V

ZS/A 32, Bd. 13

Slg. Botschafter a.D. Eugen Ott

Sorge's Own Story. Fotokopierte Vorlage der Ablichtung in Bd. 9. Aus konservatorischen Gründen nicht für die Ausleihe.

RHSA

昭和十七年二月

思想機事分

ソルゲ事件資料(二)

(リヒアルト・ゾルゲ手記(英文第一編))

機密

司法省刑事局

AN AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATION OF

SORGE'S OWN STORY

CRIMINAL AFFAIRS BUREAU MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
TOKYO, JAPAN, FEBRUARY 1942

A partial Documentation of the Sorge Espionage Case Series

取扱注意
No. 191

機密

昭和十七年二月

思想検事分

ソルゲ事件資料(二)

(リヒアルト・ゾルゲ手記訳文第一編)

司法省刑事局

Handle with Caution
No. 191

February 1942
Top Secret

SORGE CASE MATERIALS

Part 2 Translation of Statement of Richard Sorge

Criminal Affairs Bureau Ministry of Justice

本資料の内容は政治上、外交上に重大なる影響を有するに付、特に機密保持に留意相成度。

TRANSLATION:

The contents of this Document vitally affects Domestic Administration and Foreign Relations and should be kept absolutely secret.

Editor's note: In 1942, the Japanese Government was vitally concerned with the neutrality of Soviet Russia. It had become obvious, during the judicial investigations, that Sorge was a Comintern or Soviet Agent. Sorge maintained confidence for a long time, that he would ultimately obtain the protection of the Soviet Embassy. This element explains why the Prosecution and the Ministry of Justice, handled the accused and co-defendants with particular care and, as evidenced in sworn statements separately filed in this series, did not employ methods of brutality, duress or coercion.

This authenticated translation is the basis upon which the abbreviated G-2 report was developed and issued on Dec. 15/1917. Another source was the *Foreign Affairs Yearbook, Home Ministry, 1942*. These unimpeachable sources, authenticated recently by a group of top-flight American, British and Japanese lawyers, to gild the proverbial lily, are normally considered *res adjudicada* and are further supported by juridical affidavits of still-living eye witnesses and former defendants in the trials.

As an *arriere-pensee*, the Intell. Div. Tokyo would have been better advised to have filed the complete translation of these Court Records instead of the abbreviated version of its research writers, the now disputed Dec 15/47 report; Smedley could then have sued the Japanese Ministry of Justice, for its publication of this material, instead of dragging in MacArthur's name, an obvious publicity stunt. Conversely, the War Department could then have charged that same Ministry with "*inadvertency of release*" or with the qualifications of a *faux pas*.

With the reprint, in English, of these Japanese Reports, the matter of justification is now no longer one of *phraseology* of reporting but one of *res adjudicada* and of *juridical fact*.

However, the purpose and objective of the original Tokyo report remains the same: The suggestive story of international espionage; its technique of subversion, sabotage and betrayal; the participation of known individuals as accessories; the recognizable links with American Communists, pseudo citizens, fellow-travellers, stooges and gullible dupes; the links with Comintern agents that have also appeared on the American stage and, finally, the sinister background story of the Shanghai *conspiracy*, an incredible web of Communist machinations, by willing collaborators of every description and nationality, including Americans, to bring about the collapse of the National Chinese Government, *a plan that has since ripened into a disastrous fait-accompli*.



Handle with Caution
No. 191

February 1942
Top Secret

SORGE CASE MATERIALS

Part 2 Translation of Statement of Richard Sorge

Criminal Affairs Bureau Ministry of Justice

TOP SECRET (Kimitsu)

Handle with Caution
No. 191

Feb 1942

Sorge Case Materials

Part 1 of translation of statement of Richard Sorge

Criminal Affairs Bureau

Justice Ministry

Foreword

1. The German Richard Sorge entered the German Communist Party in 1919, was sent to Comintern headquarters in Jan 1925, immediately became a member of the Russian Communist Party, joined the staff of the Comintern intelligence department and engaged in espionage activities in the northern European nations, China and elsewhere. He was ordered to serve as a spy in Japan in 1933, went to that country as a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung, organized a secret espionage ring including the German Max Klausen, a member of the German Communist Party and radio technician sent out by the same Soviet intelligence authorities; the Yugoslav and member of the French Communist Party Branko de Voukelitch, the US Communist Party member Miyagi Yotoku, who had been sent to Japan by his party to perform espionage work; the political adviser to the Chinese Communist Party Ozaki Hozumi, whom Sorge himself had recruited around 1930 in Shanghai; and others, and directed and supervised the said ring in the collection and transmission to Soviet headquarters, either in writing or via radio, of information concerning military affairs, foreign relations, politics, economics and other miscellaneous subjects.

2. The contents of the present printed document comprise Part 1 of a translation of typewritten German notes prepared by Sorge in lieu of a statement at the direction of the Tokyo District Criminal Court.

3. For convenience, the various sections have been assigned outline headings, as Chapter 1, I, etc.

The contents of this document vitally affect domestic administration and foreign relations and should be kept absolutely secret.

INTRODUCTION

Preface: Civil Intelligence Summary No. 23 Dec 15/47
Comment re Preface Dec 15/47 and "Sorge's Own Story."

Prepared and translated by the
Military Intelligence Section, General Headquarters Far East Command:
Tokyo/Japan.

THE SORGE SPY RING

PREFACE

The space for this presentation was secured at the expense of standard sections of the CIS Periodical Summary. In this issue, therefore the normal space allotments of CCD, CIC and the Summation have been reduced in order to present "The Sorge Spy Ring: A Case Study in International Espionage in the Far East."

There are available certain publications, previously issued, covering Soviet military, economic and political activities. From a counter intelligence viewpoint the following chapters are of special interest:

Instruments used in Subversive Activity, p. 55-58
Soviet Espionage in Canada, p. 59-61

The CIS Periodical Summary covers related material within the purview of FEC and SCAP. On the subject of international espionage CIS has long been aware of a dramatic historical case, with quite modern applications: "The Sorge Spy Ring, 1933-1941." It invites suggestive comparison with certain trends known to CIS.

The revelations in the Canadian spy case, so ably presented by the Royal Commission of Inquiry in 1946, for the first time informed the general public on Soviet successes in espionage in a friendly country. The revelation of the willingness and eagerness of supposedly loyal Canadian and British citizens to betray their country out of abstract sympathy with Communist teachings and principles is of shocking significance.

Far more important and successful as a Soviet espionage agency was the Sorge ring of some 20 men and women of various nationalities operating in Japan from 1933 to 1941. In the Sorge case, just as in the later Canadian spy case, numerous non-Russians (Japanese, Americans, British and Germans) quickly and readily agreed to betray their countries for the Soviet Union. Their common bond was Communist, hence Soviet, sympathy rather than Party membership.

The lessons of the Sorge case are so numerous and the principles of Soviet espionage taught by it so clear that it seems desirable to present a special study of this Soviet agency in a single issue of the CIS Periodical Summary. The educational advantages and uses of a study of this case are multitudinous. It is useful both for the beginner at an intelligence school, in an introduction to the methods of intelligence and counter intelligence, and for officers with many years of service in the field.

The principles and methods portrayed in this case did not die with Dr. Sorge. The dangers to which knowledge of this case should alert us have been magnified rather than reduced with passing years.

Preface to Civil Intelligence Section Periodical Summary No. 23/Dec 15/1947

The facsimile reproduction above of the "Preface" of Dec 15/1947 is also explanatory of the purpose of the entire study: A contribution to Military Schools. There is no hint anywhere of any desire for popular distribution. When the casual American conqueror opened the jails of Tokyo in a political amnesty, amongst the prisoners so released, there were the remnants of a notorious international spy ring, under Richard Sorge, a highlevel operator under orders of the Russian Army Intelligence. It soon became apparent that the Sorge Ring was part and parcel of the IIId Comintern "apparatus," in a world-wide pattern of infiltration, subversion and sedition, with the ultimate objective of Soviet domination of the Far East. Such matters are common-place in 1949 but they were not fully understood in 1945. It took the Canadian Espionage case and Igor Gouzenko's shattering revelations to sober a fatuous and gullible public.

When the Canadian Case was widely publicized by several Government agencies, as a warning of subversive methods and techniques, G-2/Tokyo realized that the Sorge Case, though ten-thousand miles away, was a completely parallel incident and needed reporting, to demonstrate a world-wide conspiracy and to force the Security Services to investigate certain personnel involved.

There was a wealth of documentation, complete civil court records, sworn statements of witnesses and defendants and the official publications of the Japanese Ministry of Justice and the Foreign Office.

The 441st C.I.C. Tokyo prepared an abbreviated summation report. In the manner of a Chinese tailor who faithfully copies even the patches, another G-2 writer expanded the original manuscript adding a certain "Sateve" touch to which Colonel Eyster, the War Dept. Press Relations Officer, took subsequent exception.

In retrospect, it would have been more conclusive to have published original Japanese sources. Under pressure of the controversy over this report, agitated by Agnes Smedley, G-2 Tokyo has now undertaken to translate and publish the original Sorge statements, developed during his trial.

Ed: The Sorge Report Dec 15/1947 is based on the more complete text of this original translation "Sorge's Own Story."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

"Mischa" or "Mischin"

2. Foreign supporters "Hamburg"
   "Jacob"
   "Klausen"
3. Chinese members of writer's China group.
   "Wang"
   Mrs. Wang
   "Mrs. Chui"
   "Chiang
   "Pai"
   "Shin"
4. Japanese members of writer's group.
   Ozaki
   Kawai
   Mizuno
   Yamagami
   Funakoshi
   Explanation concerning Kito

G. Relationship with Chinese Communist Party.
H. Writer's Duties in China.
I. Explanation of Nature of Writer's Duties in China.
   1. Duties assigned by Moscow.
      a. Social and political analysis of Nanking Government.
      b. Military strength of Nanking Government.
      c. Social and political analysis of groups and factions opposing Nanking Government.
      d. Nanking Government's domestic and social policies.
      e. Nanking Government's foreign policy.
      f. British and American China policies.
      g. Military strength of foreign powers in China.
      h. Problem of extraterritoriality in China.
      i. Development of Chinese agriculture and industry.
   2. Subjects selected by writer for study in China.
      a. Observation of economic activities of German nationals and of the increasingly conspicuous role played by German military advisers.
      b. New American activity in China.
      c. Japan's new Manchurian policy.
      d. Shanghai Incident.
      e. Sino-Japanese clashes.
      f. The question of Japan.
   3. Duties of Japanese members.
J. Other Groups in China.
   1. "Jim" or "Lehman" group.
   2. Harbin group.
   3. Frolich-Feldmann group in Shanghai.
   4. Comintern group in Shanghai.
   5. The Noulens incident.
   6. Explanation of my relationships with various groups.

Richard Sorge

Tokyo den 4. 3. 1942
Kochisho

For Mr. Ohashi.

In memory of his most
profound and most kindly investi-
gation of my case during the Winter
1941/42, I express my deep thank-
fulness to him as the leader of the in-
vestigation. I will never forget his
kindness during the most difficult
time of my eventful live.

Richard Sorge.

Sorge's Letter of Thanks

Agnes Smedley

Hozumi Ozaki

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL NATURE OF WRITER'S ESPIONAGE GROUPS IN JAPAN AND CHINA

I. Comintern Intelligence Division from 1925 to 1929.

The Comintern Intelligence Division, one of three major departments which laid the groundwork for the concrete organizational and political decisions by means of which leadership was exerted over the International Communist Party, was already in existence in early 1925, and the passing of time brought the need for expansion on the largest possible scale. I (Sontel) assisted actively in that expansion.

A. Intelligence Division Duties.

The Intelligence Division's duties were to prepare regular reports of various natures concerning the International Communist Party, to handle special party problems, to report on national labor movements and political and economic conditions in different countries and, on occasion, to compile special reports on exceptional problems of international import. The basic data used in these reports were derived from material sent to the Comintern by party representatives, newspapers, magazines and books from the various countries and occasional reports brought in by travelers and representatives.

B. Intelligence Division Organization.

Only a party comrade with years of international experience, as, for example, Kuusinen and others who held the position for a time, could become the chief of the Intelligence Division. Under the chief, there was a secretariat headed by a chief secretary, under which the affairs of the various countries were controlled and grouped in the following manner: Europe, British Empire, North American, South America and East Asia, including all the nations and parties in the Southwest Pacific. These major clasifications were further subdivided, the Europe group, for example, being broken down into German-speaking nations and parties, Romance language nations and parties (France, Italy, Spain). Scandinavian parties and Balkan nations. East Asia was divided into China, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands East Indies and a single office lumping together all the other parties in the area. When a group had a single joint reporter, he handled its business. Large parties were represented by one or more reporters, but in most cases small ones were grouped together by languages under one man. Major international problems were handled by persons who were specially designated from among the ranks of the regular reporters and who worked directly under the head of the Intelligence Division or the secretariat. All reports were filed with the secretariat. Before submission to the chief of the division, important reports were criticized at conferences of limited scope attended by the reporter, a large number of other reporters and members of the secretariat. Top secret and secret reports were given special handling by the secretariat. Included in the above categories were reports on insurrectionary movements, big strikes or, for example, partisan battles in China.

On special occasions, representatives of the Soviet Communist Party attended secretariat meetings, and at other times Red Army men were present to consider military problems arising in connection with partisan movements. As time went by, the number of reporters in the Intelligence Division grew until there were about 30, a figure which was further swelled when international conferences or other gatherings of an international nature were held.

C. Direct Intelligence Activities by Intelligence Division Espionage Agents.

With the passing of time, it grew increasingly necessary to supplement previously acquired basic data with first-hand information obtained by special Intelligence Division espionage agents operating in all countries and at all times. It had long been a practice to send special emissaries from the Organization Division of Comintern headquarters to assist local parties with organizational problems, and it was decided that such functions would have to be expanded to include intelligence work. In accordance with that policy. I was sent to the Scandinavian countries in 1927 to engage in intelligence activities concerning their Communist parties, their economic and political problems and any important military issues which might arise. I began operations in Denmark, complying with instructions by assuming a position of active leadership alongside the other party heads, attending meetings and conferences and visiting the main party organizations in the country. In so far as time permitted, I also did intelligence work on Denmark's economic and political problems, discussing my observations and findings with party representatives and incorporating their opinions in my reports to Moscow. I then went from Denmark to Sweden to study problems there in the same manner. In 1928, I participated in the work of the political committee of the Comin-

tern's second world conference, after which I went again to Scandinavia, this time primarily because of the difficult party situation in Norway. I operated in Norway in the same way as in Sweden and Denmark, but party problems of various descriptions seriously impeded intelligence work in the fields of economics and politics. Orders came for me to go to England to collect information there prior to my return; i.e., to study the labor movement, the status of the Communist Party and political and economic conditions in Britain in 1929. My instructions to remain strictly aloof from intra-party disputes accorded perfectly with my personal inclinations and enabled me to devote more attention to political and economic intelligence work than had been possible in Scandinavia.

Upon my return to Moscow, I presented to the Intelligence Division not only my regular report but also a frank analysis of what had been wrong with my information-gathering trips and my investigations in the countries visited. In addition, I submitted the following fundamental propositions; viz, that any basic and comprehensive intelligence program should be kept apart from the internal quarrels controlling local parties; that, when deemed necessary, special envoys would have to be sent out to settle purely national and limited party problems, but that such men should be able to devote themselves, if not exclusively, at least primarily, to basic intelligence activities concerning problems of economics, domestic administration and foreign policy and, when necessary, to military problems in the broad sense. This separation, I said, was also imperative because of the frequent need of the intelligence operative for secrecy. I further suggestd that, at the Moscow end, such espionage agents in foreign countries would have to be more definitely divorced than in the past from the over-all Comintern organization in order to assure a degree of separation adequate for purposes of secrecy. I cannot tell with certainty to what extent the above proposals, made at the above juncture, were influential in the fundamental transformation in the nature of my duties which subsequently transpired, but it was clear to me that a basic change had been planned in the organization of my next trip, which was to China, and in the scope of my assignment. At the same time, there was a complete change in my personal contacts and relations with the Comintern.

I followed a simple procedure in effecting liaison with the Organization Division in connection with my intelligence activities in the Scandinavian countries and England, sending correspodence to Moscow through a local party or through the consolidated liaison office in Berlin or, in rare cases, transmitting telegrams via the same channels. Most of the time I went to Berlin myself to arrange to have reports sent. In other words, I had absolutely no independent means of communication.

II. Fundamental Changes in Intelligence Activities Between 1929 and 1941.

A. Separation of Writer (Sontel) from Comintern Headquarters (Komintern Apparat).

As my relations with the Comintern had been severed upon my return from Scandinavia and England late in the summer of 1929, I began to conduct my intelligence operations in my hotel room and at houses in various locations. My non-professional contacts with other Comintern comrades ceased and I met only two or three key men directly connected with my work. When I conferred with a few Comintern men and representatives of other Communist bodies to arrange my trip to China, which was planned in line with the policy of isolating my intelligence activities and cloaking them in secrecy, this separation was made even more clear-cut than before. Persons present at our meetings included not only representatives of the Soviet Communist Party and its Central Committee but also men from the Red Army and the 4th Bureau, the Red Army intelligence arm. Most of the arrangements which I made with them concerned the technical aspects of my future work. Two members of the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR also attended one meeting to discuss the political side of my intelligence activities. I subsequently visited the so-called "4th Bureau" two or three times to make arrangements concerning technical phases of my operations in China and, later, in Japan. My separation from the Comintern became definite with the change in the nature of the duties assigned me, and I was specifically forbidden to have anything whatever to do with the Communist parties in China and Japan; I could not meet with them at my own discretion or even help them out.

The major objective of my intelligence activities was to evaluate the political situation; the secondary objective, to gather information concerning the nation's economy, with particular emphasis on its wartime economy. Third in line of importance was the collection of military information. News concerning party problems was reported only when of vital significance and when acquired by chance and not through party channels. I occasionally transmitted such news in China,

but never in Japan.

B. No Clear-Cut Affiliation of Writer (Sontel) With Any Moscow Agency.

I received no explanation concerning my organizational affiliation in Moscow; that is concerning the specific agency to which I was attached, and, naturally, I asked no questions on the subject, with the result that I do not know to this day whether or not I am attached in the line of duty to Comintern headquarters or whether I am an agent of the so-called 4th Bureau or of some other agency, as, for example, the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR or the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee. The nature of the assignments and instructions given me, however, makes it possible to draw the following definite conclusions.

C. Probable Connection with Russian Communist Party Central Committee.

After a great deal of earnest thought, I have arrived at the following conclusions. Although I do not know whether my information went to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, to the Secretariat or to some intelligence office especially created by the Central Committee to handle it, I am sure that it was used by top party circles (Oberate Leitung) and thus by top Soviet Government circles. I shall attempt to indicate below the nature of the intelligence activities in which I was engaged.

Technically and organizationally speaking, my reports were sent to the specialized agency known as the 4th Bureau, which furnished all the technical aids (wireless contacts, radio men, etc) and other assistance required to carry on my work. The bureau occasionally assigned me a few duties of a military nature, but the major emphasis was always on political information for the party leadership. Accordingly, my relationship with the Moscow authorities must be described in the following terms. All reports were sent to the 4th Bureau, whence they were forwarded to the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party and, in so far as they contained intelligence of value to it, to the Comintern. They might also be made available to such other agencies as the Russian Army and the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. In short, I was connected with Russian Communist Party headquarters from a subject-matter standpoint and with the 4th Bureau from a procedural standpoint.

D. Basis of Change in Intelligence Activities.

The reasons for the change in the nature of my intelligence activities after 1929 were as follows.

1. The changing international situation caused a general shift in center of gravity from the Comintern to the Russian Communist Party and the USSR itself.

2. My own talents were suited not so much to intelligence work designed merely for the handling of party political problems as to activity in the broader fields of economic, political and, to some extent, military intelligence.

In short, I was better able to meet the urgent need of the Russian Communist Party leadership for comprehensive economic, political and military intelligence than to satisfy Comintern demands for information concerning local parties and labor movements.

These considerations, plus the fact that I had been a member of the Russian Communist Party since 1925, were responsible for the orders which I received directing me to engage in the broad intelligence activities outlined above. When the orders came through, I asked for a technical aide (radio man), a Japanese collaborator and a competent foreign assistant, and the services of Klausen, Miyagi and Voukelitch were made available. I was authorized to recruit other personnel as necessary in the place where I was working.

III. Positions of Espionage Group Members Vis-a-Vis Moscow Authorities.

The members of the espionage group headed by me (Sontel) in Japan occupied varying positions in relation to the Moscow authorities; positions which, because they were seldom clearly defined from an organizational and administrative standpoint, are extremely difficult to explain individually.

A. My Position.

The membership in the Russian Communist Party which I had held since 1925 made my own position apparent; I was subject by virtue thereof to the orders and supervision of the party. Regardless of the nature and location of my activities, I had to accept the party's guidance and instructions. The relationship between it and myself is abundantly evident from the fact that, as my accounts show, even in Japan I paid my membership dues regularly. Thus, in Japan as in China, I was responsible for the performance of my work to the Russian Communist Party and its Central Committee. At the same time, as the head of the Japan spy ring, I was definitely res-

ponsible from a technical standpoint to the Red Army; i.e., to the 4th Bureau, which handled the technical aspects of communication with the Central Committee and solved all my technical problems.

After I began to operate in China and Japan, my relationship with Comintern headquarters was, to say the least, entirely indirect. It was composed of the following ingredients: (1) my past relations with Comintern headquarters; i.e., my record of unbroken service from 1925 to 1929; (2) my acquaintance or friendship with various individual headquarters leaders; and (3) the probability that some of my information reached headquarters through the Central Committee and was utilized by it. After my separation from headquarters in 1929, however, I had to keep in mind the fact that I was not a Comintern member. The Comintern had no individual members; it was not a party but a combination of all the Communist parties—not all the party members—in the world.

Summary

As head of the Japan spy ring, I (Sontel) was directly and primarily affiliated with the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party. I was also under the 4th Bureau of the Red Army with respect to the technical aspects of my work and a few subject-matter problems. As indicated above, I had no more than an indirect relationship with the Comintern.

B. Klausen's Position.

Klausen, a member of the Moscow radio school, was chosen to work for me by the 4th Bureau of the Red Army. His relationship to the Moscow authorities stemmed from his affiliation with the radio school and the 4th Bureau. I am not sure whether or not he was a member of the USSR Communist Party; all I know is that he was an old member of the German Communist Party sent to Moscow to enter the radio school, which was a satellite of the Red Army. He had already been sent out in a similar manner by the 4th Bureau to operate in China. He was not a Comintern member, since the Comintern had no individual members, nor had he ever worked for Comintern headquarters. His only tie with the Comintern was a certain ideological (Ideal) kinship deriving from his former membership in the German Communist Party.

C. Voukelitch's Position.

There was no direct connection between Voukelitch and the Moscow authorities; i.e., he had nothing to do with the USSR Communist Party, the Comintern or the 4th Bureau of the Red Army. All contact between him and Moscow was indirect. Moscow was a party, however, to his being ordered to leave France to go to work for me, since the order to join my spy group meant that he had been accepted by Moscow (I do not know by what organization or agency) as a functioning member of the group. I think he was also a member of the French Communist Party. In short, his position may be simply outlined as follows.

Broadly speaking, Voukelitch was connected with the Comintern by virtue of his former membership in the French Communist Party. He was registered with and recognized by some Moscow agency as a collaborator, and whether that agency was Comintern headquarters, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, or the 4th Bureau of the Red Army is beside the point.

D. Miyagi's Position.

Miyagi's position was identical with that of Voukelitch. He, too, was a member of a Communist Party (American), he, too, was ordered through Moscow to participate in my activities, he, too, was a Comintern member in the broad sense, he, too, was registered with and accepted by some major Moscow organization as a member of my group, and in his case, too, it made absolutely no difference whether the agency in question was the Comintern, Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party or the 4th Bureau of the Red Army.

E. Ozaki's Position.

Ozaki's position at headquarters differed somewhat from that of Voukelitch and Miyagi in that he had not been sent by a Moscow agency to work with my group but had been registered and accepted by Moscow as a full-fledged member upon my personal recommendation. From the standpoint of registration and approval by a headquarters agency, however, his actual position was identical with that of Voukelitch and Miyagi. To sumamrize, he was a Comintern member in the broad sense, registered and approved by either the Comintern, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party or a branch of the Red Army.

F. Explanation Concerning Bernhardt.

Bernhardt, my first radio technician, worked with me from 1933 to 1935. His position

was identical with that of Klausen. Like Klausen, he had been a member of the German Communist Party and a student at the Moscow radio school and, like Klausen, he had been assigned to me by the 4th Bureau of the Red Army.

Summary

All of the above, apprehended as members of my spy ring, were connected either directly or indirectly with one or more Moscow organizations by virtue of the positions which they occupied. My situation may be differentiated from that of the others in that I alone, as the head of the group and a member of the USSR Communist Party, bore a direct responsibility and stood in a direct relationship to Moscow, and that I alone was charged with full responsibility for our activities. Klausen and Bernhardt can be set apart on the basis of the connection with the 4th Bureau of the Red Army existing as a result of their definite affiliation with the radio school. The relationship of the other members of the group to the Moscow authorities was of a special nature.

Supplementary Explanation

For the following reasons it is difficult accurately to grasp the true positions of Voukelitch, Miyagi and Ozaki. The Comintern's refusal to recognize any individual as a member made the nature of their affiliation with it extremely ambiguous. Neither in its role as a world organizaton nor in its operating set-up would it accept individual members; its headquarters recognized only persons working within its immediate organization and had no members in any other sense of the word. As a world organization, the Comintern often was mistakenly said to be a world party, but, scientifically and properly speaking, such was not the case. It was, rather, a world organization, an agglomeration of a large number of parties and, as in the case of any other collective body, exhibited certain special characteristics in its relations with its component elements (in this case, individual Communist parties).

G. Concerning Mrs. Anna Klausen.

Anna Klausen was Klausen's wife. I had known her since before their marriage; i.e., since the Shanghai period. She was not a member of my group, although, in so far as she assisted Klausen because she was his wife, she was connected with it. At any rate, all that she did to help him was to turn their home over to him for his work and to go in his place to Shanghai on trips of vital importance to the group. We could look to her only for such personal assistance to Klausen as a wife would render to her husband; we could not expect her to become a member of the group, or could we hope by any stretch of the imagination that she would become a Communist. She was completely ignorant and indifferent with respect to political matters.

H. Concerning Voukelitch's Former Wife Edith.

This woman was not a member of my group either, but she originally played a part with respect to Voukelitch identical with that of Mrs. Anna Klausen with respect to Klausen, and after her separation from Voukelitch she helped us by making her home available to Klausen for his radio work. Within those limits, she assisted the group, but she was not interested in politics, or was there any hope of her conversion to Communism.

I. Concerning Mizuno.

Mizuno, who had been a sort of supporting member of my China group, was counted upon in Japan as Ozaki's friend and assistant. I myself met him once at a restaurant. He never supplied me directly with information in this country, but I understood that he was helping Ozaki.

J. Concerning Kawai.

Kawai was imemdiately connected with my China espionage group as an assisting member. In Japan, after numerous consultations with me, Miyagi and Ozaki took him into the organization and tried to get him to work for us, but the upshot of their efforts was of negligible value to our activities. I myself never received any material directly from him; it all came through Ozaki and Miyagi. The fact that he was in personal difficulties perhaps accounts for the indifferent results which he achieved.

K. Concerning Koshiro.

Koshiro was not a member of my group either. A friend of Miyagi, he rendered him assistance which indirectly helped the group; i.e., he was valuable to us. I met him once or twice at a restaurant to look him over and he made an exceedingly favorable impression. With my consent, Miyagi began to maintain extremely close contact with him.

L. Concerning Guenther Stein.

Stein was very actively connected with the work of my group. From the standpoint of his ideological leanings and his character as an individual, I must say that he was a sympathetic member of our group. When, however, I asked Moscow if it would be all right to accept him as a member during his stay in Japan the answer was negative.

IV. General Explanation of Character of Espionage Group In Japan (TN Heading differs slightly from version appearing in Contents).

As I see it, my espionage group should be considered a special arm of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party. That was its essential characteristic. Another distinguishing feature was its technical and organizational connection with the so-called 4th Bureau of the Red Army. The limited duties which the group was directed to perform by the 4th Bureau established a certain subject-matter relationship with the Red Army, but that relationship must be regarded as subordinate to the fundamental one described above. There was no direct subject-matter relationship with the Comintern; I do not know to what extent it received and utilized information supplied by me. Our only indirect relationship with it arose from the former membership of two or three of our group in national Communist parties. Those members were, perhaps, assigned to me through Comintern intervention, but the fact remains that my group was basically a Central Committee organization.

Supplement to Foregoing General Explanation

I have expressed my opinion concerning the nature of my Japan group in the General Summary. I have already intimated that I have no direct evidence to support that opinion, but it is based upon personal experience and I am convinced of its accuracy. If we leave the realm of "belief" and "conviction," we must limit consideration exclusively to the facts with which I dealt. Only the following can then be definitely stated: from Nov 1929 on, my espionage groups and I were technically and organizationally a direct part of Red Army intelligence; i.e., of the so-called 4th Bureau. If final conclusions are to be based upon that narrow viewpoint; if they are to be drawn solely on the basis of incontrovertible fact, my groups in China and Japan must be regarded as special branches of the 4th Bureau.

CHAPTER 2. THE COMINTERN AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE USSR.

I. The Comintern and the Communist Party of the USSR.

The espionage group which I operated in Japan was a special arm of the USSR Communist Party, and all of its members have frankly confessed that they were working to advance the cause of Communism and not for money or personal gain. This circumstance renders the relationship between the USSR Communist Party and the Comintern, and the role of both in the world Communist movement, of immense significance in the present incident.

A. Formal and Theoretical Relationship of Russian Communist Party to Comintern.

The Comintern is not a party but a world organization of national Communist parties. It consists of many sections representing individual parties, one of which is the USSR Communist Party Section. Its program as a world organization is to work for world Communism, for the incorporation of the whole world into a single Communist society. That is, it seeks to organize a world-wide soviet union—to do away with private ownership of the means of production, with class exploitation and oppression and with racial tyranny, and to unite all nations in accordance with a single master plan. This unified and consolidated plan, which indicates the roles to be played by various countries and races in the steady march toward world Communism, makes the global policy of the Comintern far more than a mere summing up of the different programs of the various sections. Without such a synthesis by the Comintern leadership, the sections would produce at the most nothing more than a variegated and ill-proportioned socialistic racial mosaic. There would be no international planning; no decisive equalizing factor.

It should be noted in this connection that the Comintern's program is not rigidly fixed but is subject to a process of development comparable to the constant and never-ending evolution of the Communist structure of society itself. Thus, the nature of the Comintern may be expected to change after a period of major development. As the revolution proceeds, for example, we shall doubtless witness an increasingly apparent shift from today's organization for class struggle to organization for the establishment of socialism on a national basis. The Comintern will some day become an economic general staff headquarters for the socialist nations of the world and subsequently a general staff headquarters for the creation of Communist societies.

At the present stage of the movement, the Comintern's immediate major objective is

to furnish positive guidance to the sections in their struggle for the acquisition of political power in their respective countries. In form and theory, the Comintern is the brains—the general staff—directing the activities of the sections as they endeavor to achieve the goal for this stage in the development of world Communism. Its actual work consists in preparing analyses of world economic and political conditions and objectively prevailing upon individual sections to adopt necessary and feasible aims based thereon. For example, it will judge the prospects for a general strike movement in a given country on the basis of the international economic health of world capitalism. Similarly, it will discourage rebellion when objective conditions do not favor violent revolution but will vigorously encourage revolt when world capitalism exhibits symptoms of acute crisis. It will also assist individual parties by consolidating national political and economic struggles and by furnishing national movements with propaganda materials, financial resources and, when necessary, political, propaganda and organization advisers. Such aid has clearly been important and effective, particularly when trained men with ample experience in other parties have been chosen to perform advisory functions. Finally, the Comintern has helped individual sections by establishing special schools and training institutes in Moscow for middle and lower echelon party leaders.

Formally speaking, the Communist Party of the USSR is a section of the Comintern like any other section. Like any other Communist party, it bows to the Comintern's will. The parties have no direct contact with one another, a rule which applies equally in the case of the Russian Communist Party. All communication between sections is through the international organization: i.e., through the Comintern leadership organs, which means that the Soviet Communist Party cannot render direct assistance to any other party in the world. All aid and support come through the Comintern, which may, however, call upon individual parties, including the Russian, to furnish indirect assistance when such action has been unanimously decided upon by the party representatives. Such assistance can in no circumstances be rendered by recourse to means other than those available to the party as a party; the Red Army or other armed forces, which are not party instruments, could never be employed. The Red Army and other military forces belong to a country, i.e., to the USSR and not to the Soviet Communist Party. The party may, upon the Comintern's request, send food, money or party members especially trained or especially qualified by experience to serve as advisers or assistants to sections in need of the Comintern's help, but the Red Army will never become seriously involved in the struggles of the sections for national power in their respective countries. Setting aside the fundamental principle of Communism that the laboring class alone is capable of achieving a Communist revolution in any given state, the fact remains that the Comintern organization is incapable of rendering direct military assistance, because, while it is a global organization of parties, it is not a global organization of nations and their armed forces. Of course, theoretically speaking, there have been exceptional cases, such as the White Russian counter-revolution against Siberia, when Outer Mongolia became a base of operations, but Trotskyite demands for armed intervention by the Soviet Union in the revolutions of other countries are entirely inconsistent with the principles and the actual setup of the Comintern.

In summary, it may be said that theoretically the Soviet Comunist Party is, like any other, subject to the leadership of the Comintern, that it maintains no direct or special relations with other sections of the Comintern and that it can render assistance to other parties only through the Comintern. Worthy of special note here is the strong stand of the Soviet Communist Party with regard to aid to the Chinese Communists, to whom it has sent special military advisers. In other countries, such as Germany, Poland and the Baltic nations, only a few Soviet Communists, far outnumbered by the regular party members, have gone to assist the local parties.

B. Working Structure of Relationship Between Russian Communist Party Leadership and Comintern Headquarters.

In recent years, there has been increasing disparity between the theory governing the relationship of the Comintern to the Soviet Communist Party and the practical application of that theory, until today the leadership of the party may be said to far outweigh that of the Comintern in importance. That leadership, in other words the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, is a decisive factor in the international Communist movement as well as in the government of the Soviet Union. Its ascendancy to power, which became clearly perceptible around 1928 and 1929, is attributable to the following causes.

1. Location of the Comintern in Moscow, which facilitates intimate relations between the party's leadership and the Comintern. This intimacy is particularly understandable when one considers the difficulties involved in liaison with other national parties in widely scattered areas.

2. As by far the most prominent and largest Communist party in the world and the dominant political party in Russia, the Russian Communist Party possesses very considerable financial resources and its monetary contributions to the Comintern have been immeasurably greater than those of any other party. Supported by the mighty Soviet Union, it provides the Comintern with all its technical, organic, administrative and political needs. Moreover, the Soviet Communist Party is able to operate freely within the Soviet Union without interference from any armed organization.

3. Of all the Communist parties of the world, the Soviet party, which includes people of over 150 nationalities and races, is best suited to maintain actual contact with a heterogeneous group of nations and races. It follows, therefore, that, as long as they continue to be associated with the Comintern, the Russians, with their variegated racial background, will participate very actively in its functions.

4. Owing to its long history, the Soviet Communist Party has the most capable and experienced leaders. The fact that they are veterans of the international labor movement with experience dating as far back as pre-revolutionary Russia, coupled with their records of distinguished service during the revolution and the founding of the Soviet Union, adds to their value. The stand taken by these leaders at international conferences and assemblies has far greater moral weight than the attitudes and declarations of the delegates of other parties. I myself vividly recall how non-Russian delegates were impressed by the mere presence of old Leninists like Stalin at these conferences.

From the early years of the Comintern on, these factors have influenced the standing of the Soviet Communists in the organization to such an extent that whenever controversies have arisen over vital issues, the opinions of the Soviet Communist Party have been accepted as final, particularly when expressed by such men as Lenin and Stalin. Such factors have become increasing powerful in the last 10 to 15 years, during which radical reshufflings of key personnel in other parties due to intra-party disputes and persecution have brought about violent fluctuations and frequent deterioration in the quality and experience of national leaders, with the result that top men in the USSR Communist Party have been forced to concern themselves more and more actively with questions of Comintern policy.

The dominant influence of the Soviet Communist Party in the Comintern today can be further ascribed to two specific major reasons; first, the fact that, despite reactionary influences and difficulties of all descriptions, the effort to establish a socialist system in the Soviet Union has been immensely successful; i.e., that the Soviet Communist Party has successfully carried out its major assignment from the Comintern, the formation of a socialist state; and, second, the fact that the center of emphasis in the developing international situation has executed a fundamental shift from the political national revolutionary labor movement to the policies adopted by the USSR in her role as a socialist state in the society of nations. Unaided, the Soviet Union has attained the status of a world power; one to be reckoned with by all the others. These two objective factors are of immeasurable significance to any general evaluation of the Comintern or appraisal of the position of the Soviet Communist Party leadership in the Comintern.

5. Establishment of socialism in the USSR.

The Soviet Communist Party was the only section of the Comintern charged with the special mission of actually establishing state socialism in a country as a step toward a Communistic social order. The current Soviet-German war has enabled us for the first time fully to evaluate the party's achievements with respect to this assignment, particularly in the economic realm. Even the German leaders have been forced to admit that they had underestimated Russia's economic potential. The theoretical controversy between Leninsts and Trotskyites over the feasibility of attempting state socialism in a single country has been resolved in recent years through practical experimentation. The job of building done in the Soviet Union has not only proved that the USSR Communist Party has accomplished its task brilliantly but has also been of overwhelming importance to the international Communist movement. Through these accomplishments, the Soviet Communist leadership has so signally increased its influence in the international labor movement as to overshadow the Comintern. The workers of the world are now more familiar with its key men than with those of the Comintern.

6. Shift in the international center of emphasis.

The second major objective factor involved is the shift in international center of emphasis from the Comintern leadership to the leadership exercised by the USSR in its role as a socialist

state. As early as 1928-1929, it was obvious that the wave of radical revolution was receding. The tide of swift and mammoth revolution was going out temporarily, and with it was going the Chinese Communists' great struggle against Chiang Kai-shek, the Nanking Government and the imperialistic world powers in China. The international revolutionary movement was forced to give increasing thought to problems of defense against counter-revolutionary forces, particularly fascism, national socialism and ultra-nationalism; the labor movement was driven back on the defensive; and an early revolutionary offensive by the laborers and the oppressed races became out of the question. Moreover, there was an ever-increasing danger that war would break out between the world powers, or that they would converge on Russia in an imperialistic attack. For all these reasons, it became critically important for the labor movement to set up a suitable defense.

In the meantime, the part played by the USSR in international issues as a nation and a world force was gaining in importance, her increasing political and economic strength compelling the leading nations of the world to reckon with this socialist state in the realm of international politics. This point was brought out clearly when the USSR and the Comintern adopted opposition to fascism and national socialism as the cornerstone of their foreign policy and strove to implement their decisions in their policy toward France and Spain. It was for this reason that the revolutionary labor movement willingly accepted Soviet Russia as the mainstay of its struggle for self-protection and survival. At the same time, objective developments in the world situation caused the Soviet leadership to move further to the fore of the international labor movement, enhanced the significance of the role played by the key men in the USSR Communist Party and increased the importance attaching to the establishment of socialism in Russia as a foundation for the international military and political position of the USSR. The workers had realized that Russian advances in the struggle against the forces of fascism and national socialism would invariably increase the threat of an anti-Soviet offensive by the said forces. Whether or not the fascists and national socialists would attack Soviet Russia would depend upon the extent of the economic results obtained by the Russians in their socialist state, for which reason those results became a practical problem of overwhelming urgency for the USSR and the revolutionary labor movement; more than ever before, the building up of the Soviet Union came to be regarded as the vital mission of the international labor movement. Trotskyism, forgotten for all practical purposes, was relegated to the status of an empty topic of debate for the intellectuals, and there was increasingly wide acceptance of the fact that only through accelerated construction of a socialist structure of society in the USSR could the security of the international labor movement be guaranteed. At the same time, the need for defense against every attack aimed at Russia was recognized. The idea of possible participation by the Red Army in proletarian revolutions in other countries became nothing more than an unfounded fear in the minds of persons unfamiliar with actual conditions in the international labor movement. In the eyes of the movement itself, the paramount mission of the Russian Communist Party was not to send the Red Army out of the country, but to establish with all possible speed a socialist economy capable of protecting the USSR, international labor's most concrete asset, from the imperialist aggression which was already making itself felt.

C. Summary.

Thus the Soviet Communist Party, far overshadowing the Comintern, functions today as the actual leader of the Communist labor movement, a fact clearly apparent in the working relationship between Soviet and Comintern leaders. In the past, the Comintern was extremely independent, consulting the party only with respect to occasional individual problems, but with the passing of time it has turned more frequently to Russian leadership for advice, and today such consultation may be considered routine. Comintern leadership can no longer map out a set course for the international labor movement in defiance of the Soviet Communist Party as it could in the past when, for example, Zinoviev was at the helm. The unification of Comintern leadership and Soviet Communist Party leadership was consummated through recognition of the latter's supremacy, a fact further reflected in the increasing alignment of the foreign policy and slogans of the revolutionary movement with those of the USSR. We may recall in this connection the common slogans aimed at fascism, imperialist war and domestic reaction in Spain, Germany and Italy. Likewise, I know many men who, like myself, were transferred from posts in the Comintern or similar bodies to agencies of the Soviet Government or to work on some phase of the Soviet economy. Finally, we may cite the large number of workers, foreign refugees, who have recently begun to work to build up the Russian economy. In the past, such persons emphatically preferred work connected with the Comintern and related government work to activities managed by the Soviet

Union. It is my impression—although it cannot be corraborated here—that a new political fallacy may be prevalent among a small minority of Communists, who, because of the tremendous achievements of Soviet socialism, seem to underestimate the value of the Comintern and its activities and to regard it as obsolete. This political fallacy with respect to the Communist point of view is clearly indicative of the profound significance of the actual progress made in Soviet construction and, indirectly, of the predominant importance of Soviet Communist leadership in the international labor movement.

The extraordinary part now being played by the Soviet Communist Party is, of course, neither permanent nor constant, for another shift in the center of emphasis may result should one or more Communist parties seize national political power and embark upon a program of socialist construction. Hence, the present Soviet Communist Party domination must be regarded as temporary, though under existing conditions its supremacy will not be challenged within the next 10 years. At any rate, its progress, as well as that of Soviet socialist construction, exerted a tremendous influence on the operations of my ring, and any appraisal of the ring's activities must be made within the framework of the foregoing shift in leadership.

II. Shift in Writer's Orientation and Activities.

The aforementioned shift in the center of emphasis of the revolutionary labor movement from Comintern leadership to Soviet Communist Party leadership was clearly reflected in my activities, my transfer from the Comintern organization to the Soviet Communist Party being but an inkling thereof. This shift, however, did not mean that we (the writer and members of the ring) abandoned our revolutionary activities on behalf of Communism; we merely shifted the direction of our Communist activities from the field of party activities under the Communist International to another equally important field; namely, activities to promote the welfare of the USSR. The latter included economic and political construction in the Soviet Union, the demands of Soviet foreign policy and defense against political and military aggression from the outside. To be more specific, the shift in my activities meant a transfer to new work designed to further Soviet foreign policy and bolster Soviet defenses against external attack. Such activities are as important and universal an expression of Communist ideals as are Comintern activities on behalf of individual Communist parties.

III. Explanation of Term "Moscow Authorities."

When questioned during the early phase of the interrogation with regard to the agency which delegated authority and issued orders to me, I deliberately employed a general and ambiguous term, the "Moscow authorities." For reasons of my own, I did not elaborate on the question of whether that term referred to an organ within the Comintern or to a key agency situated in Moscow. At the time, it was impossible to explain to the police officer through an interpreter all the complexities surrounding the change in my field of operations and the shift in Communist leadership which I have endeavored to describe in the preceding paragraphs. During the minute interrogation conducted by Procurator Yoshikawa, I barely managed to cover the complicated details concerning the changes which occurred in my direct superiors in Moscow. I have related herein in detail that prior to 1929 the Comintern organization was my "Moscow authorities" and that after 1929 my chain of command underwent a basic change corresponding to the change in the general world political situation. Had I attempted to cover all this complicated material in the early interrogation conducted by the police, it would certainly have caused delay and confusion.

The fact that I continued to meet with such leading members of the Comintern as Pyatnitsky, Manuilsky and Kuusinen after transferring from the Comintern to another organ in Moscow may be explained as follows: These Comintern leaders are old associates of mine and personal friends of long standing. They were my teachers in the movement, they vouched for my character and my new undertaking to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, and they became my sponsors when I joined the party. Possessing wide and international experience in the revolutionary movement, they continued to advise me on various matters after my departure from the Comintern (they were the only persons I saw after I left). Moreover, they were not only leading members of the Comintern but also members of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. It must be remembered here that my far-flung spy activities in China and Japan, which were something completely new, were regarded with special interest by these three old friends. This was particularly true of my activities in Japan, where I was the first and only person to succeed in carrying out such an extended mission. To my knowledge my experiment was the first to succeed. Orders and requests invariably came through the 4th Bureau of the Red

Army; this organ alone had authority over me. Such being the case, my meetings with members of the Comintern and others were purely unofficial—what I received from them was friendly advice, not directives or orders.

IV. Summary.

As has been mentioned previously, the operations of the writer and the direct members of his ring in Japan exemplify the shift in center of gravity which occurred in the Communist movement. Through our work, we contributed directly to the future welfare of the Soviet Union—to what extent we need not attempt to determine here—and indirectly to the cause of world revolution. Or at any rate, so we believed. Within the limits indicated, we worked not only for the USSR but also for the Communist world revolution.

CHAPTER 3. THE FAR EAST AS THE WRITER'S NEW FIELD OF OPERATIONS.

Transitional Notes

Other changes occurred along with the change in the nature of my work; that is, along with the shift from operations on behalf of the Comintern to my present comprehensive espionage activities for the Russian Communist Party and the 4th Bureau of the Red Army. When asked in Moscow whether I would prefer to return to Europe to work for new people who needed my services, to utilize in Europe the experience I had amassed there or, if circumstances warranted, to go to the Far East, I chose the Far East as my new theater of operations. Moscow was very pleased with my decision.

Briefly, my choice and the approval it evoked were based on the following considerations. Before the 1920's, the only theaters of operation in which the revolutionary labor movement and Soviet policy were interested were Europe and a portion of America. Very little attention was paid to the Far East. With the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution, the Comintern and the Soviet Union gradually turned their eyes toward this new area, but the experienced and able men were all more or less interested in European and American affairs. Only a few political observers realized that the Chinese Revolution and, later, the Japanese demarche in Manchuria, were events of far-reaching and worldwide significance. Moreover, very few indeed were able to decide to adapt themselves unreservedly to developments in the Far East. I resolved to engage in this work partly because it was congenial to one of my temperament and partly because I was attracted by the new and extremely complicated state of affairs in the Orient. With a small group of others, I believed that a transformation of tremendous consequence in the revolutionary labor movement and in Soviet foreign policy could be anticipated in this new field of the Far East; that the security problem faced by the Soviet Union with respect to external friction and probable attack would have to be reviewed and changed in line with the new role to be played by the Far East; and, finally, that events in the Far East would of necessity cause momentous reverberations in the great powers of Europe and the United States and might bring about a fundamental change in the existing balance of power. That this belief was correct has been demonstrated clearly during the past few months. At the time, it was merely a general idea on my part—a conjecture—but I considered it sufficiently valid to constitute ample grounds on which to transfer my sphere of activity to East Asia. Thus, I made two changes at once, the transfer from Comintern activities to activities on behalf of the Soviet Union, which was tremendously important to me personally (and which, incidentally, showed the shift in emphasis in the Communist movement), and the major shift from Europe to the Far East. Entrusted with a certain mission, I went to China in Jan or Feb 1929 and there embarked upon new and comprehensive espionage activities.

CHAPTER 4. THE WRITER'S ESPIONAGE GROUP AND ACTIVITIES IN CHINA BETWEEN JAN 1930 AND DEC 1932

I. The Writer's Espionage Group and Activities in China Between Jan 1930 and Dec 1932.

A. Organization of the China Group.

I came to China with two foreign co-workers who had been dispatched on orders from the 4th Bureau of the Red Army. The only person in China upon whom I knew that I could depend was Agnes Smedley, of whom I had first heard in Europe. I solicited her aid in establishing my group in Shanghai and particularly in selecting Chinese co-workers. I met as many as possible of her young Chinese friends, making special efforts to become acquainted with those who volunteered to cooperate and work with foreigners for Leftist causes. I discovered one who was

very competent, decided to use him as my interpreter and gradually became so well acquainted with him that I was able to talk to him without reservations. After associating with him for two or three months, I spoke to him briefly of my aims and asked him to work with me. I also asked him to introduce me to suitable persons among his relatives and friends. I called this Chinese "Wang" and added his wife as a second member of my group. Wang gave me the names of his friends in Canton when I went there to spend two or three months, and among them I found a woman, a native Cantonese, who fitted into our work extremely well. She was on close terms with Smedley and I gradually became very friendly with her, succeeding in enlisting her as an associate. Later, her husband, who was a serious tuberculosis case, joined our group. A Chinese whom I used to call Chiang, and whom I met through this Cantonese woman, also became my associate in Canton. The Cantonese woman took care of liaison between me and him. After my return to Shanghai, I increased the number of my associates greatly by selecting suitable people from among the friends of "Wang" and "Chui," the Cantonese woman. Thus, the Chinese members of my group in China were recruited. All of them were sympathizers with the people's revolutionary movement and some had had contacts with the Chinese Communist Party, but none had been party members. In compliance with orders from headquarters, I had been deliberately avoiding any direct connections with the Chinese Communist Party.

I used the same method in obtaining foreign co-workers for my espionage group. At first I selected people from among Smedley's friends, approaching them by asking Smedley to introduce me to them and then waiting until I could negotiate with them directly. I kept the number of foreign co-workers obtained in this manner down to three. They were not actual members of my group, but rather helpers or supporters. The first friend I made in Shanghai was Ozaki, through whom I established connections with other Japanese. I cannot say definitely now, but I seem to remember that I met Ozaki for the first time through Smedley; I am sure that before I met him I asked Smedley repeatedly to introduce a suitable Japanese to me. There is no doubt that Smedley conferred with her Chinese acquaintances concerning my request and that it was relayed to suitable Chinese and Japanese in Shanghai. It was in that way that I met Ozaki, and I think Smedley was the one who introduced us. After that Smedley and I met Ozaki frequently at Smedley's home. As I have stated previously, all these things happened so long ago that my memory is not very accurate, but I believe that my first meeting with Ozaki was exactly as stated above. I do not remember whether I met him for the first time in a restaurant or whether it was at Smedley's house. At any rate, I cannot recall that Kito requested that I meet Ozaki. I cannot recall being at all intimate with Kito. By meeting Ozaki, I was able to realize my desire to become acquainted with a suitable Japanese.

B. Writer's Use of Chinese Members for Collection of Information.

As before, I would like to limit my discussion to a minimum number of Chinese with whom I dealt directly. I worked chiefly with Wang in Shanghai; only in exceptional cases did I work with other members. Wang brought in data and information from various sources and we discussed them. When the information and data submitted were of such a nature as to require more accurate explanations or reports, he and I talked to the persons who had brought them in. I transmitted orders and requests pertaining to the collection of data and information to others through him. I avoided meeting agents individually to explain my orders in other than exceptional cases. However, in the presence of Wang, I usually met agents who came from places other than Shanghai. With the passing of time, it became apparent that individual agents possessed special interests and skills with respect to certain of the subjects on which information and data were being gathered, and we began to divide the work in Shanghai roughly according to individual specialties. Agents in Peiping, Hankow, Canton, etc. had to handle all kinds of problems. We met late at night most of the time, using crowded streets when the weather permitted. Meetings were also held in private homes; for instances, at Wang's home or, more convenient, at foreigners' homes which I could visit easily. Since frequent meetings at one place would attract attention, I took care to change the location from time to time. I avoided using my own home as a meeting place as much as possible. Working in this manner made it necessary for me to meet Wang frequently before a project was undertaken, but in the Shanghai of those days not much risk was involved and it was not at all impossible to do so.

C. Methods Used in Collection of Information by Japanese Members; Methods of Contacting Japanese Members.

My meetings with Japanese members took place at restaurants, cafes or Smedley's

第四章　西暦一九三〇年一月より同一九三二年十二月迄の支那に於ける私の諜報グループと活動

第一　西暦一九三〇年一月より同一九三二年十二月に至る迄の支那に於ける私の諜報活動

一、支那に於ける私のグループの組織

私は赤軍第四本部から帰国を命ぜられた二名の外人協力者と一緒に支那に来ました。上海に於ける活動に関して私が心当てにして来た人は一人あるのみでした。それはアグネス・スメドレーであり、私は彼女のことを欧羅巴に居る時から聞いて知つて居りました。私は彼女を訪ねて上海に於ける私のグループの建設、特に私の協力者となるべき支那人の選定に就て助力を求めました。彼女の紹介で彼女の知合の支那人の若い人々に私は出来るだけ多く会ひました。そして特に左翼的意味に於て外国人と通んで協力して働かうと云ふ者と知合になるやうにしました。暫くしてスメドレーの知人中に助手として実に適当な一支那人を見出し、彼を私の通譯に採用することにしました。私は此の男と段々親密になり、そして腹蔵なく話をし、又一緒に働けるやうな間柄になりました。夫れから尚二、三ケ月附合つた上、私は如何なる目的を抱いて居るかを彼にざつと話しました。そして彼に私と一緒になつて働くことを求め、又彼の親戚知己中の適当な人の紹介を頼みました。私は此の支那人を王(ワン)と呼び、又其の細君も私のグループの第二の成員として仲間に加へました。私は二、三ケ月間広東に赴いた際、王から広東に居る彼の友人の名前を教へて貰ひました。私は其の人々の中に広東生れの女で我々の仕事に至極適当な人を発見しました。彼女はスメドレーと親交がありましたが、私とも段々親しくなつて来ました。私は此の女も私の協力者の仲間に加へることに成功したのです。肺病重患者の彼女の夫も後に仲間入りしました。其の広東女から紹介された一支那人――私は彼(姜チアン)と呼んで居ました――が、広東に於ける私の協力者となりました。私と彼との連絡は広東女が勤めて呉れました。広東から上海に戻つて来てから、私は王やチュイと呼ぶ広東女の友人の中から適当な人を選び出して協力者の大塚貞を行ひました。暫くして支那に於ける私の支那人グループが出来上つた次第です。彼等の全部は国民革命運動の同情者であつた者であり、其の一部は支那共産党に接近したことのある者でした。然し共産党の党員であつた者は一人もありませんでした。私は本部からの指令に従つて直接的に支那共産党と直接関係を持つことを避けて居たのです。

私は私の諜報グループに外人協力者を引入れることに就ても同様の手段を用ひました。私は先づスメドレーの知人中から人を物色し、スメドレーに紹介を頼んで之に接近し、本人と直接交渉の時期が来るのを待つて居りました。然し暫くして私は外人協力者を獲得しましたが、其の数は三人丈に止めました。此の三人の外人は私のグループの成員ではなく、謂はば補助者又は支援者でありました。私が上海で見出した最初の友人は尾崎でした。彼を通じて私は他の日本人とも関係が出来ました今判然申上げることは出来ませぬが、尾崎とも最初はスメドレーの紹介で会つた様に記憶します。其の前に誰か私はスメドレーに対して適当な日本人を紹介して呉れと再三頼んだ様に思ひます。スメドレーは私の此の希望に就て友人の支那人達と協議したに違ひありませぬ。其の結果、私の希望は上海に居る支那人又は日本人の然るべき所へ伝達されました。其処で尾崎との会見が具体化されるに至りましたが、会見の際スメドレーに伴つて私は初めて尾崎に紹介された様に覚えて居ります。其の後も私はスメドレーと共に彼女の家で度々尾崎に会ひました。前に申上げた如く、之等の間での事は可成以前に遡ることなので記憶は正確ではありませぬが、尾崎との第一回の会見は前述の通りで間違ないと信じます。私が最初尾崎とレストランで会つたのか又はいきなりスメドレーの家で会つたのか、此の点は今迄く記憶して居りませぬ。併し呉れにせよ、鬼頭が尾崎と会見することを求めたと云ふ事情は私には如何しても思出すことが出来ませぬ。要するに、私は鬼頭と云ふ人物に親しく会つたと云ふ事を思出すことが出来ないのです。尾崎との此の会見に依つて通常な日本人と知合になり度いと云ふ私の希望は達成されました。

Facsimile page from the original Ministry of Justice pamphlet. Certified photostat copies were mailed separately to the Dept. of Army. The pamphlet is still available but in a few copies only: it has become a collector's item. It was microfilmed for the record; originals are in the files of G-2 Tokyo. Extracts: Chapter 4, Section 1 Par A. "..... *I came to China with two co-workers who had been dispatched on orders from the 4th Bureau (Intelligence) of the Red Army. The only person in China upon whom I knew that I could depend was Agnes Smedley, of whom I had first heard in Europe . . . . the first friend I made in Shanghai was Ozaki . . . . I seem to remember that I met Ozaki for the first time through Smedley* (*) . . . *after that Smedley and I met Ozaki frequently at Smedley's home.* ....."

(*) Editor: Ozaki wrote a letter, from Sugamo Prison, June 8/1943. Ozaki, the right-hand man in the Sorge Ring, was introduced by Smedley in Weitzmeyer's bookshop, the rendezvous of Shanghai leftists: "..... *I may say that, in a more profound sense, my meeting with Agnes Smedley and Richard Sorge had been predestined . . . my subsequent decision to follow the narrow road was determined by my encounter with them* ....."

The little bookshop had done its bit as a recruiting station for the 4th Bureau (Intelligence) of the Soviet Army, but the narrow road ended on the gallows.

home. Since it was dangerous for Japanese to walk around the streets of Shanghai at the time of the first Shanghai Incident, for safety's sake I waited for the Japanese member at the Garden Bridge at the boundary of the Japanese Concession and put him in an automobile or escorted him myself to the meeting place. In order to avoid detection by the Japanese police, I hardly ever visited Japanese in the Japanese Concession. There were exceptions, however; I met Ozaki once or twice at a cafe in Hongkew. I felt most at ease when we met at Smedley's home and I took Ozaki and Kawai there on many occasions. We went back and forth to the meetings by automobile, since they were usually held late at night. I avoided unduly frequent meetings. As far as possible, I tried to separate them by intervals of at least two weeks. After Ozaki was replaced by other Japanese, I changed the rendezvous to main streets in the International Settlement. We usually met in cafes or in the restaurants of large hotels on Nanking Road. We had to avoid going to Chinese restaurants as much as possible because the Chinese were antagonistic toward the Japanese. Meeting dates, fixed beforehand, were strictly observed to obviate the necessity of utilizing the telephone and the mails. There were times when we were at a loss as to what to do when something important happened suddenly, but we decided to stick to this policy. Whenever I met Japanese I did so alone; I did not allow my foreign national assistants to accompany me. The first time I introduced a Japanese to Paul was when I did so to make liaison arrangements in connection with my departure from Shanghai. We very seldom exchanged written materials when we met; we transmitted information orally. Kawai's reports were exceptions.

D. Meetings with Foreign Members.

For the most part, I met foreign members at their homes. My own home was also often used. Meetings were held very frequently, with arrangements usually being made by telephone. Later, we also met at the homes of members' friends. At times, we had supper at restaurants or met at bars and dance halls. Everyone preferred to meet in the French Concession. We rarely went to the Japanese Concession. We hid the materials we collected and the documents we compiled in our homes. I destroyed or returned the materials after sending my reports to Moscow, but, even so, we always had a great many documents in our possession. Unlike Japan, Shanghai at that time was comparatively safe for persons engaged in activities such as ours. We left very important documents with friends for safekeeping. Our friends did not know the nature of the things that were left in their custody. We merely said that they were confidential documents when we asked them to hold them for us.

E. Writer's Personal Collection of Information.

The information brought in by the members was not enough to satisfy me, so I personally went out and collected all the facts and materials that I possibly could. There was no embassy in Shanghai, but I immediately gained an entree into German social circles and there gathered information of various descriptions. In these circles, which revolved around the German Consulate-General, I became very well-known and much sought after by people who wanted favors done. I associated with German merchants, military instructors and scholars, among whom the most important were the military advisers to the Nanking Government. I selected and associated with the ones who were active not only in military but in political affairs at Nanking, as, for example, Col van "Glieber," then senior military adviser and later consul general. The military advisers frequently invited me to Nanking and came to Shanghai to visit me. I also traveled with them to Chiahsing and Hangchow. I received a great deal of information from them as to the inner workings of the Nanking Government, plans for subjugation of the warlords and economic and political policies and, at the time of the Shanghai Incident in 1932, they provided me with accurate facts concerning the methods of warfare and actual strength of the Japanese. By becoming friendly with the Eurasia German fliers, I was able to learn about conditions in remote Chinese districts. Moreover, I made several trips into the interior to study various aspects of the Chinese scene. By constantly broadening my knowledge and reading books about China, I was able to become enough of an authority to submit information and make timely judgments on subjects of many descriptions.

F. Persons Directly Attached to Writer's Chinese Group.

1. Foreigners. "Alex"

Alex accompanied me to China on orders from the 4th Bureau of the Red Army. His duties were to control liaison with the 4th Bureau of the Red Army from a technical and organizational standpoint and to handle military problems. However, after staying in Shanghai for about half a year, he had to return to Europe with his wife because the settlement police had begun to watch his movements very closely. I was sent out to act as his political collaborator. We worked

independently, but inasmuch as he was older than I and was in direct technical communication with Moscow he might be considered my superior. After he left Shanghai I took over the technical and organizational duties, the military problems and the over-all command of the group.

"Seber Weingarten"

Weingarten, the man in charge of wireless operations in my group, remained in Shanghai after I returned to Moscow. He was a graduate of the radio school in Moscow who had been ordered by headquarters to work with me.

Agnes Smedley

She was an American and a correspondent of the German newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung. She was used in Shanghai by me as a direct member of my group. She worked for me very competently. She stayed in Shanghai after I returned to Moscow.

"John"

He was sent to Shanghai to work for me by the 4th Bureau of the Red Army in 1931. Although he acted as my proxy in a few liaison duties, he was chiefly concerned with code and photographic work. He was a Pole, a former member of the Polish Communist Party.

"Paul"

He was designated as my successor by the 4th Bureau of the Red Army. While I was in Shanghai, he was chiefly concerned with military matters, on which he was an expert. He became the leader of the group after I left.

"Mischa" or "Mischin"

He was a White Russian who had been employed by my predecessor—the superior of the below-mentioned Klausen—as a radio technician. He worked for me in Canton and Shanghai.

2. Foreign supporters.

A German woman who was called "Hamburg." She offered us the use of her home and engaged in various liaison functions, such as performing messenger duties and holding materials for us.

"Jacob," a young American newspaper reporter. For the most part he gathered various kinds of political information from foreigners.

A young employee of the American Consulate who brought in economic and political news. I have forgotten his name.

Klausen.

Klausen, who went to Shanghai before I did, handled wireless operations for his superior, a man known as "Jim." He was attached to the 4th Bureau of the Red Army in Moscow. I first met him in his role of wireless operator in Shanghai. He worked for me for quite a while at Canton, although not as an active member, after which he was transferred to a group in Manchuria. I knew that he was an able man, so I proposed at Moscow in 1935 that he be sent to Japan.

3. Chinese Members of Writer's China Group.

Wang

I have already discussed Wang. I do not know his real name. At any rate, he was the key member of my group.

Mrs. Wang

She worked very actively for us in Shanghai. Later, I sent her work independently in Nanking, where she secured a position in the Foreign Ministry of the Nanking Governmet. She brought in economic data and some military material from Nanking.

Mrs. "Chui"

She joined my group in Canton, and her husband later worked for me in Shanghai, covering problems peculiar to South China and maintaining liaison between Canton and Shanghai.

"Chiang"

He was a Cantonese and always stayed in Canton. He sent in regular military and political information on South China.

"Pai"

He was Wang's friend. He assisted Wang greatly in liaison work at Shanghai.

"Li"

He joined us through Pai and Wang. Later, I sent him to Nanking where he handled liaison between Nanking and Shanghai.

"Shin"

He sent me political intelligence from Nanking, where he always stayed. Later, I found

三、日本人成員に依る情報蒐集の方法及日本人成員との連絡方法

私と日本人成員との會談はレストランや、カフエーや、スメドレーの家で行はれました。第一次上海事變の時は日本人が上海の街を歩くのは危險でしたから、私は用心して屢々次の樣な方法を採りました。私は日本人租界の始まる地點のガーデン・ブリッヂで日本人成員を待合はせました。私は其處から日本人を自動車に乘せ、若くは私が自から護衛して會合の場所に向ふことにしました。私は日本側警察の目を避ける爲、日本人租界に日本人を訪ねることは殆どしませんでした。然し其の例外があり、私は一、二回尾崎と虹口のカフエーで會つたことがあります。然し一番氣樂なのはスメドレーの家で會合することでした。私は幾度か尾崎や川合を連れて彼女の家に行きました。其の往復に私達は自動車に乘りました。會合の時間は大抵夜遲くなつてからでした。餘り頻繁に會合することは避ける樣にしました。可成二週間以上經たねば再び會はぬ樣に注意しました。他の日本人が尾崎と代つてから會合地を共同租界のメーン・ストリートに移しました。大抵南京路のカフエー又は大ホテルのレストランで會ひました。支那人の料理店で會ふことは支那人が日本人に對して敵愾心を持つて居るので、出來る丈け避けねばなりませんでした。會合の日取は豫め堅く約束して置くことにしました。電話や手紙で連絡を採ることを避けて居たからです。突發的に重大な用件が起つた場合には隨分困ることもありましたが、私達は此の方針を固執することにしました。私は日本人に會ふ時は單獨で會ひ、外國人の補佐員を參加させませんでした。上海引上げ間際には、私は初めて一人の日本人をバウルに紹介して連絡する樣に取計ひました。會合の際に、文書の交換は極く稀れにしか遣りませんでした。川合の報告は例外でしたが、情報の傳達は口頭を以てしたのです。

Facsimile page from the original Ministry of Justice pamphlet. Certified photostat copies were mailed separately to the Dept. of Army. The pamphlet is still available but in a few copies only; it has become a collector's item. It was microfilmed for the record: originals are in the files of G-2 Tokyo. Extracts Chapter 4 Section 1, Par C: "..... *My meetings with Japanese members (of the spy ring) took place at restaurants, cafes or Smedley's home ..... in order to avoid detection by the Japanese police. ..... I felt most at ease when we met at Smedley's home and I took Ozaki and Kawai there on* many occasions. ....."

(*) Editor: In that period, there was an international settlement. Foreigners enjoyed extra-territorial rights and immunities. Kawai is still living, in Tokyo and has confirmed every detail of these meetings and the operations of the of the spy ring, in sworn statements to the Occupation authorities.

a competent liaison man at Hankow, but our relationship did not develop to the point where I dealt directly with him. He was brought in by Wang.

The above persons and, of course, the active members, had numerous friends who voluntarily brought in information for us, but I can no longer recall their names.

4. Japanese Members of Writer's Group.

Ozaki

Ozaki was my first and most important associate. I met him in Shanghai through Smedley. Our relationship, both practical and personal, was perfect. His information was the most accurate and the best that I received from any Japanese source, and I formed a close personal friendship with him immediately. That is why I worked out a means of contacting him as soon as I arrived in Japan. His departure from Shanghai in 1932 was a great loss in so far as our activity was concerned. At the time, I knew very little; in fact, practically nothing at all, about the close ties which apparently existed between him and the Chinese Communist Party.

Kawai

Ozaki brought him to my place and introduced us. He was very active and very anxious to work at that time. He went to Manchuria for me to obtain information on two occasions and I believe he was constantly in touch with conditions in North China. After Ozaki left, however, I found it very difficult to maintain relations with him because he was unable to speak any foreign language. I remember that Kawai took me to see his friend Kawamura in Shanghai, but I did not meet Kawamura at any other time and no personal relationship developed between us. I never met Kawai or Smedley in Peiping.

Mizuno

Ozaki introduced me to Mizuno, but I met him only a very few times. He struck me as being more of a scholar than a political spy. I met him once in Japan at a restaurant.

Yamagami

Ozaki presented Yamagami to me as his successor at the time of his departure, but our association ended after one or two meetings. I cannot recall now why we parted so soon. Yamagami introduced me to Funakoshi.

Funakoshi

I met him frequently, and our relationship continued until I left China, at which time I introduced him to my successor, Paul, who then worked with him. From the beginning, my relationship with him was less positive than it had been with Ozaki, nor did he bring in as much information as Ozaki.

Explanation Concerning Kito.

I state definitely that he was not a member of my group and that I never worked with him. I heard of him a few times from Smedley and Ozaki, but I had no personal relations with him. I remember other members but I do not remember anything about him. My guess is that Smedley had some direct or indirect liaison with Kito and relayed to him my desire to obtain a Japanese who could be trusted. If Kito had been a member of my group, it would not have been necessary for me to ask Smedley to introduce me to Ozaki. As I stated at the beginning of the interrogation, I am convinced that I met Ozaki through Smedley and not through anyone else. Not only that, if Kito had been my co-worker, I would not have desired to meet Ozaki, because I wanted only one competent and reliable Japanese associate, not a large group or even five or six. Moveover, I was prohibited by Moscow from dealing with famous people like Kito. Had I known that Ozaki was intimately connected with the Chinese Communist Party, I would have hesitated over the idea of entering into such a close association with him and probably would have abandoned it entirely.

G. Relationship with Chinese Communist Party.

I was strictly forbidden by Moscow to have direct contact with the Chinese Communist Party. Besides, I had no duties which necessitated such contacts. Any information concerning the party which I collected and forwarded to Moscow was obtained sporadically and by indirect means. Once in a while my Chinese associates and Smedley obtained this type of information. I shall definitely state again that after my relationship with the Comintern ended and I began to work for the Soviet Communist Party and the 4th Bureau of the Red Army, I was forbidden to maintain direct connections with other Communist parties. Moscow constantly stressed the fact that in cases such as mine, contacts should never be made with other Communist parties. A special Comintern Group collected intelligence concerning the Chinese Communist Party and for a time a special

group reported on the Chinese Communist Red Army. I had no authority to report on such subjects and my group had no authority to participate in the functions of the Chinese Communist Party. Furthermore, I myself had been taught by my experiences in Scandinavia and England to recognize the necessity of separating intelligence work from local party relationships and had proposed to Moscow that such a step be taken. I had left the Comintern in order to specialize in espionage activities. There was no reason for me to turn my back in Shanghai on the orders of Moscow and personal experience. When I came to work in Japan, I was even more particular about this matter than I had been in China. Moreover, I had orders from Moscow forbidding me to have anything to do with the Japanese Communist Party.

H. Writer's Duties in China.

My duties in China can be divided into two categories; first, those assigned to me when I left Moscow and second, new duties, arising in conjunction with the changing political situation in the Far East, which I took up and studied of my own accord.

The following duties were assigned to me at Moscow:

1. A social and political analysis of the increasingly powerful Nanking Government.
2. A study of the military strength of the Nanking Government.
3. A social and political analysis of the various groups and factions in China and a study of their military strength.
4. A study of the domestic and social policies of the Nanking Government.
5. A study of the foreign policy of the Nanking Government with respect to the various powers, particularly Japan and the Soviet Union.
6. A study of American, British and Japanese policy with respect to the Nanking Government and other groups and factions.
7. A study of the military strength of the various powers in China.
8. A study of the extraterritoriality and concession problems.
9. A study of the development of Chinese agriculture and industry and of the situation of the laborers and farmers.

These were the duties assigned to me by Moscow. With the tacit consent of the authorities there, I also took up the following duties to keep pace with the changing political situation in the Far East.

1. Observation of new German economic activities, with particular reference to the ever-increasing number of German military advisers.
2. Observations of the constantly expanding role of the United States in China, with particular reference to new American investments in Shanghai.
3. Observation of Japan's new Manchurian policy and its effect on Soviet Russia.
4. Accurate observation of Japanese objectives and the disposition of Japanese armies in the Shanghai Incident.
5. Observation of the deterioration in relations between the Nanking Government and Japan.

My attention was so deeply engaged by the new Japanese policy in China that I finally developed an interest in the whole Japanese problem. I was not able to penetrate to the root of the matter while in China, but my work there prepared me for my future activities in Japan. Moscow headquarters approved my choice of subject-matter and expressed satisfaction therewith.

I. Explanation of Nature of Writer's Duties in China.

I shall now endeavor to explain my two types of espionage activity; *i.e.*, the duties assigned to me by Moscow and the study projects which I selected myself.

1. Duties assigned by Moscow.

a. Social and political analysis of Nanking Government.

Among the main things which we attempted to ascertain through our espionage activity in this connection were the classes of people actively supporting the Nanking Government and the true nature of the change taking place in the government's social foundation. At that time the attitude of the Chinese masses—the laborers and farmers—toward the Nanking Government was either passive or antagonistic, while the Shanghai bankers, the Chekiang financial clique, the large landowners, the gangs, the opium smugglers and other big business interests were gradually beginning to regard it with favor. The attitudes of the intellectuals varied, but with the expansion of the government's bureaucratic structure some of them had become government officials. I had to study and report to Moscow the attitudes of the important classes of the people toward the Nan-

Die japanischen Mitglieder meiner Gruppe in China.

Hauptmitglied war Ozaki, den ich wie schon vorher erwähnt, meiner Ansicht nach durch A.Smedley kennen gelernt habe. Aus dieser Zeit hatte ich ihn in Erinnerung als ich nach Japan kam. Ich suchte ihn deshalb auch so schnell wie möglich in Japan wieder zur Arbeit heranzuziehen.

Kawai.

Kawai lernte ich durch Ozaki kennen und verwandte ihn über Informationsdienst aus der Mandschurei und Nordchina. Er war damals sehr energisch und voller Arbeitseifer und ein sehr wertvolles Mitglied meiner Gruppe. Er scheute keine Anstrengungen.Wegen der Sprachschwierigkeiten war die Arbeit mit ihm nach dem Fortgang Ozakis recht schwierig, sodass Ozaki mich mit einem anderen Japaner,dem Yamagami verband.

Yamagami.

Mit ihm kam ich nur ein oder zweimal zusammen.Dann stellte er mir Funahashi vor,der die Verbind[illegible] mir weiter aufrecht erhielt. Weshalb [illegible] und wohin er ging [illegible]

[illegible]lich selten.
[illegible]g gering.
[illegible]einen

[illegible]e Zeit
[illegible]t ihm
[illegible]g
[illegible]rem-

in Schanghai, da wir gute alte Freunde waren.Beruflich hatte ich keine Verbindungen mit ihm.Seine Aufgabe bestand[illegible] dabei, chinesische Partei in allen wichtigen politischen Fragen zu beraten und ueber die kommunistische Bewegung mir nach Moskau zu berichten, also eine gewisse schriftliche Arbeit, wie ich sie in Shanghai zu leisten hatte. 1938 musste er nach der Verhaftung von Noulens fluechten und kehrte nach Moskau zurueck.

Noulens wurde durch die Kd/ Chiang kai schenk Regierung verhaftet. Das heisst diese ersuchte die Schanghaier Fremden-Polizei um seine Verhaftung.Nanking erfuhr von seiner Arbeit und Arbeit durch die Verhaftung einiger Mitglieder der chinesischen Parteifuehrung.Bei seiner Verhaftung wurden sehr viele Materialien ueber die chinesische Partei gefunden, so dass seine Rolle eindeutig nachgewiesen werden konnte. Er wurde zu langjaehriger Gefaengnisstrafe verurteilt, jedoch nach einigen Jahren freigelassen.Seine Auslieferung an die Chiang kaischek Regierung durch die Wiederlassungspolizei verursachte einem grossen Sturm unter vielen Auslaendern,die eine Aktion zu seiner Befreiung in die Wege leiteten.Neulens gab sich als Schweizer aus und hatte auch einen schweizer Pass. Doch die Schweizer Behoerden kuerten an seiner Sprache feststellen, dass er kein echter Schweizer war.Seine richtige Nationalitaet weiss ich nicht; nehme an dass er Balte war.

Facsimile of original pages in Sorge's report, hand-typed and edited by him. The original report was in German, Sorge's native language; it was then translated into Japanese during the process of the trial. G-2/Tokyo is in possession of certain portions of the original Sorge statement. Other fragments, in direct testimony, appear in certain volumes of the bound Court Records. *See Exhibits 1 and 2 transmitted to Washington 28 February 1946.*

king Government and the manner in which those attitudes were changing. I gathered pertinent information mostly through conversations with members of my group, association with people in various walks of life and other types of personal research. I sent voluminous reports to Moscow twice, once during the latter part of 1930 and once around Jun or Jul 1932, and smaller supplementary reports on several occasions.

b. Military Strength of Nanking Government.

Investigation of the military strength of the Nanking Government called for the constant collection of all sorts of information about the various divisions maintained by the government and the reorganizations effected by the German military advisers. Moreover, we had to keep on the lookout for changes in the military high command, in the armament of fortresses and military units and in military training. We gradually compiled complete information concerning the so-called Chiang Kai-shek divisions, which were equipped with the latest weapons; the divisions loyal to the Nanking Government; and the divisions of dubious reliability; and, in addition, were able to ascertain in a general way the situation of major army units with respect to modern weapons and reorganization. Since conditions were always changing, however, it was next to impossible to know exactly how things stood at all times. I gathered facts of this type chiefly through the Chinese members of my group, but I had to obtain important information personally from German military advisers and businessmen engaged in importing weapons.

c. Social and political analysis of groups and factions opposing Nanking Government.

My main objects of study were the Canton, Kwangsi, Feng Yu-hsiang (?) (TN Sic) and other factions, the first two of which I was able to investigate with particular thoroughness. The important point here, too, was to clarify the nature of the basic social elements of which these groups and factions were composed. Although foreign banks were also involved, the Canton bankers and wealthy Kwangsi men, who were exclusively Chinese, were playing an important role behind the scenes. I personally gathered most of the material which the group obtained with regard to this problem, but after I left South China my associates sent me supplementary reports more or less regularly.

d. Nanking Government's domestic and social policies.

The investigation of this problem called for an examination of the theoretical bases and actual operation of the various laws promulgated by the Nanking Government for the benefit of the laborers and farmers, but, as the government was not vary interested in such matters, I had very little to report. My Chinese associates collected the materials. I cannot recall any details concerning the reports which I made.

e. Nanking Government's foreign policy.

I had been ordered to gather information continuously concerning the Nanking Government's foreign policy. I was most concerned with the attitudes adopted toward the Soviet Union, Japan, England and the United States. It was clear that the government's policy was one of dependence on England and the United States and that, from a practical standpoint, the policy was paying off. Nanking believed that this foreign policy of dependence on England and the United States would enable it to take a strong stand against the Soviet Union and, later, against Japan. I gathered material concerning the problem from my Chinese members and from the German and American Consulates. During the Shanghai Incident of 1932, this policy of reliance on British and American support was most interesting to observe. England and the United States made desperate efforts to help the Nanking Government resist Japan.

f. British and American China Policies.

I have already dealt with this problem under "e" above. It was also my duty to investigate the situation with regard to Anglo-American and Japanese dealings with anti-Chiang factions. England was using Hongkong as a base for maneuvers aimed at a rapprochement with the Canton and Kwangsi factions and Japan was doing everything possible to win over influential elements in North China, but had not as yet attempted to branch out in other directions.

g. Military strength of foreign powers in China.

We had to keep a close watch on foreign garrison forces and fleets in China, with special reference to changes. As soon as the Shanghai Incident broke out, the various powers increased their military strength greatly, with the result that my work in this field became extremely important, and I had to make more minute observations of the various power's dispositions of military strength than in the past. I collected most of the material myself from German military instructors.

h. Problem of extraterritoriality in China.

This issue played an extremely important role in foreign policy at the time. To the Nanking Government, it was an internal problem involving considerations of prestige and frequent conferences with the representatives of the various powers were held concerning it. When the so-called Fessenden Mission headed by Judge Fessenden was sent out to draw up a compromise proposal with respect to the Shanghai concessions, the problem reached the explosive state. The mission came up with a proposal, the contents of which I learned far in advance of the official announcement from German and American sources. The United States, which was very favorably disposed toward the Nanking Government, was then endeavoring to settle the extraterritoriality problem and England appeared to be reluctantly following the American lead. The Soviet Union was interested in the problem only in so far as it exerted a very real effect upon relations between the Nanking Government and the various powers enjoying extraterritorial rights.

i. Development of Chinese agriculture and industry.

The Nanking Government was engaged in a number of projects to overcome the agricultural crisis and it was my duty to observe the results. The government's agricultural policies were designed primarily for the benefit of the wealthy farmers and great landowners and none of them was successful.

I was also supposed to observe industrial developments, with particular reference to any attempt to foster the munitions industry. My investigations disclosed that the textile industry had grown tremendously, that two or three new arsenals had been built, that old arsenals had been renovated and similar facts. I was able to determine the exact productive capacity of the Nanking and Hankow aresenals, obtaining official diagrams, statistical reports and other accurate documents. Chinese members of my group and Germans furnished the data. I also had to investigate Chinese air routes, methods of training fliers, etc., in which connection I was able to contact and gather important information from German fliers.

I continued to study the problem of Chinese agriculture, which I had personally selected as a subject of investigation, over a long period of time. The fact that I was particularly interested in it resulted in my accumulating an enormous amount of pertinent data.

2. Subjects selected by writer for study in China.

I shall list and explain the most important of the subjects which I personally chose for study as a result of events which occurred after I assumed my duties in China.

a. Observation of economic activities of Germans and of the increasingly conspicuous role played by German military advisers.

I was so forcibly struck after assuming my duties in China by the increasing tempo of German activities that I resolved to undertake a detailed study of the subject. The Moscow authorities approved my investigation of German economic activities and encouraged me to become friendly with the German military advisers. The Germans were attempting to increase their political prestige in China, which was then negligible, by virtue of their strong economic foundation at home and of their influence over the military policy of the Nanking Government. Germany paid little attention to Japan at the time, most German diplomats believing that Germany would be able to secure a place in the Far East through a vigorous China policy. Such thinking still predominated in the early stages of the China Incident and there was very little support for the pro-Japanese policy advocated by a handful of Nazi leaders. Even today, most Germans favor China over Japan. German economic circles, in particular, see a brighter future in China than in Japan. In other words, not only has Germany traditionally maintained a sympathetic attitude toward China, but she looks to her for the satisfaction of her economic needs. For these reasons, many Germans have not abandoned hope of a Sino-German accord. Germany's economic and military activities in China at the time in question were designed to establish a starting point for such a pact. It cannot be said that Germany's desires have been permanently frustrated by Japan's recent China policy, but their realization has certainly become impossible for the time being. The objective of Germany's activities at the time was to gain control of the reorganization of the Chinese Army. She planned to supply war materials to the army and ultimately establish a network of munition plants and indirect national defense enterprises. At the same time, China was to become the proving ground for the German acronautical industry. Such were the common objectives of the German military advisers, businessmen, diplomats, etc. in China. Needless to say, these German policies with respect to China became matters of grave concern to the Soviet Union, both economically

and politically. The Soviet Union knew Chiang Kai-shek well enough to be sure that China and Germany could not act in concert against her in Mongolia and Turkestan, but it was still necessary to watch relations between the two very closely. I voluntarily assumed the duty of observing and collecting information on this subject and I believe that I did so most successfully. At all times, I was able to collect accurate information from Germans because I associated with a great many and was on friendly terms with the most influential advisers.

b. New American activity in China.

American activities in China, which consisted chiefly of large investments in Shanghai and investments in radio broadcasting and aviation enterprises, were being directed systematically by American businessmen and commercial attaches at the Shanghai consulate. The United States had also become active diplomatically in connection with the problems of extraterritorial rights and the cessation of hostilities in Shanghai. The United States will take the place of Great Britain as the dominant power in the Far East, a future development of which signs had appeared at that time; British activities in the Far Asia were already receding. Thus, the USSR was placed in a position where she had to give more consideration to diplomatic relations with the United States.

I received material on this complex problem mainly from Smedley and a young member of the American Consulate, but Smedley's contributions were sporadic in nature.

c. Japan's new Manchurian Policy.

The Manchurian Incident which occurred in the fall of 1931 changed the position of Japan in the Far East completely. After seizing control of Manchuria, Japan had an incentive to play an extremely active role in East Asia. Furthermore, it was easy to see that the conquest had bolstered her determination to make that role a dominant and exclusive one. The direct effect of the Manchurian Incident on the Soviet Union was to bring her face to face with Japan in a vast border region hitherto more or less neglected from the standpoint of national defense. In other words, a new situation of very far-reaching significance for the Soviet Union had developed. I had no duties with respect to Manchuria, which was the responsibility of the Harbin group, but I was nevertheless forced to watch this new situation in East Asia very closely.

d. Shanghai Incident.

The outbreak of the battle of Shanghai in 1932 indicated a new trend in Japanese diplomatic policy, although, of course, we did not know definitely at the time whether it was simply a single unexpected skirmish or whether it represented a Japanese effort to conquer China following the acquisition of Manchuria. It was likewise impossible to tell whether Japan would push northward toward Siberia or southward into China. Such being the situation, my work became much more important during the Shanghai Incident. I had to try to discover Japan's true purpose and to study in detail the fighting methods of the Japanese Army in the battle of Shanghai.

e. Sino-Japanese clashes.

The Manchurian Incident and the Shanghai Incident presented new Sino-Japanese problems. Relations between the two countries not only exhibited an inevitable deterioration, but they changed completely in nature. China, like the Soviet Union, viewed the new Japanese activity with new eyes and, perforce, with new apprehension. It goes without saying that I devoted the closest attention to these new problems.

f. The question of Japan.

Although I investigated all these matters separately, I found myself compelled to deal with the problem of Japan as a whole and I decided to do so in a general way while still in China. As a start, I embarked on a course of study by which I sought to become thoroughly familiar with Japanese history and diplomatic policies.

3. Duties of Japanese members.

I need not mention that when I began to study the subjects which I had personally chosen to investigate, my Japanese friends assisted me very materially. In particular, Ozaki, Kawai and Funakoshi had to help me a great deal while I studied the problems discussed in "b," "c," "d" and "e." They served as my most important sources of information when I investigated Japan's new Manchurian policy, the effect of the said policy on the Soviet Union, the Shanghai Incident, Sino-Japanese clashes and the general problem of Japanese expansion. I cannot recall now what individual tasks I assigned them; it is utterly impossible for me to do so. But I can say that, in general, such tasks had to do with the subjects mentioned under "b," "c," "d" and "e" above. Covering a broad field, Ozaki acted as my teacher in connection with these problems. He explained Japan's

Manchurian policy during the past several years and her future plans. I asked him to submit information to me on Japanese plans with respect to North Manchuria and the Siberian border and to collect data whereby we could determine whether or not Japan harbored further aggressive designs against China or Siberia. After talking over the project with him, I sent Kawai to Manchuria and North China twice to investigate these problems and to gather military information. Ozaki also gave me very useful information concerning the Shanghai Incident and Japanese policies relative thereto. I presented the following problems to him: What is Japan's real political objective in the battle of Shanghai? What is Japan's objective with respect to Shanghai and its reconstruction? What does Japan intend to do about British and American interests in Shanghai? And, finally, I asked him for explanations concerning Japan's military objectives, fighting strength and operations in Shanghai. I did everything possible personally to visit the parts of the city where fighting was taking place in order to gather information on Japanese military objectives in Shanghai and the fighting potential and operations of the Japanese forces. I was able to do such things because of the unique nature of the city. I received additional data and various types of information concerning Japanese tactics from German military instructors.

I learned much of value from Ozaki about Japan's past China policy and what could be anticipated concerning her future stand in the light of the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents. I can no longer recall details of the conversations that Ozaki and I had concerning these problems, but I was able to gain a general knowledge of Japanese history and politics by talking to him. In particular, he provided me with a detailed account of the internal political changes which occurred in Japan before and after the Manchurian Incident. It was also Ozaki who gave me an adequate knowledge of the ultra-nationalistic movement in Japan during 1931 and 1932.

Kawai brought in all sorts of information from Manchuria and North China. He reported on the operations of the Japanese Army in Manchuria, Chinese guerrilla tactics, Japan's political and economic objectives in Manchuria and the like. It seems to me that he also supplied me with various materials concerning Japanese policies in North China. I cannot recall clearly at present the extent to which he was active in gathering material and information for me during the Shanghai Incident. Kawai forwarded information to me through Ozaki. The truth is, therefore, that I was unable to say how much of the news I received actually came from Kawai.

I can no longer remember what kind of information I received from Funakoshi. Since the Shanghai Incident had been ended by a general peace treaty or, to put it differently, by a truce, I believe that the data he submitted were concerned only with the general problem of Japan's Manchurian and China policies.

Since I very rarely met Mizuno, Kawamura and Yamagami, I recall almost nothing about my conversations with them.

J. Other Groups in China.

1. "Jim" or "Lehman" group.

The first group to work in Shanghai was the Jim group, also known as the Lehman group. I had never heard of it until I arrived in Shanghai. Jim had been sent out from the 4th Bureau of the Red Army, arriving in Shanghai slightly before Alex and me. His chief duty was to establish radio communication between Shanghai and other parts of China and Moscow. If, in addition to performing his main work, he was able to obtain intelligence, he was to send such intelligence to Moscow. In short, his duties were primarily technical, preparatory and experimental in character. When I arrived in Shanghai he had already succeeded in establishing radio communication between Shanghai and Moscow and was trying to establish contacts with other districts in a similar manner. However, it seems that he was unsuccessful in the case of Canton. Jim employed Klausen as his subordinate. Further, he employed a White Russian called Mischa or Mishin in Shanghai. Later, he gave Alex and me the wireless station that he had established in Shanghai and made preparations to leave for Moscow. I do not know when he left Shanghai. I know only that after he returned to Moscow he became principal of the radio school. I met him in Moscow when he was principal of the school. I took care of Mischa until he died. He worked for me in Canton and later in Shanghai. Klausen was with my group for a short time. In 1931, I sent him to the Harbin group on orders from Moscow. Thus, the Jim-Lehman group died a natural death.

2. Harbin group.

The next group with which I came into contact in the course of my work was the

Harbin group, which had also been sent out by the 4th Bureau of the Red Army. Its duty was to gather military information in Manchuria. As a sideline, it gathered political intelligence as well. The Harbin group acted as a letter-box for me; I forwarded letters and documents for Moscow to it and it sent them on. Money sent to me by Moscow also came through this channel. Liaison with the Harbin group was established in the following way. To begin with, somebody from the group came to Shanghai to confer on the technique of the "letter-box communication" system, and thereafter members of my group and members of the Harbin group took turns at serving as mail carriers and traveling between Harbin and Shanghai. Klausen acted as contact man for me on numerous occasions. I believe it was in the spring of 1932 that I myself carried mail to Harbin.

I met Ott-Gloemberg, chief of the Harbin group, for the first time in Shanghai. I called on him at Harbin to turn over the mail to him. I also met Frolich, sometimes called Theo, who had formerly worked in Shanghai, at Harbin. I do not believe I met the radio technician, Artur, at Harbin, although I heard about him. Theo and Ott-Gloemberg left Harbin in 1932. I happened to meet them by chance and not in connection with my work in Russia in Jan 1933. My relationship with the Harbin group was strictly a letter-box affair. There was no administrative relationship at all.

3. Frolich-Feldmann group in Shanghai.

The Frolich-Feldmann group was also operating in Shanghai in 1931. Like the others, it had been sent out by the 4th Bureau of the Red Army. Its duty was to make connections with the Chinese Red Army and to gather intelligence concerning it. It had its own radio connection with Moscow and therefore did not use our station. The chief of the group was Frolich, also known as Theo, who held the rank of major general in the Red Army. Feldmann was a radio technician and held the rank of lieutenant colonel. There was another man in the group, but I do not know who he was. Unable to fulfill their mission, these people left Shanghai during 1931. I had no working relationship with them and met them only by chance. Shanghai is such a small city that it was difficult to avoid such chance encounters. I did not receive instructions from Moscow to contact them. They had their own mission to perform and there was no formal connection between us.

4. Comintern group in Shanghai.

I met the Comintern group in Shanghai by chance in 1931. It consisted of a political branch and an organization branch, the latter comprised of Noulens, who became famous after his arrest, and one or two assistants. Karl Lesse later came to Shanghai to assume the post left vacant by Noulens. The organization branch had various duties to perform, but it was primarily concerned with the maintenance of liaison between the Comintern, the Chinese Communist Party and the political branch of the Shanghai Comintern group. Liaison duty was of three different types; (1) personnel work; i.e., the movement of personnel between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party, (2) the transmittal of documents and letters and (3) radio communication. The organization branch also assumed the duty of financial liaison between Moscow, the Chinese Communist Party and the political branch; assisted in finding meeting places and houses for the organization branch (TN Sic) and the Chinese Communist Party; rendered all kinds of technical and organizational assistance to illegal activities in China; took an active part in the exchange of secret materials between Moscow and China; and assumed responsibility for the safety of members of the political branch. In this last connection, it had the authority to issue orders to political branch members, restrict their movements, etc.

The political branch consisted of Gerhardt, whom I had known in Germany and worked with in my Comintern days, and one or two assistants. I did not meet the assistants. I chanced to meet Gerhardt in Shanghai and renewed our old acquaintance, but our work was absolutely unrelated. Gerhardt's duty, or rather that of the political branch, was to act as a spokesman for the political policy with respect to the Chinese Communist Party decided upon by the Comintern general conference. It also acted as an intermediary for the exchange of information between the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern and submitted reports concerning all the social problems involved in the labor movement in China. The reports were forwarded to Moscow through the organization branch. I must state here that these reports were never sent through my radio facilities or my other liaison channels. With the arrest of Noulens, Gerhardt's status in Shanghai became precarious, and he decided to return to Moscow in 1931. All in all, I met Gerhardt only three times.

5. The Noulens Incident

I first learned that Noulens was secretly operating in Shanghai when he was arrested. The arrest caused a great sensation among the foreigners in Shanghai. The Shanghai settlement police arrested him at the request of the Nanking Government and remanded him into the Government's custody. The Government had arrested the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and learned from their confessions of Noulen's existence and activities. It had even discovered the rendezvous where Noulens and the party met. Noulens and his family were arrested at their home, where extremely damaging secret documents were uncovered and seized as prima facie evidence. Noulens insisted that he was Swiss, but the Swiss authorities vehemently denied it. He was sentenced to a long prison term, but soon thereafter the Soviet Union intervened and he was deported.

6. Explanation of my relationships with various groups.

My group had no dealings with any other except for a purely business relationship with the Jim or Lehman group and the Harbin group. Because of the fact that I went to Shanghai to take over Jim's place, I had to have contacts with him. The Harbin group acted as a letter-box for contact between Moscow and myself, but we had no other relations with one another. I went out occasionally with members of the Theo-Feldmann group to drink and discuss general problems, but we had no working relationship whatsoever. The nature of our duties was entirely different. Furthermore, we were prohibited by orders from Moscow from mixing our duties. My relation with Gerhardt was the same. He had been my friend since the days in 1921 when we participated in the German Communist movement together and we visited each other frequently when we were in Moscow. Therefore, it was not anything unusual to renew our old acquaintance when we unexpectedly met in Shanghai. As noted previously, we saw each other only occasionally, and we had absolutely nothing to do with each other from a business standpoint. There was nothing in our association to foster a personal relationship between myself and the Chinese Communist Party. I was strictly prohibited by Moscow from entering into such a relationship. I was even forbidden to meet Gerhardt. Later, when I made a report to Moscow concerning my association with Gerhardt, Moscow headquarters simply passed it over. Finally, I affirm that the duties of my group and those of Gerhardt were different and were never intermingled.

TOP SECRET (Kimitsu)

Apr 1942

Handle with Caution
No. 189

Sorge Case Materials

Part 2 of translation of statement of Richard Sorge

Criminal Affairs Bureau

Justice Ministry

Foreword

I. This document comprises the second and last part of a translation by the Procurator's Bureau of the Tokyo District Criminal Court of typewritten German notes prepared by Richard Sorge in lieu of a statement.

II. For convenience, the various subject headings have been prefixed by numerals and letters as was done in the Sorge Case Materials (2).

The contents of this document vitally affect domestic administration and foreign relations and should be kept absolutely secret.

IV. seine Aufgaben in China.

Von Moskauer Center wurden mir folgende Aufgaben in China gestellt:

A. Informationen und Studium ueber die Staerke der Nankingregierung und ihre Entwicklung zur Zentral Regierung.

B. Das Verhaeltnis der Nanking Regierung zu den Nord-Generals Gruppen und Sued-Gruppen, hauptsaechlich Feng und die Kwangsi- und Canton-Klique.

3. Das Verhaeltnis der Nanking Regierung zum Grossfinanz, zu den Arbeitern und Bauern.

4. Die Beziehungen Nankings zu den Grossmaechten, England und Japan hauptsaechlich, aber auch auf Deutschland, das starke Anstrengungen in China machte.

5. Nanking und Soviet-Russland.

6. Die militaerische Macht Nankings und der verschiedenen Generals-Kliquen.

7. Japans China-Pol[illegible] mechanischen [illegible]schenfalles.

[illegible] ploeta- [illegible]ve auf- [illegible]ehung [illegible] und [illegible]n meine [illegible]n und [illegible] fuer

Komintern-Apparat.

Der von der Komintern in Schanghai aufgebaute Apparat bestand aus zwei Teilen. Der erste Teil war der organisatorische Apparat, der zweite der politische. Der organisatorische Apparat hatte die Aufgabe die briefliche und wenn moeglich Radio-Verbindung mit Moskau aufrechtzuerhalten. Die finanziellen Fragen der Verbindung mit der chinesischen Partei zu regeln, fuer die Zusammenkuenfte zwischen dem politischen Komintern-Apparat und der chinesischen Partei Wohnungen und Haeuser bereitzustellen. Auch die Sitzungen groesseren Charakters zu organisieren. Ausserdem ging durch diesen Apparat der direkte persoenliche Verkehr zwischen Moskau und der chinesischen Partei. Dieser Apparat wurde ausserordentlich streng geheim gehalten, so dass ich von der Anwesenheit von Neuling/ zum erst durch seine Verhaftung in Schanghai erfuhr. Seinem Nachfolger Karl Lessey(?) traf ich in Schanghai einige wenige male.

Der politische Apparat wurde durch einen politischen Berater fuer die chinesische kommunistische Partei und moeglicherweise durch einen oder zwei Gehilfen fuer ihn, gebildet. Zu meiner Zeit war es ein gewisser Gerhardt, den ich seit vielen Jahren aus Deutschland aber auch aus der Komintern her kannte. Ich traf diesen einigemale privatim

Facsimile of original pages in Sorge's report, hand-typed and edited by him. The original report was in German, Sorge's native language; it was then translated into Japanese during the process of the trial. G-2/Tokyo is in possession of certain portions of the original Sorge statement. Other fragments, in direct testimony, appear in certain volumes of the bound Court Records. *See Exhibits 1 and 2 transmitted to Washington 21 February 1946.*

取扱注意
No. 189

機密

昭和十七年四月

思想検事分

ソルゲ事件資料(三)

(リヒアルト・ゾルゲ手記譯文第三編)

司法省刑事局

Handle with Caution
No. 189

April 1942
Top Secret

SORGE CASE MATERIALS

Part 3 Translation of Statement of Richard Sorge

Criminal Affairs Bureau Ministry of Justice

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. THE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES OF MY GROUP IN JAPAN.

A. The techniques employed in the espionage activities of my intelligence group in Japan.

1. Division of duties and selection of material.

The membership of my espionage group automatically determined to some extent the manner in which the work of collecting information and intelligence was divided. Klausen was unable to take part in the actual collection of intelligence and information, because his purely technical duties kept him fully occupied. Ozaki obtained information chiefly about political and economic affairs, Miyagi gathered economic and military data and took charge of the translation of all documents written in Japanese and Voukelitch collected news primarily from foreign correspondents and French acquaintances and handled such technical work as photography. I myself gathered and collected information from foreigners, principally Germans.

Generally speaking, the group members knew only what I told them of the functions entrusted to us and the parts specifically assigned to them. At the same time, it was stipulated that when one of them met with me we would discuss all problems in which he was interested or which he thought important, which meant that not only Ozaki but also Miyagi and Voukelitch had to bring in as much political and economic information as they were able to obtain, and that Ozaki brought in whatever military information he could gather. The division of work was intentionally kept flexible so as to obtain information from the widest range possible. For example, it was my duty to see that Miyagi did not become so engrossed in economic and political questions as to neglect military information. I reserved the right to revise when necessary the principle that each member should concentrate on his primary intelligence function. I spared no effort to avoid subjecting members to such revisions, but nevertheless I occasionally made changes.

On special occasions, I had all the members concentrate on a single particular problem regardless of their individual functions. I will cite several instances in which this was done. During the 26 Feb 1936 Incident, I asked them to devote their full attention to gathering detailed information of every description, from which I then made what sense I could. Again, in 1937, I directed all of them to concentrate for the first few weeks after the outbreak of the China Incident on the preparations for the first mobilization of the Japanese Army. When the Nomonhan battle began, I asked everyone to concern himself exclusively with discovering what reinforcements Japan would send to the Mongolian border in order that I might be able to judge the potential extent of the conflict. When Germany attacked the USSR, all members collected all manner of detailed information on Japan's political attitude toward the war, and I observed in great detail the scope and direction (north or south) of the great mobilization begun in Japan at the time. After I was convinced that there would be no war between Japan and the Soviet Union, I asked that attention be directed to the American-Japanese conversations, which were taking place under the strained relations then existing between the countries, and to their future progress.

From the wealth of information collected by my agents and myself I sometimes selected and called to the attention of my colleagues questions which I personally felt were worth of special note. At other times, I told them that such and such a problem was of no interest as far as our work was concerned, or brought to their attention the fact that much contradictory information was being reported and urged them to submit accurate reports on matters in hand, to discover the true causes of events, etc.

I decided what portion of the information brought me and the information I myself collected should be reported to Moscow by radio, what should be reserved for later delivery by courier in more detailed written form and what should not be sent at all.

As a general rule, I did not reveal to my collaborators the manner in which I used information and intelligence. Only Klausen, who handled the code message, knew what reports I sent to Moscow and how I revised the information I obtained. (Of course, I sometimes consulted Ozaki for increased accuracy in the evaluation and interpretation of news and important political developments.) I kept secret all my documentary reports, no matter what their nature; when it was necessary to round out a report, I would ask someone, usually Miyagi, for additional or supplementary information, but I tried not to go beyond that. I often asked Ozaki and Miyagi to prepare certain military or other information in written form for my next report, doing so whenever I felt that some special problem would be of particular interest to Moscow or that it required immediate attention.

I not only selected the information to be used in our reports to Moscow, but I also

decided how to use it. In other words, I did not pass on information obtained from my collaborators exactly as I received it. I used information of every type as a basis for my wireless and other reports, relating it to other information and evaluating it for worth and accuracy. This was why my wireless messages and reports did not necessarily repeat the actual wording of reports from my collaborators. Of course, I do not mean to say that I acted in an arbitrary fashion; I used the information I received very conscientiously and after careful deliberation.

I very seldom told all my co-workers about information and data which I personally acquired or about reports brought me by group members; I did so only when I thought it necessary in order to indicate a definite direction for their efforts or to avoid the collection of false information. There were times, however, when, for general political reasons, I felt that it was necessary to inform my co-workers of information I had obtained personally or from the members of the group.

To sum up, I personally handled the division of work, the selection of information and the preparation of reports for Moscow.

2. International liaison maintained by my espionage group through liaison agents.

Our international liaison activities consisted almost exclusively of the transmittal of mail to and from Moscow. In other words, we maintained technical liaison with the central authorities by courier; but we had no personal contacts with other activity groups or organizations, either in Japan or abroad. There were hardly any instances in which courier liaison from here or from Moscow was not of a purely technical nature. At a pre-arranged meeting, a courier from my group would deliver a carefully wrapped packet to a Moscow courier and receive in return a packet from Moscow. That concluded their business; nothing more was said, except for a few general questions and answers, and no reports were exchanged. Conversation on secret matters regarding the work was sanctioned only when Moscow had been consulted beforehand. It was permissible, however, to ask the courier if he had been to Moscow lately and, if he had, to inquire about conditions there and about old friends. If we had met the same courier several times before, we asked general questions about the Soviet Union and our friends. As previously noted, the work, its nature and the organization were referred to only under very special and unusual circumstances.

The couriers from Moscow were not authorized to give us orders. With one exception, they were all strangers to us, and we knew neither their names nor their positions in Moscow or abroad. We had the impression that most of those whom we met over a long period of time were "professional" couriers; that is to say, that they were entrusted with carrying the Soviet Union's official courier mail and the so-called unofficial mail (i.e., such as that for my espionage group).

In most cases, we did not know whether their main headquarters was in Moscow or in some one of the official or unofficial organizations maintained by the Soviet Union abroad. Most of the ones we met were fairly young men, whose general level of training, political and otherwise, seemed quite ordinary. Meetings with them were arranged with Moscow in advance. The place of the meeting, the time and the formal technical conditions were agreed upon by radio. If the couriers were unknown to one another, special distinguishing signs, passwords and series of recognition phrases were decided by radio. For example, the following arrangement was once made for a meeting with a courier in a certain restaurant in Hongkong. The Moscow courier was to enter the restaurant at a few minutes past three o'clock, take from his pocket a big long black Manila cigar and hold it in his hand without lighting it. When the courier from here (in that occasion it was I) saw the signal, he was to approach the restaurant counter, take a conspicuous pipe from his pocket and fail to light it. When the Moscow courier saw him do so, he was to light his cigar, after after which I was to light my pipe. The Moscow courier would then leave the restaurant, and I too would leave and follow him slowly to a certain park where we were to hold our conversation. He would begin by saying, "Greetings from Katcha" and I would say "Greetings from Gustav," after which everything was to take place as planned.

For other meetings; for example, the one that took place in a certain coffee shop in Shanghai, it was arranged to signal with small packages; that is, one person would carry a yellow package and the other a red one.

A third type of rendezvous was planned at a very small Japanese restaurant in Tokyo, a place where other foreigners never came. The courier who was to come in last, was to order a very special Japanese dish, and the man I sent was to use this as an opening to begin a conversation with him, asking if the dish were sweet and saying that his friend "Paul" always ordered it too. The courier from Moscow was to answer that he had heard of it from his friend "Jimmy." As

all the arranged passwords had then been given, they would begin to discuss delivery of the material.

If the same couriers met frequently, it was agreed that they themselves would arrange their next meeting. Moscow was informed, however, if, in the course of time, some unexpected change became necessary.

Too much time has elapsed between 1933 and 1941 for me to be able to give the exact number and dates of the meetings which occurred between Moscow couriers and representatives of my group, but I will describe the ones I remember.

The first meeting, which had been arranged in Moscow before my departure, took place in Tokyo toward the end of 1933 or the beginning of 1934, when a courier whom I did not know came from Shanghai with my name and the German Embassy as an address to contact. He telephoned the embassy and also informed me by letter that he had arranged to have a doorman wait for me in the lobby of the Imperial Hotel on the morning of a certain day and take me to him. The meeting was carried through as planned. We arranged to go on a sight-seeing visit to Nikko the following day, and we exchanged what we had to deliver there. His package contained chiefly money. He left me the number of a post office box in Shanghai for use in case of need.

Arrangements were made for another meeting around May of 1934 in Shanghai. This courier spoke English so as to give the impression that he was very clever, but I took him for a Scandinavian. I did not know what he did or where, nor did I ask. The passwords to be exchanged at the hotel for the first meeting had been arranged previously in Moscow. I have now forgotten them, although I remember that they were names of fictional characters.

For the next meeting, which, as I said before, took place in Shanghai, I sent Bernhardt's wife. In accordance with arrangements, she was summoned to the Palace Hotel on the morning of a certain day, and on the following day at about the same time she was visited in her room by a certain woman and the remaining arrangements were made.

Bernhardt himself went to the next meeting, also in Shanghai, which occurred in the autumn of 1934. It had been arranged by radio. As I remember, packages of various colors were used as recognition signals and two personal names as passwords.

Bernhardt's wife went to Shanghai again at the beginning of 1935, at which time arrangements had already been made for the two of them to return to Moscow within the year. Besides serving as a courier, Mrs. Bernhardt also made a number of purchases for us.

I myself carried our next lot of mail direct to Moscow, when, as previously noted, I went to report in 1935. I had originally been forbidden to dispense with the services of a special courier and make a long journey carrying articles to be delivered through many countries, but I made photographs of the documents and brought them safely. In Moscow I wrote out the reports which had hitherto been sent by courier and also made a detailed verbal report.

After my return to Tokyo on 26 Sep 1935, I sent a courier to Shanghai again for the first time in the spring of 1936. As far as I can recall, I sent Klausen, who had to go to Shanghai anyway to bring back his wife. This meeting was arranged in advance by radio.

I myself went to Peiping in August of 1936 to deliver material. This time it was not an ordinary courier whom I met, but my old Moscow friend "Alex" (not the same man as the Shanghai "Alex" of 1930), who had formerly worked for the Secretariat of the Russian Communist Party in Moscow but was then with the 4th Bureau. At this meeting he was to consult with me about all kinds of problems connected with the work; i.e., about organizational and political problems. It had been arranged beforehand by radio that we were to meet at the Temple of Heaven in Peiping on a definite date and the meeting was held as planned.

Around that time, Guenther Stein and his friend Miss "Gantenbein" joined our activity group in Japan. Thus, I was able to make use of a number of people as couriers, Klausen, Mrs. Klausen, Guenther Stein and Stein's woman friend. Between the beginning of 1937 and the summer of 1938, I sent these people to Shanghai by turns to deliver mail. As far as I remember, I sent someone three times in 1937. I sent someone two or three times in 1938 before summer. At the end of 1938, I myself traveled to Manila and Hongkong as a courier for the German Embassy, at the same time carrying materials to be delivered to Moscow. The other courier appeared to have come by air from Chungking to Hongkong where we met. The meeting place had been designated by radio; the recognition signals were, as I said before, a cigar and pipe.

I no longer remember whether it was in 1939 or in 1940 that I stopped sending couriers to Shanghai. I may have sent Mrs. Klausen or Klausen himself to Shanghai once in

1939. At any rate, courier liaison with Shanghai gradually became more difficult as a stricter control came to be exercised over return trips to Japan. I then inquired about the possibility of meeting in Tokyo and, after much trouble on the part of Moscow, a liaison system was established in Tokyo.

The technical side of the matter was entrusted to Klausen. I do not know how many times he met couriers in Tokyo in 1940, but I am certain it was not less than three; it may have been more. Once, when he was ill, I myself met a courier in a small restaurant close to Shimbashi Station. This meeting was arranged in the manner I have already described. The recognition signal was to order a certain special Japanese dish. Meetings were held frequently in 1941. We delivered material to couriers especially often from the sixth to the eighth week after the outbreak of the Russo-German war. Once I attended a meeting in Klausen's office to see the courier myself.

I believe that two different couriers came to the meetings in Tokyo, a tall strong-looking young man and, later, a still younger, slightly built courier. However, I was unable to identify the picture shown me by the police officer in the last examination as the tall strong man. The man I met did not wear glasses. The picture of the second man shown me bears some resemblance to the man I met in Klausen's office, but I hesitate to swear that it is the same man. The last courier I met was, I thought, in every respect a typical professional courier, traveling from country to country. I used to avoid asking questions about such things. We parted after a brief conversation on the Russo-German war.

The last meeting with a courier before my arrest was probably held in the first part of October. Because it was Klausen who went, I do not remember the date. No photographs were given to the courier at that time, but only some information, collected for the most part by Miyagi, which was handed over in the form in which it had been submitted. As far as I know, the next meeting was to have taken place in November.

Technically speaking, the material which we sent to Moscow by courier consisted of numerous rolls of film taken with a Leica or similar camera. We rolled the film tightly to make it as small as possible. When we had not sent anything for a long period; that is, for four or five months, 25 to 30 rolls of film would accumulate. After the European war began, the amount of material which we sent gradually decreased because we began more and more to report the main results of our work by radio. After the outbreak of the Russo-German war, in particular, we cut down on long reports and bulky documents and concentrated on reporting essential facts by radio.

For the most part, the couriers from Moscow brought only money; very rarely did we receive written orders. Such orders as they did bring were always couched in very simple terms. Again, only very rarely did we receive evaluations from Moscow on information which we had sent, or messages indicating that such and such information was of little interest but that such and such information was highly important. Occasionally we were urged to report in more detail on a certain question.

International liaison of this type by specially delegated persons was the only contact we had; other than that, we were completely isolated.

3. Communication among group members.

The theoretical principle which governed communication among group members was, in brief, as follows. I myself was the only person to have direct communication with all the key members of my espionage group. These contacts had to be made as seldom as possible and maintained with the most scrupulous care. In other words, insofar as possible, the place of the meeting had to be changed each time and the meeting made to appear accidental. The direct members of the group either had no contact with one another or met on very rare occasions only. Strict adherence to this principle, which was of my own devising, was, of course, not always easy. For eaxmple, the fact that I often communicated with Klausen could hardly be kept secret over a long period of time, for which reason it was necessary to disguise our meetings in a manner wholly legitimate and free from suspicion of ulterior motive. The fact that we both belonged to the German Club, the fact that Klausen had formerly operated a motorcycle and automobile business and the fact that he took very good care of me when I was severely injured in a motorcycle accident in 1938 all served to divert suspicion from our frequentmeetings. Klausen often visited me even when my servant was there, and occasionally other German visitors happened to meet him at my house. We also telephoned to each other's homes directly, heedless of whether or not the telephone lines lines were tapped.

My relationship with Voukelitch was kept secret. Occasionally I told the ambassador that, as a German newspaperman, I was purposely maintaining a fairly tenuous contact with the office of the French news agency Havas in order not to sever all connections with reporters representing enemy countries and countries unfriendly to Germany. The number and method of our meetings, however, were kept secret.

In the past I often used to go to Voukelitch's house to discuss various matters pertaining to the work, and Klausen also frequently went there to work. Miyagi knew the house and went there a number of times on business; to meet me, to give material to Voukelitch to photograph, or to make some arrangement with Voukelitch for the future. After Voukelitch remarried, I no longer went to his house. He came to my house after calling me in advance from a public telephone. Voukelitch was in direct contact with Klausen and often went to his place to return the radio equipment which Klausen installed in his house. Voukelitch's former wife also went to Klausen's house frequently for the same purpose, and I too went there often at one time, but during the last few years I have gone very seldom. As time went on, intercourse between the two or three foreigners in the group became unavoidable. Strict adherence over a long period to the theoretical principle mentioned previously was difficult and a waste of time.

While Guenther Stein and his woman friend were in Tokyo, their relations were limited to Klausen, who used Stein's house for his work, and myself. Stein had no direct contacts with Voukelitch. In my absence, or when I was ill, he was entrusted with contacting Miyagi or Ozaki, but they met in restaurants and not at his house.

In addition to the above, I had individual contacts with Ozaki and Miyagi. From 1939 to 1940, my meetings with them were held mostly in restaurants. It was not usual for Miyagi to visit Voukelitch's house and for me to meet him there. We tried to meet in restaurants which we had never used before or had used only seldom, but as time passed it was not at all easy to find a new place on each occasion. I rarely went to foreign restaurants, but when I did so it was with Ozaki. I avoided the Imperial Hotel because I feared that I would be watched.

I began to use my house to meet Ozaki and Miyagi in 1940 or 1941, after which time it attracted attention for a foreigner to be alone with a Japanese in a Japanese restaurant. I though it would be wise to avoid public places, because Ozaki and Miyagi were being asked more and more frequently who I was or who they themselves were. We decided therefore, to meet at my house in the evening after dark. From that priod on, Voukelitch made a number of visits to my house, and Klausen came very often when Ozaki or Miyagi was there, with the result that he naturally met one or the other of them on several occasions. Although I may be mistaken, I do not believe that Voukelitch ever met Ozaki either at my house or anywhere else. At any rate, regarding Miyagi and Voukelitch I stuck to the principle that only I should meet these two agents. With the passing of time, intercourse between Miyagi and Ozaki with respect to their work became unavoidable, and I therefore approved the legitimate pretext which they devised for meeting at Ozaki's house.

With two exceptions, I had no direct intercourse with the lesser members of my group. The only exceptions were the one time when, with Ozaki, I met Mitsuno in a restaurant and the one or two times I met Koshiro. Naturally, the methods used by Ozaki and Miyagi to communicate with the lesser members were not under my supervision. I had no alternative except to trust them to act on their own experience and ability. At times, I inquired as to how they were meeting and urged them to take special precautions.

4. Radio communication with the central authorities.

As I myself know nothing about radio, and as Klausen has made a detailed statement on the subject, I will confine myself to the following general explanation.

Since uninterrupted radio communication with the central authorities was of the utmost importance to our work, achievement of radio contact, its constant maintenance and precautions against detection were the most important of our illegal activities. Around the end of 1933, as I have said before, Mr. and Mrs. Bernhardt arrived in Japan, he to act as my radio operator. He established one wireless station in his house in Yokohama and a second one in Tokyo in Voukelitch's house. The technical phase of his work was so unsatisfactory, however, that I was able to send only very short messages and those very seldom. Also, he was panic-stricken about not being able to prevent detection of the stations. When Klausen arrived in Japan, a fundamental change took place. His technical ability and enthusiasm for his work knew no bounds. While Bernhardt was here I had to do the coding, which took a great deal of my time, but after Klausen arrived I

got permission from Moscow to teach him the code and had him take over the work. Standard procedure was for the leader alone to handle the code work, but Klausen's character was such that I was such that I was able to obtain permission without any trouble.

Klausen set up as many wireless stations as possible in order to ensure the success of our radio activities. At one time he was able to send messages from four different locations. Almost always, at least three places were used. Klausen's house, Voukelitch's house and the house of Voukelitch's former wife were the sites employed. While Stein was in Tokyo, his house was also used. As I remember, Klausen tried to set up a station once in my house, but the results were not good, and we resolved to use it only when we had no alternative. We changed the places frequently in order to avoid or mislead as much as possible the surveillance which we thought was bound to become gradually stricter. Klausen frequently endeavored to make his radio apparatus smaller so that the package which had to be carried to the place of operation each time would not be conspicuous and the whole thing could be easily concealed. The difficult thing, however, was to find good materials in Japan. Besides, to buy radio materials, especially when the purchaser was a foreigner, was very conspicuous. So Klausen tried to get the necessary materials from Shanghai. As I remember, he brought them back with him from Shanghai.

At one time, an attempt was made to set up a permanent radio contact point in Shanghai in addition to the one thought to be in Vladivostok or its vicinity. It was intended merely as a relay station for Moscow; there was never any intention to make independent contact with China. Except for two or three times, attempts to contact Shanghai were failures. On orders from Moscow, we tried to make direct contact with Khabarovsk, but this was discontinued by Klausen in order to prevent our communications from being monitored. Radio contact was used to send urgent information, our reports to the central authorities on organization and Moscow's orders to us on organization and operations.

With only a few exceptions, Klausen was always able to make excellent contact with the central authorities.

5. Courier communication with Moscow.

I have already written in detail about courier communication. The mail which we sent to Moscow by courier at irregular intervals consisisted of economic, political and military documents obtained from the German Embassy or submitted by Ozaki and Miyagi and reports by Ozaki and Miyagi on economic, political and military questions. (These last were frequently no more than information on such questions.) Whenever a courier was available, I also sent personal reports covering general developments in domestic and foreign policy in Japan over the period being reported on. I sent fairly long and almost regular reports on the danger of war between Japan and the Soviet Union, to which I added detailed information on the China Incident and other Japanese military operations. Lastly, I made reports on Japan's war preparations, aircraft, the increase in the number of divisions, the mechanization of the army, etc. I also furnished information concerning the organization of my espionage group on almost every occasion. At times there were special problems, such as the legitimate position of Voukelitch or Klausen. In most cases, I submitted a financial statement covering the report period just ended.

Documents and other materials, including Japanese military publications, were photographed as soon as we got them. I photographed some of them directly at the German Embassy. Some of the photographing was done at my house, but the major portion was handled at Voukelitch's house. I wrote the reports just before the couriers left. Sometimes I had Voukelitch and Klausen write individual reports on subjects which concerned them.

The sizes of the packets sent by courier varied considerably. As I said before, they often contained as many as 30 rolls of film, or easily 1,000 sheets if counted by separate pictures. At other times, however, we sent as few as 15 rolls, or even fewer when packets were dispatched as frequently as every five or six weeks. Lately that is, during 1941, I sent nothing but the most important of the information we obtained and the most urgent reports. I have already discussed the mail sent from Moscow in the section on couriers.

With the one exception I have mentioned, all the material was sent in the form of pictures. As a precaution to make sure that the prints would be legible, we developed the film. The pictures that I took in the German Embassy under difficult conditions were often unsatisfactory, but in view of the circumstances under which I worked I had to be content with them. While the film was accumulating, we concealed it at my house, at Klausen's house and, for a time, at Voukelitch's house. Only materials and documents were kept at the German Embassy. No film was kept there.

B. The duties of my espionage group in Japan.

These duties may be divided into two categories: (1) the general duty outlined in 1933 and the fairly concrete detailed duties assigned me in 1935 and (2) the duties I found it necessary to assume on the basis of the various events which occurred while I was in Japan. The duties I myself assigned were later confirmed by Moscow as important and necessary.

1. The duty outlined in 1933 and the more detailed duties assigned by Moscow in 1935 may be summarized as follows.

a. To observe most closely Japan's policy toward the USSR following the Manchurian Incident, and, at the same time, to give very careful study to the question of whether or not Japan was planning to attack the USSR.

This was for many years the most important duty assigned to me and my group; it would not be far wrong to say that it was the sole object of my mission in Japan. In 1935, when Klausen and I bade goodbye to Gen Olitsky of the 4th Bureau, he strongly stressed its significance. Its accomplishment, in the sense that it would enable the USSR to avoid fighting a war with Japan, was a matter of extreme concern to all quarters in Moscow. What must be taken into account here is the fact that the USSR, as it viewed the prominent role played and the attitude taken by the Japanese military in foreign policy after the Manchurian Incident, had come to harbor a deeply implanted suspicion that Japan was planning to attack the Soviet Union, a suspicion so strong that my frequently expressed opinions to the contrary were not always fully appreciated in Moscow, especially during the Nomonhan battle and the large-scale Japanese mobilization which followed in the summer of 1941.

Besides our primary mission of discovering whether or not Japan intended to attack the Soviet Union, we were also naturally expected to observe all other foreign policy issues involving Japan's policy toward the Soviet Union. However, Moscow was more concerned with the Manchuria-Siberia border problem and the Mongolia-Manchuria border problem than with fishing problems or the Sakhalin question.

b. To make an accurate observation of any reorganization and augmentation of Japanese Army and air units which might be directed against the Soviet Union.

This duty, which was related to the first one, entailed the obtaining of very broad military intelligence, because the Japanese military, in order to justify their increased budget demands, were pointing to the Soviet Union as Japan's principal enemy. Accordingly, my espionage mission was not concerned solely with increases in the number of Japanese forces in Manchukuo but covered all measures, particularly army reorganizations, that seemed to indicate that war was being planned against the USSR. Naturally, a close watch on the mechanization and motorization of the Japanese Army was an important part of our work. To everyone's surprise, the Japanese armed forces had carried through a very large reinforcement program and a wide reorganization, which, it was considered, were aimed not solely at China but at the Soviet Union as well. Troop strength had been tripled and army divisions brought to a fair approximation of their Soviet counterparts, and mechanization had gone forward with leaps and bounds after the Nomonhan Incident. These particular developments, taken together with the open declarations of many military leaders, could be regarded as aimed at the Soviet Union, and I was accordingly greatly interested in them. Of course I could make no more than chance observations with regard to war preparations in Manchuria, since it was impossible to keep a constant watch on them from Japan, but, inasmuch as I was unable to decide whether or not some secret organization in Manchukuo was handling the problem directly, I took an interest in it. I had to keep a constant watch on Japan's troop strength in China because it was possible for Japanese forces to be quickly dispatched from occupied areas there to the Soviet border.

c. To study closely German-Japanese relations in the sense that they would inevitably become closer after Hitler came into power.

Of course, in the middle of 1933 and the summer of 1935 it was still too soon to predict how far the slow improvement in relations between Germany and Japan would go, but Moscow was convinced that a rapprochement was taking place, and, moreover, that it was directed chiefly against the USSR. The Russians were so prone to suspect that the Japanese and German foreign policies were aimed against the USSR that in 1941, when Japan took the last great turning in her career, Moscow was taken completely by surprise.

This particular duty was assigned to me as one of my major functions because, in view of the manner in which I had operated in China, Moscow rightly thought that I would be able

to establish sound connections in high German circles in Japan. Of course, it was assumed that I would get a firm foothold in the German Embassy, which was the sole place where I could study such developments in detail.

d. To obtain constant information on Japan's policy toward China.

This may be thought of as a continuation of the espionage and investigation activities which I had performed in China. At the time the duty was assigned me, no one foresaw to what a broad sphere it would extend by the summer of 1937. Moscow merely supposed that a knowledge of Japan's China policy would, to a certain degree, reveal Japanese intentions toward the USSR, and that the course of Japan's future relations with other countries easily could be deduced from her China policy.

e. To keep a close watch on Japan's policy toward Britain and America.

This duty was especially important because, prior to the start of the China Incident, Moscow believed that there was a possibility that Japan would turn upon the USSR with the support of Britain and America. Moscow's opinon was that the idea of all the great powers' fighting a war to contain the Soviet Union was not one to be dismissed lightly.

f. To keep a constant watch on the real part played by the Japanese military in deciding the course of Japan's foreign policy; to watch closely all trends within the army likely to affect domestic policy, with particular reference to the young officer group; and, lastly, to follow closely general trends in domestic policy in every political sphere.

This duty was assigned because Moscow was fully cognizant of the leading part the Japanese military played in all of Japan's policies, and especially in her foreign policy. The Russians were well aware after 1931 that the power of the army had increased greatly, and during the next several years they could not help wondering if the influence of the military over Japan's political leaders would continue to grow. This question had a very real significance for Moscow because, for several decades, Japan's military leaders had considered Russia and the USSR as Japan's only real hypothetical enemy. Since no one foresaw in 1933 that the Japanese Navy would gradually increase its political influence or that wartime economic needs (petroleum, rubber and metals) would be sought in the south, it was natural for Moscow to believe that should the army's decisive influence continue to grow it would be turned against the Soviet Union. This particular duty was, therefore, exceedingly important.

g. To obtain constant information on Japan's heavy industry, with particular reference to the expansion of her war economy.

Since the degree to which Japan was able to solve this problem would largely determine the effectiveness of her army, it was natural for Moscow to be interested, the more so because until 1931 Japan had devoted her energies to developing light industry on a peacetime basis. Since the USSR itself had experienced practical difficulty in converting to heavy industry from light industry, the manner in which Japan would solve the problem was also of great interest to Moscow.

This particular duty included a general consideration of the economic development of Manchukuo, with particular reference to heavy industry, but I was able to collect only two or three pieces of information on the subject because of the impossibility of close and constant observation from Tokyo.

2. Independent duties in Japan.

The most important duties which arose in the course of various political events may be summarized as follows. (I shall discuss them in chronological order.)

a. The so-called Feb 26 Incident in 1936 and its effect on the internal situation.

This was one phase of the duty, originally assigned me by Moscow, which I have described in "f" under item 1. However, the Feb 26 Incident was of such great significance that first the incident itself and then its internal repercussions had to be considered a special duty. Although for some time prior to 25 Feb signs of internal strain had become increasingly evident, the 'explosion," and particularly the unique course it pursued, came as a complete surprise to foreign countries and foreigners. Nevertheless, the incident had a very typical Japanese character and hence its motivations required particular study. A discerning study of it, and, in particular, a study of the social strains and internal crisis it revealed, was of much greater value to an understanding of Japan's internal structure than mere records of troop strength or secret documents. The resolution of the internal crisis under the Hirota, Hayashi and First Konoye Cabinets also offered material for large-scale research. Lastly, the fact that the Feb 26 Incident was completely suppressed by the China Incident provided excellent first-hand information of the type required for

an understanding of Japan's foreign policy and her internal structure. It is easy to see, therefore, why our espionage group made the incident one of its special duties. There is no doubt that in Moscow, too, it attracted the greatest interest, not from a purely military standpoint but from a broad political and social standpoint as well. Needless to say, attention was also given to the resolution and suppression of the internal crisis that followed it.

b. The alliance between Germany and Japan.

The first conference concerned with the so-called anti-Comintern pact made it clear that the German ruling class and the powerful Japanese military leaders wanted not merely a political rapprochement between the two countries but as close a political and military alliance as possible. The problem assigned me in Moscow, that is, the study of German-Japanese relations, now appeared in an entirely new light, since no doubt was felt that the chief object which bound the two countries together at that time was the USSR, or more precisely speaking, their hostility toward the USSR. The fact that at the outset I had got wind of the secret negotiations in Berlin between Oshima and Ribbentrop made the duty of observing the relations between the two countries one of the most important of my activities—all the more so because, as is well-known now, these negotiations were designed not simply to arrange an anti-Comintern pact but to conclude an actual alliance. The negotiations between the two nations at various periods and amidst many changes in the international situation always claimed a major share of my attention during my years in Japan. It is undeniably true that the strength of the anti-Soviet attitude displayed by Germany and Japan during the alliance negotiations was a matter of great concern to Moscow. After the start of the Russo-German war in the summer of 1941, the question of whether Japan would take action consistent with her first attitude, upon which the negotiations to conclude an alliance with Germany had originally been based, was again a matter of grave concern to Moscow. To find the answer to this question was one of the most important duties which arose during my years in Japan, and one which my espionage group accomplished with outstanding success.

c. The China Incident in and after 1937.

The China Incident was another unforeseen event which imposed an especially important duty upon us. It placed Sino-Japanese relations on an entirely new footing, one giving Japan monopoly rights in China. Having hitherto been regarded as impossible by the other powers, such a basis for relations between Japan and China confronted not only Britain and America but Moscow as well with an entirely new problem.

The Incident was confined to China, its course being such that while it was in progress Japan's expansionist policy could not abruptly or easily be shifted to the north. As Japan advanced into South China, her economic, political and military interest in southern problems gradually came to the fore, a fact which meant that Siberia was not the chief target of Japanese expansion.

The China Incident was very important to us from the economic standpoint as well, inasmuch as plans for Japan's war economy and her conversion to heavy industry were laid during that time. That is to say, it offered an excellent opportunity for the observation of Japan's shift to a war economy, one of the duties assigned me by Moscow.

Lastly, the China Incident afforded an excellent opportunity for a detailed study of Japanese methods of waging war and the strengthening and organization of the Japanese Army. The China Incident provided a proving ground for the expansion of Japan's armaments and the reorganization of her army. To observe the various aspects of these two operations during this period was not at all difficult.

Aside from the above, the Soviet Union's China policy was radically altered by the Incident, as was China's development, with which my work had previously been concerned for a number of years. These were all reasons why the Incident posed a special problem for us.

d. The collapse of Japan's long-standing relationship with Britain and America.

It was apparent that prosecution of the China Incident on an all-out basis would lead either to a complete surrender to Japan by Britain and America or to a major crisis in relations with those two countries. A change became apparent within a few months after the China Incident, and the only doubtful point was whether England and America would surrender to Japan's policy or whether a crisis would develop. The tendency of Britain was, as is well known, to appease Japan, or rather to countenance her China policy, but her increasing dependence upon the United States, which was especially obvious after the outbreak of the European war, obliged her to follow the diplomatic lead of the United States instead of adopting an appeasement policy. When Japan's southward advance was added to the China Incident and the policy of a German-Japanese

alliance, the ultimate collapse of relations with Britain and America was the result. England, Japan's former ally, and the United States, which had favored the alliance, thus became Japan's enemies.

Since the China Incident embraced both of the above possibilities in its early stages, all attentive diplomatic observers were obliged to follow the progress of relations among the three countries very closely. Later developments justified the work that I undertook in this regard.

e. Japan's attitude toward World War II and the Russo-German War.

I believe it is not necessary to explain the nature and significance of the duty which I assumed in this connection. Its extreme importance is obvious when one recalls the efforts made by Germany to draw Japan into the war during the past two and a half years. Just before the outbreak of the war, Germany tried to conclude an alliance with Japan aimed chiefly at England; in 1940, she succeeded in getting Japan to sign a treaty against England and America; and in 1941 she devised all manner of plans to incite Japan to war against the Soviet Union. Thus Japan's attitude toward World War II was of great concern to Moscow, and, needless to say, her stand following the outbreak of the Russo-German war was also of vital interest. No other issue had had as direct a relation to my most important mission in Japan; that is, to the question of war or peace between Japan and the Soviet Union, as had the attitude of Japan toward the two world political events just mentioned. The above reasons will enable you to understand the interest taken in this particular mission by my espionage group and our intense desire to accomplish it. At any rate, we had to work on it until Oct 1941.

f. The great mobilization in the summer of 1941.

This duty may be considered a part of item "e," but the fact that for several months it was an extremely important mission for my espionage group is reason enough to consider it separately. A correct knowledge of the scope of the mobilization and its direction (north or south) would give the most accurate answer to the question of whether or not Japan wanted war with the Soviet Union. At the outset, the large-scale nature of the mobilization and the fact that some reinforcements were sent northward gave us cause for anxiety, but it gradually became apparent that it was by no means directed primarily against the Soviet Union. This conclusion enabled us ultimately to answer the question set forth in item "e"; that is, to assert that Japan was not planning to attack the Soviet Union that summer or autumn, or, to put it differently, that no attack would be forthcoming until the spring of the next year at the earliest.

The problem confronting us after we reached this conclusion was that posed by the decisive crisis in American-Japanese relations. In December the crisis finally resulted in war, but we were able to study only the first phase. We were unfortunately deprived of the opportunity to accomplish this mission.

3. Directives for special activities issued by Moscow.

During my many years in Japan, I received numerous directives from Moscow in addition to the assignments listed under 1. The majority were transmitted by radio, but on rare occasions they were sent by courier. Such directives were either of a general or of a very special nature. The general ones instructed me to increase my espionage activity, told me to obtain better information sources, or, frequently, warned me to take all possible precautions. The special ones instructed me to find out things like whether or not a certain division actually existed and where it was stationed, what types of new airplanes were being adopted and what new tanks were being produced by the Japanese Army. On rare occasions, directives were issued on questions of a political nature; for example, I was once asked about the possibility of an understanding between Japan and America with regard to the Soviet Union. I was never ordered to undertake any new mission beyond those assigned by Moscow or those I assigned myself. I cannot recall any such reports. Moscow had complete confidence in the political aptitude and political consciousness of my espionage group. Everything has been told about the mission of my espionage group in Japan under items 1 and 2.

4. General remarks.

I must now say something about the execution of the duties I have just outlined.

During the period from Sep 1933 to the summer of 1935, the execution of the duties assigned us was almost completely out of the question. This period was spent in working into the especially difficult situation in Japan. In other words the espionage group had to be organized and a foundation laid before constructive activity could be undertaken. Moreover, we foreigners in the group first had to become acquainted with the subject matter of our mission. An accurate understanding of the various problems involved was quite impossible at the outset. It took time

for Miyagi, who had lived abroad a good while, and even more time for us foreigners, to get abreast of Japanese problems. I may say that constructive espionage activity did not commence until after I had returned from my brief visit to Moscow in the summer and fall of 1935, and that the group was not able to branch out and function as a strong organization until around the beginning of 1936. The preceding months must be viewed as a period of acquainting ourselves with the situation in Japan, as a period of study and as a period of preparation for actual constructive activity. Criticizing the early period of my stay in Japan is the same as criticizing the actual results of my work. These results had no notable value until 1936.

C. Information sources available to the direct members of my espionage group in Japan.

General remarks.

I must first make a few general remarks before taking up the subject in detail.

I do not know all the information sources which were available to the direct members of my group. I know only those which were most important and which had a sustained usefulness, and I know their general character rather than individual names and personalities. That I lack knowledge of the sources employed by the members of my group is not because I was indifferent to their activities and efforts or because I was indolent. Because of the nature of the work I had to performs, most information sources dried up as soon as they were cultivated, and I never accepted one as truly valuable and useful until it had been proved over a long period of time. Therefore, I considered a knowledge of my confederates' sources important only when they had passed the above test. I made it a principle not to attach any weight to the names of the people in question but to be satisfied with knowing their general character. This was intentional on my part so that if I were questioned about them I would know very little likely to get them into trouble. This is a traditional principle for illegal activity.

1. Ozaki's sources.

I believe Ozaki's most important source of information was a group of men around Prince Konoye, a sort of brain trust, to which Kazami, Saionji, Inukai, Goto and Ozaki himself belonged. Perhaps there were others, but I remember only that I occasionally heard the above names. When Ozaki and I referred to these men, we usually called them the Konoye group. If I wished to name the source in my reports to Moscow, I called it "circles close to Konoye." I had the impression that if the greater part of Ozaki's information on domestic and foreign affairs did not come from his own rich knowledge and sound judgment it came from this group. Information from the Konoye group concerned the situation regarding the Konoye Cabinet's domestic policy, influences molding domestic and foreign policy and plans in the making. Sometimes he obtained economic information, and on very rare occasions political and military information. He continued to obtain information from the group when Konoye was no longer premier, but not as frequently, nor were the facts always accurate. I cannot say who among the men in the group gave the most information. That was very difficult to determine. I had the idea that the man most intimate with Ozaki was Kazami, or possibly Inukai, but I must emphasize that that was merely a vague impression and not anything I heard Ozaki say in so many words. I believe Ozaki's personal relations were closest with those two men. Sometimes, however, they seemed to change. Ozaki had too independent a mind always to see eye to eye with them, and for that reason, differences of opinion and tensions may often have clouded his relations with them.

Ozaki sometimes met Prince Konoye directly, whether in private or not I do not know. The information he obtained from these meetings did not take the form of concrete individual political reports but was concerned with broad political opinion and thinking in general, and sometimes with Prince Konoye's frame of mind. While such information was not concrete, it was extremely important, providing a far deeper insight into the Japanese Government's policy than mountains of detailed facts. I remember in particular Ozaki's report on his meeting with Prince Konoye in 1941, which revealed very clearly what great efforts the prince was making to settle the China problem and avoid any conflict on the diplomatic front. It depicted better than the largest array of political documents or anything else the policy of the Third Konoye Cabinet toward the USSR and toward Britain and America. However, such personal meetings between Ozaki and Prince Konoye were very rare.

The South Manchuria Railway Company.

Through his work for the South Manchuria Railway, Ozaki had access to a great deal of political and economic information, a part of which he was able to use for our purposes. At times he also got possession of political and economic documents and sometimes of purely military data.

I believe a small part of what little military information I did obtain came from this source.

What I must emphasize is that I never asked about such information sources except in a very general way. On most occasions it was enough for me just to have Ozaki say that this information was valuable, this was average or that was not very helpful.

I think Ozaki made monthly economic and political reports for the South Manchuria Railway; at least I believe that some of the economic and political reports he gave me were based on information he got through the company and were prepared as a part of his work for it.

The trips which Ozaki made for the company were also extremely useful. I was very much inconvenienced by his absences, but his travels were most profitable. Owing to his connections with important people and his acute powers of observation, he always brought back information very valuable for our purposes. He went to Manchuria once and to China several times at the request of the South Manchuria Railway, and on each occasion I explicitly asked him to give his attention to certain political and military problems for our work.

Ozaki's sources of military information.

I recollect only one or two reports by Ozaki containing general military and political information which he had obtained from active officers in the Japanese Army. I received the impression that these officers wanted to confer with Ozaki because of his special knowledge of China. Of course, Ozaki tried to get information from them too. I do not think that he had any definite source of military information.

Ozaki's newspaper connections.

As a very well-known ex-newspaperman himself, Ozaki had many friends among Japanese reporters. I think most of them had been colleagues of his in the days when he worked for the Asahi Shimbun. He was able to get a great deal of information from these reporters, most of it political. On two or three occasions, he obtained political information concerned with the military. I believe he also had connections in the government's information office and, earlier, with the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. Information from these sources was concerned chiefly with day-to-day political developments: information on fundamental principles was rare.

Ozaki himself.

Ozaki himself had an excellent education. His wide knowledge and his reliable judgment made him one of the few men who were information sources in themselves. On this score a conversation or a discussion with him was highly rewarding, and I often sent his personal opinion on some issue or on future developments to Moscow as information of great value. I depended on his judgment in connection with many questions which were too difficult or too peculiar to Japan for me to have complete confidence in my own interpretation. On two or three occasions I consulted him before making final major decisions fundamental to my work. Thus Ozaki himself was essential to my work and must be considered a direct source of information. I am very deeply indebted to him.

Ozaki had two or three assistants for his work in my espionage group. One of these was Mizuno, whom I had previously known in China. I myself met Mizuno only once, in a restaurant, on which occasion, as far as I remember, the main subject of conversation was the farm question. Kawai must also be regarded as Ozaki's assistant, although, as I have said before, it would be more apt to say that Ozaki was Kawai's means of support. Lastly, I must mention a certain specialist (Note). He was an old friend of Ozaki's who was brought into our work soon after I arrived in Japan, but who turned out to be far from what we had expected. Instead of a military expert, as we all had thought in the beginning, he gradually turned into a money "expert." Miyagi had some relations with these assistants of Ozaki's.

Note. Refers to Shinozuka Torao.

2. Miyagi's sources.

I think Miyagi's oldest connection, whom he apparently met frequently, was a friend of long-standing employed as a confidential secretary to Gen Ugaki (Note 1). Most of his information concerned domestic affairs, chiefly developments in Japan's internal policies. Not infrequently there were also reports from this source on Russo-Japanese relations and Japan's China policy. Naturally, problems of the Ugaki Cabinet predominated, and after Ugaki became Foreign Minister in the Konoye Cabinet his private secretary was able to provide much information. At the time these events were taking place, he gave us full information on the strong opposition Ugaki encountered when he attempted to form a cabinet. During Ugaki's term as Foreign Minister, he provided full details on the tension that arose between Ugaki and Konoye over the China policy

and the establishment of a "China Board."

Miyagi had a connection of long-standing with a man from Hokkaido (Note 2) who provided much detailed information on Hokkaido and, sometimes, Sakhalin. The information was chiefly on military matters; mobilization in the Hokkaido garrison area, complete tranquility, the dispatch of individual units to Sakhalin and the construction of airfields in Hokkaido and Sakhalin. Occasionally this source supplied economic information on commodity supply difficulties in the north and news concerning the prohibition, for military and political reasons, of travel in the north.

According to Miyagi's story about this source, he was a friend of many years' standing who had had Leftist tendencies for a long time. However, I understood from what I heard that he had abandoned a positive political stand long before and was now engaged strictly in business—at least, that was how I understood the situation. The man was obviously engaged in the fishing business in Hokkaido.

Miyagi said that he also had permanent connections with several newspaper reporters, of whom I believe he was especially intimate with one or two. One of them apparently was an extreme political Rightist (Note 3). Miyagi's data on extreme Right organizations in Japan came chiefly from this source, which, in all likelihood, also yielded information on internal tensions and economic difficulties. The second reporter (Note 4) seems to have had some connection with the military. I do not know whether he was a reporter by profession or whether he was temporarily employed as one. He, too, seems to have leaned to the extreme Right in his political thinking.

Of Miyagi's sources of purely military information, I knew Koshiro fairly well. Miyagi occasionally mentioned other names, men who had just left the military service or men just about to be conscripted, but I had the impression that they were not constant or regular sources of information. I believe they were temporary acquaintances rather than genuine confederates.

Koshiro was the only person I judged to be a genuine collaborator. After Koshiro returned from Manchuria, Miyagi formed a close relationship with him, for which reason I decided I wanted to know him better and met him once or twice in restaurants. I got the impression that most of our information on the mobilization of the Tokyo and Utsunomiya divisions came from Koshiro, and that he was also responsible for two or three reports on the organization of new combined units (Truppen Des Bande TN: Sic) from the old Tokyo and Utsunomiya divisions. Koshiro gave Miyagi a variety of data on the living and working conditions of troops on the Siberian border, and I believe that he also furnished several individual pieces of information about the army's new artillery and tanks.

I believe Miyagi picked up other military information on the streets of Tokyo, in restaurants and in bars. I had the impression that in order to collect such information he made a practice of frequenting all sorts of bars. He often complained to me about the amount he had to drink in order to obtain trivial facts.

Miyagi made frequent trips to Osaka, but I do not know the names of his connections there. He said only that he visited two or three acquaintances. On such trips he sometimes went on to Kobe to learn something about mobilization of divisions there or cancellation of mobilizations.

Lately it seemed that Miyagi was often meeting a former friend from America (Note 5). It was my impression, however, that he did not want him as a new source of information but rather at a translator and general assistant for much of his other work. He talked about him several times, and whenever I expressed any anxiety about his association with this former friend from America he declared emphatically that the man was trustworthy.

Miyagi also seemed to have a large number of temporary acquaintances who probably furnished him information from time to time, but they cannot be considered regular or constant of information. In recent years he was on close and friendly terms with Ozaki because he translated Ozaki's information and relayed Ozaki's individual reports to me; that is, he brought me partial data consisting of reports and translations of information obtained from Ozaki's sources.

As I have said before, Miyagi also maintained contact with Ozaki's assistants, Kawai, Mizuno and the "Specialist." For that reason these men too may be considered occasional information sources of Miyagi's. As with Ozaki, I was on close personal terms with Miyagi.

Note 1. Refers to Yabe Shu
Note 2. Refers to Taguchi Ugenda
Note 3. Apparently refers to Sano Masahiko
Note 4. Apparently refers to Kikuchi Hachiro
Note 5. Refers to Akiyama Koji

3. Voukelitch's sources.

Voukelitch had two duties in the group; he assisted in the technical aspects of our activity and he collected information.

His most important source was the Domei news agency. He went there every day in the course of his work and therefore could easily find out all manner of information, both published and unpublished. He also was able to grasp the political undercurrents within Domei itself. His information from this source was purely political, some of it indicating the political atmosphere. In principle, important information could not be obtained from it, but such scanty news was important and very interesting as a supplement to the large amount of information my group collected from other sources. I am thinking in particular of Voukelitch's report on the atmosphere within Domei with regard to World War II and the sentiment at the time the Russo-German war broke out. Domei's attitude, which was never pro-German, expressed the feeling of a majority of the Japanese people.

Voukelitch was often able to learn news which was well-known at Domei but had not been made public due to censorship. This information provided another good indication of political conditions in Japan and the government's attitude. He also obtained several bits of information by talking with the French at Havas. From this source, he learned the general political attitude of his French friends toward Germany after the fall of France, as well as their attitude toward Japan's Indo-China and southern policies. However, this was atmosphere material (Stimming Bilder) rather than definite information.

Havas was in contact with the French Embassy, as was Voukelitch himself on occasion, a fact which added interest to the general and background information he obtained there. Voukelitch also talked with the military attache of the French Embassy a few times ,but the information he obtained was of little importance.

As a correspondent for the Havas news agency, Voukelitch was able to make a trip to Nomonhan authorized by the Japanese military, which, of course, gave him an opportunity to collect information for our work.

Lately he had been obtaining a good deal of information from foreign newspapermen, particularly Americans, some of which was very interesting. It was concerned primarily with diplomatic policy; for example, the most important thing he brought me was the speech made by Ambassador Grew in Sep 1941. He seemed recently to have greatly improved his relations with American newspapermen.

4. Guenther Stein's sources.

Stein was in Tokyo from 1936 until the beginning of 1938. He was a sympathizer but never an actual member of my group. Actually, however, he did give us positive cooperation.

Stein was closely associated with Ambassador Dirksen, whom he had known since Moscow, and who looked upon him as an intelligent and important person. More significant for our work was the connection with the British ambassador which he enjoyed by virtue of the fact that he represented a British newspaper. He was especially close to the famous Sir Sansom (TN: Sic) in the British Embassy. From the British Embassy he was able to obtain information chiefly on general diplomatic policy. At times he had opportunities to talk to the then British ambassador and British naval attache. As Stein was also on very intimate terms with all foreign newspapermen, especially the British and American reporters, he sometimes learned interesting individual facts from them. Lastly, he had close connections with Domei and hence, like Voukelitch, was able to scent out the general political undercurrent and atmosphere there. He was also very valuable as a source of information in that he had studied the Japanese economic situation very conscientiously and had written excellent books about it. His economic studies clarified many facts hitherto little understood. His chief fields of study were Japan's foreign trade and financial problems.

5. My own sources.

a. General remarks.

I will discuss the German Embassy, the most important of my own information sources, in detail in another section.

I may say positively that all the other sources to which I had access were completely subordinate to my sources within the German Embassy and the sources available to the direct members of my espionage group. What I learned from my own sources—excluding the above mentioned two chief sources—was relatively important, and I may say positively that I troubled myself

over those sources only when I first arrived in Japan. After 1938 or 1939, they no longer played any part in my espionage activity. I stopped paying attention to them completely. The reason for the drying up of sources which I mentioned earlier was the continual strengthening of the espionage laws in Japan in conjunction with the China Incident. After the Incident started, the information sources listed hereunder, fearing to violate the law, refused to supply any information whatsoever. Their funds of interesting information also decreased sharply.

Lastly, I wish to state my conviction that none of the persons named hereunder with whom I had contact knew anything whatsoever about my true mission or the nature of my work. These sources and acquaintances thought I was a well-known newspaperman and nothing more.

b. German businessmen and engineers.

When I first arrived in Japan, I heard much talk of general economic conditions from businessmen and engineers. They never looked at the whole picture, however, and could supply nothing but very general information about the limited fields in which they were engaged. Fearing that their competitors might learn something from me, they said that they did not possess any detailed information. Generally speaking, I preferred to talk to the engineers, who were not as timid as the businessmen, and who at least knew their own fields. After 1938 I had no further dealings with businessmen and engineers. I caused the German Embassy to give a good deal more study to individual economic problems, especially those bearing on national defense, than had been customary. After the embassy had assembled pertinent source material, I would assist in compiling reports for the military attache and for my own purposes. I no longer relied on businessmen and engineers for my information. Before that I was friendly chiefly with an engineer named "Mueller" of the German Machine Company (D.M.A.G.). I was also friendly with his competitor, the "Guden Hoffman" Refinery. I also used Mr. Kahlbaun, the head of a chemicals concern. I believe these men left Japan before the outbreak of the war in Europe; at any rate, I have not met them for a long time. From the first two men I heard several things about the state of Japan's steel industry and from the last a little about Japan's chemical industry. I also heard that Japan had purchased from Germany a number of patents for the manufacture of synthetic benzine, but I was unable to learn the full details. Later, however, I found them in the files of the economic section in the German Embassy. On several occasions, I met the engineers in charge of assembly at the Heinkel Manufacturing Company, who had come to Japan with Mr. "Haag" I have mentioned previously for dealings with the Japan Airplane Industry Company (Nippon Hikoki Kogyo Kaisha). I heard several items of general information from them on the manufacture of engines for German aircraft in Nagoya. After 1938 I no longer met any of these assembly engineers. Later, in the files of the air attache at the German Embassy, I discovered additional information on the manufacture of these engines and the purchase of German airplanes by Japanese airplane companies. At the time several German airplanes flew direct to Japan from Germany, I naturally asked the pilots about their flight and their plans in Japan. I flew from Japan to Manchuria and back with one of the pilots, Baron von Gablentz, in the Junker he had flown from Germany to Japan. However, negotiations for the purchase of large Focke-Wulf and Junker planes were later broken off. I afterwards found this information in the files of the German Embassy. I heard from the aforementioned "Mueller" two or three things concerning the establishment of the "Wartz" factory in Manchuria by a German heavy industry company. However, as I said before, information like this began to decrease in 1938, and by the beginning of 1939 it had disappeared completely, with the result that I had to base my reports for the military attache "Makki" solely on material available in the German Embassy.

Most of the German businessmen and engineers I met only at the German Club or at embassy receptions, but, as I was a German reporter, I was sometimes invited to meetings at the Tokyo German Chamber of Commerce. Hence, for professional reasons, I had to study the general problems faced by German traders in Japan. Conversation between me and the businessmen or engineers at these meetings naturally centered chiefly around economic problems. I had personal relations with only a very small number of businessmen, and they were all contacts entirely distinct from my espionage activity. That is to say, I met them as family men when women and other guests were present.

In my notes with regard to my personal friendships, the names "Mohr" and "Kaumann" appear very frequently. In both their houses—because they were businessmen with whom I was on very close terms—I was made to feel most welcome by their families. Their families were also

Gunther Stein

Max Clausen

friends of the German Embassy staff families. These friendships were entirely apart from my espionage activity. They were rather the exact opposite, since they were social contacts I maintained to strengthen my legitimate cover in Tokyo or because I was favorably disposed toward the persons as individuals. When I went to China, especially Shanghai, I of course visited the German diplomatic agencies there. The German minister "Fischer" and I formed a close friendship, and I naturally had various political conversations with him. He got a good deal of detailed information from me about Japan's China policy and German interests in China. (TN: Sic) In addition, "Fischer" and I shared an interest in Chinese history and ancient Chinese art.

I was friendly with the German businessmen in China, and when I went to Shanghai I always visited two or three to talk about economic conditions and German trade conditions. I also met Doctor Woidt, whom Klausen has mentioned. He came to Tokyo about once a year, and I saw him there, since all of the German businessmen in China got in touch with me when they came into town. Woidt was not a member of my espionage group, but, as a government official, he knew much of interest, for which reason I was glad to keep in touch with him. I used several things he told me for my espionage activity. In my Moscow wireless reports, I referred to him, as to the rest of the China businessmen, as "Kommersant." The last time I met Woidt was about a year ago. I liked him personally; he was one of the few of his kind toward whom I was favorably disposed. Usually I did not care very much for the German businessmen in China and Japan. They were a pain in the neck to me.

c. The Nazi party in Tokyo.

Having joined the Nazi Party for reasons which I have stated elsewhere, I often had contacts with the party and with party members, from whom I used to hear various bits of political information on Germany. For example, I heard about the extensive preparations for war and the fact that, even though Germany had come to terms with Russia, anti-Soviet feeling in the Nazi Party ran high when the world war began. From that time on, I was of the opinion that, despite the existence of the pact, sooner or later a break with the Soviet Union would inevitably occur. The attitude of Nazi Party members toward Japan was divided. One faction did not particularly welcome close cooperation between Germany and Japan. They believed that Germany could not gain any economic benefits from such a partnership, and several of them openly advocated a close union with China. Even Mr. Stahmer, an intimate associate of Ribbentrop's whom I have mentioned before, held much the same opinion after the 1939 negotiations for an alliance between Germany and Japan were broken off. Lately a sort of anxiety that the war will last a long time has made itself felt in the Nazi Party, and the certainty of victory has conspicuously declined. Shortly before the removal of the Soviet General "Tukhachevsky"—early in 1938, I believe—I got many hints from the Nazis in Tokyo that they were privately counting on an impending internal collapse in the Soviet Union. The names of "Tukhachevsky" and "Putona" the military attache in London, were mentioned in this connection. Nazis returning from Germany were responsible for propagating this opinion, which was widely held by party members. I also heard from them that counter-revolutionists in Germany were in contact with "Putona," who in turn was in communication with "Tukhachevsky."

d. The Dutch colony in Tokyo.

Although it was broken off early in 1939, my connection with the Dutch colony in Tokyo must be considered the next source of information. The fact that I sent dispatches to the Amsterdam Handelsblatt put me in contact with Dutch diplomatic and business circles, from which I obtained several items of information with regard to Dutch resistance to Japanese economic penetration of the Dutch East Indies. I also heard a great deal about Dutch and British, and later American, cooperative efforts to resist Japan's economic invasion of Dutch possessions. I learned a number of individual economic facts about trade between Japan and Holland from Dutch banking circles, and I was also able to find out something about Japan's foreign trade and present financial and economic condition. This information source was cut off in 1938 after Germany's policy in Europe had already put a grave strain on her relations with Britain and France and, to some extent, with Holland. At that time Dutchmen were already definitely turning away from Germany and Germans and toward Britons and Americans.

e. German newspapermen in Japan.

My professional relations with the other German journalists in Japan were naturally very close. I often met "Wiese" and "Karow" of the DNB, "Schurtz" of the Deutsche Allegemeine Zeitung, "Magnus" of the German Economic News Agency and "Zermeyer" of the Transocean

Press, none of whom had an inkling of my true position or real activity. Of course, we exchanged opinions as newspapermen on all sorts of events and political developments, discussed various problems and indulged in the newspaperman's habit of sneering at all things political. I was considered well-informed by the other reporters, who did not give me any news or information worth mentioning; rather, it was a case of their wanting to get news from me. But I say emphatically that I never passed on the information my Japanese co-workers obtained or the secret intelligence I got at the German Embassy to any newspaperman. I was very strict and scrupulous on that score. The other newspapermen respected me not only as a famous German journalist but as a generous friend ready to help them whenever necessary. For example, when "Wiesse" was on leave of absence I took his place at the DNB, and, similarly, when anything occurred to warrant sending a wire which the others did not happen to know about I informed them. We not only met at the office but we ate together and visited each other at home. On the other hand, when they knew I did not want to go to Domei or the Information Bureau of the Japanese Government they would take care of it for me. I was considered a slightly lazy, high-living reporter. Of course they had no idea that I had a great deal to do besides my newspaper work. For all these reasons, then, my relationship with German newspapermen was one of close fellowship.

f. Foreign press correspondents.

As the other foreign correspondents, who were all anti-German, assumed that I was a Nazi reporter, I was estranged from them; our relationship was nothing more than a conventional business one, and even that was largely discontinued in 1939. Prior to 1938 I had a few professional contacts with the Reuters representative "Cox" and the Americans "Morin" and "Thomas," but with the increasing political tension in Europe, the death of "Cox," and the departure of "Morin" and "Thomas," my individual relations with foreign correspondents virtually ceased. There was almost no one among those lately in Tokyo whom I knew personally. I always avoided "Redman" because I detested him. I know nothing about "Cox's" alleged espionage activities. I always thought of him as a happy-go-lucky, completely naive reporter. I was indifferent to the foreign correspondents because Guenther Stein and Voukelitch were already in a position to obtain information from them. I myself did not have to take on that job.

g. The Domei news agency and Japanese journalist.

For the same reason, I kept up relations with Domei and the Japanese reporters only after I first arrived in Japan, associating with them no more than was customary. Later, as it was of no interest, I broke off even this relationship, relying on the information obtained by Stein and de Voukelitch and on the political gossip picked up by "Wiesse." The latter was a cynic and very fond of gossip. I use this word humorously and not in a bad sense.

As for other Japanese, excluding those in my espionage group, I saw as little as possible of them during the last several years. Before that that I had mingled with reporters from the Asahi, Nichi Nichi and Domei along with the German correspondents. In recent years I have invited Murata, Kumasaki and Mori of the Japan Advertiser to lunch, but only on rare occasions and chiefly with other Germans. I invited them as a a matter of duty and so as not to give the impression that I had broken off all relations with Japanese. I had no ulterior espionage purpose in mind, for I was well aware that I would get no interesting information from them. It was the same in the case of Murata after he turned businessman. Formerly he had at least given me some information about Nakano and the Tohokai, but later he was interested only in making money.

h. The War Ministry.

I had the same relations I have described above with the press section in the War Ministry and the army officers I met through Maj Gen Ott and Col "Makki." In recent years my association with these people could almost be called non-existent.

Through Ott and "Makki" I became acquainted with Gen Oshima and met him frequently, interviewing him for my newspaper after the conclusion of the German-Japanese alliance. I was acquainted with the then Col Manaki, Majors Yamagata and Saigo, the present Gen Muto and other officers whose names I have forgotten. I had met the then Col Saito of the press section of the War Ministry some time previously and he often extended invitations to me along with the other German reporters. I also extended him several invitations as one of a group of German reporters. I did not have much to do with Akiyama, his successor in the press section, but I met Col Utsunomiya several times and called on him once or twice in Shanghai, the last time in the spring of 1941.

Besides the above men, I once interviewed the then Ambassador Shiratori before his illness and talked with him as long as was possible. I frequently met Nakano, a politician and party

leader, and I also encountered the then Admiral Kobayashi several times at banquets. The present Foreign Minister Togo, granted me an interview once a long time ago, and I later met him once or twice at embassy functions.

I have been present at a number of the interviews which it is customary for new foreign ministers to give to foreign reporters, but these were merely formal press conferences. The last one I attended was the interview Foreign Minister Matsuoka gave after his return from Germany and Russia.

D. My investigations in Japan.

1. Introductory remarks.

It was my conviction that a deep understanding of every problem related in the least way to our mission was a prerequisite to the successful accomplishment of our intelligence objectives in Japan. In other words I did not believe that I should concern myself exclusively with the technical and organizational work of receiving orders and conveying them to my co-workers and forwarding reports to the Moscow authorities. I could not reconcile myself to such a simple concept of my responsibilities as the leader of an intelligence group operating in a foreign land. I had always felt that a man in such a position should not content himself with the actual collection of information but should cultivate a thorough understanding of all problems related to his activities. The collection of information had an importance of its own, but I was convinced that the ability to appraise it and to evaluate the over-all political picture was of vital importance. I also realized that, while the assignments we received from Moscow could not be treated lightly, it was equally important that we discover and report new tasks, new problems and new developments arising in the course of our activities before Moscow itself became aware of them. Such work entailed an exhaustive and constant analysis of Japanese affairs. Finally, had I lacked the ability to evaluate a given problem and erroneously analyzed a situation, I would have become a target for the ridicule of my Japanese co-workers. Had I not been considered to possess sound judgment and an extensive fund of information, I could never have occupied the secure position I commanded at the German Embassy.

It was for the reasons I have outlined above that I plunged into an exhaustive study of Japanese affairs the day I landed. Several years later, my studies registered an appalling minus score. A faulty command of the Japanese language had proved to be my downfall.

The best excuse I have to offer for my failure is that I suffered from a lack of time caused by the pressure of my newspaper duties, my work for the German Embassy, my research and my secret activities.

2. Basis of my Research.

I possessed as good a general educational background for my work in Japan as was obtainable at a German university. I was familiar with European economics, history and political science, and I had spent nearly three full years in China studying her history, past and contemporary, her economy and her culture and making a comprehensive firsthand investigation of her politics. While in China, I had already written several things on Japan in order to obtain a general perspective of Japan. Finally, I would like to add that I had approached all this preliminary study and training from a Marxist standpoint. My readers may not agree with me, but I am convinced that the Marxist approach, which calls for an analysis of basic problems—economic, historical, social, political, ideological and cultural—facilitates and expedites to a great extent the work of those who would understand fundamental issues in any country. Using this system, I undertook a detailed study of Japanese affairs in the autumn of 1933.

3. My study of Japan.

At the time of my arrest, the discovery of between 800 and 1,000 books at my home proved a source of considerable annoyance to the police. Most of these works were on Japan. In building up my library, I collected every foreign language edition of an original Japanese work that I could lay my hands on, the best books that foreigners had written on Japan and the best translations of basic Japanese works. For example, I have English translations of the Nippon Shoki (collector's item) and the Kojiki, a German translation of the Manyoshu, an English version of the Heike Monogatari and a translation of that brilliant masterpiece of world literature, the Genji Monogatari. I took particular pains with my study of ancient Japanese history (from which I derive the greatest enjoyment even at present), ancient political history and ancient social and economic history. I studied the times of the Empress Jingu, the Wako (TN Japanese pirates who operated along the China coast) and Hideyoshi in closest detail to gather material for a good-sized history of Japan's expansion, from the early days on, which I was compiling. The voluminous

and excellent translations on Japan's ancient economy and politics proved invaluable. One did not have to look far for material, since many foreigners were making studies of old Japan. I am sure that I had access to much more material than the average foreigner.

With this as a point of departure, it was a simple matter to grasp contemporary Japanese economic and political problems. I studied the agrarian question very closely, and from there went on to small industry, big industry and finally heavy industry, although the tight veil of secrecy imposed by the law in recent years made my work unproductive and dangerous. Of course, I also studied the social position of the Japanese farmer, worker and petty bourgeois. In the early days, it was possible to do so. I utilized purely Japanese sources as much as possible, such as economic magazines and the announcements of government offices. The cereal shortage and the uprising of 26 Feb 1936 provided me with excellent study materials, as did the innumerable domestic conflicts between the parliamentary group and the extreme Rightists. The passing political scene told the observer versed in ancient Japanese history far more than the Alien Police suspected. In the light of ancient Japanese history, it was easy to understand Japan's present foreign policy. Japan's foreign policy problems could be readily evaluated if one had a knowledge of ancient history.

I also interested myself in the development of Japanese culture and art, studying the period embracing the Nara, Kyoto and Tokugawa eras; the influences of the various Chinese schools, and the recent period of modern effort from the Meiji era on.

In addition to my home library, I utilized the German Embassy library in Tokyo, the spersonal library of the German ambassador, and the Tokyo East Asia German Society Library, which was rich in scientific reading matter. The society often sponsored academic gatherings and lectures at which ancient Japanese history was the usual topic of discussion. I kept more or less in touch with follow Germans who were interested in these subjects and exchanged views with them.

Shortly after my arrival in Japan, I had translations made of various Japanese histories. I had a large collection of such manuscripts at my home. I also had excerpt translations made regularly from a number of Japanese magazines. By means of this system, I was able to make a close study of Japanese material on the agrarian problem appearing in books and magazines.

4. Various other research methods.

My study of Japan was not based solely on material appearing in books and magazines. First I must mention my meetings with Ozaki and Miyagi, which were not confined to the exchange and simple discussion of information. Frequently some real and immediate problem would bring up an analogous phenomenon in some other country, say China, or turn the topic to Japanese history, or to the social and political situation. My meetings with Ozaki were invaluable in this respect because of his unusually extensive knowledge of Japanese and foreign history and politics. Thanks to these two friends and co-workers, I achieved a clear understanding of the singular position held by the Japanese Army in the control of the state, as well as of the nature of the advisers to the Emperor or Genro (elder statesmen), who defy legal definition. It was also from them that I learned of the dominant role played by the Wako in the Middle Ages and their influence upon the Hideyoshi and Tokugawa periods. Their assistance consisted not so much in supplying individual facts and historical analogies as in enabling me to attain an over-all impression and broad general understanding of the subject in hand. Such was the case with respect to the Feb 26 Incident and the agrarian problem, both of which I studied with special thoroughness. Their frequent advice and general appraisals and evaluations of these two problems were highly significant. Moreover, I could never have understood Japanese art as I did without Miyagi. Our meetings often took place at exhibitions and museums, and it was nothing unusual for our intelligence and political discussions to be pushed into the background by talk on Japanese and Chinese art.

I did my best to familiarize myself with the vital problems confronting me in Japan and to dig deep into my work. My meetings with Ozaki and Miyagi constituted a vital phase of my research.

My frequent meetings with Ambassador Ott and two or three members of his staff were politically educational. The immediate problems discussed helped me to observe the general political picture and draw conclusions concerning it, and they were also useful for purposes of comparison with past phenomena. Ambassador Ott was a shrewd, able, politically realistic diplomat, and his assistant, Marchtaler, drew upon history and literature for his interpretations of contemporary events. My conversations with them frequently presented me with helpful suggestions for my research. Of late, Minister Kort, with his comprehensive knowledge of European political developments and his excellent background, has added fresh interest to our conversations and

general discussions. These talks inspired me to study anew the history of Europe, the United States and Asia.

Finally, I must mention how significant my innumerable trips proved to be to my study of East Asia. Although police restrictions later made it all but impossible, in the old days; that is, around 1938-39, travel in Japan was comparatively simple, and at first I made frequent trips, not as a mere tourist, but in order to learn to know the more important cities and regions. My travels in Japan proper were made not for espionage purposes but to obtain a better knowledge of the country and its people; to provide a substantial intuitive basis for my study of history and economics. Thus, I planned a tour of the Japan Sea coast, Niigata and the area to the west, visited Nara and Kyoto frequently, and covered the Kii Peninsula in detail. I passed through Kobe, Osaka, the Inland Sea, Shikoku and down the Kyushu coast to Kagoshima. On Sundays, I used to hike everywhere from Tokyo to the area west of Atami. My primary interest on these hikes was to inspect the rice crop in all seasons and under varying conditions. My observations came in handy for the legitimate articles I contributed to the Frankfurter Zeitung and the Geopolitik.

I never traveled with any members of the intelligence group because I considered it too much of a risk. The single exception was when I met Ozaki in Nara for a certain purpose. Our meeting there was of short duration.

5. Practical value of my investigations.

It has been my personal desire and delight to learn something about the places in which I have found myself, a fact particularly true with respect to Japan and China. I have never considered such study purely as a means to an end; had I lived under peaceful social conditions and in a peaceful environment of political development, I should perhaps have been a scholar—certainly not an espionage agent. My research was, nevertheless, of very real importance to my main work in China and Japan. As noted at the beginning of this section, I did not intend to function merely as a letter box for information collected by others; on the contrary, I considered it absolutely essential that I obtain the most complete understanding possible of the country's, i.e., Japan's problems. My study made it possible for me to determine whether or not problems and events were important from the standpoint of Soviet diplomacy and from a general political and historical point of view. For example, none of the border disputes between Japan and the USSR worried me because I had quickly realized that they were comparatively innocuous, but I regarded the various "China incidents," and particularly the one in the summer of 1937, as the prelude to a great war which would engulf all China. My study of Japan's history, with special emphasis on the Meiji and post-Meiji eras, saved me from vacillation and confusion.

My research also permitted me to evaluate correctly the reliability of information and rumors, an accomplishment of vital importance to my secret activities, since intelligence in the Far East contains far more rumors and conjectures than in Europe. Had I failed to screen the reliable intelligence from the false, I should certainly have exposed myself to serious censure.

Similarly, I was able to get a general idea of whether or not a fresh problem was important to the USSR. I had the full confidence of the Moscow authorities in this respect, and I was never criticized for failure to recognize and study a new phenomenon or problem of vital importance. My judgment has been respected by Moscow ever since my China days.

Finally, my research enabled me not only to seek necessary information and transmit it accurately, but, at the same time, to formulate independent judgments on economic, political and military developments. The greater number of my radio messages and reports contained, in addition to basic material, analyses derived from individual bits of information. I was always outspoken. Whenever I felt that my opinions and and political analyses were correct and necessary, I never hesitated to forward them to Moscow, and I was encouraged to do so. Moscow frequently hinted that it placed a high value on my power to judge and appraise the general situation.

It is not correct to think that I indiscriminately transmitted all the data that we collected. I took it upon myself to see that our information was screened most carefully, and only what I considered essential and absolutely safe from criticism was sent. The process of selection often entailed hours of extra work. The same thing was true of analyses of the political and military situations. This ability to select material and present a general appraisal or picture of a given development is a prerequisite for intelligence activity of genuine value, and it can be acquired only through much serious and careful research.

Again, one must not think that our work ended when our reports had been sent out by radio. Such messages constituted only one of many phases of our intelligence activities, and certainly not the chief one. At irregular intervals, I sent great quantities of mail to Moscow,

which included not only documents and other materials but also reports written by myself. I almost always included reports covering the domestic and international political picture and military affairs during the report period. They summarized and analyzed the most important developments since the last mail: i.e., they represented serious and painstaking efforts to present, on the basis of abundant information and research, an accurate and objective long-range picture of new developments and of the general situation during the past several months. Such laborious reports could never have been attempted without comprehensive study and knowledge. Unlike Berlin and Washington, Moscow knew China and Japan too well to be fooled easily. The Soviet level of knowledge of Far Eastern affairs was far above that of the American and German Governments, and Moscow demanded that I send in systematic, soundly based and carefully planned reports at intervals of several months. I believe I can say that I succeeded in meeting the relatively high standard demanded by the Moscow authorities, an accomplishment which would have been impossible but for my research.

My studies did not interfere with my development as an expert intelligence agent. When necessary, I performed my duties with speed, resolution, courage and resourcefulness.

I never boasted that I was capable of solving all problems concerning Japan. Many times, I relied upon the judgment of Miyagi or, in particular, that of Ozaki. The same was true for the final wording of my analyses of important developments. Before appraising a given development in Japan or wording such an appraisal, I frequently talked to Ozaki or Miyagi, and I encouraged Ozaki to take the liberty of correcting me whenever my judgment erred, particularly when the judgment was vital to Soviet policy. For example, I predicted from the very outset that the China Incident would be an extremely drawn-out affair and could not but weaken Japan irreparably: at the time of the Nomonhan Incident, I stood firm on the view that Japan had no intention of waging war against the Soviet Union; and I maintained that the great mobilization of Aug 1941 was not directed primarily against the Soviet Union. In each of these cases, I placed an extremely high value on the judgment of Ozaki, and, to a lesser extent, that of Miyagi in deciding upon a responsible and well-studied view for transmission to the Moscow authorities.

6. My study of Japan and my legitimate cover.

Aside from its immense practical value to my intelligence activities, my research on Japan was an absolute necessity as a cover. Without it, I could not have won the firm position I commanded at the German Embassy and among German journalists. My position at the embassy was not acquired solely because of my personal friendship with members of the staff; on the contrary, some of the staff even resented my influence. My broad fund of general information, my comprehensive knowledge of China and my detailed study and knowledge of Japan were the main reasons for my position at the embassy. Without this knowledge, i.e. without my detailed research, certainly none of the embassy staff would have cared to discuss things with me or to consult me on confidential matters. Many of them referred problems to me because they knew that I would always contribute something toward their solution. None of them was as well versed on China or Japan as I was after my wide travels and long years of research, and most of them lacked the general political training that I had acquired through my connection with the Communist movement since 1924.

My research was likewise of importance to my position as a journalist, since, without it, I would have found it difficult to rise above the the level of the run-of-the-mill German news reporter, which was not particularly high. It enabled me to gain recognition in Germany as the best reporter in Japan. The Frankfurter Zeitung, for which I worked, often praised me on the ground that my articles elevated its international prestige.

I would like to note that the Frankfurter Zeitung represented the highest standards of German journalism, and that it was far ahead of the rest of the field in content value. This view is not mine alone; it is shared by the German Embassy, the German Foreign Office and Germans of culture.

Naturally, my reputation as a top reporter for a ranking German newspaper was extremely important to my intelligence activities. This general recognition of my abilities worked favorably on my position at the embassy. It was because of my stature as a journalist that the German Foreign Office offered me a high official position with the embassy. I refused it, but my prestige at the embassy rose considerably.

My journalistic fame brought me innumerable requests for articles from German periodicals, and the Frankfurter Zeitung and the Geopolitik pressed me for a book on Japan at the earliest possible date. My plans for the book were shattered with my arrest. I had completed 300

pages of the manuscript. Needless to say, my essays appearing in the Geopolitik, which were fairly lengthy articles on various subjects, built up my reputation among the German reading public as a journalist and author.

It is far from my intention to boast about myself. I have simply tried to prove that my research work in Japan was absolutely necessary to my intelligence work for Moscow. Without this research and my general cultural background, my secret mission would have been impossible and I would never have entrenched myself at the embassy and in German journalistic circles. Moreover, I could never have carried on for seven years in Japan unmolested. It was not skill nor the examinations that I had to pass at the Moscow Intelligence School but my basic study and knowledge of Japanese problems that counted most.

E. The political work of my group.

1. General remarks.

I was strictly forbidden by Moscow to engage in any non-intelligence activity, i.e., to undertake any propaganda or organizational functions of a political nature.

This ban meant that my group and I were not allowed to make the least attempt to exercise any political influence on any persons or group of persons. We obeyed it faithfully with one exception; that we worked actively on other people to influence their opinions of Soviet national strength. It was utterly impossible not to violate a general restriction which made no provision for such special cases, for if Ozaki and myself, as advisers—political experts and experienced advisers—had endorsed the prevailing derogatory opinion and underestimation of Soviet strength, our positions would have been directly endangered. It was for this reason that our group took a special stand in connection with the evaluation of Soviet strength. In doing so, we did not engage in propaganda on behalf of the Soviet Union, but endeavored to teach various persons and classes of society to evaluate Soviet strength with due caution. We encouraged individuals and groups not to underestimate Russian strength and to strive for a peaceful solution of pending Soviet-Japanese problems.

Ozaki, Voukelitch and I maintained this attitude for a number of years. When the cry for war with the Soviet Union became urgent in 1941, I sent an inquiry to Moscow prompted by conversations with Ozaki in which he expressed the belief that he could successfully exceed the limits mentioned above and influence members of his group in favor of a positive peace policy toward the Soviet Union. He was confident that if he took a strong stand against a Soviet-Japanese war in the Konoye Group he could turn Japan's expansion policy southward.

The inquiry was very general, outlining the possibilities of positive action by Ozaki, myself and other members of the group; the reply was negative, not forbidding such activities outright but labeling them unnecessary. With tension ever mounting after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war in 1941, I felt that it was within my authority not to interpret the reply as a clear-cut prohibition. I imported a wider and more discretionary meaning to the word "unnecessary," refusing to construe it as an explicit ban on our participation in such activities.

Accordingly, I did not restrict Ozaki's positive maneuvers within the Konoye Group, nor did I hesitate to work, on the Germans particularly in view of the fact that my attitude had remained unchanged over the past several years. The maneuvers that my group and I attempted were confined to the scope and the political problems described on the two preceding pages. Not one of our members exceeded this restriction, because to have done so would have been to endanger our original and principal mission. I would like to emphasize this point thoroughly. What we did was not propaganda by any means.

The foregoing instance, in which we sent an inquiry to Moscow and received a negative reply, was the only one in which I learned of maneuvers on Ozaki's part. As far as I know, he began to work on his friends actively after our discussions. The argument which he employed was briefly as follows:

The Soviet Union has no intention whatsoever of fighting Japan and, even if Japan should invade Siberia, would simply defend herself. It would be a short-sighted and mistaken move for Japan to attack Russia, since she cannot expect to gain anything in Eastern Siberia or to wrest any sizeable political or economic benefits from such a war. The United States and Britain would very likely welcome such a Japanese embroilment with open arms and seize the opportunity to strike at the nation after her oil and iron reserves were depleted. Moreover, if Germany should succed in defeating the Soviet Union, Siberia might fall into Japan's lap without her raising a finger. Should Japan aspire to further expansion elsewhere than in China, the Southern Area alone would be worth going into, for there Japan would find the critical resources so essential to

her wartime economy, and there she would confront the true enemy blocking her bid for a place in the sun.

Ozaki worked in this way to ease the tension in 1941. Whether he attempted any other maneuvers I do not know, but I am sure that, like myself, he must have disagreed at times with superficial evaluations of Soviet strength and the prevailing tendency to underestimate the enemy. In conversation, he doubtless pointed out the lesson learned at Nomonhan and emphasized Hitler's miscalculation concerning the Soviet-German war.

3. Voukelitch's work.

Voukelitch, who, as a Havas representative, attended the general press conferences for foreign correspondents and was in contact with Domei and the Mainichi Shimbun, was able to engage in the above activities to a limited extent. I believe that he frequently challenged persons who underestimated Soviet strength and endeavored to promote a peaceful understanding with the Soviet Union. He often consulted me for suggestions as to how he might utilize the radio messages he sent to France and his conversation with Domei men. On such occasions, I usually told him to be very careful but did not discourage him from utilizing means available to him. He seems to have taken advantage of the Nomonhan Incident in this connection, as well as the increasingly stiff American policy toward Japan and the consequent need for a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement, and I think he also used Germany's merciless violation of her pact with the USSR to foster the impression that the sudden attack on the Russians was typical of the selfish and arbitrary attitude assumed by the Nazis toward their treaty commitments. Finally, by constantly pointing to the existence of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality agreement, he created an atmosphere, at least, of opposition to its abrogation by Japan.

This attitude of Voukelitch's not only coincided perfectly with the stand demanded of him by his Havas position but was also calculated to counteract the insistent propaganda by means of which the Germans were seeking to draw Japan into the Russian war. I was well aware of the propaganda effort being made, both in Berlin and in the Tokyo embassy, since I had to handle propaganda materials and advices at the embassy daily after the outbreak of World War II.

As far as I know, this was the extent of Voukelitch's activities. He did not engage in propaganda on behalf of the USSR, or, needless to say, of Communism.

4. My own work.

I shall describe my maneuvers among the German Embassy officials later. Aside from what I did there, I discussed Soviet problems with resident Germans, Nazi Party members and Japanese friends within the limits I have already indicated.

The opinions I expressed to fellow Germans were briefly as follows:

Bismarck had resolutely opposed any move leading to a Russian war, pointing out that Germany's fundamental opposition to the British-French bloc necessitated a policy of peace with Russia, and World War I had substantiated his contention most vividly. (I would like to recall that Bismarck is still revered by all Germans as an incomparable diplomat.) Unlike Czarist Russia, the Soviet Union is not an aggressive state either in structure or historical development, nor will she or can she become one in the near future. She is concerned solely with self-defense. It is the height of folly, however, to anticipate an immediate collapse, either political or military, if she is attacked by Germany or Japan. That Russia does not intend to get into the war against Germany is clearly shown by the fact that she has readily guaranteed to supply Germany with items vital to her wartime economy, including materials brought from the Far East over the Siberian Railway.

I was not afraid to express such views openly before fellow Nazis. My scathing remarks were famous, and nobody could refute them.

I addressed my Japanese friends in the following vein.

There is no reason for Japan to fear a Soviet attack. Even in Siberia, Soviet preparations are purely defensive. The argument that the Soviet Union or Russia is or has been Japan's arch enemy is historically groundless foreign propaganda. The powers have benefited from this long-standing hostility between Japan and the Soviet Union (Russia). The Japanese Army, which has taken up the cry of the foreign propagandists, is pressing for larger budget appropriations by the year to cope with this terrifying monster, the Soviet Union (Russia). Japan's true goal lies not in the north but in China and the south. The Nomonhan Incident has shown us that the Soviet Union, despite its purely defensive preparations, cannot be belittled.

At times, I pointed out how the Siberian Expedition of 1918-21 had failed and, instead

of elevating Japan's prestige, had worked against her interests. My reports to the Frankfurter Zeitung and articles in other German newspapers and magazines, which echoed this view as being that of intelligent and informed Japanese, put me on record as believing, unlike the other German newspapermen, that the probability of a Soviet-Japanese war was very slight. Germany, I added, should guard against optimism in this respect. Naturally, my language was far more discreet than this because of my Nazi readers at home.

Time proved that my stand was correct. Of course, I am not trying to say that our maneuvers either caused or promoted ensuing developments. It was not our work but the objective situation that steered Japanese policy southward.

Finally, I would like to emphasize that the political maneuvers of my group and myself were confined to the limits described above, and that they were carried on upon my own responsibility and not at the request of Moscow. Miyagi and Klausen did not engage in any maneuvers as far as I know.

CHAPTER II. MY DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES WHILE IN MOSCOW.

I have already described in another section the manner in which I effected business contacts with the Moscow authorities from Japan. I relied upon courier service and radio communication with the 4th Bureau of the Red Army; no other type of contact with other agencies of Moscow was ever made from China or Japan.

Prior to the winter of 1929, my only business contacts while I was in Moscow were with Comintern agencies and the only contacts I had as a party member were through cells in such agencies.

A. Direct contacts in the winter of 1929.

My withdrawal from the Comintern in the winter of 1929 marked the end of my business relations with it. At the same time, my contacts as a party member with party cells ceased. All further business contacts were made through the 4th Bureau of the Red Army. I became a member of the Secret Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Executive Committee which controlled my party membership card and my relations with the party. As a party member, I am still responsible to the department and under obligation to report to it each time I return to Moscow. Once a person joins the party through this department, he must report to it for travel abroad. My subsequent business contacts were restricted to the 4th Bureau. My relations with it consisted chiefly of fairly frequent meetings with the department chief, Gen "Beldin," and his substitute, Maj Gen "Davinov." Beldin agreed with my views on comprehensive political intelligence work, which he had heard from Pyatnitsky, so our talks on that subject progressed smoothly. At the same time, he stressed the fact that I would have to supply military intelligence urgently needed by the 4th Bureau. We decided that a military expert would accompany me to China to ensure the accuracy of my reporting. I had already made up my mind to go to Asia rather than to return to Europe, and as China had already become a center of interest in 1929, it was decided that I should be sent there.

I was briefed for the military aspects of my trip to China directly by officials of the Eastern Section of the 4th Bureau. Gen Beldin consulted other quarters on the details of my political and economic mission. He told me that he had had seen the highest heads of the military and the central committee. Beldin was intimate with all the leaders, whom he had known known for years through the party movement, and I knew that he kept in touch by telephone with the military heads and the key men in the central committee. All chiefs of the 4th Bureau had to be party members, and it is clear that they had close personal ties with party leaders. Without this personal intimacy, the bureau could not have functioned, and the fact that such ties existed explained why it operated so smoothly as the link between me and top party circles, particularly after I began to forward information and reports from foreign countries. Thanks to the nature of the personnel in the 4th Bureau and the intimate relations between the bureau chief and top officials, my most important reports were quickly and smoothly transmitted to key Soviet leaders.

Before leaving for China, I visited the Eastern Section, the Political Section and the Code Section of the 4th Bureau for last-minute discussions. I knew there was a radio school, but I did not call there because I was scheduled to meet my future radio engineer, who was to accompany me to China, in Berlin. He was "Sober Weingarten." I was not responsible to the 4th Bureau for routine work during that stay in Moscow or at any later date. I was not a per-

manent member of the 4th Bureau. My official contacts and my contacts as a party member were confined to special individuals in the bureau and the party central committee. My meeting with Pyatnitsky, Manuilsky and Kuusinen on the eve of my departure was purely personal and friendly.

B. My Trip to Moscow in 1933.

As soon as I returned from China, I contacted Beldin, the chief of the 4th Bureau, and his new deputy, who gave me an enthusiastic welcome. I was told that my work in China had been most satisfactory and was asked to see the two of them for details about my future activities and mission. I was not given a desk at the department or assigned any work. I was occasionally called in to discuss some matter, but most of the time Beldin or his deputy called at my hotel or invited me to his home.

As I was a member of the party, I reported my arrival immediately to the party central committee, where I again met Smoliansky (alias), who had handled my affairs back in 1929. Here, too, I was praised for my work after I had reported before a small committee and completed the processing required by the party. Smoliansky said that I had a very high standing in the party. He called on me two or three times during my stay and helped me prepare for my new mission. He was highly enthusiastic about my coming trip to Japan and commented on its significance. He did not have the authority to give me orders, but we discussed general pending Soviet-Japanese problems since the Manchurian Incident. Like most party members, he feared a Japanese attack on the USSR. These talks with Smoliansky had nothing to do with my official duties.

After I had reported on my activities in China to Beldin, I was told that my request to remain in Moscow indefinitely had been rejected and was asked to resume my activities abroad. Half jokingly, I said I might be able to do something in Japan. This suggestion received no immediate answer, but several weeks later Beldin alluded to it with sudden enthusiasm. He gave me to understand that the leaders of the party central committee were equally interested in my work and urged me to make preparations immediately. The Eastern Section apparently had determined my military mission again after discussions with army leaders. Beldin consulted top party leaders and gave me the general picture of of the political mission. The plan was for me to observe conditions in Japan thoroughly, explore at first hand the possibilities of operating there, and, if necessary return to Moscow for final discussions of my future work. Such a preparatory stage was considered necessary by the Moscow authorities, who regarded activities in Japan as most difficult and important.

With Beldin's approval, Radek of the the central committee helped me make preparations. About this time, I met an old friend, Alex, at the committee. Radek, Alex and I engaged in lengthy discussions of general political and econonomie problems involving Japan and East Asia. Radek exhibited a deep interest in my trip. As I had been in China and he was a recognized expert on Chinese politics, our talks were extremely valuable and interesting. Neither Radek nor Alex was in a position to give me orders, but both offered many suggestions. I got in touch with two members of the Foreign Commissariat who had been in Tokyo and from them obtained a detailed account of life there. I do not know their names or what type of work they were doing. Our talks were purely to exchange general information.

With Beldin's approval, I also saw my old friends Pyatnitsky, Manuilsky and Kuusinen, who had heard about my activities in China from Beldin and were "quite proud of their protege." Our talks, although they touched on political problems of a general nature, were purely personal and friendly. Pyatnitsky, who had been told about my Japan plans by Beldin, was extremely worried about the hardships I would face but delighted by my enterprising spirit.

C. My trip to Moscow in 1935.

This trip was brief, lasting only about 14 days. I saw "Ulitsky," the new chief of the 4th Bureau, and Alex, who was working under him. I reported on my experiences in Japan and the bright prospects I foresaw there. I requested a new radio engineer, preferably "Seber" or Klausen, whom I had known since my China days, asked for absolute freedom to contract any relations I deemed necessary with the German Embassy, where I wanted to do most of my work, and told Ulitsky of my desire to have the central authorities recognize Ozaki as a direct member of our group. Ulitsky approved these and all of the other important suggestions I made. He warned me to be most cautious at all times and not to rush things. I gained the impression that Ulitsky, like Beldin, consulted the party leaders before arranging for my reurn to Japan. Certainly he must have studied me, my material and my papers carefully. He was deeply sensible of the difficulties of my position and extended me every kindness. The only people I met at the 4th Bureau were Jim

and Klausen as the radio school and representatives of the Code and Eastern Sections. I was strictly forbidden to attend the international convention of the Comintern, which had just started. Manuilsky gave me a flat refusal over the teelphone. Kuusinen visited my quarters once. Pyatnitsky was sick and away. It was my personal desire to attend the convention, but security considerations prevented me from doing so.

I called at the central committee once to make a report. This turned out to be my farewell visit, a brief encounter during which my party problems were straightened out and my report was approved. Smoliansky, who had left his old position with the central committee, paid me one friendly call. My social life was very restricted, but I saw Klausen frequently to discuss our joint work in Japan. I left Moscow by plane.

Generally speaking, then, all my business contacts were with the 4the Bureau which acted as my liaison with other offices. I had nothing to do with any other office after 1929. There is no doubt, of course, that the bureau conferred with top leaders of the Red Army and members of the Politburo of the Party Central Committee with respect to the general political and military problems involved in my work abroad. (I do not know whether or not there was any liaison with the Foreign Commissariat.) Similarly, I am certain that the 4th Bureau distributed the information and material I sent to its chief from Japan. The new chief, like his predecessor, Beldin, was on intimate terms with party leaders. He was a party veteran who boasted a long-standing friendship with Lenin, Stalin and Voroshilov.

D. Why I was assigned to 4th Bureau.

This question naturally arises after a reading of my earlier notes and what I have just said. Another question also suggests itself; namely, why was I not placed directly under the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee?

The answer to the second question is very simple. The central committee of the Soviet Communist Party has no international information bureau but only a domestic news office. It relies entirely upon information collected by other branches of the Soviet Government and has no thought of duplicating their work; in fact, it has never entertained the idea of establishing an international information dpartment of its own. It has emphasized a wide variety of information collected from various government offices and from various standpoints.

Within the Soviet Union, there are five government agencies engaged in the collection of political, economic and military information of an international character over a comparatively wide range. These are the Tass News Agency, the Comintern, the Foreign Commissariat, the GPU and the 4th Bureau of the Red Army. Of course, there are any number of other organizations engaged in the same type of work, but they specialize in particular fields or professions. They are not comprehensive or political, nor do they collect the secret material and information to which the highest Soviet leaders must attach primary importance.

The abovementioned five government intelligence agencies are somewhat one-sided, and, therefore, unable to meet the growing demand of the top leadership for comprehensive information.

Tass, which handles only legitimate information for the press, is controlled to too great an extent by the censorship regulations of other countries, which must be observed by Tass employees engaged in legitimate work.

I have already described in detail the intelligence work of the Comintern, the primary objectives of which are social problems, the international labor movement and the Communist Party movement. The Comintern does not attempt to collect comprehensive foreign and domestic political reports or secret information.

The reports received by the Foreign Commissariat from Soviet Embassies overseas are also defective in that they present only the diplomatic angle; they are one-sided both with regard to the problems handled and with regard to their source (embassy information offices). In most cases, isolated Soviet Embassies have been unable to keep up with the mounting demand for comprehensive secret information.

The intelligence activities of the GPU are likewise very one-sided. This agency collects secret information, but is concerned chiefly with counter-espionage, anti-Soviet organizations and observation of ideological tendencies in foreign countries. It has almost no important information sources of use in the formation of vital foreign policy.

The 4th Bureau cannot be considered a narrowly specialized organization whose activities are restricted to military espionage, nor can it be equated with the defense agencies of Germany. To cite a single example, it does not engage in counter-espionage like the German National

Defense Bureau. It is an intelligence organization which covers a relatively wide field, recruits excellent personnel and has high technical standards. Pure military espionage is only one of its many activities. It engages in the collection of intelligence in the spheres of military affairs in general, military administration and economics. Reports accumulate there from military attaches serving with embassies overseas, military committees, wartime economic committees and secret intelligence groups and spy rings. It also handles and studies a great deal of legitimate and semi-legitimate material on the military governments, purely military problems and wartime economies of other nations. Finally, there is a political section within the bureau where incoming information is fashioned into highly competent reports or summarized for top army and party leaders.

It was only natural, therefore, that the Soviet high command should turn to the 4th Bureau when the need for secret intelligence became urgent. To cope with the growing demand for information, it was necessary merely to staff the agency with the best personnel available. From the standpoint of technical level and seriousness of purpose, this agency was probably without an equal.

The party leaders and the Red Army have cooperated closely since the founding of the Soviet Union. Most of the old party members joined the army after the revolution. The Red Army has been relatively free from the frequent changes of personnel which have taken place in other branches and offices of the Soviet Government and the party, and the so-called purges have not hit the inner core of old party members as they have in other agencies. The close personal ties uniting the army leaders and Lenin, Stalin and Molotov have proved lasting and long-standing. It is now easy to understand why the political leaders of the Soviet Union picked the 4th Bureau of the Red Army to answer the growing need for secret political intelligence, although, of course, one cannot deny the fact that other large intelligence agencies were striving to improve the caliber of their own work.

Finally, I must mention the following reasons as partly responsible for my transfer to the 4th Bureau. Gen Beldin, then chief of the 4th Bureau and a close friend of Pyatnitsky, had known about me since before my days with the Comintern. When, after my return from England, I discussed my past activities for the Comintern with Pyatnitsky and told him that I wanted to enlarge the scope of my work, but that I could not do so as long as I remained with the Comintern, he went to see Beldin about my problem. Beldin was of the opinion that my ambition could be fulfilled satisfactorily at the 4th Bureau and he called me in a few days later for a detailed discussion of comprehensive intelligence activities in Asia. In addition, I had already known various members of the 4th Bureau personally back in Germany. They had visited me in the Rhineland and Frankfurt to converse on political, economic and military problems and had attempted to interest me in joining the bureau. In other words, Beldin knew about me not only through Pyatnitsky and my activities with the Comintern but also through the reports of two or three of his co-workers during my German days.

I believe I have now covered all the reasons for my transfer to the 4th Bureau in the winter of 1929.

E. Additional remarks on the communication between the 4th Bureau and my activity group.

As this topic has already been discussed in detail in another section, I shall mention here only the different signatures employed by the 4th Bureau on its order to me. These orders bore the signatures "Director," "Dal" and "Organizer." Their significance was as follows. Orders issued personally by the chief of the 4th Bureau were signed Director. Such orders were major directives dealing with political and organizational matters of vital importance to my work. Anniversary greetings always bore the same signature to emphasize the personal touch.

A special indirect style was employed in communications sent to us by important persons. It was possible to guess accurately that radios of gratitude sent to us invariably originated with leading Soviet figures because the chief of the 4th Bureau would express satisfaction to us only when he had been informed that such and such report or material was of value or importance. We received a large number of such messages of congratulations and gratitude from 1936 on, all of which it should be stressed were signed by the director as the originating authority. The above-mentioned three signatures were the only ones that appeared on radiograms or letters. Otherwise all promises would have been broken and our peace of mind would have been destroyed.

I believe that, in addition to the messages of gratitude, a number of orders were sent to us by the director in accordance with instructions from Soviet leaders. The following are only two or three examples.

In reply to a detailed report from me on the secret negotiations for an anti-Comintern pact (which I have described elsewhere), I received a radiogram exhorting me to put more effort into future reports. This incident indicated that the highest political leaders were deeply interested in the problem and in my report. My written report and my lengthy expression of opinion on the diplomatic situation (which somewhat removed from my original work) were rewarded with the statement that my views were always welcomed with deep interest in top political circles. In other words, I was told to offer opinions and recommendations on foreign affairs freely. At the same time, I was cleared on the score of having handled a problem which, strictly speaking, I had had no business to touch in Japan.

When, at the time of the Nomonhan Incident, I complained about the inefficiency of Soviet propaganda, I received a reply which expressly stated that my complaint was being sent on to higher authority and which indicated that appropriate steps would be taken to remedy the situation. The same was true for my reports on the Soviet Union. I was informed that all of them created intense interest among the highest army command and leaders of the party, thanked, and asked for more news.

During the first several years, comparatively unimportant reports were signed Dal, the Russian equivalent for Far East. Afterward, that is, around the beginning of 1940 or a little later, this was superseded by Organizer. Its appearance on orders meant that they had originated with the Eastern Section of the 4th Bureau and not with the director, although the latter doubtless knew about them. I addressed telegrams or reports that I thought particularly important to the director. This was true for messages pertaining to organizational problems especially important to our local activities, as well as for the more important political and military reports. At times, I appended the word "Confidential" to the address to emphasize the importance of the message still further. This identified the contents as very important, and the message was treated accordingly by the director.

CHAPTER III. MY PAST HISTORY AS A GERMAN COMMUNIST.

A. Why I became a communist.

World War from 1914 to 1918 exerted a profound influence upon my whole life. Had I been swayed by no other considerations, it alone would have made me a Communist. When it broke out, I was only eighteen and a half years old, a high school student in the Richterfelder district in Berlin.

1. My childhood and school years.

Until the war, my boyhood was passed amid the comparative calm common to the wealthy bourgeois class of Germany. Economic worries had no place in our home. What made my life a little different from the average was a strong awareness of the fact that I had been born in the Southern Caucasus and that we had moved to Berlin when I was very small. Our home also differed immensely in many respects from that of the average bourgeois family in Berlin. The peculiarities of the Sorge family endowed my early childhood with with certain distinguishing features, and, like all my brothers and sisters, I was slightly different from the average schoolchild. I was a bad pupil, defied the school's regulations, was obstinate and willful and rarely opened my mouth. In history, literature, philosophy, political science and, of course, athletics, I was far above the rest of the class, but I was below average in my other studies. At the early age of 15, I developed an avid interest in Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, Klopstock, Dante and other difficult authors and, in addition, struggled in vain with history of philosophy and Kant. My favorite parts of history were the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars and the time of Bismark. I knew Germany's current problems better than the average grown-up. For many years, I studied political developments carefully. At school I was known as "Prime Minister." I knew what my grandfather had done for the labor movement and I also knew that my father's ideas were diametrically opposed to his. Father was unmistakably a nationalist and imperialist, and throughout his life he was unable to shake off the impression made upon his youth by the building of the German Empire during the war of 1870-71. He was strongly conscious of the property he had amassed and the social position he had achieved abroad. My elder brother became an extreme Leftist; I recall that he had strong anarchist leanings rooted in Nietzsche and Stirner. I was a member of a workers' athletic association for many years, which meant that I had constant contacts with the workers, but I had no clear political stand as a student. I was interested only in collecting political knowledge; I neither desired nor was able to adopt a definite attitude of my own.

2. World War I.

One summer vacation, I visited Sweden and returned to Germany by the last boat available. World War I had broken out. I volunteered for service immediately, joining the army without reporting to my school or taking my final graduation examinations. I was impelled to make this decision by a strong urge to seek new experiences, a desire to liberate myself from school studies and what I considered the whole meaningless and purposeless pattern of living of an 18-year-old, and the general outburst of excitement created by the war. I did not consult my superiors, my mother or the other members of my family (my father had died in 1911). After a completely inadequate six-week training course at a drill ground in the outskirts of Berlin immediately after the outbreak of the war, I was shipped out to Belgium to take part in a great battle on the banks of the Yser. This period may be described as "from the classroom to the battlefield" or "from the school chair to the slaughter block."

After this fierce and sanguinary conflict had stirred up the first and most serious psychological unrest in the hearts of my comrades and myself, and after our thirst for battle and adventure had been glutted, several months of silent and pensive emptiness began.

I mused over my knowledge of history and realized that, on this several hundred-year-old; nay, several-thousand-year-old battlefield, I was fighting in one of Europe's innumerable wars. How meaningless these oft-repeated wars were becoming! How many times before me German soldiers had fought in Belgium to invade France and the armies of France and other nations had poised here ready to overrun Germany! Was the significance of these past campaigns ever remembered?

My political curiosity led me to wonder what motives underlay this new war of aggression. Who cared about this region, or that new mine or industry? Whose desire was it to capture this objective at the sacrifice of life? None of my simple soldier friends ever desired annexation or occupation. None of them even understood the meaning of our efforts. Nobody knew the real purpose of the war, not to speak of its deep-seated significance. Most of the soldiers were middle-aged men, workers and handicraftsmen by trade. Almost all of them belonged to industrial unions, and many were Social Democrats. There was one real Leftist, an old stonemason from Hamburg, who refused to talk to anybody about his political beliefs. We became fast friends, and he told me of his life in Hamburg and of the persecution and unemployment he had gone through. He was the first pacifist I had ever come across. He died in action in the early days of 1915, just before I was wounded for the first time.

At the outset of the war, my attention was arrested by the fact that we common soldiers were living a life completely apart. There was very little off-duty contact with officers. They kept to themselves, and I was never able to feel a great affection for them.

Shortly after I returned to Germany to nurse my wound, I learned for the first time how difficult it was to maintain a normal standard of living. I found that there were two true standards for weighing this. (Original translator's note: Inequalities and the existence of the blackmarket) Money could buy anything on the blackmarket. The poor were irate. The initial excitement and spirit of sacrifice apparently no longer existed. Wartime profiteering and surreptitious buying and selling were beginning to appear, and the lofty ideals underlying the war were receding farther and farther into the background. In contrast, the material objectives of the struggle were gaining increasing prominence, and a thoroughly imperialistic goal, the elimination of war in Europe through the establishment of German hegemony, was being publicized.

I utilized my period of convalescence to prepare for my graduation examinations, in which connection I entered the Medical Department of Berlin University and attended two or three of its lectures. I was not very happy in Germany and at a loss as to what to do. The political works and trends which I had been studying so diligently had been deprived of real significance by the war. I volunteered for service again before my convalescence time was up, finding very few of my old comrades when I returned.

I was sent to the Eastern Front. The great offensive and our gains there alleviated the general weariness to some extent, but all the men dreamed of peace in their spare moments. The fact that, although we had already pierced deep into the heart of Russia, there was still no end in sight made some of them begin to fear that the war would go on forever.

The situation at home was critical when I returned in the beginning of 1916 after being wounded a second time and making a hard and long trip across the occupied zone of Russia. I knew people of almost every class (that is, the families of my comrades); simple working fami-

lies, my middle class bourgeois relatives and my wealthy friends and acquaintances, and I was able to make a fairly complete observation of the economic situations of a number of classes and social strata. The bourgeoisie, steadily slipping to the level of the proletariat, was endeavoring to escape its fate by sedulously bolstering the myth of German spiritual superiority. I abhorred the efforts of these ignorant and supercilious representatives of the so-called "German spirit." A few political leaders were already beginning to feel uneasy over the war, with the result that domestic and foreign policy became cruel and brutal. In other words, reaction and imperialism were on the increase. I became convinced that Germany was unable to provide the world with either new ideas or new contributions in other forms, and that Britain and France were similarly incapable of assisting Germany and the rest of the world. No long-winded dissertations on spirituality and lofty ideals could move this conviction of mine, which has been responsible for the fact that ever since that time, and regardless of the race of people involved, I have looked askance at claims of spirituality and idealism trumpeted forth by a nation at war.

Still more discontented than after my first convalescence, I lost no time in volunteering for front-line duty again. I felt that I would be better off fighting in a foreign land than sinking deeper into the mud at home.

The general atmosphere I found in my unit was even gloomier than before, but more of the men were showing an interest in political problems and in the issues involved in the termination of the war. The notion was slowly growing among them that a violent political change was the only way of extricating ourselves from this quagmire. I met two soldiers who were in contact with radical political groups in Germany, one of whom frequently talked of Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht. In my discussions with these men and my own reflections, the termination of the war did not figure prominently. Far more important was the question of how to eliminate the causes of all this meaningless self-destruction and endless repetition of war here in Europe. This issue seemed to us a great deal more basic than the ending of the current war. We were not so cowardly as to fear its continuation or to exhaust all available means in a desire to see it end. We knew too well that a mere laying down of arms would simply offer Germany's enemies a free hand for their imperialistic designs. What was important to us was a broad solution, a permanent answer on an international scale, but we were still at a loss as to how to achieve it. We were too far removed from the Leftist movement in Germany and other countries.

Our discussions were spurred on by the vigorous propaganda of nationalistic and imperialistic political bodies, which were sending large numbers of propaganda leaflets to the front. They tried to raise the morale of the men by explaining in detail every one of the demands that Germany had to make of other countries to establish a lasting supremacy and by defining our broad war objectives, but the actual results were far from what they had expected; as far as the Leftist radicals at the front and within Germany were concerned, their efforts were like pouring gasoline on fire. As was my habit, I merely listened to these discussions and asked questions; I still had no convictions, knowledge or resolution. The time was ripe, however, for me to pass from my long period of fence-sitting to the final stage of decision. Just at this time, I incurred my third injury, a very serious one. I was struck by many shell fragments at one time, two of which smashed bones.

At the field hospital, where I required serious attention for several months, I met a very cultured and intelligent nurse and her father, who was a doctor. A little later, I learned that both of them had close relations with the radical Social Democratic faction. They gave me my first detailed account of the state of the revolutionary movement in Germany, of the various parties, factions and groups that had bean established, and of international phenomena in the revolutionary movement. For the first time I heard of Lenin and of his activities in Switzerland. I was now able to feel that, if I were to probe deeper into the basic questions concerning imperialistic war which had come up at the front, I could find an answer to them, and I became firmly resolved to discover that answer, or rather that set of answers, as soon as I recovered. Already, I regarded myself as an apostle of the revolutionary labor movement.

My convalescence at the field hospital was useful to me in other ways as well. I undertook a study of philosophy, learning Kant and Schopenhauer thoroughly, grappled with history and the history of the fine arts and became interested in economic problems. The nurse and her father gave me adequate literature in any field I cared to explore. Despite the seriousness of my injuries and the excruciating pain involved in their treatment, I was happy for the first time in many years. My strong will to study, which emerges from time to time even today, was developed in those days.

When partially recovered I resumed my studies at the university, although I was still a soldier, and visited the field hospital for treatment. I abandoned medicine, deciding to concentrate on the study of government and economics to answer my growing interest in the social, economic and political changes affecting Germany and Europe.

At this time, that is, during the summer and winter of 1917, I realized most thoroughly the meaninglessness and the devastating efforts of the Great War. Already several millions had perished on each side, and who could predict how many more millions would go the same way? The highly vaunted German economic machine had crumbled in ruins; I myself, like countless other members of the proletariat, felt the collapse through hunger and constant food shortages. Capitalism had disintegrated into its component parts, anarchism and unscrupulous merchants. I saw the downfall of the German Empire, whose political machinery had been termed indestructible. The members of Germany's ruling class, shaking their heads in helpless despair over these developments, split morally and politically. Culturally and ideologically, the nation fell back on empty talk of the heritage of the past or turned to anti-Semitism or Roman Catholicism. The militaristic and feudalistic ruling class and the bourgeoisie were unable to produce a single idea capable of charting a new course for the nation and saving it from total ruin. Germany's foes fared no better. Their political demands already augured further solutions through arms in the future. The only fresh and effective ideology was supported and fought for by the revolutionary labor movement. This most difficult, daring and noble ideology strove to eliminate the causes, economic and political, of this war and any future ones by means of internal revolution.

I spent my time at the University of Berlin in a detailed study of this ideology, with particular reference to its theoretical basis. I read the ancient Greek philosophers and Hegel for his influence on Marxism. I read Engels and then Marx, studying every book to which I had access. I also studied the enemies of Marx and Engels, the men who had challenged them on their theoretical, philosophical and economic tenets, and delved into the whole history of the labor movement in Germany and the rest of the world. In these several months, I acquired a basic knowledge of Marx and the rudiments of a practical way of thinking.

The outbreak of the revolution in Russia indicated to me the course which the international labor movement should adopt. I decided not only to support the movement theoretically and idealogically but to become and actual part of it. All of the solutions to my personal and material problems at which I have arrived since have perforce stemmed from that decision. World War II, now approaching its third year, and particuarly the German-Soviet War, have strengthened my conviction that my decision of some 25 years ago was correct. I am able to say this with due consideration for all that has happened to me in the past 25 years and, especially, during the last year, as a result.

3. My career in the German revolutionary labor movement from 1918 to the end of 1924.

After my release from all further military service in Jan 1918, I enrolled in Kiel University. Needless to say, I little thought that a German revolution would start there within a year. At Kiel, I joined a revolutionary organization, the Independent Social Democratic Party. I did not join the Spartacus group for the simple reason that I could not find any way of getting in touch with it in Kiel. My first work with the party was in connection with a socialist student organization. I established it, with two or three other students, and later became its leader. For the party organization itself, I acted as the head of a training group in the district where I lived, teaching the history of the labor movement, the difference between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements, etc. Of course, I recruited new party members from among my student friends and attended to minor details.

I contributed to the revolution touched off by insurgent sailors at the Kiel naval port by delivering secret lectures on socialism before groups of sailors and harbor and dock workers. One of these lectures I can recall even today. I was called for early one morning, secretly led away to an unknown destination, which proved to be a sailors' underground barracks and there asked to conduct a secret meeting behind closed doors.

Immediately after the revolution, my work for the party consisted in handling the countless membership applications which were pouring in and in propaganda and teaching activities. I also had plenty to do in connection with the socialist student organization, which was now very strong.

At the end of the year, two or three of my comrades and I went to Berlin on official party business to work at the party headquarters there. Fierce fighting had broken out in Berlin

between the faction led by Nosuke (TN Transliteration) and "Scheidemann" and the revolutionary movement, and the army had sided with Nosuke against the revolution. The party needed assistance, but it was already too late to do anything when I arrived in Berlin. The Spartacus Riot was suppressed later after much bloodshed. We were forced to halt at the station and searched for arms, but fortunately my weapon was not discovered. Any person who carried a weapon and refused to turn it over was shot. After being detained for several days inside the station, my comrades and I were sent back to Kiel. One could hardly call it a triumphant return. Early in 1919 I went to Hamburg to prepare for my doctor's examination.

In Hamburg I organized another socialist student group, serving as its secretary, and performed general duties for the party in the district where I lived. At the end of that year, I was appointed training chief of the party's Hamburg area organization guidance department. Shortly afterwards, our party, like the Spartacus group and other revolutionary bodies, was automatically merged with the German Communist Party. Throughout 1920 I served the local organization in Hamburg in the capacity of training chief. At the same time, I was an adviser for the Hamburg Communist newspaper. One day I received a visit from the famous socialist Scheidemann. He asked me if, as Adolf Sorge's descendant, I would be interested in joining his movement, but of course I gave him a flat refusal.

I next secured a teaching position in a higher school in Aachen and prepared to move inland, but before doing so I was ordered to appear before the central committee in Berlin, where, after I had delivered a report on conditions in Hamburg, I was askd to carry on various positive activities in the Aachen area for the party. The area was dominated by the workers, and the Catholic labor organizations were extremely powerful. Shortly after my arrival in Aachen, I was made a member of the city guidance deparment of the party organization and put to work handling training problems. At the same time, I engaged in active propaganda work among the miners. Soon I established contact with the Rhineland regional guidance department at Cologne. I was frequently invited to their meetings, and I was asked to help the Communist newspaper there as I had done in Hamburg. Once, during a school vacation, I edited the Communist newspaper of Soringen (TN Transliteration) for two months while its editor was in prison. I also attended some of the central committee's expansion and guidance conferences as the representative of the Rhineland region.

Needless to say, it was impossible for me to continue my political activities for the party in Aachen and retain my assistant professorship at the higher school. Toward the close of 1922, I was expelled from the school for engaging in a heated political controversy.

After consulting with the party, I decided to intensify my activities among the mine workers and to work with them in the Aachen coal mining region to cover my living expenses. I was able to find employment in a mine near Aachen as an inexperienced worker without being detected. It was a hard life, and my work suffered immensely because of the serious injuries I had received at the front, but I never regretted the decision. The experiences that I went through as a miner were just as valuable to me as those I gained on the battlefield, and my new vocation was equally significant to the party.

Within a short time, my work among the miners had produced a number of beneficial results. I organized a Communist group in the first mine at which I was employed, saw it develop soundly and moved on to another mine near Aachen. During the same year, I changed mines again.

An effort to do similar work for the party in the coal mining district of Holland failed. I was discovered immediately, expelled from the mine and deported from the country.

In the meantime, I had become known in the Aachen mines, with the result that I was no longer able to find work. The authorities threatened to turn me over to the Allied military government (the war had just ended and the Rhineland was under the military occupation and political administration of the victorious Allies), so I was forced to leave Aachen and the occupied area.

I then went to Berlin to discuss my future party activities with the central committee. They offered me a salaried position with the party guidance department, but I refused because I wished to gain more practical experience and to complete my academic training. My friends suggested that I take a position as assistant in the social science department at the University of Frankfurt, and at the same time double as a private lecturer, and the guidance department approved the idea, requesting me to engage in positive activities with the party organization in Frankfurt.

At Frankfurt, I was appointed a member of the city guidance department and, as in the past, handled training matters and served as adviser to the Communist newspaper. Shortly after that, the party was outlawed in Germany. My name was not very well known to the authorities in Frankfurt, which meant that I was able to render valuable assistance to the party. I handled all the secret documents and the membership register and maintained secret liaison between the central committee in Berlin and the organization in Frankfurt. The party funds and propaganda material were sent to me. I hid most of the party's property in my study room at the university or in the social science library, concealing large bundles in the coal bin in the classroom. There were two or three party members working there, so there was no need to fear discovery. Concealment of these materials permitted the guidance department to utilize them constantly, with the result that, despite the ban on the Communist Party, there was no appreciable slackening of its activities in Frankfurt. Meanwhile, over in Saxony, an armed rebellion had set up a workers' republic, with which, by party orders, we were in constant secret communication. I visited Saxony frequently on special missions to deliver essential political and organizational reports and directives which it was possible for the party to route through us in Frankfurt.

As I was engaged in secret liaison for the party, it was not surprising that, at the Communist convention held at Frankfurt am Main in 1924, I was selected by the guidance department to protect delegates from the Soviet Communist Party who had entered the country illegally to represent the Comintern. Throughout the session, I looked after the security of these important delegates, saw to their quarters and decided upon the activities in which they might safely engage. As the German Communist Party was facing serious political hardships, the Comintern had sent us four of its leading figures, Pyatnitsky, Manuilsky, Kuusinen and Lozovsky. In addition to discharging my responsibilities as a delegate to the convention, I fulfilled this far from simple mission to the satisfaction of all concerned. Of course, my relations with the Comintern delegates were very intimate, and we grew more friendly every day. At the close of the session, they asked me to come to Comintern headquarters in Moscow that year to work for them. I could not go at once because I had to attend several organizational and intelligence councils immediately after the Frankfurt convention, but the proposal of the Comintern delegation, which was to have me set up an intelligence bureau for the Comintern, was approved by the party leaders in Berlin, and I left for Moscow at the end of 1924 to begin work in Jan 1925. At the same time Pyatnitsky switched my name from the German Communist Party to the Soviet Communist Party.

Before closing, I would like to mention my meeting in 1923 with a delegation from the Moscow Marx-Engels Research Institute, led by the illustrious scholar Ryazanov, which, while touring Germany to collect material for this great new research center, asked me for information on the posthumous political papers of Adolf Sorge, who had served as secretary for the First International during Marx's lifetime. Ryazonov invited me to join the institute in Moscow, but the German party leaders would not release me.

Finally, I must add that my career as a writer was not confined to Communist journalism. In 1922, I wrote a pamphlet called "The Accumulation of Capital and Rosa Luxembourg," which was a critical and theoretical study of the theories of Rosa Luxembourg. I am convinced that my handling of this difficult topic was clumsy and immature, and I hope that the Nazis burnt every last copy. While in Moscow, I published "The Economic Provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty and the International Labor Class," and in 1927 I published "German Imperialism." I believe that these were competent pieces of work. Both were read widely in Germany and translated into Russian.

My activities for the German Communist Party ceased with my removal to Moscow in 1924-25 and my transfer to the Soviet Communist Party. My relations with the German Communist Party were confined to the period 1918-24.

証明書

左のパンフレット二冊は、当時自分が東京刑事地方裁判所檢事として取調に当つていたリヒアルト・ゾルゲが独乙語で手記した原文を飜訳人生駒佳年をして忠実に日本語に飜訳せしめこれを原文と共に訴訟記錄に編綴したものを司法省刑事局においてそのまま印刷に附したものであつてこのパンフレットの内容は右飜訳文のそれと相違ないことを証明する。

一、昭和十七年二月

ゾルゲ事件資料 (一)

(リヒアルト・ゾルゲ手記訳文第一編)

司法省刑事局

一、昭和十七年四月

右の独乙語原文及びその訳文は、リヒアルト、ゾルゲに対する刑事訴訟記録中に編綴されていたのであるが、右記録は昭和二十年（一九四五年）五月下旬司法省刑事局が東京刑事地方裁判所検事局より引継を受け保管中、終戦直後他の書類と共に焼却したものと判断され、現在は存在しない。従つて前記印刷物がゾルゲの手記としては唯一のものであると考える

昭和二十四年三月　五　日

法務廳檢務局長　高橋一郎

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

CONCERNING THE BOOKLETS ENTITLED "SORGE CASE MATERIALS"

I hereby certify as follows:

A. That, as indicated in the attached certificate of YOSHIKAWA Mitsusada, the two booklets listed below are exact copies printed by the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice of accurate Japanese translations of notes written in German by Richard SORGE.

1. "Sorge Case Materials (2)"
(Part 1 of Translated Notes of Richard SORGE)
February 1942
Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice

2. "Sorge Case Materials (3)"
(Part 2 of Translated Notes of Richard SORGE)
April 1942
Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice

B. That the aforementioned German original and the original Japanese translation were incorporated in the official records of the criminal proceedings against Richard SORGE; that they were transferred to the custody of the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice by the Procurator's Bureau of the Tokyo District Criminal Court in the latter part of May 1945; that they no longer exist, having presumably been burned with other documents immediately after the termination of hostilities; and that it is therefore believed that the aforementioned printed material constitutes the only Sorge statement now in existence.

5 March 1949

TAKAHASHI Ichiro (Seal)

Chief, Procuratorial Affairs Bureau
Attorney-General's Office

TRANSLATOR'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I am an official translator of Japanese documents in the employ of General Headquarters, Far East Command and that to the best of my ability, skill and judgment, the above is a true and accurate translation in the English language of the attached document.

Tadao Yamada
TADAO YAMADA
CWO USA W214104?

I, Tadao Yamada, CWO, USA, W214104?, having been duly sworn, state that I am an official translator of the Japanese language employed as such by General Headquarters, Far East Command since July 1947; that the translations into English of extracts and material taken from the Japanese translations of notes written by Richard SORGE and printed into booklets entitled Sorge Case Materials 2 and 3 by the Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice, together with translations of authentications and certifications of former and present Japanese government officials concerned, and appearing above my signature are true and accurate translations to the best of my ability, skill and judgment.

17 May 1949

G.H.Q. USAFPAC APO 500 G-2 Gen. Staff

E. A. HEDLEY
Captain, Infantry
Summary Court

Tadao Yamada
TADAO YAMADA
CWO, USA, W214104?

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the two booklets listed below are printed reproductions prepared by the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice of accurate Japanese translations made by Translator IKOMA Yoshitoshi of original German notes written by Richard SORGE, whom I examined in my capacity as a procurator of the Tokyo District Criminal Court, and incorporated together with the original notes into the official case records; and that the contents of the booklets are identical with the contents of the said translation.

1. "Sorge Case Materials (2)"
   (Part 1 of Translated Notes of Richard SORGE)
   February 1942
   Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice

2. "Sorge Case Materials (3)"
   (Part 2 of Translated Notes of Richard SORGE)
   April 1942
   Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice

4 March 1949

YOSHIKAWA Mitsusada

Chief, Special Examination Bureau
Attorney-General's Office

TRANSLATOR'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I am an official translator of Japanese documents in the employ of General Headquarters, Far East Command and that to the best of my ability, skill and judgment, the above is a true and accurate translation in the English language of the attached document.

G-2 G.H.Q. A.C. of S. USAFPAC APO 500

Tadao Yamada

TADAO YAMADA
CWO USA W2141047

ゾルゲ事件資料と題するパンフレットについて

一、左のパンフレット二冊は、別紙吉河光貞の作成した証明書で明らかなように、リヒアルト・ゾルゲが独乙語で手記した原文を忠実に日本文に飜訳したものを司法省刑事局においてなんら変更を加えることなく印刷に附したものに相違ない。

一、昭和十七年二月
ゾルゲ事件資料 (一)
(リヒアルト ゾルゲ手記訳文第一編)
司法省刑事局

一、昭和十七年四月
ゾルゲ事件資料 (二)
(リヒアルト ゾルゲ手記訳文第二編)
司法省刑事局

ゾルゲ事件資料 (三)

(リヒアルト・ゾルゲ手記訳文第二編)

司法省刑事局

昭和二十四年三月四日

法務廳特別審査局長 吉河光貞

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

CERTIFICATE

A. I hereby certify that the two booklets listed below are printed reproductions of that which I, at the request of YOSHIKAWA Mitsusada, faithfully translated from the original German language notes written by Richard SORGE.

1. "Sorge Case Materials (2)"
   (Part 1 of Translated Notes of Richard SORGE)
   February 1942
   Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice

2. "Sorge Case Materials (3)"
   (Part 2 of Translated Notes of Richard SORGE)
   April 1942
   Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice

B. The original of the above notes were typewritten by Richard SORGE himself and I frequently saw him make corrections of errors in my presence. Because of this and various other reasons I can certify that these notes were written by SORGE himself.

13 May 1949

IKOMA Yoshitosni (Seal)

Faculty Member
Tokyo Foreign Affairs College

TOKYO To, KITATAMA Gun,
KOKUBUNJI Machi
KOKUBUNJI 2419

TRANSLATOR'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I am an official translator of Japanese documents in the employ of General Headquarters, Far East Command and that to the best of my ability, skill and judgment, the above is a true and accurate translation in the English language of the attached document.

USAFPAC A.C. of S., G-2 G.H.Q. APO 500

Tadao Yamada
TADAO YAMADA
CWO, USA, W2141047

證明書

一 左のパンフレット二冊は別紙吉河光貞の依嘱により、私がリヒアルト・ゾルゲの手記した独乙語の原文を忠実に日本語に翻訳したものを、そのまま印刷に附したものであって、このパンフレットの内容は右翻訳文のそれと相違ないことを證明する。

一 昭和十七年二月

ゾルゲ事件資料(二)
(リヒアルト・ゾルゲ手記訳文第一編)

司法省刑事局

一 昭和十七年四月

ゾルゲ事件資料 (三)

(リヒアルト・ゾルゲ手記訳文第二編)

司法省刑事局

右の手記原文はリヒアルト・ゾルゲが自らタイプライターを用いて作製したものであって、私は彼が度々私の面前で誤字を訂正し書入れをするのを見た。右及びその他種々の理由によりこの手記はゾルゲ自身が書いたものに相違ないことを證明することができる。

昭和二十四年五月十三日

東京都北多摩郡国分寺町国分寺二千四百拾九番地

東京外事専門学校教授 生駒佳年 (生駒)

SORGE

HANGED 7 NOV 1944

MIYAGI

DIED 2 AUG 1943

MILITARY AFFAIRS INVESTIGATOR
SHINOZUKA, TORAO
Former Army Lieut., Factory Mgr
Arrested: 14 Nov 41
Innocent of guilty knowledge but was a Communist

RETURNEES FROM U.S.A.
SUZUKI, KAMINOSUKE
Broker, arrested: 13 Oct 41
Innocent

KYUSHU NIPPO

TRANSLATOR
AKIYAMA, (Frank) KOJI
Sentence: 7 years
Released: 10 Oct 45

Agents

KITABAYASHI, TOMO
7th Day Adventist Church
Los Angeles Sewing School
Sentence: 5 years
Died: 9 Feb 45

CPL KOSHINO, YOSHINOBU
Army Friends
Sentence: 15 years
Released: 8 Oct 45

YASUDA, TOKUTARO, MD
Patients
Sentence: 2 years
with stay of execution

TAGUCHI, UGENTA
War Ministry Reporters
Daito Industrial Co.
Jiseikai
Sentence: 13 years
Released: 6 Oct 45

YAMANA, MASAZANE
National Farmers Union
Shakaitaishu-to
Tohokai
Honkeiko Iron Co.
(Manchuria)
Sentence: 12 years
Released: 7 Oct 45

KUZUMI, FUSAKO
Shakaito
Great Japan Loyalist Party
Japan Proletarian Party
Cabinet Information Bureau
Sentence: 8 years
Released: 8 Oct 45

KONOE CABINET
SAIONJI, KINKAZU
Arrested: 1942
Suspended Sentence

WEDNESDAY (Breakfast) ASSN
INUKAI, KEN
Arrested: 4 Apr 42
Innocent

TOKYO ASAHI GROUP
Editor, TANAKA, SHINJIRO
Arrested: 15 Mar 42
Innocent

WAR MINISTRY INFO. BUREAU
Reporter, ISONO, KIYOSHI
Arrested: 28 Apr 42
Innocent

SHOWA RESEARCH ASSOCIATION
SAIONJI, KINKAZU

OZAKI

HANGED 7 NOV 1944

Agents

FUNAKOSHI, HISAO
China Research Institute (Peiping)
Sentence: 10 years
Died: 27 Feb 45

KAWAMURA, YOSHIO
Chief, Shanghai Branch Office, Mansmu Nichi Nichi Shimbun (Manchuria Daily News)
Died: Before trial 42

KAWAI, TEIKICHI
China Research Institute
Sentence: 10 years
Released: 10 Oct 45

MIZUNO, SHIGE
Kyoto Area Intelligence
Sentence: 13 years
Died: 22 Mar 45

SOUTH MANCHURIAN R.R. TOKYO OFFICE MANTETSU BUILDING

- HSINKING
- MUKDEN
- DAIREN (Home Office)
- PEIPING
- SHANGHAI

MITSUI BUSSAN KAISHA RESEARCH BUREAU

THE SORGE SPY RING

1933 – Japan Phase – 1941

AGENTS, CONTACTS, SOURCES

Publications Branch, Operations Division, CIS

RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF
4TH BUREAU

RED ARMY FAR EAST
4TH BUREAU

COURIER

KLAUSEN
(ANNA)
$¥$¥$¥$

SORGE

EMBASSY
U. S. S. R.

COURIER

CONTACTS

IMPERIAL JAPANESE
CABINET
KONOYE

OZAKI

STEIN

de VOULKELITCH
(Edith)

MIYAGI

EMBASSY
GERMAN

CONTACT

CONTACT

CONTACT

ASAHI

EMBASSY
U. S.

EMBASSY
FRENCH

EMBASSY
BRITISH

SOUTH
MANCHURIAN
RAILWAY

BREAKFAST
CLUB

COURIER

SHOWA
RESEARCH
ASSOCIATION

JAPANESE
AGENTS

COURIER

SHANGHAI

HONG KONG

THE SORGE SPY RING JAPAN

25/A-32 / 13 - 86

PUBLICATIONS BRANCH, OPERATIONS DIVISION, CIS G-2 OCTOBER, 1947