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U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

APO 415

Interview No. 18

Eckhardt


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OKL Liaison Service, North

20th May 1945

QUESTION

What were the effect of night attacks by the RAF, after the RAF had begun to bombard German targets in great strength?

ANSWER

The first attack of this nature was the raid on Cologne. On account of the large number of aircraft involved in this attack, the raid had a strong effect on the morale of the population; they were partially reassured by our own counter-measures, such as the sending up of night-fighters. The effects on the armaments industry and transportation system were also evened out by the fact that, at that time, armament passed into other hands to Todt and then to Speer. As a result of this change, there was not only equalization, but also an increase in production.

Transportation and communication did not suffer too heavily as there were many alternatives available in the attacked Ruhr area. The night-fighter became our most important counter-weapon; a special aeroplane reporting service was instituted; night fighter service was expanded; single engine fighters were mostly utilized for this purpose. Owing to the great areas to be traversed by the RAF and to the detection of enemy aircraft through radiolocation, the defence stood a chance of making good; moreover, it was possible to put the night-fighters in the air from the very start of operations.

Did you provide for an increased production of night-fighters or a greater utilization of fighter aircraft, on account of what you have just said?

In 1940 Germany began to support her submarines by

Yes, until the end we endeavoured to create a large night-fighter unit and we planned along those lines, we envisaged both production and utilization angles. We still are faced with the problem of combating mosquito aircraft.

The problem cannot be disposed of or explained in a few words, because it is

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QUESTION

ANSWER

means of long range aircraft, in the attack on English convoys, this in an attempt to cut off England and interrupt her exports. Submarine activity continued whereas air activity was stopped. What is the reason for this?

closely bound up with our entire war economy and effort. Necessary steps were not taken to expand the Luftwaffe as the Luftwaffe had carried out air warfare of an operative nature during the first year of the war, in the course of the following years it took on a cooperative character. Combat aircraft (Schlachtflugzeuge) and fighters mainly were constructed, that is to say aircraft which could be utilized on the battle-field, whereas heavy bombers were not constructed, although plans had been made for them (He 177). FW 200 as well as Ju 290 were converted civilian aircraft; therefore, as such not bombers which could resist attack, and did not stand a chance against carrier or cargo planes.

Do you wish to imply that the production-capacity of the Luftwaffe was not great enough?

When means of production are limited one cannot construct tanks, aircraft and guns, at one and the same time. There is a boundary somewhere and the Luftwaffe was subject to the strictest limitations.

But didn't you utilize the FW 200?

Yes, but the losses were considerable, however.

Did you stop this because you saw that losses were becoming too great?

No, we wanted to concentrate on the production of He 177. We were unable to do so, because it was produced too late owing to construction errors. A certain amount of FW 200 were built, but the numbers built were not large enough for the scale of operations.


Then it wasn't a case of ceasing production because casualties were too high and because it was no longer worth while?

No. This type ceased to be produced, and it was then no longer possible to start producing them again.

In 1942 we started small-scale day-light attacks, first of all employing no more than 12 planes; for instance against Lille. What were the results of these raids and how, if at all, did it affect planning?

These attacks had no immediate effects on our planning. We were too heavily engaged in Russia and Africa. The opinion still prevailed that we should increase the armament of the fighter aircraft, and provision had been made for the replacement of the majority of small-

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QUESTION

ANSWER

Was this a result of the attacks?

caliber weapons by larger-calibers,

No. The relatively small scale American attacks had not yet given rise to any anxiety. Air-combats against English fighters over the Channel loomed in the foreground.

So you didn't pay much attention to our day-light attacks. Did you at that time already envisage changing the technique of your formations, because you thought such a change was necessary?

I dont quite understand the question. Do you mean technique or tactics?

I meant tactics

At this time no. We began, at this time, to be obliged to be ready in all ways to fly in stronger formations, because English fighter cover was following in ever increasing strength.


In the whole of 1942, therefore, you didn't have to undertake any fundamental changes, either in the concentration of formations or in tactics?

I dont know of any changes. In the West, even in the air we were on the defensive. We used formations nearly exclusively for reconnaissance together with submarines. Most formations were situated in the East, in Africa, and in Italy. There we were still attacking and we supported the attacks launched by our ground forces.

Now for the first six months of 1943. At this time, the RAF had almost doubled the number of its attacks and of its aircraft. Now we shall deal with English night attacks. What was the effect of those night raids and what changes did they bring about?

Our greatest difficulty was that we could not get our ships into the air, in any kind of weather, especially the single-engine night-fighter. Consequently, the AA defence was strengthened and the aircraft warning system was intensified and expanded. Whats more, formations for the defence of the Reich were strengthened. At that time we had not envisaged the possibility of day-light attacks becoming equally concentrated and, consequently we hadn't yet utilized daylight fighters for this type of combat. Fighters were put into operation on the battlefields of the East, West, etc. Generally speaking, it was attempted to raise and speed up aircraft production. There were too few planes to be assembled

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QUESTION

ANSWER

Do you use these attacks as a pretext for obtaining more planes or for achieving a greater supply of raw materials for the production of planes?

and distributed.

It had always been the desire of the Luftwaffe to receive more aircraft.

Did the daylight raids undertaken at the same time by the Americans from January until July 1943, achieve significant results and how effective were they?

We were greatly surprised by the long-range of the American fighters which demanded long range aircraft but had never obtained them.

General Anderson said that until 1943 we did not have many fighter escorts and such aircraft were not very long range aircraft.

Yes, they were in the Ruhr area.

And now let us discuss the same period. January until July 1943. Quite apart from these fighter escorts, how far did these attacks alarm the Luftwaffe and what losses did the Luftwaffe sustain?

Leading personalities had long been aware of the danger. At an early date it had been decided that air-power was the decisive factor in this war. The Luftwaffe's influence was so great, on the one hand, in the land and sea fighting that people were compelled to face facts. On the other hand, the German Airforce had been in action since the beginning of the war, had known no period of tranquility, and, as a result, no reserves could be built up, nor was it possible to construct different or new types. One was compelled to get along with all available aircraft at that time and could only demand that

- 1) The total should be considerably increased
- 2) New types should be constructed without diminishing current production especially fighters capable of longer range and equipped with heavier armament.

How were you to achieve this, when you just said that current production of aircraft was not to be disturbed?

Greater production to be achieved by diversion of other armament capacities, of Army or Navy. Exhausting of all possible means afforded by total war, as was later achieved.

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QUESTION

ANSWER

During these battles did you perceive that that which you had lost, was replaceable or that it in no way tallied with requirements?

I must point out that we never had enough formations to combat daylight attacks, because fighting at the front had the first priority. Not only were the formations too small, but also the training of the crews was not extensive enough. Nevertheless, in comparison with the losses, successes achieved were satisfactory, although they should have been higher in order to put an end to the attacks.

The relations between losses and successes were satisfactory then even though the result could have been considerably higher, if there had been sufficient aircraft and had the fight not had to be fought on the periphery?

Yes, if it had been possible to divert a greater number of formations from the front. The first formations were withdrawn from the East after the attacks on Hamburg area especially dive bomber formations. That was in July/August 1943.

In other words you were satisfied with results achieved by the limited numbers of fighters at your disposal, providing we did not make use of fighter escorts?

Yes, we did try to obtain more squads in order to annihilate as many formations of the enemy as possible.

Were you still using small caliber weapons or had you already converted small caliber armament to heavier?

In fighters and dive bombers we had 2 cm armament, in ME 110 two 2 cm and four 7.9 mm.

At that time did you prepare a program aiming at increasing the defence?

A Central Control (Luftwaffenbefehlshaber-Stift), later Luftflotte Reich, for the defence of the Reich was set up; to this office were subordinated all Air Defence units (Luftverteidigungskräfte) Pilots, planes, AA and radar units, and other units barrage units - this office was responsible for the carrying out of the necessary ARP measures in the province of traffic, industry, etc

Apart from this subordination of one unit to another, did you allow for an increased and expanded aircraft production?

We made many plans but were not able to implement them. The situation was improved when the Jaegerstab was set up in 1944; as a result of this we concentrated on the production of fighter aircraft.

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QUESTION

ANSWER

In appropriate interpolated question.

The Jaegerstab was set up by the Armament(Ministry)itself, who assumed the responsibility of production; consequently it was a civilian staff. All the Luftwaffe did after that was to make demands. In some ways that was the beginning of Speer's assumption of control.

In July 1943 the RLF losses began to lessen because they had devised special equipment, which gave the alarm in advance. What effect did that have on the night-fighter?

We were under the impression that our night-fighters were so successful and effective that the RLF was only able to carry out night attacks on those nights during which weather conditions would not allow us to put our night-fighters in the air. Great advantages were scored by the British, and later by the Americans, by their use of bomb sights (Panoramagermete). Our radiolocation was also set out of gear by the dropping of window. This "doubling" especially as far as AAA was concerned, worked out until the end.

It was said at that time that our efforts would be of trifling consequence as regards the enemy's actual air-force, but would achieve actual results as regards high frequency, that is to say, the utilization of enemy radio equipment.

What were the effects of the mass attacks undertaken later in 1943 by the American Air Forces which carried out strong daylight attacks and penetrated deeper and deeper into the Reich itself?

Daylight raids did not affect the civilian population as deeply as night attacks, during which it was torn from its sleep, compelled to take shelter in cellars, fire duties, etc. The English, moreover, dropped more incendiaries where the Americans dropped high explosives. Furthermore, night attacks had to be directed against the area covered by one city, whereas daylight raids were directed against industrial and transportation targets, and only in exceptional cases against a limited area of a city.

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QUESTION

ANSWER

Whereas we had started our attacks with as few as 12 planes, now in 1943 we attacked with as many as 700. Did anyone in the German Luftwaffe come to fear that worse attacks might take place?

I and many others foresaw what was coming to us.

What about the entire German General Staff or the General Staff of the German Air Force, didn't it take this into consideration?


Yes, but a general opinion of the situation by higher authorities was so pressing that it was not possible to create any specific center in Germany for the protection of production. Furthermore, we had a pressing need for airforces in East and South.

At any time in 1943 did you elaborate a program providing for a higher and more thorough training of fighter pilots?

We requested that training of fighter pilots be intensified. General Galland was appointed for this purpose.

How many more pilots did you train in this way in 1943?

More and more Squadron Leaders were trained as planes were assembled, a relation of 1,5:1. This was maintained until later when it was prevented by difficulties in obtaining fuel.



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QUESTION

ANSWER

The special program under General Galland did provide for a greater number of fighter aircraft, what were the numbers?

We demanded and attempted to achieve a monthly production of at least 3,500 fighter aircraft. We did not attain this figure. Later, that is in 1944, we achieved a production of some 2000 aircraft per month. In 1943 there were 1000 to 1200 aircraft per month. I cannot give you more accurate figures.

How many flying hours did a pilot have to complete in order to carry out his full training?

Some 13 months, later only 11 months.

How many hours in the air?

I can't give you exact figures, some 40 to 50 hours in trainer aircraft. Before that, (they had) flight school training. General Galland who has been captured by the Americans could supply you with more adequate figures.

When did production surpass 2000 aircraft?

In the summer of 1944. Production was then maintained and always stood at more than 2000 planes a month.

Did you still maintain the standard of 40-50 flying hours?

Broadly speaking, we did adhere to this program. Later we were unable to do so owing to lack of fuel. Schools were disbanded; their instructors and Squadron Leaders from other formations were drawn upon to man fighter aircraft.

When did lack of fuel begin to affect the training schedule?

After damage of the Hydrierwerke.

If you had to lessen your original training hours because of lack of fuel, how much (flying time) did you still have to give him?

A normal fighter pilot was given 15 cub.m for his entire training. A bad weather fighter required 30 to 40 cubic meters, in accordance with the demands of the General commanding fighter aircraft, General Galland.

You haven't answered my question fully. What was the minimum training given to a fighter in spite of lack of fuel?

The training depended entirely on the fuel available. Training centers had to make do and train as many fighters as possible. Moreover, flight instructors, bomber pilots, night fighters were to be inducted into day-light fighters.

... still had an elaborate ...
-8- however which was still fully implemented

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QUESTION

ANSWER

Some pilots who jumped during the winter offensive in the Ardennes said that they had only some 135 flying hours to their credit. Is this accurate?

We still had an elaborate training program which was still fully implemented in the Spring of 1944. By the closing down of schools we were still able to maintain the required numbers of Squadron Leaders until December 1944/January 1945.

Did you depreciate the quality of the Isoktan?

It tallied approximately with what I have said.

At the end of 1943/beginning of 1944, did you have a good idea, a clear perspective of how deep into Germany our formations were penetrating?

No, that wasn't possible because the motors couldn't have stood it. With the exception of jet planes which could be flown on an inferior quality fuel, a kind of Diesel fuel.

After you saw that we could penetrate still deeper, did your General Staff work out any program taking into account the now radically transformed situation?

Yes, everywhere with the bombers, as far as the Elbe with your fighters. We had allowed for that

The fact that enemy fighters could make inroads as far as the Elbe or the Oder was not all important. We were more interested in a fighter of our own, a longer-range fighter which we did not receive. We could observe the gathering of hostile formations, but we did not know where they would fly to, whether it would be towards North or South Germany. The decisive factor now was to get our fighter formations to the spot, at the right moment. But on the other hand we had to wait and see where they were heading for. Here we lacked a plane which could stay in the air long enough, that is a long-distance fighter. This was the salient point. This is how false starts were brought about, because it was never possible to ascertain early

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QUESTION

ANSWER

Was the Luftwaffe, therefore, unable to obtain her requirements?

enough in what direction the planes were flying.

The longer-range fighter was being evolved.

Did you think of providing groups of twin-engine fighters (Me 110, Ju 88) for the Rhine and Ruhr areas, in order to attack our fighter escorts as soon as they had overflown their range?

We didn't produce many Me 110's. The Ju 88 was less suitable. It was originally a bomber, but was used over the Atlantic as a dive-bomber. We sustained heavy losses this way.

Why did the GAF use these planes in such large numbers and so successfully and why then did it stop doing so?

The losses were too great. We used it as long as we possibly could,

To what do you attribute this? Is it due to our employing a single-engine fighter?

Yes.

Did you originally plan on using it more, even after our one engine planes achieved greater penetration?

We planned on using it outside the striking range of your fighter aircraft, and tried to use it with fighter cover. But our own fighters became so involved that it was hardly worth our while.

At the end of February 1944 we concentrated on aircraft plants and assembling plants. How far did this affect the flow of aircraft?

There were many cases of decreases in production which had themselves quite acute. Owing to them we were unable to build up reserves as we had hitherto. All we could do was to complete and refresh the existing formations.

Was it very obvious?

Yes.

As you sustained heavy losses after attacks on, say Munich, you altered your tactics. Before, you attacked in every way, at any opportunity; afterwards, only when the opportunity was favorable. Was this due to a change in your tactics or what were your reasons?

As long as the results were 1:1 to the losses and the attacks were not too frequent, the losses were bearable. From a given period onwards attacks became so frequent, that our losses became important. We had to keep our strength, and were compelled to use our units when we thought we had a chance of achieving results. The weather conditions, the

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QUESTION

ANSWER

Have you any records on the subject or do you know off hand how great your losses were in January and March 1944?

locating of formations also played a part therein. We had no prospects of waging a successful battle if the number of bombers was greater and did not decrease. By means of fewer starts, we tried to approach in stronger formations.

From the invasion onwards in any one engagement, involving bombers or fighters, we lost at least one plane.

Have you accurate figures in the South?

Yes, there should be. Obersten I.G.Kienitz of the OKL, South of Berchtesgaden will have all necessary records.

From the 20-26. 2. 44 we flew some 8 times and attacked the aircraft and assembly plants and from 6.3.44 onwards we attacked Berlin. Can you tell me anything about losses then?

You are referring to attacks on Regensburg, Augsburg, Marienburg, Posen, etc. It did cause us partial loss of production. But, owing to the formation of the Jaegerstab we were able to stabilize our losses at a given period. We were worried lest engine-plants should also be attacked, but this was not the case. Engines were a bottleneck.

Aircraft losses were not so great, so that individually they did not affect us, though they did in the long run. Shortage of crews was not so obvious because they parachuted over our own territory. But we did notice the shortage after continual attacks, because the replacement reserves decreased considerably.


Approximately what percentage of the crews were saved from your planes which were shot down?

Some 35-40%.

General Anderson had assumed that the position had been more favorable. Can you tell him whether more joined the 35 or 40% at a later date, after their wounds had healed?

It is difficult to say because it varied according to various months.

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QUESTION

ANSWER

At the beginning of 1944, January, you employed special tactics to compel our fighters to jettison their emergency tanks. Why did you then abandon this method?

We intended to carry through with those formations from the West and the occupied areas. They should have been put into action against the fighter escorts, compel them to jettison their emergency tanks. In this way the bombers could be directly attacked. This miscarried because our fighters were tied up in the West, and from the start they had already been involved in actual combat.

In fall of 1944, the English in their turn also began to make daylight attacks, though in limited numbers. They gradually penetrated deeper and deeper into Germany. Why didn't the GAF adapt itself to combat and attack the more vulnerable Lancaster of the English which afforded a much better target owing to its unyieldiness?

The first attacks during the invasion period were directed against the VI launching sites. That was the time to attack them. We advised it, but it was done only once, and this without striking success because the English were well protected by Spitfires.


Later German fighter formations were assembled back, deeper inside Germany there to protect the plants of the armament industry, especially the fuel producing industry. They were suitably grouped within this area according to the importance of the target. Everything did not go according to our plans and wishes. Our enemy had the initiative. We could do no more than concentrate on essential targets, save only for the Ardennes offensive. When the transportation situation in the Ruhr began to offer too serious a problem, formations were sent there. The English attacks then became more cautious.

On many occasions we flew in with the British and English going in shorter distances where they penetrated deeper into the Reich. We encountered opposition but the English did not. What is the reason for this?

Our formations were placed more towards the rear. The English attacked in the Rhine. The Americans who were flying deeper into Germany could be intercepted in time, and, therefore, dealt with more effectively.

Is it true that you were ordered to defend whole areas and not pay attention to anything else?

Yes, in the Ruhr and Rhine areas we had other formations which were not powerful enough. They were utilized mainly to support the ground forces, to ward off



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QUESTION

ANSWER

After these February raids during which we damaged aircraft and assembly plants, did you still continue to receive the necessary amount of planes, or were you able to stabilize losses.

support the ground forces, to ward off fighters, etc.

We replenished our squadrons at this time and we, therefore, sent relatively strong formations to France after the invasion. In spite of your attacks we had been able to bring our formations up to par so that, at the beginning of the invasion we had quite a few squadrons at our disposal.

How many aircraft did you get hold of through this replenishing?

We were able to throw in some 1000 fighters, due to replenishing process which lasted some 2 1/2 months.

When did you begin to feel a lack of fuel?

After the attacks on the Hydrierwerke, in July or August 1944.

Did that hamper your operations considerably?

Yes, firstly the training, actual fighting capacity not yet because the front was always supplied first. The lack of fuel became effective when the Russian offensive began because we required much fuel for this sphere of operations.

Was it on the basis of an order issued from high up, or was it a matter of tactics which the GAF was evolving, that the GAF always attacked our heavy bombers and not the medium bombers during daylight attacks.

The results were better.

What percentage of the GAF did you hold in readiness for this express purpose, namely to attack the heavy bombers which were to carry out strategic bombing?

The percentage varied according to the strength of the attack. Sometimes we had as much as 65% of the total German fighter strength in readiness for these battles.

At the beginning of 1944 you offered much stiffer resistance to our attacks than you did later in 1944. Although you appeared to have much the same number of squadrons and aircraft, you seemed

I assume that the Americans too improved, that their numbers increased and that they gained experience. As for as we were concerned we spent our strength in actual combat. Our best men were lost. Squadron leaders were lacking, we had to

Inst

QUESTION

to utilize them less, what is this due to?

In 1945 we not practically no opposition. Was this a matter of policy or inability to do anything?

Was this the main reason for the Me 262 not having been produced sooner?

When should you have begun production?

Was delay due to bombing of factories or a result of changes which various offices wished to effect?

The first of these planes were used in September/October 1944. Then it was a slow process until the new planes were produced. Was this a result of bombing and consequently a crippling of production?

ANSWER

use young Squadron Leaders and untrained men from other units to fly our aircraft. I can explain it by showing you figures of losses. Until the invasion the relation of losses to successes was 1:1, then 1.3 up to 1.5:1 and finally some 3.5:1.

It was the actual hopelessness of the situation because the number of fighters we had at our disposal could not hope to score successes against the Western enemy. We placed all our hopes in jet-propelled aircraft (Strahlflugzeuge) with which we hoped to attack again. Only with this type of aircraft could we hope to achieve successes.

There were quite a few difficulties arising out of the airplane itself, because it required many modifications. Consequently modifications and delays in production. Finally large-scale production was demanded, but delivery of the model was rendered difficult owing to constant bombing.

In the Spring.

Both. There are many types of production. One can place everything in one plant or else distribute manufacture over a certain number of plants. In the first instance, should the plant be bombed, production is stopped altogether; in the second production is dependent upon the transportation system. We endeavored to go underground.

The plane was sent to the front without any testing. That is why many weren't produced. Many demands for alterations were sent in from the front, and such suggestions had to be taken into consideration. That is why we set to work carefully in order to avoid any serious

QUESTION

ANSWER

Did you produce the Me 262 underground?

mistakes or miscarriages.

Partly, yes.

What production figures did you hope to attain?

At least 2000 planes a month, according to Speer.

When did you or Speer hope to attain this figure?

According to plans made last fall, by Spring.

Did you have the requisite number of pilots on hand or had you the necessary training schools?

We held in constant readiness crews which we drew from disbanded squadrons.

How many hours training did you give a pilot when you switched him to Me 262?

In the case of an experienced leader, of a bomber unit, 10 hours, of a fighter unit, 20 hours, until their redeployment.

You had anticipated the 1944 invasion or expected it. What number of planes were you holding in readiness or using?

Some 1200 planes.

Where were these stationed?

A few in France, Belgium and Holland, the rest in Germany. After the invasion, they were removed to France, Holland and Belgium.

How far did our bombing of the airfields affect their readiness and lessen their chances?

It is difficult to say. In some cases more, in others less. The last raids during which a large number of bombs was dropped have put airfields out of operation for a certain period of time. In France we took off from fields. In Germany, on account of jet-planes we needed large runways. We mobilized everything and everyone to restore these fields within a few days so that one could take off from them once again.

After the invasion you used airfields and fields in France. But you abandoned these even

The decisive factor in the withdrawal of the formations was the fact that previously we had encountered much

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QUESTION

ANSWER

long before our troops arrived and withdrew to the vicinity of Paris. Why?

opposition from British and American fighters and had had much difficulty in taking off from airfields, in grouping our forces. That is why formations were withdrawn towards the rear, and not due to bombing. We weren't located on the fields and they bombed. Large airfields which were little used.

The next question is purely a matter of interest. This is no criticism of leadership. When we began our invasion you had some 1200 planes in readiness. Why didn't you use these planes to attack our soldiers as they sailed in and sink their boats, a fact which was 100% feasible.

The fighter cover, British and American influenced us. Moreover, our planes were not on the spot, but would have had to be flown there, mostly from Germany. Flights lasted over 48 hours due to bad weather conditions, owing to taking off difficulties etc. We could only take off at daybreak or twilight, so as not to become involved in air-battles.

The crisis lasted longer than 48 hours at least 14 days.

It was due to difficulties of knowing how to deploy our forces. The invasion was covered by thousands of planes. Because of excellent Radar our planes could be located as soon as they drew close. Our Radar on the other hand was nearly totally destroyed, so that we couldn't load a squadron in the air. Then our fighters preferred to attack fighters, rather than attack ground targets or carry bombs. Moreover, you should remember that there is considerable difference between prepared planes and planes which are held in readiness.

One of my officers can give you better information on the subject, he was attached to I1 at L'Ardo West; he is well informed about the invasion: his name is Oberstlt I.G.Panitzki.


Do you recall the attack launched during New Year 1945?

Yes, it coincided with our attack in the Ardennes.

What were the results of the attack of 1. 1. 1945?

Some 465 planes destroyed on the ground and 280 planes due to damage sustained.

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QUESTION

ANSWER

How many crews did you lose then?

The greater part because only few returned.

You certainly cant explain it away as a favorable operation, can you?

We didn't begin early enough, otherwise we might have achieved better results.

Is it true: that the attack was scheduled earlier, towards Xmas?

The date of the attack was put off again and again; it should have coincided with the beginning of the offensive.

When did you become aware of the fact that the GAF was no longer in a position to cooperate actively with the ground forces in order to insure their protection?

At the time of the invasion.

General Anderson would like to know if you didn't assure even earlier that the situation afforded grounds for reflexion and was, in fact, extremely critical, when you came to reflect that formerly there had been deep aerial penetrations which had not incurred heavy losses. Wasn't that in itself a danger signal?

That was the case after El Alamein when it became difficult to conduct an operational air warfare.

In closing General Anderson said he had no more questions to ask at that time, that he reserved the prerogative and right of requesting General Christian for further questioning after the material had been processed and as further questions were raised.

End of Conference 1725 hours.

