladivostok July 19, 1934, on the steamship *Yingchow* due to police raids at No. 38 Race Road, which netted incriminating Communist documents.

He appears in the Canadian espionage case as an "agent in the United States": Fred Rose, Communist member of the Parliament in Canada used Freda Lipshitz as go-between from himself (cover name Debouz) to Berger, and others in Washington.

* Gerhart Eisler Sorge Material (Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice, ch. IV, sec. J-4): "The Comintern group in Shanghai consisted of a political branch and an organization branch. The political branch was in charge of "Gerhardt" (Eisler) whom I had known in Germany and worked with in my Comintern days.

With the arrest of Noulens, Gerhardt's status in Shanghai became precarious and he decided to return to Moscow in 1931. * * *

The tendrils of Mr. Eisler weave into far places. He next appears as Communist International representative in the United States in 1936. His first wife was Hede Gumpertz. Eisler was later transferred to Europe. His second wife, Hede's sister, Elli whom he married in 1931 said she was still his wife in 1946. He returned to the United States with another woman, whom he apparently married in 1942. The amorous exploits of Comintern agents appear as complicated as their professional work. Hede Gumpertz was in charge of an underground Communist apparatus in Washington. She broke with Stalin later on. She knew Alger Hiss and talked with him in an apartment of Noel Field, State Department official who was a member of her apparatus. Incidentally, she was not allowed to tell her story to the jury in the first trial of the Hiss case (Counterattack, July 8, 1948). The character of her former husband makes this story more than plausible.

An ardent sense of slight comfort to the mothers of America: A considerable number of young American soldiers died in the war period 1941-45, so that "Gerhardt" Eisler could pursue his business of treason and sabotage in the comparative safety of the United States. It is noted that he found Europe too hot in 1941. Needless to say, there is no mention of a draft for service in the United States except perhaps to subvert some Government employees. Eisler's spectacular arrest in New York and subsequent escape to London recently, dovetail accurately into the general pattern of long ago. He left Shanghai in 1931 in just as much of a hurry and for the same reasons.

largest representation to the nation playing host to the Congress—in every case the Soviet Union. The executive functions of the Comintern were vested in the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), which advertised several foreign members but was actually controlled by its predominant Soviet representation. Like the "World" Congress, the ECCI met periodically, primarily to determine general lines of policy, but final control of the Comintern rested in the "praesidium," which was made up, among others, of a "politburo," several standing Commissions, and a political Secretariat. Under the praesidium there were several training schools, sectional or regional secretariats and auxiliary departments, which were concerned with generalized work in specific fields and, finally, certain auxiliary organizations which worked directly and specifically with foreign Communist or Communist-front groups.

The Comintern was the nondiplomatic foreign arm of the U. S. S. R. Organized at Moscow in 1919, the Comintern was, until its alleged dissolution in 1943, a quasi-governmental body aimed largely at fostering Communist and Communist-front groups in the capitalist world in order to carry out such Communist strategy as the Government of the U. S. S. R. considered essential to the promotion of world revolution or, as conditions required, the protection of the Soviet Union.

(b) *Auxiliary organizations.*—Only a few of the Moscow auxiliary organizations are of immediate concern here, although all of them, numbering about 13, had variable interests in Shanghai, operating through an extraordinary variety of channels:

(1) *Profintern:* The Red International of Labor (Profintern) was created in 1919 in order to counteract the influence of the International Federation of Labor Unions of the Second (Socialist) International. The profintern consisted of a headquarters apparatus controlled by the praesidium and of affiliated sections which in most countries outside the U. S. S. R. took the form of Red trade-union oppositions. In the field, the Profintern organized international propaganda committees for work among specific trades. In addition, the Profintern sponsored the creation of parallel labor-union federations of which the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PTTUS) and the All China Labor Federation were important examples.

(2) *Krestintern:* The Red Peasant International (Krestintern) was founded in 1923 to break the resistance to communism of the peasantry in various countries. Although it enjoyed far less success than organizations devoted to the laborer and the intellectuals, it directed local Communist groups which organized so-called peasants' unions including the Chinese Peasant League.

(3) *VOKS:* The Society for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries (VOKS) was established in Moscow in 1923 to promote Soviet culture abroad as an instrument of political propaganda. The cultural attaché of each Soviet Embassy abroad was in direct charge of VOKS and, as such, was charged with liaison with the ECCI in Moscow and with the formation of the so-called friendly societies. The activities of VOKS can be gaged from the sections of its headquarters: Foreign relations; reception of foreigners; international book exchange; press; exhibitions, etc.

(4) *MOPR:* International Red Aid (MOPR), created in 1922, has been characterized as the "Red Cross of the Communist International," designed primarily to assist political prisoners, secret agents caught red-handed and other victims of bourgeois reaction.²⁰ International Red Aid, which functioned legally and illegally in 67 countries was complemented by Workers International Relief, both directed for many years by the German Communist Willi Muenzenberg. Abroad not only International Red Aid itself but separate Communist-front groups organized for the defense of a particular case have played the leading role in assisting individual Communists jailed for subversive activities.

(5) *IURW:* The International Union of Revolutionary Writers was organized in 1925, probably under VOKS auspices, to enlist sympathetic literati abroad for the promotion of pro-Soviet and anti-Fascist and antiwar themes. In Moscow the IURW was responsible for the publication of the English-language Moscow Daily News and International Literature, a periodical devoted to the promulgation of Communist ideology abroad. At one time an American, Walt Carmon,

²⁰ With calculated skill international communism long ago subverted semantics to confuse the slogans and clichés of capitalist society; the universal sentimental appeal of the historical Red Cross and its protection of the weak and oppressed was bound to be exploited. In the United States the agency was known as International Labor Defense.

was an assistant editor of *International Literature*.¹¹ Langston Hughes, the American Communist poet, and Agnes Smedley were contributors. Anna Louise Strong for years was editor of the *Moscow Daily News*, while another American, Fred Ellis, was employed as a cartoonist on the staff of *Trud*, the official organ of the All Union Council of Soviet Trade-Unions.¹² The printing of these foreign language periodicals was done by the State Publishing House (Gosstat) in cooperation with the International Book Publishing Association (Mezhkniga), both Soviet Government enterprises.

26. Chinese organizations and Communist fronts

On a national and sectional level the organs of the Comintern often began to lose their distinctive coloring, becoming Communist-front groups in a host of forms. However, each auxiliary organization of the Comintern was represented abroad, often by apparently unconnected groups, which ranged from outright Communist to pseudo-liberal movements, which were organized or infiltrated by Comintern agents. In many cases, these national organizations could be traced to more than one Moscow group as activities impinged on the different fields of the praesidium. Often they were temporary organizations or local movements designed to gain popular or mass support for an immediate aim; just as often, however, they were serious long-term projects. As these groups touched the Shanghai scene during the period of Smedley's residence there, they form an interesting and often highly interconnected web which requires relatively detailed treatment.

(a) *PPTUS*—The Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and its parent organization, the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau, were the most important and highly organized apparatus for Comintern labor activities in the Far East during the late 1920's and early 1930's.¹³ The PPTUS set up in 1927 at a conference in Hankow, was attended by several prominent Comintern leaders, including Lozovsky,¹⁴ a Comintern agent who rose from secretary of the Profintern in 1928 to a transient position as leader of the Soviet labor movement. Another member of the Hankow conference who later became first head of the PPTUS was the American Communist Earl Browder, who was assisted in his work in Shanghai by an American woman, Katherine Harrison. Other Americans, including a journalist, James H. Dolsen, one Albert Edward Stewart, and Margaret Endjus, were prominent in the affairs of the PPTUS as was the German woman, Wiedemeyer.¹⁵ Richard Sorge himself was suspected by the Shanghai police of having come on a mission for the PPTUS when he arrived in Shanghai in 1930.¹⁶

Set up for Comintern work in China, Indochina, Malaya, Japan, Formosa, Korea, and the Philippines, the PPTUS had no direct connection with the ECCI or the Praesidium in Moscow although a chain of liaison existed to the Profintern and some instances of direct connection between Moscow and Shanghai were discovered. In that particular period and primarily for security, the PPTUS derived its authority from a Comintern subsidiary in Berlin, the Western European Bureau (WEB) and from the WEB through the Far Eastern Bureau (FEB) in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok.¹⁷

The Western European Bureau, largely an organ of the immensely powerful and well organized (pre-Hitler) German Communist Party, went far beyond its stated function of maintaining contact with the sections in Western Europe; in fact, the WEB appears to have been, for a time, almost a peer of the ECCI, operating often independently. From the WEB authority went to the Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai. There was also an FEB (Dalluro) in Khabarovsk (later transferred to Vladivostok) which maintained direct contact with both the illegal PKR in Shanghai and the Praesidium of the Comintern in Moscow. Instructions and cash subsidies for distribution by the FEB were transmitted from the WEB in Berlin through courier channels to an import business in

¹¹ Editor: Walt Carlson is listed in the Fourth Report, Un-American Activities in California, 1948, p. 273, as a member of the League of American Writers and affiliated with its congress.

¹² G-2 Document No. 40: SMP File D-5834, April 25, 1934, p. 4.

¹³ G-2 Document No. 39: SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932, p. 13.

¹⁴ G-2 Document No. 37: SMP File D-7884, May 10, 1927 to April 16, 1928. Editor, Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, an old-time Bolshevik, was known as an expert on the Far East and has held important posts in the Dalluro (Far Eastern Bureau). His early connection with Sorge is worthy of note. *Sorge's Own Story*, ch. III, p. 55.

¹⁵ G-2 Document No. 5: SMP File 4825, May 8 to 10, 1933, pp. 20-22.

¹⁶ G-2 Document No. 18: SMP File D-3509, January 10, 1932, to August 31, 1933, p. 5.

¹⁷ G-2 Document No. 30: SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932. Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947.

Shanghai dealing in wines, perfumes, and other luxury articles. Comintern agents in the import company passed on these funds and instructions to the staff of the FEB (Shanghai) which consisted of eight or nine Europeans and several Chinese. Funds of the FEB were deposited in no less than seven Chinese banks from which they then were withdrawn as needed. The FEB was a regional organ of the Comintern, responsible for the dispatch of students for training in Moscow and for payments to Chinese organizations led by the PPTUS.¹⁷ The size of the payments, at least \$500,000 annually, gives some indication of the importance attached to China alone by the Comintern strategists of the early 1930's.¹⁸

The operational unit of the FEB although preceding the parent body in date of formation in Shanghai, the PPTUS (also known as TOSS) was staffed largely by the same personalities although direct PPTUS work was done by three foreigners aided by Chinese translators. Two of the foreigners working for PPTUS during the early 1930's are known to have been Albert Edward Stewart and Margaret Endjus, while the third was reported to have been James Dolson, all Americans.¹⁹

When Earl Browder left Shanghai in 1929 or 1930, Gerhart Eisler is reported to have taken his place as secretary of the PPTUS. It is certain that Eisler was in Shanghai in 1929 in connection with the PPTUS.²⁰ The interlocking evidence of the Sorge records settle this point beyond a doubt: the FEB was divided into an organizational section, under Noulens and a political branch under Gerhart (Eisler). When Noulens was arrested, Eisler fled and other operators went underground. Conversely, this fact puts the Noulens defense group in a proper light: Soviet agents staging a defense rally for another agent.

The most famous of the Comintern agents connected with the FEB (and PPTUS), were Paul and Gertrude Ruegg, more widely known as Mr. and Mrs. Hilaire Noulens. Noulens, traveling on a stolen Belgian passport as Ferdinand Vandereruyzen, arrived in Shanghai March 19, 1930, to head the FEB. Fifteen months later, on June 13, 1931, he was arrested for Communist activities as a result of a cable address found on a French Communist Joseph Ducroux, alias Sorge LeFranc, when the latter was arrested in Singapore on June 1, 1930. Following Ruegg's arrest, trial, and conviction, authorities learned that he and other members of the FEB and PPTUS, in addition to seven bank accounts, had rented 14 or 15 houses and apartments while in Shanghai, seven of which were known to have been maintained concurrently. Ruegg himself used at least 12 names in Shanghai and carried 1 Canadian and 2 Belgian passports and his wife used 5 names and also carried 2 Belgian passports.²¹

¹⁷Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, p. 40ff. See also report by Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence in the French Municipal Police, Shanghai: Simultaneément avec l'établissement du Bureau extrême-oriental de la Troisième Internationale, le Profintern (International Syndicate Rouge) installé, également à Shanghai, une branche du Secrétariat de l'Union Pan-Pacifique Ouvrière (organisation auxiliaire du Profintern, chargée de la direction du mouvement syndicaliste militant dans les pays du Pacifique et dont le siège se trouve depuis 1929 à Vladivostok). G-2 Document No. 104. (English translation supplied by Bureau of the Third International, the Profintern (Red International of Labor) installed, likewise at Shanghai, a branch of the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (auxiliary organization of the Profintern, charged with the direction of the militant trade-union movement in the Pacific countries, and of which the headquarters have been since 1929 in Vladivostok).)

¹⁸G-2 Document No. 30: SMP File ZCS 827, March 7, 1932, pp. 15, 29, 30.

¹⁹G-2 Document No. 5: SMP File No. 4825, May 8 to 10, 1933, p. 21. The records of these men as Communists and Comintern operators is beyond question and has become crystal clear in recent years. Eisler is probably the more dangerous of the two. His recent flight aboard a Polish ship, his seizure and release by the British are all of a pattern. See also Sorge Story, pt. I, ch. 4, sec. 7, pgs. 4 and 5.

²⁰G-2 Document No. 30: SMP File No. ZCS-827, March 7, 1932, p. 18ff. The French report, previously quoted bears out the Shanghai documents: Sur LeFranc on trouva deux boîtes de papier dont l'une portait l'indication, Post Office Box 208, Shanghai et l'autre: Hilaire, Shanghai. . . Des descentes furent aussitôt opérées dans les autres maisons louées par Noulens sous différents noms. Elles amenèrent la saisie d'une quantité importante de littérature communiste et de nombreux documents en différentes langues, relatifs au mouvement communiste en Extrême-Orient et l'arrestation de la femme de Noulens connue sous les noms de Madame Vandereruyzen, Morre, Ruck, etc. (G-2 Document No. 104). (English translation supplied by the committee: On the person of Le Franc were found two sheets of paper, of which one carried the notation, "Post Office Box 208, Shanghai," and the other: Hilaire, Shanghai. . . Raids were immediately conducted in the other houses leased by Noulens under different names. They led to the seizure of a sizable quantity of Communist literature and of numerous documents in different languages relative to the Communist movement in the Far East and the arrest of the wife of Noulens known under the names of Madame Vandereruyzen, Morre, Ruck, etc.)

The All-China Labor Federation, of which Smedley was a member²² was one of the recipients of the FEB subsidies, receiving \$1,500 monthly from the PPTUS.²³

(b) *Nouzens Defense Committee*.—International Red Aid (MOPR), as stated, has taken various forms abroad.²⁴ In Shanghai MOPR played its most spectacular role during the early 1930's in the defense of the head of the FEB, Paul Ruegg, alias Hilaire Nouzens, alias Hilarie Nouzens, alias Ferdinand Vandercruyssen and a host of other names. When Paul and Gertrude Ruegg were arrested June 13, 1931, the International Red Aid took charge of their defense. Willi Muenzenberg, German Communist wheel horse and one of the Comintern's most efficient organizers of both Communist and front groups, formed a defense unit first known as the Nouzens Defense Committee, the Shanghai branch being led by Harold Isaacs,²⁵ and boasting among its members Agnes Smedley, Irene Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer) and Madam Sun Yat-sen; the group continued efforts to free these Comintern agents for several years after they were finally sentenced.²⁶

The Rueggs, when arrested, posed as Belgian citizens named Herzsens, and had used many aliases, such as Vandercruyssen, although the man had previously been known in Shanghai as Hilaire Nouzens. Their claim to Belgian protection was disapproved and the couple was handed over to the Chinese authorities for prosecution as Communist agents. The League Against Imperialism and other Comintern groups protested that Nouzens, as he was then known, was merely the paid secretary of the PPTUS, possibly a more easily defensible position than his actual post as leader of the FEB. Later in 1931 a collateral English defense group, apparently inadvertently, referred to him as "Ruegg." The ensuing investigation disclosed that Paul Ruegg was an active

²² G-2 Document No. 10; SMP File D-4718, January 4 to May 20, 1933, p. 22.

²³ G-2 Document No. 30; SMP ZCS-327, March 7, 1932, p. 14. Editor: Like so many front organizations, this Profintern agency is difficult to trace in all its ramifications. As a Chinese labor organization it attempted to channelize laborers' grievance toward Communist ends. As a foreigner, Smedley's position is not quite clear, though as an outside adviser Smedley gave the All-China Labor Federation a direct connection with the Profintern in addition to its indirect liaison through the PPTUS, the FEB, and finally the WFB.

²⁴ Editor: In the United States MOPR has been known as International Labor Defense, headed for several years by Representative Vito Marcantonio. A more recent offshoot is the Civil Rights Congress, a postwar development, which drew heavily non-Communist support to make it a genuine front group. An important part of the technique of this and similar MOPR groups is to form in democratic countries so-called civil rights groups to defend individual cases. Characteristically, the Civil Rights Congress has formed an Eisler Defense Committee, or committees to protest the denial of public meeting privileges to known Communists, and others which can enlist the support of many Americans genuinely interested in the protection of civil rights (Union Calendar 575, H. Rept. No. 1115, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Report on Civil Rights Congress as a Communist-Front Organization, September 2, 1947. Fifth report, Un-American Activities in California, 1949, pp. 439, 446).

²⁵ G-2 Document No. 16; SMP File D-6628, April 1935, p. 4; G-2 Document No. 6; SMP File D-3956, August 18, 1932-May 23, 1935, pp. 10, 11.

²⁶ G-2 Document No. 12; SMP (French) Dossier No. III A-30, March 10, 1930-November 19, 1941, 2-C-16. J. M. Jabez, the former deputy commissioner of intelligence in the French municipal police, Shanghai, again provides collateral information on this notorious case: "Les 10 et 20 aout 1931. Madame Sun Yat-sen qui venait de rentrer de Berlin à Shanghai, recevait de différents organisations et groupes radicaux d'Europe, une série de telegrammes lui demandant d'intervenir dans l'affaire Nouzens et réclamant la libération des inculpés. Parmi ces telegrammes, à noter ceux des écrivains et des artistes allemands, des avocats allemands, de Clara Zetkine, membre de la fraction communiste du Reichstag (décédée en juin 1933, en URSS), d'un groupe de membres travaillistes du Parlement Anglais, d'écrivains, d'artistes et de savants Espagnols, du Comité Central de la Ligue Contre l'Impérialisme, du Comité Central du Secours Ouvrier International, de Romain Rolland, l'Impérialisme, du Comité Central du Secours Ouvrier International, de Romain Rolland, l'Impérialisme, etc. * * * Au début du mois de Septembre 1931 les milieux radicaux étrangers à Shanghai avaient formé, de leur côté, un comité de 'secours' au Secrétaire de l'Union Pan-pacifique Ouvriers.' Parmi les membres de ce comité se trouvaient Madame Agnes Smedley, anarchiste syndicaliste Américaine, bien connue dans les milieux radicaux de la Place, J. B. Powell, rédacteur du journal China Weekly Review, Edgar Snow, H. Isaacs, journalistes radicaux Américains (G-2 Document No. 104). (English translation supplied by the committee: August 19 and 20, 1931. Madame Sun Yat-sen, who had just returned from Berlin to Shanghai, received from various radical European organizations and groups, a series of telegrams demanding of her to intervene in the Nouzens case and demanding the liberation of the defendants. Among these telegrams were noted those from writers, German artists, and lawyers; from Clara Zetkin, member of the Communist faction of the Reichstag (deceased the last of June 1933, in the U. S. S. R.); and from a group of members of the Workers Party of the English Parliament; from Spanish writers, artists, and intellectuals; from the Central Committee of the League Against Imperialism; from the Central Committee of the International Labor Defense; from Romain Rolland, Henry Barbusse, etc. . . . At the beginning of the month of September 1931, the intellectual radical foreigners in Shanghai formed, for their part, a committee for aid to the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat. Among the members of this committee was discovered to have been Agnes Smedley, American anarchist trade-unionist, well known in the radical circles of Shanghai; J. B. Powell, editor of the paper, China Weekly Review; Edgar Snow and H. Isaacs, radical American journalists (G-2 Document No. 104).)

Swiss Communist who had been prominent a decade earlier in Switzerland and had come to police notice only sporadically after he had gone to Moscow in 1924.²⁷ After the disclosure of Ruegg's identity, the international committees adopted his real name for their Committee for the Defense of Paul and Gertrude Ruegg. The committee attracted or solicited known Communists, incidental sympathizers, and non-Communist humanitarians, listing Leon Fechtwanger and Albert Einstein as German members of the committee, and several sentimental Americans then at the height of their fame, including Floyd Dell, Sinclair Lewis, Theodore Dreiser, John Dos Passos, and Oswald Garrison Villard.²⁸

Despite MOPT efforts, the Rueggs were found guilty of seditious activities and imprisoned in Nanking. With the release of many political prisoners, when Nanking fell to the Japanese, the pair were liberated in September 1937 and have since disappeared. Ruegg is reported to have entered the United States in 1939 as Naum Katzenberg²⁹ and another report claims that he again visited Shanghai in 1939, Chungking in 1940, and the Philippines in 1941.³⁰

(c) *Friends of the U. S. S. R.*—The Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R., Shanghai branch was founded in 1932 by Edmund Egon Kisch, a Czechoslovakian journalist long known as a Comintern agent.³¹ The Shanghai branch of this pro-Soviet Communist front was one of a series of typical overseas societies for cultural relations between the U. S. S. R. and a given country, the autonomous and ostensibly independent branch in the United States being known as the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, the successor to the (American) Friends of the Soviet Union and the American Council on Soviet Relations.³² The purpose behind the formation of these groups is to gain support for Soviet foreign policy objectives through highly publicized participation in these front organizations of "liberal" elements who were presumed to believe sincerely in the altruistic nature of Soviet policy.³³

The names of some of the more important members of the Shanghai branch are known, listing among others in the early 1930's Agnes Smedley, Irene Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer), and Harold Isaacs.³⁴ Communism un masks boldly when successful. The character of this society is made plain by its sudden revival in our days in the wake of the Communist conquest of China. A new label appeared, "China-Soviet Friendship Association," and opening meetings were attended by Communist bigwigs like Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-chi. Madame Sun Yat-sen was listed as one of the sponsors of an organization which proclaimed its mission as "the establishment and consolidation of the cultural, economic, and other relations of China and the Soviet Union."

(d) *Friends of China.*—Outside the original range of the friendly societies, but similar to foreign cultural groups for the support of countries presently within the Soviet orbit, the International Friends of China was a front organization which capitalized on western sympathy for China and its defense against Japanese aggression, in order to promote the ends of the Chinese Communists. Like individual fellow travelers, the Friends of China, founded in 1934 with offices in New York, London, and Paris, gave sole credit for Chinese resistance to the Chinese Communists and attempted to divert normal sympathy to support of one party in China. Although its stated aims were lofty, the society tipped its hand when it claimed to have "done much to expose the collaboration of Chiang Kai-shek with the Japanese, British, and American imperialists." Although the London and Paris branches engaged in relatively little activity, European members then included such respectable fronts as the Labor Party's chief whip in the House of Lords, Lord Marley and Bertrand Russell, long known for his interest in China, as well as Edmund Egon Kisch, classified as

²⁷ G-2 Document No. 30: SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932, pp. 21-22.

²⁸ G-2 Document No. 6: SMP File D 3656, August 18, 1932-May 23, 1935, p. 10.

²⁹ Memorandum 19, December 1, 1947, Third (Communist) International, Personnel, p. 43.

³⁰ G-2 Document No. 33: SMP File ZCS-638, October 9, 1947, p. 9.

³¹ G-2 Document No. 10: SMP File D-4718, January 4, 1933-May 20, 1933, p. 31.

³² DA Cir. 192, DA Washington 25, D. C., June 29, 1948.

³³ WDGS, The Soviet Union, p. 56. (Editor:) Membership in a Soviet friendship society is neither charge nor proof of Communist Party membership. Affiliation could be classified as misplaced sympathy. However, when association is combined with more obviously Communist groups, membership in a "friendly" society becomes a practical indication of strong support of Communist world objectives. Thus the imperceptible evolution of the fellow traveler.

³⁴ G-2 Document No. 31: SMP file cards, various: G-2 Document No. 10, SMP File D-4718, various.

an active Comintern agent, and other known Communists. The New York branch, the American Friends of China, which included Earl Browder in its membership, was the most active. Affiliated with the Communist-front American League Against War and Fascism,³² the American Friends of China published its own monthly magazine *China Today* which was pro-Communist.³³

The American group also sponsored a Shanghai publication of similar nature, *Voice of China*, published by Max and Grace Granich. This paper, published from March 1936 until the latter part of 1937, although not overtly a Communist publication, portrayed the Chinese Communists as the only defenders of China's independence and resistance to the Japanese. The magazine was suppressed after more than 18 months of existence and the Graniches returned to the United States December 21, 1937.³⁴

(6) *League for Civil Rights.*—The China League for Civil Rights remained in a twilight zone of respectability en route to becoming a Communist-front organization. The group was initially organized by such liberal Kuomintang members as Madame Sun Yat-sen, who, despite her sojourn in Moscow and her acceptance by the CCP, was not then regarded as a Communist, Hu Shih, Lin Yu-tang, and Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei at the height of the Kuomintang persecution of dissident opinion.³⁵ As a Communist front during its comparatively short existence, it was a perfect example of such an organization. Obviously objected to by Kuomintang authorities, who closed its Peiping branch, the high position of the Chinese leaders of the parent organization in Shanghai precluded any direct action against the league by the Nanking authorities until the organization finally liquidated itself after complete lack of success in its objectives.³⁶

(7) *League Against Imperialism.*—The League Against Imperialism was a relatively early Comintern body, founded by German Communists and various colonial nationals as the League for Struggle Against Colonial Oppression. While it existed outside any of the auxiliary groups of the ECCI, its direct connection with Moscow was obvious and its basis was article 8 of the conditions of admission to the Comintern, obliging Comintern sections in countries with colonies to advocate and support the "liberation" of colonial populations. At a 1927 Congress in Brussels, the notorious Willi Muenzenberg formed the League Against Imperialism as a front or so-called innocents group which would serve as a rallying point for anti-imperialist national revolutionary movements and promote the U. S. S. R. as the champion of the liberty of colonial people.³⁷ Agnes Smedley, during her Berlin days, admits having been present when her Indian friends participated with the Communists in founding the league³⁸ and took an active part, shortly after her arrival in Shanghai in May 1929, in organizing the China League Against Imperialism.³⁹ The Chinese branch, along with its western counterpart, took an active part in attempting to agitate mass pressure in the Noulens case⁴⁰ and participated in several antiforeign movements, later becoming involved with the Antiwar Congress.

Typical of the Communist-front organization in seeking respectable stooges, the Antiwar Congress boasted Ellen Wilkinson, the Labor MP, and Lord Marley as leading names.⁴¹ Following a congress in Amsterdam in August 1932, Lord Marley and a party of foreigners sailed for Shanghai to attend an Asiatic Congress Against Imperialist War. The Chinese Communists had no illusions about this group, despite its "liberal" front, often referring to it as the Barbusse Mission after one of its members, Henri Barbusse, a prominent member of the Comintern and publisher of the French Communist organs *L'Humanité* and *Le Monde*.⁴²

³²(Editor.) *The World Committee Against War and Fascism*, organized in 1932, was designed to direct public opinion against any aggressor against the Soviet Union and to promote noninterventional pacifism. Although many members of the World Committee were non-Communists, its control was in the hands of such Communists as Willi Muenzenberg and Henri Barbusse. Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, Third (Communist) International, Structure and Functions, p. 56.

³³G-2 Document No. 91: SMP File D-7256, April 16, 1936, p. 3.

³⁴G-2 Document No. 4: SMP File D-7295, March 3, 1936-December 30, 1937.

³⁵Editor: The presence of at least two foreigners, Smedley and Isaacs, is worthy of note. G-2 Document No. 31, SMP file cords, various.

³⁶G-2 Document No. 96: SMP File D-4455, February 2, 1933 May 14, 1935, p. 22.

³⁷Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, Third (Communist) International Structure and Functions, pp. 7, 56 et al.

³⁸Battle Hymn of China, op. cit., p. 24.

³⁹G-2 Document No. 1: SMP File D-7268, March 3, 1936-December 30, 1937, p. 55.

⁴⁰G-2 Document No. 49: SMP File No. D-3527, April 15, 1932-August 18, 1932, p. 4.

⁴¹G-2 Document No. 68: SMP File D-2554, October 12, 1932, pp. 10, 11, 15.

⁴²G-2 Document No. 59: SMP File D-4280, July 6, 1933-February 19, 1938.

⁴³G-2 Document No. 46: SMP File D-517, September 19-October 25, 1929, p. 12;

G-2 Document No. 68: SMP File D-4380/5, August 25, 1933, pp. 90, 113, etc.

The Antiwar Congress presumably was to gather data on Japanese aggression, the Comintern having denounced the 1931 Lytton Mission as a "whitewash" by the "imperialist organ," the League of Nations. Madame Sun Yat-sen, China representative of the World Committee Against Imperialist War, headed the welcoming committee and a host of organizations in China promoted the mission, organizing mass welcome demonstrations but tying in the visit with the necessity for the "extension of the revolutionary struggle." Joined with these ostensibly Chinese problems were demands "to oppose the imperialist attack on the U. S. S. R." as well as to "celebrate the recent victories of the (Chinese) Red armies" and "to oppose Christianity and fascism."⁴² On hand to welcome the mission were Agnes Smedley and delegates from America, Canada, and Australia. It appears, however, that the Antiwar Congress accomplished nothing: Lord Marley spoke at a few meetings, was shocked when taken through a colony of laborers' hovels, and departed Shanghai less than 2 months after his arrival.⁴³

(9) *Zeitgeist Bookstore*.—The *Zeitgeist Bookstore*, established by Irene E. I. Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer) in November 1930, was part of a widespread and elaborate Comintern network operating from the International Union of Revolutionary Writers in Moscow. Prior to the advent of Hitler, the *Zeitgeist Buchhandlung* in Berlin, with a branch office of its own in Moscow, was an important Comintern cultural outlet, part of a syndicate headed by Willi Muenzenberg, who was also German head of the League Against Imperialism, of the Comintern's own bank in Paris, the *Banque Commerciale Pour l'Europe du Nord*, and a vast number of other Comintern organizations and enterprises until he was read out of the Comintern in 1933, 2 years before his suicide.⁴⁴ The Shanghai branch of the *Zeitgeist Bookstore* was set up as a focal distribution point of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, stocking Communist publications in German and English as well as more legitimate literature, mainly in German. The amount of business transacted by the *Zeitgeist Bookstore* was small and the shop closed in 1933, ostensibly due to its poor finances. A more likely reason was the destruction of the legalized German Communist Party since, after a trip to Europe in the autumn of 1933, Irene Wiedemeyer returned to Shanghai on September 9, 1934 to set herself up in the book business again, this time as the Shanghai representative of International Publishers of New York.⁴⁵ The latter organization has long been the publishers of American Communist Party writings and the American distributor of International Literature.⁴⁶

Although Miss Wiedemeyer acted as the agent of International Publishers, another Shanghai group was also known as the authorized agents for International Literature. Mrs. V. N. Scroff (Sotox), the wife of the head of the Shanghai agency of TASS, operated the American Book & Supply Co., which sold International Literature; it is significant, however, that the American Book & Supply Co. and Miss Wiedemeyer's agency occupied offices in the same building at 410 Szechuan Road.⁴⁷

Miss Wiedemeyer had had some background in the Third International although there are gaps in information on her activities in Shanghai. She had married Wu Shao-kuo, a Chinese Communist, in Germany in 1925 and had studied the principles of revolutionary movements in Asia at the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow in 1926-27. In Shanghai she knew Agnes Smedley well and was a member of the Nonleas Defense Committee and the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R. She, as well as Smedley and Isaacs during 1932 were reported to have been in close contact with John M. Murray, an American correspondent for the Pacific News Agency, a Vancouver organization listed as an outlet of the Comintern and possibly a front for the League Against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression of Canada.⁴⁸ In any event the particular role of the leftist bookshop was to operate as an outlet for revolutionary literature, rendezvous of espionage partisans and fellow travelers. Wiedemeyer's (Weitemeyer) *Zeitgeist Bookstore* is covered elsewhere in the Sorge Trial Records. Ozaki, Sorge's

⁴² G-2 Document No. 68: SMP File D-4386, July 15-August 18, 1933, pp. 161, 156.

⁴³ G-2 Document No. 68: SMP File D-4386/5, September 28, 1933, p. 93. G-2 Document No. 59: SMP File D-4386, July 6, 1933-February 19, 1936.

⁴⁴ Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, Ibid. (Communist) International Structure and Functions, pp. 37, 41, 42, et al. (3847). This report presents an interesting picture of some of the activities of a remarkable Comintern agent.

⁴⁵ G-2 Document No. 23: SMP File D-6450, November 14, 1934-February 13, 1935, p. 5. SMP file card (Weitemeyer).

⁴⁶ G-2 Document No. 23: SMP File D-6480, November 14, 1934-February 13, 1935, p. 5.

⁴⁷ G-2 Document No. 31: SMP file card (Weitemeyer).

⁴⁸ G-2 Document No. 10: SMP File D-4718, January 4, 1933-May 20, 1933, pp. 20-82.

right-hand man, was introduced by Smedley in Weitemeyer's bookshop, rendezvous of Shanghai leftists, mail drop for espionage agents." Later on, during his imprisonment in Sugamo, he wrote a pathetic letter on June 8, 1943:

" * * * I may say that, in a more profound sense, my meeting with Agnes Smedley and Richard Sorge had been predestined * * * my subsequent decision to follow the narrow road was determined by my encounter with them * * *"

The little bookshop had done its bit as a recruiting station for the Fourth Bureau (Intelligence) of the Soviet Army—but the narrow road led to the gallows!

(h) *Ancillary American contributory factors.*—The interlocking court records of the Sorge case and the files of the Shanghai municipal police show a very considerable traffic of shady international characters, over a long period of years. Their clandestine operations in the thirties have paved the way for the collapse of Nationalist China in recent years, under the cumulative impact of the Japanese occupation.

The recent State Department white paper throws some flickering light on this complex, general problem:

" * * * The combined force of overpopulation and new ideas set in motion the Chinese revolution, first under the leadership of Sun Yat-Sen and later Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. It should be remembered that Soviet doctrine and practice had a measurable effect upon the thinking and principles of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen particularly in terms of economics and party organization and that the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists cooperated until 1927, when the Third International demanded a predominant position in the Government and in the Army. It was this demand which precipitated the break between the two groups. * * *"

This is an oblique admission that the infant republic was weaned on Soviet doctrine and practice; it easily explains the widow Sun Yat-Sen as a front for many Communist efforts and it concedes naively, that the Chinese Communist Party came under the orders of the Third International, the recognized Soviet tool of internal sabotage and subversion, in its demands on the government and army in 1927—and thereafter.

The Shanghai police records contain many items in which American diplomatic and consular officers have attempted to stem the Red tide, by denying the protection of the International Settlement or American pseudo-citizenship to these operators; a classical case is the intervention of the American consul to stop the publication of *The Voice of China*.²⁴

While the white paper apparently skirts the conspiratorial underground, it confirms the impact of the Comintern apparatus, amply evident in the Sorge and Shanghai documents; it can at once be stated that individual propagandists and operators like Smedley and Stein, and the horde of saboteurs, agents, fellow travelers and dupes, unleashed by the Comintern, represent the major element in this Oriental disaster and their nefarious work must be considered a contributory and even decisive factor.

MR. TAVENNER. I desire also to introduce in evidence a map tracing the connection of the various organizations concerning which you have testified with various Soviet Government agencies and divisions of the Comintern. I will hand it to you and ask you to identify it.

General WILLOUGHBY. It is so identified, sir.

MR. TAVENNER. I offer it in evidence and ask that it be marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 42."

MR. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The map above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 42," is filed herewith.)

MR. TAVENNER. Will you explain briefly to the committee what it purports to show?

²⁴ Vol. II of five volumes of procurator's examination of Ozaki, Hosomi; Interrogation No. 20, March 5, 1942, Question 14 et al.

²⁵ See footnote 36; pt. III; G-2 Dec. 4, SMP File D-7298, March 3, 1936-December 30, 1937.

General WILLOUGHBY. Intensive examination of the Shanghai records, plus other supporting evidence available to the G-2 section in Tokyo, made it comparatively easy to reconstruct the organizational family tree of the Third (Communist) International.

The upper part of this family tree is the Communist mother unit. The next part shows the foreign ancillaries, in this instance leading into China. The third part is devoted to Shanghai. The box International Red Aid leads to International Labor Defense (United States) and Civil Rights Congress. I again refer to the article by Craig Thompson in the Saturday Evening Post of February 17, 1951, which covers this specifically with reference to the United States. I covered it specifically with reference to Shanghai. That is the purpose of this chart.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, in the course of your tenure in Tokyo, were you acquainted with a person by the name of Philip Keeney, or did you have occasion to look into the case of Philip Keeney?

General WILLOUGHBY. As a citizen, Mr. Counsel, I am very anxious to be of service to this committee, but as a Federal employee and functionary, I am expected to carry out to the letter the regulations of the Army and the Presidential directive of March 1948, under the terms of which I must respectfully decline to dwell on this individual, since he was a Federal employee and no reference to his files is permitted, derogatory or otherwise.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Keeney has appeared before this committee, but he did not cooperate.

I believe you were asked questions before another committee relating to several other Government employees?

General WILLOUGHBY. I was.

Mr. TAVENNER. Is your answer the same as to those as to Philip Keeney?

General WILLOUGHBY. My technical objection is the same, on account of the clear-cut regulatory orders.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I believe that is all.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Doyle, do you have further questions?

Mr. DOYLE. I want to renew my question, then, if it is proper at this place to ask the general to give us the benefit of his recommendations as to remedial legislation to meet the problem facing this country with regard to subversive activities. If you have any suggestions or advice as to what further we can do in meeting the situation which originates domestically or is instigated from foreign countries, give us that.

General WILLOUGHBY. I have strong feelings on this entire field, and am delighted at this opportunity of submitting certain thoughts that might be termed recommendations.

First, the Federal Government should give full and unqualified support to this committee. Possibly a joint House-Senate committee is indicated, as they are operating in the same sphere of investigation.

Such committee should be supported financially in order that their research staffs may be increased. I have the impression that while these staffs are doing a first-class job, they obviously are limited both in time and personnel.

With reference to such expanded allocation of funds to support the research staffs of such committees as this, there should be established a central file or record system in which information of this kind ultimately finds its place, for future reference, or so that these interlocking relationships could be traced.

Second, the FBI should be vigorously supported. In my association over many years with the FBI, I hold the highest regard for the efficiency of that body. The authority should be extended from its present field to include the international relationships in the areas of subversion.

Third, their work should be made easier by the elimination of legalistic juridical objections. For example, to determine whether wiretapping under certain conditions is illegal. Wiretapping is in the same category as furnishing a pistol to a law enforcing agency combating crime. All law-enforcing agencies, with particular regard to the FBI, should be given free play in their fight against these subterranean forces of evil which have no such fine distinction as to whether or not wiretapping is or is not illegal. The law-enforcing agency combating them should be given complete liberty of action.

Fourth, having remarked once on the excellent work of the California State Committee on Un-American Activities, I would recommend that each State legislature form and maintain such a committee and that this network of proposed State un-American activities committees cooperate, on a correspondence or secretarial basis, with this congressional committee, so that the investigative process Statewide blankets the Nation.

I also would recommend that at least one State university, or universities, should at once institute special research courses leading to academic degrees, or acceptable under that classification, to study the mechanism of communism and to disseminate combative literature to that effect.

That, roughly, is my thought on the subject.

Mr. DOYLE. You didn't mention any legislation other than what we now have.

General WILLOUGHBY. I am glad you reminded me of it.

I think that any legislation that in your experience you have found to be deficient in your line of inquiry should be strengthened or new legislation provided, in order to satisfy the experience, for example, by this committee in its past dealings; in fact, legislation to make this committee permanent and not subject to, shall we say, an allocation of funds, so that if the funds are not forthcoming the personnel collapses. There is room for a permanent watchdog on a congressional and State level for the laudable purposes of this inquiry.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you very much.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Velde, any further questions?

Mr. VELDE. General, I want to thank you for the very fine contribution you have made to this committee as a result of your very extensive and distinguished service as Intelligence Chief to General MacArthur.

It occurred to me while you were testifying that your hands were tied a little bit by this Presidential directive issued in April of 1948, and subsequent Presidential directives. I realize full well that it would be unwise for this committee to have available to it all of the files of the FBI, or all of the G-2 files, but it does seem to me that

certain files, especially the older files, personnel files, loyalty files, should be available to congressional committees for their examination and perusal.

I wonder if you agree with me on that?

General WILLOUGHBY. May I say that I am reluctant to criticize Presidential directives, but that the legislative liberty which is accorded to Congress would, of course, enable them to pursue their channels of inquiry according to the dictates of their conscience.

Mr. VELDE. With reference to your recommendation relative to the FBI and other investigative agencies, I happen to be familiar with the operations of the FBI, being a former FBI agent myself. I realize their hands are tied in certain investigations, especially those involving subversives, by the fact it is difficult to obtain the permission of the Attorney General in many cases to install wire taps or secret means of obtaining information. However, it may be done, with the authority of the Attorney General, and he only grants that authority, as I understand it, when there is other corroborative evidence of subversive activity in violation of the Federal laws. Do you think that procedure should be changed in any way?

General WILLOUGHBY. While I am anxious to be of assistance to you, Mr. Velde, of course my specialty has been in a slightly different category. I believe the Congress is in a position to effect such regulations as they see fit, and my opinion is practically worthless.

Mr. VELDE. When did you say that the Japanese intelligence were first aware of the fact that the Sorge spy ring was operating in Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. They must have been aware of it for some time, because they intercepted Klausen's radio messages to the Siberian radio station. They knew by that token they were in contact with some foreign agent. But Klausen had domicile furnished by the British subject Guenther Stein, and shifted his station continually so that they were not able to catch up with him.

Mr. VELDE. Japan was on peaceful terms with Russia during the thirties?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. That was a contributing factor.

Mr. VELDE. Would you say the Japanese had intelligence of the Sorge spy ring as far back as 1935?

General WILLOUGHBY. That is not my impression; that is too far back; that is too far back. As a matter of fact, Sorge, as I recall, was in and out twice. I would have to look this up.

Mr. VELDE. Of course, it isn't too important. I just wanted to bring out the fact you have so ably brought out so many times, that we have a counterpart to the Sorge spy ring, or did have, and I suppose it is still functioning in the United States of America, and the first conclusive evidence that there was a Soviet spy ring operating in this country was adduced in March 1943, that late, although it was determined the spy ring had been operating sometime prior to that time, and probably back as far as 1934 or 1935. And I might say that the evidence that was produced was substantiated by highly confidential means such as you have been discussing.

The only difficulty that we have, as I see it, is the fact that after evidence is obtained by highly confidential means, it is not permitted as evidence in courts of law. I think our distinguished colleague, Mr. Walter, is considering a bill before the Judiciary Committee at this

time to make evidence secured by wire tapping and other confidential means admissible in courts of law.

Do you concur that that would be a good recommendation for legislation?

General WILLOUGHBY. I concur. I have already gone on record that all legalistic juridical objections in the way of law-enforcing and investigative agencies should be removed, without touching the individual liberty in its broad concept, in order to make their work both easier and more effective. I selected wire tapping. Perhaps there are other references possible. To be morally sensitive when you are dealing with a criminal strikes me as silly.

Mr. VELDE. Of course we all hate to have our rights of privacy violated. I know I do, and I am sure you do too. But in cases where we are liable to lose all our rights if we don't use such method, I think the method is justified.

General WILLOUGHBY. I assume it would only be applied against subversive and criminal groups. The average citizen of probity would hardly be exposed to it, and if he were, he could easily make his position defensible, I have a feeling.

Mr. VELDE. Thank you again.

Mr. WOOD. General, I join with other members of the committee in conveying to you the very deep appreciation that this committee feels for the effort you have expended, and the considerable sacrifice of your strength in the present condition of your health, as well as your time, to come here and give the committee and the American people the valuable information you have given.

After all, we only operate as the agents and representatives of the people. We have no power other than to make known to the American people, as best we can, what is going on that strikes at our liberty and way of life. I am particularly impressed with what you had to say, and appreciative.

I wouldn't be entirely human if I didn't also take this opportunity to express very great gratification for your feeling about this committee. This committee has been in existence a relatively short time. We operate under a limited budget. It is significant that this committee has in its employ only eight investigators, who have to cover a wide area. Every member of this committee, elected Member of the Congress itself, has other committee assignments besides this, in addition to the general work as Members of Congress in undertaking to study and pass intelligently on legislation that comes before the Congress, which makes it obviously imperative that we lean rather heavily upon our counsel and staff, and we are very fortunate to have a staff and counsel of which no one needs to be ashamed, and of which we are very proud.

It has occurred to me—not now but sometime at your leisure, today or tomorrow or some future time—you might find an opportunity to confer with the investigative staff and counsel of this committee and, out of the abundance of your wide knowledge and experience, you might make some suggestions, perhaps, to the staff that would be beneficial to them in the performance of the various and many duties piling in both day and night.

I happen to know that members of this staff work long hours. There is no clock-watching on this committee. Frequently they go for 24

hours at a time without sleep. I felt that perhaps you might be in a position to be of some assistance to them by making such suggestions as you might think would be helpful to them, out of the abundance of your experience.

Mr. Counsel, do you have any further questions you desire to ask the general?

Mr. TAVENNER. It is my thought that there is other testimony which is vital to the committee.

Mr. WOOD. I understood we wanted to have an executive session with the general, and if he can join us for an executive session we would be very grateful to him.

(Thereupon, at 4:50 p. m., the public testimony of General Willoughby was concluded, and a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities proceeded to go into executive session.)

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