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INTERMEDIATE INTERROGATION REPORT (IIR) NO 12

PRISONER: SS O/Stabsf WOLFF, Hans Helmut, alias
Dr KIATZ, Hans (KING Operator)

DATE: 14 August 1945

WOLFF, last KAS of Thuringia, was arrested by 970 CIC Det. 7 Jun 45, in the Gustav FREYTAG House near GUTHA (Thuringia) on charges of organizing Sigrune and Bundschuh operations in Saxony and Thuringia.

Two former employees of the Thuringia Gestapo, Frau Lilo SIEGMUND and Frl Gisela FRANGE, turned informers, revealed that the Gustav FREYTAG House was to be used as a meeting place for Gestapo members. WOLFF was one of several suspects arrested there.

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O/Gruf Hans Helmut WOLFF was an early member of the NSDAP and held various positions in the SA, SS, and Gestapo.

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CONFIDENTIAL1. INTRODUCTION

This report covers WOLFF's activities with respect to underground movements only. A report on his entire career is to be published shortly.

2. REFERENCES

970th CIC Det Arrest Report dtd 22 Jun 45
Preliminary Interrogation Report, 13th Army Group
Interrogation Center, dtd 28 Jun 45

3. REPORTa. Personalities

SCHULZ, Friedrich, O/Stubaf	Chief Stapo Stelle DRESDEN after 18 Mar 45
SELTZEN, fnu, Standf	IdS Salony
SCHMIDT, fnu, Krim Kom	In charge of DRESDEN Werwolf
Tschirsky, fnu, Standf	Amt VI, RSHA, Werwolf advisor
v. FRITSCH, fn, Maj	IV AK (IV Corps)
KOPKOW, fnu Stubaf, Krim Dir	Referant IV-A/2, RSHA
WAGNER, fnu, Krim Rat	In charge of DRESDEN Sigrune
SCHROEDER, fnu, O/Stubaf, O/Reg Rat	Chief Stapo Stelle WEIMAR
FISCHER, Friedrich alias STATER, Heinrich, Krim Rat	In charge of WEIMAR Sigrune
VIHOEFER, Walter alias VOIGT, Walter, H/Stuf	Adj to WOLFF
ERLINGER, Erich O/Fuehrer	Chief Amt I, RSHA
KRETSCHMER, Gerhard Max, Krim Kom	Member Bundschuh WEIMAR
STEDING, fnu, Krim O/Sekr	Member Bundschuh WEIMAR
HOLZWEILER or HOLZWEBER, fnu Krim Sekr	Member Bundschuh WEIMAR
DUDA, Walter alias BERGER, Walter, Krim Angest	Member Bundschuh WEIMAR
Dr. KOEHLER, fnu, H/Stuf, Krim Kom	Chief Aussen Stelle Erfurt
Dr. TRUHLER, fnu	BdS Thüringia
KRUEGER, fnu, Col	Luftwaffe, (probably Gen ASCHENBERG- NER's staff)
SIEGMUND, Lilo	Secretary to WOLFF

b. Chronological table of events

22 Feb 45	WOLFF appointed temporary chief of Stapo Stelle DRESDEN
First week March 45	Pessau and Sigrune orders
16 Mar 45	SCHULZ, new Stapo Leiter DRESDEN arrives
26 Mar 45	WOLFF ordered to WEIMAR
3 Apr 45	VIHOEFER arrives in WEIMAR with Bundschuh order
9 Apr 45	ERLINGER's visit
11 or 12 Apr 45	WOLFF leaves WEIMAR
24 Apr 45	WOLFF with Stapo personnel in Bochner Wald
10 May 45	WOLFF gives orders to disband organization
7 Jun 45	WOLFF arrested

c. DRESDEN

WOLFF head of Referat IV-B/2a, RSHA, was appointed temporary Leiter of Stapo Stelle DRESDEN on 22 Feb 45. The newly appointed permanent chief of the DRESDEN Stapo Stelle, O/Stubaf SCHULZ, who was still on his way from East Prussia, did not arrive in DRESDEN until 18 Mar 45. During the month he headed the DRESDEN office, WOLFF familiarized himself with existing preparations for underground movements and developed them considerably.

Stabs Stelle DRESDEN was located in a single room of emergency barracks built for HSEFF von ALVENSLEBEN. The elaborate Gestapo files were in disorder, and no preparations had been made for their disposal in event of a sudden Allied advance. There was a shortage of weapons and uniforms. Wire and radio communications had almost completely broken down, and WOLFF had to establish several new Aussen Stellen to maintain contact with his outlying districts.

(1) Werwolf

WOLFF made contact with the Werwolf organization during his very first days in DRESDEN. Although C/Gruf PRUETZMAN was listed as head of the Werwolf, WOLFF thinks that the order initiating the movement had come from Amt VI, RSHA. The order had been addressed to the IdS, Standf SEITZEN, and had called for the following: intensive recruiting of Germans and foreigners, establishment of an intelligence gathering agency (Nachrichten Dienst), sabotage in allied-held territory.

Krim Kom SCHMIDT had been put in charge of Werwolf matters and had been assigned to the IdS together with three assistants (Krim Sekr). WOLFF remembers that an Obersturmfuehrer from Amt VI had reported to the IdS to assist him.

Early in March 1945, Standf TSCHIRSKY of Amt VI, accompanied by an Infantry major, came to DRESDEN to consult with the IdS on the progress of Werwolf. The IdS told TSCHIRSKY that recruiting had not been successful. Few people particularly among the Silesian evacuees in DRESDEN, had shown enthusiasm for reentering Russian-occupied territory. The only appreciable results had been obtained among members of the HJ and Wehr Ertaechtigung Lager (WEL). TSCHIRSKY, however, opposed the use of people below 18 years of age.

A school for prospective Werwolf members was opened appr 20 Mar 45, the first course lasting eight or ten days with approximately 85 students attending. The instructor was an officer whom the IdS had been able to borrow from Maj von FRITSCHE of AK IV (IV Corps).

(2) Unternehmen Dessau

The order to establish Dessau was brought by a Hauptsturmfuehrer of Amt VI around 10 Mar 45. The order called only for an intelligence gathering net (Nachrichten Dienst) to be operated in allied held territory. The IdS was responsible for the organization in his district and reports were to be forwarded directly to Amt VI.

During TSCHIRSKY's visit, WOLFF mentioned Dessau once, but TSCHIRSKY immediately answered that he was not interested in Dessau, and that no connection existed between Dienst Stelle PRUETZMAN and Unternehmen Dessau. To prevent interference between the two organizations it was agreed that the Dessau project would limit its recruiting to the Eastern districts of DRESDEN.

(3) R-Netz

WOLFF and the IdS occasionally discussed an Army organization, known as R-Netz, similar to Unternehmen Dessau. WOLFF thinks that the R-Netz, was to collect information in allied-held territory under the direction of Mil Amt. He denies knowing any further details.

(4) Sigrune

WOLFF's first contact with the Sigrune movement came during a routine conference held between Gruf MUELLER and the Referenten of Amt IV, RSHA. MUELLER and KOPKOW, head of Referat IV-A/2, discussed the possibilities of Sigrune which WOLFF vaguely recalls as a possible Amt IV undertaking.

Early in March 1945, while in DRESDEN, WOLFF received the order to establish a Sigrune organization. Presumably the order came from Referat IV-A/2 although it was signed by MUELLER himself. Sigrune was to be organized in all non-occupied territory. Its mission was the gathering of political as well as military intelligence and the preparation of sabotage projects for the expected occupational period. All Stapo Leiter were to help initiate and supervise the Sigrune project.

The Sigrune order created considerable confusion in DRESDEN. It was never understood why there were to be three different organizations with almost identical purposes. They overlapped in many respects and frequently recruits were stolen back and forth. After much discussion it was finally decided that Wervolf and Dessau were to operate exclusively in allied-held territory and would limit their recruiting to the eastern districts of DRESDEN, whereas Sigrune would recruit among the residents of the western part and would not be operational for the moment.

Great stress was placed on the reliability of prospective Sigrune members and no one was accepted until approved by the Stapo Leiter or other officials of the Stapo Stelle. People with W/T experience were to be given preference as far as practicable. For procurement of W/T sets and for additional code training, WOLFF was to communicate at once with Stabstuf KOPKOV, Abteilung IV-A/2, RSHA.

Krim Rat WAGNER was charged with organizing Sigrune. To assist him, WOLFF reassigned the three Kriminal Sekretare from Krim Kom SCHMIDT (in charge of Wervolf) to WAGNER.

During WOLFF's stay in DRESDEN 26 people were chosen for Sigrune. SCHULZ, the new Leiter of Stapo Stelle DRESDEN who had arrived around 18 Mar 45, was already acquainted with Sigrune and continued to work according to the plans made by WOLFF.

28 Mar 45 a radio message from Amt I, RSHA, assigned WOLFF to WEIMAR as K&S for Thuringia. It stated specifically that he was not to return to BERLIN but was to proceed to WEIMAR at once.

d. WEIMAR

WOLFF arrived in WEIMAR during the afternoon of 30 Mar 45. The Stapo Leiter WEIMAR, O/Stabstuf SCHROEDER, had not been informed of the appointment which produced a rather awkward situation for WOLFF. He informed SCHROEDER that the order had come directly from BERLIN and asked SCHROEDER to cooperate and help him.

The main function of the new K&S was merging the Gestapo and Krim into one organization. Just as in DRESDEN, WOLFF had to establish new Ausson Stellen because poor communication facilities made control of his district almost impossible.

(1) Sigrune

SCHROEDER informed WOLFF that the order for Sigrune had arrived a few days earlier. SCHROEDER had put Krim Rat FISCHER in charge of Sigrune but so far nothing had been accomplished. As far as WOLFF remembers, a Sigrune organization was never started in WEIMAR.

(2) VIEHOEFER's Arrival

During the night of 3 Apr 45 H/Staf VIEHOEFER of Amt I, RSHA, arrived in WEIMAR and reported to WOLFF. VIEHOEFER's orders were to proceed to the IdS, KASSEL, but all connections with that city were interrupted, so WOLFF decided to keep him as his personal adviser because he was familiar with the policies of Amt I.

VIEHOEFER brought with him the following three documents:

- (a) A map of the KASSEL area pinpointing all Dienst Stellen and Aussen Stellen for the reorganization of the Sipo under the new RSHA plan.
- (b) An order signed by HITLER to shoot all people who displayed the white flag, removed roadblocks or other defenses, refused to join the Volksturm, or deliberately sabotaged the defense of Germany.
- (c) An order from Amt I calling for the establishment of an underground movement to be known to Bundschuh. The order stated specifically: (I) that all members of the Sipo were to be notified at once that their active participation in the Bundschuh was expected. (II) that an over-all Intelligence gathering system (Nachrichten Dienst aller Art), sabotage teams, and tank destroyer teams were to be organized. (Rache der Nationalen Ehre - Vindication of the National Honor.)

VIEHOEFER added that Bundschuh was to be activated without delay, and that reports were to be forwarded to Amt I. WOLFF does not remember whether the Bundschuh order was signed by ERLINGER or by one of his assistants. He feels, however, that KALTEBRUNNER and HITLER must have known of the project because ERLINGER would not have assumed the responsibility for creating an underground movement without approval by his superiors.

(3) Bundschuh

The Bundschuh order was announced to all WEIMAR Sipo personnel at a special meeting, 4 Apr 45. For security reasons WOLFF did not use the term Bundschuh but spoke of "Werwolf" when he informed the personnel. The entire staff responded to the call for volunteers, but WOLFF felt that certain officials were indispensable in their present positions and that others were too old for the dangerous undertaking. The final selection of eight or nine men included VIEHOEFER, Krim Kom KRETSCHER, Krim C/Sekr STEDING, Krim Sekr HOLZMUELLER (or HOLZWEBER), Krim Angest DUDA, and three or four others whose names WOLFF cannot remember.

Plans and preparations for Bundschuh activities were made, but according to WOLFF's repeated statements, lack of time and the general confusion in WEIMAR prevented the execution of most of the plans. The main points of the program were as follows:

- (a) Bundschuh was to be essentially as Sipo enterprise. Use of outside elements was to be limited to establishment of contact addresses (Anlaufstellen) and messengers.
- (b) No specific missions were assigned for the time being. Bundschuh members were to disappear, stay behind, and await further orders.

- (c) Arrangements for forged identity papers were made with the local police force.
- (d) Weapons and ammunition were to be acquired at any cost. Mills and quarries should be searched for explosives to be taken, by force if necessary.
- (e) Every Bundschuh member was to receive RM 1,000 in cash.
- (f) 100 - 200 lbs of canned meat, cigars, cigarettes, tobacco, and ten bottles of Schnaps were to be buried in a hiding place by KRETSCHER. WOLFF does not remember the location.

A short time before he left WEIMAR, WOLFF received from KRETSCHER the names and locations of five contact addresses which he no longer remembers. However, he recalls the pass-word "Ich komme fuer Benjamin" (Beanie sent me).

(4) Bundschuh in ERFURT

WOLFF and VIHCEFER selected 23 Bundschuh volunteers from the personnel of Aussen Stelle ERFURT. Dr KOEHNEN was appointed head of the Aussen Stelle while all others made preparations to go into hiding with the advance of the Allies. WOLFF tried unsuccessfully to get a W/T set and an operator from KOPKOW. The only activity of the ERFURT group consisted in giving KOHNEN short reports on the enemy situation.

(5) EHRLINGER's Visit

EHRLINGER, head of Amt I, visited WOLFF on Sunday, 9 Apr 45. He asked for a complete and detailed picture of the situation in WEIMAR, particularly the progress made in organizing Bundschuh. WOLFF repeatedly tried to explain that there was not sufficient time to build an effective organization especially with no equipment obtainable. EHRLINGER insisted upon the establishment of Bundschuh in spite of any difficulties and, so WOLFF claims, left him with the entire responsibility for finding ways and means.

When WOLFF asked what steps should be taken in case of further Allied advances, he was told to retreat as far as the border of Thuringia and there wait for orders from either EHRLINGER or the Bds Thuringia. EHRLINGER left for MUEBERG after this 10-hour conference.

e. BOEHMER Wald

WOLFF did not leave WEIMAR until the city was almost surrounded. The entire Sipo personnel of WEIMAR as well as Gestapo members from recently Allied-occupied territories, altogether around 800 persons, had already retreated to BUEGEL (Thuringia). From BUEGEL they moved on to LANGENWETZENDORF (Thuringia) where, 13 Apr 45 WOLFF joined them together with Staff HUEBNER, H/Staff BOENSCHNER, U/Staff BOEM, KALERT, HERTEN, two secretaries and VIHCEFER.

En route WOLFF had checked several Aussen Stellen and had had a conversation with the Bds, Dr TRUEBNER. He had been told to keep up the regular Gestapo activities, particularly to prevent desertion from the Wehrmacht and Sipo. It was then that WOLFF received authorization from the RSKA to execute military personnel in case of desertion or disobedience.

From LANGENWEISENDORF VIEHCEFER was sent to BERLIN to inform Amt I of the situation and to get further orders. The trip was unsuccessful. VIEHCEFER found no one to whom he could make his report or who had authority to issue orders. A few days later he was back in LANGENWEISENDORF.

Orders finally arrived 24 Apr. WOLFF was in ROTHEBAUM/Bochner Wald when he received instructions from the BIS. He was to take his unit towards the Danube and assemble in an area SE of DEGENSDORF/Danube. There were neither vehicles, nor petrol for the move, but WOLFF could not inform Dr TRUHLER who had left for an unknown destination. He decided to act on his own, sent him the old and sickly, split the remainder of the group into three units and moved deeper into the Bochner Wald.

(1) WOLFF's Unit

Guided by WOLFF, the unit under his command developed into a band of terrorists. The plan was to kill German traitors, to engage in all types of sabotage, to form small tank destroyer teams, and to embark on a regular program of Wervolf activities. Individual action was strictly prohibited, and the control of all operations remained solidly in WOLFF's hands. Equipment consisted of small arms, a few Panzerfaust, and some explosives captured in raids on quarries and on US dumps. Food was obtained from the local population.

For security reasons no one group knew of the location of the others. Each group was assigned a code name, and meeting places for messengers were established. The communications system proved utterly inadequate because of the long distances and the deep snow. Higher headquarters could not be reached by W/T because there was no power for the radio truck.

(2) Other Units in the Bochner Wald

WOLFF's three units were not the only ones operating in the Bochner Wald. WOLFF had several meetings with members of an SS Jagd Verband but knows no details concerning the unit. He made several efforts to use the radio at headquarters of Kommando des Melderebietes KOELM, located on top of the Osser Mountain. There was an Luftwaffe man from PRAGUE trying to find an SS Jagd Verband who asked WOLFF for the best way to bring up gasoline trucks. VIEHCEFER met Col KRUEGER of the Luftwaffe (probably Gen ASCHEN-PRERNER's staff) whom WOLFF invited to join in Wervolf activities, but who flatly refused.

9 May 45 US troops moved into the area. WOLFF made a trip into the valley and heard that the Americans were shooting all members of the SS. The following day he learned of the German surrender and he decided to disband his organization. Orders were issued to abandon the entire undertaking, all personnel was discharged and granted permission to return home. The problem of identification papers was solved with the aid of OT envelopes with official seals. All surplus rations were distributed among the farmers and all weapons destroyed. WOLFF claims that no underground dumps were established.

f. Return Home and Arrest

Together with 8 men and 4 women WOLFF started for home. The group was checked and controlled many times along the way which made them decide to split into smaller groups.

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In ESCHENBACH (nr BAYREUTH) WOLFF managed to obtain an AMG pass and was given a ride on a PW truck to LEIPZIG. Here he separated from Frau SIEGMUND who gave him the address of her step-parents at the Gustav FREYTAG House in GOTHA in case he needed a place to stay. WOLFF then visited his family in ROCHLITZ/Saxony. His wife persuaded him not to give himself up but to find some small job where his past would not be checked too closely. He proceeded to the address given him by Frau SIEGMUND where he was arrested 7 Jun 45.

4. CONCLUSIONS

WOLFF's plans and preparations for an active underground movement can hardly be considered important in the light of their actual accomplishment. It is interesting, however, to observe that as long as an agency existed to issue orders, at least the physical appearance of WOLFF's group survived; but when contact with the higher echelon was broken even so ardent and fanatical a Nazi as WOLFF could see no other way but to disband his group and admit defeat.

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

None.

For Colonel PHILP:

Robert T. Longstreth
 ROBERT T. LONGSTRETH
 Major, Infantry
 CI Section

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1. REFERENCES

FIR, USFET Interrogation Center, dtd 28 Jun 45. IIR No 12, USFET MIS Center, dtd 14 Aug 45. CIR No 8 (King Operation), USFET MIS Center, dtd 31 Aug 45.

2. REASON FOR REPORT

Information contained in this report is believed to be of immediate interest.

3. REPORTa. Introduction

WOLFF joined the SA on 15 Mar 32 in NEUMARKT, a suburb of KOELN. On 1 May 32 he joined the NSDAP and received Party No 1,111,862. In 1937 he was taken into the services of the Gestapo and SS.

b. Activities in the Gestapo and SS

When WOLFF joined the Gestapo in 1937, he was commissioned as an U/Stuf in the SS. In 1938 he became an O/Stuf, in 1939 a H/Stuf, in 1940 a Stubaf, and in November 1944 an O/Stubaf. He first served on probation as Regierungs Assessor in Referat II-B/3 (which corresponded to a sub-section of Amt IV in later years), in which he dealt with all applications of Germans residing abroad who wanted to obtain passports or visas to enter Germany.

On 1 Mar 38 WOLFF was made Regierungs Assessor and was transferred to Stapo HALLE, where he replaced the Leiter. There he supervised personnel, looked after administrative and financial matters, and took charge of counter-intelligence measures for the big industrial undertakings of the HALLE district (Abwehr polizeiliche Belange). He also dealt with the problems of the "Bekennnis Kirche", which at that time were growing because of stiffening resistance within the church.

A few days before the outbreak of war, WOLFF was ordered to Stapo FRANKFURT/Oder, where he again took the place of the Leiter. His duties here were the same as at HALLE.

In the beginning of February 1940, WOLFF was sent to the Stapolst at DANZIG where he became the Leiter as soon as his chief was drafted into the Wehrmacht. At the end of 1940 WOLFF was charged with the direction of all the affairs of the Dienst Stelle. Here he dealt with the same problems as before, and especially with the protection of docks, port facilities, and all Wehrmacht installations. Apparently because of his onerous duties and failing health, WOLFF had two nervous breakdowns in June 1941, the second one being quite serious.

At the end of August 1941, he was ordered to the office of the BdS at THE HAGUE and was given the job of examining all possibilities relating to a unification and reorganization of the many branches of local and state police forces, with a view toward the creation of one uniform body of the Orpo and Sipo.

While dealing with these problems, WOLFF came in contact with a man named LENZ, who had inaugurated the system of identity cards in Holland and who, as chief of the Rijksbevolkings Register, had also introduced a very efficient form of registration (Helde System). It was during this period that WOLFF wrote and published a study on the aforementioned police problems.

In the beginning of 1942, after he had finished with the duties previously described, WOLFF was ordered to take over the direction of Abt IV of the office of the BdS at THE HAGUE. In March 1942, in collaboration with the local Abwehr authorities, he succeeded in starting a successful "Funkspiel" with the British Intelligence Service which lasted for several months. As a consequence of this Funkspiel, BdS and Ast Niederlande were able to learn the names of all agents coming to Holland, as well as to discover sabotage material and weapons. In recognition of his successful work, WOLFF received a special written congratulation from the Reichsfuehrer SS and a sum of RM 2,000.

In October 1942 WOLFF was transferred to the RSHA and was detailed to take charge of Referat IV-D/3.

In February 1944 he was sent to a mountain health resort because he had suffered another severe nervous breakdown, supposedly resulting from the enormous amount of work he was doing. In June 1944 WOLFF was made an Ober Regierungs Rat. From 21 Jul 44 to the beginning of September of the same year, he was ordered to help in clearing up matters relating to the 20 July affair. He conducted police investigations of some of the liaison officers (Verbindungs Offiziere) and political emissaries (politische Beauftragte).

On 23 Feb 45 WOLFF was temporarily charged with the direction of Stabslot DRESDEN. His successor arrived in the middle of March, after which WOLFF was to return to the RSHA, BERLIN. However, on 29 Mar 45, WOLFF was unexpectedly given the post of the KdS at WEIMAR. He took command on 31 Mar 45.

4. CONCLUSIONS

None

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

None

For the Commanding Officer:

22 Jan 46

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Attn: CI, US Forces, European Theater

The GND IV-N was a special organization upon which the Amts Chef IV placed great importance, and for this reason it was put under his personal direction. SS H/Stuf Krim Kom HALWANSEGER was the Referat of IV-N. Meetings of the Referat were held at least every six months in BERLIN or some other city; one of the last meetings took place in WEIMAR. The Amts Chef generally attended these gatherings and personally emphasized the importance of the GND in all the fields where opportunity was to be found, especially among foreign workers. Because of the importance with which it was regarded, the supervision of the GND was stressed as a special duty of the chiefs of the Steps Stellen and their executive officers. Accordingly, special IV-N Referate under the direction of experienced and specially suited executive officials were established in all Steps Dienst Stellen.

All V-Leute were handled by IV-N. IV-N evaluated the reports of these V-Leute and turned the results over to the RSHA and to its own Sach Referate. Theoretically only IV-N was permitted to deal with V-Leute but it seems doubtful that this was strictly adhered to in practice, because at times going through IV-N and Sach Referate channels led to delays. IV-N also handled pay and communications equipment for agents, filling the requirements of the Steps Stellen. The Referat included the so-called G(?) men who formed the first category of the V-Leute. These G men supplied information as a full-time job, either as "hauptamtlich" or "nebenamtlich" informants. Other categories of V-Leute were designated as A(?) men and I(?) men, but these designations changed at times. A men were persons who were continuously called in for information (Auskuenfte), and I men were persons who only occasionally furnished information (Informationen).

The whole reorganization was handicapped because the old Referate IV-D/3 and IV-D/5 in BERLIN were located in widely separated buildings and alleviation of their situation was made impossible because of air raids. This arrangement was only remedied at the end of September 1944, when most of the Referate of Amt IV moved into the vicinity of MUEENCHBERG (approx 70 km E of BERLIN). There Referat IV-B/2a was able to set up shop in adjoining rooms. At the end of 1944, IV-B/2a was forced by the Russian advance to move its special work to an alternate location. The remaining part of IV-B/2a was ordered to remain in MUEENCHBERG for the time being. Only a small staff of workers from each Referat was retained in BERLIN.

In February 1945 WOLFF was assigned to Steps DRESDEN.

Referat IV-D/3, in which WOLFF first worked, dealt with the following:

1. All the affairs concerning members of German allied and friendly nations living in the Reich and occupied territories. This also included problems relating to the "Iron Guard" in Rumania.
2. All matters of immigration from the East into the Reich.

In the middle of 1944, for the purpose of conserving personnel and for organizational simplification, Amt IV was reorganized into two groups (Gruppen) which were in turn broken down according to specialty and geographical region. The groups were subdivided into Abteilungen and Referate. A Gruppen Leiter generally headed an Abteilung, and an Abteilungs Leiter a Referat. In this reorganization, WOLFF was appointed head of Referat IV-B/2a, which concerned itself with the affairs of the eastern territories, heretofore the province of Referat IV-D/5. These territories (Ost Gebiete) had practically ceased to exist at the time of the formation of the new Referat, so that they were no longer considered in the organizational subdivisions. Personnel of IV-D/5 was partly taken over by IV-B/2a.

Another function of the new Referat involved supervision by the Sipo (security police) of the so-called VLASSOV movement, which had existed for some time and was given official recognition at a reception of VLASSOV by HIMMLER. However this required only a security police observation; political supervision and negotiations were conducted by the SS Haupt Amt through SS O/Gruf BERGER and, later, by the Foreign Office as well. A third function was observation by the Sipo workers in the Eastern territories.

WOLFF's Referat also included a staff officer (Stabs Offizier) who had come from the Militaerische Abwehr (III-F) and who evaluated the results of the Abwehr in the East for central agencies.

The plan to transfer the various center of the RSHA from BERLIN was under discussion as far back as the first heavy air attacks in 1943, but it had to be put aside several times for reasons of lack of space and material. Finally it was definitely decided to transfer the offices of Amt IV after its reorganization in the middle of 1944. Again the date was postponed, but various departments of Amt IV had already been transferred prior to the above mentioned date. IV-C/2 (protective custody-Schutzhaft) had been transferred to PRAGUE, IV-C/1 (files and personnel matters) to THERESIENSTADT, and IV-A/2 (paratroopers, enemy agents, and saboteurs) to FUERSTENBERG.

In approximately the middle of September 1944, two emergency camps (Ausweichlager) "Dachs I" and "Dachs II" were ready; they were situated about 70 km to the East of BERLIN on the way to KUESTHIN (nr the station of TREBNITZ). IV-A moved to "Dachs II" and IV-B to "Dachs I". The relatively small departments IV-B/3 and IV-B/4 remained in BERLIN because their barracks were not yet completed.

The head of Amt IV remained in BERLIN and paid only occasional visits to the camps for conferences. Meetings of the various Referenten were held either in the camps or in BERLIN.

During the last days of January 1945, when the Russians had suddenly formed a bridgehead across the Oder River and had reached points 20 to 25 km North and Southeast of the camps, it was necessary to destroy the files and documents of the Dienst Stellen in one night. In accordance with instructions from the Reichsfuehrer SS to the effect that no SS or police unit whatsoever was allowed to retreat, the men remained in the camps and the women were sent back to BERLIN. Hasty defenses were organized with the available Panzerfausts, machine pistols, and rifles, and it was decided to retreat together with the fighting forces. At this time there were no military units of appreciable strength in the vicinity of the camps; the troops were just then being hurried to the front. The Russians discontinued their offensive in this sector because of the sudden thaw and also because of the strengthening of the anti-tank defenses on the German side.

The men remained for approximately ten days at TREBNITZ and were then suddenly recalled to BERLIN. The central office building at the Prinz Albrechtstrasse had just been rendered uninhabitable by the heavy air attack of 3 Feb 45, and even the head of Amt IV no longer lived there. In the meantime new barracks near HOF in Bavaria, in the offices of the Auslands Brief Pruefstelle (postal censoring office) had been designated for the transfer of sections of Amts I, II, and IV. Because space was limited, each department could send no more than a so-called Arbeits Stab (advance working staff) to HOF. The remaining personnel of Amt IV was retained in BERLIN and detailed to the offices of the Stapelst for temporary duty. Possibility for satisfactory work in HOF remained very limited. In addition to other unfavorable conditions, very little mail arrived from other Dienst Stellen which were widely spread over the Reich. Courier communications were also very unsatisfactory because of lack of fuel and the general dislocation of railroads.

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Especially urgent matters were attended to personally by the department chiefs with the aid of two or three men. At that time most of the department chiefs were located at the Dienst Stelle in the Kurfuerstenstrasse (126 ?); others were working in the Dienst Stellen at Lutherstrasse (west side of BERLIN), Artilleriestrasse (nr Stettiner station), and Wrangelstrasse (BERLIN-STEGLITZ). In many cases the men slept and worked at these places. Because of the continually changing situation, meetings of the department chiefs were held almost daily, in the Kurfuerstenstrasse.

Some of the department chiefs (Abteilungs Leiter and Referenten) had moved to BERLIN-WANNSEE during the middle of March 1945.

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On the first or second day of WOLFF's presence in WEIMAR, the Ober Staats Anwalt of that district came to see SCHROEDER, the Leiter of the Staps and now WOLFF's representative, to discuss the treatment of the political prisoners of the court (Justiz Gefangnis). The Ober Staats Anwalt explained that if the Staps agreed, he intended to dismiss the minor cases immediately and to leave the more serious cases, which under more normal circumstances would have been punished by death (so-called Todes Kandidaten), to the Americans, or to let them go free at the last moment. To this WOLFF replied that, according to orders, under no circumstances was any Todes Kandidat to be released or abandoned to the enemy. If it was impossible to withdraw the prisoners, they were to be shot. If the Ober Staats Anwalt did not have the necessary powers at his disposal to do so, he would be forced to turn the prisoners over to the Staps.

The Ober Staats Anwalt stated that he would immediately contact the General Staats Anwalt by long distance telephone to inquire whether he would be authorized to turn the prisoners over to WOLFF upon the enemy's approach. The next day the Ober Staats Anwalt informed WOLFF that the General Staats Anwalt had granted the authorization, and that a list of the names of the Todes Kandidaten would be submitted to WOLFF. The Ober Staats Anwalt asked WOLFF to appoint an official to take charge of the prisoners at the desired time and begged WOLFF not to execute them within the court grounds. WOLFF appointed Krim Rat FISCHER for this job. Then followed a meeting between SCHROEDER, FISCHER, and WOLFF in which FISCHER was completely informed of the details. (This fact is repeatedly denied by FISCHER, who claims not to remember any such meeting.)

At the same time WOLFF extended the order to include the police prisoners who were held in the police prison in WEIMAR. This order also affected only those persons who were to expect the death sentence; this was specifically mentioned in the consultation with the Ober Staats Anwalt. (Here again FISCHER denies that it was made clear to him which category of prisoners in the police prison were to be executed.)

The execution took place one evening during April 1945. Twenty people of the court prison and approximately 120 persons of the police prison, not all of which were Todes Kandidaten, were shot. WOLFF claims that the shooting of all of the prisoners of the police prison was a direct violation of his orders. He states that he tried to call FISCHER to account for this, but had not been able to find him and consequently the matter remained unsettled.

(In contrast, FISCHER maintains that he had received a note from WOLFF upon which were the names of 20 people who were held in the court prison, and an additional order to shoot the prisoners of the police prison as well. He pleads complete ignorance of the consultation with the Ober Staats Anwalt and the decision to shoot only people sentenced to death. The interrogator is inclined to credit WOLFF's story and believes that FISCHER is merely trying to place the entire blame on WOLFF.)

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In the police prison were also six women who had been turned in by a Dienst Stelle of the RSRA with the note that these were their own agents (Agentinnen) who, as a result of special training, had full knowledge of very important secrets but who had proven themselves to be completely unreliable. Consequently they were not to fall into enemy hands under any circumstances. Since the possibilities of withdrawing these agents no longer existed because of transportation difficulties, WOLFF sent these women to the concentration camp at BUCHENWALD. Later it was reported that they had been hanged there.

1. The Shooting of a Habitual criminal in WEIMAR

Immediately upon WOLFF's arrival in WEIMAR, SS H/Stuf Krim Rat LINDNER, Leiter Kripo WEIMAR, informed WOLFF, supplementing his report with written records, that a well known habitual criminal had been apprehended by the Kripo. He reported that this man had again committed an offense against criminal law and against some of the more important civil decrees necessitated by the war. Because of the seriousness of the offense, Krim Rat LINDNER proposed immediate execution of the violator and public posting of the facts of the case. The shooting was authorized and the execution was reported to WOLFF. The public announcement of the case was apparently precluded by technical difficulties. The case was reported to the HSSPf.

2. The Shooting of a Haupt Sturm Fuehrer of the Waffen SS

While returning from an official trip to ERFURT, GOtha, and EISENACH, WOLFF was informed by the Buergermeister of a village on the GOtha-EISENACH road that an SS H/Stuf had deserted his post during the retreat in the vicinity of the village, leaving six or seven women employees to their own devices and abandoning weapons and ammunition.

WOLFF, accompanied by SS U/Stuf Krim Kom KRETSCHMER, immediately hurried to the locality mentioned by the Buergermeister. From the women, he ascertained that the replacement center of the Waffen SS at FULDA-WERRA had been dissolved; the male personnel had been assigned to a combat team while the female personnel were to be discharged under the direction of an Army Hauptmann of this post (not an SS H/Stuf as the Buergermeister had erroneously informed WOLFF). The captain had also been instructed to take along the complete files and records of the post and numerous weapons and ammunition. The captain had taken the women, weapons, etc. to the vicinity of the aforementioned village and then departed in a truck in the general direction of MORDEAUSEN, without leaving any further instructions. Contrary to orders, all written records were left behind to be seized by Americans who had already arrived in that vicinity.

In ERFURT, WOLFF telephoned HSSPf Erprinz WAIDECK, who was staying at the BUCHENWALD Concentration Camp, and then hurried to him, along with KRETSCHMER, to report this affair. The HSSPf ordered KRETSCHMER to destroy the papers as quickly as possible. He also ordered an intense search for the guilty Hauptmann, who was to be shot upon sight.

Several days later WOLFF was informed that this Hauptmann had been seen in GERA. WOLFF in turn reported this by phone to the HSSPf who reiterated his previous orders. Because at that time WOLFF was not aware of the new directive stating that the police had been authorized to act regardless of the jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht, he inquired whether it would not be necessary to have the verdict decreed by a court-martial or an SS und Polizei court. In reply, the HSSPf emphasized that he stood by his orders and added that there was no doubt as to guilt in this case.

WOLFF forwarded these orders with an SS Stabaf of Amt I or II, RSHA, to a certain REICHART (or REICHELT), who happened to be passing through WEIMAR on his return to GERA. This man later reported the execution of the orders to WOLFF through the Aust GERA. WOLFF then informed the HSSPf.

3. The Shooting of Two Escaped Prisoners of a Concentration Camp

When WOLFF and KRETSCHMER arrived at dawn at the scene of the desertion mentioned in case (2), an old man, probably the manager of the estate, came running toward them and begged protection against two escaped prisoners of a concentration camp. He claimed that they had appeared at noon and had attempted to force their way into the estate but had been discovered and consequently taken flight. The old man stated that the two prisoners were still somewhere in the vicinity and would probably attempt to break in under cover of darkness. He feared that the worst would happen to the women and himself because there were weapons and ammunition throughout the forest. He said he had already asked the Volksturm in the next village to send a few armed men to locate and shoot the two prisoners.

The old man led WOLFF to some underbrush where the prisoners were hiding and they were then arrested. They were foreigners, thought to be Ukrainians from Galicia.

WOLFF's small four-seater (PKW) was already overloaded with five people so it was impossible to take the prisoners along. There was no prison in that area and the proximity of the enemy and the consequent unrest of the populace made temporary accommodations for the prisoners impossible. WOLFF claims that it was his duty to have the prisoners shot immediately for the protection of the populace. A report of this case was submitted to the HSSPf along with that of the case related in para (2).

4. The Shooting of a Teacher

Aust GERA informed WOLFF that a teacher in that area had repeatedly shown himself to be an opponent of Nazism. He was reported to have torn HITLER's picture out of its frame in front of school children and to have replaced it with a dog's head, and during this act to have said that everybody should act similarly. He also said that the Americans would arrive soon and then there would be a thorough house cleaning.

WOLFF reported this case to the HSSPf who ordered the teacher to be shot. WOLFF delivered the order to Aust GERA, which later announced the execution.

5. The shooting of an Innkeeper

One afternoon the adjutant of the ES Pf phoned WOLFF and informed him that a farmer (or the Orts Bauern Fuhrer) from a village situated NE of ERFURT had just reported that an innkeeper in his village had recently been in very close touch with foreign laborers, especially Poles and Russians who frequented his place. This innkeeper was alleged to have made some such remarks as, "The Americans are close by" and, "I have contacted the foreigners and now it will be our turn to dish it out for a change." WOLFF cannot remember the exact phraseology used by the innkeeper but he claims that it implied that now the Nazis would be shot.

The HS-Pf ordered WOLFF to dispatch an SS officer immediately to that locality in order to check the facts of the case with the Buergermeister, Orts Gruenzen Leiter and the neighbors, and to establish whether or not the accused had especially close ties with foreign laborers. If necessary, he was to question the accused as to whether he had uttered the alleged remarks, and if so, the accused was to be shot on the spot.

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The SS Stubaf mentioned in the case outlined in para 2 was with WOLFF at the time of the telephone call from the adjutant of the HSSPf. He had come from GERA and had to return once more to his former alternate post which was only a few kilometers distant from the above mentioned village. WOLFF passed on the orders of the HSSPf to this SS Stubaf and sent him on. Later the SS Stubaf reported to WOLFF that the facts had been correct and that the innkeeper had even confessed to the remarks which he had been accused of having made. The SS Stubaf said that thereupon he had shot the accused and informed the neighbors as to the reasons for the shooting. WOLFF in turn reported the execution of orders to the HSSPf.

6. The shooting of a Kriminal Sekretar (or Krim O/Sekr)

On the day which Kommando SCHROEDER had moved to BUERGEL (beginning of April 1945), a Krim Sekr (or Krim O/Sekr) of Kripo DUESSELDORF reported to WOLFF. He had come to Thuringia without the proper travel permit of his Dienst Stelle. He asked WOLFF for forged papers so that he could remain in Thuringia. Because he was pressed for time, WOLFF was unable to concern himself with this man and curtly ordered him to keep himself in readiness at all times to move to BUERGEL with Kommando SCHROEDER. This prospect did not appeal to the Krim Sekr; he complained of heart trouble and felt that consequently it would be senseless to have him move out with a Kommando of the SD. He was approximately 45 years old and his physical condition appeared normal for his age. His complaint was nothing new, since many members of Kommando SCHROEDER complained similarly because of over work.

During the day, the Krim Sekr tried to approach WOLFF on several other occasions but the latter was too busy to listen. WOLFF was so absorbed by other affairs that he forgot about the Krim Sekr, assuming that he had departed with Kommando SCHROEDER as WOLFF had ordered. Late that evening, the man again approached WOLFF, asking for false papers. Because of the RSHA directive and his growing distrust of the man, WOLFF could not agree to his proposition, and decided to investigate the matter. The Krim Sekr stated once more that he had no desire to retreat with the Sipo but wanted only to go into hiding in the Thuringer Wald in order not to be recognized as a member of the SD. At this point U/Stuf KRETSCHNER, who together with SS H/Stuf VIEHOFER had remained with WOLFF, became completely outraged over this behavior, which to him seemed unbecoming an official of the Sipo, and suggested that he should take this man to DUESSELDORF, not with false papers but under his proper name. Before WOLFF could answer, the Krim Sekr began to shout and object like a sniveling coward. When WOLFF agreed to KRETSCHNER's proposition, he began to plead and lament even more, saying that he would prefer to retreat with the Sipo. His whole attitude betrayed his previous refusal as to cowardice which made him afraid to remain with a unit of the Sipo or to be recognized as a member.

A superior disciplinary authority could not be reached at the time and consequently it was up to WOLFF to settle the matter. The nature of the case demanded the severest punishment, according to higher directives. WOLFF discussed his decision with VIEHOFER and KRETSCHNER, who seconded it in view of everything that had taken place. WOLFF ordered a roll call of all men who were still in the house in order to explain his decision to them, as was his custom in all cases of severe punishment. WOLFF carefully explained the crux of the matter and emphasized that "if we cannot maintain discipline, order, and cleanliness in our own ranks, then we have forfeited the right to reproach our compatriots". WOLFF then repeated his order to KRETSCHNER to shoot the man in the presence of the others. KRETSCHNER later reported the execution to WOLFF. The latter informed Amts Chef I, who approved WOLFF's decision.

7. The shooting of an Interpreter

During the stay in BUERGEL (nr JENA), an interpreter of Stapo WEIMAR repeatedly refused to carry out the orders of WOLFF's representative, SS O/Stubaf SCHROEDER. Furthermore, he had tried to desert Kommando SCHROEDER but had been caught in flight. SCHROEDER had the man shot and reported the incident to WOLFF.

8. The shooting of a Hauptmann in GREIZ

Several days after WOLFF's last conference with the Bds in RANIS (middle of April 1945) the constabulary informed WOLFF, who was in GREIZ, that the people of a nearby village only a few kilometers from the front, had been outraged by the behavior of a certain Hauptmann. This officer was alleged to have removed all military insignia from his uniform and intended to return home in this condition. WOLFF immediately hurried to the village and discovered that this was true.

When WOLFF questioned him, the Hauptmann handed him a Wehrmacht certificate dated the same day showing that he had been discharged as fit for labor duty only. Upon admonition he admitted that he had merely obtained this certificate because of his own successful contention that he was no longer fit for active service. WOLFF doubted the man's reason for discharge because he still appeared quite robust, and besides, he had not been given the customary physical examination. WOLFF felt that the issuance of the certificate was merely a favor to enable the Hauptmann to effect his desertion in the guise of legality. He decided to investigate and asked the officer for the location of the issuing agency where he claimed to have been only a few hours before. The Hauptmann mentioned a little place, the name of which he could not remember, and pointed vaguely in some direction since he was under the impression that WOLFF most likely would not go there. WOLFF ordered him to show him the way. Thereupon the Hauptmann became disturbed and suddenly confessed that he had made a mistake and that the unit involved was located in GREIZ rather than the previously indicated place. He had deliberately falsified the location of the unit. When WOLFF insisted that he lead the way to the unit in GREIZ, the man claimed that he could no longer do so; the unit had already moved and could therefore not be reached.

In the ensuing examination at the Dienst Stelle, WOLFF told him that his story and attitude clearly indicated that the certificate had not been obtained through regular channels and was merely a subterfuge. The captain could find no reply to this; his bearing betrayed his guilt.

When WOLFF reproached him for his unmilitary conduct, which would undoubtedly undermine the morale of other members of the armed forces as well as civilians, the Hauptmann's only reply was that others had done the same but had been able to get away with it. He said that his only wish was to get home, but not as an officer. He admitted that he had intended to give himself up to the Americans.

That same evening, after the circumstances were explained to the people present, the captain was shot at a public place.

9. The shooting of an Ordnance NCO, SE of GREIZ

While spending a night SE of GREIZ, near the Autobahn, WOLFF was informed by the Landwacht (militia) of a neighboring village that an officer, obviously a deserter, had appeared and demanded civilian clothes, stating that he was through with this senseless war and that he was going home. He also stated that the Americans would bring a superior economic system with them. WOLFF immediately set out to investigate and discovered that the supposed officer was actually an Ordnance NCO. This man attempted to clear himself at first by explaining that he had tried to find his unit in the village, and also by denying the reported utterances. Several of the farmers of the Landwacht were present and unanimously confirmed the alleged remarks, and finally the NCO confessed his guilt. He was shot that night. WOLFF reported this incident and case (8) at the next conference with the Bds.

10. The shooting of three Inhabitants of NEUERN (S of FURTH in WALD)

During one of the first days (appr 26 Apr 45) which WOLFF and his men spent in the Boehmerwald in the vicinity of the Schwerzer See, SS H/Schrf SCHMIDT, who had been in NEUERN, returned and informed WOLFF that the military Kempf Kommandant

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(combat CO) and the Volkssturm Fuehrer would like WOLFF or his representative to investigate the following matter immediately: For quite some time, particularly during the last few evenings, meetings of a political nature had been observed at a store, owned by a woman, which was used as a "letter box". A rumor had already spread through the population that surrender of the village to the enemy without a struggle was being discussed there and that new appointments in the administration of the community were already decided upon. On the previous day, the proprietress of the "letter box" had told a woman witness that she need not fear for the fate of NEUERN because it would not be defended. The Volkssturm and the men of the Kampf Kommandant were to be neutralized in time. Two officers of the Wehrmacht had already been sent to the Americans to inform them that the village would be given up without a fight. The cinema owner (SCHMIDT?) and Amts Gerichts Rat (SCHMIDT?), both of whom had figured prominently in the conferences, had already been selected as leading members of the future administration. The woman was also alleged to have said that if the Wehrmacht or SS should decide to confiscate one of her trucks, she would see to it that it would not be in working condition. The next day, a lawfully confiscated truck was found to be completely out of order. Upon examination by a mechanic, it was established that the truck had been tampered with. In view of these serious accusations, WOLFF personally went to NEUERN to investigate.

The Kampf Kommandant and the Fuehrer of the Volkssturm carefully pointed out that their position was extremely dangerous because the numerous VLASSOV troops of the Luftwaffe in and around NEUERN would undoubtedly attack their rear in case of an American push, especially since the cinema owner, SCHMIDT, held the position of Sonder Fuehrer der Luftwaffe on the teaching staff of the VLASSOV units. WOLFF thereupon proceeded to the camp where these troops were quartered and arrested SCHMIDT there. Shortly afterward, the Amts Gerichts Rat was apprehended. WOLFF then took the two men to the home of the proprietress of the "letter box", where she, her daughter, and another accused man had been called together by the Kampf Kommandant's representative and an Unter Fuehrer of the Waffen SS.

At first everything was denied and it was claimed that the gatherings had been purely of a social nature. WOLFF departed to question the woman witness, who repeated the accusations in a very convincing manner and declared herself willing to face the accused at WOLFF's request. The proprietress thereupon confessed to the remarks in question and to the whole affair in general. She, however, denied having had any part in tampering with the truck and blamed her driver, a Czech, who could no longer be reached for questioning.

The two men, contrary to their previous story in which they pleaded complete ignorance, attempted to discount the conferences with the accused woman as harmless but they became very much involved in conflicting statements. The proprietress stuck to her confession although there was no reason why she should try to prove the men and herself guilty, especially since they were friends and the cinema owner was engaged to her daughter. Her daughter was also under suspicion, but the implications were insufficient to prove her guilt.

The proprietress, the cinema owner, and Amts Gerichts Rat were shot that same night in agreement with the Kampf Kommandant who had been kept informed by his representative.

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ANNEX E O I

WOLFF's Observations on Some WEIMAR Personnel

PRISONER: SS O/Stubaf WOLFF, Hans Helmut, alias
Dr KRATZ, Hans (KING Operation)

DATE: 14 August 1945

VIEHOEFER

VIEHOEFER was present at all meetings or interviews. He is well acquainted with the entire situation in WEIMAR. WOLFF trusted him completely and knew him to be reliable and well informed about Act I, RSHA. VIEHOEFER attended to WOLFF's duties during the latter's absence.

Their personal friendship ended the day of the surrender in the Bochner Wald when WOLFF reprimanded and punished VIEHOEFER for drunkenness.

FISCHER

SCHROEDER complained bitterly about FISCHER whom he described as lazy and apathetic. The day after his arrival in WEIMAR, WOLFF met FISCHER who appeared to be in poor physical shape and on the verge of collapse. FISCHER admitted that his nerves were shot to pieces, he could not handle his work properly and was contemplating suicide. WOLFF argued that in these critical times every available man was needed and that he hoped FISCHER would regain his self-confidence and resume his work. A little later FISCHER assured WOLFF that he would try to give him his fullest support.

Questioned about Sigrune, FISCHER admitted that he had not even started because of too much other work. WOLFF knew the difficulties and did not reprimand him although he insisted that something be done at once because time was getting short. FISCHER agreed but as far as WOLFF remembers nothing was ever accomplished.

Shortly before WOLFF left WEIMAR, FISCHER, DUDA, and KRETSCHMER went to SAALFELD (Thuringia) to establish a contact address. Only KRETSCHMER returned and WOLFF never saw the other two again. He insists that FISCHER had no other mission in SAALFELD.

KRETSCHMER

KRETSCHMER had orders to work closely with FISCHER and DUDA. He seldom came to the Dienst Stelle and therefore WOLFF had no occasion to give him specific instructions for Bundeswehr.

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KRETSCHMER established five Anlauf Stellen (contact addresses) and given the addresses to WOLFF. He also obtained and hid some food.

DUDA

DUDA was introduced to WOLFF by KRETSCHMER. While in WEIMAR, WOLFF knew practically nothing about him. Only after WOLFF had left the Buchner Wald did he learn from Frau SIEGMUND details about DUDA's past, otherwise he would have never employed him for Bundschuh.

HOLZ

HOLZ introduced himself to WOLFF as a member of the Gestapo KOELN in the Hotel Elephant in WEIMAR, and asked for advice and assistance, if possible a march order to MAGDEBURG. WOLFF promised the march order but at the same time offered HOLZ a job in WEIMAR. HOLZ returned a few days later and told WOLFF that he had decided to stay. WOLFF then ordered KRETSCHMER to familiarize HOLZ with all Bundschuh details.

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ANNEX NO II

Personnel of Stapo Stelle WEIMAR

PRISONER: SS C/Stabaf WOLFF, Hans Helmut, alias DATE: 14 August 1948
 Or KRATZ, Hans (KING Operation)

H/Stuf, Krim Rat	LINDNER, (fnu)	Leiter K, Kripo
U/Stuf, Krim Kom	BOHM, (fnu)	Kripo
Stabaf, Reg Rat	HUEBNER, (fnu)	z b V under WOLFF
H/Stuf, Krim Kom	HUETIG, (fnu)	Leiter Aussen Stelle ERFURT
O/Stuf, Krim Kom	LORENZ, (fnu)	Aussen Stelle ERFURT
Reg & Krim Rat	LANGE, (fnu)	Leiter Kripo ERFURT
Krim Rat	ENGEL, (fnu)	Kripo ERFURT
Krim Insp	ERLICH, (fnu)	Leiter Stapo GOTHA
Krim Insp	RITTER, (fnu)	Leiter Kripo GOTHA
H/Stuf, Krim Kom	SCHULZ, (fnu)	Leiter Aussen Stelle GERA
U/Stuf, Krim Sekr	OPPEL, (fnu)	Leiter Aussen Stelle SCHLEIZ

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
FINAL INTERROGATION REPORT (CIFIR) NO 30

PRISONER: Stapo Kom KRETSCHMER, Gerhard

DATE: 19 September 1945

Stapo Kom Gerhard KRETSCHMER was well trained in both Kripo and Stapo work. He is cooperative and his information is considered trustworthy.

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1. REFERENCES

Preliminary Report, HQ 12th Army Group, MFIU No 4, dtd 14 May 45;
CIR No 8, USFET MIS Center, dtd 31 Aug 45.

2. PERSONAL DATA

- a. SURNAME: KRETSCHMER
- b. CHRISTIAN NAME: Gerhard
- c. ALIAS: McKING, Gerd Falk
- d. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 16 Mar 15, DEUTSCH-EYLAU
- e. NATIONALITY CLAIMED: German
- f. OCCUPATION: Stape Kom
- g. RELIGION: Catholic
- h. DESCRIPTION

- (1) HEIGHT: 1.82 m
- (2) BUILD : slender
- (3) FACE : oval
- (4) HAIR : dark blond
- (5) EYES : blue-gray

- i. LANGUAGES: German, English, some French
- j. LAST PERMANENT ADDRESS: WEIMAR, Lotten Str 51
- k. FATHER: Max KRETSCHMER
- l. MOTHER: Meta KRETSCHMER
- m. WIFE: Gisela KRETSCHMER, nee STRAUSS
- n. CHILDREN: Hannelore (3 yrs), Gabriele (6 mos)
Werner (4 yrs): born out of wedlock to Elfriede LANG
- o. IDENTITY DOCUMENTS: Wehrpass, Soldbuch, Kennkarte

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3. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

- a. SOURCE OF PRISONER, INCLUDING ARRESTING AGENCY: Arrested in WEIMAR 16 Apr 45 by CIC Det 220, XX Corps.
- b. ACCEPTED ON RECOMMENDATION OR REQUEST OF: G-2 (CIB), HQ 12th Army Group.
- c. DATE OF ARRIVAL: 9 May 45.
- d. RESUME OF ANY REPORTS AND/OR DOCUMENTS SENT IN WITH PRISONER: Third US Army CI PIR dtd 30 Apr 45; Arrest Report.
- e. RESULTS OF NAME CHECK AGAINST PERSONALITY CARD INDEX: CPI Pink Cards 113409 and 69993.
- f. BRIEFS UPON WHICH PRISONER WAS INTERROGATED: KING Operation.
- g. NAME AND UNIT OF INTERROGATOR: T/Sgt CHILEWICH, USEFET MIS Center.
- h. PRISONER'S ATTITUDE AND REACTIONS: Fully cooperative.
- i. EVALUATION OF PRISONER'S RELIABILITY: Trustworthy.
- j. DATE, PLACE AND AUTHORITY FOR DISPOSITION OF PRISONER: Authority to dispose of prisoner has been applied for.

4. INTERROGATION RESULTS

a. Life History

KRETSCHMER joined the Landes Polizei in 1934, finished his schooling and then entered the Kripo (1939). He attended various courses such as those at the Fuehrer Schule der Sipo in BERLIN where he received general training in Kripo and Stapo work.

1941 he was transferred to the Stapo, and in November 1942 became Krim Kom WEIMAR. Later he served with the Feld Kommandantur 298 as Sipo against partisan activities near KIEV (Russia). KRETSCHMER was discharged from the "U.K. Stellung fuer Sipo" (1944) and went to KASSEL to recruit new members for the Sipo as a member of Ergaenzungs Stelle IX.

1 Apr 45 KRETSCHMER was invited to join the resistance movement but was arrested as a Stapo agent on 16 April before he could act.

b. KING Operation

All information of immediate interest on KRETSCHMER is contained in CIR No 8, USEFET MIS Center, dtd 31 Aug 45, concerning the KING Operation.

5. CONCLUSIONS: None.

6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Since KRETSCHMER falls into the automatic arrest category, it is recommended that he be interned.

For Colonel PHILP:

Leroy Vogel
 LEROY VOGEL
 Captain, Inf
 CI Section

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COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
FINAL INTERROGATION REPORT (CIFIR) NUMBER 34

PRISONER: DUDA, Walter, Gestapo informant

DATE: 9 October 1945

Walter DUDA, informant for Stapo Stelle WEIMAR, was connected with the KING operation.

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ZS/R-48 - 33 30

1. REFERENCES

CIR NO 9, USEET MIS Center. dtd 31 Aug 45
Interrogation report, CIC Det WEINAR, dtd 8 Jun 45.
Interrogation report, unnumbered, CI Camp 93 US Seventh Army, dtd 6 Jul 45

2. PERSONAL DATA

- a. SURNAME: DUDA
- b. CHRISTIAN NAME(S): Walter
- c. ALIASES: BERGER, BACH
- d. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: GELSENKIRCHEN, 5 May 13
- e. NATIONALITY CLAIMED: German
- f. OCCUPATION: Commercial artist
- g. RELIGION: Protestant
- h. DESCRIPTION:

- (1) HEIGHT: 1.73 m
- (2) BUILD: slender
- (3) FACE: oval
- (4) HAIR: brown

- i. LAST PERMANENT ADDRESS: ESCHWEGE, Nauerstr 4 c/o MUELLER
- j. LANGUAGES: German
- k. FATHER: Edward DUDA (deceased)
- l. MOTHER: Wilhelmine DUDA, nee SCHIWY, GELSENKIRCHEN
- m. BROTHERS: 1-Emil DUDA (worked as interpreter with German Army)
- n. SISTERS: None.
- o. WIFE (or FIANCEE): Emma JOST (42) SIMERN (nr KOBLENZ) Herzog
Reichardstr 14

3. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

- a. SOURCE OF PRISONER, INCLUDING ARRESTING AGENCY: CIC Det WIESBADEN
- b. ACCEPTED ON RECOMMENDATION OR REQUEST OF: G-2 (CIB), 12th Army Group
- c. DATE OF ARRIVAL: 25 Jul 45

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- d. RESUME OF ANY REPORTS AND/OR DOCUMENTS SENT IN WITH PRISONER:
 - Interrogation report, CIC Det WEIHAAR dtd 8 Jun 45.
 - Interrogation report, CI Camp 93, Seventh US Army, dtd 6 Jul 45
 - Reports by DUDA on GOSSEWITZ, 10 Jun 45
 - " " DUDA on FANIS, 16 Jun 45
 - " " DUDA on POESSNECK, 17 Jun 45
 - " " DUDA on POESSNECK, 18 Jun 45
 - " " DUDA on POESSNECK, 27 Jun 45
- e. RESULTS OF NAME CHECK AGAINST PERSONALITY CARD INDEX: None.
- f. BRIEFS UPON WHICH PRISONER WAS INTERROGATED: None.
- g. NAME(S) AND UNIT OF INTERROGATOR(S): Lt HEINIG, USFET I-15 Center
- h. PRISONER'S ATTITUDE AND REACTIONS: Cooperative.
- i. EVALUATION OF PRISONER'S RELIABILITY: Considered reliable, but is exaggerating the importance of his information to ingratiate himself with US authorities.
- j. DATE, PLACE AND AUTHORITY FOR DISPOSITION OF PRISONER: Authority for disposition has been applied for.

4. INTERROGATION RESULTS

Walter DUDA was born at GELSENKIRCHEN 5 May 13. He studied commercial art and graduated from school at a time when Germany was economically prostrate. Subsequently he became a member of the Arbeiter Jugend. When he found he could not get employment as an artist, DUDA took a job in a coal mine, but, because of his known communist affiliations, went into hiding when the Nazis came to power in 1933.

His communist acquaintances helped him obtain a job with the E Prussian Landhilfe where he also served as courier for the Communist Party, frequently crossing the Polish-German border. Eventually he was arrested by the Gestapo, tried, convicted, and sent to the BUCHENWALD concentration camp (1933). Here he got in touch with communist elements which were powers in the camp, and through these was able to get certain jobs entailing unusual privileges. In time DUDA became an informer for the Gestapo and thus was able to survive eleven years at BUCHENWALD without apparent injury to his health.

Being unscrupulous, an informer, and opportunist, DUDA found it advantageous to pander to the American occupation authorities and to offer them what information he had about Nazi planned underground activities. He was used by the CIC Det at KASSEL to aid in the investigation of resistance movements, and helped destroy one underground organization in Thuringia. DUDA's help was valuable even though his information was not always accurate.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Fundamentally, DUDA is untrustworthy. He will barter his knowledge of Gestapo methods and concentration camps for his personal advantage because this is in keeping with his unscrupulous behavior.

DUDA was connected with an underground movement after the collapse of the German army.

6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DUDA is a security threat and it is recommended that he be interned.

For the Commanding Officer:

Leroy Vogel
LEROY VOGEL
Captain, Inf
CI Section

Institut für Zeitgeschichte - Archiv

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CONSOLIDATED INTERROGATION REPORT (CIR) NO 8

SUBJECT: KING Operation

DATE: 31 August 1945

This is the final summary of results obtained from interrogation of a number of former Gestapo officials and German civilians arrested in Thuringia during the latter part of June 1945 on suspicion of organizing and supporting a nation-wide resistance movement.

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CONFIDENTIALa. General

Testimony of two former members of the WEIMAR Gestapo, who were captured and interrogated at length in April and June 1945, respectively, seemed to indicate that Adolf Stollen (contact addresses) were rush-rooming throughout Thuringia and that a control agency directed a well-established courier service, not only in Thuringia but extending as far west as KOBLENZ. It further appeared that former members of the Gestapo had successfully penetrated communist groups in the SAALFELD area and were presently using them as cover for their Nazi-inspired underground activities.

To uncover completely the entire organization and to ascertain its extent and implications, it was decided to utilize the two captured WEIMAR Gestapo men, Gerhard Max KRETSCHMER and Walter DUDA, who offered their services willingly enough. With the release of KRETSCHMER on 21 May 45, the project became known as the "KING Operation", receiving its name from KRETSCHMER's alias, KING, which title was used by the US agency directing the operation. DUDA, alias BERGER, who, before he was taken into custody, had made several overtures to American authorities in an attempt to tell his story, began his work on 8 Jun 45.

The background of both KRETSCHMER and DUDA is interesting enough to be told briefly and in addition will add to the understanding of the KING operation's final results.

b. Personalities

The following personalities are mentioned in this report:

DUDA, Walter, alias BERGER, Walter, feeder WEIMAR Gestapo, turned informer.

FISCHER, Friedrich, alias STATER, Heinrich, Krim Rat, former Leiter Stäpostelle WEIMAR.

HOFME, Alice Helene, owner of bakery in WEIMAR used as a contact address.

HOLZ, Willi, alias KOLL, Willi, Krim Asst Gestapo KOELN, suspected of establishing contact addresses.

HUETHER, Werner Peter, owner of Mouxier Chocolate Factory in SAALFELD, suspected of furthering underground movements.

KRETSCHMER, Gerhard Max, Krim Mem WEIMAR Gestapo, turned informer.

RAESEL, Johannes, chief of ISV in Gau Thuringia, suspected of acting as courier

SEISS, Karl Heinz, O/Lt, Luftwaffe, suspected of acting as courier

WOLFF, Hans Helmut, alias Dr KRAFTZ, Hans, O/Stufel, last AGS of Thuringia

2. REPORTa. KRETSCHMER's Background

Ambitious and shrewd, KRETSCHMER was a Gestapo man for the past six years. His service to the Gestapo has been in various capacities, from trigger man to fighting partisans on the Russian front with special Gestapo detachments. There are numerous reasons why this man should make an all-out attempt to ingratiate himself with US authorities. He undoubtedly hopes that by his turning informer some of his past activities will not be too closely investigated.

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b. DUDA's Background**CONFIDENTIAL**

DUDA has spent many years in concentration camps and Gestapo jails. He was convicted in 1933 of high treason as a member of the Polish Communist Party after he had been captured while crossing the German-Polish border. MACHSEHAUSEN and BUCHENWALD are familiar places to him. However, it is quite possible that soon after his initial trial DUDA embarked upon a career of stool-pigeon and informant for the Gestapo. He admits having enjoyed certain privileges which were not ordinarily granted camp inmates, and he hardly gives the impression of a man who has been exposed to the worst of Nazism for the past twelve years. In 1944 he escaped from BUCHENWALD, was recaptured soon afterward, and then turned full-time informer for the Gestapo, first in the WEIMAR jail and later at liberty in the SAALFELD area.

In short, DUDA is a denouncer of the worst sort who undoubtedly hoped that clever maneuvering could once again save his life, and he meant to spare no efforts to produce the necessary results.

c. Previous Reports Published

Shortly before the Russo-American territorial adjustments placed under Russian jurisdiction the main area of the KING operation, all persons implicated by the reports of KRETSCHMER and DUDA were arrested. The following were brought to this Center and the results of detailed interrogation of them were published in separate reports:

WOLFF	IIR No. 12, dtd 14 Aug 45
HOLZ	IIR No. 15, dtd 22 Aug 45
HOEHNE	IIR No. 7, dtd 2 Aug 45
RAEBEL	IIR No. 13, dtd 15 Aug 45
HUETNER	IIR No. 19, dtd 30 Aug 45
FISCHER	IIR No. 20 dtd 31 Aug 45

Before going into a review and analysis of each individual case it should be stated that all interrogations quickly led to one conclusion, i.e. KRETSCHMER and DUDA both had greatly exaggerated the extent and significance of the resistance movement. Undoubtedly both men used a lot of imagination in the attempt to sell their story.

d. Review of Cases

(1) WOLFF

WOLFF, last KdS of Thuringia, was suspected of being not only planner and organizer of resistance before the capitulation of Germany, but also as still controlling the underground organization in Thuringia. However, interrogation did not establish that WOLFF had engaged in any resistance activities after V-E Day. He had organized Sigrune and Bundschuh groups in WEIMAR before the city's surrender, had retreated with a large group of Gestapo members into the Buchner Wald and there attempted for a while to resist. But when he learned of Germany's final defeat he dissolved his group and returned home to his family. There is no evidence that WOLFF controlled any group or groups thereafter or that he had visions of a nation-wide Werwolf organization. This, of course, does not in any way alter the fact that WOLFF was and probably still is a fanatical Nazi who was feared and hated by his employees and who by his own admission is responsible for the deaths of countless persons.

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(2) HOLZ

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HOLZ was accused by KRETSCHMER of having established Anlauf Stellen from WEIMAR to KOELN and of directing a courier service between the two cities. Interrogation showed that HOLZ, a Krim Kom of the KOELN Gestapo, had come to WEIMAR on 30 Mar 45 seeking a hideout. WOLFF, with whom HOLZ made contact, asked him to help with Bundschuh, and HOLZ was material in establishing the Anlauf Stelle in the HOERBE bakery where, incidentally, he had found a home. A list of addresses extending from WEIMAR to KOELN which KRETSCHMER presented as prepared Anlauf Stellen turned out to be merely acquaintances of HOLZ, and only three of them were considered by HOLZ as possible prospects. Nevertheless HOLZ had dangerous plans and if they were not put into operation it was not because he lacked fanaticism but because he was stopped in time.

(3) RAEBEL

KRETSCHMER's statement that couriers were being dispatched regularly from WEIMAR and KOELN also proved to be a gross exaggeration. KRETSCHMER had accused RAEBEL, NSV Leiter for Thuringia, Frl MUEHLFORT of WEIMAR and O/Lt SEISS of acting as messengers for the organization.

Interrogation of RAEBEL, a weak and timid nobody, established that he had taken a trip to BOTTENHORN (Hessen-Nassau) as well as to KOELN out of concern for his safety and in order to avoid capture by the US authorities. HOLZ had persuaded him easily enough that HOLZ's relatives in BOTTENHORN and friends in KOELN would be more than willing to help. RAEBEL did carry personal messages to Frau HOLZ and to HOLZ's friends but he emphatically denies that he acted as a courier for a resistance organization. Unsuccessful on his trip, he returned to WEIMAR thoroughly disillusioned, announced his decision to surrender. He reported to the AMG office the next morning.

(4) Frl MUEHLFORT

Frl MUEHLFORT was one of the two MUEHLFORT girls who travelled from WEIMAR to SIEGEN/Sieg during the latter part of May 1945. HOLZ, who was being treated for an old illness by Frau MUEHLFORT, a doctor, learned of their intended journey and asked them to take a letter to his wife in BOTTENHORN, which they did. About two weeks later one of the girls returned to WEIMAR and brought HOLZ a personal message from his wife.

(5) SEISS

SEISS entered into the picture purely by coincidence. When KRETSCHMER was released on 20 May 45 he met SEISS, who claimed to have escaped from an American PW camp, to have helped several other prisoners to do the same, and to have stolen large numbers of AMG identification papers by posing as a Luxembourger. SEISS also seemed to have definite ideas about underground movements and hinted occasionally that he had to establish contact with certain reliable friends. When interrogated, however, SEISS was revealed as only a German army officer without proper discharge papers who, by the agency of amorous advances, had succeeded in persuading three female civilian clerks in a Landrat's office to steal a number of registration and identification blanks for him. There are no indications that SEISS was in any way connected with a resistance organization.

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(6) HOEHNE

The HOEHNE bakery in WEIMAR where HOLZ made his home was described by KRETSCHMER as the center of all Thuringia underground activity. From HOEHNE, who was very much under HOLZ's influence, at a meeting held on 8 Apr 45 at the WEIMAR Gestapo headquarters, agreed to the use of her bakery as an Anlauf Stelle. Both HOLZ and HOEHNE testify that KRETSCHMER was the only person who ever visited the bakery using the proper password, "Alice, wie geht es?" SEISS and RAIBEL also had come to the bakery, but in HOLZ's company, and neither one of them knew the password.

(7) FISCHER

DUDA's accusations were directed against HUETHER and FISCHER and would their validity have been established, would have been far more serious. FISCHER, Krim Hat of the WEIMAR Gestapo, was said to have infiltrated the communistic groups in the SAALFELD area and was using them as cover for his Nazi-inspired underground work. FISCHER does not deny that he had penetrated communistic circles with the help of DUDA, but he vehemently denies the second half of that charge. FISCHER claims his actions were motivated by his desire to break relations with the Gestapo and to join his family, which was living near SAALFELD. At first this sounds like a rather fantastic claim from a Gestapo man of 12 years standing, but a number of facts stand in FISCHER's favor. He had been a member of the SPD since 1928; he attempted to resign from the political police in 1933 when that organization became the Gestapo; he had successfully resisted the recruiting of the SS; an investigation against him ending in February 1944 resulted in his transfer to WEIMAR as a disciplinary measure; SCHROEDER, Stapelleiter WEIMAR, had warned WOLFF that FISCHER was not reliable; FISCHER had disobeyed WOLFF's direct orders when he did not return from his SAALFELD trip. Furthermore, interrogation of several communists from the SAALFELD area did not incriminate FISCHER whereas all persons questioned suspected DUDA of having been a Gestapo informer at one time.

(8) HUETHER

In HUETHER's case it was definitely established that he had hidden large quantities of explosives in his factory and that he had actually given DUDA four sticks of American dynamite, which had been fished out of the Saale River. His explanation and excuses for not having reported the explosives to AMG are perhaps convincing enough to cause him to be considered a case for a military government court rather than a member of a resistance movement, although it is possible that he planned to use the explosives for sabotage at a later date. HUETHER's interrogation did not establish as fact DUDA's charges that HUETHER had assisted a number of prominent Nazis to go underground.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The KING operation, even if it did not produce the result originally expected, comes to a satisfying conclusion. Although no nation-wide resistance movement was uncovered it is not beyond possibility that some of the suspects might have made better-planned and executed attempts in the future to organize an underground movement.

There is little doubt that both KRETSCHMER and DUDA knew the limited scope of what they described as a tremendous undertaking when they were first interrogated. By serving their knowledge bit by bit, constantly exaggerating and always pretending that the big break was soon to come, they hoped to keep their captors satisfied enough to grant them privileges and freedom. And then there always was the possibility that some unforeseen event, such as the appearance of SEISS, would provide them with a bit of information which, they hoped, would help us to forgive and forget their past. As agent provocateur neither one of them was successful, having added little to the existing situation.

It is interesting to note that so ordinary a person as Frau HOLZE, whose husband had just died and who had three small children to care for, could be induced to support HOLZ's plans. This might serve as an indication of where the sources of possible future resistance movements can be found, and as a warning that many a small Nazi still has abiding faith in his ideology, destroyed as it may appear on the surface.

Both KRETSCHMER and DUDA are excellent examples to indicate the care and caution with which informers must be selected. Although they were constantly and carefully supervised it was not possible to prevent them from playing up their accusations and from obtaining more considerations than their exploits actually warranted. However they were instrumental in rounding up a number of potentially dangerous people and so served their purpose well enough.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for final disposition of KING operation personalities:

KRETSCHMER	Internment (automatic arrest)
DUDA	" " "
WOLFF	" " "
FISCHER	" " "
HOLZ	" " "
RAEHEL	" " "
HOEHNE	Trial by AMG Court
HUETHER	" " "
SEISS	" " "

For Colonel PHILP:

Robert T. Longstreth
ROBERT T. LONGSTRETH
Major, Infantry
CI Section

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SEP 1 1945 INTERMEDIATE INTERROGATION REPORT (IIR) NO 15

PRISONER: Krim Asst HOLZ, Willi alias KOLL, Willi DATE: 22 August 1945
(KING Operation)

HOLZ was arrested on suspicion of 'Wervolf' activities in WEIMAR and KOEHL. He was charged with establishing an Anlauf Stelle (contact address) at the HOEHNKE bakery in WEIMAR for the purpose of organizing a communications net between former Gestapo members. This charge was brought by KRETSCHMER, ex-member of WEIMAR Gestapo, turned informer.

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ANNEX

Addresses Supplied to KRETSCHMER by HOLZ 8

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1. REFERENCES

970th CIC Det Arrest Report dtd 22 Jun 45, 12th Army Group
Interrogation Center Preliminary Interrogation Report dtd 30 Jun 45.

2. PERSONALITIES

a. Mentioned in this Report

RABEL, Johannes	NSV official for Gau Thuringia, suspected of acting as courier
WOLFF, Hans Helmut alias Dr Kretz, Hans	O/Stubaf, last KdS of Thuringia
HOEHNE, Alice Helene	Owner of WEIMAR bakery used as Anlauf Stelle
BISCHOFF (fmu)	Neighbor of HOEHNE
WEINERT (fmu)	Neighbor of HOEHNE
HILDEBRECHT (fmu)	Neighbor of HOEHNE
BORNSCHEUER (fmu)	Krim Sekr Gestapo WEIMAR
FISCHER, Friedrich alias STATER, Heinrich	Krim Rat, former Leiter Stapo Stelle WEIMAR
NIESSEN, Willi	Friend of HOLZ in KOELN
SCHAAF, Otto	Friend of HOLZ in KOELN
FALL (fmu)	Friend of HOLZ in KOELN
Frau Dr MUEHLPFORT (fmu)	Physicien in WEIMAR
Dr HUNSTEIN (fmu)	Physicien in WEIMAR
SEISS, Karl Heinz	O/Lt, Luftwaffe, suspected of acting as courier
KRETSCHMER, Gerhard Max	Krim Kom Gestapo WEIMAR, turned informer

b. Also under Investigation

VIEHOEFER, Walter alias	
VOIGT, Walter	H/Stuf, Pol O/Insp, adj to WOLFF
HUETHER, Werner Peter	Owner of Mauxion Chocolate Factory, suspected of furthering underground movements
DUDA, Walter alias	
BERGER, Walter	ex-feeder WEIMAR Gestapo, turned informer

3. CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS

30 Mar 45	HOLZ arrives in WEIMAR
2 Apr	HOLZ moves to HOEHNE bakery
11 Apr	WEIMAR Gestapo evacuated
20 Apr	RABEL returns to WEIMAR and departs for BOTTENHORN
Beginning May	MUEHLPFORT girls take message to HOLZ's wife
28 May	KRETSCHMER establishes contact with HOLZ
31 May	RABEL returns from BOTTENHORN and departs for KOELN
9 Jun	RABEL returns from KOELN
	HOLZ meets SEISS
18 Jun	KRETSCHMER and SEISS leave WEIMAR
22 Jun	HOLZ arrested

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4. REPORTa. Introduction

HOLZ, ex-member of the KOELN Gestapo, is a convinced and arrogant Nazi who admits that he was willing to do anything for the Fuehrer and the Fatherland. He has the golden HJ badge, was a member of the SA and SS, and is generally a typical product of Nazism at its worst.

Together with his family HOLZ was evacuated to BOTTENHORN (Hesse-Nassau) when the fall of KOELN was imminent. He stayed in BOTTENHORN until the approach of the Allied troops and then joined a shipment of prisoners destined for BUCHENWALD concentration camp, planning to have the perfect story to cover his past activities. When the train reached WEIMAR, he changed his mind, however, left the transport and headed straight for the WEIMAR Gestapo office where he obtained a document establishing his identity and the fact that he had reported to the proper authority.

b. First Days in WEIMAR

One of the first people in uniform whom HOLZ saw on the streets of WEIMAR was RAEBEL. HOLZ approached him, told his story and asked whether RAEBEL could find him a place to stay. RAEBEL immediately obtained a room at the Hotel Elephant for him and asked HOLZ to visit him.

At the hotel, HOLZ met WOLFF whom he remembered from his service with the police on the German-Dutch border. Upon learning that WOLFF was now the KdS of Thuringia, HOLZ told his own story and asked WOLFF for a travel order to MAGDEBURG, where he planned to hide with his sister-in-law. WOLFF agreed but asked HOLZ to come to his office the following day explaining that he might have some work for him.

Because of an air raid HOLZ could not pick up his travel order next morning. Having cancelled his room at the hotel, he went to RAEBEL's house to find out where he could stay. RAEBEL agreed to take him into his own house until something more suitable could be found. He told HOLZ that he had received an order from the Deputy Gauleiter of Thuringia to recruit suitable prospects for an underground organization. He indicated that he would like to use HOLZ for the project but HOLZ replied that the Gestapo would not release him although he would be glad to help. HOLZ admits that he was very pleased to learn that positive measures were being taken to continue the fight.

The next morning, 1 Apr 45, HOLZ began looking for better lodgings. He went to the nearby bakery of Frau HOEHNE. (HOLZ had once been a baker), introduced himself as a Gestapo agent, showed his credentials and explained that her bakery would be an ideal hideout for him. HOEHNE told him that she would let him know the following morning. HOLZ was very pleased and began to consider staying in WEIMAR. With this in mind he went to see WOLFF at the Gestapo headquarters

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 47c. Relations with WEIMAR Gestapo

HOLZ informed WOLFF that he had found excellent quarters and expressed his willingness to remain in WEIMAR. Thereupon WOLFF referred HOLZ to a Kommissar after telling him that a resistance movement was in the making in WEIMAR. The Kommissar, whose name HOLZ does not remember, explained to HOLZ that the organization was to concern itself primarily with sabotage of communications and supply lines and that at present he was recruiting persons familiar with weapons and explosives. He mentioned that a communications net was to be organized and that a number of contact addresses had already been established but that more were needed. He asked HOLZ to be on the lookout for reliable persons who would be suitable for the resistance organization.

From then on HOLZ paid routine calls at the Gestapo office almost daily. He reported that the HOEHNE bakery would be an excellent contact address. HOEHNE as well as her neighbors, BISCHOFF and WEINERT, were politically reliable and trustworthy and all three had expressed their willingness to participate in an underground movement.

On 7 Apr HOLZ obtained a new Kennkarte (identity card) under the alias KOLL, profession baker. WOLFF had instructed him to go to the police where he would receive the identification paper upon using the password, "Ich komme von FISCHER".

The same day HOLZ was given one pistol by WOLFF and two by Krim Sekr BORNISCHUEER with instructions to safeguard them. He was told that other weapons would be given him later.

Frau HOEHNE was called to Gestapo headquarters the next day. She was questioned about LANGE, whom HOLZ had previously denounced for making derogatory remarks about HITLER. Then, so HOEHNE told HOLZ that evening, she was asked whether her bakery could be used as a contact address, to which she agreed. HOLZ expressed his appreciation and personal gratitude for her action.

On 9 Apr Krim Rat FISCHER reprimanded HOLZ for not having acted more promptly in the LANGE affair. He said that HOLZ was now an important member of the WEIMAR Gestapo and as such should be aware of his responsibilities. WOLFF took the same attitude, and hinted that the WEIMAR Gestapo was about to leave the city and that HOLZ would remain to carry on their duties.

On 11 Apr HOLZ found that the entire Gestapo headquarters had left. A small boy told him that Krim Kom KRETSCHMER had stayed behind and was to be found in his apartment. HOLZ claims that he had never met KRETSCHMER. He asked HOEHNE to go to him and summon him to the bakery.

KRETSCHMER came to the bakery and used the correct password indicating that he had been in contact with FISCHER's organization. HOLZ asked him where he could get in touch with either WOLFF or FISCHER for further instructions. KRETSCHMER could not give him any information, suggesting that it might be too dangerous to establish contact immediately with either WOLFF or FISCHER and recommending that he remain quiet and await further developments.

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On the eve of the occupation of WEIMAR, HOLZ took the three Gestapo pistols and his personal papers to BISCHOFF's house, where he hid them in a store room. The house was requisitioned by US troops and although it was thoroughly searched the weapons were not found. When the troops had left, BISCHOFF returned the pistols to HOLZ who hid them under a stove in the bakery. Later HILDEBRECHT and HOLZ buried the following items in BISCHOFF's garden: his own pistol, the three Gestapo pistols, one or two pistols belonging to BISCHOFF and WEINERT, his golden HJ badge, Gestapo notebook, a picture of his brother in the SS, several papers belonging to HOBME and her party pin. This took place several days after the occupation of WEIMAR, and HOLZ fully realized that he was violating AMG regulations. When he registered with AMG he used the false Kennkarte as his identification.

d. RAEBEL's Travels

About 20 Apr RAEBEL returned to WEIMAR. He had left with the Volksturm shortly before the Allies entered the city. Expecting to be arrested if his presence became known, he went to HOBME and asked her to send for his wife. In the meantime he had a discussion with HOLZ who advised him to go to BOTTENHORN where HOLZ's wife was staying with relatives who could help RAEBEL. HOLZ claims that the only reason he suggested this trip was to help RAEBEL and to let his own wife know his whereabouts. RAEBEL left for BOTTENHORN the same day and returned to WEIMAR on 31 May. HOLZ's family had been unable to do anything for RAEBEL. He did, however, inform HOLZ not to visit his wife in BOTTENHORN because the American police was looking for him there.

Once again HOLZ persuaded RAEBEL to leave WEIMAR immediately because US authorities were searching the city for all prominent Nazis. This time he suggested that RAEBEL go to KOELN where HOLZ had several good friends. He gave RAEBEL the following addresses:

- Willi NIESSEN, Alte Burg Strasse 31. An uncle of HOLZ's wife, half Jewish. HOLZ had helped him to stay out of a concentration camp. Brother employed by A.G. KOELN.
- Otto SCHAAT, Christine Strasse 4. An acquaintance whom HOLZ knew when he was with the police on the Netherlands border.
- Willi BALL, Siebach Strasse. HOLZ knew him in the days when he was a baker.

HOLZ maintains that he sent RAEBEL to KOELN only because he believed that his friends there could help RAEBEL, and not in connection with the resistance movement. He does admit, however, that he hoped to obtain some help from NIESSEN for his personal affairs.

RAEBEL returned from KOELN on 9 Jun. The trip had proved unsuccessful. SCHAAT received him coldly and refused all aid; BALL gave him three loaves of bread, and the best NIESSEN could do was to suggest that RAEBEL return to WEIMAR and give himself up. He said that if HOLZ would surrender to the US authorities in KOELN, he might be able to put in a good word for him.

Early in May HOLEZ received typewritten transcripts from Frl MUEHLFERT about twice a week. He mentioned to her that he was getting a contact address. She considered this extremely foolish and could see no sense in the undertaking. On 30 May she mentioned that her two daughters were going to SIMS, the next day to visit relatives. He asked her whether they would take a letter to his wife at BOE WISEN, to which she agreed. About twelve days later one of the girls visited HOLEZ at the bakery and told him that his wife was planning to come to WEIMAR soon.

f. KRETSCHMER and HOLEZ

KRETSCHMER came to visit HOLEZ again on 28 May. He described his experiences with the Americans, the treatment he had received and his release. He strongly advised HOLEZ not to surrender because he felt that connections between Goetters members must be maintained. KRETSCHMER frequently came to the bakery to discuss the political situation and plans for the future. During their meeting on 3 Jun HOLEZ mentioned that a Dr HUMSTEIN at the Schiller Schule Hospital had access to black army discharge papers and that he might be able to remove SS blood group tattoos. KRETSCHMER was anxious to get a start in some business. He hit upon the idea of buying medical supplies for the hospital and asked HOLEZ to obtain permission from Dr HUMSTEIN to act as his purchasing agent. HOLEZ mentioned that he knew two men at the Bayer factory in LEVERKUSEN/Rhine who might also prove useful. KRETSCHMER thought that a trip to LEVERKUSEN could serve as camouflage for making contact with people for the underground movement. Upon KRETSCHMER's insistence, HOLEZ gave KRETSCHMER several addresses of people he knew in SOEMM. HOLEZ claims that he did this only to put an end to KRETSCHMER's constant demands. HOLEZ further claims that he never made contact with Dr HUMSTEIN but pretended that the doctor had left the hospital.

During the same meeting KRETSCHMER told HOLEZ that he had to get in touch with FISCHER, who supposedly was at a mill near WEIMAR. HOLEZ claims that although KRETSCHMER asked him repeatedly to accompany him, he refused to go along.

On 8 Jun KRETSCHMER informed HOLEZ that he had bought an automobile for RM 600.- and showed him a certificate for the car as well as a permit to purchase medical supplies. He claims to have secured this permit from the Health Dept. To obtain gasoline for the car, KRETSCHMER asked HOLEZ to accompany him to GEMERODA, a little village 5 km West of WEIMAR, where he had buried 40 lts of gasoline near a blacksmith shop. KRETSCHMER, HOLEZ, and ROEMME proceeded to GEMERODA. KRETSCHMER had a short conversation with a blacksmith, who told him that the gasoline had been discovered by the Americans. HOLEZ believes that the blacksmith shop was a contact address because of some remarks KRETSCHMER had made.

Apparently the purchase of the car had left KRETSCHMER without any funds. He repeatedly approached HOLEZ for a loan and although HOLEZ was doubtful about KRETSCHMER's ability to refund the money and ROEMME did not trust KRETSCHMER, a loan was finally arranged. HOLEZ gave ROEMME RM 600 and authorized her to lend RM 1000 to KRETSCHMER, hoping that by including ROEMME in the transaction KRETSCHMER would be more likely to return the money.

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g. SEISS and KOLE

KOLE met SEISS for the first time on 8 Jun in the apartment of one of RAFFERT's friends. SEISS told him that he was a 1st Lt in the GAF, who had escaped from American captivity and had helped several other prisoners to do the same. SEISS spoke fluent French and had successfully posed first as a Frenchman and later as a Luxembourgier with the aid of some documents that were either forged or stolen from an AMG office. SEISS frequently expressed his desire to go to LIMBURG/Lehn to establish contact with some of his former friends. KOLE claims not to know any details.

A day or two later, SEISS came to the bakery and met KRETSCHMER. He repeated his story and again mentioned that it was necessary for him to make contact with his former friends. SEISS had some very definite ideas about resistance movements and believed it essential to stay in touch with reliable people who would be willing to help Germany to throw off the Allied yoke.

h. KRETSCHMER's Departure and KOLE's Arrest

On 15 Jun it was decided that SEISS should accompany KRETSCHMER as far as LIMBURG. KRETSCHMER's trip to LUXEMBOURG was to last one week and the purchase of medical supplies was to be the pretext under which the journey was to be made. KRETSCHMER wanted to accomplish three things on his trip: find politically reliable people for an underground movement; visit some of SEISS's friends for the same purpose; and look for hiding places for KOLE, SEISS, and KRETSCHMER. The latter was not quite sure that the American investigation of his case had been closed.

KRETSCHMER and SEISS left WEIMAR on 16 Jun and shortly thereafter KOLE was arrested.

5. CONCLUSIONS

None

6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

None

For Colonel PHILP:

ROBERT G. LOISELIER,
Major, Infantry,
GI Section.

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A N N E X

Addresses Supplied to KRETSCHER by HOLZ

PRISONER: Krim Asst HOLZ, Willi alias FOLL, 'Willi
(KING Operation)

DATE: 22 August 1945

a. For "ewolf Purposes

SS H/Stuf JANSEN, 'Willi	KOELN-FIPPES
Krim Pat PROELL (fnu)	BEUEL (nr BOHM) Horst-Wessel Str. 97
SS H/Stuf LANGE (fnu)	BOHM
Frau POSE. (fnu), owner of Restaurant "Auf dem roten Berg". Her husband was a Criminal Kommissar of KOELN Gestapo.	KOELN-FIPPES
DAHM family	WINTERSCHIED (Siegkreis)

b. For the Purchase of Medical Supplies

Dr Ing KOERNER (fnu), I.G. Farben	LEVERKUSEN
Dr Ing ROELGEN (fnu), I.G. Farben	LEVERKUSEN

c. For Personal Reasons

SCHLINDACH, Georg	KOELN-RENFELD
SCHAAP, Otto	KOELN-FIPPES, Christinastr 4
Bakery BALL	KOELN-FIPPES, Siebachstr
BIESSEN, 'Willi	KOELN-FIPPES, Altbuenerstr 31
NIESSEN, Heinz	KOELN-FIPPES
ROEDDER family	SIEGBURG/Sieg Ernstr 26
Dr SPALINGER	MUCH (nr SIEGBURG)
YIRFEL (fnu)	WINTERSCHIED (Siegkreis)
MILFEBIT (fnu)	KASSEL
FURHMANN, Karl Heinz	FRIEHLAR, Madamerstr 8
SCHMIDT's sawmill	FREYKORF-ALSOCKE/Sieg
Dr LEPKES (fnu)	VISSEN/Sieg
SCHMITZ (fnu)	DILLENBURG (Dillkreis) Hotel HIRSCH
HOLZ, Peter	BUECHEL (Siegkreis)

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CI - F31/14
29 Oct 15

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Auth: _____
Init: _____
Date: _____

CI FINAL INTERROGATION REPORT
(CIFIR) NO 44

PRISONER: Krim Ast HOLZ, Willi
alias KOLL, Willi

Stapo Stelle KOELN

Willi HOLZ, lately a member of the KOELN Gestapo, was connected with the KING operation.

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DOD Dir. 5200.10, June 29, 1960
NMW by TH date 4/15/15

1. REFERENCES

970th CIC Det Arrest Report dtd 22 Jun 45
 12th Army Group Interrogation Center FIR dtd 30 Jun 45
 USFET IJSC IIR No 15 dtd 22 Aug 45
 USFET IJSC CIR No 8 dtd 31 Aug 45
 USFET IJSC FIR No's 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, dtd 29 Oct 45

2. PERSONAL DATA

- a. SURNAME: HOLZ
 b. CHRISTIAN NAME(S): WILLI
 * ALIASES: KOHL, WILLI
 . DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 26 Dec 13, BERG GLADBACH
 . NATIONALITY CLAIMED: German
 . OCCUPATION: Baker - Fruit Asst (SS Schrf)
 . RELIGION: Gottgläubig
 . DESCRIPTION:
- (1) HEIGHT: 1.69 m
 (2) BUILD: slender
 (3) FACE: long
 (4) HAIR: blond
- *(5) PHYSICAL PECULIARITIES or
 DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: None
- . LAST PERMANENT ADDRESS: BOTTENHORN (Kreis Bielefeld)
- . LANGUAGES: German
 . FATHER: Christian, HOLZ (Deceased)
 . MOTHER: Maria, HOLZ nee LIEBE
 * BROTHERS: Peter(13), Berni(20), Heinz(22)
 * SISTERS: Margarete(34)
 * WIFE (or FIANCEE): Maria HOLZ, nee BUNGARTEN, BOTTENHORN
 * CHILDREN: 1 *sons: Horst (6)
 _____*daughters: Harliose (9), Elfriede (3)
- . IDENTITY DOCUMENTS: None

3. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

- a. SOURCE OF PRISONER, INCLUDING ARRESTING AGENCY:
 Arrested by 970th CIC, 22 Jun 45 in WEAR
- b. ACCEPTED OR RECOMMENDATION OR REFUSE OF:
 G-2(CIG), 12th Army Group
- c. DATE OF ARRIVAL
 22 Jun 45
- d. RESULTS OF ANY REPORTS AND/OR DOCUMENTS SENT IN WITH PRISONER:
 None

- d. RESULTS OF NAME CHECK AGAINST PERSONNEL CARD INDEX:
None
- f. BRIEFS UPON WHICH PRISONER WAS INTERROGATED:
G-2 (CIB)
- g. NAME(S) AND UNIT OF INTERROGATOR(S):
T/S John H SLADE, USFPT MIS Center
- h. PRISONER'S ATTITUDE AND REACTIONS:
Cooperative
- i. EVALUATION OF PRISONER'S RELIABILITY:
Unreliable
- j. DATE, PLACE AND AUTHORITY FOR DISPOSITION OF PRISONER:
Departed for Camp 74, 1 Oct 45, by Auth USFPT G-2(CIB)

4. INTERROGATION RESULTS

a. GIS Career

HOLZ was born 26 Dec 13 at BENT GLADBACH. He was first a baker and then a railroad employee before joining the Party and the SA in 1933. Shortly afterwards he entered the SS and received the golden HJ Decoration. In 1941 he was assigned to the Schupo and in 1944 he was transferred to the Gestapo at FOHL. When the fall of KOEHL seemed imminent, HOLZ and his family were evacuated to BOTTENHOHN (Hessen-Nassau), and in March 1945 he moved to WEIMAR where he offered his services to the Gestapo.

b. KING Operation

All information of immediate interest about HOLZ, including his connection with the King operation, is contained in USFPT ICC CIB No 3, dated 31 Aug 45.

5. CONCLUSIONS

None.

6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Because HOLZ falls into the automatic arrest category and because he is fanatically Nazi in his convictions, it is recommended that he be interned.

For the Commanding Officer:

Robert L. ...
for
LEON VON L.
Captain, Inf
CI Section

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INTERMEDIATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT (IIR) NO 20

SEP 24 1945

PRISONER: Krim Rat FISCHER, Friedrich, alias
 STRABLER, Heinrich (KING Operation)

DATE: 31 August 1945

Krim Rat Friedrich FISCHER, of the WEIßAR Gestapo, was arrested by CIC Det, 119th Inf, on 15 Jun 45 in RUPPERSDORF (Thuringia) on suspicion of having organized underground activities under cover of membership in local communist groups. This change was made by DUDA, ex-leader of WEIßAR Gestapo turned informer

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 DOD Dir. 5200.10, June 29, 1960
 NMW by TH date 6/15/65

1. REFERENCES

PIR No 2, USEET Interrogation Center, dtd 2 Jul 48, Report, CIC Det
119th Inf, dtd 18 Jun 48

2. PERSONALITIESa. Mentioned in this Report

DUDA, Walter, alias BERGER, Walter, ex-feeder WEIMAR Gestapo turned informer
HEIP (fnu) owner of mill in UETTERWIRTSCH (Thuringia), prospective Anlauf Stelle
HOEHHE, Alice Helene, owner of WEIMAR bakery used as an Anlauf Stelle (contact address)
HUEBNER (fnu) Krim Insp WEIMAR Gestapo, Sigrune volunteer
HUETNER, Werner Peter, owner of Maximilian Chocolate factory in SAALFELD, suspected of supporting underground movements
JAHN (fnu) Krim Sekr WEIMAR Gestapo, compiled list of V-laenner to be used for underground work
Frl KAELLER (fnu) HUETNER's Secretary
KRETSCHLER, Gerhard Max, Krim Kom WEIMAR Gestapo, turned informer
MECHOLD (fnu) Krim Sekr WEIMAR Gestapo, charged with procurement of false identification papers for Sigrune
SCHROEDER (fnu) C/Stubaf, O/Reg Fat, Chief Stapostelle WEIMAR
STAUDING (fnu) Krim O/Sekr, originator of plan to penetrate communist groups.
WOLFF, Hans Helmut, alias Dr KRATZ, Hans, last KdS Thuringia
Fran GATTEFFELD (fnu), communist friend of DUDA
BECHMANN (fnu), communist in the SAALFELD area
HOEFTNER (fnu), communist in the SAALFELD area
TRIEBEL (fnu), communist in the SAALFELD area
Frau WUNDER (fnu), communist in the SAALFELD area
HENNINGER (fnu) burgomaster of GOSSWITZ

b. Also under Investigation

HOLZ, Willi, alias KOLL, Willi, Krim Asst KOELN Gestapo, suspected of organizing Anlauf Stellen

RAEBEL, Johannes, official of Gau Thuringia, suspect of acting as courier for underground movements

3. REPORTa. Introduction

This report covers FISCHER's activities with respect to underground movements only. A report on his entire career will be published shortly.

FISCHER joined the EUBISBURG Kripo in 1938 as a Krim Kom candidate, having become a member of the SPD (Social Democratic Party) the same year. He attended an eight-month course at the Polizei Institut BERLIN (1931) and was subsequently assigned to the BERLIN political police, where he became Krim Kom the following year.

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FISCHER claims he made several unsuccessful attempts to resign from the political police after that organization was transformed into the Gestapo in 1933.

After three years with Stapo FRANKFURT/Oder (1933 - 1936) FISCHER was assigned to Stapo MAGDEBURG. There he was promoted to Krim Rat, and became chief executive officer (Leiter IV) in 1940. In spite of his comparatively high office he never joined the SS, although a number of attempts were made to enroll him as a member.

In 1943 an investigation was opened to determine whether FISCHER had made disparaging remarks about certain Party officials. As a disciplinary measure he was ordered to Stapo WEIMAR in November of that year, and although the investigation was terminated without findings (February 1944) FISCHER had lost his friendship with the chief of the WEIMAR Gestapo, C/Stabschef SCHROEDER. Nevertheless FISCHER became Leiter IV of the Stapo-Stelle and directed (or was informed of) most of its activities, despite SCHROEDER's frequent direct dealings with FISCHER's subordinates. Referat IV-N and counter-espionage matters were handled by SCHROEDER exclusively and consequently FISCHER knows nothing about them.

b. Sigrune Preparations in WEIMAR

During the first week of March 1945 SCHROEDER handed FISCHER an RSHA order, signed by Graf MUELLER, which dealt with stay-behind activities. This order directed that Stapo officials, reliable agents and members of the Party or affiliated organizations would go underground as soon as their respective districts had been overrun by the Allies, and that intelligence on troop movements, attitude of the population, etc., was to be gathered. If trained personnel were available sabotage was to be committed. The Stapo Leiter was cautioned to discuss the matter individually with those chosen to stay behind, since each agent was to operate independently and was to know nothing of the activities of the others. "Sigrune" was chosen as the code name for this project.

SCHROEDER discussed the Sigrune plan with FISCHER, who felt it would be extremely difficult to carry out, especially at this late date when most Stapo officials were too well known to operate underground successfully. Nevertheless FISCHER was charged with selecting suitable personnel, and he now claims that the only person acceptable and also willing to serve was Krim Insp HUEBNER, deputy chief of Referat IV-I/a. Another duty SCHROEDER charged FISCHER with was the procurement of false identity papers. Eventually he delegated this task to Krim Sekr MECHOLD.

At the same time SCHROEDER requested Krim Sekr JAHN to submit a list of reliable V-Maenner to be used for underground activities. FISCHER received a copy of the list and remembers the names ECK, HAEFNER and MUELLER out of approximately eight submitted. FISCHER disclaims knowledge of any other actions SCHROEDER might have taken to comply with the Sigrune order.

31 Mar 45 WOLFF, the newly-appointed KdS of Thuringia, asked FISCHER in SCHROEDER's presence what steps had been taken to organize Sigrune. FISCHER had to admit that practically nothing had been done so far.

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The following day WOLFF held a meeting of all Gestapo members. He stressed the gravity of the situation in WEIMAR and asked for volunteers to stay behind after the Allies had overrun their area, adding that he expected a large number of volunteers. FISCHER responded after a moment's thought, immediately stating that he was ready for any mission, but WOLFF told him that he was still essential to the Stapostelle and would have to wait a few more days.

At a meeting held 7 or 8 Apr 45 FISCHER, STUEDING and DUDA discussed the communists. STUEDING had been thinking earlier of joining the communists for protective coloring while still carrying on underground activity, but WOLFF had felt that STUEDING was too well known to carry this plan off successfully. FISCHER, who was virtually unknown to leftist groups, decided at this meeting that he and DUDA could adopt this same plan, especially since DUDA had connections with the KPD (Communist Party) dating back to the pre-1933 era.

Plans for underground movements were constantly discussed by members of the WEIMAR Gestapo. Erich Kon KRETSCHMER mentioned that he had bought a car and already registered it in the name of a firm for which he planned to work during the occupation. FISCHER suggested that Anlauf Stellen (contact addresses) be established at the HEIM mill in UNTERWIRBACH (Thuringia), where his family was living, and at the Maxion Chocolate Factory in SAALFELD, whose owner, HUEBNER, was known to FISCHER. STUEDING arranged for an Anlauf Stelle in the bakery of Mrs HOEDT, and FISCHER remembers that the name "Alice" was part of the password. During this period MECHOLD obtained false identification papers for several members of the Stapostelle and FISCHER was issued a Kennkarte (identification card) under the alias STRABER, which FISCHER claims to have used previously for confidential investigations.

There are two reasons, so FISCHER insists, why he cannot give a clearer and more coherent picture of the preparations made by the WEIMAR Gestapo. (1) There was no organized plan for the execution of the Sigrune order. (2) He had no interest in stay-behind activities beyond using them for breaking his relations with the Gestapo. Only with that end in view did he ever profess any enthusiasm for or concern over the Sigrune project.

SAALFELD Trip

On 9 Apr 45 FISCHER finally received WOLFF's permission for a trip to the SAALFELD/Saale region to investigate that area for suitable locations of Anlauf Stellen and the possibilities of using communist circles as cover for a future underground movement. Together with KRETSCHMER, MECHOLD and DUDA, he left WEIMAR that same evening with specific instructions to return within two days. A case of hand grenades, a few machine pistols and a briefcase of ammunition were taken along.

Their first stop was the HEIM mill in UNTERWIRBACH, where FISCHER believed his family to be, but found that they had left shortly before FISCHER's arrival. Because KRETSCHMER's car had a broken spring, the four men decided to spend the night at the mill. The weapons were hidden in a clothes closet, however HEIM was not informed that his mill was to be a future Anlauf Stelle.

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FISCHER claims that his real motive in going to UETTERVIRBACH had been to see his family, although he continued to pretend active interest in the underground.

d. Penetration of Communistic Groups

The next morning KRETSCHER went back to WEIMAR to obtain another car. Feeling that this was the ideal opportunity to slip away from the Gestapo, FISCHER and DUDA left on foot for SAALFELD, where FISCHER tried in vain to find Fräulein KÄMNER, secretary to the owner of the Maxion Chocolate Factory, ostensibly to obtain chocolate. From SAALFELD the two men travelled to KLEIN KANSDORF (Thuringia) to visit a communist friend of DUDA, Frau GATTERFELD, whose husband had been arrested by the WEIMAR Gestapo for communistic activities. FISCHER was introduced as a communist sympathizer and stayed at Frau GATTERFELD's house for the night. The next day he went by bicycle back to UETTERVIRBACH to pick up clothes which he had left and to dispose of the weapons and ammunition which were still in a closet at the HEIN mill.

e. FISCHER's Activities after V-E Day

For the next six weeks FISCHER successfully continued to pose as a communist and was introduced as such to a number of people by DUDA. DUDA and FISCHER had moved to GOSSWITZ (Thuringia), where FISCHER met the BECHMANN, HOEFTNER, TRIEBEL and HENNIGER families and a host of their friends, most of whom were communists. All of them either knew each other since before 1933 or had become friends during the years of Nazi persecution. Connections between them were of personal and local nature and there was no indication that they were part of a state or nation-wide organization.

FISCHER and DUDA spent most of their time procuring food for the GOSSWITZ community after DUDA had obtained a permit from the burgemeister allowing him to travel within a 15-km radius from the town and act as the town's foodbuyer.

About 1 May 45 FISCHER revealed to DUDA his true intentions. He told him that his only concern had been to leave the Gestapo ranks and to join his family. DUDA remarked that he, too, had not been very anxious to return to WEIMAR, however, in spite of FISCHER's pleas, he always refused to drive FISCHER on his newly-acquired motorcycle to REICHENBACH (Saxony), where FISCHER's family was now living.

On 9 Jun 45 FISCHER moved to the inn of WUNDER in RUPPERSDORF (Thuringia), where he was arrested on 15 Jun 45.

4. CONCLUSIONS

FISCHER concealed his true identity skilfully for a period of almost two months and he succeeded in penetrating communist groups in the SAALFELD area.

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The results of his interrogation, however, do not lead to the conclusion that he maintained any contact with a Nazi underground movement during the period, nor is there any reason to believe that his intentions were not those now claimed.

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

For Colonel PHILP:

Robert T. Longstrech

ROBERT T. LONGSTRECH
Major, Infantry
CI Section

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ANNEX

FISCHER's Observations on WOLFF and DUDA

PRISONER: Krim Rat FISCHER, Friedrich, alias
STRAETER, Heinrich (KING Operation)

DATE: 31 August 1945

1. WOLFF

WOLFF, KGS of Thuringia and chief of Stapo WEIMAR, is efficient and ruthless. FISCHER was afraid of him and so were the other members of Gestapo WEIMAR. Although WOLFF had been warned by his predecessor SCHROEDER about FISCHER's unreliability, he decided to let FISCHER coordinate all stay-behind activities and to carry on Gestapo activities after the main body of the Stapo WEIMAR had evacuated the city. Interrogation of WOLFF confirmed FISCHER's statement that WOLFF never had a chance to issue final instructions because FISCHER chose not to return from his SAALFELD trip to see WOLFF before the latter's departure from WEIMAR.

2. DUDA

DUDA spent many years in various concentration camps for communist activities. At the end of 1944 he was transferred to the Stapo jail in WEIMAR to testify on the conditions in the BUCHENWALD concentration camp. He gave testimony on the communist underground in the camp and was eventually used by the Gestapo as an informer, first in jail and later at liberty in the SAALFELD area. FISCHER asserts that he had no personal dealings with DUDA, however he did read his reports as part of his routine work. When he found out that DUDA could be used as an introduction into communist groups he had his first talk with him. After FISCHER had met a number of communists with DUDA's help he saw less and less of DUDA. FISCHER tried to maintain the friendliest relations with him because he hoped that DUDA would drive him to his family in Saxony, but eventually he became suspicious of DUDA's prolonged and unexplained absences and frequently strange behavior.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER
APO 757

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
FINAL INTERROGATION REPORT (CI-FIR) NO 45

PRISONER: FISCHER, Friedrich Krim Rat

Friedrich FISCHER, member of the WEIMAR Gestapo and formerly with the political police at BERLIN, was connected with the KING operation.

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1. REFERENCES: USFET MISC PIR No 2, dtd 2 Jul 45
 USFET MISC IIR No 20, dtd 31 Aug 45
 USFET MISC CIR No 8, dtd 31 Aug 45
 USFET MISC FIR Nos 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, dtd 29-30 Oct 45

2. PERSONAL DATA:

- a. SURNAME: FISCHER
 b. CHRISTIAN NAME: Friedrich
 c. ALIASES: STRAEGER, Heinrich
 d. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: BARMEN (nr WUPPERTAL), 6 Jan 05
 e. NATIONALITY CLAIMED: German
 f. OCCUPATION: Kriminal Rat, Gestapo
 g. RELIGION: Protestant
 h. DESCRIPTION:

- (1) HEIGHT: 1.90 m
 (2) BUILD: Strong
 (3) FACE: Oval
 (4) HAIR: Blond
 (5) EYES: Blue-gray
 (6) PHYSICAL PECULIARITIES or
 DISTINGUISHING FEATURES:
 Wears eye glasses, scars on both hands

- i. LAST PERMANENT ADDRESS: Julius Schreck Strasse 25, WEIMAR
 j. LANGUAGES: German, some English, some French
 k. FATHER: Emil FISCHER (67)
 l. MOTHER: Lina FISCHER, nee HELLMANN (63)
 m. BROTHERS: None
 n. SISTERS: None
 o. WIFE: Frieda FISCHER, nee SCHJUNG
 p. CHILDREN: Eva Gertrude (10)
 q. IDENTITY DOCUMENTS: None

3. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

- a. SOURCE OF PRISONER, INCLUDING ARRESTING AGENCY: Arrested in RUPERSDORF,
 Kreis Schleiz, 15 Jun 45, by US Forces
 b. ACCEPTED ON RECOMMENDATION OR REQUEST OF: Chief (CIB)USFET
 c. DATE OF ARRIVAL: 22 Jun 45
 d. RESUME OF ANY REPORTS AND/OR DOCUMENTS SENT IN WITH PRISONER: None
 e. RESULTS OF NAME CHECK AGAINST PERSONALITY CARD INDEX: None
 f. BRIEFS UPON WHICH PRISONER WAS INTERROGATED: Verbal brief by joint
 CIC-SCI operation group
 g. NAME AND UNIT OF INTERROGATOR: T/3 John H SLADE, USFET MISC
 h. PRISONER'S ATTITUDE AND REACTIONS: Cooperative
 i. EVALUATION OF PRISONER'S RELIABILITY: Reliable
 j. DATE, PLACE AND AUTHORITY FOR DISPOSITION OF PRISONER: Departed for Camp
 71, 5 Oct 45, by Auth G-2(CIB), USFET

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4. INTERROGATION RESULTS

a. Life History

Friedrich FISCHER was born in 1905 and worked as a clerk from 1925 to 1928 before entering the DUISBURG Kripo for training as Krim Kom candidate. In 1931 he attended an eight-month course at the Polizei Institut BERLIN and during the same year entered the Social Democratic Party.

After graduation FISCHER was assigned to the political police in BERLIN and was promoted to Krim Kom in 1932. He was transferred to the Gestapo in 1933 and assigned to Stapo Stelle FRANKFURT/Oder. In 1936 he was transferred to the Stapo Stelle MAGDEBURG, made Chief there in 1940, and later in the same year promoted to Krim Rat. He was assigned to Stapo Stelle WENNAU in November 1943 and stayed there until the city was taken by the Americans.

b. KING Operation

All information of immediate interest on FISCHER is contained in CIR No 8 (KING Operation), USFET MIS Center, dtd 31 Aug 45.

5. CONCLUSIONS: None

6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Since FISCHER falls into the automatic arrest category, it is recommended that he be interned.

For the Commanding Officer:

Leroy Vogel
LEROY VOGEL,
Captain, Inf,
CI Section

29 October 1945

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 APO 757

NOV 21 1945

C O U N T E R I N T E L L I G E N C E
CONSOLIDATED INTERROGATION REPORT (CICIR) NO 9

SUBJECT: Amt IV RSHA

DATE: 15 November 1945

This report deals with the functions, organization, and personalities of Amt IV RSHA and its satellite agencies.

C O N T E N T S

Page

1. Sources of Information
2. Report
 - a. Introduction
 - b. Size of Amt IV RSHA
 - c. Forschungs Amt and Forschungs Stellen
 - d. Organization, Functions, and Personalities of Amt IV RSEA
3. Conclusions
4. Comments and Recommendations

A N N E X E S

- I. PIFRADER's Reported Death
- II. Personality List

- 1 -

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

- a. Stubaf Kurt LINDOW, Krim Dir IV-B/1a, RSHA
- b. Standf Dr Rudolf MILDNER, Obst d Pol, Kds WIEN and Nieder Donau
- c. O/Stubaf Hans H. WOLFF, O/Reg Rat, Chief of Stapo DRESDEN
- d. Standf Erich ISSELHORST, Amt IV RSHA, Sued Stab HCF.
- e. H/Stuf Leonhard HALLANSEGER, Krim Kom, Abt IV-N, RSHA.

2. REPORTa. Introduction

The primary purpose of this report is to give as detailed a list as possible of personnel and their positions in Amt IV RSHA. Like all other agencies during the last hectic stages of the war, Amt IV underwent a number of sudden and confusing changes; consequently, individuals named and located by above sources may have been transferred unknown to them during the last few weeks of the war. It seems certain that with the exception of a few transfers to local Stapo Offices, most of the changes and transfers were within Amt IV RSHA.

b. Size of Amt IV RSHA

Amt IV RSHA employed about 800 people of whom approximately 400 were women assigned to do routine clerical work. None of these women was affiliated with the SS. According to LINDOW, the shortage of help became so acute toward the end, that cleaning women were often taken from their jobs of sweeping and dusting and put to work filing and typing as best they could. Sources estimated the male strength of Amt IV as approximately 400 at the close of the war, of whom 220 are accounted for in this report. It is reasonably certain that all important members have found their correct places on this list and that those who do not appear below were very minor clerks.

c. Forschungs Amt and Forschungs Stellen

The Forschungs Amt, an agency which worked in very close cooperation with Amt IV, was a part of the Air Ministry and under the command of GOERING. Its central office was in the Air Ministry building. The Amt and its subordinate units, Forschungs Stellen A and D, were the only ones permitted to tap wires; evidence collected in this manner was not submitted in court because the very existence of this office was supposed to be closely guarded from the knowledge of all but a few.

The Forschungs Stellen, which were organized in the larger towns, consisted of departments A and D. A supervised the tapping of telephones and B was in charge of all telegraphic communications. Requests by local Stapo Stellen for such services were sent to the Forschungs Stelle for action.

The tapping of wires was done from a chamber set aside in the local post-office where an employee of the Forschungs Stelle was on duty 24 hours a day. Nobody except the individual on duty entered the room and no outsider was supposed to know of its existence. The information so obtained was forwarded to the Forschungs Amt, which maintained close liaison with Amt IV through Reg Rat SCHOLZ, a close friend of Amts Leiter MUELLER.

As soon as information was received at the Forschungs Amt, it was forwarded to Referat IV-A/5a to be acted upon; thus it came about that the Forschungs Amt, which was really an agency of the Air Ministry, worked directly with MUELLER and frequently took orders from him.

d. Amt IV Organization

Leiter Amt IV RSHA	MUELLER, Heinrich	Gruf
Adjutant	DUCHSTEIN, Albert	O/Stuf
Asst Adjutant	SCHUMACHER	U/Stuf
Stenographer	HELMUTH (Frl)	
Stenographer	SCHMIDT, Eve (Frl)	

The above were part of MUELLER's office staff and worked in the same building with him.

zbV	KLEIN	C/Fuehrer	Special mis- sions
Liaison Officer	SCHOLZ	Reg Rat Stubaf	Liaison with the Forschungs Amt. Is said to have escap- ed with MUELLER and may be in hiding with him.
Liaison Officer	FISCHER	U/Stuf	Liaison with Amt III
Gruppen Leiter IV-A	HUPPENKOTHEM	Standf	Succeeded PANEINGER; dir- ectly under MUELLER
Gruppen Leiter IV-B	LISCHKA	O/Reg Rat Stubaf	Succeeded PIFFRADER; dir- ectly under MUELLER

Gruppe IV-B had a large number of military personnel assigned to work for it, including a high ranking officer detached from the OKW. Whether IV-A also had an officer assigned is not certain.

Attached to IV-B	ROHLEDER	Obst	In charge of all military personnel as- signed to IV-B
Adj Gruppe IV-B	JAHN	Pol O/Sekr U/Stuf	
Special Courier	DOERING	U/Schrf	

Amt IV Geschaefts Stelle (Administrative HQ)

This organization was directly under Amts Chef MUELLER and consisted of five sub-branches:

1. Geschaefts Stelle proper

2. Geheime Registratur (secret registry office)
3. Erkennungs Dienst (photo identification of arrestees)
4. Zeichnungs Stelle. (drafting section)
5. Polizei Gefaengnis (Stapo police prison)

The Leiter of the entire Geschaefts Stelle was PIEPER, Hans.
Reg Rat, Stubaf. Personnel of Geschaefts Stelle proper, included:

BERNDT, Pol Rat, H/Stuf
 BROCKMEIER, Pol O/Insp, H/Stuf
 HILLIGES, Pol Insp, O/Stuf (brother of HILLIGES IV-B/3b)
 OETZEL, Pol O/Insp, O/Stuf
 HEGEMANN, Pol O/Sekr, O/Schrf
 OPITZ, courier
 KLEIN, courier
 ZIEHLS, courier

a. Geheim Registratur personnel:

DANN, Pol Insp. (not a member of the SS)
 KRETSCHMANN, Pol Insp, O/Stuf

b. Erkennungs Dienst was handled by

KRAUSE, Krim O/Sekr, U/Stuf

c. Zeichnungs Stelle was manned by

TISCHLER, Krim O/Sekr, U/Stuf

d. Police prison was supervised by

GOGALLA, Wilhelm, O/Stuf

Abteilung IV-A/1

Leiter: O/Reg and Krim Rat Stubaf LITZENBERG; succeeded O/Fuehrer PANZINGER late 1944 and also kept position of Referat Leiter IV-A/1b.

Referat IV-A/1a

Dealt with communist and civilians who had crossed existing frontiers.

Leiter: Krim Rat, H/Stuf PUETZ, Geunther (succeeded Krim Dir Stubaf LINDOW January 1945)

Asst : RIKOWSKI, Krim Kom, and SS applicant
 BAUER, Wilhelm, Krim O/Sekr, SS applicant
 BORDASCH, Herbert, Krim O/Asst, SS applicant
 BRANDT, Erwin, Krim Rat, H/Stuf
 ECKERLE, Fritz, Reg Amtmann, H/Stuf
 HAUT, office employce, not an SS member
 HEROLD, Pol O/Insp, H/Stuf
 HOFMANN, Reinhard, Krim O/Sekr, U/Stuf
 HUSE, Krim Sekr, not an SS member
 KEMPEL, Andreas, Krim Sekr, not an SS member
 KNOBLOCH, Dr, Krim Rat, H/Stuf

MEHER, Gerhard, Krim O/Sekr, U/Stuf
 ORTMANN, Krim O/Sekr, H/Schrf
 PITA, Krim Asst, Schrf
 RASCH, Paul, Krim Sekr, SS applicant
 SCHMIDT, Krim O/Sekr, not an SS member
 SIMMER, Krim Kom, O/Stuf
 SPERLING, Krim Sekr, not an SS member
 WESTERMANN, Krim Kom, O/Stuf
 WODTKE, Gustav, Krim O/Sekr, not an SS member
 WIECZOREK, Krim Sekr, not an SS member
 WUTHE, Ministerial Registrar, SS membership not certain

Referat IV-A/1b

Above referat handled all re-actionary movements, such as "National Opposition", "Legitimisten" (Austrian movement), "Bayrischer Monarchismus" (Bavarian monarchism), "Separatismus", "Schwarze Front", and violations of radio control

Leiter: O/Reg and Krim Rat Stubaf LITZENBERG
 Asst : Krim Rat SADER
 ALTMANN, Krim Sekr, not an SS member
 HELLER, Krim Sekr, not an SS member
 KUHN, Krim Kom, SS O/Stuf
 PIETSCH, Pol O/Insp, H/Stuf
 PROCHNOW, Krim Rat
 SCHEIBEL, Krim Sekr, O/Schrf

NOTE:

The names of a number of female employees who served as file clerks, etc., but who were not connected with the SS are not available.

Abteilung IV-A/2

Leiter: Krim Dir, Stubaf KOPKOW

Referat IV-A/2a

Combated sabotage in Germany.

Leiter: BUCHERT, Krim Kom, H/Stuf
 Asst : BERG, Krim O/Sekr, not an SS member
 GOGOLLO, Krim Sekr, O/Schrf
 HABECKER, Krim Kom
 LANGE, Krim O/Sekr, U/Stuf
 BAROWSKI, Krim Sekr, not an SS member
 SCHULZ, Krim Insp, not an SS member
 TSCHETSCHLER, Krim Sekr

Referat IV-A/2b

Known as the Funk Spiel Sachgebiet. Induced enemy agents apprehended in Germany to send back false reports and to maintain communications with their respective countries. Information received by these agents was used by the Referat.

Leiter: AMPLETZER, Thomas, Krim Rat, H/Stuf
 Asst : MUELLER, Krim Kom, H/Stuf
 BIELMAIER, Krim O/Sekr, not an SS member
 BRENNER, Krim Kom
 FUHRMANN, Krim Sekr, O/Schrf
 HAUPT, Krim Kom, H/Stuf
 KLINGER, Freddie, SS applicant
 STUEBING, Krim Kom, H/Stuf

NOTE:

IV-A/2 is reported to be a small office. It is likely that additional but unimportant personnel can be named by KOPKOW (held by British authorities) and by KLINGER (now held at 3rd US Army IC).

Abteilung IV-A/3

Leiter: QUETTING, Stubaf, who replaced HUPPENKOTHEM when later was when later was given post of Acting Gruppen Leiter (under PANZINGER who later left Amt IV for position with Amt V). QUETTING, in addition to being Abteilungs Leiter, kept his position as Referats Leiter of IV-A/3a.

Referat IV-A/3a

Handled counter espionage cases and cases of treason against the State.

Leiter: SCHAEFER, Dr Karl, Krim Dir, Stubaf (This was formerly HUPPENKOTHEM's Referat.)
 BAUERMEISTER, Hptm, (detached from OKW)
 HACKER, Krim Insp, SS rank unknown
 ENGELMANN, Dr, Reg Rat, Stubaf
 MAEUSLER, Krim Dir, Stubaf
 LANGEMACH, Krim Sekr, SS rank unknown.

Referat IV-A/3b

Industrial security (i.e., planting of V-Leute in big plants and keeping check on certain potential threats to security), corruption in industries, and political police. Personnel:

Leiter: QUETTING, Stubaf
 HOFFMANN, Krim Sekr, SS rank unknown
 KELLER, Obst/Lt (detached from OKW)
 KUNZE, Pol Insp
 MOTZKUS, Max, Krim Angest
 TISSHER, Krim Rat, Stubaf
 EISENSCHMIDT, Krim Kom, H/Stuf
 GANS, Krim Dir

Referat IV-A/3c

Referat IV-A/3c (Chief - OPITZ) was dissolved and taken over by IV-G (late: 1944).

Abteilung IV-A/4

Leiter: EICHMANN, O/Stubaf
 Asst : GUENTHER, Stubaf

Bothe also were in charge of Referat IV-A/4b.

Referat IV-A/4a

Handled church matters. A specialist was assigned to handle each faith (Catholic, Protestant, etc.) and sect matters.

Leiter: HAHNENBRUCH, Reg Rat, Stubaf
 BLOBEL, Standf
 JAHR, Dr, Stubaf (formerly worked in press affairs with Amt IV but after his return about March 1945 from the east, (TILSIT) he is believed to have been assigned to HAHNENBRUCH)
 JAKOBS, H/Stubf
 KUNZE, H/Stubf
 NEUHAUS, Dr, (went to POSEN Spring 1945 and is believed to have been killed there. Sources said that none of the POSEN personnel returned.)
 NOVAK, O/Insp, H/Stubf
 HASENBANK, O/Sekr, no SS membership known

Referat IV-A/4b

The activities of this agency were centered around affairs of Jews and lodges, such as "Free Masons". Personnel:

Leiter: EICHMANN, O/Stubaf (reported to have done extensive travelling)
 GUENTHER, Stubaf
 ANDERS, Amtmann, not an SS member (?)
 WOEHHR, Amtmann, H/Stubf

NOTE:

Sources indicate that there were many more persons in Abteilung IV-A/4 and especially in Referat IV-A/4b, but these persons are not known by name. WILDNER has given a list of possible hide-outs which EICHMANN may be using. (List forwarded through channels)

Abteilung IV-A/5

Leiter: Dr RANG, Reg Dir, Standf. RANG succeeded Dr MILDNER (one of the sources) who claimed that his position was left vacant upon his release. However, it seems likely (as borne out by other sources) that RANG, whose rank called for a better position, was transferred out of IV-A/6 (where his usefulness was limited) and put in charge of IV-A/5. His old job was given to TRENKER.

Referat IV-A/5a

- a. Schutz Dienst for personnel (Security for Personnel)
- b. Attentats Melde Stelle: Handled attempted assassinations or plans for such which were discovered through monitoring of telephone conversations. Routed reports from the Forschungs Amt go higher echelons.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Leiter: SCHULZ, Reg and Krim Rat, Stubaf
KABLITZ, Krim Insp, O/Stuf (has brother in IV-M)
MATTHIEU, Krim Kom, O/Stuf

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Referat IV-A/5b

This Referat dealt with Party member affairs, and sought to prevent corruption within the organization. Its task was made difficult by favoritism and intrigue within Party ranks.

Information from HALMANSEGER and LINDOW indicates that press matters were also handled by this office.

Leiter: SANDERS (former name SAMIERSKI) Krim Rat, Stubaf
FEHLING, Krim Kom, not an SS member
MUELLER, Krim Rat
KRANZ, Reg Amtmann, (Press specialist)

NOTE:

Organization of this office was fluid, and lack of names of additional personnel may be attributed to this fact.

Abteilung IV-A/6

Leiter: BERNDORFF Dr, O/Reg and Krim Rat, O/Stubaf
Asst : FOERSTER, Krim Rat
BERNDORS was also in charge of Referat IV-A/6a

Referat IV-A/6a

Protective custody. (As defined by sources, this title refers not to individuals but to the safety of the government.) Actions of this Referat are treated in a separate report now being compiled at this Center. IV-A/6a had purely administrative functions and did not make any arrests.

Leiter: BERNDORFF, Dr, O/Reg and Krim Rat, O/Stubaf
BONATH, no rank known
DIDIER, O/Insp, H/Stuf
GIESSEN, Pol O/Insp, not an SS member
IBSCH, O/Insp, not an SS member
KETTENHOFEN, Felix, Amt Mann, SS rank unknown
KUEHNE, no rank known

Referat IV-A/6b

Kept principal files (Haupt Karteien) on matters handled throughout Germany by Gestapo.

Leiter: WITZEL, Amts Rat, Stubaf
LEHMANN, Pol Insp, not an SS member
MAUCH, Pol Rat, H/Stuf
ZAGEL, Pol O/Sekr, not an SS member
GRUNERT, Pol Sekr

Abteilung IV-B/1

Leiter: Dr HOENER, O/Reg, Rat, Stubaf. Also had charge of IV-B/1a

Referat IV-B/1a

Dealt with political matters in France and Belgium.

Leiter: HOEMER, Dr. O/Reg Rat, Stubaf
 Asst : LINDOW, Kurt, Krim Dir, Stubaf
 BREUER, Krim Sekr, U/Stuf
 BURJES, Krim/Sekr, U/Stuf
 BRUNER, Dr. Maj (detached from OKW)
 CARL, Pol Insp, SS rank unknown
 GERBER, Paul, Krim O/Sekr, not an SS member
 GRENZ, Otto, Krim Sekr, U/Stuf
 FELDMANN, Krim Kon, O/Stuf
 HAVEMANN, Otto, Pol Insp, O/Stuf
 HAAS, Hptm, (detached from OKW)
 HEINRICHSONN, Krim Angest, U/Schff
 MOELLER, Walter, Krim Kon, H/Stuf
 SEIBOLDT, Fritz, Krim Rat, H/Stuf
 SEIDEL, Friedrich, O/Insp, not an SS member
 De WAAL, Interpreter, Office employee, not an SS member
 WEEGE, Krim Sekr, H/Schrf
 DREXEL or DREXLER, Krim Insp, not an SS member

Referat IV-B/1b

Supervised activities in Great Britain, Netherlands, and USA.

Leiter: CLEMENS, Krim Rat, Stubaf
 ARNDT, Krim O/Sekr, U/Stuf

Referat IV-B/1c

Concerned with Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland.

Leiter: RAUCH, Krim Rat, H/Stuf
 SAMUEL, O/Insp, H/Stuf
 WENZEL, Krim Sekr (Not certain of this employee)
 BEHRENDT, U/Stuf, O/Sekr

NOTE:

IV-B/1b and IV-B/1c were small. It is therefore possible that not many more persons were employed.

Abteilung IV-B/2

Leiter: WOLFF, Hans Helmut, O/Reg Rat, O/Stubaf. Although transferred to DRESDEN in February 1945, he should be listed as chief of this Abteilung, since his influence persisted even after his departure. FUMY succeeded him as Abteilungs Leiter.

Referat IV-B/2a

Handled matters concerning Russia.

Leiter: WOLFF, Hans Helmut, O/Reg Rat, O/Stubaf
 Asst : FUMY, Rudolf, Krim Rat, Stubaf
 THIEMANN, Reg Rat, Stubaf
 SCHMIDT, Reg Amt Mann, not an SS member
 SCHULTZE, Krim Rat, H/Stuf

PILLING, O/Insp, H/Stuf
 RECHENTHIN, O/Insp, H/Stuf
 HAYN, Krim Sekr, U/Stuf
 HEIN, O/Sekr, not an SS member
 HORSCH, Major, (detached from OKW)
 GRUENDLING, O/Insp, H/Stuf
 STEFFEN, Krim Insp, not an SS member
 WOLF, Krim Sekr, U/Stuf
 WOLANSKY, Krim Sekr, Stuschrif, Interpreter
 WEBER, Krim Sekr, Stuschrif
 KENDLER, Krim Sekr, Stuschrif
 ROSE, Krim Sekr, H/Stuf
 ZIMMAT, Pol O/Sekr, U/Stuf
 KUEHN, Pol O/Sekr, not an SS member
 DEDIO, Joseph, office employee, interpreter
 ZIMMERMANN, office employee, interpreter
 REMPEL, Krim Angest, SS Mann, interpreter
 WIRSING, Krim Angest, not an SS member
 PRZEMOZNY, office employee, interpreter, not an SS member
 KRUEGER, Pol O/Sekr, Interpreter, not an SS member
 SADIKOW, office employee, not an SS member, interpreter

Referat IV-B/2b

Handled matters pertaining to Poland.

Leiter: TOMSEN, Harro, Reg Rat, Stubaf
 KUFAHL, Amts Rat
 HELLER, Krim Kom, SS O/Stuf
 OPPERMANN, Amt Mann, H/Stuf
 DUBIEL, O/Insp, H/Stuf
 WEILER, Krim Rat, H/Stuf
 SALTZINGER, Hptm, (detached from OKW)

Referat IV-B/2c

Dealt with Czechoslovakia. SCHOENESEIFTEN former Leiter, left for the front early 1945. Below personnel as of last known listing:

Leiter: THIEDECKE, Franz, Amts Rat, Stubaf
 SCHREIER, Krim Sekr, Stuschrif
 ICKER, not an SS member

NOTE:

Above list of names of IV-B/2a is believed complete except for the names of two minor employees. In addition to all the listed male employees, there were approximately 50 women employed as typists, file clerks, etc., but none held responsible or confidential positions.

Abteilung IV-B/3

O/Reg Rat and O/Stubaf TRENKER (formerly known as TRNKA) succeeded RANG as Leiter late in 1944. RANG was sent to IV-A5. TRENKER's duties are not known to sources. They believe that he also assumed charge of IV-B/3c.

Referat IV-B/3a

Activities in Spain and Portugal.

Leiter: AARENS, Hermann, Krim Rat, H/Stuf
 GUDJONS, Krim Kom, H/Stuf
 HAGEMEISTER, U/Stuf
 LANGE, Reg O/Insp, not an SS member

Referat IV-B/3b

Supervision of Italy and Switzerland.

Leiter: HILLIGES, Krim Rat, Stubaf. (has brother in Geschaefts
 Stelle IV)

Referat IV-B/3c

Balkan countries.

Leiter: Dr TRENKER O/Reg Rat, O/Stubaf
 Dr BURG, Krim Rat, H/Stuf
 STAHN, Krim Sekr

NOTE:

The list of names is believed incomplete; efforts are being made to secure further information about Abteilung IV-B/3.

Abteilung IV-B/4

Leiter: KRAUSE, Mim Rat, not an SS member

Referat IV-B/4a

Passport matters.

Leiter: BAUMANN, Christian, O/Reg Rat, Stubaf

Referat IV-B/4b

Central Office for Immigrants (Einwanderer Zentral Stelle)

Leiter: BROENING, O/Reg Rat, O/Stubaf
 SACKERMANN, Paul, Krim Sekr, not an SS member

Referat IV-B/4c

Visa and permits for travel abroad.

Leiter: JAROSCH, Pol Rat, H/Stuf
 BECKER, Pol Inspt
 KOENIGSHAUS, Franz, Reg Amt Mann, H/Stuf
 KOSCHATE, Reg O/Insp, not an SS member

NOTE:

BAUMANN, now in US custody, should know more names.

Several special agencies were at the disposal of Amts Chef MUELLER, and although these agencies worked independently, as was the case with the Special Investigation Squad (Fahndungs Trupp), they were for administrative purposes placed under an Abteilung of Amt IV.

Dienst Stelle IV-B/aa Foreign Workers (Auslaendische Arbeiter)

Death with distribution, allotment, and treatment of foreign workers employed in Germany and areas under German Control.

Leiter: HAESSLER, Krim Ko , H/Stuf

Other personalities not known so far. It is believed that there was only one other co-worker.

Gruppe IV-G Bänder Control (Zoll Grenz Schutz)

This agency, concerned with the checking of traffic and mail, was taken over from the Finance Dept in October 1944.

Leiter: SOMANN, O/Fuehrer
BLUME, Dr Standf
OPITZ, Paul, Reg Rat, Stubaf

Dienst Stelle IV-ZARP Central Censorship Office (Zentrale Auslands Brief Pruefungs Stelle)

Taken over April 1944 from the Abwehr and placed under the command of O/Stubaf Johannes MUELLER who later replaced by HELLER and dismissed from the service for alleged inability to find billets in HOF for Sued Stab Gruppe.

Leiter: HELLER, Reinhold O/Reg Rat, O/Stubaf
VOGT, Joseph, Reg Rat, Stubaf
SPANN, Hermann, Krim Rat, O/Stuf
TOLEN, Krim Rat, no SS membership.

Fahndungs Trupp Special Investigation Squad

The Fahndungs Trupp was under Amts Chef MUELLER's personal supervision, although administratively attached to IV-A/5a. Its members (approximately 15) were sent on special missions.

Leiter: SCHAEFFLER, Krim Insp
HEIN, Krim Insp, O/Stubaf
KIRCHDORF, Krim O/Sekr
PINKENDEY, Krim O/Sekr
- LANGE, Gustav, O/Sekr
MUELLER, Christoph, Krim Sekr
RADLOFF, Krim O/Sekr

Referat IV-N

IV-N BERLIN was the file and message center where all records of agents and V-Loute working with Stapo Stellen in various localities were kept. All reports to the various Referate were channelled through this office.

Letter: HAIMANSEGER, Krim Kom E/Stuf
REGNATH, Franz, Krim C/Sekr
KARLITZ, Otto, Krim Sekr
EDER, Anton, Krim C/Asst
RUDOLPH, Frau, Secretary
HABECKER, Frau, File Clerk

3. CONCLUSIONS

None.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is believed that the sources have given the names of all the important members of Amt IV. Interrogation of DUCHSTEIN, Graf MUELLER's chief adjutant, should reveal specific details about MUELLER's activities and plans.

For the Commanding Officer:

Haimanseger
LEROY VOGEL
Captain, Inf.,
CI Section

DISTRIBUTION: " D "

NOTE: Personalities to this report will follow.

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER
APO 757

ANNEX NO I

PIFRADER's Reported Death

SUBJECT: Amt IV RSHA

DATE:

MILDNER, one of the sources, states that an Allied aircraft raid on LINZ (Austria) in late April 1945 resulted in the death of PIFRADER, Stepo Stello Chief Leopold SPANN, and 14 other members of the Gestapo who had taken refuge in building adjoining a church. MILDNER states that the deaths took place in a half hour after he had terminated a conversation with PIFRADER and had left the town because he feared to be caught in an air raid. He also states that a funeral was held for both PIFRADER and SPANN.

1. AMPLETZER (fnu) SS H/Stuf Krim Rat Deputy head IV-A/2a, RSHA
lives BERLIN
Career: Expert on parachutists and the tracking down of enemy agents.
cf AMPELETZER, NFIU 4 CIR 4/4, dtd 29 May 45.
2. BAUM, Otto SS H/Schrf Pol Sekr With KdS Thuringia (Stapo WEIMAR)
born 1915 1.73 m slender black hair
Misc: Married; children.
3. Dr BERNDORFF, Emil (?) SS O/Stufaf, O/Reg Rat, Krim Rat Referent IV/A/5b
RSHA
lives BERLIN 1.75 m slender sometimes wears glasses
Misc: Married.
CPI Pink Card 80613
4. BORNSCHREUER, Wilhelm (?) H/Stuf Art I, RSHA
last at Sipo school at FUERSTENBERG (?) born 1910 in KOBIENZ (?) 1.77 m
slender blond fair complexion
Career: Trf from the SD of the RFSS.
Misc: Married; children.
CPI Pink Card 60218 (WILHELM)
5. BOEHL (fnu) SS J/Stuf, Krim Kom KdS WEIMAR
may now be in DESSAU lives WEIMAR born 1912 1.75 m muscular blond
hair fair complexion blue eyes
Career: Trfe from Schupo.
Misc: Married. Wife lives in DESSAU.

6. BRODERSEN (fnu) Pol Rat in Gestapo; Leiter I, KdS WEIMAR
lives WEIMAR last seen in ST KATHERINA/Boehmerwald born 1890 1.62 m
black hair
Misc: Widower.
7. BRUEGGEMANN, Paul (?) SS H/Schrf, Krim Sekr With KdS Thuringia (Stapo WEIMAR)
born 1905 in Thuringia 1.78 m muscular build blond hair
Career: Formerly with Schupo in Thuringia.
Misc: Married; children.
8. Dr. BUCEARDT, Friedrich (?) SS O/Stubaf Leiter III-B/2, RSHA
lives BERLIN born 1910 in RIGA (?) 1.75 m muscular build blond hair
Career: Particularly active in the Vlassov operations.
Misc: Married; children. Wife used to live in POZNAN. Speaks Russian.
cf CPI Pink Cards 1116329, 53509
9. CLEMENS (fnu) Stubaf, Krim Rat IV-B/1-b, RSHA
lives BERLIN born 1910 in N Germany 1.75 m slender blond hair
Career: Before the reorganization was Referent in IV-E. Security expert.
Misc: Married; children.
10. DUDA (fnu) Krim Angest With KdS Thuringia
lives WEIMAR born 1912 1.75 m muscular blond hair
11. EHLERS (fnu) SS O/Stubaf, O/Reg Rat IdS u SD, Wkr IX
lives KASSEL (?) born 1907 1.75 m muscular
Career: Previously in Sicherheits Haupt Amt (later Amt III, RSHA).
Misc: Married. Wears gold Party badge.
12. EHRlich (fnu) Krim Insp Leiter Ast GOTHA With KdS Thuringia
lives GOTHA born 1888 1.72 m slender black hair
Misc: Married.
13. EICHMANN, Adolf (?) O/Stubaf Leiter IV-A/4, RSHA
lives BERLIN, Kurfuerstenstr 1.75 m muscular
Career: Trfd from SD, RFSS.
Misc: Married; children. Wife used to live in PRAGUE.
CPI Pink Card 87055.

14. ENGEL (fnu) SS H/Stuf (?), Krim Rat With KdS WEIMAR
 lives N of ERFURT (Thuringia) 1.72 m stocky build black hair
Career: Was instructor at Sipo school at FUERSTENBERG. Previously Deputy Head of Kripo ERFURT.
Misc: Married. Wife lives N of ERFURT.
 CPI Pink Card 1206
15. FISCHER (fnu) Krim Rat with KdS WEIMAR
 lives WEIMAR born 1905 1.85 m slender build blond hair
Career: Previously with Stapo MAGDEBURG (?).
 CPI Pink Card 113398.
16. GUENTHER, Hans (?) SS Stubaf Referent IV-A/4 b, RSHA
 lives BERLIN, Kurfuerstenstr. born 1912 1.76 m slender build
Career: Trfd from SD, RFSS.
 cf CPI Pink Card 31599
17. Dr. HAHNENBRUCH, Erich (?) SS Stubaf Referent IV-A/4 a, RSHA, since late 1944
 lives BERLIN born 1913 nr KOELN 1.75 m slender build blond hair
Career: Trfd from SD, RFSS (?)
Misc: Married.
 cf CPI Pink Card 101578
18. HALMANSERGER (fnu) SS H/Stuf, Krir Kom Referent IV-N, RSHA
 lives BERLIN born 1893 in MUENCHEN 1.76 m slender build
Career: Formerly with Bavarian political police. World War I veteran.
Misc: Married.
 cf CPI Pink Card 205058.
19. HELBING, Lieselotte Kanzlei Angest with KdS Thuringia, Aust GOTHA
 lives WALTERSHAUSEN (nr GOTHA), Geizenberg 16 1.67 m slender build
 blond hair fair complexion blue eyes
Misc: Widow.
 CPI Pink Card 54096.

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20. HERSMANN (fnu) SS Stubaf with SD RFSS
 lives WEIMAR born 1909 slender build aquiline nose
Career: Former chief of SD Abs WEIMAR.
Misc: Married; 4(?) children.
 CPI Pink Card 119281.
21. HEUSS, Otto SS H/Stuf, Krim Kom With KdS Moselland (Stapo KOBLENZ)
 lives KOBLENZ born 1908 in NEUNIED (?) 1.76 m slender build brown eyes
Career: Worked in Spain.
Misc: Married; 2 children. Wife lives vic GERA (Thuringia).
22. HILLIGES (fnu) SS Stubaf, Krim Rat or Krim Dir Referent IV-B/3, RSHA, since Autumn 1944
 lives BERLIN
 CPI Pink Card 3664
23. Dr HOEHNER, Wilhelm (?) SS Stubaf, O/Reg Rat Leiter IV-B/1, RSHA, since late 1944
 lives BERLIN born 1910 in NW Germany 1.77 m slender build black hair brown eyes
Career: With RSHA 2-3 years. Previously Leiter Stapo WILHELMSHAVEN or BREMERHAVEN. Dr Jur.
 CPI Pink Card 84876 (HOENER)
24. HOLZWEBER or HOLZMUELLER (fnu) SS U/Stuf, Krim Sekr With KdS WEIMAR
 may now be in the Thuringian Forest born 1902 1.78 m muscular blond hair
25. HOLZMUELLER (fnu) SS U/Stuf, Krim Sekr With KdS WEIMAR
 see HOLZWEBER
26. HUEBNER (fnu) SS Stubaf, Reg Rat KdS WEIMAR since April 1945
 last seen in LOHBERG/Boehmerwald, May 1945 born 1910 in Saxony (?) 1.75 m muscular
Career: Previously with IdS DANZIG. Jurist.
27. HUETTIG (fnu) SS H/Stuf, Krim Kom Leiter Ast ERFURT; with KdS Thuringia
 lives ERFURT last seen in Thuringian Forest (?) born 1910 1.75 m muscular blond hair
Misc: Married.
 cf CPI Pink Card 125273.

28. JOST, Herbert (?) SS U/Stuf With KdS Moselland
born 1910 in the Rhineland 1.73 m stocky build blond hair fair
complexion
Misc: Married.
cf CPI Pink Card 87550
29. KLOECKER (?) (fnu) SS U/Stuf With KdS Moselland
born 1912 1.77 m slender blond hair fair complexion
30. KOELLNER (fnu) Driver for Ast GOTHA
born 1917 1.74 m slender limps from wound incurred in World War II
31. Dr KOENEN, Josef (?) SS H/Stuf (?) With KdS Thuringia
lives WEIMAR born 1908 vic KOELN or AACHEN 1.74 m slender black
hair
Misc: Married. Wife lives in WEIMAR. Dr Jur (?).
32. KROENING (fnu) SS H/Stuf Krim Kom or Krim Rat With IV-A/2 a, RSEA
lives BERLIN (?)
Carcer: Expert on apprehension of parachutists and enemy agents.
cf CPI Pink Card 58908.
33. LANGE (fnu) Leiter Kripo ERFURT until April 1945
lives ERFURT born 1880 1.75 m slender grey hair
Misc: Married.
CPI Pink Card 3586
34. LANGE (?), Hermann (?) Hptm Referent IV-A/3 b, RSEA, since Autumn 1944
lives BERLIN born 1904 1.76 m slender blond hair
cf CPI Pink Card 103170
35. LECLAIR (fnu) SS Stuschrf, Krim Sekr With KdS Thuringia
born 1907 vic AACHEN 1.73 m muscular sometimes wears glasses
Misc: Married; children.
36. LINDNER (fnu) SS H/Stuf, Krim Rat Leiter V with KdS WEIMAR
lives WEIMAR last seen in ROTHENBAUM/Boehmerwald in April 1945 born
1907 1.78 m slender build black hair dark complexion
Misc: Married.

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37. LISCHKA (fnu) Deputy Leiter IV-B, and Leiter IV-B/1 and IV-B/2, RSHA
lives BERLIN-SPANDAU born 1908, BRESLAU 1.85 m slender build
black hair sometimes wears glasses
Career: Lawyer. RSHA expert on church problems. With BdS PARIS. As
deputy to the Amtschef he participated in transfer of control of military
security (III - F) to the SD.
Misc: Married. Wife used to live in BRESLAU.
CPI Pink Card 42000
38. LITZENBERG (fnu) SS Stubaf, Reg Rat, Krim Rat Leiter IV-A/1 and Referent
IV-A/1 b, RSHA
lives BERLIN born 1902 in BERLIN (?) 1.76 m slender build blond
hair
cf CPI Pink Cards 20010 and 107672
39. NEHOLD (fnu) Krim Insp or Krim O/Sekr With KdS Thüringia
lives WEIMAR born 1885 1.73 m stocky build dark blond hair
40. MERTEN, Paul SS U/Stuf, Krim O/Sekr With KdS Moselland
born 1900 nr DANZIG 1.76 m muscular black hair dark complexion
Career: World War I veteran. With Schupo DANZIG(?). With Stapo DANZIG.
Misc: Married; children. Wife lives in Rhineland
41. Dr NEUHAUS (fnu) SS Stubaf, Reg Rat Referent IV-A/4 a, RSHA
lived in POZNAN may have been killed in POZNAN born 1907 in HESSE (?)
1.74 m slender dark complexion
Career: Philologist(?). Sent to POZNAN in 1944 as Leiter IV.
Misc: Married.
CPI Pink Card 53874
42. OPEL(T) (fnu) SS U/Stuf, Krim Sekr (?) Leiter Ast SCHLEIZ With KdS
Thuringia
born 1903 1.77 m muscular black hair dark complexion
43. Dr PAMTZINGER, Fritz (?) SS O/Fuhrer, Obst d Pol Deputy Chief Amt V, RSHA
lives BERLIN born 1905 in MUENCHEN(?) 1.72 m slender build black
hair sometimes wears glasses
Career: Dr Jur. Formerly with Bavarian Political Police. Intimate friend
of the Amtschef IV. At first active in counter-Communist work, then be-
came Leiter IV-A.
Misc: Married. Wife lives in BERLIN.
CPI Pink Card 400007.

44. PIEPER (fnu) SS Stubaf, Amts Rat Office head in Amt IV, RSHA
 lives BERLIN-ZEHLENDORF born 1903 in BERLIN (?) 1.75 m muscular
 black hair sometimes wears glasses
Misc: Married. Wife lives in BERLIN-ZEHLENDORF.
 CPI Pink Card 64040 (PIPER)
45. Dr RANG, Fritz SS Standf, Reg Dir Referent IV-A/5 b, RSHA
 lives BERLIN born 1900 1.75 m slender build grey hair blue eyes
Career: Press expert. Leiter IV-D for several months in 1943, 1944. Dr. Jur
Misc: Married; 2 children.
 CPI Pink Card 52358.
46. RAUCH, Franz (?) SS H/Stuf, Krim Rat Referent IV-B/1 c, RSEA
 lives BERLIN born 1908 in MUENCHEN (?) 1.73 m muscular
Career: Formerly in Bavarian Political Police, then in Stapo KOBLENZ.
Misc: Married.
 of CPI Pink Card 111796
47. RITTER (fnu) Krim Insp Deputy Leiter Ast GOTHA With KdS Thuringia
 lives GOTHA born 1888 1.70 m muscular grey hair
Misc: Married.
48. RITTER (fnu) SS Stuf, Krim Kom With KdS Thuringia
 lives WEIMAR born 1905 1.75 m muscular
Misc: Married.
49. SANDERS, Erich (?) SS Stubaf, Krim Rat or Krim Dir Referent IV-A/5 a,
 RSHA
 lives BERLIN born 1908 1.75 m muscular
Misc: Holds Gold Party Badge.
 of CPI Pink Card 80145.
50. Dr SCHAEFER (fnu) SS Stubaf, Reg u Krim Rat or Krim Dir IV-A/3 a, RSHA
 lives BERLIN born 1902 in Hesse (?) 1.76 m muscular fair
 complexion sometimes wears glasses
Career: Dr Jur (?). Was Referent of IV-E before the reorganization.

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51. SCHMIDT, Franz SS H/Schr in SS u Pol Division
lives FUCHSBERG (Boehmerwald) born 1907 in FUCHSBERG 1.74 m strong
black hair brown eyes
Misc: Holds Golden Honor Badge of the NSDAP. Married; 1 child. Wife
lives in FUCHSBERG.
52. SCHNEIDER, Walter SS H/Schrf, Krim Sekr KdS Thuringia (Stapo WEIMAR)
born 1905 1.73 m strong build black hair
Career: With Schupo in Thuringia.
Misc: Married; children.
53. Dr SCHOENESEIFFEN, Manfred SS Stubaf, Reg Rat Ref IV-B/2 c, RSHA
(Czechoslovakia) since November 1944
lives TREBNITZ (Brandenburg) born 1912 in BONN (?) 1.75 m slender
black hair
Career: Lawyer. Acting Stapo Leiter in WILHELMSHAVEN, DANZIG, CHEMNITZ.
Misc: Married; 1 child. Wife used to live in CHEMNITZ.
CPI Pink Card 29807.
54. SCHROEDER (fnu) SS O/Stubaf O/Reg Rat KdS Thuringia since March 1945
lives WEIMAR last seen in ST KATHARINA/Boehmerwald in May 1945
Career: Leiter Stapo WEIMAR until March 1945.
Misc: Married.
CPI Pink Card 51513 cf MFIU 4 CIR 4/4 dtd 29 May 45.
55. SCHULZ (fnu) SS H/Stuf, KrimRat Leiter Ast GERA, KdS Thuringia
lives GERA born 1890 1.70 m strong build grey hair
Misc: Married. Awarded Iron Cross 1st Class World War I.
56. SCHULZ (fnu) SS Stubaf, Krim Rat Referent in IV-A/5, RSHA
lives BERLIN born 1897 1.71 m stocky build grey hair oval face
healthy complexion.
57. STEUDING (fnu) SS U/Stuf, Krim O/Sekr KdS Thuringia
lives WEIMAR born 1903 1.73 m strong build black hair dark
complexion
Misc: Married.
58. Dr TRUMLER, Hans SS O/Fuehrer, Obst d Pol BdS Hessen-Thuringia
Career: Formerly with BdS Westmark
Misc: Married; children. Wife lives in FUERSTENBERG.
CPI Pink Card 83021.

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59. WENDLANDT (fnu) Krim Angestellter KdS Thuringia
lives WEIMAR born 1912 in BERLIN (?) 1.77 m slender build blond
hair fair complexion
60. WITZEL (fnu) Pol Rat (?) IV-A/6 a, RSHA
lives BERLIN born 1900 in BERLIN (?) 1.76 m frail grey hair
sometimes wears glasses
Career: In charge of files and personnel records of Amt IV during last
2-3 years before the capitulation.
WEISHEIT (fnu) SS U/Stuf, Krim O/Sekr Ast JENA, KdS Thuringia
born 1905 1.75 m slender build black hair dark complexion
61. WUNDERLICH (fnu) Pol Insp KdS Thuringia
lives WEIMAR born 1882 1.72 m slender build