GERMAN YEARBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY

Secret Services and International Arms Trade in the Cold War Era

2022 • Volume 6

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Articles from the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*

Published by the Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History
and the University of Nebraska Press

German Yearbook of Contemporary History (ISSN 2509-744X) is published annually by the Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History and the University of Nebraska Press. The journal focuses on twentieth- and twenty-first-century history, with each issue devoted to a central theme. It contains a combination of translated articles from the Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History's prestigious quarterly journal, *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, and original research. Its goal is to disseminate this important scholarship with an English-speaking audience.

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Introduction

Secret Services and the Arms Trade in German-Speaking Europe

WILLIAM GLENN GRAY AND THOMAS SCHLEMMER

At the time of this writing, in the early months of 2022, an impassioned debate swept Germany concerning the prospect of military exports to Ukraine. The "traffic light" governing coalition in Berlin, uniting the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Greens, and the Free Democratic Party (FDP), initially turned down Kyiv's request to supply lethal weapons; it even barred Estonia from reexporting D-30 howitzers left over from East Germany's Cold War stocks. Explaining the decision, Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) invoked Germany's long-standing policy of barring weapons exports to conflict zones. "Our restrictive position is well known and is rooted in history," remarked Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock (Greens) in Kyiv in mid-January.[1] The federal government knew it had public opinion on its side. Three weeks before Russian President Vladimir Putin sent his soldiers marching into Ukraine, a representative opinion poll showed 71 percent of respondents rejecting German weapons shipments to Ukraine; only 20 percent were in favor.[2] The results were in keeping with the dominant German self-understanding since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, namely, that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was a civilian power, perhaps even a force for peace.[3] In this sense, the military, the weapons trade, and even the secret services all counted as a necessary evil at best. Such topics were also long neglected within the field of historical research. It is little wonder that a keyword search for "arms trade" or "weapons exports" pulls up fewer than fifteen titles in the library catalog of the Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History.[4]

After Russian troops launched their offensive against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the terrain in Berlin shifted dramatically. Now the traffic light coalition was prepared to send the Ukrainians weapons after all: "they are fighting for freedom and their democracy, values that we share with them," Scholz

explained during a special session of the Bundestag. He justified the reversal by suggesting that a new era had dawned: it was a *Zeitenwende*, an epochal change.[5] Commentators largely shared this assessment; the *Atlantic* reported that "Europe's Sleeping Giant" had awoken. For the first time in its seventy-year history, the FRG was sending Stinger missiles and anti-tank weapons directly into a combat zone.[6] Public opinion followed the U-turn in Berlin: in early March a poll found that 61 percent of the respondents approved of weapons deliveries to Ukraine. Even so, the discomfort is palpable among politicians and the public at large, and every further step—such as the export of armored fighting vehicles or other heavy weapons that the Ukrainian government has asked for—remains controversial.[7]

The controversies of 2022 demonstrate just how cautiously the Federal Republic has approached the problem of arms supply. The imperative to avoid stoking wars of aggression was written into the country's Basic Law in 1949—an obvious rejection of Nazi Germany's flagrant militarism.[8] Although neutral Austria did not consider itself a successor state to the Third Reich, it, too, balked at the prospect of fueling distant conflicts. Yet both states harbored advanced industrial economies with expertise in steelmaking, electronics, and precision mechanics—the fundamental components of weaponry. The temptation to support local arms production with foreign contracts was, at times, quite overwhelming. And the keenest customers for weapons were often states located in or near zones of conflict. Nor did these interested parties inevitably leave empty-handed, for despite its declared self-limitations, the Federal Republic numbered among the most significant arms exporters in the world. Over the period 2017 to 2021, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) counted Germany as the fifth largest weapons-exporting nation, following the USA, Russia, France, and China.[9] The year 2021 was in fact a record year in the history of German weapons exports: the federal government approved arms deliveries worth 9.25 billion euros. Egypt, by far the largest buyer, drew criticism due to its violation of human rights and its involvement in military conflicts in Yemen and Libya.[10] Politics, business, and morality often stood in contradiction with one another when it came to arms deals and weapons exports.

The theme of spying might, at first glance, bear little direct relationship to the problems of arms exports. The leading arms manufacturers were private companies in West Germany (though not in Austria), whereas secret services were state organs by definition. Heavy weapons were bulky and not easily concealed. Even if the terms of sales contracts were not always disclosed, periodicals such as the *International Defense Review*—a predecessor of *Jane's Defence*

Weekly—kept close tabs on the procurement decisions of military formations the world over. Firms active in this highly competitive industry wanted the capabilities of their weapons to be known; West German manufacturers proudly invited foreign military observers to witness test firings of anti-tank missiles.[11] By contrast, intelligence work operated behind a shroud, carefully concealing the identity of agents and the nature of their reach and capabilities.

On closer inspection, however, a number of parallels emerge. Intelligence services were intertwined with the private sector in significant ways—acting through shell companies, for example, or planting agents inside sensitive industries. Meanwhile, state actors sometimes sought to conceal weapons sales, using straw purchasers to circumvent legal restrictions. Secret services and the arms trade both occupied a privileged position at the highest levels of political decision-making. West Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst or BND) reported directly to the chancellor; weapons exports were subject to a permit system that left sensitive decisions in the hands of a small cabinet committee, the Bundessicherheitsrat.[12] As for the rival German state, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Ministry for State Security (MfS or Stasi) carved out an enormous empire encompassing more than 45,500 employees in 1971 and double that figure by 1989.[13] Arms sales and spying had foreign policy implications, but were such core government activities that foreign ministries never had full jurisdiction.

Deception and cover-ups always entailed the risk of public exposure, at least in democratic polities. Furious scandals rocked West Germany and Austria during the postwar decades when shady export deals came to light or secret agents were exposed, as Michael Geyer observes in his commentary for this volume. Media and parliamentary scrutiny intensified, at least for a time; resignations or prosecutions sometimes followed. Such scandals merit historical consideration on their own terms, simply by virtue of how intensely they captured the public's attention.[14] But there is a great deal more to be learned from studying these realms of subterfuge, corruption, and double-dealing. The arms trade offers important clues regarding the values and priorities of postwar democracies, while the world of espionage illuminates the inner workings of German statecraft. And both spheres of activity reflect back constantly on the long shadows of the Third Reich, the cause of so many ruptures and continuities in German history.

As fodder for blockbuster movies and paperback thrillers, Cold War espionage features prominently in popular understandings of the postwar decades. But historians could not count on engaging in serious academic study of the intelligence services until, quite unexpectedly, the Soviet bloc

collapsed and the archives tumbled open. The USSR's own KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti or Committee for State Security) did not open its doors—though a few insiders managed to smuggle out some notes from the archives, leading to two important volumes.[15] Fortunately the Stasi, despite furious endeavors to shred documents during its final months in existence, left behind an enormous cache of material that was secured on behalf of the public in newly united Germany.

Early interest in the Stasi focused mainly on the identity of "unofficial collaborators," who numbered in the hundreds of thousands at any given time. As private citizens from the ex-GDR obtained permission to read their own Stasi records, they could readily identify which neighbors, friends, trusted confidants, or family members had reported on their private conversations.[16] Historians influenced by these perspectives wrote about the Stasi as an omnipresent source of dread or even terror in East German life, leading to implicit or explicit comparisons with the role of the Gestapo in Nazi Germany.[17] Social historians—spearheaded by Mary Fulbrook—have pushed back against this monochromatic reading of everyday life in the GDR, but may in turn have overstated the degree of personal liberty afforded by the party-state.[18] Numerous recent studies have explored the Stasi's suppression of religious affiliations in the GDR as well as its special expertise in prison operations.[19]

As for the Stasi's spying abroad, the paper files of the sprawling Main Directorate for Reconnaissance (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung or HVA) were targeted for destruction in 1989–90, making it difficult to piece together the full range of its activities in the Federal Republic and in other NATO states.[20] The historian Hubertus Knabe has nevertheless attempted to document East German infiltration, to the point of characterizing West Germany as a "subverted republic."[21] Individual spies within Bonn's political establishment did come to light—some before and some after the fall of the GDR. The exposure of Günter Guillaume, one of Chancellor Willy Brandt's top aides, as a Stasi agent in 1974 led to Brandt's resignation,[22] whereas another compromised SPD official, Karl Wienand, was not tried until the 1990s, when Stasi records yielded evidence of his activity as an informant.[23] It is safe to say that a great number of Stasi collaborators in the West have escaped detection and will go to their graves without facing consequences.

Alongside information gathering at the political level came industrial espionage. Intelligence supplied by the HVA narrowed East Germany's productivity gap with West Germany measurably—by 6.9 percent of total factor productivity and 5.5 percent per worker.[24] Rüdiger Bergien's article in this volume points to another avenue of technology transfer: the outright purchase

of information technology by the Stasi. Bergien's remarkable story shows how West Germany's Siemens corporation leaped at the opportunity to get ahead of IBM in what it hoped would be a burgeoning Soviet bloc market during the era of détente. It unwittingly supplied three 4004/45 computers to a dummy purchaser that turned out to be the Stasi's own Division XIII. The Siemens storage and retrieval systems allowed the Stasi to track Western visitors to East Berlin and the GDR; they also boosted East German computing skills, as the Stasi's programmers learned to maintain and enhance the finicky Siemens software.

Another central avenue of Stasi research concerns the foreign policy role of the intelligence service. The Stasi Records Archive (Beauftragter für die Stasi-Unterlagen or BStU) has sponsored a series of historical studies on the spy agency's cooperation with its Soviet bloc counterparts; together they endeavored to contain the dynamic of human rights pressure unleashed by the Helsinki Process from 1975 onward. Not surprisingly, the complex relationship between the Stasi and its "big brother," the KGB, has drawn special attention.[25] The article by Siegfried Suckut in this volume highlights a desperate attempt by the Stasi in 1969–70 to warn the KGB about the true aims of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* (Eastern policy), which Stasi chief Erich Mielke viewed as a concerted program to undermine the GDR. Alongside Suckut's careful elaboration of the documentary record, these pages feature the first English-language translation of a lengthy Stasi analysis underscoring the agency's fears. The pairing of the Suckut and Bergien articles presents readers of this volume with a snapshot of the extremely fluid situation created by East-West détente, with Stasi agents capitalizing on the fruits of East-West exchange even as their higher-ups fretted about where it all might lead.

If the Stasi could be considered the best-researched of all the ex-Warsaw Pact secret services, West Germany's BND was long a closed shop for historical research. This was not unique to the spy agency in Munich-Pullach: because the Federal Republic had not experienced a regime change, there was less opportunity to crack open the vaults of most West German institutions. Since 1990 the Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History has edited the long-running annual series *Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany* (*Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik* or *AAPD*) on behalf of the Foreign Office.[26] This project, which relies on the selection of material by teams of historians, has yielded a range of magnificent volumes covering four-fifths of West German history (now 1949–53 and 1961–91). Nevertheless, a more routine and wide-ranging procedure for document declassification did not exist in Germany until the 2010s.[27]

As Kristie Macrakis observes in her commentary for this yearbook, the lack of archival access to BND materials meant that many histories of the West German agency relied upon declassified material from the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—thus reflecting the perspective of US agents. An Independent Historians' Commission summoned by the BND in 2011 aimed to remedy this unsatisfactory situation; the four lead historians assembled teams of researchers and sent them into the Pullach archive.[28] A similar commission had already scoured the files of Bonn's Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) and presented its findings in highly sensationalized form in 2010.[29] The BND was but one of several agencies—including the Interior Ministry, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz or BfV), and the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt)—that hastened to respond to public interest about the origins and early history of these institutions.[30] As for the history of the secret services, the work of the Independent Historians' Commission first brought the long-neglected genre of intelligence history into closer contact with mainstream contemporary history in Germany. Over time the conviction took hold that "the Federal Republic, too, had something like a *secret state* of 'secret services,'" which exercised "influence over political processes, and perhaps even society's perceptions of reality."[31] The commission's publications also presented new angles on the "weighted history" of the Federal Republic. This concept derives from Axel Schildt and points to a central question for the 1950s and 1960s: "given the depressing material and moral burdens, how could a civilized and democratic polity emerge that today seemingly naturally fits in with normal international standards?"[32] Answers to this question are not easy, particularly when one takes note of the intensity—recently uncovered by researchers—with which Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had the oppositional SPD spied on by the BND.[33] This may not have been a "German Watergate," as claimed in the press in April 2022,[34] but it cannot be denied that continuities of personnel and the persistence of extra-legal practices from the Third Reich cast shadows over the development of democracy and the rule of law.[35]

For all of the independent historians' commissions, a key theme was the continuity of personnel from the Third Reich into the Federal Republic. Some also emphasized the role played by outside powers, mainly the United States, in shaping these agencies' ethos and working methods. Both questions feature prominently in this volume's contribution by Thomas Wolf. Drawing upon his book-length study of the origins of the BND, Wolf challenges the notion that Reinhard Gehlen, a German army intelligence general, built out a spy network single-handedly on the strength of his skill and charisma. On the contrary,

Wolf finds that a different veteran of army intelligence, Hermann Baun, managed to win clandestine US funding for "Operation Rusty"—a program for recruiting German veterans to monitor Soviet military strength. By mid-1947, Baun had hired some 2,000 collaborators for what turned out to be a chaotic and ineffective intelligence operation. It was the weakness of Baun's management structure and the absence of professional analysis that allowed Gehlen to swoop in and take control. Readers will find in Wolf's article a state-of-the-art read on Gehlen's impressive mythmaking and the centrality of US influence in the founding of the BND—even or especially when American officials took a hands-off approach.

By now, substantial research support has gone into the study of both the Stasi and the corresponding West German secret services. Including Wolf's book, the BND's historical commission alone has published thirteen volumes.[36] The arms trade in central Europe has not attracted quite so much scholarly attention, perhaps because the topic sits at the juncture of military history, foreign relations, and political economy. Historians writing from each of these directions have, nevertheless, approached the topic in important ways. Scholars associated with the Center for Military History and Social Sciences (ZMSBw) in Potsdam have published more than two dozen books on the GDR's military history—including Klaus Storkmann's *Secret Solidarity*, a look at East German military aid to Third World countries.[37] On the West German side, Dieter Kollmer has written an important monograph on weapons procurement, which is intimately related to export activities—though the ZMSBw has yet to devote a volume specifically to the Federal Republic's weapons exports.[38]

Kollmer has also coordinated a look at "military-industrial complexes" in Europe, a perspective that foregrounds the role of industry in the arms export arena. Perhaps surprisingly, Kollmer argues that the Federal Republic did not harbor a full-fledged military-industrial complex. Measured by value, arms sales seldom constituted more than 1 percent of German exports.[39] Be that as it may, there is still ample reason to engage more deeply in the business history of the armaments sector. This is an angle pursued by Stefanie van de Kerkhof in a monograph examining how weapons makers marketed their products. Van de Kerkhof finds that key manufacturers such as Rheinmetall tried to associate their products with positive virtues—above all "security"—rather than directly acknowledging the deadly purpose of their wares.[40]

Thomas Riegler's article in this volume also starts from the angle of political economy, pointing to the structural crisis of Austria's state-owned steel conglomerate in the late 1970s. The motive for switching over to an export-

focused production model—producing a Canadian-designed howitzer under license—was to maintain employment in the metalworking industries. So far as Chancellor Bruno Kreisky was concerned, the needs of Austrian workers overrode any moral concerns about who was buying these weapons. Before long the Noricum division of the Austrian state industries was selling howitzers to both sides in the Iran-Iraq War—a cynical yet lucrative business arrangement that violated Austria's own neutrality laws. As details came to light, judicial investigations followed, yielding a dense record of testimonies wielded by Riegler to showcase the complicity of union bosses, government officials, and business managers. Riegler's essay represents the most complete treatment of the Noricum scandal in English, offering an important window into the politics of the Second Austrian Republic.

Economic considerations play a role in an article by one of this volume's editors, William Glenn Gray, in the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*. Gray observes that, during the 1960s, the hectic pace of West German arms purchases in the United States resulted in an enormous stock of surplus weapons that the Bundeswehr was eager to pass along to prospective buyers in the Global South. Several prospective sales were scuppered, however, for fear that the surplus weapons would find themselves in the hands of regional rivals such as India or Pakistan. Some surplus weapons were sold or given away to African countries under a small military aid program in the 1960s, but the program proved controversial and the Bundestag was soon discussing an outright ban on military aid *and* commercial weapons exports to non-NATO countries. Willy Brandt's cabinet sought to clarify German policy by means of an administrative measure rather than a legislative solution. In June 1971 the cabinet passed a series of "Political Principles" governing the export of arms and other military equipment. In theory, then, the cabinet had asserted the overriding primacy of political restraint over the commercial interests of the arms industry.[41]

The two remaining articles in this volume explore how the Federal Republic's restrictive policies were reconsidered as a result of economic circumstances and foreign policy pressures. The essay by Bettina Weißgerber, adapted from her 2019 dissertation, demonstrates the enormous significance of arms exports for Bonn's relations with ambitious oil-rich countries—in this case Iran under the monarchy of Shah Reza Pahlavi. In the wake of the 1973 "oil shock," German policy makers were tempted to allow the sale of Leopard tanks to the shah—or even Iranian tank production under license. Weißgerber lays bare the confusion in Bonn as Helmut Schmidt's cabinet sought to find some rationale for justifying special treatment of Iran, an exception to the Political Principles forbidding sales to such a dangerous corner of the world.

The shah's overthrow in 1979 changed the nature of the Iranian challenge, but it hardly resolved the question of arms exports to the Middle East. The article by Hubert Leber explores the unexpected fallout when the Saudi government asked in 1981 to purchase West Germany's newest battle tank, the Leopard II. Chancellor Schmidt appeared to favor the deal, figuring that tank exports would serve as an enticement for a more all-encompassing program of German-Saudi economic cooperation. In response to Israeli objections, Schmidt remarked that German policy should no longer be dictated by memories of Auschwitz. Ironically, the ensuing outrage yielded the exact opposite policy result: not only did Schmidt's government abandon the tank sales to Saudi Arabia, but it modified the Political Principles in 1982 to underscore Germany's historical responsibility toward Israel. Leber's approach combines arms export policy and the politics of the past, illuminating a tremendously significant turning point in German-Israeli relations.

In presenting a series of translated articles on statecraft and commercial policy in German-speaking central Europe, the editors aim to acquaint readers with dilemmas that continue to overshadow German (and Austrian) engagement with the world. In remarks to the Bundestag on February 27, 2022, Foreign Minister Baerbock sought to assuage the concerns of many Greens and Social Democrats: "we will continue to be cautious when it comes to arms exports and military operations."[42] The restrictive arms export policies described in these pages were often a source of frustration for German and Austrian leaders, but deviations from the usual rules could easily backfire, angering domestic opinion while generating touchy reactions overseas. As for espionage, the Cold War division of the Continent no longer persists, but the question of technology transfer to unfriendly powers still remains. Intelligence services often misinterpret the intentions of adversary leaders, as the Stasi did in its overly negative assessment of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*—and most Western agencies did in judging Vladimir Putin's prewar rhetoric in 2022. Meanwhile, the relative autonomy of German intelligence services, following years of dependence on the United States, remains a sore subject in Berlin. Historical research is not a perfect guide to the present, but there is a certain logic to the workings of the international system, and readers of this volume will be better equipped to discern that logic.

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With volume 6 of the *German Yearbook of Contemporary History*, the Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History and the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*

continue the successful collaboration with the University of Nebraska Press that began in 2020. For a second time we have cause to thank Joyce Gettman, Manjit Kaur, Joel Puchalla, and Shannyn McEntee for their advice and their dynamic support. We also thank our translator team—Sinéad Crowe, Dona Geyer, and Melanie Newton—which has performed first-class work. Melanie Newton helped us tremendously by proofreading the translations, as did Merle Read in taking on the copyediting of the present volume. Our thanks go out as well to Mirella Kraska and Kira Rettinger, who set this volume in motion and accompanied its early phases. As editors we owe our greatest debt to Julia Menzel, who took over the position of editorial coordinator from Mirella Kraska on September 1, 2021, and carried forward her skillful labors seamlessly. Without her support this volume would not have come together, or at least not in a timely fashion. As we were wrapping up the manuscript, the war launched by President Putin was raging in Ukraine. We earnestly hope that peace will have returned by the time volume 6 of the *German Yearbook of Contemporary History* appears on shelves.

April 14, 2022

Notes

1. "Scholz: Keine deutschen Waffen für die Ukraine," *Deutsche Welle*, January 18, 2022; Michael R. Gordon and Bojan Pancevski, "Germany Blocks NATO Ally from Transferring Weapons to Ukraine," *Wall Street Journal*, January 21, 2022; "Scholz lehnt Waffenlieferungen an die Ukraine weiter strikt ab," *Der Tagesspiegel*, February 7, 2022.

2. ARD-DeutschlandTrend, February 3, 2022, https://presse.wdr.de/plounge/tv/das_erste/2022/02/20220203_ard_deutschlandtrend_ukraine.html.

3. Bernhard Rinke, *Die beiden großen deutschen Volksparteien und das "Friedensprojekt Europa": Weltmacht, Zivilmacht, Friedensmacht* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006); Michael Herkendell, *Deutschland—Zivil- oder Friedensmacht? Außen- und sicherheitspolitische Orientierung der SPD im Wandel 1982–2007* (Bonn: Dietz, 2012).

4. The classic study is Michael Geyer, *Deutsche Rüstungspolitik 1860–1980* (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1984); other works relating to historical peace and conflict research include Detlef Bald, ed., *Rüstungsbestimmte Geschichte und das Problem der Konversion in Deutschland im 20. Jahrhundert* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 1993).

5. "Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz am 27. Februar 2022," https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/regierungserklaerung-von-bundeskanzler-olaf-scholz-am-27-februar-2022-2008356.

6. Noah Barkin, "Europe's Sleeping Giant Awakens," *Atlantic*, March 1, 2022.

7. Alan Posener, "Waffenlieferungen: Brutale Verweigerung," *Zeit Online*, April 10, 2022,

https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2022-04/waffenlieferungen-ukraine-christine-lambrecht-bundesregierung.

8. Article 26, Paragraph 1, of the Basic Law reads: "Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional. They shall be criminalised." See https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0143 (accessed April 11, 2022).

9. SIPRI, "Global Share of Exports of Major Arms by the 10 largest Exporters, 2017–21," available at https://sipri.org/gallery/gallery-arms-transfers-graphics-2021 (accessed May 5, 2022).

10. "Jahresstatistik für 2021: Neuer Rekordwert bei Rüstungsexporten," ARD Tagesschau, January 18, 2022, https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/ruestungsexporte-deutschland-rekord-ruestungsexportgesetz-101.html.

11. "Rheinmetall und Thales demonstrieren erfolgreichen Einsatz von Mission Master SP und 70 mm-Lenkraketen in Schweden," Rheinmetall press release, April 7, 2022, https://www.rheinmetall.com/de/rheinmetall_ag/press/news/latest_news/index_30528.php.

12. Kai Zähle, "Der Bundessicherheitsrat," *Der Staat* 44, no. 3 (2005): 462–82.

13. Jens Gieseke, *The History of the Stasi: East Germany's Secret Police, 1945–1990*, trans. David Burnett (New York: Berghahn, 2015), 49.

14. Jürgen Bellers and Maren Königsberg, eds., *Skandal oder Medienrummel? Starfighter, Spiegel, Flick, Parteienfinanzierung, AKWs, "Dienstreisen", Ehrenworte, Mehmet, Aktenvernichtungen* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004); Thomas Ramge, *Die großen Polit-Skandale: Eine andere Geschichte der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2003).

15. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

16. Timothy Garton Ash, *The File: A Personal History* (New York: Random House, 1997).

17. The secondary literature on the topic is enormous. Immediately after the dissolution of the Stasi, a flood of publications began to appear. For an overview of the early debates, see Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ed., *Wann bricht schon mal ein Staat zusammen? Die Debatte über die Stasi-Akten und die DDR-Geschichte auf dem 39. Historikertag 1992* (München: dtv, 1993); see also Gary Bruce, *The Firm: The Inside Story of the Stasi* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

18. Mary Fulbrook, *The People's State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).

19. A series published by Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Göttingen, "Analysen und Dokumente," serves as a primary outlet for this focused research. See, for example, Markus Anhalt, *Die Macht der Kirchen brechen: Die Mitwirkung der Staatssicherheit bei der Durchsetzung der Jugendweihe in der DDR* (2016); Julia Spohr, *In Haft bei der Staatssicherheit: Das Untersuchungsgefängnis Berlin-Hohenschönhausen 1951–1989* (2015); Arno Polzin, *Mythos Schwedt: DDR-Militärstrafvollzug und NVA-Disziplinareinheit aus dem Blick der Staatssicherheit* (2018).

20. Marco Bruni, "Lo spionaggio tecnico-scientifico della stasi in Italia (1969–1989)," in *Contemporanea* 24, no. 4 (2021): 627–43.

21. Hubertus Knabe, *Die unterwanderte Republik: Stasi im Westen* (Berlin: Propyläen, 1999).

22. Eckard Michels, *Guillaume, der Spion: Eine deutsch-deutsche Karriere* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2013).

23. In 1996 the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court sentenced Karl Wienand to two and a half years in prison; however, the former SPD politician was pardoned by Federal President Roman Herzog. "Ehemaliger SPD-Politiker Wienand gestorben," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 10, 2011.

24. Albrecht Glitz and Erik Meyersson, "Industrial Espionage and Productivity," *IZA Institute of Labor Economics*, Discussion Paper Series, DP no. 10816, June 2017.

25. Douglas Selvage and Walter Süß, *Staatssicherheit und KSZE-Prozess: MfS zwischen SED und KGB (1972–1989)* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019); Douglas Selvage and Georg Herbstritt, ed., *Der "große Bruder": Studien zum Verhältnis von KGB und MfS 1958 bis 1989* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2022).

26. Rainer A. Blasius, "Der ehrenvolle Auftrag des Auswärtigen Amts: AAPD. Vorgeschichte und Anfänge eines editorischen Großunternehmens und der Außenstelle in Bonn," in *50 Jahre Institut für Zeitgeschichte. Eine Bilanz*, ed. Horst Möller and Udo Wengst (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 127–44.

27. William Glenn Gray, "Declassified Breakthroughs in Germany: A Highly Organized Data Dump is Underway," *Passport* 47, no. 3 (January 2017): 52–55.

28. Hellmuth Vensky, "Zweiter Versuch zur Erforschung des Geheimdienstes," *Die Zeit*, February 16, 2011.

29. Eckart Conze et al., *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik* (Munich: Blessing, 2010). For an overview of the ensuing controversy, see Martin Sabrow and Christian Mentel, eds., *Das Auswärtige Amt und seine umstrittene Vergangenheit: Eine deutsche Debatte* (Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fischer, 2013).

30. For the results of these commissioned inquiries, see, among others: Imanuel Baumann et al., *Schatten der Vergangenheit: Das BKA und seine Gründungsgeneration in der frühen Bundesrepublik* (Köln: Luchterhand, 2011); Constantin Goschler and Michael Wala, *"Keine neue Gestapo": Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2015); Frank Bösch and Andreas Wirsching, eds., *Hüter der Ordnung: Die Innenministerien in Bonn und Ost-Berlin nach dem Nationalsozialismus* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2018).

31. Rüdiger Bergien, "Nachrichtendienstgeschichte in der Erweiterung? Neue Publikationen der Unabhängigen Historikerkommission zur BND-Geschichte," *Neue Politische Literatur* 66, no. 2 (2021): 175–204, here 202.

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33. Klaus-Dietmar Henke, *Geheime Dienste: Die politische Inlandsspionage des BND in der Ära Adenauer*, vol. 2 (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2022).

34. Willi Winkler, "Wie Adenauer die SPD ausspähen ließ: Das deutsche Watergate," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, April 9–10, 2022.

35. Thomas Schlemmer and Susanna Schrafstetter, "Introduction: Three Shades of Brown. The Nazi Past and Postwar Careers in Germany and Austria," *German Yearbook of Contemporary History* 5 (2021): 1–19.

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39. Dieter H. Kollmer, "Rüstungsinterventionismus—Rüstungsgüterbeschaffung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland nach 1945," in *Militärisch-Industrieller Komplex? Rüstung in Europa und Nordamerika nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, ed. Kollmer (Freiburg: Rombach, 2015), 131–54, here 140–41.

40. Stefanie van de Kerkhof, *Waffen und Sicherheit im Kalten Krieg: Das Marketing der westdeutschen Rüstungsindustrie 1949–1990* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2019).

41. William Glenn Gray, "Waffen aus Deutschland? Bundestag, Rüstungshilfe und Waffenexport 1961 bis 1975," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 64, no. 2 (April 2016): 327–64.

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The Origins of the BND

The Gehlen Organization: Process, Myth, and Legacy

THOMAS WOLF

This article deconstructs the founding myth of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (the West German Federal Intelligence Service, abbreviated BND), which has commonly been understood as the outgrowth of a primordial "Organization Gehlen." Classified materials from the BND reveal instead that in the months after the end of World War II, a heterogeneous intelligence service of hundreds of operatives developed under the leadership of Abwehr officer Hermann Baun. It was financed lavishly by the US Army, but did not generate many successes. Although Reinhard Gehlen had little influence at first, he outmaneuvered Baun due to his absolute conformity with the USA. The highly unstructured organization with its dysfunctional operations carried on under Gehlen's willy-nilly leadership. Through targeted myth formation, and despite countervailing political pressure, Gehlen managed to evade tight parliamentary scrutiny of the internal workings of the nascent BND. This helps to explain why Gehlen's organization took on persons with a sometimes highly incriminating Nazi past.

Introduction

For much of his life, Reinhard Gehlen, who was born in Erfurt in 1902 and died in the Bavarian municipality of Berg, near Lake Starnberg, in 1979, invested considerable energy in shaping both his own public image and the founding myth of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service, BND), of which he was president from 1956 to 1968. Having served in the High Command of the Wehrmacht as chief of the Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East, FHO) military intelligence service until 1945, Gehlen was commissioned shortly after the war ended to compile studies of military history. By early 1946 the Americans had enlisted Gehlen, the former major general, along with the counterintelligence officer Hermann Baun to establish a US-funded intelligence service. This allowed both men to continue their careers virtually uninterrupted. From the beginning Gehlen liked to describe his work with

the United States as a kind of intelligence partnership between equals, and he claimed to have gained several concessions from his American counterparts in exchange for his cooperation. In particular he claimed to have forced them to accept the German character of the incipient organization, the importance of securing German interests, and even his loyalty to a future German state.[1]

For a long time Gehlen's founding myth, which soon found its way into early publications on the origins of the BND,[2] endowed him with political legitimacy. For generations of BND employees, it created a sense of meaning and cohesion. At the ceremony marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the BND on April 1, 1981, for example, BND president Klaus Kinkel struck a reflective tone as he spoke about the intelligence service's achievements. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan two years earlier was just the latest in a series of international crises that the BND had failed to recognize in time.[3] Kinkel therefore advised his audience to think "self-critically about the value of our work, avoiding mythologizing and self-righteousness." But he did not actually question the founding myth. Instead, Kinkel remarked that "a secret foreign intelligence service, of all things, had been created as the first organ of an incipient German state."[4] Kinkel was, in effect, treating Gehlen and Baun's US-financed apparatus as one of the cornerstones of the West German state.

The release of US documents in recent years has prompted historians to rethink the founding narrative created by Gehlen.[5] Documents in the BND's archives now allow us to reassess the origins of the BND by tracing its history back to the early days of the Gehlen Organization. The question of continuities and ruptures between the Third Reich, Allied-occupied Germany, and the young Federal Republic arises not only with regard to the BND's staff, but also its organizational structures. Gehlen always told the story of his intelligence service from the perspective of how it ended, describing the transformation of the Gehlen Organization into the BND as the culmination of a rigorous development that was carefully planned from the start. Contemporary documents, however, suggest that this perspective needs to be reversed. Indeed, when the service was transferred to control by the Federal Republic on April 1, 1956, the Federal Commissioner for Administrative Efficiency[6] reported: "In terms of its purpose and status as an institution, the formation of the BND does not involve creating something new, but rather taking over tasks that were already being performed along with the entities performing them. Since the purpose of these tasks remains essentially the same, the institution can be taken over in the form it assumed in response to wartime and postwar experiences."[7] On one hand, this statement reveals only a limited willingness to critically examine how the BND, as a state security organ, adapted to the

legal and constitutional framework of the young Federal Republic. On the other, it raises the question of precisely which "institution" and "form" were now being transferred from their American roots to the West German state. Why and how did this transfer occur in the first place? And with what legacies and consequences did this transformation burden the new German service, a service that was in fact not so new or German at all?

This article begins by examining the establishment of the service under the leadership of Hermann Baun, Gehlen's rival and the real espionage expert in the early days, and it describes the organizational principles that Baun inscribed into the apparatus. These were the principles Gehlen had to contend with when, having returned to Germany in summer 1946 after spending about a year in the United States, he joined ongoing operations and rapidly superseded Baun as head of the entire apparatus. The outcome of this veritable power struggle and its consequences will be analyzed against the backdrop of the service's uncertain prospects. From 1949 onward, those involved in political negotiations about the establishment of a West German foreign intelligence service always had the existing apparatus in mind. The establishment of the BND must therefore be considered in light of the fact that the Gehlen Organization was US-dominated for almost ten years. An examination of the service's structural features reveals how weak the BND's management was in the 1950s, as well as the causes and consequences of that weakness. The two founding moments of the BND—those of 1946 and 1956—provide a case study of how the political will to shape the institutions of the young West German democracy was constrained by existing facts and continuities. They also illustrate how strongly Gehlen, as an instance of continuity in the BND's personnel, was able to shape these circumstances.

The Creation of the Intelligence Apparatus

In August 1945 Reinhard Gehlen and six other former Wehrmacht officers left an American prisoner of war (POW) camp in Oberursel for the United States.[8] The FHO documents that were to serve as the basis of the first military-historical studies had already been taken to the United States, and it was only thanks to the assistance of a US officer that Gehlen and his group were able to follow them there. Gerhard Wessel, Gehlen's longtime colleague and successor as FHO chief (and later as BND president), remained in Germany.[9] There he served as Gehlen's link to Hermann Baun, who had been one of the most important experts on Eastern Europe in the Wehrmacht's military intelligence service. Born in Odessa in 1897, Baun had worked for the German consulates

in Odessa and Kiev between 1922 and 1937 before joining the Abwehr (the Wehrmacht's military intelligence service). During the war, he headed the Abwehr unit Leitstelle I Ost, directing frontline espionage against the Soviet Union.[10] In September 1945 Baun presented the US Army with an initial plan for the establishment of an intelligence service.[11] The area of operations was to cover no less than the entire Soviet-controlled sphere in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. Initially, however, G2, USFET (United States Forces European Theater)—the division of the US occupation force responsible for military intelligence—only received approval from the War Department for a much smaller operation. Yet despite being instructed to gather information about spies in the American-occupied zone of Germany only, Baun adhered to his rather grandiose plans. The US officers of Operation Rusty, the code name for the project, decided without authorization to let Baun do as he liked.[12] They also met his requests for money and goods that could be sold on the black market, and soon they were supplying him with more than he requested.[13]

Thanks to this generous funding, the number of permanent employees and informants increased dramatically within a few months, from 150 on May 1, 1946, to more than 2,000 on May 1, 1947.[14] The number of American employees did not grow at anything like the same rate. Until spring 1947 just two officers, John R. Deane Jr. and Eric Waldman, were responsible for supervising Operation Rusty.[15] The twenty-seven-year-old Deane had made a career as a platoon leader, and by the end of the war he was commanding a battalion. Waldman had fled Nazi rule in Austria and enlisted in the US Army in 1942. Both men already had some experience of the Soviet Union. During the latter half of the war, Deane's father had worked as an American military attaché in Moscow, where he witnessed the growing estrangement between the wartime allies.[16] Waldman, for his part, served in the Eastern Europe section of the Pentagon's intelligence division in 1945.[17] Deane and Waldman were among those officers who recognized soon after the war that the Soviet Union was emerging as the United States' new opponent. They do not appear to have been too concerned by their inability to supervise Baun's burgeoning apparatus or indeed to keep an eye on Baun himself. As Deane once noted laconically, "Baun was constantly going off somewhere, no one knew where, making contact with someone, no one knew whom."[18] For Baun, these working conditions could hardly have been more favorable. Thanks to the United States' enormous financial support and the army's complete inability to exercise control, he could create exactly the espionage apparatus he had envisaged.

Baun's plans for the structure of the apparatus were inspired by the

Abwehr's frontline intelligence operations during the war against the Soviet Union,[19] whereby a team of managers would direct espionage activities and gather, check, and pass on the information that had been procured. Wherever possible Baun staffed his team with people he knew personally and who ideally had served in similar functions during the war.[20] Initially, only prisoners scattered across American POW camps were hired, as they could be recruited inconspicuously by US officers. However, this made it very difficult to find experienced administrative staff. In the very early days, Kurt Liehr and Rudolf von Glinski were responsible for administrative tasks. Before the war Liehr, a renowned pilot, had flown a scheduled service to Moscow and Leningrad, and in August 1939 he piloted one of the planes that brought Joachim von Ribbentrop's delegation to Moscow to sign the German-Soviet nonaggression pact.[21] He had no administrative experience. Staffing decisions such as this were typical of Baun's early priorities, when the primary objective was to revive and expand espionage activities as quickly as possible so as to deliver on the big promises that had been made to the army. Von Glinski, who came from the attaché service and spoke English, focused on translation and performed administrative tasks on the side.[22] The former Abwehr officers considered the creation of a functioning administration to be of secondary importance or even a hindrance, as they believed that successful espionage required extreme flexibility and the ability to make quick decisions on the ground.[23]

The espionage activities themselves were decentralized. Baun provided his agents, who mostly comprised former mobile frontline intelligence officers, with American goods and currency, and instructed them to revive their old contacts or, where possible, make new ones. If the agents managed to establish stable connections—or, to put it more accurately, if they managed to establish the credibility of these connections—they received long-term funding. This was then used to recruit more agents, who in turn established their own intelligence connections.[24] As a result, field offices based on personal networks emerged, and these field offices maintained several subordinate offices. The word "offices" is something of an overstatement, though, since their personnel, the focus of their operational work, and their internal structures were heterogeneous, inconsistent, and always heavily influenced by the personality of their first director.[25]

Baun did not see this inconsistency as a disadvantage. In fact, he deliberately refrained from intervening in the establishment of the field offices and defining their responsibilities. Instead, he let recruitment and organization develop their own dynamics in the field. As a result, growth was uncontrolled and employees tended to follow their own whims. By mid-1946 at least six field

offices had been set up in this manner. The Gehlen Organization would later be celebrated for its military intelligence operations in the Soviet Occupation Zone (SOZ) and the GDR. But there was little evidence of this promise either in Baun's initial plan or in the profiles of the field office directors who were hired. Four of the offices were led by former frontline intelligence officers who had built links with exile groups and collaborators during the war. For example, Arthur Moos (code name Ritter), who had been responsible for training agents in Leitstelle I Ost and was known to have good contacts in the Baltic countries,[26] became the head of the "R" field office in Esslingen. A second line of continuity led to the German personnel of what was known as the "Vlasov Army," where Heinz Herre, one of Gehlen's most senior staff members in the FHO and later a leading figure in the Gehlen Organization and the BND, had been chief of staff.[27] In early 1946 Herre made Baun aware of Roman Hönlinger, whom Herre had got to know in the Vlasov Army. No doubt thanks to his Vlasov contacts, Hönlinger was entrusted with setting up his own field office. He recruited several former comrades in arms to the Baun apparatus, which, in providing a plentiful supply of dollars, real coffee, and cigarettes, offered a dream workplace. Alfred Bentzinger, who had served in various Abwehr units in France, was the only figure without war experience in the East to head a field office. But Bentzinger, who was appointed in spring 1946, had other qualities. He had numerous good contacts in southern Germany, for example, many of whom were former members of the Nazi security apparatuses. His field office, 114, was the only one intended for counterintelligence and counterespionage rather than information gathering.[28] As these examples illustrate, personal acquaintances and wartime contacts were decisive criteria for selecting and promoting personnel in the early days. Purported or actual links to anti-Communist groups in Soviet-controlled parts of Europe were particularly well rewarded. Thus Baun was able to pursue his ambitious plans. However, most wartime contacts soon proved to be of little value as, unsurprisingly, many of them could not be revived. And in any case, nurturing such contacts had little to do with intelligence gathering in the SOZ and observing Soviet forces there, since these were skills that would first have to be arduously learned.

Baun and his staff in Oberursel sought to create performance incentives in the field offices by fostering competition. Instead of being allocated fixed budgets, field office directors received money and barter goods depending on performance. They were allowed to decide for themselves how to deploy these resources and were not required to submit receipts. The management team therefore looked solely to the intelligence submitted when allocating funds.

The more information a field office supplied, the more funds it received, and so quantity took priority over quality. Few of the intelligence reports submitted had been expressly requested by management, having instead been written by field agents and their informants (*V-Leute*) at their own instigation. After submitting these reports, the field offices would receive more funding, which they would use to recruit new staff and informants, who would, in turn, gather more information without receiving any specific orders to do so. This system ultimately proved to be disastrous, as unsystematic intelligence with little real content was constantly being fabricated while field agents proliferated uncontrollably. Meanwhile, the operation's management team was overwhelmed, and it soon became impossible to process the constantly growing number of intelligence reports.[29] At the same time, many of the intelligence missions that the management team had actually assigned were not accomplished.[30] Because the informants were tied to the field offices, Baun and his team of managers were powerless to do anything. The quid pro quo system and funding methods fueled uncontrolled growth, cemented the field offices' independence, and, most importantly, encouraged their tendency to gather and report any and as much information as possible, with little regard to quality or relevance.

In the first months, information gathering was largely determined by the informants' skills, knowledge, and dedication. No training was provided, and so the operation was wholly reliant on its recruits' espionage talents and ability to improvise. In spring 1948, for example, a former Luftwaffe Oberfeldwebel (flight sergeant) was regarded as the operation's best asset for monitoring Soviet air forces in eastern Germany. The man in question lived in the city of Lüdenscheid in North Rhine-Westphalia and spent an average of two weeks per month observing airfields in the SOZ. Given that his mobility was impaired, he was not entirely suited to such "flying missions," but as far as his commanding officers were concerned, his dedication and finesse more than compensated for his physical disability. Few of the agents who obtained information from the SOZ actually lived there, but instead gathered their information on trips. The recruitment of informants in the early days was similar to the recruitment of permanent staff insofar as the most important criteria were that they were immediately available and promised to deliver rapid results.[31]

As well as channeling the flow of funds, Baun's managers attempted to use their (admittedly rather fragmentary) organizational knowledge as a steering tool. They ensured that field offices were kept in the dark as much as possible about who else was working for the apparatus. The idea behind this secrecy was that it would enable managers to compare and better evaluate the

information that the field offices had obtained independently of each other.[32] A side effect, however, was that Baun's intelligence service began to spy on itself. In early November 1946, for example, a report was received that a former Major Moos was attempting to recruit Estonian agents from a displaced persons camp in Geislingen, near Stuttgart. The Major Moos in question was Arthur Moos, the field office director mentioned above.[33] The field office that had filed the report was immediately instructed to "cease observing M,"[34] but it was not informed that Moos was in fact a colleague. Another negative effect of the field offices' isolation from one another was that it further increased the number of reports being produced, leading to duplications and a greater risk of agents working for multiple field offices. Identical information reached Baun's managers by various channels, creating the impression that the information was more credible and significant than it actually was. Thus, not only was the apparatus failing to achieve its goal of comparing and evaluating information more effectively, but the siloing of the field offices had turned into a liability. In addition, it intensified field offices' tendency to mistrust and resist any attempt by management to find out about their personnel. After all, informants were the most valuable resource in the competition with the other field offices, and they needed to be protected.

The financial autonomy afforded field office directors and the misguided criteria for allocating funds not only led to irreparable weaknesses, but also caused Baun's organization leadership to become dependent on the field offices. Although it succeeded in purely quantitative terms, Baun's understandable attempt to have an impressive apparatus up and running as quickly as possible prevented its managers from having any real control over the field offices. Neither the leadership nor their American funders had a satisfactory overview of the composition of their apparatus. Within just a few months Operation Rusty had grown into a jumble of largely independent, control-resistant, and siloed networks whose individual parts were tied only loosely to the organization via American goods and money. One of the few pillars of stability in Baun's bloated, out-of-control espionage apparatus was his own personal relationships with the field office directors, most of whom owed their jobs to him.

The Integration of Gehlen's Group

On the other side of the Atlantic, Reinhard Gehlen had almost nothing to do with these developments. Although his group had flown to the United States in August 1945, it initially had no material to work with, as the FHO documents had been seized by the division of the War Department responsible for

archiving looted German archival material. During the war the United States and Britain had devised plans for systematically taking control of German files, a plan that triggered clashes among the economic and military, historical and political, and legal and intelligence preferences of numerous agencies.[35] Interest in the German files was soon accompanied by an interest in hiring at least a few Germans to evaluate the material. Gehlen's recruitment and move to the United States took place at a propitious time, as the Allies' keen interest in German expertise had created a thriving labor market for academics, military officers, and civil servants. His post-1945 career path has been portrayed (not least by Gehlen himself) as a chain of fortunate circumstances at the end of which he, the defeated Wehrmacht general, convinced his victors of his value to them. His success here owed a great deal to the support of a few American officers who, in spite of their low ranks, were "clear-sighted about the emerging political trend."[36] Gehlen was just one of many elite German functionaries to be employed by the Allies after the war,[37] when numerous US officers, acting on their own initiative, seized the human and material "resources" of the defeated Germany without having a clear idea about what their specific long-term benefits might be. Contrary to how it appeared to those involved at the time, Gehlen's recruitment was not unusual. However, it did demonstrate two unique features. First, Gehlen's group managed to change the character of its work during its stay in the United States. Although it initially focused on the history of the war, as the months passed it was also asked to evaluate current material from the US intelligence service. From spring 1946, at the latest, the content of the Gehlen group's studies makes it clear that the Americans intended to record German experiences for reference in any future conflict with the Soviet Union.[38] In light of worsening relations with Moscow, the War Department believed in the relevance of the group's work. The group's second unique feature was its link to the intelligence apparatus that Baun was setting up in Allied-occupied Germany, an apparatus whose structure and focus would soon become the raison d'être of Gehlen's group.

It took around four months for the first direct contact to be established between Gehlen in the United States and Wessel and Baun in Germany. The ensuing correspondence is remarkable for several reasons, not least for its ambiguity. Gehlen's letters, which were, of course, monitored by the Americans, combined pledges of loyalty to the United States of America with general claims to leadership of the intelligence apparatus in Allied-occupied Germany. Baun, for his part, officially recognized Gehlen's guidance and provided sporadic work updates. However, in practice Baun merely conveyed decisions he had made under his own authority, insisting to Gehlen and the Americans that

he retain the professional autonomy he had enjoyed during the war as head of Leitstelle I Ost.[39] For the time being, Gehlen had no choice but to agree. He declared himself "100 percent in agreement" and wrote that he "would like to work for a few years within the framework desired by Otto [Baun]."[40] Here we find the roots of accusations made later by both parties that each had acquiesced to the other's leadership and then reneged on that promise.

Serving as Gehlen's deputy in Germany, the affable and competent Wessel established himself as the point of contact for the officers of G2, USFET. In March 1946, just as work was about to officially begin, Baun asked Gehlen for a general assessment of the political situation and an outline of the direction espionage activities should take. Gehlen drew up a proposal for "Organizing Initial Work" as well as an "Overview of Critical Intelligence Questions."[41] However, he had these documents sent to his confidant Wessel rather than to Baun, with the instruction that the papers be forwarded to G2, USFET, which would then put them into force for Baun. Wessel was told to proceed in the same way with future instructions. Gehlen's "proposal" was based on the nominal counterintelligence mission and was therefore outdated from the start.[42] He had deliberately kept the intelligence questions wide-ranging and thematically broad, as their purpose, he wrote, was to give Baun's work "an initial framework."[43] The American officers did not influence the content of Gehlen's instructions,[44] which did go into effect; but their very general character, plus the chaotic way in which the apparatus actually functioned, meant that they hardly played any role at first. Nevertheless, they were useful in helping to maneuver Wessel into the role of permanent liaison between the army and the incipient intelligence service. Gehlen and Wessel thus managed to achieve a position of prominence vis-à-vis the Americans, yet this had no impact on the activities of Operation Rusty, as Baun continued to control American goods and money, as well as relationships with the field offices.

This was the situation when Gehlen and his group returned to Germany from the United States in July 1946 in order to be integrated into ongoing operations. This instruction was based on a plan, drafted by Wessel, which stipulated that Operation Rusty should now comprise an Information Gathering section, to be headed by Baun, and an Evaluation section, to consist of four members of Gehlen's group plus Wessel himself. Wessel did not set out a clear hierarchical relationship between the two groups, simply stating that "Group X [Baun] will provide the intelligence material; Group Fritz [Gehlen] will process and evaluate it." The "spatial unification," he added tersely, would "ensure" collaboration.[45] Deane accepted this plan virtually unchanged and passed the English translation on to his superior, General Edwin L. Sibert.[46]

Wessel's proposals were undoubtedly commissioned by US officers and were probably intended to serve as a basis for the War Department's imminent decision in July 1946 on whether the project should be continued or not. The lack of major differences between Wessel's draft and the American version suggests that Deane and Waldman had convinced their superiors that a well-structured, efficient apparatus was already in place. As far as the relationship between Gehlen and Baun was concerned, the American version stated that Gehlen would oversee the "coordination of the efforts of this group [Gehlen's Evaluation section] with those of the Information group."[47] According to the "plan," Wessel would serve as Gehlen's deputy. No other details were offered. However, Wessel's work journal reveals his appointed tasks: to evaluate the "overall situation" as well as the contents of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*.[48]

Increasingly in the months that followed, Deane and Waldman had the Germans prepare reports to serve as a basis for negotiations in Washington on the continuation of the operation.[49] American documents reporting on Operation Rusty at the time therefore present a rather rose-tinted view. When we compare these with the German sources in the BND archives, we find they conceal in particular the very limited scope of the Gehlen group's work. The close relationship between the US officers and the former Wehrmacht officers ultimately led to a continued supply of misinformation to more senior American officials. But the American documents are unrealistic in another respect too: they put Gehlen officially in charge of the project as a whole, a role he gladly accepted, but in reality the field offices—the heart of the operation—escaped his influence and remained loyal to Baun.

As the army did not intervene and Gehlen lacked the means to enforce his leadership, the integration of the Gehlen/Wessel group did not change the entrenched structures of Operation Rusty. Baun remained in charge of the budget. Only his section was able to hire new staff, and his authorization was needed before black market goods could be procured. For the time being, then, Gehlen was completely dependent on Baun. The case of Gustav Hilger illustrates this relationship and the problems it caused. When the war ended, Hilger was regarded as one of the top experts on the Soviet Union.[50] He had lived in Russia for over forty years, eighteen of which he had spent working for the German embassy in Moscow. The army brought him to the United States, where he prepared studies for the military intelligence service and the Department of State. Like Gehlen, he returned to Germany in July 1946 and joined Operation Rusty, becoming a member of Baun's leadership team, where he was to work on "political and defense questions in the Eastern region."[51] Gehlen immediately tried to recruit this prominent expert to his own section,

but Baun successfully resisted.[52] Hilger therefore had no input on the analysis side in the second half of 1946, to the mounting dissatisfaction of members of the Evaluation section, who wanted to benefit from his political expertise.[53]

The supply of resources caused similar tensions, as illustrated by Gehlen's rather grotesque battle for a car. Hitherto only the Information group had had a car,[54]so in mid-September Gehlen requested a car for the Evaluation section. Baun, whose authorization was needed for larger requests such as this, refused, saying simply: "Don't have a spare one." Four weeks later Baun became more amenable to the idea and promised a car would arrive in the coming days. Gehlen then decided that, "as a matter of principle and for psychological reasons," the car should be made available to him alone. Twelve days later, a car did arrive at the warehouse, but it could not be driven yet: "F [Gehlen]: Battery's still missing." Baun was supposed to bring the missing battery back from his next trip to Heidelberg, but nothing seems to have come of this, as Gehlen was soon trying to arrange a car by other means.[55] Wessel's journal includes more accounts of such unpleasantries, including a long fight for a typewriter.[56]

The Gehlen group's complete dependence on Baun for supplies fueled more discord from fall 1946. Amid the chronic shortages of Allied-occupied Germany, the power to allocate food and scarce goods was a trump card, and among German spies it soon became more important than wages. Baun's authority over finances was the ultimate instrument of power. As well as undermining Gehlen's claim to leadership, it ensured that the Evaluation group could not expand. In the second half of 1946 just one typist was recruited to the group,[57] while the Information section kept growing. Contrary to the BND founding myth, Hermann Baun, not Reinhard Gehlen, dominated the early phase of Operation Rusty, whose focus was therefore information gathering rather than analysis. The deployment of staff and resources increasingly became a matter of prestige rather than necessity in the simmering antipathy between Baun and Gehlen. From the outset, then, the new German intelligence apparatus was burdened with rampant growth, lack of control, poor results, and conflict at the top.

Under these conditions, it was practically impossible for Gehlen and Wessel's Evaluation team to have much input into the work of the Information section.[58] They submitted information requests in the form of "intelligence missions" at irregular intervals, with thirty arriving on the desks of Baun's managers by early 1947.[59] However, rather than immediately passing these missions on to the field offices, the managers added them to their own operational tasks, frequently altering their focus in the process.[60] As a result,

it could take several weeks for the Evaluation section's intelligence requests to reach the field offices, which in turn could not be relied upon to respond. But the relationship between Evaluation and Information Gathering was unsystematic and unsatisfactory in the other direction, too. Gehlen's group did not have direct access to incoming counterintelligence and counterespionage reports, as Baun's staff first summarized these as "defense reports," had them translated into English, and then sent them straight on to G2, USFET. Only then was Gehlen allowed to see the reports and submit follow-up questions,[61] which were then converted by members of the Information leadership team into intelligence missions for the field offices. When the army sent queries, these were forwarded first to Gehlen and then to Baun's Information staff, which was the real hub of this very awkward, counterproductive flow of tasks and reports. Staff in Baun's section even began to evaluate information themselves without any input from Gehlen's section. In fact, the staff of Gehlen's section did not even know how Baun's apparatus functioned. In an internal meeting, for example, one of Gehlen's employees asked, "What does O [Baun] do with our requests for intelligence? How does he pass them on?"[62] The question was never answered. For many of the agent reports from the first few months, there is no evidence in the archives that they ever found their way to Gehlen's Evaluation group.

Within its first year, Operation Rusty had turned into a graveyard for information of various kinds and varying quality. It is therefore difficult to define what exactly the operation's focus was in terms of espionage. In his communication with American officials, Gehlen always emphasized the gathering of operational military information, an emphasis that is also clear in American documents.[63] However, given the organizational idiosyncrasies and workings of Rusty, these documents should not be taken at face value. A great deal of the information procured by Baun's apparatus never made it to Gehlen; often it was never even forwarded to the army, as Baun's staff would filter it, use it themselves, or simply throw it away. A cursory examination of the records in the BND archives suggests that the investigation of suspected or actual Communist activities in the American Zone of Occupation formed a large part of the Baun section's espionage activities.[64]

The large discrepancy between the two groups in terms of staff numbers, combined with a jealous determination by both sides to avoid sharing responsibilities, created an extremely circuitous process of information exchange in which Gehlen's Evaluation section was sidelined. Once Baun's staff began to evaluate incoming reports themselves, Gehlen and his little group became an increasingly insignificant element within Operation Rusty.

What Future? A Meeting and Its Consequences

Gehlen would later repeatedly claim that one of the most important milestones in the prehistory of the BND was reached on August 30, 1946. On that day, he came to a verbal "gentleman's agreement" with General Sibert, the American occupation forces' chief of intelligence staff. The agreement concerned the conditions under which the Germans would agree to continue working for the Americans.[65] This meeting was indeed of great significance, but not for the reasons Gehlen suggested. Sibert, one of the US Army's most prominent intelligence officers,[66] was about to transfer to the newly formed Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the precursor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and he planned to take Operation Rusty with him. In the previous weeks, Sibert had hinted that German staff would be transferred to the United States. Now he made two additional demands: the operation was to be thoroughly audited by American specialists, and then integrated into the CIG.[67] While Gehlen and Wessel agreed to this—and indeed it was not difficult for them to agree—Baun was reluctant to give the Americans a comprehensive look inside his sprawling apparatus.[68] No "gentleman's agreement" was actually concluded between the Germans and the Americans on that day; there was not even room for it on the agenda. The aim was simply to explore whether and how the German espionage team might continue working for the United States. Sibert dictated the conditions, and Gehlen was quick to accept them. Baun, on the other hand, would not agree to them, as they were antithetical to his understanding of the character and workings of his apparatus. The Americans did not take kindly to this, and so the Sibert-Gehlen discussion paved the way toward a settlement of the conflict between Gehlen and Baun.

As Baun's resistance appeared to be threatening Operation Rusty's continued existence, Gehlen and Wessel sought to extend their influence into the workings of the Information section. On September 30, Gehlen passed along leadership of the Evaluation section to Wessel so that he himself could focus more on Baun's activities.[69] Meanwhile, Wessel attempted to improve access to the Information Gathering apparatus by introducing organizational reforms. In November he changed the way work was allocated in Evaluation, ordering that in future each employee was to work only on "order of battle" intelligence[70] and produce regular intelligence requests for Information Gathering.[71] Wessel's aim here was to strengthen the field offices' focus on military intelligence in the SOZ, as this was where the Evaluation team's wartime expertise lay.

Thus, from fall 1946, Gehlen and Wessel attempted to exert direct influence over the Information section, for which Baun had hitherto been solely

responsible. There is nothing in BND documents to support Gehlen's later claim that he had developed at an early stage and consistently pursued the foundational idea of building a unified intelligence service that integrated information gathering and analysis.[72] Indeed, this concept did not stem from his wartime experiences, as he repeatedly insisted.[73] It was only when the army put pressure on Gehlen and Wessel (one of Baun's sharpest critics) to assert control over the entire apparatus that these two men departed from the organizational structures they had learned in the Wehrmacht. And it was not until fall 1946 that they took steps and devised strategies to bring Information Gathering and Evaluation closer together. These ideas were not based on professional conviction. They were simply a means of endowing their claim to leadership—a claim that had hitherto existed only in US Army papers—with a material foundation.

The transfer of Operation Rusty to the CIG was discussed in New York on December 19, 1946. In line with General Sibert's view on the matter, the final decision was postponed until after the operation had been audited by a CIG expert.[74] Knowing that the army hoped to hand the operation over to the CIG, Gehlen and Wessel now had a chance—and indeed were under great pressure—to resolve the conflict with Baun. In late 1946 and early 1947, they hastily drafted a proposal for establishing a German leadership team that would be in charge of the entire apparatus and report directly to the US officer in charge, Deane. In doing so, they referred to the two sections, Evaluation and Information Gathering, as a single organization for the first time. Before this, only Baun's apparatus had been called an "organization" in internal communication and correspondence with the army. In the proposal the "overall organization" comprised all sections of Operation Rusty. Gehlen clarified the final terminological ambiguities by hand: as an "intelligence expert," Baun would not be part of the "overall leadership" and would instead head a department within the "overall *organization*."[75] Gehlen, in contrast, as the newly installed chief, would have control over the allocated resources and command authority over the field offices. The word "organization" had become a cipher for Gehlen's claim to leadership.

In mid-January 1947, shortly before the decision on these plans was due, Gehlen and Wessel sought to bolster their ambitions by invoking their alleged agreement with General Sibert for the first time. Sibert, Gehlen wrote, had instructed Gehlen to "take charge of Op. Rusty in Germany. This general order was not given in writing. I [Gehlen] accepted this order because 1. General Sibert fully supported in both ideological and professional terms the basic views I presented to him; 2. Mr. Berndt [Baun] and his group, which was

created during my stay in the US, agreed to report to me."[76] Gehlen and Wessel had become more self-assured and better at adapting to the haphazard and constantly changing conditions of the early postwar period. Just as a decision was about to be made on integrating the unruly German apparatus into the strictures of the young CIG, Gehlen and Wessel provided their sponsor with a founding narrative in which the key messages were political and professional consensus; deliberate, considered actions; and rational, effective structures. None of these messages reflected the realities of the past year of espionage work in Germany. There were no official minutes of the meeting with Sibert, and so it was easy for Gehlen to invoke it for justification. Outsiders knew nothing about the history of the intelligence service. Shortly after the war and in the decades that followed, Gehlen shrewdly used this history—or rather, his version of it—as both a political instrument and his own personal hero narrative. But the gap between the BND founding myth and historical reality could hardly have been wider.

The almost irresponsibly unconcerned Deane and Waldman accepted Gehlen's proposal.[77] They were still following Sibert's plan to hand Operation Rusty over to the CIG, but Baun, who wanted to keep his apparatus independent and opaque, posed a major obstacle. They decided that the compliant Gehlen would be a far more amenable chief, even though his Evaluation section had hitherto played a negligible role within the operation as a whole. In February 1947 Deane set out in writing the rights and duties of the German chief of operations and officially transferred these to Gehlen. By handing control of finances over to Gehlen, the army deprived Baun of his authority, thereby resolving the power struggle.[78] One reason for Baun's failure was his attempt to assert the service's autonomy. Gehlen would later claim that he himself had fought for this autonomy, but in reality he had never even tried.

Organizational Development: Structures in Spring 1947

Gehlen and Wessel were now able to recruit more staff for Evaluation, define its functions, and, most importantly, transfer people there who had previously worked in Baun's section. In March 1947 two new subsections were created within the Evaluation group: Political Evaluation, headed by Gustav Hilger, and Economical [*sic*] Evaluation, headed by Helmut Klocke. During the Third Reich, Klocke had published studies on the sociology of agriculture that established him as an expert on the East. In 1936 he joined the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (Ministry of Aviation), and during the war he worked in Fremde Luftwaffe Ost, the Luftwaffe's intelligence service.[79] Heinz

Herre was placed in charge of the Press Evaluation department, which now joined the Evaluation section, having previously worked independently.[80] With Gehlen as chief of the entire organization, the Evaluation section immediately experienced enormous growth. Within just a few weeks the number of employees doubled, and the hiring of Hilger and Klocke gave the section a more civilian profile. The English terms used indicate that the purpose behind all steps taken during this time was to gain American approval. Gehlen was determined to visibly "Americanize" the apparatus.

In the realm of Information Gathering, the newly installed leadership duo made no organizational changes and hardly any staff changes. Initially they did not even part ways with Baun, around whom the entire apparatus had been constructed. They wanted to intensify the intelligence service's activities throughout the Eastern Bloc and still saw espionage against the Soviet Union as a job for experts, in which experience was the key to success. "The agent service against Russia is to such a large degree a matter of long experience and accurate knowledge of the Russian mentality that only a very few German officers were able to lead and employ Russian agents with any degree of success,"[81] Gehlen had told the Americans in summer 1945, and he continued to adhere to this view. Just one change was made: Hans-Jürgen Dingler, a distant relative of Gehlen's, was appointed to keep an eye on Baun as his chief of staff. Gehlen believed that Dingler, who had headed an Abwehr unit in Silesia from 1937 to 1939, had the necessary expertise.[82] Dingler immediately began systematizing work processes and maintaining a high presence in the field offices. On his initiative, directives were issued more often in written form and were coordinated better with the Evaluation section.[83] Such measures were urgently necessary responses to the ever-increasing workload, which could no longer be handled under Baun's management style. The changes were welcomed in the Information section too.[84] In May 1947 Baun was replaced by Dingler as head of Information Gathering and demoted to head of a small office cut off from the rest of the apparatus. Nevertheless, his reputation as an espionage expert remained intact. Even Gehlen remained in thrall to this reputation for a while. In early 1948, as the Cold War was becoming a reality and it was still proving impossible to procure critical political information from the Soviet Union, Gehlen floated the idea of bringing Baun back into the leadership fold. Ultimately, however, Dingler and Wessel rejected the idea. Baun remained employed by Gehlen's intelligence service until 1949 and was tasked with forming high-level connections. Disputes continued, though, and he was let go in October 1949 after it was proven that he had embezzled funds.[85] He died of cancer in 1951.

Changes at the leadership level in early 1947 had little impact on the field

offices, as it was virtually impossible to effect real organizational change in these very heterogeneous entities. A staff shake-up was not even attempted, and all field office directors who had been appointed under Baun were still in their positions in spring 1947. Timid attempts to implement structural changes were similarly ineffectual. To coordinate their work better, from late March 1947 field offices were allowed to ask the Information team whether specific persons were in contact with other offices.[86] However, direct communication between the field offices remained prohibited. It often took weeks for them to receive responses to their queries, if indeed they received any at all. A rule stipulating that inquiries be answered within four weeks was introduced in June,[87] but the situation did not improve. The field offices continued to be opaque conglomerations of personnel networks that were cut off from each other and indeed cut themselves off from each other. In October the Information team demanded that "the offices' files be expanded in order to provide every office director with an overview of his agents and connections."[88] Such an overview should have been a given. Yet three-quarters of a year after Gehlen had assumed leadership of the service, and more than one and a half years after the Germans had begun espionage activities for the occupying power, no one could keep track of who worked for the apparatus. The sprawling field offices remained as impenetrable as ever. The advantage of this for the field offices themselves was that it allowed them to simulate potential that did not actually exist.

Still with a view to integrating the German staff into the new American central intelligence apparatus, Samuel Bossard, a CIG expert on Germany and an experienced intelligence officer, conducted a review of Operation Rusty in March and April 1947. After visiting the leadership staff and a few field offices, he submitted a report that clearly shows how difficult it was for an outsider to come to grips with Rusty as an entity and realistically assess it. For example, Bossard described two offices—the MEZ (Mitteleuropäische Zentrale, Central European Head Office) and the SEZ (Südeuropäische Zentrale, Southern European Head Office)—as the link between the field offices and the Information Gathering staff.[89] The MEZ and the SEZ were supposed to pass intelligence missions on to the field offices and gather reports received from the field offices and send these to the Information section. Or at least this is what had been envisaged in Baun's original plan. But while the MEZ had been operating from its base in Munich since April 1946, the SEZ office had never actually existed in the form envisaged. Instead, it was identical to Herbert Dohnal's field office 13. Bossard had received an organizational chart of the field offices, taken the information at face value, and simply reproduced this in his report.

It is worth examining this example in more detail. Dohnal, who had spied on the Soviet Union as a frontline intelligence officer during the war, had been part of Baun's Information section since August 1946,[90] setting up a field office in Salzburg which was initially responsible for espionage in Austria. Until the spring of 1947, all intelligence requests concerning Austria were directed to Dohnal's office 13. In May 1947 field office 4913 was created. Under its recently recruited director, Emmerich Ofczarek, 4913 was responsible for counterintelligence in Austria. Although it was allocated resources by Dohnal's office, it worked independently.[91] Ofczarek is a good example of how directors were recruited and deployed by the Information section in the early days. Born in Vienna, Ofczarek had worked for the SD (Sicherheitsdienst, the Nazi intelligence service) and served in an Abwehr commando during the war. In the final year of the war he became acquainted with Heinz Herre. In addition, his school friend and comrade in arms Kurt Kohler had joined Baun's staff in August 1946 to set up the counterintelligence unit.[92] Thanks to his connections to two high-ranking staff members, his "secret service experience," and his contacts in Austria and Czechoslovakia, Ofczarek's postwar intelligence career took off immediately when he was offered a senior position.[93]

Field offices 13 and 4913 remained the only ones in Austria that reported directly to Information Gathering staff. However, there is some evidence to suggest that, at the time of Bossard's report, the organization was planning on creating more field offices in Austria that, like 4913, would be subordinate to Dohnal's office.[94] In early 1947 Dohnal was being introduced to other field office directors as head of the SEZ.[95] The intelligence service's descriptions of itself mixed up plans with current realities. In keeping with Baun's vision, the Information apparatus had been a promise for the future right from the beginning—a promise to the United States, but also to the apparatus itself. The idealistic plans had an integrative effect as long as employees believed that these plans could be realized. They assigned staff a role in the brewing confrontation between the blocs, though the real role played by German intelligence staff was far more modest. It was impossible for Bossard to see what was happening behind the scenes of Operation Rusty, and so the apparatus's deliberate self-deception was replicated in his report.

The Bossard report recommended that the CIG take over Operation Rusty, but the former was reluctant to assume responsibility for a chaotic intelligence service led by former Wehrmacht officers and staffed by former Abwehr and SD members. Once again, then, the decision was to wait; the CIG wanted to determine whether any useful parts might be salvaged if the service were

liquidated. After so much investment, however, the army was not prepared to wind down Operation Rusty straightaway, and so it decided to keep funding the operation for the time being. Otherwise the army did not intervene much, but simply let things take their course. This is evident from the fact that, until summer 1949, the number of American employees working on the operation in Germany remained wholly insufficient. As a result, the organizational structures that had developed during the first few months of the operation remained intact. The lack of change in personnel was striking too. All the field office directors working for the operation in the summer of 1954 had been there since before 1949; indeed, most of them had joined the operation in 1946/47. Their careers during the war ranged from SS Untersturmführer to Generalleutnant of the Wehrmacht. Employees who proved to be reliable, understood the service's mechanisms, and were able to work within them had been able to carve out careers in the fragmented, insular, and siloed apparatus. But it remained to be seen which of these employees would make it into the BND.

From the Gehlen Organization to the BND

In 1949 the Gehlen Organization went through two major changes. First, the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany that year made the previously rather theoretical prospect of working for the new West German state more concrete. Second, on July 1, 1949, the CIA took charge at the organization's headquarters in Pullach.[96] James H. Critchfield, a young, highly decorated colonel who had left the army to join the CIA in 1948,[97] was appointed chief of the American command there and held this role until the BND was established in 1956.

From the beginning the CIA worked under the assumption that the Gehlen Organization would eventually be handed over to the Federal Republic[98] and indeed actively supported this transfer.[99] In May 1951 John J. McCloy, the US High Commissioner for Germany, suggested to German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that the latter discuss this prospect with Gehlen so that the political framework would be in place as soon as the Allied occupation ended.[100] As the CIA expanded its own operational capacities in Germany in the early 1950s, the importance of the Gehlen Organization as an intelligence service dwindled. At the same time, though, the Gehlen Organization gained political significance as a future partner. Paradoxically this was reflected in the attempts of CIA staff in Pullach to exert more control over the organization. When they took over in 1949—a time when transferring the intelligence

service to the Federal Republic still seemed a distant prospect—Critchfield and his officers were determined to finally establish effective monitoring of the Gehlen Organization's operational work. Along with other measures,[101] the budgeting of operational work was changed so that all intelligence-gathering operations outside the territory of German Democratic Republic (GDR), the former SOZ, had to be individually applied for and approved. This gave the Americans an insight into the organization's intentions, potential, and, most importantly, intelligence contacts in the Soviet satellite states.[102] For a long time the CIA had extensive and in-depth knowledge of operations, structures, and personnel in Pullach. Its knowledge of the Gehlen Organization's internal workings was a major reason why the Americans continued to provide support for the organization despite its many flaws. If they had insisted on creating a new German intelligence service, they would have lost such "insight." Realizing this, the Gehlen Organization naturally resisted such interventions.[103] Following the CDU/CSU's federal election victory in September 1953 and the failure of the European Defense Community in August 1954, it had become evident that responsibility for the Gehlen Organization would soon be transferred to the West German government, so from 1953/54 onward the CIA increasingly tried to avoid conflicts. Thus, despite growing doubts about Gehlen's competence—doubts expressed in drastic terms in some internal correspondence—CIA staff in Pullach were instructed to limit their efforts to exert greater control lest the agency's relationship with a future German foreign intelligence service be damaged.[104]

The United States' political support and forbearance in operational matters played into Gehlen's hands as preparations to create a German foreign intelligence service got underway. When the BND was being set up in the mid-1950s, the occupying powers exerted far less pressure than they had done vis-à-vis the Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) and police force just a few years earlier.[105] Experiences—positive or negative—gained during the Weimar Republic were of little help in creating a foreign intelligence service. Internal political debates therefore revolved around the big and still unanswered questions about political oversight, whom the service should report to, and its remit,[106] while questions about its organization and composition were neglected. Gehlen quickly filled this gap, and from the beginning the Federal Chancellery was prepared to meet his demands. In fact, back in December 1950, Adenauer's right-hand man, Hans Globke, had promised to "fully take over" the organization as soon as it was politically possible and the issue of financing had been clarified.[107] Staff at Pullach provided Globke and Adenauer with memoranda which the federal cabinet then used

when discussing the establishment of the BND.[108] Once the die had been cast in Gehlen's favor in 1953, neither the German government nor the opposition put forward independent proposals about the form a German foreign intelligence service should take. When Siegfried Beermann, the SPD parliamentary group's security policy adviser, outlined his thoughts on the supposedly new service, he used the subject line "Gehlen Organization" as a matter of course.[109] The lack of political interest and initiative allowed Gehlen to present the structures and idiosyncrasies of his apparatus, which had emerged by chance rather than design, as the desirable, even ideal, form for a German foreign intelligence service. This is well illustrated in his responses to unforeseen crises that once again stalled the takeover of Gehlen's service.

In November and December 1953, numerous agents in the GDR were apprehended by the Stasi in several waves of arrests,[110] causing the Bundestag to finally sit up and take notice. On December 11, Gehlen was called before the Committee for Questions of European Security (the precursor of the Defense Committee) to respond to accusations that security precautions had been inadequate. Because they were classified, his statement and the subsequent round of questions from Bundestag members were not recorded in the minutes.[111] However, the BND archives contain notes of the meeting, taken by a committee member, which were passed on to Pullach by one of Gehlen's personal confidants.[112] The archives also contain a long, detailed paper dated December 9 on the "Principles of the Secret Intelligence Service," the "Safeguarding of Intelligence Work," and the causes of and measures taken in response to the recent incidents. This paper was most likely used by Gehlen as notes for his statements before the committee, or at least intended for that purpose.[113] Both documents mention a "bulkhead system" for the first time and characterize this system as the Gehlen Organization's key security measure. Contrary to appearances, the documents claim, internal siloing had protected Gehlen's organization from serious incursions by the enemy: "No clear knowledge shared from the bottom up, no connections to offices working in parallel. Only the head office and the office directly involved in managing an agent (i.e., the branch) have personal details."[114]

Gehlen survived the 1953 crisis by presenting the organizational peculiarities and weaknesses that had emerged (without his input) in the apparatus's initial phase as an asset and giving them a memorable and ingenious name. In the years that followed, the "bulkhead system" became widely accepted as an essential principle for structuring an intelligence service. In the official takeover report of March 1955, which was drawn up in close collaboration with the Gehlen Organization, the "bulkhead system" was described as

"an administrative maxim governing the intelligence service." Moreover, this maxim was prioritized over the usual structuring principles of German governmental agencies: "General administrative principles must yield to the special requirements of this service."[115] Thus, from one moment to the next, the status quo in the Gehlen Organization became the norm for the BND. There are no records documenting whether anyone recognized the problems stemming from the adoption of this principle.[116]

The "bulkhead system" was better at protecting the BND from pressure to reform and unwanted political oversight than at warding off attacks by enemy services. For example, the BND cited this system as a reason for refusing to comply with the requirement to create a staff council, claiming that candidates would have to be made known to all staff, thereby rupturing the internal silos. Although all federal agencies were required by law to have a staff council,[117] the BND delayed creating one for years, a delay that met with understanding across party lines.[118] Throughout Gehlen's time as head, the "bulkhead system" was considered sacrosanct within the service. When handling petitions, for example, "the point of departure [was] the current structure and the existing bulkhead system."[119] For twenty years the mess inherited from Baun and given an impressive label by Gehlen during a political emergency formed an insurmountable barrier for anyone seeking to subject the BND to scrutiny.

This situation was all the more paradoxical in that the "bulkhead system" did not remotely fulfill its alleged purpose, namely, to minimize the damage caused by double agents, as illustrated by the case of Heinz Felfe. For about ten years Felfe, who joined the Gehlen Organization in 1951, provided the Soviet intelligence service with important internal information about the organization and other federal security agencies.[120] As a Soviet Union counterintelligence agent who enjoyed Gehlen's protection, Felfe was able to gain access to areas and operations far beyond his remit.[121] The "bulkhead system" was in any case undermined on a daily basis by personal contacts and transfers, which made the system "ineffective, naive, and basically unfeasible within a few years," according to a later internal report.[122] The sacred maxim was in fact a rather mundane shield: for the rest of his life, Gehlen would refer to this principle in order to play down the Felfe catastrophe.[123] Immediately after Felfe was exposed, however, all code names were changed at headquarters and in the field offices, including in areas that had had nothing to do with Felfe.[124] No one could ascertain how many details of the Byzantine service Felfe had actually passed on to the Soviet Union. The renaming of all offices could be interpreted as a precautionary measure. But it also suggests that, within the BND, belief in

the effectiveness of the "bulkhead system" was extremely shaky at the moment it was put to the test. It is more likely that the system helped double agents like Felfe to go undetected, as they were able to justify their security breaches by referring to higher, undisclosed missions. Other intelligence agencies and similar organizations also relied—and indeed continue to rely—on strict siloing as a security measure.[125] But the early BND was unique in its unreflective, dogmatic use of siloing to avoid oversight, criticism, and legal regulation. The principle's roots went right back to the service's establishment. Gehlen, who was new to the world of espionage, retained and accepted this principle until he had completely internalized it himself, using it to cut everyone off from everyone else.

On July 20, 1954, Otto John, president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, went to the GDR and appeared in East Berlin a few days later claiming to be a West German refugee.[126] The scandal triggered a fierce debate about the restructuring of state security in the Federal Republic, delaying the takeover of the Gehlen Organization yet again.[127] It also brought Gehlen unprecedented publicity. The defection of the head of the West German domestic intelligence service to the East prompted the press to report on the person who would likely head the future foreign intelligence service. In fall 1954 several in-depth profiles of Gehlen—some of them published in multiple installments—appeared in major daily and weekly newspapers, ranging from the *Hamburger Echo* to *Die Zeit*, *Der Spiegel*, and the *Deutsche Soldatenzeitung*. The profiles were especially concerned with the question of Gehlen's reliability: was he a lackey of the Americans? John's close ties with Britain, where he had fled in 1944 and on whose recommendation he was apparently appointed,[128] put the question of Gehlen's reliability on the political agenda. Faced with this rather threatening situation, Gehlen went public with his reinterpretation of his meeting with General Sibert on August 30, 1946. His embellished story about the beginnings of his organization and how he had bravely stood up to the Americans now became widely known.[129] Gehlen repeatedly mentioned the conversation that had taken place behind closed doors with Sibert, a conversation he had long invoked to justify his position within his organization and vis-à-vis his American funders. Now he was determined for newspaper readers to learn about what a shrewd strategist and staunch patriot he was. It is no secret that intelligence services provide fertile ground for mythmaking, but the establishment of the BND illustrates how myths can be converted into political capital. Any discussion of the success or failure of political oversight of the BND must consider such myths, as they are

among the factors that can hinder control from the outset. Gehlen's reputation helped him transfer his intelligence service's structures and personnel to the Federal Republic without attracting too much political attention.

The following example illustrates the connection between organizational and personnel continuities. With the introduction of the CIA's administrative requirements and the German civil service pay scale, which applied from 1951, some Gehlen Organization employees were grouped into pay grades, and a special budget category was created for their salaries. All other employees working full- or part-time for the service were categorized as "ND [nachrichtendienstlich, intelligence] personnel."[130] The BND was permitted to differentiate its staff in this way because the Gehlen Organization had presented such differentiation as a prerequisite for being able to perform espionage work as part of the civil service. The BND's permanent staff were all federal civil servants. They were therefore required to meet the requirements of public-service law and had to be assigned to approved permanent posts. But these regulations did not apply to ND personnel, who did not enter into any contractual employment relationship with the federal government. Only persons who supplied information and were not permanent BND employees were supposed to be employed as ND personnel, and they were paid under special categories in the BND budget for operational work.[131] The amount paid continued to be determined solely by the responsible office, and the use of these funds was not monitored by the Bundesrechnungshof (Federal Audit Office) until the early 1960s. In practice this lack of oversight allowed the BND to bypass the approval needed for permanent staff appointments. Such an arrangement would have been "unthinkable in traditional government agencies," as the first head of the BND's personnel department recalled.[132] The Chancellery knew about this arrangement and recognized its implications: "Although it exists, the service's substructure is not visible in the organizational chart," a Chancellery employee noted shortly before the takeover.[133] The political will to transform the Gehlen Organization into a German intelligence service as quickly and smoothly as possible shaped the actions of the responsible authorities, namely the Chancellery and the Federal Audit Office. They believed and accepted what Gehlen and his staff presented as necessary for successful espionage, just as they had believed and accepted the importance of the "bulkhead system." Clarifying exactly whom and what they were committing to and funding was of secondary importance.

The case of Alfred Bentzinger illustrates just how easy it was to hide obscure figures within the "ND personnel" category. It is also an example of how Gehlen himself exploited this option. Bentzinger, who had been a senior

member of the Information section since spring 1946, was the head of field office 114 (later renamed GV L), which recruited numerous figures who had formerly been involved in the Third Reich's machinery of persecution and repression, including the double agent Heinz Felfe. In 1953, after several security leaks, the office was closed, and Bentzinger was put in charge of another field office with a reduced remit.[134] Kurt Kohler, to whom Bentzinger reported, described the latter as an "experienced intelligence practitioner" with "a not entirely honest character, scheming, more cunning than clever." According to Kohler, Bentzinger was in no way a "leader by nature."[135] In Gehlen's view, however, Bentzinger had proved to be of value over the years, having been involved in several politically sensitive domestic operations. Gehlen wished to keep the well-informed employee on as the head of a field office, in the hope that this would keep him within the service and on good terms with it.

After the Gehlen Organization was superseded by the BND, Bentzinger's employment status was thrown into question. As a highly paid field office director—since July 1951 he had been in pay grade TO.A (Tarifordnung Angestellte, pay scale of public civil service employees) I[136]—he counted among the senior full-time personnel who were now to be appointed federal employees. However, the Chancellery would not have been able to approve the appointment of this former Abwehr Feldwebel (an NCO rank) because he lacked the qualifications required for a career as a senior civil servant.[137] Gehlen was not prepared to accept this: "In view of his current responsibilities and previous service, Bentzinger should continue to be remunerated in line with TO.A I. He is therefore to be classified accordingly. A statement from the BKA [Bundeskanzleramt, or Chancellery] can be deferred in this special case."[138] The "ND personnel" category offered a way around the problem. Bentzinger was transferred to this category in December 1958, retroactive to April 1, 1957, but remunerated in line with TO.A I. All this occurred without Bentzinger meeting the official requirements and without the approval or even knowledge of the Chancellery. Bentzinger was one of the BND employees whom the Chancellery knew existed but preferred not to know too much about. The deception did not come to light until three years later, when the Federal Audit Office, which had only recently tightened its audit criteria, was conducting its routine annual audit.[139] The far-reaching room for maneuver afforded the BND in the form of "ND personnel" allowed it to retain full-time employees for years, even if they had tainted pasts or lacked the necessary qualifications. Gehlen and his senior staff had managed to preserve structures in which everyone could be comfortably accommodated. As a result, the makeup of the BND's staff remained heavily influenced by its predecessor organization until

the 1960s. Dozens of people with heavy involvement in the Nazi persecution machinery were a part of the operation from the beginning.[140]

Conclusion

The establishment of the BND is inextricably linked with the creation of the Gehlen Organization. The first few months of the intelligence service funded by the US Army were very different from those described in Gehlen's founding narrative. In a powerful act of mythmaking, the first president of the BND retrospectively invested his organization with a rigor it did not in fact have. He first employed this myth very successfully in his leadership battle with Hermann Baun and returned to it in the years that followed. His struggle to create a unified German intelligence service supposedly based on the experiences of the war, the putative "gentleman's agreement" with General Edwin L. Sibert, and the alleged breach of trust by Baun, who according to Gehlen first acknowledged and then undermined Gehlen's claim to leadership: all these narratives follow the same pattern. Gehlen carefully presented them to superiors, policy makers, and the public whenever he needed to highlight his unwavering patriotism and steadfastness in the face of the American world power. Many words could be used to describe the early days of the Gehlen Organization, but "rigor" is not one of them. Gehlen aligned himself much more closely with the United States and assured the Americans of his unconditional loyalty more convincingly than the recalcitrant, assertive Baun. In fact, it was not Gehlen but Baun who tried to defend the autonomy of Operation Rusty from the US Army. The decision to install Gehlen as chief was made with a view to the hoped-for handover of Operation Rusty to the incipient US intelligence service. With Gehlen at the helm, it was easier to pretend that a well-structured, manageable espionage apparatus was already in place.

The reality was very different. From spring 1946 an espionage apparatus had been hastily cobbled together, and before long no one could keep track of it. Gehlen's appointment as chief did little to change either the weak management at the top of the organization or the autonomy the field offices had enjoyed from the start. The dubious organizational principles that had been established under Baun remained in place, as Gehlen was unwilling and unable to reform them. When placed under pressure, he adopted most of them. The founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, combined with the arrival of the CIA in Pullach, transformed conditions for the Gehlen Organization and increased its political significance. As the label "bulkhead system" attests, Gehlen was adept at selling the persistent weaknesses and

glaring flaws in his organization as strengths. Deliberate mythmaking and self-mythologizing helped ensure that the questions other government agencies had to answer were not even asked when the BND was established in 1956. In some cases, structures that had been in place for ten years were simply preserved, and staff were retained who would not have been allowed to remain under the usual administrative regulations. It would take the BND and the Federal Republic years to pay the financial and political costs incurred, not to mention the costs in terms of professional competence and expertise.

Gehlen's maxims about the effective organization of an intelligence service became entrenched only after he was put in charge of Operation Rusty. Drawing on Baun's ideas and in collaboration with US Army officers, Gehlen worked from 1947 on creating an institutional solution that would integrate intelligence gathering and analysis in the military, political, and economic fields. He defined norms for the service's organizational structure that would soon become unchallenged doctrines. The institutions in charge of the service—the Federal Chancellery, the Federal Audit Service, and the parliamentary groups in the Bundestag—were gullible, turned a blind eye, or else (in the case of the Chancellery) acted in their own political interests. They took instruction from Gehlen—whom those in the know did not regard as a true expert—on how to organize and monitor (or rather, fail to monitor) a foreign intelligence service. A political lack of interest combined with a determination to establish the service as soon as possible enabled Gehlen, alias "Dr. Schneider," to turn his ideas and personal ambitions into reality and transform his organization into a national intelligence service. The institutional roots of the BND lie in the postwar period, not in wartime, and certainly not in the mid-1950s, when it was created. The official establishment of the BND on April 1, 1956, was little more than a relabeling. In terms of staff and structures, the service continued to be the Gehlen Organization.

Notes

Translation by Sinéad Crowe

1. Reinhard Gehlen, *Der Dienst: Erinnerungen 1942–1971* (Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler, 1971), 149–50.

2. Wolfgang Wehner, *Geheim: Ein Dokumentarbericht über die deutschen Geheimdienste* (Munich: Süddeutscher Verlag, 1960), 106; Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, "Der Mann ohne Gesicht," *Die Zeit*, April 26, 1968, 10; E. H. Cookridge, *Gehlen: Spy of the Century* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1971), 134–35. Hermann Zolling and Heinz Höhne express cautious skepticism in *Pullach intern: General Gehlen und die Geschichte des Bundesnachrichtendienstes* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1971), 110–11.

3. Peter F. Müller and Michael Mueller, *Gegen Freund und Feind: Der BND: Geheime Politik und schmutzige Geschäfte* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2002), 579–85. For an assessment of the BND's work during the Prague Spring, see Andreas Hilger and Armin Müller, *"Das ist kein Gerücht, sondern echt": Der BND und der "Prager Frühling"* (Marburg: Unabhängige Historikerkommission zur Erforschung der Geschichte des Bundesnachrichtendienstes 1945–1968, 2014).

4. Bundeskanzleramt (hereafter BK-Amt), VS-Registratur, Az. 15100 (221), Klaus Kinkel, speech to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the BND, n.d., ca. April 1, 1981.

5. Wolfgang Krieger, "German-American Intelligence Relations, 1945–1956: New Evidence on the Origins of the BND," in *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 22, no. 1 (March 2011): 28–43; Wolfgang Krieger, "US Patronage of German Postwar Intelligence," in *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, ed. Loch K. Johnson (New York: Routledge, 2007), 91–102; Jens Wegener, *Die Organisation Gehlen und die USA: Deutsch-amerikanische Geheimdienstbeziehungen 1945–1949* (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2008).

6. The Federal Commissioner for Administrative Efficiency (Bundesbeauftragte für Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Verwaltung, BWV) is responsible for publishing reports and briefs with proposals for administrative efficiency at the federal level, a role traditionally performed by the president of the Bundesrechnungshof (Federal Audit Office). See Friedrich von Pfuhlstein, "Über die Institution des Bundesbeauftragten für Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Verwaltung," in *Verfassung, Verwaltung, Finanzkontrolle*, ed. Eckart Schiffer and Helmut Karehnke (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1975), 375–404.

7. BND-Archiv, 150267, fols. 5–6, "BWV, Gutachten über die Organisation Gehlen (Organisatorische Gliederung, Personal-, Sach- und Geldbedarf), März 1955."

8. On the creation of the intelligence apparatus see Thomas Wolf, *Die Entstehung des BND: Aufbau, Finanzierung, Kontrolle* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2018), 37–43, 52–62.

9. Gerhard Wessel (1913–2002) joined the FHO in 1942 and became its chief after Gehlen was removed in April 1945. He was a member of the Gehlen Organization until the end of 1951 and then joined Amt Blank, the predecessor of the Federal Ministry of Defense. After being taken on by the Bundeswehr in 1956, he helped establish the Military Counterintelligence Service (Militärischer Abschirmdienst, MAD). On May 1, 1968, Wessel succeeded Gehlen as BND president. For further information on Wessel's biography, see Dieter Krüger, "Gerhard Wessel (1913–2002): Der Ziehsohn Gehlens an der Spitze des BND," in *Konspiration als Beruf: Deutsche Geheimdienstchefs im Kalten Krieg*, ed. Dieter Krüger and Armin Wagner (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2003), 264–83.

10. BND-Archiv, Nachlass (personal papers, hereafter NL) 11, vol. 1 and vol. 2. See Winfried Meyer, *Klatt. Hitlers jüdischer Meisteragent gegen Stalin: Überlebenskunst in Holocaust und Geheimdienstkrieg* (Berlin: Metropol, 2015), 232–34.

11. The plan itself has not survived, but it is mentioned in "Lewis to Galloway, September 22, 1949," in *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945–49: A Documentary History*, vol. 1, ed. Kevin C. Ruffner [hereafter *Intelligence Partnership*, vol. 1] (Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, European Division, Directorate of Operations, 1999), 154–57, here 154.

12. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 9, "Wessel an Gehlen, 8.3.1946."

13. For example, in April 1946 Baun received almost exactly the 25,000 cigarettes he had requested. Over the course of the next five months, this rose to 160,000 cigarettes. During the same period, the cash he received rose from around $9,000 to around $40,000. See "Burress to Vandenberg, October 1, 1946," in *Intelligence Partnership*, vol. 1, 103–23, here 120–21.

14. These figures are estimates produced several years later to document the service's growing staff numbers from 1946 onward. While they are not exact, they attest to a rapid increase in employee numbers over the first few months, an increase confirmed in other sources. BND-Archiv, Digitalisierte Karten, K99_8.3, "Personnel Strength," n.d. [September 1949].

15. Records in Gerhard Wessel's work journal, BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10.

16. John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia* (New York: Viking Press, 1947).

17. Mary Ellen Reese, *Organisation Gehlen: Der Kalte Krieg und der Aufbau des deutschen Geheimdienstes* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1992), 67, 104, 119–20. Deane retired from the US Army as a four-star general in 1977, while Waldman left the military in 1952 to pursue an academic career, teaching political science at Marquette University in Milwaukee and at the University of Calgary.

18. BND-Archiv, NL 4, vol. 17, fol. 62, "Siegfried Graber, Notizen zu einem Aufbau (1945–1946)," 1991. This is supported by the CIA's later assessment of the army's lax leadership principles: "Money and services were furnished in exchange for information." The intelligence agency was baffled by the army's cultivation of "uninquisitive, unprying, and uninterfering habits": "Central Europe Division to Assistant Director for Special Operations, July 21, 1950," in *Intelligence Partnership*, vol. 1, 361.

19. On the creation, structure, and activities of the frontline intelligence units, see Meyer, *Klatt*, 232–42; Winfried Meyer, "Subtile Reparaturarbeiten am Gehlen-Mythos: Anmerkungen zu Magnus Pahl, Fremde Heere Ost," *Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (2013): 24–38, here 31; Vadim J. Birstein, *Smersh: Stalin's Secret Weapon. Soviet Military Counterintelligence in WWII* (London: Biteback Publishing, 2011), 147–52.

20. For example, Siegfried Graber, Gustav-Adolf Tietze, and Ferdinand Boedingheimer were all assigned responsibilities similar to those they had during the war under Baun. BND-Archiv, NL 4, vol. 15, fol. 110, "Aufklärungsgruppe," n.d., ca. July 1946; "Etatmäßige Stellenbesetzung der den Heeresverbänden für 'Barbarossa' zugeteilten Abwehrgruppen (Stand: 10.6.1941)," in *Das Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*, ed. Norbert Müller et al. (Koblenz: Bundesarchiv, 2007), 499; Susanne Meinl and Bodo Hechelhammer, *Geheimobjekt Pullach: Von der NS-Mustersiedlung zur Zentrale des BND* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2014), 170; Magnus Pahl, *Fremde Heere Ost: Hitlers militärische Feindaufklärung* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2012), 428.

21. See the references in the autobiography of Hitler's chief pilot: Hans Baur, *Mit Hitler über Europa: Als Flugkapitän im Dienste des Reiches* (Kiel: Arndt, 2012), 169–70.

22. BND-Archiv, NL 4, vol. 17, fol. 62, "Graber, Notizen."

23. Baun's remarks to American interrogating officers in summer 1945: The National Archives of the UK, KV 2/1502, 3–4, "The Development of the 'Geheimer Meldedienst' from

the End of the First World War until the Termination of the Second World War." Those who had served alongside Baun during the war also commented on his maverick organizational approach; see Meyer, *Klatt*, 240.

24. BND-Archiv, NL 4, vol. 17, fols. 74–75, "Graber, Notizen."

25. On the example of field office 120, see Gerhard Sälter, "Kameraden: Nazi-Netzwerke und die Rekrutierung hauptamtlicher Mitarbeiter," in *Die Geschichte der Organisation Gehlen und des BND 1945–1968: Umrisse und Einblicke*, ed. Jost Dülffer et al. (Marburg: Unabhängige Historikerkommission zur Erforschung der Geschichte des Bundesnachrichtendienstes 1945–1968, 2014), 39–50.

26. BND-Archiv, 220000, V-600, fol. 4, "Personalkennkarte," n.d.; BND-Archiv, 1402, "Gruppe Bohlen, GV 'H', 6.5.1970"; BND-Archiv, NL 4, vol. 18, fol. 21, "Siegfried Graber, Notizen zu einem Aufbau, II. Teil, 1992/1993"; BND-Archiv, NL 18, "Erinnerungsbericht Eva Morgenstern, 1965."

27. On Herre's biography, see Meinl and Hechelhammer, *Geheimobjekt Pullach*, 172–74.

28. On Bentzinger's recruitment and his service up to 1945, see James H. Critchfield, *Auftrag Pullach: Die Organisation Gehlen 1948–1956* (Hamburg: Mittler, 2005), 47; BND-Archiv, NL 4, vol. 17, fol. 71, "Graber, Notizen"; BND-Archiv, 220000, V-3030, fol. 67, "Anmeldung Bentzinger, 18.3.1953."

29. BND-Archiv, NL 2, vol. 1, fols. 40–45, here fol. 41, "Heinz Herre, 26.2.1947."

30. At the end of March 1947, thirty-four of the sixty-eight counterintelligence and counterespionage missions that had been assigned to the field offices had been accomplished either not at all or only partially. BND-Archiv, 122288, fols. 1855–59, here fol. 1858–59, "III (Spionageabwehr/Gegenspionage) an Mitteleuropäische Zentrale (MEZ), 28.3.1947."

31. Ronny Heidenreich, *Die DDR-Spionage des BND: Von den Anfängen bis zum Mauerbau* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2019), 79–83.

32. BND-Archiv, NL 15, vol. 2, fol. 14, Roman Hönlinger, "Die Anfänge der Beschaffung und zu Personen in der Vorläuferorganisation, 1983."

33. By the end of the war he had become a major, and his field office was located in Stuttgart. Counterintelligence Report No. 216 contains a report on the displaced persons camp in Geislingen: BND-Archiv, 122276, fol. 969, "III, Abwehrmeldung Nr. 216, 24.2.1947, Anlage 18."

34. BND-Archiv, 122288, fol. 101, "III, Anlage zu Aufkl.Auftrag Nr. 41, 14.11.1946."

35. Astrid M. Eckert, *Kampf um die Akten: Die Westalliierten und die Rückgabe von deutschem Archivgut nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), 22–76.

36. Gehlen, *Dienst*, 135–47, here 137; see also Reese, *Organisation Gehlen*, 86–110; Wegener, *Organisation Gehlen*, 57–66. Reese and Wegener mainly follow the accounts provided by the early Gehlen supporters John Boker and Eric Waldman, which are published in *Intelligence Partnership*, vol. 1, 19–34, 45–50.

37. Esther-Julia Howell, *Von den Besiegten lernen? Die kriegsgeschichtliche Kooperation der U.S. Armee und der ehemaligen Wehrmachtselite, 1945–1961* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2016); Derek R. Mallett, *Hitler's Generals in America: Nazi POWs and Allied Military Intelligence* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013); Linda Hunt, *Secret*

Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

38. Mallett, *Hitler's Generals*, 139, 164.

39. Meyer, "Subtile Reparaturarbeiten," 31.

40. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 9, "Gehlen an Wessel, 28.11.1945."

41. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 9, "Gehlen an Wessel, 16.4.1946."

42. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 9, "Wessel an Gehlen, 25.5.1946."

43. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 9, "Gehlen an Wessel, 16.4.1946."

44. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 9, "Wessel an Gehlen, 25.5.1946."

45. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 9, "Vorschläge für Maßnahmen und Umorganisation nach Eintreffen Gruppe Fritz, 28.6.1946."

46. "Deane to Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, USFET, July 2, 1946," in *Intelligence Partnership*, vol. 1, 93–97, here 95.

47. "Deane to Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, USFET, July 2, 1946," 94.

48. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Diensttagebuch Gerhard Wessels, Eintrag vom 15.7.1946."

49. In fall 1946 Gehlen and his colleagues also wrote the "Vandenburg Report," a detailed account for the Central Intelligence Group of the results of the operation's work to date. The redacted report is published in *Intelligence Partnership*, vol. 1, 103–23. Wessel's work journal documents the fact that Gehlen's group authored these reports: BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10.

50. Shortly before the end of the war, American and British government officials received the following bon mot, which was ascribed to Stalin: "German heads of State and German Ambassadors to Moscow came and went—but Gustav Hilger remained." Cited in "Interrogation Report Gustav Hilger, October 13, 1945," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*. Part III: *From 1940 through 1945*. Series A: *The Soviet Union and Finland*, vol. 6: *January 1945–December 1945*, ed. Anita Prazmowska (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1997), 280; CIA, Electronic Reading Room (hereafter ERR), Hilger, Gustav, "Military Intelligence Service, 208596, October 11, 1945." See also Eckart Conze et al., *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik* (Munich: Blessing, 2010), 369–73.

51. BND-Archiv, NL 4, vol. 15, fol. 110, "Aufklärungsgruppe, Juli 1946."

52. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Diensttagebuch Gerhard Wessels, Eintrag vom 3.8.1946"; BND-Archiv, NL 4, vol. 17, fol. 65, "Graber, Notizen"; BND-Archiv, NL 17, vol. 1, fol. 12, "Kurt Kohler, Erinnerungssplitter."

53. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Diensttagebuch Gerhard Wessels, Eintrag vom 10.12.1946."

54. BND-Archiv, NL 4, vol. 17, fol. 5, "Graber, Notizen."

55. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Diensttagebuch Gerhard Wessels, Einträge vom 19.9., 17.10., 19.10., 29.10. u. 18.11.1946."

56. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Diensttagebuch Gerhard Wessels, Eintrag vom 4.11.1946."

57. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Liste der Angehörigen der Evaluation Group (Auswertungsgruppe), 1.11.1946."

58. Matters were further complicated from September 1946, when both sections no longer worked at the same location in Oberursel. In mid-August, rumors had emerged that the operation had been discovered by Soviet and other American intelligence services. To hide the army's role in the operation, the leaders of the Information Gathering section were relocated to a former hotel in Schmitten, around twenty kilometers from Oberursel. Baun moved into his own house nearby. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Diensttagebuch Gerhard Wessels, Eintrag vom 22.8.1946"; BND-Archiv, 1111, fols. 28–30, here fol. 29, "Plan for the Organization Otto Based on the Directions of G2, 23.8.1946."

59. These missions were numbered; not all of them have survived. BND-Archiv, 122699, fol. 2249, "Aufklärungsauftrag Nr. 29 datiert vom 8.1.1947."

60. These were also labeled "intelligence missions." Between August 1946 and the end of that year, around fifty of these missions were sent by counterintelligence and counterespionage agents to the field offices. BND-Archiv, 122288, fols. 1588–90.

61. BND-Archiv, 122699, fol. 2251, "Aufklärungsauftrag Nr. 25, 10.11.1946." Reference is made there to "Counterintelligence Report No. 53" and follow-up questions are posed with reference to the relevant lines of the report. The report has not survived. Thematically, the questions correspond completely with the content of the German version of "Counterintelligence Report No. 53," but the line numbers differ. It is likely, therefore, that the Evaluation team was provided with the English version only.

62. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Diensttagebuch Gerhard Wessels, Eintrag vom 10.12.1946."

63. "USFET, G-2 Division to Chief Intelligence Branch, September 24, 1946," in *Intelligence Partnership*, vol. 1, 124–27.

64. Klaus-Dietmar Henke, *Geheime Dienste: Die politische Inlandsspionage der Organisation Gehlen 1946–1953* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2018).

65. Gehlen, *Dienst*, 149–50.

66. Ludwell Lee Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950–February 1953* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 186.

67. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Diensttagebuch Gerhard Wessels, Eintrag vom 30.8.1946." See also Wegener, *Organisation Gehlen*, 72; Critchfield, *Auftrag Pullach*, 50–51.

68. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Diensttagebuch Gerhard Wessels, Eintrag vom 30.8.1946."

69. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Diensttagebuch Gerhard Wessels, Eintrag vom 30.9.1946."

70. "Order of battle" refers to ongoing gathering of intelligence on the enemy's military strength and troop deployment.

71. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Evaluation Group, Anhalt für die Aufgabenverteilung, 15.11.1946."

72. Meyer, "Subtile Reparaturarbeiten," 27–28.

73. Reinhard Gehlen, *Verschlußsache* (Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler, 1980), 27.

74. "Helms, Memorandum for the Records: 'Operation Rusty', December 19, 1946," in *Intelligence Partnership*, vol. 1, 195.

75. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Richtlinien für die Weiterführung der Operation Rusty, 27.12.1946"; the word in italics is the correction that Gehlen inserted by hand.

76. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Denkschrift über die Notwendigkeit neuer Führungsmaßnahmen in der Operation Rusty, 13.1.1947"; BND-Archiv 1111, fols. 89–93, here fol. 89. According to a handwritten comment, the draft was written by Wessel.

77. BND-Archiv, 1111, fol. 97, "Festlegung der wesentlichen Besprechungspunkte vom 16.1.1947."

78. BND-Archiv, 1111, fol. 98, "Deane an German Chief of Operation Rusty, 25.2.1947"; see also *Intelligence Partnership*, vol. 1, 201.

79. On Klocke's life and career, see Thomas Wolf, "Compromised Cooperation: Scholarly Experts on Eastern Europe in the Service of West German Intelligence in the Early Cold War," in *Intelligence Agencies, Technology and Knowledge Production: Data Processing and Information Transfer in Secret Services during the Cold War*, ed. Rüdiger Bergien, Debora Gerstenberger, and Constantin Goschler (Abingdon: Routledge, 2022), 18–36, here 27–29. On the functions and organizational development of the Luftwaffe's intelligence service, see Meyer, *Klatt*, 219–26; Pahl, *Fremde Heere Ost*, 169–87; Horst Boog, "German Air Intelligence in the Second World War," in *Intelligence and National Security* 5, no. 2 (1990): 350–424.

80. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 10, "Gliederung der Evaluation Group, Entwurf, 20.3.1947."

81. "The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign (Ic-Dienst Ost)," in *German Military Intelligence, 1939–1945*, ed. Military Intelligence Division (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984), 1–135, here 8; the German version, *Auswertemethoden des deutschen Ic Dienstes im Osten*, is in the BND-Archiv, NL 13, vol. 1. On the study's function as Gehlen's "application" for the army, see "John Boker, Report of Initial Contacts with General Gehlen's Organization, May 1, 1952," in *Intelligence Partnership*, vol. 1, 19–34, here 25.

82. BND-Archiv, 220000, V-53115, fols. 20–21, "Anmeldung Hans-Jürgen Dingler, 19.2.1960."

83. BND-Archiv, NL 4, vol. 15, fols. 122–24, "Graber, Bearbeitung historischer Vorgänge," here "Schreiben v. 17.9.1947 u. 25.5.1981."

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86. BND-Archiv, 122288, fol. 1406, "III an MEZ, 25.3.1947."

87. BND-Archiv, 122288, fols. 1450–53, here fol. 1453, "Z/III an MEZ, 16.6.1947."

88. BND-Archiv, 122288, fol. 1528, "7/III an diverse Dienststellen, 24.10.1947."

89. "[Bossard] to [Galloway], May 5, 1947," in *Intelligence Partnership*, vol. 1, 341–42.

90. BND-Archiv, 122288, fol. 1592, "III, Aufklärungsauftrag Nr. 5, 30.8.1946." On Dohnal's biography, see the details in BND-Archiv, NL 17, vol. 1, fol. 10, "Kohler, Erinnerungssplitter"; BND-Archiv, NL 4, vol. 17, fol. 24, "Graber, Notizen."

91. BND-Archiv, NL 4, vol. 1, fol. 38, "90 Z/Chef [Dingler], Zusammenarbeit 13 mit 4913, 29.4.1947."

92. Meinl and Hechelhammer, *Geheimobjekt Pullach*, 191.

93. BND-Archiv, 220212, fols. 7, 9–15, 84–85; BND-Archiv, NL 17, vol. 1, fols. 4–5, 9, "Kohler, Erinnerungssplitter."

94. BND-Archiv, NL 4, vol. 3, fol. 173, "Arbeitsbereich 13 (Stand vom 1.12.1946)"; BND-Archiv, NL 4, vol. 17, fol. 87, "Graber, Notizen."

95. BND-Archiv, NL 2, vol. 1, fols. 35–39, here fol. 37, "Heinz Herre, Gesprächsnotiz, 20.1.1947."

96. Krieger, "German-American Intelligence Relations," 34–37; Wegener, *Organisation Gehlen*, 81–84.

97. On Critchfield's biography, see his memoirs, *Auftrag Pullach*; Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men. Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 133, 157.

98. BND-Archiv, NL 2, vol. 1, fols. 162–63, "Aktennotiz über Gedankenaustausch 20 [Critchfield]—34 a [Herre], 14.10.1949."

99. CIA, ERR, Globke, Hans, "Chief of Station Karlsruhe to Chief Foreign Division M, [. . .]-Globke Meeting, August 9, 1951"; CIA, ERR, Globke, Hans, "Chief of Mission Frankfurt to Chief EE (Eastern European Division), Meeting with CAUSA, August 22, 1953."

100. CIA, ERR, Heusinger, Adolf, "William G. Wyman to Deputy Director (Plans), May 26, 1951."

101. College of William and Mary, Digital Archive, Diary of Heinz Danko Herre, "Diensttagebuch Herre, Einträge vom 13.9.1949 u. 6.2.1950"; BND-Archiv, 4021, fols. 71–73, "75,2 [Verwaltung], Detaillierung des verlangten Abrechnungssystems durch Mr. Baxter am 6.10.1949."

102. BND-Archiv, 3196, fols. 175–81, "31 [Nachrichtenbeschaffung] an 30 [Gehlen], 26.11.1949."

103. College of William and Mary, Digital Archive, Diary of Heinz Danko Herre, "Diensttagebuch Herre, Eintrag vom 20.2.1950." The CIA was also fully aware of his shift. See "Chief of Station Karlsruhe to Chief FDM, March 25, 1950," in *Intelligence Partnership*, vol. 1, 345–56, here 347.

104. "Helms to Chief EE, September 3, 1953," in *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*: *CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949–56*, vol. 2, ed. Kevin C. Ruffner (Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, and European Division, Directorate of Operations, 2006), 474–75.

105. Constantin Goschler and Michael Wala, *Keine neue Gestapo: Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2015), 26–91; Daniell Bastian, *Westdeutsches Polizeirecht unter alliierter Besatzung (1945–1955)* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010); Herbert Reinke and Gerhard Fürmetz, "Polizei-Politik

in Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung," in *Staat, Demokratie und Innere Sicherheit in Deutschland*, ed. Hans-Jürgen Lange (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2000), 67–86.

106. Wolf, *Entstehung des BND*, 273–356.

107. BND-Archiv, 1110, vol. 1, fols. 72–78, here fols. 72–73, "30 [Gehlen], Reise nach Bonn v. 10.–14.12.1950."

108. BK-Amt, VS-Registratur, Az. 15100 (64), vol. 1, fols. 11–16, "Grundfragen einer zweckmäßigen ND-Spitzenorganisation, 13.3.1951"; fols. 20–38, "Vorschlag für Gliederung und Aufbau eines Deutschen Nachrichtendienstes, 1.11.1951"; fols. 52–55, "Vortragsnotiz, 21.5.1952."

109. Archiv der sozialen Demokratie Bonn (hereafter AdsD), SPD-BT-Fraktion, 2. WP, Mappe 234, "Beermann, Organisation Gehlen, 17.5.1955"; see also Stefanie Waske, *Mehr Liaison als Kontrolle: Die Kontrolle des BND durch Parlament und Regierung 1955–1978* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), 29.

110. Ronny Heidenreich, Daniela Münkel and Elke Stadelmann-Wenz, *Geheimdienstkrieg in Deutschland: Die Konfrontation von DDR-Staatssicherheit und Organisation Gehlen 1953* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2016).

111. "4. Sitzung, 11.12.1953," in *Der Bundestagsausschuss für Verteidigung: Der Ausschuss für Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit, Januar 1953 bis Juli 1954*, ed. Bruno Thoß on behalf of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 2010), 707.

112. BND-Archiv, op. Akte 24854, fols. 48–50, "Mü., Organisation Gehlen, Beilage 1: Berichtsabschnitt, 7.1.1954."

113. The document's style and content indicate that this was its intended use. There is evidence that it was passed on to the Chancellery. BND-Archiv, 1172, fols. 184–201; Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 136/50221, fols. 172–89.

114. Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 136/50221, fol. 179, "Bericht, 9.12.1953."

115. BND-Archiv, 150267, fol. 10, "BWV, Gutachten, März 1955."

116. The secret service theorist and CIA employee Sherman Kent, who had met Gehlen during his time in the United States, had the following to stay about a dogmatic "bulkhead system" in his fundamental study published in 1949: "It can become its own worst enemy. For if it allows the mechanisms of security to cut it off from some of the most significant lines of guidance, it destroys its own reason of existence." Kent warned against allowing security regulations to become an end in themselves: "I am concerned with the point that security is like armor. You can pile on the armor until the man inside is absolutely safe and absolutely useless." Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence* (Princeton, 1949), 167–68, 193.

117. "Personalvertretungsgesetz vom 5.8.1955," in *Bundesgesetzblatt* I (1955): 477–79.

118. AdsD, SPD-Bundestagsfraktion, 4. WP, fol. 871, "Erler to Schmitt-Vockenhausen, 14.11.1963"; Waske, *Mehr Liaison*, 91–92.

119. BND-Archiv, 4474, fols. 3–4, "89 [Petitionswesen] an 770 pers. [Herre], Kritische Betrachtungen zu Missständen im BND und Vorschläge zur Behebung, 15.5.1962."

120. Norman J. Goda, "The Gehlen Organization and the Heinz Felfe Case: The SD, the KGB, and West German Counterintelligence," in *A Nazi Past: Recasting German Identity in Postwar Europe*, ed. David A. Messenger and Katrin Paehler (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 271–94.

121. The Chancellery official in charge at the time later said: "Felfe was one of former President Gehlen's closest confidants and, despite being just a senior civil servant, he could effortlessly navigate the bulkhead system, which for others was very strictly upheld." Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik, NL Bachmann, 1-798-002/4, "UAL III A [Bachmann] an Ministerialdirektor Selbach, 2.7.1968."

122. BND-Archiv, NL 1, vol. 61, fol. 100, "Stellungnahme Dr. Karl-Eberhard Henke an Gerhard Wessel, 9.11.1972."

123. Gehlen, *Dienst*, 288.

124. BND-Archiv, 1088, fols. 54–56, here fol. 55, "Auswirkungen des Falles Felfe auf Aufbauplanung und Organisation des BND, 2.9.1963."

125. Christopher Grey provides an analysis of this security measure's impact on an intelligence organization and its employees in *Decoding Organization: Bletchley Park, Codebreaking and Organizational Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 121–32.

126. Goschler and Wala, *Keine neue Gestapo*, 141–60; Bernd Stöver, "Der Fall Otto John: Neue Dokumente zu den Aussagen des deutschen Geheimdienstchefs gegenüber MfS und KGB," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 47, no. 1 (January 1999): 103–36.

127. Erich Mende, "Zur Neuorganisation des Staatsschutzes, 3.8.1954," *Freie Demokratische Korrespondenz* 5, no. 50 (1954): 7–11.

128. "Stenografischer Bericht über die 7. Sitzung des Ausschusses zum Schutz der Verfassung, 27.7.1954," in Reinhard Schiffers, *Verfassungsschutz und parlamentarische Kontrolle in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1957: Mit einer Dokumentation zum "Fall John" im Bundestagsausschuss zum Schutz der Verfassung* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1997), 97–98.

129. Thomas Wolf, "Secret Publicity: Die Presseberichterstattung über Reinhard Gehlen in der frühen Bundesrepublik" (unpublished *Staatsexamen* thesis, Dresden 2011).

130. BND-Archiv, 4021, fols. 111–14, "30/37 [Verwaltungs- und Rechtsabteilung] an 30,0 [Horst von Mellenthin], 6.11.1953."

131. BND-Archiv, 150267, fols. 13–14, "BWV, Gutachten, März 1955."

132. BND-Archiv, NL 71, vol. 2, fols. 61–64, here fol. 63, "Joachim von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, Stellungnahme zu den offenen Fragen des BND-Archivs vom 11.11.1991."

133. BK-Amt, VS-Registratur, Az. 15103 (18), vol. 1, fols. 46–49, here fol. 47, "Bemerkungen zum Haushaltsvoranschlag des BND, 28.2.1956."

134. Bentzinger's new office was responsible for investigations against former employees accused of treason or embezzlement; BND-Archiv, 104518, "105 [Operationelle Sicherheit] an 902 [Langkau], 10.5.1960."

135. BND-Archiv, Personalakte Alfred Bentzinger (P-192-OT), fol. 10, "L 122 [Kurt Kohler], Beurteilungsnotiz über Herrn Bender (Dst. 142), 21.3.1955." Critchfield, *Auftrag Pullach*, 186–92, describes Bentzinger's relationship with the CIC, the US Army's counterintelligence service. In addition, Bentzinger had "access to the most important files in Pullach," according to Critchfield (192). On Kohler's security division and Bentzinger's field office, see Gerhard Sälter, *Phantome des Kalten Krieges*: *Die Organisation Gehlen und die Wiederbelebung des Gestapo-Feindbildes "Rote Kapelle"* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2016).

136. BND-Archiv, P-192-OT, fol. 27, "Festsetzung der Grundvergütung des Bentzinger, Alfred," n.d., ca. 1957.

137. BND-Archiv, P-192-OT, fol. 25, "511/R [Personalabteilung], Einstufung Ma. Bentzinger—142—, 9.12.1957."

138. BND-Archiv, P-192-OT, fol. 29, "70 [Gehlen] an 511 [Personalabteilung], 20.1.1958."

139. BND-Archiv, 4109, fols. 85–86, "Niederschrift über die Prüfung der Jahresrechnung des BND, 10.5.1962."

140. This issue is specifically addressed by Sabrina Nowack, *Sicherheitsrisiko NS-Belastung: Personalüberprüfungen im Bundesnachrichtendienst in den 1960er Jahren* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2016), Christoph Rass, *Das Sozialprofil des Bundesnachrichtendienstes: Von den Anfängen bis 1968* (Berlin, Ch. Links Verlag, 2016), and Sälter, *Phantome*.

Programming with the Class Enemy

The Stasi, Siemens, and IT Knowledge Transfer during the Cold War

RÜDIGER BERGIEN

This article shows how the East German Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, MfS, colloquially known as the Stasi) managed to get hold of West German computer technology even without its usual spying and smuggling methods. In 1970, Siemens delivered three of their most modern mainframes quite officially and with the blessing of the West German government to an East Berlin front company disguising the Stasi's main computing center. Technicians, programmers, and Siemens sales personnel even provided "IT support" for Division XIII of the MfS and delivered spare parts, new software versions, and peripheral equipment. Western technology enabled the Stasi to jump-start its moves toward digitalization, which put it in the lead compared with other Eastern state security services until 1989.

Technology Transfer during the Cold War

The Siemens Data-Processing Division was remarkably tight-lipped about its most successful deal with a Socialist state.[1] While the company publicized the sale of one Siemens 4004/45 mainframe computer to the Moscow Institute of Computer Technology in April 1970, celebrating it as an act of bridge-building between West and East,[2] the sale of three 4004/45 computers to the Central Institute of Information and Documentation (Zentralinstitut für Information und Dokumentation, ZIID) in East Berlin at around the same time went unmentioned in corporate communications. No press releases were issued, and members of the Siemens managing board said nothing about the deal in speeches or interviews.[3] The silence surrounding a transaction worth 20 million deutsche marks (DM) may have had something to do with public opinion in West Germany at the time: Without doubt, trade with the Soviet Union, which had intimated a degree of openness to rapprochement, met with greater

approval than deals with the Ulbricht regime in its later years. But likely of equal importance was the fact that Siemens's customer did not appreciate publicity. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) declined to take part in the kind of handover ceremony that usually accompanied deals of this magnitude. Moreover, for years, it refused to take the director of the Siemens West Berlin regional office on a tour of the computer center that had been equipped with Siemens technology. Organizing such a courtesy would have necessitated an extremely complex undercover operation, because the ZIID computer center was in fact Division XIII of the Staatssicherheit, or Stasi, East Germany's secret police agency.

In the early 1980s, if not earlier, West German intelligence learned from a defector named Horst Schuster that Siemens had sold its newest generation of mainframe computers to the Stasi in 1970. As director of the East German foreign trade company Interver, Schuster had arranged the deal with Siemens in 1969. After leaving the GDR with the assistance of the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) in 1983, Schuster shared what he knew about the relationship between Siemens and the Stasi. In 1994 Ingrid Köppe, a Bundestag member from the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen party, presented a "dissenting report"—a response to the majority report issued by the "Schalck" Committee of Inquiry—in which she quoted from the statements Schuster had made to the BND about the Siemens computers.[4] Köppe was seeking to prove that the federal government and West German corporations had been involved in the machinations of the East German Ministry of Foreign Trade's Commercial Coordination (Kommerzielle Koordinierung, KoKo) division. She invoked the sale of the computers to the ZIID in the context of alleged violations by Siemens and other West German companies of the CoCom embargo, which regulated exports of Western technology to the Eastern Bloc. But because Köppe quoted extensively from BND documents, her report was promptly declared classified and banished to the Bundestag's Secret Records Office.[5] As a result—but also because members of the Bundestag, in particular conservatives, questioned Köppe's credibility and motives, with some claiming she was acting on the instructions of former Stasi officers—hardly any attention was paid to her report in the years that followed.

Scholars of contemporary history have not investigated Köppe's claims in detail either, even though organizational history studies of specific divisions within the East German Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, MfS) have verified that the MfS computer center's hardware had indeed consisted of Siemens mainframe computers for more than a decade.[6] The prevailing image of Stasi data processing as kilometers of filing cabinets

and index card records partly explains this gap in the research. Historians have failed to recognize that the MfS made considerable use of computers, or else their perceptions have been colored by the mocking post-1989/90 discourse that reinforced the image of a technologically backward East German state.[7] Another reason for the gap is that research on contemporary and GDR history has long focused on the results of West–East technology transfer, such as the fairly efficient use of Western technology in the East German economy,[8] largely ignoring the transfer process itself. As a result, historians have failed to recognize that the transfer of technology—particularly advanced technology such as computers—is first and foremost a transfer of knowledge, and so requires a considerable degree of communication and interaction.[9] Thus historians have never investigated where the Stasi acquired the knowledge not just to keep three Western mainframe computers in operation, but also to make these the basis of their information system.

This article's central premise is that computers were used far more extensively in the MfS than they were in their Socialist "brother organs," including the KGB[10] and the Soviet Union's military intelligence service, the GRU,[11] and that the Stasi could not have achieved this level of computerization without Siemens. I will show that as well as using Siemens hardware, the MfS computer center received years of IT support from the Siemens West Berlin regional office, something that research to date has failed to examine. My research draws largely on MfS records because at the time of writing the sale of data-processing systems to the GDR is not documented in the Siemens AG archives in Berlin. However, the minutes of management meetings held in the Siemens archives do provide insights into the overall development of the company's Data-Processing Division. MfS archives, on the other hand, contain not only reports on meetings with Siemens employees, but also numerous original letters, offers, and draft contracts from Siemens.[12]

At the theoretical and methodological level, this article draws on scholarship on the history of knowledge and technology transfer to investigate how this unequal partnership came into being in 1969 and remained in place until 1989.[13] In addition, I investigate the forms that technology and knowledge transfer took in practice, examining how the Stasi adapted the IT expertise it gained from Siemens to both its information requirements and its key organizational objective—to maintain power by means of extensive surveillance. To fully understand the history of the relationship between the MfS and the Siemens Data-Processing Division, one must consider it in the context of the history of computerization in the MfS. This chapter opens with the beginnings of this latter history in 1964.

The Beginnings of Information Technology at the Stasi

When the Stasi acquired its first computers, it was under the impression that the GDR was being overrun by West Germans. In 1963 the GDR government and the West Berlin Senate signed a *Passierscheinabkommen*, a border pass agreement enabling West Germans to enter the GDR (by 1969, 5.4 million of them had done so), placing the Stasi under pressure to act.[14] Just when the "Antifascist Protection Barrier" (i.e., the Berlin Wall) was enabling the GDR to control its border with West Berlin, a new wave of potential "human traffickers," "agents," and other "enemies" (as the Stasi called them) began to flood into East German territory. The first border pass agreement covered the period between mid-December 1963 and early January 1964. Though it had involved lengthy negotiations, the agreement was finalized at the last minute, and the Stasi needed to channel large amounts of manpower and resources into implementing it. Monika Tantzscher describes the monitoring of the border pass agreement—which involved numbering West German visitors "Visitor 1," "Visitor 2," and so on—as the largest project the MfS had undertaken up to that point.[15] In 1964 the head of the Stasi, Erich Mielke, ordered the establishment of the Working Group on Securing Tourist Travel (Arbeitsgruppe zur Sicherung des Reiseverkehrs, ASR), whose tasks included documenting the hundreds of thousands of entry and transit applications submitted by West Germans. The ASR, however, suffered from considerable structural and personnel problems. By the end of 1964 it employed 115 people, three-quarters of whom were women, as was typical for divisions concerned with data collection, not just in the Stasi, but in other East German organizations too.[16] Most of the women working for the ASR were the wives of official Stasi employees and had been hastily recruited. In general, they recorded the applicants' personal details working from home.[17] The ASR director's decision that data be stored on punch cards was critical in turning the rather makeshift ASR into the nucleus of IT at the MfS.

Given his background and previous career path, Kurt Opitz, the first director of the ASR, may seem an unlikely candidate for *spiritus rector* of IT at the Stasi. Indeed, Opitz was a fairly unremarkable representative of his generation of MfS employees.[18] Born into a working-class family in 1918, he had no more than a basic education, served in the Wehrmacht, and joined the MfS in 1952. The only indication that he may have had an interest in technology was his apprenticeship as a mechanic. Yet according to those who knew him, Opitz believed in the importance of IT from the start: He was "the man who . . . said in the ministry, folks, we need to do this,"[19] and though as a lieutenant colonel

he was relatively low-ranking, he was able to compensate for his low grade via his direct line of communication with the deputy minister, Bruno Beater. By 1964 Opitz had recruited to the working group young, highly qualified university graduates, a cohort that had hitherto barely existed at the MfS. One such recruit was twenty-four-year-old Lothar D., who had studied electrical engineering and written his dissertation on "Preparing to Deploy an Electronic Data-Processing System." Another was Reiner H., also twenty-four years of age, a mathematics graduate who before joining the MfS had managed one of the first computer centers in the GDR, that of the Volkseigener Betrieb (VEB) Kohlekombinat Böhlen, a coal mine.[20] More than likely, it was Lothar D., Reiner H., and a few other of the first expert recruits who began work in 1964 at VEB Maschinelles Rechnen, a state mechanical calculation enterprise in Berlin,[21] where they set about developing formats that would allow ASR raw data to be automatically processed by calculating machines.[22]

This development work (which, incidentally, was conducted at night, as the VEB had no computers to spare during the day—not even for the Stasi) got off to a promising start. In early 1965 the MfS deputy minister, Beater, granted the ASR approval to purchase a Gamma 10, a small computer that was still very similar to a punch-card machine, from the French manufacturer Bull. An East German foreign trade company imported the computer for the MfS. By 1967 the MfS had purchased a second Gamma 10, and at the Leipzig Fall Trade Fair of that year, it bought a Bull BGE 115, a state-of-the-art second-generation computer. The BGE 115 had magnetic disk storage, which would enable the MfS to rapidly filter specific information from large amounts of data. In contrast to the Gamma 10, however, the BGE 115 could not be installed without the manufacturer's assistance. This prompted the MfS leadership to prioritize IT knowledge transfer and recognize it as perhaps the central prerequisite for computerization. In this case Main Directorate for Reconnaissance (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, HVA) sent undercover "unofficial collaborators" with a technological background to attend Bull training sessions in Paris. On their return to the GDR, the collaborators shared what they had learned with ASR employees.[23]

Under the leadership of Reiner Hoffman, Division 3 of the ASR became a bona fide computer center within just a few years. By 1969 it employed eighty people working on several projects simultaneously.[24] These included the Trade Fair Project, which stored the details of all Western visitors to the Leipzig fairs,[25] and Project 06/66, which involved several hundred ASR data collectors entering personal, travel, and vehicle information on all West Germans traveling to the GDR on day visas.[26] The latter database sped up background

checks considerably. Index card records were still also being kept, but soon no one wanted to work with them, and in the early 1970s "index-card work for this category of traveler" ceased.[27] From then on the Stasi worked only with electronic data sets for most visitors from the West.

The Stasi had by now reached a respectable technological level in comparison with other countries. Only the major US security agencies were in a different league altogether. Between 1950 and 1963 the National Security Agency purchased no fewer than sixty digital computers, although most of these were used for signals intelligence.[28] The Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had been using IBM mainframe computers since the late 1950s.[29] In contrast, the BND had begun building a computer center in the mid-1960s, but only started the changeover to electronic data processing after Gerhard Wessel took over from Reinhard Gehlen as the intelligence service's president in 1968.[30] The first computers went into operation at the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) and the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) in 1970 and 1972 respectively.[31] Meanwhile, the KGB was using a Soviet-manufactured Minsk 22 computer to "monitor the movements of foreigners," as HVA chief Markus Wolf learned in Moscow in 1967, but had no plans to expand its IT.[32] The GRU, for its part, used its computers solely for the purpose of decrypting and encrypting messages.[33] MfS leaders opted for a different approach. Doubtless encouraged by the progress made in the ASR, but probably also concerned by the advances their enemies in the West were making, they decided to kick-start digitization by completely computerizing information processing in the MfS. Thus, in the latter half of the 1960s, HVA staff submitted documentation for the IBM System/360 architecture that was to serve as the basis for the Unified System of Electronic Computer Technology (Einheitliches System Elektronischer Rechentechnik, ESER) developed by member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) from 1969.[34] In addition, HVA employees managed to obtain copies of detailed quotes from Siemens for the introduction of computers in the Hamburg and West Berlin police departments,[35] as well as copies of quotes and plans for the introduction of computers to Munich's vehicle registration office. Their crowning achievement, though, was getting their hands on the trip report of a Siemens employee who in 1968 had visited the FBI's computerized National Crime Information Center, as well as police departments in several major US cities to learn about their use of computers.[36]

The mass of data accumulating in the ASR, combined with the information it had gathered on the enemy's activities, left no doubt that the future of mon-

itoring and surveillance lay in computers. It was evident, too, given the state of the Socialist computer industry in the late 1960s,[37] that the ASR would continue to require Western technology if it was to achieve what most Western intelligence services were working toward at the time: an integrated computer-based information system where all incoming information could be stored and accessed by all divisions. At a district committee meeting of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) in May 1967, Mielke was already bragging that, thanks to the enemy's technology, the Stasi would soon have "a state-of-the-art data-processing system."[38] In summer 1968 the Stasi leadership resolved to purchase a Siemens 4004/45, a mainframe computer with roughly the same capabilities as IBM System/360–70 computers, to serve as the basis of the computer center. This plan involved several unknowns, however. In 1968 the CoCom technology embargo committee still prohibited Western companies from exporting "third-generation" computers to the Eastern Bloc, and so it was unclear whether it would be possible to acquire both the hardware and the necessary IT expertise. In other words, it was by no means certain that Stasi employees would be able to receive training from the enemy as they had done after the purchase of the Bull computers.

Despite these question marks, in early 1968 the Stasi leadership believed it had found a man with both the technological expertise and the experience to oversee the computerization of the Stasi using Western technology. Importantly, this was a man also viewed as politically trustworthy: in Mielke's words, he was someone "we can put to good use here in the Ministry for State Security."[39] The man in question was Dieter Altdorfer,[40] who had what was probably the only résumé of its kind in the GDR. He was a party member, had a doctorate in mathematics, and had already set up a computer center at the Karl-Marx-Stadt University of Technology.[41] Moreover, during his time in academia, Altdorfer, who demonstrated a habitus that was more bourgeois than "Chekist,"[42] had visited conferences and even computer centers in West Germany. He was therefore a godsend for the Stasi with respect to the planned relationship with Siemens. If one accepts that technological knowledge is culturally embedded—in other words, that a major transfer of technology also involves cultural transfer—then Altdorfer fulfilled the requirements for the role of "transcultural mediator," or "poster boy to impress Siemens," as he himself put it.[43]

Learning from the Enemy

In the latter half of the 1960s the Siemens Data-Processing Division was growing rapidly, despite having experienced significant teething troubles. In con-

trast to its all-conquering competitor IBM, Siemens had not built a foundation in punch-card technology, and so it lacked a client base it could "shift" to computers. The first Siemens digital computers were strongly geared toward technical and scientific applications, and it was only in 1964 that top management decided the company should begin developing applications for commerce and public administration.[44] At first, Siemens's products were unable to compete with those of IBM, a failure blamed internally on IBM's aggressive pricing strategy.[45] However, thanks to its partnership with the US company Radio Corporation of America (RCA), Siemens managed to "bridge the technological gap" in 1964/65.[46] Building on RCA developments, the West German company launched the System Siemens 4004, a universal computer family on a technological par with the IBM System/360. In West Germany, Siemens's market share grew from around 5 percent to over 12 percent,[47] partly due to the subsidies offered more or less openly by the federal government's IT funding programs.[48]

Nevertheless, IBM's dominance remained so overwhelming that the West German market was too small for Siemens,[49] making exports a matter of survival for the Data-Processing Division. Having traditionally demonstrated an orientation toward the East, from the mid-1960s Siemens pinned great hopes on doing business with the Eastern Bloc. These hopes received a boost when, amid the cybernetics hype of the time, Eastern party and state leaders began developing an interest in the potential of computers to reform their planned economies. In 1967/68 several delegations from the USSR—including one in October 1968 from the Ministry for Instrument-Making, Automation Devices, and Control Systems—visited the Siemens data-processing plant.[50] Following the Republican Richard Nixon's victory in the American presidential election of November 1968, it seemed that CoCom regulations, which had been particularly strict about IT exports, would be relaxed.

In late 1968 and early 1969, Siemens entered into negotiations with the Moscow Institute of Computer Technology on the sale of a 4004/45 computer.[51] At around the same time, the Siemens West Berlin office received a request for a quote from Horst Schuster at Interver. This request must have electrified the office's sales manager: Schuster was interested in purchasing three 4004/45 mainframe computers at once for the ZIID. The sum involved—more than 20 million DM—spoke for itself. Moreover, the GDR's deputy minister for external trade, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, hinted at the prospect of more orders to come. In October 1969 he told the director of the Siemens data-processing plant that the purchase of the three mainframe

computers would be "just the start of a business relationship in this field," and that "if Siemens fulfills this contract satisfactorily . . . more deals" would follow.[52] Thus the negotiations conducted from May 1969 onward between Siemens, on one side, and representatives of Interver, Büromaschinen-Export GmbH,[53] and Working Group (Arbeitsgruppe, AG) XIII[54] of the MfS, on the other, were accompanied by "great interest and a cooperative attitude on the part of the Siemens representatives." The director of the West Berlin office, in particular, did "everything to seal the deal," according to MfS Oberstleutnant Opitz.[55]

Siemens's "great interest" led to ZIID employees (who were, in fact, undercover Stasi officers) receiving an invitation to the Siemens headquarters. On June 30, 1969, a seven-person delegation—comprising five MfS employees and two employees of the company Intertechna, a front for foreign espionage—under the leadership of Altdorfer, the prospective technical director of the MfS computer center, traveled to Munich, where they received two weeks' training from Siemens staff on the 4004 system and the GOLEM information retrieval system.[56] In addition, they discussed how to set up the computer center and whether the air conditioning could be supplied by a GDR company. Finally, they met with representatives of Büro-Organisationsgesellschaft, an office organization company from Frankfurt am Main, which offered to supply fifty Vonomatic 752 systems, technology the Stasi needed to digitize its index card systems, for 1.5 million DM. The Stasi employees were put up in a hotel near the central station, and the recreational program included a two-day tour of the Alps and an evening visit to the Lach- und Schießgesellschaft cabaret.[57]

It was already clear that the enemy's IT expertise would not be shared under politically neutral conditions. For the Stasi's IT experts, "learning from the enemy" meant coming very close to the enemy.[58] It also meant accepting the enemy's ideas on how the relationship between a computer manufacturer and a major client should be. Most importantly, the IT knowledge transfer demanded an exceptional ability to adapt from all stakeholders—including Altdorfer, all MfS officers who were in regular contact with Siemens, and of course the West Berlin Siemens representatives. While this adaptability tends not to be explicitly mentioned in the MfS reports, it was clearly in evidence during the second phase of the knowledge transfer, when MfS programmers and technicians underwent training.

Siemens conducted some of these training courses in East Berlin, and MfS employees were sent to Siemens data-processing schools in West Germany for others. A report by Captain Reiner F. provides insights into the first course,

which took place in July 1969 in East Berlin. The report first praises the two Siemens instructors for expressing "a positive attitude toward developments in the GDR" and for advocating recognition of these developments. The report does not consider the possibility that the two West Germans might have just been trying to humor the course participants. F. also lauds the Siemens representatives for "punching cards themselves for practice programs in the evenings" and "also testing these outside working hours."

It appears to have been especially important to F. to share with his superiors the praise of one instructor, who said that "the level of the entire course is very high," adding that he had "never taught a course to such a high level before."[59] But although the East German technicians had supposedly made an excellent impression, a Siemens representative insisted that they complete an aptitude test before being sent to West Germany: "He refused to provide technician training without a prior psychological aptitude test."[60] In the Western IT industry, where working with computers was seen as a "question of talent," such tests were regarded as indispensable.[61] This had the Stasi employees worried, however; after all, it might be difficult to undertake enemy-administered psychological tests without blowing their own cover. Altdorfer resisted at first, claiming that "such tests are not customary for us" and that he feared "problems with the unions."[62]

Despite such tensions, knowledge transfer in the form of training courses progressed rapidly,[63] though the undercover nature of the operation imposed certain limits on "learning from the enemy." Initially, at least, "we were . . . very short staffed . . . one mainframe man, one magnetic tape man, one [magnetic] disk man," with no other technicians completing training in Munich for the time being, according to the technician Herbert Maier.[64] More importantly, though, it remained uncertain for a long time whether these technicians would ever receive the hardware for which they were being trained at great expense. According to Opitz, at a meeting on July 30, 1969, the director of the Siemens West Berlin office "appeared embarrassed" and "hinted that the situation was not very favorable."[65] The attempts by Siemens representatives in summer 1969 to obtain special permission from the Office for Export Control in Washington to supply three 4004/45 computers to the ZIID, and another one to the Moscow Institute of Computer Technology, were not rejected outright, but neither were they successful. The Nixon administration allowed the old embargo rules to expire on August 21, 1969, without replacing them with new ones.[66] In his report on the "status of the Siemens contract negotiations," MfS First Lieutenant O. wrote that this state of limbo was "inhibiting work in the computer center."[67] The situation was not helped by the fact that at Siemens's

behest, several members of the MfS Working Group (AG) XIII were tied up with preparing "extensive . . . documentation" in fall 1969. The documentation, which had been requested by the Office for Export Control in Washington, was supposed to demonstrate the civil and scientific character of the ZIID.[68]

The tone of MfS employees' reports on the fourteen negotiation meetings with Siemens between September and December 1969 is more strained. The task of converting files from index cards to machine-readable formats had already begun in MfS Division XII ("Information/Archive"),[69] and so failure to deliver the hardware at this stage would have been a serious setback. The repeated attempts by the director of Siemens's West Berlin office to reassure MfS AG XIII employees ("Herr O . . . , trust me, everything has been done to secure the delivery") and remind them that they had the support of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs (Bundeswirtschaftsministerium, BMWi) probably did not boost their optimism.[70]

But within Siemens, too, there was growing concern that the technology embargo would block access to trade with the Eastern Bloc. According to an MfS file memo, in October 1969 two members of the Siemens management board were to travel to Washington with the objective of "expediting the licensing of these systems [i.e., the 4004/45 computers]."[71] There, they were unofficially informed that 1,500 items, including desktop computers, were to be removed from the CoCom embargo list.[72] In December 1969 Siemens received special permission to deliver one 4004/45 unit to Moscow[73] and three 4004/45 computers to Wuhlheide in East Berlin, where the ZIID's offices were located, and to where, in order to maintain their cover, the MfS's AG XIII now had to move. A flurry of activity erupted there. In spring 1970 Fundament, the SED's real estate company, erected a low-rise building to house the Siemens computers. In August large trucks with West German license plates carrying the 4004/45 central units and hundreds of accessories and peripheral elements, from "high-speed printers" to magnetic tape units and visual display units, rolled through the barbed wire barriers surrounding the computer center.[74] In the notebook kept by MfS officers disguised as security guards, at least a dozen Siemens technicians a day were recorded entering Building Z 70 in the weeks that followed. Only when the installation of the equipment was complete, in late 1970, could the officers think of noting each individual West German vehicle entering the premises and providing the Siemens representatives with visitor passes.[75]

Drawn up by Altdorfer and others in spring 1969, the plan for introducing computers to the MfS stated that after the one-year guarantee period expired in fall 1971, Siemens employees would no longer have "access to the

property." However, like Western security services before them, the Stasi soon learned that, in the medium term, it would be impossible to operate the newly installed computers without the manufacturer's support.[76] In the early phase of computerization, manufacturers and security services entered into a kind of "forced marriage":[77] The manufacturers needed the security services' experience, while the security services needed the manufacturers' expertise. The Stasi's meticulous plan to have "the enemy" train its own staff would not spare it this "forced marriage." This became even more apparent when it emerged that Siemens—a relative newcomer to the IT industry—had delivered products that did not always live up to their promise.

Testing for Siemens

Thanks to its partnership with RCA, Siemens was able to simultaneously launch a mainframe family and establish itself as a commercial computer manufacturer. This partnership only covered the hardware, however. Siemens did not manage to acquire software packages from RCA, mainly because the requirements of West German and European customers—many of which were state bodies—differed too drastically from those of RCA's primarily commercial customers in the US, "and modification would have been too costly and time-consuming."[78] Thus, in the late 1960s, Siemens developed its own application software, including the SESAM database system and the GOLEM information retrieval system. But "the recurring problem with the application software" was that the customers' "special requirements demanded major modifications and new features,"[79] not to mention the fact that the early software contained numerous errors.[80] Altdorfer and his Stasi programmers would soon become all too familiar with these errors.

When ordering its hardware, the MfS chose GOLEM as its basic database system. In spring 1969 GOLEM was one of the Siemens Data-Processing Division's newest software products, and it boasted some pioneering features. For example, search terms could be entered in free verbal form and combined with operators such as "and," "or," and "not," which meant that researchers were no longer tied to a catalog of fixed coded queries.[81] At the time, however, there was just one GOLEM user: the federal government's press office, which used the system solely as a document research system, and not, as the Stasi planned, as a database with dozens of searchable fields. A rude awakening soon followed. By May it had become evident that without add-on programs, it would be impossible to enter text, input search queries, or generate descriptors. On July 17, Altdorfer and two representatives of Intertechna presented

Siemens employees with an exhaustive "functional specification document for the GOLEM project,"[82] in which they demanded these add-on programs and listed the basic procedures that GOLEM absolutely had to provide, such as search functions and authorization checks. The upshot of the meeting was bad news for Altdorfer and the Intertechna representatives: Siemens had given up working on PASSAT I, a utility program that was to generate automated text descriptions based on word frequency analyses, and PASSAT II would not be available until spring 1970 at the earliest.[83] There was plenty more bad news to follow.

In October 1971 Harry Bochmann, head of IT at the Central Evaluation and Information Group (Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe, ZAIG), to which the AG XIII now reported, observed that "as an early user of GOLEM," the MfS was doing Siemens's testing for it.[84] The following year, Altdorfer went so far as to claim that his programmers were practically co-developers of Siemens products: "The current GOLEM II version," he explained, "is largely based on our GOLEM I version"—in other words, on the add-on programs that MfS computer center employees had written themselves.[85] It is worth briefly mentioning in this context that from 1974 GOLEM II was used in the West German BKA too.[86] Though only documented in MfS sources, it is apparent here that the IT knowledge transfer between Siemens and the MfS was not unidirectional. In fact, it may be more accurate to refer to a process of knowledge circulation than knowledge transfer.[87]

At the time, Altdorfer and his team derived little satisfaction from the GOLEM II version they claimed to have co-developed. In fall 1973 Altdorfer wrote that "the GOLEM II system's relatively high susceptibility to breakdowns . . . still necessitated constant contact with Siemens." (Incidentally, Altdorfer cannot have found this contact wholly disagreeable; in retrospect, he praised the "very good service" provided by Siemens staff, acknowledging that they always came immediately "whenever we had a problem.")[88] In this report Altdorfer was trying to provide his own superiors with plausible explanations for the delays in the software development. Siemens kept providing his team with defective software versions, he wrote, and one could never be sure whether the "program errors that had already been rectified (in earlier versions) would crop up again in the newer versions."[89] What he and his team were experiencing here was the consequences of the Siemens Data-Processing Division's business strategy, which since the late 1960s had been pursuing "accelerated growth" in hardware production at the expense of progress in software development.[90]

It was not just immature software that continued to tie the MfS to Siemens. Another problem was that Socialist computer manufacturers were unable to supply the MfS with modern peripheral equipment, let alone modern mainframes. More specifically, they could not provide magnetic disk storage. Unlike magnetic tapes, which provided only sequential access to data, magnetic disks allowed users to access data immediately and were therefore essential for creating larger and quickly searchable databases. During a visit to Moscow's *Avtomatizatsiya* exhibition in May 1969, Opitz and Altdorfer discovered that when it came to removable disk storage, the Socialist camp was a long way from being a "world leader."[91] Little changed in the years that followed. Thus, in 1972/73, MfS staff were working on databases that were in fact unusable due to the lack of disk storage. At the same time, dozens of unused visual display units and modems from the Siemens Transdata series, worth a total of around 2 million DM, were piled up in the MfS computer center's storerooms because the Stasi's plans for its own networking had stalled.[92] The plan to develop a Stasi computer network comparable to the data networks of West German security services had to be put on ice for the time being.

There was great relief in the MfS when, in mid-1973, Dr. S., an employee of the Siemens West Berlin regional office, made an extremely attractive offer: Siemens would provide the ZIID/MfS computer center with four large disk storage devices, each with a capacity of 54 megabytes (MB), plus the accompanying drives and other accessories, in exchange for the unused Transdata data communication technology the MfS had purchased. The total value of the equipment Siemens offered to supply was 932,000 DM. "For us," Opitz from Division XIII wrote almost euphorically in late August 1973, this would be "a very good deal." Indeed, prices for disk storage devices had fallen sharply while prices for data communication technology had held steady, and as a result the MfS stood to make a profit of around 250,000 DM.[93] Of course, Dr. S. was also acting in Siemens's interests. By 1973, 54 MB disks were being phased out and replaced by 72 MB and 144 MB disks.[94] Meanwhile, Transdata technology had become something of a cash cow for the Data-Processing Division, accounting for almost half its earnings. With network expansion underway in West Germany, the Transdata system was in high demand, not least by the BKA and state criminal police offices, which were working with great urgency on expanding INPOL (Informationssystem der Polizei, Police Information System).[95] A further advantage of the deal for Siemens was that it would keep its key customer in the GDR, the ZIID, tied to Siemens technology.

United against CoCom

On October 1, 1976, the East Germans signed the acceptance certificate for the large-capacity disk storage devices that had been installed in the MfS computer center. As a project that had been dragging on for years was finally brought to completion, both sides "shared a few words of thanks," according to an MfS file memo.[96] The Siemens sales representative, Dr. S., suggested organizing an "acceptance party," whose attendees would include "the top gentlemen of the West Berlin regional office." Dr. S. hoped to combine this party with a visit to the MfS computer center (or what he believed to be the ZIID computer center). Hauptmann Thilo W. thanked Dr. S. for the latter suggestion but politely declined. However, as he argued in his file memo, Thilo W. actually thought the MfS should go along with the party suggestion, despite the difficulty involved in maintaining the "ZIID cover story" amid the "relaxed atmosphere" the Siemens staff sought to create.

Over the years Altdorfer, Thilo W., and their colleagues must have become quite adept at making innocuous small talk with Siemens representatives. For Siemens, business meals were part and parcel of partnerships of this kind, and so the supposed ZIID employees dined regularly with Siemens staff, often at the Unter den Linden hotel in East Berlin, sometimes at a restaurant in West Berlin. Dr. S., who from 1973 was the account manager for ZIID, believed strongly in the importance of conducting the partnership in an informal framework. He initiated "New Year meals,"[97] brought his business partners little gifts, and in summer 1978 suggested a boat trip on the Havel.[98] MfS file memos shed no light on how MfS staff behaved on such occasions. But in early 1979, shortly before commencing employment at another company, the Siemens employee responsible for software support for the MfS computer center requested "a dinner with Gen. Jakel and Gen. Große." That this employee wished to dine with two Stasi officers with whom she had been working closely for years suggests that MfS employees must have comported themselves rather well during such recreational activities.[99] Indeed, Siemens staff continued to invite Altdorfer, whom they greatly respected, to events even after he had given up his directorship of Division XIII and joined Main Division III to work in electronic espionage against West Germany.

Dinner invitations, parties, possibly even day trips were standard methods of nurturing business relationships, even with customers on the other side of the Iron Curtain. But MfS records, at least, indicate that Siemens occasionally went above and beyond the norm. For example, the MfS apparently received the new GOLEM II version ahead of its official approval by Siemens management.

In mid-March 1972 an employee of Siemens's West Berlin office told Altdorfer that at Siemens "there has been a strict rule for quite some time prohibiting the distribution of software documentation and indeed the software itself before its release."[100] But, according to the Stasi report on the conversation, the Siemens representative said that "given the good working relationship with us [i.e., MfS Division XIII]," he saw "no risk . . . of headquarters hearing about it." He would therefore "support us fully in this matter too" and would "hear and see nothing," but he did ask for a favor in return: "Dr. . . . asked us to consider the possibility of selling the add-on software we created for GOLEM . . . to the Siemens company or at least offering it to customers that perform tasks similar to those of the ZIID. He referred in this regard to the ongoing negotiations with the Warsaw National Library."

It is unlikely that an official sales agreement ever materialized; selling software to a capitalist corporation would probably have been a step too far for the MfS finance department, even if it continued to use the ZIID cover. Nevertheless, the idea appealed to Altdorfer. It is conceivable that an unofficial solution for East-West knowledge transfer was found. Another memo reveals that the Siemens branch office in West Berlin did indeed supply MfS Division XIII with the GOLEM system documentation,[101] so it is possible that Division XIII provided its add-on software in return.

On several occasions Siemens also supplied hardware and peripheral equipment prohibited by CoCom, circumventing the embargo by declaring these products as replacement parts and billing for them under whichever replacement parts contract was valid at the time. For instance, in February 1974, Major Lothar D. asked a Siemens employee for an "unscheduled" delivery of a few telephone buffers, which were needed for data communication. According to the MfS transcript, the Siemens representative explained that "he was not interested in whether one could build a telephone buffer out of the ordered replacement parts. He would treat the corresponding list of parts as a normal replacement parts order."[102]

The West Berlin office relied primarily, however, on contacts of senior Siemens management in the federal government to push through ZIID/MfS orders that required special authorization. Siemens staff and BMWi employees shared the view that the responsible officer in the US Department of Commerce was an "Eastern emigrant" who "loved nothing more than blocking exports to the East."[103] In April 1976, when American approval for the delivery of the large-capacity disk storage devices was still pending, the manager of the West Berlin office contacted the BMWi. Subsequently, at the latter's request, "the West German Embassy . . . approached the responsible

American authorities about speeding up the approval process." In this case, at least, the tactic worked.[104]

Thanks to backing from the West German state and politicians, Siemens was able to supply a considerable number of computer systems and peripheral devices to countries in the Soviet sphere of influence.[105] This backing became even more important from the late 1970s, when, after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the US government sought once again to tighten CoCom regulations on computer exports. Siemens, Bosch, and other companies complained to the BMWi about US agencies' delaying tactics, which in the case of three Siemens applications for the export of computer systems to Poland and Hungary in 1979 almost led to the cancellation of orders worth 15 million DM. Only after the BMWi intervened were the contracts saved.[106] In the early 1980s a Siemens manager assured his GDR negotiating partner (who was also an MfS informant) "that Siemens has the basis to get around embargo regulations and is prepared to do so too, because it has plenty of contacts in the federal government and keeps . . . the government informed about these deals, ensuring from the outset that a scandal is avoided should the deals become public."[107]

Against this background, it is not difficult to understand why the account manager, Dr. S., attempted to sell the ZIID/MfS computer center new Siemens computers—including the 7.708 and 7.531 compact computers[108]—even though Siemens was experiencing difficulties exporting these same computers to other Eastern Bloc countries. Dr. S. was working on the assumption that there would be a way around the embargo regulations. Hauptmann Thilo W. and his comrades in the MfS computer center pretended to be interested in Dr. S's offers. In truth, though, since the late 1970s the Stasi had been working on a new hardware strategy: "The Phasing-Out of Siemens Technology."

The Long "Phasing-Out of Siemens Technology"

Siemens technology had provided the MfS with the digital kick-start its "brother organs" never had. In particular, from 1974 the Automatic Preselection System (System zur automatischen Vorauswahl, SAVO), which was used by MfS Division XII, made checking people's records dramatically faster. Once SAVO went live, Division XII staff no longer had to spend hours flicking through index card boxes. Instead, they simply entered the name of the person into a Siemens visual display unit and were then able to access an electronic index stored on Siemens large-capacity disk storage devices. Within a few seconds they found out whether the suspicious person had already been

"registered" by the MfS or not. Today, this may seem like a simple operation, but it enabled Division XII to increase the number of person checks from 2.2 million in 1968 to more than 8 million at the end of the 1970s.[109] But when the SAVO system was linked with the Application and Approval Procedure (Antrags- und Genehmigungsverfahren, AGV) project, which aimed to store information on all West Germans entering the GDR, computerization's true potential for the Stasi's surveillance and repression practices became evident. From the late 1970s it was possible to automatically merge new data sets in the AGV data repository with SAVO records.[110] With no additional work, MfS employees could identify from the many millions of Western visitors those individuals on whom, for whatever reason, there was already information in the MfS archives. This drastically intensified the level of control in a way that would never have been possible by analog means.

From the perspective of the leading IT specialists in the MfS computer center, these achievements rested on shaky foundations. While the hardware was adequate in 1969, five years later it could not even be relied upon to keep operations up and running. In 1973, at the urging of the ZAIG, Minister Mielke decided that the Siemens computers were to be replaced with COMECON-produced ESER computers. This decision probably had less to do with the official political reasons offered than with financial concerns: a new generation of Siemens mainframe computers would have been too expensive, even for the MfS.[111] In late 1973, however, it became clear that VEB Robotron was experiencing difficulties developing the ES 1055, the computer the Stasi wanted. As a result, plans to launch the model in 1976 came to nothing.

Altdorfer therefore suggested in February 1974 that at least one new Siemens 4004/151 computer be purchased to bridge the years until the ESER ES 1055 computers were delivered. He had consulted with the director of the Ministry of Foreign Trade's KoKo division, Schalck-Golodkowski, who had agreed to assist with the procurement of the Siemens computer. According to Altdorfer, this computer's performance was already equivalent to what the ES 1055 would only be able to deliver from 1979, and it would allow the MfS to continue developing its current IT applications without having to immediately undertake the dreaded software system changeover. The purchase would "necessitate technician training in the Federal Republic," but Altdorfer argued that this was justifiable. Given the alternative, his position was understandable. If the MfS continued to work with its existing hardware—in other words, the Siemens 4004/45 computers—until 1979 or 1980, the minister would find that "there would be no progress in the deployment of IT in the MfS" between 1975 and 1980, Altdorfer warned darkly.[112] The development of "operationally

important projects such as the travel database" would have to be halted, he added, seeing as users in the various divisions were already feuding over the few available computers.

In making this proposal, Altdorfer risked an open confrontation with the ZAIG director, Werner Irmler, and its head of IT, Harry Bochmann, both of whom aimed to eliminate Siemens technology quickly and completely. Irmler and Bochmann were proponents of a "unified information-processing system" based on ESER hardware and software, but another cutting-edge Siemens mainframe computer would render such a unified system redundant. Rather than invoking their own institutional interests, they countered Altdorfer's proposal with "political-ideological" arguments: "Siemens poses a growing risk to us," they told Altdorfer, according to his notes. On the minister's orders, "a shift to ESER" was to take place. Most importantly, though, Altdorfer was instructed to "think correctly in political terms"—an unassailable argument that was enough to silence an MfS novice such as Altdorfer. At a meeting with Mielke not long after, Irmler presented Altdorfer's proposal as evidence of a "Siemens ideology" that was supposedly rampant in the MfS computer center. With this, any possibility of a new Siemens computer was off the table. Altdorfer was dismayed. In his personal notes he concluded that "the whole incident" was hardly consonant with "Socialist leadership and management principles."[113] But other than express his resentment in his notebook (a promotional gift from Siemens emblazoned with the slogan "Siemens Data Technology—Programmed for the Future"), there was nothing Altdorfer could do. The phrase "Siemens ideology," which created fear in much the same way as Stalin's branding of his political enemies, ruled out any further debate.

Irmler and Bochmann would soon learn, though, that choosing a certain hardware and software basis involves long technical path dependence. In other words, it would not be so easy for the Stasi to get rid of Siemens. One reason for this was that in 1979 the new ES 1055 computers were still not ready. In April 1978 Bochmann was forced to admit that the first new IT system would not be delivered until early 1982,[114] followed by the second and third in 1983 and 1984 respectively. This would mean, he said, "heightened reliance on Siemens . . . especially until 1980, when we make it clear to Siemens that we will be replacing it with ESER and not, as has repeatedly been left open, possibly with Siemens after all."[115]

The Stasi had thus ended up in the one situation the ZAIG leadership had wanted to avoid at all costs. The functionality of their information systems was now heavily dependent on the goodwill of a capitalist corporation and on the latter's contacts in those Western agencies and government bodies that, de-

spite the "Second Cold War," could provide special CoCom exemptions for IT supplies.

But even if the new ESER computers had been delivered on schedule in 1979, the Stasi would probably have been unable to use them, as their basic software systems, ISPER and GOLEM, were not compatible with ESER. New ESER-compatible basic software therefore had to be developed for all major MfS database projects.[116] This would prove to be a massive, virtually unmanageable undertaking involving years of delays. As a result, the operating system changeover that was so important for the "Phasing-Out of Siemens Technology"—a changeover the Stasi wanted to conceal from Western security services at all costs—meant another extension to the Siemens computers' service lives. The last service life extension for one of the 4004/45 computers delivered in 1970 ended on November 30, 1989. As of December 1989 the last Siemens computer system in the former MfS was scrapped, and the parts were sold to staff of the HVA computer center, which was in the process of being dissolved. Alternating current motors, fans, and magnetic disk control displays found keen buyers, adding a few extra thousand deutsche marks to the finance department's coffers in January 1990.[117]

The concurrent demise of the MfS and scrapping of Siemens computers, however, should not be seen as symbolic of a double downfall. By 1989, after the lean years between 1975 and 1983/84, the hardware in the MfS's computer centers, of which there were now four, had finally reached a level high enough for IT staff to feel equipped for the challenges of the 1990s. As well as four ES 1055 computers, the Stasi now had two ES 1057 systems, the most modern ESER products in the field of "mid-range data technology."[118] In addition, there were numerous small-process computers, more than 200 desktop and personal computers in the ministry alone, and—at last—data communication between regional offices and certain border crossing points (*Grenzübergangsstellen*, GÜSt), on one hand, and Stasi headquarters, on the other. This still could not be compared with the advanced technology used in the computer centers of Western police departments and secret services. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the MfS could do a great deal with the technology it had, and that by the late 1980s it was only beginning to unlock computers' potential for surveillance.[119]

Siemens played a major role in the progress made by the Stasi. It was Siemens, too, that helped ensure that the scenario painted by Altdorfer and others of MfS information processing breaking down during the painfully slow "Phasing-Out of Siemens Technology" never happened. Contrary to the MfS's fears, key figures in the Siemens West Berlin office did not lose interest

in the ZIID/MfS as a customer when Major Lothar D. came clean at the 1978 Leipzig Spring Fair, explaining that "the Siemens 4004/45 computer can only be replaced . . . with an ESER computer." According to D.'s report, "the Siemens representatives were skeptical about the capabilities of the EC 1055, . . . but they accepted our situation."[120] And Dr. S., the enterprising Siemens account manager responsible for the ZIID/MfS, expressed optimism about the prospect of future partnerships: there would certainly be opportunities for the MfS to use "new Siemens technology and therefore newer, more powerful software," he said.[121] He would turn out to be right. The partnership between the MfS and Siemens did not end with the decommissioning of the 4004/45 computers. Instead, a new chapter in the partnership began in the 1980s.

Among the Siemens products Dr. S. routinely pitched to MfS representatives at meetings and business lunches were the electronic security system SI-PASS, a telephone system, and laser printing systems. In the 1980s such printers were room-sized machines costing around a million DM each. But whereas his attempts to sell compact computers was ignored, the ZIID/MfS computer center was interested in the printers. Over the course of the 1980s, the MfS increasingly found that the ability to rapidly print hundreds of thousands of high-quality index cards, wanted-person notices, and similar documents had become essential for conducting border checks with the desired intensity.

The reason for this lay in an IT-related "simultaneity of the non-simultaneous" in the MfS. By the early 1980s, very large amounts of personal data were being saved in electronic databases such as the travel database, the "Database of Illegal Border Crossings," and many more. However, data communication was still not being used to connect regional MfS offices and the GÜSt to the central data repositories. Every personal record and every wanted-person notice had to be sent in paper form or, to be more precise, in the form of computer printouts. Notes that the ZAIG director, Werner Irmler, had had prepared for a speech to the minister in summer 1989 reveal that this was by no means a minor problem. Around 500,000 index cards with information on wanted people were sent to the GÜSt each month.[122] Meanwhile, HA VI had to respond to around 180,000 requests per month for information from its digital travel data repository. Furthermore, it was expected to do so "quickly, . . . legibly, and at various lengths (from 1 line to several A4 pages)."[123] The "ESER parallel printers from the Polish People's Republic" failed "to meet these high demands." As Herbert Maier of Division XIII recalled, "If you use them to print thousands of copies of the same forms, the letters start to blur and the agent can't read them anymore. A laser printer produces completely different images, of course."[124] Irmler, too, praised the Siemens laser printers,

which had been purchased in 1984, to Mielke, saying that they "performed the intended tasks excellently." Because of an "expected continued increase in . . . cross-border travel and the need to . . . combat the subversive abuse of inbound travel and tourism," Irmler saw the purchase of more Siemens laser printers as "urgently necessary," a view that Mielke came to share during the GDR's final crisis.

In the late 1980s, Siemens representatives made repeated complaints to the federal government about the still stringent CoCom regulations, claiming that these had made "trade [in IT products] with the GDR and Eastern Bloc countries . . . impossible within a reasonable technical framework."[125] The ZIID's purchase, in summer 1989, of a "twin laser printing system" worth 2 million DM may have lifted spirits a little, however.[126] In September 1989 Siemens technicians from West Berlin returned to Building Z 70 to install the system. But had there been a party to celebrate the installation of the printers in September 1989, there would probably have been a notable absentee: Dr. S., the Siemens employee who had initiated this new business partnership in the early 1980s.

MfS counterintelligence had been keeping tabs on Dr. S. since 1980, and HA XVIII suspected him of collaborating with the BND. At S.'s invitation, an East German foreign trade company employee had participated in a Siemens programming course in Munich, where the BND attempted to recruit him. This gave the Stasi strong grounds for suspicion. It began to tap S.'s calls to the GDR and discovered, among other things, that he had "an entrenched hostile, negative attitude toward the social system in the GDR."[127] In 1984 the Stasi considered subjecting S. to an "operational interrogation," but then, as the laser-printer contract was about to be signed, decided not to do so. In the end the Stasi opted to have the East German Ministry of Foreign Trade put pressure on Siemens management to withdraw S. from dealings with the GDR. Siemens management demurred, pointing out that, when it came to securing CoCom exemptions, "no one from [the Siemens office in] West Berlin is as familiar with the procedures . . . and the documentation to be submitted, including points of formulation, as Dr. S."[128] Siemens's reluctance to remove S. made him even more suspicious in the eyes of the Stasi, who continued to insist on his dismissal. In 1985, the Stasi had its way.

It is unclear whether S. really worked for the BND, potentially passing on secrets about the MfS's use of computers from the mid-1970s. What is certain, though, is that from the start the computer centers of the secret services in both East and West were a major focus of intelligence operations on both sides. In October 1980 Wolf, the HVA director, announced that the "task of

all operational lines" was to penetrate "the IT systems of the Federal Republic's intelligence services."[129] The BND, for its part, had been working intensively since the 1970s on identifying the East Berlin locations of the MfS computer centers.[130] According to Herbert Maier, Stasi "specialists spent days inspecting" the Siemens laser printers delivered in 1984, eventually "finding what they had suspected":[131] transmission equipment, presumably installed by the BND, for which the "compromising" of IT intended for the Eastern Bloc was a routine task.[132] It is therefore highly likely that Western intelligence services were aware of the IT knowledge transfer between Siemens and the MfS independently of the statements made by the defector Horst Schuster in 1983. It is possible that for the BND and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution the benefits of having detailed information on the Stasi's use of computers outweighed the dangers posed by a computerized MfS. Thanks to the events of 1989/90, West German intelligence never had to address the question whether this might have been a mistake.

Conclusion

This article's central finding is that Siemens—or, more precisely, the Data-Processing Division of the Siemens West Berlin regional office—served as the Stasi's most important IT supplier for a good decade. If we leave aside the specificities of its context, the story of this partnership illustrates why and how such transfers came about. The hunger for Western technology complemented a strong desire to export in Western companies under pressure to move forward in certain segments. For both sides the benefits outweighed the risks. In spite of its anticipated dangers, the partnership with Siemens enabled the Stasi to develop IT whose standard was probably unparalleled in the Soviet sphere of influence. As far as is known, no other Communist intelligence service managed to send dozens of employees for data-processing training at a Western computer manufacturer. It is also extremely unlikely that any other Communist intelligence service received years of software and hardware support from a leading Western corporation whose staff could be—and were—in its own computer center within an hour.

But the knowledge transfer had unintended effects for the Stasi, too. The accusation made by the senior ZAIG officers Irmler and Bochmann that the management of Division XIII espoused a "Siemens ideology" was based on attitudes and positions clearly demonstrated by Altdorfer and his staff. Meals with Siemens employees and training in West Germany may have led to an outlook that—by MfS standards, at least—was more pragmatic than politi-

cal in nature. Given that they were isolated from the rest of the MfS in their offices in Wuhlheide and apparently feeling insufficiently appreciated by the "user divisions,"[133] the atypical attitude of the data center employees, who numbered almost 400 in the mid-1970s, may have been strengthened by such accusations.

Siemens, meanwhile, hoped that the contract to supply the ZIID with three 4004/45 systems would enable the company to enter the GDR's mid-range data technology market, which was seen as promising at the time. Indeed, a few other contracts did follow. It is unclear, however, whether business with the GDR proved to be profitable overall for the Siemens Data-Processing Division. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that, in the early years in particular, the MfS provided Siemens with a field of application in which the latter could test its new products in practice and use the experience of MfS programmers to enhance these products. It has been claimed that while contributing to the computerization of the West German police, "Siemens learned a lot quickly from the BKA mainframe computer."[134] This is also true of Siemens's role in East Berlin's Wuhlheide, albeit on a smaller scale.

Notes

Translation by Sinéad Crowe

1. The title of this article is borrowed in part from Tobias Wunschik, *Knastware für den Klassenfeind: Häftlingsarbeit in der DDR, der Ost-West-Handel und die Staatssicherheit (1970–1989)* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014).

2. "Elektronen-Rechner auch im Ostblock gefragt: Computer-Bande mit Moskau," *Die Zeit*, September 9, 1970.

3. At least not according to the relevant press cuttings collection in the Siemens AG archives (hereafter SAA). SAA, 68.Li 141.

4. Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, Stenographischer Bericht, 235. Sitzung, June 23, 1994, accessed October 22, 2018, 20580–20604 C, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/12/12235.pdf.

5. As a committee member, Köppe had been permitted to read reports by BND informants, but she was not allowed to name these informants in her report (Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/7725, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/12/077/1207725.pdf), which continues to be a classified document. An application by the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen parliamentary group to have the report declassified (Deutscher Bundestag, 18. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 18/12821, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/128/1812821.pdf) was refused by the CDU/CSU and the SPD parliamentary group. Yet, as the application points out, the report has been "freely accessible online for decades," for example at https://www.cryptome.org/stasi-biz.htm. All links accessed October 19, 2018. CoCom stands for Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls.

6. On the Stasi's IT projects, see the following volumes of the series *Anatomie der Staatssicherheit—Geschichte, Struktur, Methoden: MfS-Handbuch*: Roger Engelmann and Frank Joestel, *Die Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe* (Berlin: Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 2009); Andreas Schmidt, *Hauptabteilung III: Funkaufklärung und -abwehr* (Berlin: Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 2010); Monika Tantzscher, *Hauptabteilung VI: Grenzkontrollen, Reise- und Touristenverkehr* (Berlin: Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 2005). On the use of IT in Division XII of the MfS, see also Philipp Springer, "Das Gedächtnis der Staatssicherheit: Entwicklung, Struktur und Funktion der Abteilung XII des MfS," in *Das Gedächtnis der Staatssicherheit: Die Kartei- und Archivabteilung des MfS*, ed. Karsten Jedlitschka and Philipp Springer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016), 25–150. For the first comprehensive analyses, see Christian Booß, "Der Sonnenstaat des Erich Mielke: Die Informationsverarbeitung des MfS. Entwicklung und Aufbau," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 60, no. 5 (2012): 441–57, and, for a comparison with the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt), Rüdiger Bergien, "'Big Data' als Vision: Computereinführung und Organisationswandel in BKA und Staatssicherheit (1967–1989)," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 14, no. 2 (2017): 258–85.

7. Constantin Goschler, Christopher Kirchberg and Jens Wegener, "Sicherheit, Demokratie und Transparenz: Elektronische Datenverbundsysteme in der Bundesrepublik und den USA in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren," in *Wege in die digitale Gesellschaft: Computernutzung in der Bundesrepublik 1955–1990*, ed. Frank Bösch (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2018), 64–87, here 83.

8. Gerhard Barkleit, *Mikroelektronik in der DDR: SED, Staatsapparat und Staatssicherheit im Wettstreit der Systeme* (Dresden: Hannah-Arendt-Institut für Totalitarismusforschung, 2000); cf. Sari Autio-Sarasmo, "Knowledge through the Iron Curtain: Soviet Scientific-Technical Cooperation with Finland and West Germany," in *Reassessing Cold War Europe*, ed. Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (London: Routledge, 2011), 66–82.

9. Erik van der Vleuten, "Toward a Transnational History of Technology. Meanings, Promises, Pitfalls," *Technology and Culture* 49, no. 4 (October 2008): 974–94.

10. KGB stands for Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security).

11. Engelmann and Joestel, *Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe*, 69. On the GRU's use of IT for cryptography, see Jonathan Haslam, *Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 232–47. GRU stands for Glavnoe razvedyvatel'noe upravlenie (Main Intelligence Directorate).

12. This article also draws on the records of the Federal Office of Economics and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, which provide insights into Siemens's position on the CoCom technology embargo. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BArchK), B 108 or B 102. In addition, I interviewed two former employees of the MfS computer center.

13. Michael Homberg, "Mensch | Mikrochip: Die Globalisierung der Arbeitswelten in der Computerindustrie 1960 bis 2000—Fragen, Perspektiven, Thesen," *Vierteljahrshefte*

für Zeitgeschichte 66, no. 2 (April 2018): 267–93, here 271; Dagmar Schäfer and Marcus Popplow, "Einleitung: Technik und Globalgeschichte—Globalisierung, Kulturvergleich und transnationaler Techniktransfer als Herausforderung für die Technikgeschichte," *Technikgeschichte* 80, no. 1 (2013): 3–11, here 5.

14. On the *Passierscheinabkommen*, see Gerhard Kunze, *Grenzerfahrungen: Kontakte und Verhandlungen zwischen dem Land Berlin und der DDR 1949–1989* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999).

15. Tantzscher, *Hauptabteilung VI*, 51–52.

16. Roland Wiedmann, *Die Diensteinheiten des MfS 1950–1989: Eine organisatorische Übersicht* (Berlin: Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 2012), 221. On the large proportion of women who worked in data collection and subsequently in early data processing application, see, with reference to Anglo-American research, Frank Bösch, "Wege in die digitale Gesellschaft: Computer als Gegenstand der Zeitgeschichtsforschung," in Bösch, *Wege in die digitale Gesellschaft*, 7–38, here 27.

17. Wiedmann, *Diensteinheiten*, 221.

18. Jens Gieseke, *Die hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter der Staatssicherheit: Personalstruktur und Lebenswelt 1950–1989/90* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2010), 110–26.

19. Interview with Herbert Maier, June 12, 2018, author's transcript and audio file, 6. Maier had joined the ASR in 1966. I have changed the names of the two former MfS employees I interviewed as they wish to remain anonymous.

20. Archiv der Behörde des Bundesbeauftragten für die Stasi-Unterlagen (hereafter BStU), MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 585, fols. 1–134, here fols. 123–24, "Kurt Opitz (MfS, ASR), betr. Vorlage über den Aufbau und die Funktion der elektronischen Datenverarbeitung als Dokumentationszentrum im integrierten Informationsverarbeitungssystem des MfS, 13.3.1969."

21. BStU, MfS, SED-Kreisleitung (SED-KL), no. 5215, fols. 48–58, here fol. 53, "Manuskript für eine Führung durch Traditionskabinett Abt. XIII."

22. On data formatting as the condition sine que non of the "displacement of the world into the computer," see David Gugerli, *Wie die Welt in den Computer kam: Zur Entstehung digitaler Wirklichkeit* (Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fischer Verlag, 2018), 49–59.

23. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 585, fols. 1–134, here fol. 43, "Opitz, betr. Vorlage über den Aufbau und die Funktion der elektronischen Datenverarbeitung als Dokumentationszentrum im integrierten Informationsverarbeitungssystem des MfS, 13.3.1969."

24. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 585, fol. 20.

25. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 585, fol. 42.

26. By the end of 1966 the ASR had 466 employees, 404 of whom were women. Wiedmann, *Diensteinheiten*, 221.

27. BStU, HA III, no. 1544, fols. 78–96, here fol. 80, "MfS, Abt. XIII, Stellvertreter 'Technik und Produktion' (TP) des Leiters, betr. Erzielte Ergebnisse, o. D. (Juni/Juli 1974)."

28. Samuel S. Snyder, "History of NSA General-Purpose Electronic Digital Computers," Washington, Department of Defense, 1964, 93–95, accessed October 18, 2018, http://nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/nsa-early-computer-history/assets/files/6586784-history-of-nsa-general-purpose-electronic-digital-computers.pdf.

29. Diana R. Gordon, "The Electronic Panopticon: A Case Study of the Development of the National Criminal Records System," *Politics & Society* 15, no. 4 (December 1987): 483–511.

30. Archiv des Bundesnachrichtendiensts, 1714_OT, fols. 1–32, "Vortrag CDA in Abteilungsleiter-Konferenz am 24.7.1968, Tgb.-Nr. 26/68." The BND's Central Encryption Office in Bonn had already been using data processing since 1960: see Armin Müller, *Wellenkrieg: Agentenfunk und Funkaufklärung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes 1945–1968* (Berlin: Ch.↑ Links Verlag, 2017), 270.

31. Bergien, "Big Data," 261–62.

32. According to Markus Wolf, for its next hardware purchase in 1968/69, the KGB set its sights on a relatively small "second-generation" computer, a Ural 16: BStU, MfS, Sekretariat des Ministers (SdM), no. 1432, fols. 2–19, here fol. 8, "Markus Wolf (MfS, HV A), betr. Besprechungen mit dem Komitee für Staatssicherheit der UdSSR vom 3.–6.4.1967 in Moskau, 10.4.1967."

33. Haslam, *Near and Distant Neighbors*, 239–47.

34. Horst Müller and Klaus Rösener, "Die Unterstützung der elektronischen Industrie," in *Die Industriespionage der DDR: Die Wissenschaftlich-Technische Aufklärung der HV A*, ed. Horst Müller, Manfred Süß, and Horst Vogel (Berlin: Das Neue Berlin, 2008), 77–109, here 78–79.

35. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 446, fols. 1–75, "Siemens AG, Zweigniederlassung Hamburg: Polizeiliches Informationssystem DISPOL, Einsatzstudie, November 1969"; Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe (ZAIG), no. 35268, fols. 1–60, "Siemens AG, Geschäftsbereich Datenverarbeitung: Siemens System 4004 bei der Kraftfahrzeugzulassungsstelle der Landeshauptstadt München, Dezember 1971."

36. BStU, MfS, HA VI, no. 15705, fols. 187–213, "Siemens-Datenverarbeitung, betr. Die elektronische Datenverarbeitung der Polizei in USA (polizeiliches Informationssystem), 12.11.1968."

37. Felix Herrmann, "Zwischen Planwirtschaft und IBM: Die sowjetische Computerindustrie im Kalten Krieg," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 9, no. 2 (2012): 212–30; Slawa Gerovitch, *From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).

38. BStU, MfS, SED-KL, no. 3393, fols. 51–133, here fol. 111, "Erich Mielke, betr. Referat über Probleme des VII. Parteitags der SED und über sich daraus ergebende Aufgaben (Sitzung der SED-KL am 29.5.1967)."

39. BStU, MfS, SdM, no. 1343, fol. 50, "Protokoll des Referats des Ministers auf der Delegiertenversammlung der HV A, Februar 1967." In this speech Mielke suggested that the search for a 100 percent reliable specialist was the main problem the Stasi faced in its efforts to computerize.

40. Name anonymized.

41. BStU, MfS, KS, no. 12421/90, fol. 24.

42. Altdorfer came from a middle-class family; an evaluation written in 1979 emphasized his sensitivity, tact, and politeness, as well as his "cultural education and huge interest in certain art movements." BStU, MfS, KS, no. 12421–90, fols. 49–50.

43. Interview with Dieter Altdorfer, author's transcript and audio file (name of the interviewee anonymized).

44. Heinz Janisch, *30 Jahre Siemens-Datenverarbeitung: Geschichte des Bereichs Datenverarbeitung 1954–1984* (Munich: Siemens AG, 1988), 28.

45. In 1963/64 the Siemens Data-Processing Division's losses equaled its sales, which amounted to 30 million DM. Bernhard Plettner, *Abenteuer Elektrotechnik: Siemens und die Entwicklung der Elektrotechnik seit 1945* (Munich: Piper 1994), 245, 252–53.

46. Susanne Hilger, "Von der 'Amerikanisierung' zur 'Gegenamerikanisierung': Technologietransfer und Wettbewerbspolitik in der deutschen Computerindustrie nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg," *Technikgeschichte* 71, no. 4 (2004): 327–44, here 338.

47. This was accompanied by a steep increase in the Data-Processing Division's sales from around 25 million DM in 1963/64 to 900 million DM in 1969/70. Timo Leimbach, "Die Geschichte der Softwarebranche in Deutschland: Entwicklung und Anwendung von Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie zwischen den 1950ern und heute" (PhD diss., University of Munich "Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München," 2010), 110.

48. Between 1967 and 1979 Siemens received around a billion DM from these programs; see Leimbach, "Die Geschichte der Softwarebranche," 192.

49. For example, despite the somewhat open subsidies Siemens received from Federal and state governments, IBM's market share of state IT applications was 71 percent in 1974; see Leimbach, "Die Geschichte der Softwarebranche," 192.

50. SAA, 68. Li 141, "Meldungen über die Branche."

51. SAA, 68. Li 141, "Meldungen über die Branche."

52. According to an MfS file memo, the director of the Siemens data-processing plant had traveled to East Berlin for the meeting with Schalck-Golodkowski. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 4006, fol. 11, "Aussprache mit Genossen Brosch, Intertechna, 30.9.1969."

53. Büromaschinen-Export GmbH (Business Machine Exports, BME) was part of VEB Datenverarbeitungs- und Büromaschinen. Notwithstanding its name, the BME was also responsible for IT systems and peripheral equipment. Simon Donig, "Die DDR-Computertechnik und das COCOM-Embargo 1958–1973: Technologietransfer und institutioneller Wandel im Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Sicherheit und Modernisierung," in *Informatik in der DDR: Eine Bilanz*, ed. Friedrich Naumann and Gabriele Schade (Bonn: Gesellschaft für Informatik, 2006), 251–72, here 257–58.

54. AG XIII was created out of the former Division 3 (computer center) of the Working Group on Securing Tourist Travel in 1969. AG XIII now comprised the entire MfS computer center. In 1972 it was upgraded to Division XIII.

55. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 2653, fols. 1–4, here fol. 4, "Opitz (ASR, Leiter), betr. Bericht über den Besuch der Ausstellung 'Avtomatisazija 1969' in Moskau, 29.5.1969."

56. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 812, fols. 13–21, "Altdorfer (MfS, ASR), betr. Bericht über die Reise einer Studiengruppe zur Firma Siemens nach München vom 30.6.1969 bis 11.7.1969, 11.7.1969." GOLEM stands for "Großspeicherorientierte, listenorganisierte Ermittlungsmethode" (mass storage-oriented, list-organized derivation method).

57. For Altdorfer and his comrades, this was probably a one-off opportunity to experience West German political cabaret at its best. The show being performed at the time—*Der*

Moor ist uns noch was schuldig, written by and starring Dieter Hildebrandt—was described by one critic as one of the "strongest . . . ever performed by the Lach- und Schießgesellschaft." Till Hofmann, ed., *Verlängert: 50 Jahre Lach- und Schießgesellschaft* (Munich: Karl Blessing Verlag, 2009).

58. Johannes Paulmann, "Feindschaft und Verflechtung: Anmerkungen zu einem scheinbaren Paradox," in *Vom Gegner lernen: Feindschaften und Kulturtransfers im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Martin Aust and Daniel Schönpflug, (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 2007), 341–56.

59. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 812, fols. 11–12, "Reiner F., Bisheriger Verlauf des Assembler-Lehrgangs für die '4004', 24.7.1969."

60. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 4006, fols. 47–50, here fols. 48–49, "Altdorfer: Aussprache mit Vertretern von Siemens bei Interver, 4.6.1969."

61. Nathan Ensmenger, *The Computer Boys Take Over: Computers, Programmers, and the Politics of Technical Expertise* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 119.

62. Altdorfer himself sat this test, possibly to provide a good example, and achieved the best grade. In the end, he allowed the tests to proceed, justifying them to his superiors by saying that he could not afford to make any blunders in his choice of which technicians to send to Munich. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 2653, fol. 33, "Altdorfer, Durchführung eines Testes für DV-Personal, 23.6.1969."

63. Siemens's great interest in the ZIID as a customer is again evident from the fact that Siemens had made an exception to its usual practice by agreeing to cover the accommodation costs for the MfS technicians trained at a Siemens school in Frankfurt am Main. Naturally the Stasi officers presented this as a negotiation triumph. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 4231, fol. 12.

64. Interview with Herbert Maier, June 12, 2018, author's transcript and audio file.

65. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 4231, fols. 14–15.

66. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 4231, fol. 41, "Abt. XIII: Aktenvermerk: Aussprache mit Herrn . . . , Zentralniederlassung (ZN)-Siemens/West-Berlin am 9.9.1969 bei Intertechna, 11.9.1969." See also Frank Cain, "Computers and the Cold War: United States Restrictions on the Export of Computers to the Soviet Union and Communist China," *Journal of Contemporary History* 40, no. 1 (January 2005): 131–47, here 142.

67. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 4231, fols. 18–21, here fol. 21, "AG XIII, Oberleutnant O.: Siemens-Vertragsverhandlungen, Stand der Verhandlungen per 10.12.1969—Zeitraum ab 4.8.1969."

68. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 4231, fol. 19.

69. Springer, "Gedächtnis," 77–80.

70. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, 4231, fols. 42–44, here fol. 43, "Abt. XIII: Aktenvermerk: Aussprache mit Herrn . . . , ZN-Siemens/West-Berlin am 12.9.1969 bei Intertechna, 15.9.1969."

71. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 4006, fol. 11, "Aussprache mit Genossen Brosch, Intertechna, 30.9.1969."

72. In December 1969 the Nixon government issued a position paper prohibiting the export to the Eastern Bloc of computers with processor speeds exceeding 8 million bits per

second. According to this criterion, the 4004/45 computer should not have been exported, but the position paper also set out the requirements for special exemptions. Cain, "Computers and the Cold War," 142.

73. SAA, 68.Li 141, "Auszug ZA: Monatsbericht Dezember 1969."

74. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 4231, fols. 36–40; the items are listed in Appendix 1 of the import contract signed by the BME and the ZIID on January 23, 1970.

75. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 8147, fol. 165, "Wachbuch-Eintrag, 16.12.1970."

76. On relations between Siemens and the BKA, see Dieter Schenk, *Der Chef: Horst Herold und das BKA* (Hamburg: Spiegel-Buchverlag, 1998), 127.

77. The first director of the BKA Data-Processing Division used this term to characterize his division's relationship with Siemens. Interview with Herbert Tolksdorf, July 2, 2015, author's transcript and audio file, 12.

78. Janisch, *30 Jahre*, 49.

79. Janisch, 49.

80. Leimbach, "Geschichte der Softwarebranche," 110. It wasn't just Siemens that had this problem; rather this was a structural bottleneck that arose as a result of ramping up the speed of the computer. Gugerli, *Wie die Welt*, 47–49.

81. Klaus Hülck, Dietrich Klugmann and Günter Peetz, *GOLEM: Ein allgemein anwendbares Verfahren für die Dokumentation und das Wiederauffinden von Informationen* (Munich: Siemens, 1967).

82. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 4006, fols. 25–31, "MfS, AG XIII: Pflichtenheft für Golemprojekt ZIID," n.d., ca. July 1969.

83. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 4006, fol. 25.

84. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 4006, fol. 25.

85. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 812, fols. 22–45, here fol. 22, "Übersicht über Stand und Probleme des EDV-Einsatzes im MfS," probably written by Altdorfer, early 1975.

86. BArchK, B 106/91077, BKA, DV 1–1, "betr. Aufbau des Verbunds," here "Sachstand am 8.3.1974 vom 15.3.1974, Anlage 3: Dokumentationssystem: Computergestütztes System zur Erschließung und Wiedergewinnung kriminalistisch-kriminologischer Literatur."

87. Johan Östling et al., eds., *Circulation of Knowledge: Explorations in the History of Knowledge* (Lund: North Academic Press, 2018).

88. Interview with Altdorfer, September 7, 2018, author's transcript and audio file.

89. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 812, fols. 22–45, here fol. 23, "Übersicht über Stand und Probleme des EDV-Einsatzes im MfS," probably written by Altdorfer, early 1975.

90. Janisch, *30 Jahre*, 60.

91. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 2653, fols. 1–4, here fol. 1, "Opitz (ASR, Leiter), betr. Bericht über den Besuch der Ausstellung 'Avtomatisazija 1969' in Moskau, 29.5.1969."

92. The Ministers' Confidentiality Working Group insisted that the data communication be encrypted and performed outside the MfS premises. Encrypting data communication proved to be highly complex, however. In July 1974 the experts of Division XI of the MfS concluded that it would involve "unreasonable costs and technical complexity." BStU, MfS, HA III, no. 1544, fols. 99–100, "MfS, Abteilung XIII, betr. Aktennotiz: Absprache am 5.7.1974 zwischen Mitarbeitern der Abteilung XI und XIII, 9.7.1974."

93. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 3378, fols. 102–4, here fol. 104, "Abteilung XIII, Leiter: Konzeption zur Erweiterung der bei der Abteilung XIII eingesetzten Datenverarbeitungstechnik, 30.8.1973."

94. Janisch, *30 Jahre*, 94.

95. As well as the West German police force, state agencies such as regional social insurance offices and tax offices built their data communication networks on the Transdata system. Therefore, MfS technology did not necessarily end up at the BKA in Wiesbaden or the State Criminal Police Office (Landeskriminalamt) in Hanover, though it is certainly possible. On the use of Transdata, see Ulrich Coura, "TRANSDATA," in *Data-Report* 12 (1977): 32–35.

96. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 3656, fols. 107–8, "Abt. XIII, UA 8, Hauptmann (Hptm.) Weber: Aktennotiz über die Abnahme des Kaufvertrags no. 25–642/50067/8 über die Lieferung von Großplattenspeichern, 4.10.1976."

97. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 3656, fols. 91–92, "Abteilung XIII/2, Hptm. Weber: Aktennotiz über eine Beratung mit dem Vertreter der Firma Siemens, 6.6.1977."

98. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 3656, fol. 77.

99. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 3656, fols. 62–63, here fol. 63, "Abteilung XIII/2: Aktennotiz über ein Treffen mit Dr. S., Firma Siemens, 7.2.1979."

100. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 3656, fols. 148–51, here fol. 149, "Aktennotiz über den Besuch auf der Leipziger Frühjahrsmesse am 16. und 17.3.1972 durch Genossen Major Dr. Altdorfer und Leutnant Weber, 27.3.1972."

101. In spring 1973 Siemens contacted Division XIII again with the news that representatives of the Deutscher Normenausschuss (West German Standards Committee) and the Federal Press Office wanted to speak to the ZIID about its experiences with GOLEM. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 3656, fol. 147, "Altdorfer, betr. Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit Vertretern der Firma Siemens am 12.3.1973 in Leipzig (Messestand der Firma Siemens), 16.3.1973."

102. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 7801, fols. 44–45, here fol. 44, "MfS, Abteilung XIII, Unterabteilung 6: Aktennotiz, 15.2.1974." Accordingly, there was no contradiction in handling the potential sale of a PT 80 electronic print terminal "via a replacement parts contract." BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 3656, fol. 90.

103. BArchK, B 102, 286059, 3, BMWi, Referat V A 4, "betr. Verzögerung deutscher COCOM-Anträge durch die amerikanischen Behörden, mit Anlage 1: COCOM-Lizenzierungsverfahren für den Export von drei Siemens-EDV-Systemen nach Polen und Ungarn," n.d., ca. September 1978.

104. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 3656, fols. 137–38, "Abteilung XIII/8: Aktennotiz über ein Telefongespräch mit Dr. S., 19.4.1976."

105. In the late 1970s, 6 percent of all Siemens computer exports were going to the Soviet Union. Autio-Sarasmo, "Knowledge through the Iron Curtain," 78.

106. BArchK, B 102, 286059, BMWi, Referat V A 4, "Vermerk betr. deutsch-amerikanischer Meinungsaustausch über COCOM-Fragen vom 27. bis 29.9.1978 in Washington," here "Gespräche im Commerce Department über einzelne COCOM-Anträge der Firmen Siemens, BASF und Rasch, 25.10.1978."

107. BStU, MfS, HA XVIII, no. 35132, fols. 1–3, here fol. 2, "HA XVIII/8/ 1: Bericht des IMS 'Stein': Dienstreise West-Berlin, Verhandlungen mit der Firma Siemens am 20.1.1982, 14.12.1982 [*sic*]."

108. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 3656, fols. 40–44, "Siemens AG, ZN West-Berlin, an das ZIID der DDR, Herrn Weber, betr. Angebot, 8.8.1978."

109. Springer, "Gedächtnis," 89, 113.

110. BStU, MfS, HA VI, no. 37, vol. 3, fols. 2–14, "MfS, HA VI, Abteilung EDV, betr. Einschätzung des Nutzeffekts der EDV bei der Realisierung des Antrags- und Genehmigungsverfahrens auf der Grundlage einiger messbarer Faktoren, 28.5.1980."

111. At least this was the view of the witnesses I interviewed: "Well, we couldn't afford them . . . so . . . the changeover to ESER technology, it was for solely economic reasons." Interview with Herbert Maier, June 12, 2018, 24, author's transcript and audio file.

112. BStU, HA III, no. 1544, fols. 120–27, here fol. 127, "MfS, Abt. XIII, Stellvertreter TP des Leiters, betr. Konzeption zur perspektivischen Entwicklung der EDV-Technik im MfS, 9.4.1974."

113. BStU, MfS, HA III, no. 1544, fols. 151–54, here fol. 152, "Handschriftlicher Vermerk von Oberstleutnant Altdorfer," n.d., ca. end of March 1974.

114. BStU, MfS, ZAIG, no. 26234, fols. 172–74, here fol. 172, "Aktennotiz, verm. von Oberstleutnant Harry Bochmann, zur Verlängerung des Ersatzteilvertrags mit Siemens sowie zur Beschaffung von ES 1055-Rechnern, 21.4.1978."

115. BStU, MfS, ZAIG, no. 26234, fols. 172–74, here fol. 172, "Aktennotiz, verm. von Oberstleutnant Harry Bochmann, zur Verlängerung des Ersatzteilvertrags mit Siemens sowie zur Beschaffung von ES 1055-Rechnern, 21.4.1978."

116. In 1977 the ZAIG handed this task over to VEB Robotron's Center for Research and Technology, where the company's own "developer collective" worked solely on Stasi projects. Engelmann and Joestel, *Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe*, 70.

117. Receipts from sold parts in BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 3139.

118. BStU, MfS, ZAIG, no. 5720, fols. 9–12, "Auflistung der 1989/90 vorhandenen Hardware in Auflösungskonzeption RZ—ZAIG—Haus 8/Eingang A, 30.1.1990."

119. Booß, "Sonnenstaat des Erich Mielke."

120. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 3656, fols. 83–84, here fol. 83, "Abteilung XIII, Stellvertreter des Leiters: Bericht über ein Gespräch mit Vertretern der Firma Siemens anlässlich der Leipziger Frühjahrsmesse 1978, 7.4.1978."

121. BStU, MfS, Abt. XIII, no. 3656, fol. 84.

122. BStU, MfS, ZAIG, no. 50071, fols. 75–84, here fol. 75, "Generalleutnant Werner Irmler: Bereitstellung eines Offline-Laserdrucksystems zur Sicherung der weiteren Automatisierung und Rationalisierung von zentralen Speicherführungs-, Überprüfungs- und Auskunftsprozessen, 20.6.1989."

123. BStU, MfS, ZAIG, no. 50071, fol. 81.

124. Interview with Herbert Maier, June 12, 2018, 15–16, author's transcript and audio file.

125. BArchK, B 102, 363602, "Hans-Gerd Neglein (Mitglied des Vorstands der Siemens AG) an Lorenz Schomerus (Staatssekretär im BMWi), betr. mit einer 'Notiz: Exporte in die DDR und Osteuropa', 31.3.1987."

126. In addition, the MfS's Main Division III, which was responsible for "signal intelligence" and "electronic combat," allegedly purchased another Siemens computer in 1986. This computer was reportedly installed in the HA III computer center on Normannenstraße. "Lauscher im Datenreich," *Der Spiegel*, September 9, 1996.

127. BStU, MfS, HA XVIII, no. 11655, fols. 20–35, here fol. 24, HA XVIII/7, "Hptm. Machost: Vorschlag zum Abschluss der operativen Bearbeitung des ZOV 'Rechner', Reg.-Nr. XV/2089/83, 17.1.1984."

128. BStU, MfS, HA XVIII, no. 35132, fols. 90–92, here fol. 92, "Information eines Inoffiziellen Mitarbeiters der HV A," n.d., ca. August/September 1985.

129. On the problems surrounding the use of electronic storage and research systems from enemy organizations, with a letter from Markus Wolf, HVA director, to Günther Kratsch, Leiter HA II (October 1980): BStU, MfS HA II, 17990, fols. 1–17, here fol. 16.

130. BArchK, B 206/1822, "Informationen über Gegnerische Dienste -DDR- EDV-Anlagen des MfS im Großraum Ost-Berlin, Stand: April 1978."

131. Interview with Herbert Maier, June 12, 2018, author's transcript and audio file.

132. Interview with former BND president Hans-Georg Wieck, August 31, 2018, author's transcript and audio file.

133. Bergien, "Big Data."

134. Schenk, *Chef*, 127.

Problems with the "Big Brother"

The GDR's Ministry for State Security and the CPSU's Policy toward Germany in 1969/70

SIEGFRIED SUCKUT †

This article examines how the East German secret service reacted to the onset of the new *Ostpolitik* of Willy Brandt's Social Democrat–Liberal coalition in Bonn in 1969/70. Material from the GDR Ministry for State Security (MfS) shows that Minister Erich Mielke and his deputy Markus Wolf, the head of the department for espionage in Western countries (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, HVA), considered Brandt's variant of "imperialist" *Ostpolitik* especially dangerous for the GDR and the Socialist states, as it allegedly aimed at abolishing Socialism in the GDR and undermining the Eastern alliance system. In conversations with the KGB leadership, they warned their "Big Brother" and exhorted Moscow not to make any concessions to the West German government at the expense of the GDR. The core of this article consists of a presentation manuscript—translated into English for the first time—prepared by the Stasi as it sought to make its case to KGB chief Yuri Andropov in the summer of 1970. Wolf tried to exhibit a confident, sometimes even schoolmasterly attitude toward the Soviet representatives. The Stasi nevertheless failed to dissuade the Soviets from signing a renunciation of force treaty with Brandt's government in August 1970.

A Change of Government in Bonn: All Quiet on the Western Front?

When Willy Brandt was elected chancellor of the Federal Republic in fall 1969—the first Social Democrat to occupy this position—the initial response of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) was business as usual. Party apparatus staff under Central Committee (Zentralkomitee, ZK) Secretary Albert Norden were instructed to prepare for the Politburo an immediate assessment of Brandt's October 28 address to the Bundestag, in which he had set out his program for government. This assessment came to the unspectacular conclusion that "no fundamental political reorientation" was to be expected "either in domestic

or foreign policy." There had been a change of government, the report stated, but no change of power. The GDR could now expect to become acquainted with a somewhat more flexible "Social Democratic approach to pursuing imperialist policies" and so, the report advised, the SED leadership should "continue to focus its main attention on combating monopoly capitalism and the conservative and extreme right-wing forces" led by the CDU/CSU.[1] The report also recommended that "constructive criticism" be leveled at the Social Democrat–Liberal coalition where necessary.[2] In other words, the assessment was sober and skeptical and showed little sign of real concern.

Although SED General Secretary Walter Ulbricht could be quite emphatic at times, it probably surprised everyone when he criticized the report's findings at a meeting of Politburo members on October 30, 1969. Ulbricht believed Brandt's address should be seen as "progress" and he insisted that the SED must now work toward ensuring that this new government remain in power for "a fairly long time."[3] The SED chief struck a combative, optimistic tone: if Brandt was going to pursue a new *Ostpolitik*, he said, "then we will pursue a new *Westpolitik*, one that will be extremely successful."[4] At this point the Politburo did not commit itself to either of these approaches. A draft resolution forwarded to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in advance had struck a balance between the two,[5] and the SED leadership was waiting for instructions from Moscow. Presumably because of a lack of support in the Politburo and his own doubts as to whether the GDR had the economic strength to pursue an offensive policy toward the Federal Republic, Ulbricht quickly backed down and moved closer to the tenor of the Norden paper. During a visit to Moscow in early December, he presented the views espoused in the latter to the CPSU leadership and the heads of the other Communist parties.[6] The SED had decided in principle to keep following its existing policy toward the Federal Republic; the putative continuity in Bonn was to be met with a similar tactic in the GDR.

The Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, MfS) led by Erich Mielke had fewer difficulties assessing the new West German chancellor. Since his time as mayor of West Berlin, Brandt had been regarded by Stasi officers as a dangerous adversary pursuing a "hostile policy against the GDR."[7] In the view of the MfS, Brandt had simply switched to a tactic of "conquering the GDR by peaceful means," and his apparent readiness to pursue peace and understanding was a sham. Nevertheless, as head of intelligence, Minister Mielke, like the SED leadership, wished to first present his assessment in Moscow and have it approved there. He therefore prepared carefully for a consultation with KGB chief and CPSU Politburo Candidate

Member Yuri Andropov in mid-November 1969.[8] Also representing the MfS at the meeting was Markus Wolf, head of the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, HVA), which was responsible for espionage in the West. Wolf had the HVA prepare a strategy paper more than eighty pages long listing the strategic goals of the Social Democrats' *Neue Ostpolitik* and outlining future challenges facing the "Chekists" in the Eastern alliance.[9] The addressees of this paper, which has not yet been examined by historians, are not specified. However, judging by its content and timing, it was likely intended to provide Mielke with information and arguments. A ten-page summary held in the files of the minister's secretariat suggests that Mielke shared the HVA's assessment.[10] Presumably this summary served as the basis for Mielke's presentation in Moscow.

The MfS Warns Its Soviet "Friends" and Registers Waning Solidarity in the Socialist Camp

Echoes of the assessment prepared by the ZK apparatus under Norden's instruction can be detected in both of these documents. The longer strategy paper, however, is formulated as an urgent warning to the Soviet Union to recognize the intentions behind the Social Democrats' *Neue Ostpolitik*. It presents the new West German policy as an attempt to split the Socialist camp, play the states off against each other, "undermine" their alliance with the GDR, and to isolate both them and the Soviet Union.[11] In some passages the assessment of the situation reads like an admonitory call to the leading power in the East for help. For example, the introduction recalls that not long ago, on the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the GDR, Comrade Leonid Brezhnev had affirmed that "friendship with the GDR" was "dear to the heart of the Soviet people."[12]

Unlike those responsible for work on the West under Norden, Markus Wolf, who was in charge of monitoring the Federal Republic, came to believe very soon after the change of government in Bonn that the power shift posed a threat to the GDR. Wolf was especially concerned that the shift would weaken solidarity among members of the Eastern alliance. He stressed the changes, rather than the continuities, in Bonn's *Ostpolitik* and highlighted the challenges these presented for the Socialist states. In its negotiation strategy plan for Moscow, the HVA quoted Brandt's alleged "internal" announcement that he intended to "strike the GDR from behind" using its allies.[13]

To prepare for the meeting, Wolf's officers had also noted down examples of how the SPD/FDP coalition was trying to exert political influence,

especially by economic means, in specific Eastern states—and not without success.[14] We do not know whether Mielke and Wolf presented all these examples in Moscow, but their concern is very evident in the papers. Even in the "SU/CPSU," the documents stated, there were "forces" that were "not without illusions" about the new federal government.[15] For example, Mielke and Wolf were unsettled by a statement made by a named sector head in the International Liaison Department of the CPSU's Central Committee, who had said that "serious power shifts" were occurring in West Germany, and that "great transformations in favor of peace and security were under way" in Europe. Meanwhile the chief Soviet television commentator had announced that the Federal Republic could no longer be seen as a "demon," and *Izvestiya* had remarked on the fact that Brandt was no longer calling for the "overthrow of Socialism in the GDR."

It is notable that Mielke and Wolf considered the Brandt government's *Neue Ostpolitik* to be far more dangerous than it was perceived to be in the SED Politburo, of which Mielke was not yet a member.[16] There was a particularly large discrepancy between Mielke's position and that of his former mentor, Ulbricht, although Mielke's views seem to have been less at odds with Ulbricht's designated successor and the party's top security official, Erich Honecker.[17]

The five-page minutes of the Moscow conversation with Andropov, which were prepared in Berlin on November 17, 1969, reveal that the KGB chief's language was remarkably cautious and diplomatic; for example, he stressed that he spoke only for himself, but that he was aware of the view of his party's "leading comrades." Nevertheless, it is evident that he believed Brandt's *Neue Ostpolitik* to be not nearly as threatening as it had been characterized by the MfS.[18] It is now known that, even at this early stage, Andropov was one of the members of the Soviet leadership who believed that a lasting improvement in relations with the Federal Republic was possible and indeed desirable.[19] While he stressed that there was "not very much new" in Bonn's policy, he believed that Brandt's statement should be "seriously heeded." Furthermore, he described some of the ideas presented in the statement as "tempting" and highlighted an objective advantage of the Federal Republic over the GDR—namely, that it was "bigger and richer."[20] According to the MfS's notes on the meeting, he reassured Mielke and Wolf that the Soviet Union's policy on the German question and its policy toward the GDR were "consistent and clear." When Nikita Khrushchev and Aleksei Adzhubei had begun to "flirt" with West Germany,[21] the Central Committee had "corrected" this and would "correct it again at any time"; there would be "absolutely no vacillation here,"

Andropov insisted.[22] The fact that the Soviet Union appeared to be singling out Germany for special treatment probably only served to unsettle Mielke. According to the notes on the meeting, the KGB chief never contradicted his visitors from the GDR. Nevertheless, they would have noticed that his responses failed to affirm the undying solidarity that was repeatedly pledged on official occasions.

Two months later, on January 9 and 14, 1970, "discussions" took place in Berlin between Mielke and General Semyon Tsvigun, Andropov's deputy, who led a KGB delegation on a short visit to the GDR.[23] Apart from the minister himself, "other leading MfS comrades" were to attend the "reception" held as part of the afternoon program of January 9.[24] Documents do not indicate whether Wolf was also present. It seems that the second meeting, on January 14, was not initially planned. The only evidence that it took place is a handwritten note attached to the third copy of the MfS paper, which was sent to the files of the Central Evaluation and Information Group (Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe, ZAIG).[25] Mielke's preparatory notes for the talks suggest that he aimed to present "new facts" that would reinforce the assessment of the SPD/FDP government he had provided in Moscow in November 1969. He wished to emphasize the lack of change in the foreign policy goals of "West German imperialism," which, he believed, still sought to bring about the "disintegration" and "division" of the Socialist states and to "isolate" both the Soviet Union and the GDR in the Eastern alliance.[26] In Mielke's view, Brandt's government was taking a "more sophisticated" and "flexible" tactical approach involving a "demagogy of nonviolence."[27] In hindsight, it is clear that warnings such as these were also directed at Soviet "friends." The MfS's own intelligence activities had revealed that Moscow was already engaged in more intensive talks with the West German government about a nonaggression treaty than either side had acknowledged.[28] Indeed, thanks to its Bonn "sources," the MfS was later able to inform the SED leadership—often in detail—about the progress of negotiations between Egon Bahr and Andrei Gromyko in Moscow.[29] It would appear that warnings about the particular "danger" posed by the Social Democrats' *Ostpolitik* was again the focus of a meeting with leading KGB representatives in Berlin in February 1970.[30] Similar warnings were also the subject of several briefings drafted by the HVA for the SED leadership. However, Mielke passed on only one of these, which, in detailing the SPD caucus's discussion of the Kassel meeting between Brandt and GDR Minister-President Willi Stoph, bore more positive news for senior party figures.[31]

The MfS Presentation Strategy: Warnings and Critical Questions for the "Big Brother"

MfS warnings peaked a few weeks before the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union signed a renunciation of force treaty in August 1970, as the files reveal. In June, MfS and KGB leaders had met again, apparently in Berlin. The HVA drafted a detailed presentation strategy (*Konzeption*), presumably to help Mielke prepare for the talks, to which it attached "Details from Internal Information from the West's Area of Operations about Certain Events in Socialist Countries."[32] In the presentation manuscript, MfS representatives explicitly expressed their desire to "hear the chairman's ideas on preparing for the meeting of the intelligence organs."[33] It is therefore clear that Andropov was one of the envisaged Soviet representatives. A list of participants has not survived, however. As the stated aim of the meeting was to continue the bilateral consultation that had taken place in November 1969 in Moscow,[34] it can be assumed that Markus Wolf took part again. The fact that the MfS's negotiating strategy was once again based on intelligence gained in the Federal Republic also makes it highly likely that Wolf was present. It would appear that the GDR representatives intended to use this knowledge to gain a tactical advantage over the Moscow Chekists. When Mielke and Wolf cited "internal" statements revealing the political intentions of members of the West German government, their visitors could hardly doubt this, since the latter had sufficient evidence that the MfS's information channels reached all the way to the political control rooms in Bonn.

According to the presentation strategy, Mielke intended to begin by saying that his November assessments had proven to be "correct" and that the MfS wished to report now on "new phenomena and trends."[35] It asserted that the SPD's main objective was still the "Social Democratization of Socialist states and Communist partners,"[36] and, having become a "direct ally" of West German "imperialists,"[37] the party was seeking to "transform the status quo" in Europe. Brandt and SPD parliament group chair Herbert Wehner had stressed "internally," it went on, that they wanted "Social Democracy" to become an "epidemic" in the Communist movement and to "win Communists over" to the cause of "defeating Communism."[38] The SPD was betting on the existence of "revisionist forces" and "anti-Socialist phenomena, ideas, developments" in the USSR and the other Socialist states, according to the GDR Chekists' plotline for the meeting, and the party was particularly concerned to "weaken" the "strongest power of Socialism."[39] The East German representatives also intended to cite documents from the "area of operations" showing that the

SPD leadership had intelligence on the Socialist states that apparently gave it grounds for confidence. On the basis of this, the MfS had found that even some of the "leading circles" in Socialist countries were harboring "illusions" about the political intentions of Willy Brandt and the Social Democrats.[40]

The "Western press" was engaging in similarly exaggerated speculations, including "with regard to the USSR's attitude," the MfS emissaries intended to argue. They therefore wondered: "Is Brandt's peace and détente demagogy being judged accurately in the USSR?" Was there "proper recognition that Brandt's so-called détente policy" was aimed primarily at giving "West German imperialism greater scope in its foreign policy for enforcing its anti-Socialist political doctrine?"[41] As an "example" the MfS pointed out that, according to Agence France-Presse, Gromyko had said during his visit to France that the "Brandt/Scheel government" was "more realistic" than its predecessors.[42] The government's attitude showed, Gromyko reportedly said, that it "recognized the realities, especially the limits; this would make progress possible, etc."[43] Speculation about the USSR's attitude toward Bonn had recently increased "immeasurably," especially in connection with the "West German-Soviet talks on [a] renunciation of force treaty," according to the document.

The MfS had secretly obtained a Bonn draft of a renunciation of force treaty with the Soviet Union in which "essential demands" of Socialist allies were "ignored."[44] The West German government intended to use this draft as the basis for further negotiations with the USSR, as the MfS representatives noted indignantly in their presentation strategy. The tactical objective of *Ostpolitik*, they claimed, was to isolate the GDR within its own camp by negotiating with Moscow and Warsaw, or, as ministers Egon Franke and Walter Scheel had put it "internally," to back the GDR "into a corner."[45] The draft Soviet-West German treaty demonstrated an unwillingness "to recognize the status quo in Europe" and, more importantly, "to recognize the GDR under international law."[46] But what value would such a treaty have, Mielke and Wolf intended to ask, "if West German imperialism" failed to recognize the "permanence of the postwar borders and the realities based on these"?[47] Bonn spoke merely of "respect," which could hardly be seen as a "binding guarantee under international law." The West German government had claimed that the USSR was ready to accept the former's "principle of the right of self-determination." What this really meant, according to the presentation document, was "the restoration of the power of monopoly capitalism in the GDR." Bonn had also declared that the USSR would accept its option of "German reunification," but likewise this was just an attempt to "mask the objective of annexing the GDR."

According to the presentation strategy, the SPD/FDP coalition was now giving the impression that, on this basis, it intended to begin negotiations with the USSR soon, raising the following questions for the MfS: "What is the USSR's attitude to these issues? Does it recognize Bonn's intentions and how does it intend to thwart them?" As the GDR's intelligence service had learned, Brandt saw an agreement with the Soviet Union as crucial for the continuation of his *Ostpolitik* "against" other Socialist states.[48] In this context, the document states, it would be "interesting to know" the "justification and aim" of the discussions that had been held in Moscow and Leningrad on June 15 and 16, 1970, with the "specialists in softening up [the Socialist camp]" from the "Bergedorf Discussion Group" (Günter Grass, Rüdiger Altmann, Countess Dönhoff, Rudolf Augstein, among others, are mentioned here by name).[49] The document also asks what outcome the Soviet comrades hoped for from a major trade union delegation traveling to the Federal Republic to discuss "cooperation" with the DGB (the West German Trade Union Confederation) and having "ostentatious" photographs taken with President Heinemann (a press photograph was enclosed with the manuscript).[50] One of the final questions of the presentation strategy was: "On what political judgments does the USSR base these measures?"[51]

It is worth noting that the tone of these intended questions fluctuates between interrogation and accusation. There is little evidence of a hierarchical gap between the two intelligence services in the MfS presentation strategy.[52] It is not clear whether the questions were actually posed in the same form, but handwritten notes suggest that the manuscript did serve as the basis for the MfS report to the KGB during their June meeting. As the pages of the manuscript contain numerous incomplete sentences with plenty of blank space between them, this would have been quite possible in terms of time. Unfortunately, Stasi files do not record the reactions of the KGB representatives. What is clear, however, is that the MfS was surprised and alarmed by the increasingly obvious shift in West German-Soviet relations. Its bogeyman image of the Federal Republic was disintegrating, and the West German government's inter-German interests appeared to be more important to hitherto reliable "friends" than those of the SED. It can be assumed, if not proven, that Mielke's questions had been discussed with Ulbricht in advance. Indeed, the latter may well have been looking for a way to raise concerns in Moscow about Soviet policy toward Germany without having to address them directly himself. If that was indeed the case, the MfS's questions could be read as those of the GDR leadership, which would lend the Stasi documents cited here even greater historiographical significance. The SED leadership was

almost certainly informed about what Mielke planned to say in Moscow, as well as about how the discussions with the KGB chief, who was in close contact with Brezhnev, had gone; any other scenario would appear inconceivable.[53] An introductory note in the preparatory MfS manuscript for Mielke's earlier meeting in Berlin with Andropov's deputy, Tsvigun, on January 9, 1970, states that the SED leadership "appreciated" the "great importance" of the visit. This note therefore lends further credence to the thesis that Mielke and the SED leadership agreed on the former's approach to consultations with Andropov.[54]

Unheeded Warnings: The Treaty of Moscow, August 12, 1970

Just a few weeks later, the MfS leadership realized that its warnings had gone unheeded. In Moscow on August 12, Brandt and Alexei Kosygin signed a renunciation of force treaty. The Soviet leadership had accepted the MfS leadership's repeated negative assessments of West Germany's *Ostpolitik* and inter-German policy, and had instructed the SED to uphold its policy of strict boundaries vis-à-vis the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, the USSR loudly declared its support for the treaty, in which the Federal Republic notably did not "recognize the GDR under international law," a recognition the SED had long professed to be of the utmost importance. This set a precedent for subsequent treaties.[55]

In a number of reports the MfS recorded GDR citizens' reactions to the treaty. These reports, which relayed the opinions not only of a dissenting minority but also often of "broad segments of our citizens" (and therefore presumably also many SED members),[56] read like accounts of a momentous political defeat for the GDR leadership. Mielke passed only the first report, dated August 24, 1970, to Honecker and agitprop functionary Werner Lamberz, bypassing the politically weakened Ulbricht. This report stated that a "new Soviet policy" was being pursued, that the treaty "did not fit into the concept of the GDR," and that the latter was being forced into "compromises" with the Federal Republic. In "all strata of the population," the report claimed, reservations were growing about the SED's inter-German policy, which was now being pressured into abandoning its "primary demand" for recognition under international law.

A supplementary report written by the ZAIG for Mielke and dated September 28 focused on the reactions of "leading and prominent academics" who were worried that the Soviet Union would prioritize academic exchange with the Federal Republic in the future.[57] The report, which also cites the academics' grounds for their concern,[58] concludes with the following sentence: "Doubts are emerging about the honesty of the USSR's relations with the

GDR."[59] Although Mielke probably shared this view, he did not take up his ZAIG officers' suggestion to share the paper with "a wider circle of Politburo members,"[60] instead opting to keep it to himself.[61]

A Final Attempt by the HVA

Markus Wolf, head of the HVA, was more combative. Even after the signing of the Treaty of Moscow, he continued to warn decision-makers in his country about Bonn's new *Ostpolitik* and inter-German policies, which in his view were aggressive and posed a particular threat to the GDR. In September 1970, according to the handwritten date, the HVA submitted a seventy-four-page report to the MfS. The six-page explanation prefacing the report suggested that the latter "could possibly be shared with a wider circle of Politburo members and candidates . . . if this is deemed appropriate." This suggestion was directed at Minister Mielke, who, as usual, now had to decide what to do with the HVA's draft Information Report 976/70 on "current developments and trends in the SPD/FDP government's actions against the European Socialist states, especially the GDR."[62] Such drafts would have crossed the desks of ZAIG employees first. However, the ZAIG could only decide whether domestic reports should be turned into Information Reports and then submitted to the minister. It always passed on reports written by the HVA.[63] In reality, then, Wolf alone decided which information from his remit was forwarded to the minister for dissemination to the party leadership. A handwritten entry on the Information Report's cover page indicates that he had ten addressees in mind in this case.[64]

The HVA claimed rather dramatically that its report's objective was to highlight "new trends in directly hostile activity."[65] The report was limited to summarizing information that had come from "leading government and party circles" in Bonn and revealing the "actual objectives of *Ostpolitik* and inter-German policies." It had become increasingly apparent, according to the report, that the GDR was dealing with "a comprehensive system of hostile activity." The HVA officers responsible for compiling the report had been guided "exclusively by essential aspects of the GDR's security" and had restricted themselves to material that had been gathered "recently."[66] An "even more comprehensive assessment" would have to include this material. The HVA avoided having to commend the Treaty of Moscow by noting that the report did not examine "positive aspects of the attitude of the SPD/FDP government (e.g., with regard to the Soviet-West German treaty)," as this would have involved "excessively large volumes" of material. Nevertheless, there was

"no change" in the HVA's "basic assessment of the reactionary intentions" of the West German government toward the Socialist states.[67] Bonn was hoping, the report claimed, to "misuse . . . the Soviet-West German treaty, in particular" for these intentions.[68] The facts presented proved that the West German government, which was not holding back in its "preparations for war," was only respecting the status quo in Europe in order to overturn it. Moreover, Bonn denied providing a binding recognition of the "inviolability of borders." The goal of "annexing the GDR" and "destroying Socialism" remained, hidden behind "slogans" such as "unity of the nation," "reunification," and "self-determination." The Social Democrat–Liberal government was not prepared to abandon its "presumption of sole representation" and was determined to "force" the GDR into submission.[69]

In tenor this document echoed the warnings that had been issued in earlier MfS preparatory papers for meetings with the KGB, but its arguments had been updated and tailored to the addressees in the Politburo. The latter cannot have failed to be impressed by the sheer number of statements by Bonn decision-makers that the HVA had gathered from its agents in the West. These included statements made at the NATO Council of Ministers meeting in Rome at the end of May, in confidential talks with German and foreign politicians, and to functionaries within their own parties.

Yet it is not clear what exactly Wolf hoped to achieve in sharing these with the SED leadership, given that the Treaty of Moscow had been signed long ago. Did he believe that even Ulbricht and other key figures in the SED leadership had not seen the "true" intentions behind Bonn's foreign and inter-German policies, and were therefore failing to recognize the risks posed to the GDR by the Social Democrats' policy of détente? Did he hope to alert them before it was too late? This would certainly not have been necessary in the case of Erich Honecker, a new powerful figure in the party leadership who had already voiced sharp criticism of the treaty to Brezhnev in August 1970.[70] Ulbricht, too, had at least let Soviet "friends" clearly sense his disappointment,[71] though Wolf was probably unaware of this. Was Wolf trying to ensure that, in pending talks with the West German government, SED figures would concentrate solely on what he saw as the GDR's interests rather than following Soviet policy on Germany? Some provocative passages citing "internal" statements made by leading members of the West German government point to this last motive. For example, the report quotes Brandt as saying that he expected the Soviet Union to have a "modulatory influence" (*sic*) on the GDR now the Treaty of Moscow had been signed.[72] Meanwhile,

Wehner is cited as saying that *Ostpolitik* would generate "ever-new difficulties in [the GDR's] own camp."[73]

What is clear is that Wolf was attempting to deploy drastic quotes and arguments in order to influence the Politburo's decision-making process. For example, the report claims that the HVA had learned that the West German Chancellery had instructed the BND to compile "a list of all members and candidates of the SED's ZK . . . which the federal government could use as a basis for realizing its goals." The list was to include all figures "who are not prepared to reject in principle all the arguments of social democracy."[74] Who would want to risk being named by the HVA as someone who was on the "BND list"? Yet a well-informed, critical reader would have noticed that most of the HVA quotes did not contain anything particularly new, given that Bonn politicians had expressed similar views in public.[75]

In the end, Mielke's reservations about the HVA's last-ditch effort must have prevailed, as the report was not circulated.[76] The ten copies that had already been prepared for circulation were destroyed, according to a handwritten note from ZAIG officers on the eleventh copy, which was filed away in the ZAIG and is the only surviving one.[77] There are no surviving documents shedding light on whether Mielke informed Wolf of his decision or the reasons behind it.

The potential political consequences of Information Report 976/70 were probably too risky for Mielke, who tended toward caution in his reporting to the Politburo. Since the HVA paper indirectly criticized the signing of the Treaty of Moscow by the GDR's Soviet "friends," Mielke may have consulted Ulbricht or Honecker, the ZK security secretary. The criticism implied in the report may well have been shared by the majority of Politburo members. However, very few were willing to trigger a debate at the party's top level, especially since it was obvious that the treaty was of great importance to CPSU leaders, despite their understanding of the interests of their East German allies. Verbally, Ulbricht had long toed the CPSU's line on German policy, and, at a conference attended by the top leaders of both parties in Moscow on August 21, 1970, he praised the treaty as "important for the internal consolidation of the GDR."[78] Meanwhile, Brezhnev had taken tactical precautions with his two-track policy on Germany, urging the SED in these months to distance itself from the initiatives of the Brandt/Scheel government. In later years Wolf, normally an admirer of the "art of dissembling,"[79] would sharply criticize Brezhnev's approach.[80]

The MfS Falls into Line

Mielke's decision not to circulate Information Report 976/70 marked a turning point in the MfS's position on Bonn's *Ostpolitik* and inter-German policies. This shift became most evident at a conference of the Warsaw Pact member states' "intelligence organs" in Budapest in December 1970.[81] Ahead of this conference the MfS delegation sent a draft of its paper to the KGB, which duly returned it with detailed suggestions for changes written on individual pages. These included a list of additions, deletions, substantive changes to the content and arguments, and instructions on the terminology to be used. The MfS draft has not survived, but the list of Moscow's requests for changes[82] and the manuscript of the Budapest paper, which was probably delivered by Wolf, have.[83]

In terms of changes to content, one of Moscow's main requests was to "provide a positive assessment" of the Federal Republic's treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, using "the official arguments of the party." In addition, Moscow wanted the paper to reflect more strongly the CPSU's "fundamental assessments" and to make it clearer that the "main task" of the Socialist states was "to force Bonn to ratify the treaties and to implement them in full." Therefore, Moscow wrote, the paper had to warn against the formation of a "right-wing cartel" in Bonn seeking to prevent just that.[84] The paper's authors were explicitly encouraged to emphasize "how dangerous" the Social Democrats' "foes" were, with their activities ultimately serving to "strengthen the imperialist system" and their "main line of attack" focused on the GDR.[85]

All of these recommendations were followed in the final manuscript of the paper. Here, the German Chekists praise the "immense international significance" of the treaties signed in Moscow and Warsaw, because in them the Federal Republic had been forced to recognize the "inviolability of the borders, including the Oder-Neisse border and the border between the FRG and the GDR."[86] The text makes no mention of the GDR's unmet demand for recognition under international law, and with regard to the still unresolved question of the relationship between the two German states, the text merely refers to relations "on the basis of the customary principles of international law between states." The manuscript issues emphatic warnings about the activities of the "right-wing bloc" in Bonn, which, it claims, ranged from the CDU to the National Democratic Party (NPD) and aimed to "overthrow the Brandt government."[87] Since these "right-wing forces" occupied almost half the seats in the Bundestag, the GDR government had felt compelled to draw a "tactical distinction." The paper claims the East German government's proposal to continue negotiations with Bonn was timed to enable the SPD and FDP to "draw

advantages during the state election campaigns in Hesse and Bavaria."[88] These formulations, which in the following months permeated the MfS leadership's inter-German policy statements, served as a form of prescribed language.

Mielke and Wolf, who had hitherto followed the old KPD (Communist Party of Germany) tradition of emphasizing the particular dangers of "Social Democratism" for the GDR and the Communist alliance, now adopted the line of the Soviet Union, which saw its own interests better protected if the Brandt/Scheel government remained in office in Bonn. From now on, the MfS would warn of ideological "diversion" against the Socialist states organized by SPD "general staff," but in order to avoid endangering the ratification of the treaties, it would prioritize the fight against the "right-wing bloc" forming in the Federal Republic.[89]

At the MfS's central leadership seminar, which took place on March 1–3, 1971, Mielke familiarized his senior officers with the official position on the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, presenting these treaties as a negotiating success for the allies and "an expression of the increased strength and growing influence of the Socialist states."[90] All attempts by the West German government to "undermine" the inviolability of the borders in Europe had been "thwarted" by the Soviet Union, he said,[91] and the Federal Republic had been forced to "also fully respect the territorial integrity of the GDR in its present borders."[92] Nevertheless, Mielke said vaguely, the Treaty of Moscow had "not [achieved] everything."[93] A few weeks later, at the delegates' conferences of SED party organizations in MfS regional offices, he tried to avert possible annoyance over the Soviet treaty policy by stating that Socialist states needed a "wise, flexible policy" toward the West.[94] The goal and significance of "certain measures" were "often not so easily recognizable," he said, and the positive impact sometimes only became apparent later. Considering his earlier critical remarks about the Soviet Union's policy toward the Federal Republic, such statements suggest that Mielke was attempting to convince himself as much as anyone else.

Summary

1. One of the key research questions investigated by scholars focusing on the history of the GDR and the MfS is how the GDR's Ministry for State Security reacted when—with the advent of European détente policy in the early 1970s—images of the enemy began to fade and the repressive practices of the East German regime had to be modified or even abandoned. A great deal is now known about how the Stasi tried to take the changed context into ac-

count in organizational and methodological terms.[95] The reasons why the East German leadership failed to prevent the Peaceful Revolution of 1989 have also been the subject of detailed investigations.[96] But up to now, little was known about how the MfS viewed the consequences of the Social Democrat–Liberal coalition's *Neue Ostpolitik* in its formative phase or how the ministry reacted to Soviet proponents of détente. The Stasi files evaluated for this article, in particular those files that originated in the HVA, provide important clues on these questions.

After the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Mielke gave the impression that, in line with the SED's position, he had welcomed détente as a policy initiated by the Soviet Union and expected it to cause trouble for the "enemy" in the West, but not for the GDR.[97] However, the discussion between the MfS and the KGB in 1969/70, which can now be partially reconstructed, together with the HVA papers cited in this article, reveal that Mielke and Wolf saw Bonn's *Ostpolitik* and inter-German policy as a latent danger to the GDR and its allies, and they wished to raise this openly with the Soviets. Indeed, Mielke's and Wolf's views here were remarkably similar and, as far as we know to date, more vehement than those of the SED leadership. Both appear to have opposed the Soviet policy on Germany reflected in the Treaty of Moscow, but they changed course when the Soviets made their strategic decision. Mielke and Wolf reluctantly modified the image of the enemy, promulgating the line that a rise to power by Bonn's oppositional "right-wing cartel" posed a greater threat to Socialist states than did the Social Democrats.

To date, it is not been possible to ascertain the extent to which Mielke acted with the knowledge or even approval of the SED leadership, but it seems implausible that he would have spoken to KGB leaders in the way he did without informing Ulbricht and Honecker. This is a point that should be examined in future analyses of the SED-CPSU's relationship to détente policy. Previous scholarship has presented Ulbricht's warning to the CPSU leadership that the GDR was not Belarus, and should not be treated as a Soviet state, as his sharpest criticism of the Soviet Union's German policy.[98] However, the critical questions Mielke and Wolf noted down for their discussions with Andropov should be considered in future research. It is possible that the two intelligence chiefs were exchanging views on Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and inter-German policy on behalf of the secretaries-general of their parties.

2. Over the course of this analysis, four distinct assessments of the Social Democrat–Liberal coalition's *Ostpolitik* and inter-German policy have emerged. The SED's ZK working group did not see any significant changes in

the federal government's policy. But in order to protect the GDR's political interests, Ulbricht wished to determine the true extent of Brandt's willingness and scope to implement a new policy aimed at reducing tensions in the East-West relationship. Meanwhile, it seems that the benefits of the West German initiative appealed to the CPSU leadership (in other words, Andropov), which was focused on its country's long-term interests. Only the MfS saw the existential threat that détente posed to Socialism in the GDR, fearing that the new policy could ultimately spell the end of the GDR. In hindsight we can see that this was a thoroughly realistic assessment of the situation.

3. The files evaluated here shed insights into the MfS's position within the Warsaw Pact system. It appears that the Soviets tacitly accepted the self-image of their German interlocutors as special allies who observed the policies of the other Socialist states and shared the weaknesses and undesirable developments they claimed to have identified. Preparatory papers suggest that MfS representatives were self-confident and even demanding in their dealings with the KGB and, to a certain extent, with the SED Politburo. The HVA draft of Information Note 976/70 reveals Markus Wolf's desire to influence party policy. This desire was shared by Mielke, who held that the role of the MfS was not simply to "carry out" the party's decisions; the information the former provided should also be "reflected in the party's policies," he believed.[99] But it seems the HVA Information Note went too far for him, and he did not circulate it.

4. The HVA's alarmist reports on the goals of Bonn's *Ostpolitik* and the dangers of "Social Democratism" provide more evidence that the attempt to use bribery to prevent Brandt's removal from office in April 1972, as described by Wolf, was instigated by the Soviets rather than the MfS/SED.[100] Honecker's more recently published comment to Ceauşescu in May 1972 that a "grotesque situation" had arisen whereby "we had to act as the main helpers in stabilizing the Brandt government" points to the same conclusion.[101]

5. Scholars now have a sounder basis for evaluating the contradictory remarks Wolf made about Brandt in later years. On the one hand, Wolf later claimed that, at the time, he did not see the change of government in Bonn as a "crossroads in postwar German politics." Yet on the other hand, he claimed to have stressed within the party "early on" that Brandt was "serious" about détente and would be "successful."[102] In light of the sources analyzed here, Wolf was being deliberately misleading. The files cited above show that Wolf and Mielke were quick to recognize the threats posed by Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and inter-German policy, and so they attempted to prevent any understanding between Bonn and Moscow that would be detrimental to the GDR.

Appendix

Strategy Plan of the GDR Minister of State Security, Erich Mielke, for Negotiations with KGB Chief Yuri Andropov in June 1970 on the Character of the Federal Republic's *Neue Ostpolitik*

Source: Archiv des Bundesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR (BStU), Bestand MfS, Akte ZAIG 5131, fols. 42–72.

3rd Copy

Strategy Plan (Theses)

For Negotiations with Leading Representatives of the USSR's Security Organs in June 1970[103]

Greetings. Extend a warm welcome once again. Meeting is expression of the close alliance between Soviet and German Chekists, which we will further consolidate and deepen.

Shared objectives in the fight against our common enemy. Need for even closer cooperation and coordination between our brother organs, for exchange of opinions on class struggle situation, and for political-operational work.

Take opportunity to highlight some new phenomena and trends, as we see them, in camp of West German imperialism and in Bonn's actions against the GDR and other Socialist countries.

Refer to negotiations in November 1969 in Moscow[104] and emphasize that our assessment of the situation in West Germany and the SPD/FDP government's policy has been fully confirmed and proven correct.

Focus today on presenting key new MfS findings that are significant for our political-operational work, especially regarding

- the role of the SPD leadership and the Brandt-Scheel government in furthering imperialism (in domestic and foreign policy) and
- new aspects of Bonn's campaign against the forces of Socialism/Communism and the resulting dangers, which demand our highest political-operational vigilance.

Confirmed: SPD leadership seeks to maintain the late-capitalist system in West Germany; moreover, it wants to make this system more effective, to repel the influence of the progressive movement working against the system, and to mitigate festering social conflicts.

Linked with the goal of enabling West German imperialism to deal more successfully with Socialism as a system.

SPD party conference, May 11–14, 1969, in Saarbrücken, clearly revealed

that Social Democracy intends to create further conditions for intensifying in West Germany the campaign against Socialist states.

Also to use Social Democratism as a means of making West German society attractive to the outside world and to propagandize it as a "model" for Socialist countries.

According to the resolution of the SPD party conference, these goals are to be included in the SPD leadership's long-term program of action. Through planned "reform of party organization," entire membership of SPD (approx. 800,000) to be obliged to strengthen the state monopoly system of government in West Germany.

Known: SPD leadership's long-term program of action is to be translated into concrete political guidelines for campaign against Socialism/Communism, in particular.

MfS is carefully following the SPD leadership's intention to take a long-term approach when planning its campaign against Socialism/Communism and to define concrete long-term measures, but also to better adapt counterrevolutionary machinations to current possibilities and realities.

Assessment: main objective is Social Democratization of Socialist states and Communist partners; at present it is one of the main versions of imperialist policy—and will be even more so in the future. In the long run it is intended to facilitate political-ideological penetration of Socialist countries (especially the GDR!).

Clear: at party conference, SPD leaders revealed this Social Democratic version of a policy aimed at "overcoming the borders in Europe" and, in this context, the goal of getting the GDR to "open up" to the West ("rapprochement" with the West).

Carefully following all preparatory work for this counterrevolutionary program, the first draft of which (with focus points and priorities) is to be presented as early as mid-1971 and adopted at the 1972 party conference.

But also taking into account the fact that the SPD leadership and the Brandt/Scheel government are already making great efforts to intensify the campaign against Socialism, using new and more sophisticated means and methods, and concealing even more skillfully their reactionary imperialist goals.

This entails even closer coordination/cooperation with the US

- See Brandt's US trip of April 10/11, 1970, and his meetings with Nixon, Rogers, Kissinger, etc.[105]

Evident: notwithstanding certain differences in opinion between Washington and Bonn and certain American misgivings on questions of tactical action against Socialist states, clear that the two imperialist states [are in] complete agreement in terms of objectives and intention:[106]

> to make the anti-Socialist counterrevolutionary policies of the SPD/FDP government and right-wing SED leaders even more effective as a component of the global strategy of US imperialism.

Furthermore, agreement to coordinate activities against Socialist states even more extensively and better.

Moreover, must be noted that Bonn's government is positioning its anti-Socialist policies even more firmly within the aggressive approach of the NATO alliance and, more importantly, seeks to

> exploit and deploy the power of NATO states even more purposefully in realizing the counterrevolutionary goals of West German imperialism.[107]

Concrete example: at NATO Council of Ministers meeting in Rome (May 26/27, 1970), Scheel appealed to NATO states to give more support to Bonn's *Ostpolitik* and its aggressive aims, e.g., by NATO states [undertaking] "multilateral activities" against Socialist countries.

Bonn seeks a "common strategy" and coordinated measures in terms of approach, as well as closer economic and political union between the Western European states, in order to be able to wage the campaign against Socialism in an even more focused manner.

Likely that NATO as a whole—despite certain misgivings on the part of some states—will follow Bonn's line, so it is to be expected that Western counterrevolutionary activities [will pose] even higher degree of danger.

Agreement from NATO, in particular, on the three focal points of Bonn's reactionary *Ostpolitik* that can be identified at present:

- activities against the Soviet Union,
- activities against the Polish PR,
- activities against the GDR.

These all pursue the objective (even if this is not always openly expressed)

> of changing the status quo in Europe.

Leading SPD functionaries, including Federal Minister of Justice Jahn, have stated that it must be recognized

"that the status quo in Europe cannot be allowed to continue. People saying here and there to leave everything as it is today is no alternative."

Brandt has said that the status quo must be "modified."

As a prerequisite for the desired change in the status quo in Europe (as a short-term objective, so to speak), the Brandt/Scheel government endeavors, using the most diverse means and methods,

- to make borders in Europe permeable (Brandt),
- to change the nature of borders in Europe and make them irrelevant (Schmidt),[108]
- to raze borders in Europe (Brandt).

This corresponds exactly with the CDU/CSU's objective, which—according to Barzel[109]—is

to achieve "freedom of movement of ideas and information, of opinions and people."

Full attention should be paid to the announcement of the SPD leadership and the SPD/FDP government

to further intensify ideological campaign against Socialist states and Communist parties in order to create conditions for achieving political goals.

Must pay particular attention to the fact that, most importantly, Social Democratism—as an "intellectual-political movement" (Brandt)—is to be used in a much stronger and more focused manner for pro-imperialist policies toward the outside world:

for the political-ideological weakening and disintegration of Socialist states as well as the division of the Socialist community of nations and the international Communist movement.

Our information confirms that SPD leaders are planning new Social-Democratist ideological attacks and offensives on a broad front against Socialist states and Communist parties, in particular against the GDR and our Marxist-Leninist party.

Objective of SPD leaders: to provide West German imperialism with new scope for expansionist foreign policy activities in the context of intensified class conflict.

West German imperialists believe that Socialism can be fought not just with the conservatism of the CDU/CSU, but also, and primarily, with the Social Democratism of SPD leaders. Have directly allied themselves with Social Democratism.

The following is becoming apparent: to a far greater extent than before, the plan is to take Social Democratism and other opportunist, bourgeois, anti-Socialist ideologies into Socialist countries and Communist parties. These activities will be one of the main types of imperialist-reactionary policy, even more so than in the past.

Not forgetting the fact that at the party conference in Saarbrücken, West German SP leaders[110] acted as the leaders of Western Social Democracy as a whole with regard to the ideological battle against Socialism/Communism. They are endeavoring to involve all Western right-wing Socialist, Social Democratic parties more heavily in this battle and to harness their power and potential.

Imperative that greater dangers are seen! Remember: Social Democracy is the governing party in the FRG and other Western countries! Possesses state resources and opportunities for intensified political-ideological diversion! Can harness power of the state monopoly system more than before!—Recognize too that West German Social Democracy emanates particular danger.

> Has become known that, as stated at party conference, SPD is preparing new activities to establish, expand, and exploit "practical and intellectual contacts with Social Democratism throughout the world"

for reactionary political-ideological influence.

But this also means: more contacts with revisionist and opportunist forces of all kinds in certain Socialist countries and Communist parties!

Thus [there is an] obvious intention to activate with the help of and on the basis of Social Democratism

> all right-wing opportunist, Social Democratic, and revisionist forces directed against Socialism/Communism.

Brandt, Wehner, and others stressed (internally)[111] that Social Democratism must be made an "epidemic" in the Communist movement, and that it must be ensured that Social Democratism is also established within the Communist camp.

The function of contacts, it is said (internally), is to win Communists over to the cause of "defeating Communism."

SPD wants to exploit revisionist elements in Socialist countries to this end. It relies heavily on, among others, those groups (e.g., in the CSSR, but also in other Socialist countries), which believe

> that all revisionists should unite more closely in order to be able to launch attacks against Socialist social order not just in one country but in several countries at the same time (Šnejdárek,[112] Hájek,[113] and others).

Revisionists in the CSSR are—we have internal information—keen to hold their positions, to "hibernate," to prepare for new attacks, but also to

> maintain contacts with revisionist elements in other Socialist countries in order to prepare joint action ideologically and organizationally.

In our view, this presents the major op[erational] task of penetrating these groups, uncovering their plans and connections, and using appropriate political and operational means to prevent them from having an effect.

Also betting on the existence and effectiveness of revisionist forces in the USSR, on links to anti-Socialist phenomena, ideas, developments in the USSR, but also in Poland and Hungary.[114]

According to internal statements, by intensifying attacks against the USSR (Brzezinski),[115] imperialists are pursuing their plan

- to weaken the strongest Socialist power
- to thereby establish conditions for "crises" in other Socialist countries, and
- to prevent joint counteractions by Socialist countries against revisionist attacks.[116]

SPD is completely in line with this. Seeks to achieve this imperialist objective by stepping up activities!

Our assessment: Social Democratism provides revisionism with key components of its counterrevolutionary program.

Lenin's insights into the close relationship, indeed identity of Social Democratism, right-wing opportunism, and revisionism are becoming even more relevant today!

Never underestimate the growing danger of Social Democratism and revisionism!

Operationally important in this context: all SPD guidelines for contacts in the East are to be reviewed and adapted to political conditions and require-

ments. (Increased contact activity aimed at intensifying political-ideological diversion is being pursued.)

Particularly important to note that in Socialist countries, SPD leadership and the federal government are skillfully

> exploiting existing illusions about Brandt's role and policies, as well as misjudgments,

in order to penetrate politically and ideologically.[117]

This is combined with heightened demagoguery on the part of Bonn in order to more cleverly disguise its reactionary goals.[118] (Phrases about peace and understanding, to a certain extent some concessions, certain compromises by Bonn to create better conditions for realizing its fundamental reactionary political doctrine).

(Please see attached material "Details from Internal Information from the West's Area of Operations about Certain Events in Socialist Countries.")[119]

In connection with the assessment of hostile activity against the Socialist camp and the situation in individual Socialist countries, it would be important to ask about the CSS's[120] experience in implementing the decisions on work in individual countries made during the chairman's last visit to Berlin.[121] This concerns countries such as the PR of China, Yugoslavia, and Romania as well as the other Warsaw Pact member states.

In this context, it would also be important and interesting to hear the chairman's ideas on preparing for the meeting of the intelligence organs.[122]

Our fundamental assessment: no departure by the SPD/FDP government from basic positions in the policy of West German imperialism and the previous governments under Adenauer, Erhard, and Kiesinger! (Brandt: "continuity"; no abandonment of principles and goals)

Even CDU/CSU have stated: differences of opinion with SPD essentially only on questions of tactical action against Socialist countries, especially GDR.[123]

All the more alarming when [there are] illusions even in leading circles within Socialist countries (PR Poland, Hungarian PR).[124]

Western press making such exaggerated speculations also with regard to the USSR's attitude.[125]

Question: Is Brandt's peace and détente demagogy being accurately judged in the USSR?

> Is there always proper recognition that Brandt's so-called détente policy is primarily calculated to give West German imperialism greater scope in its foreign policy for enforcing its anti-Socialist political doctrine?[126]

(Example: according to AFP,[127] Comrade Gromyko said in Paris that the Brandt/Scheel government is more realistic; that its attitude shows that it recognizes the realities, in particular borders; that this will make progress possible, etc.)

Speculation about the USSR's attitude to Bonn has increased immeasurably recently, especially in connection with West German-Soviet talks on a renunciation of force treaty.

We have obtained Bonn's draft of an (internal) WG [West Germany]-USSR renunciation of force agreement in which essential demands of Warsaw Pact states have been ignored. This is evident too in official statements made by leading representatives of the Bonn government. This draft is to provide the basis for Bonn's subsequent discussions (negotiations) with the USSR.

In particular, it lacks willingness to recognize the status quo in Europe, especially

- to recognize the borders under international law,
- to recognize the GDR under international law.

According to the "General Treaty,"[128] Bonn's reactionary objective—incorporation of the GDR into the imperialist West—is also to be maintained; the policy of annexing West Berlin is to be continued.

What worth does such a renunciation of force agreement have if West German imperialism evades key questions and, most importantly, fails to recognize the permanence of the postwar borders and the realities based on these?

Bonn not prepared to recognize borders!

Only talks about "respecting [borders]," etc. Can hardly be seen as a binding guarantee under international law!

Bonn claims that the USSR would be prepared to accept Bonn's thesis of "the right of self-determination."

Absolutely clear: when Bonn talks about "self-determination," what it always means is the restoration of the power of monopoly capitalism in the GDR. In West Germany, this slogan is used as a euphemism for a policy of hostility against GDR and revenge!

Moreover, Bonn claims the USSR would be prepared to accept Bonn's option of "German reunification" ("German unity and freedom in free self-determination"). Similarly, this thesis serves only to mask the objective of annexing the GDR.

We note in particular Bahr's statement of June 5, 1970, that the signing of a West German-Soviet renunciation of force treaty does not involve a recognition of the GDR (!)[129]

In the aforementioned Bonn draft of renunciation of force agreement, this cardinal question of European security—the recognition of the GDR under international law—is also deliberately evaded!

Bonn is creating the impression that on this basis, the USSR is willing to begin official negotiations on renunciation of force treaty soon (Scheel to Moscow, early July).

Question: What is the USSR's attitude to these issues? Does it recognize Bonn's intentions and how does it intend to thwart them?

Internally, Bonn's intention to create key conditions for establishing and expanding contacts with other European Socialist states by optically improving relations with the USSR has been repeatedly made known.[130]

Bonn wants to "reduce mistrust," "create trust" in order to induce other Socialist countries to engage more with Bonn [!].

Brandt on June 2, 1970: with the West German-Soviet renunciation of force treaty, Bonn will "put a crack in the wall of mistrust between East and West," and this will have a positive impact on Bonn's relationship with other Warsaw Pact member states.

Improved relations with the USSR will also improve West Germany's position in other Socialist states and benefit *Ostpolitik* as a whole [according to Brandt]. This is of utmost importance for establishing a network of the closest possible bilateral relations between Western and Eastern countries.

Known internally that Brandt personally attaches great importance to engagement with the USSR for the successful continuation of his "*Ostpolitik*" against Socialist states.[131]

In this context, interesting to know justification and aim of discussions about "East-West relations" with such specialists in softening up [the Socialist camp] as [Carl-Friedrich] Freiherr von Weizsäcker, Berthold Beitz, Günter Grass, and the journalists Rüdiger Altmann, Countess Dönhoff, Eugen Kogon, and Rudolf Augstein, held on June 15, 1970 in Moscow and June 16 in Leningrad. ("Bergedorf Discussion Group").[132]

What outcome is hoped for when a major trade union delegation travels to West Germany (May 25–June 2, 1970) to discuss "cooperation" with DGB and has ostentatious photographs taken with President Heinemann (see photos from the Western press)?[133]

On what political judgments does the USSR base these measures?

What ideas are there about the reactions among other Socialist countries (political, psychological aspects, optics, wide publicity)?

What position should be taken on this?

Do they think, for example, they can induce the DGB, which is entirely un-

der the influence of the right-wing SPD leadership, to fight against the SPD/FDP government? (while they pose beside Heinemann in the same photo?)

We bear in mind: SPD leadership and SPD/FDP government seek to exploit all possibilities to take differentiated action against Socialist states with the aim of playing them off against each other, dividing them, and driving wedge between them, including between USSR and GDR (!)

Example: Bonn believes by signing a West German-Soviet renunciation of force treaty, GDR will be forced to submit to Bonn's demands regarding the relationship between the two German states. (In Bonn's view, West German-Polish engagement would have a similar effect.)

Clear: with such activities, Bonn aims to put GDR under pressure.

Internally, it has been clearly stated: since "direct overpowering" of GDR not possible, "policies on the periphery" (*Ostpolitik*) are to create better conditions for intensified campaign against the GDR.

Also internally: Franke[134] said that the quickest possible progress in talks with Moscow and Warsaw will isolate GDR in its own camp. Scheel: GDR is being driven into a corner.

Our assessment on basis of our information: Bonn's demagogic "détente activities" are intended to expand West Germany's room for maneuver in its foreign policy toward Socialist states with the aim of

- undermining the unity and cohesion of the Socialist states,
- destroying Socialist countries' solidarity with the fundamental attitude and policy of the GDR toward West German imperialists,
- isolating the GDR from its allies

(The GDR is to be presented with ever-new difficulties in its own camp.)

That is why Bonn has also expressed its intention to maintain contacts and hold talks not only with the USSR and the Polish PR, but soon also with the CSSR and the Hungarian PR.

Another point that is of critical importance from a political-operational point of view: the government of Bonn will heavily augment its so-called *Ostforschung* [Eastern research] in order to find even more concrete starting points for political influence in European Socialist states, for counterrevolutionary action.

Method: analysis of political and other processes in Socialist states, developments and certain difficulties, constellation of political forces, activities of negative elements, etc.

So-called *Ostforschung* will be expanded and centralized.

To be expected: greater involvement of *Ostforschung* institutes in government decision-making; more government-commissioned research, including short-term analyses and expert opinions; greater concealment of [the research institutes'] actual function by emphasizing the putatively scientific nature of their activity; more exploitation for reactionary contact activities; greater involvement of so-called *Ostforschung* in intelligence activities, exploitation for secret service purposes!

Meanwhile, closer cooperation between West German *Ostforschung* institutes and similar institutes in NATO countries, especially the US.

So-called GDR research a major component of "*Ostforschung*" as whole. Objective: to support government decision-making when planning and executing its campaign against GDR; to explore new means and methods for campaign; to influence development in GDR through targeted contacts, etc.

Stronger coordination of so-called GDR research by Ministry for "Inter-German Relations."

Socialist security organs must pay more attention to these efforts by so-called *Ostforschung* and GDR research. Investigate plans and measures, prevent activities in Socialist countries! (taking into account collaboration between *Ostforschung* institutes with Western intelligence services).

In this context, not uninteresting to know that, for example, the BND and other Western intelligence services—and, as has become known, even the Danish intelligence service—are very interested in events involving leaders of the Polish PR—for example, which political forces support Moczar,[135] what political position he currently holds.

MfS always sees the Brandt/Scheel government's political plans and intentions toward the GDR in the context of its overall counterrevolutionary stance against Socialist community of nations.

In so doing, we pay very close attention to the new means and methods used to enforce this fundamental political position, specifically against GDR.

Bonn's strategic objective vis-à-vis the GDR is, by refusing to recognize the status quo, to create conditions for

- weakening, subverting, and undermining,
- annexing the GDR, incorporating into imp[erialist] system,
- destroying Socialism.

That is why the SPD/FDP government—as the Stoph-Brandt meetings in Erfurt and Kassel[136] also demonstrated—rejects relations with the GDR that are

valid under international law, recognition of the GDR and its borders under international law (like the CDU/CSU governments before it).

By refusing to recognize the GDR and its borders under international law, the SPD/FDP government also wants to be free to undertake all manner of aggressive counterrevolutionary acts against the GDR, its assumption being that it will not be held responsible as an aggressor under international law.

Bonn expects its declarations about so-called special inter-German relations, so-called all-German relations, etc.—as Brandt's appearance in Erfurt and Kassel showed—to be accepted by GDR.—Unacceptable for the GDR! In so doing, Brandt wanted to circumvent recognition under international law. Internally: Helmut Schmidt stressed that if the GDR were recognized under international law, the political foundations on which the Bundeswehr is built would be threatened (!)

Brandt/Scheel government continues—demagogic declarations do not change this—pernicious course of Adenauer, Erhard, Kiesinger, and Strauß.

In contrast, GDR is in favor of relationship of peaceful coexistence between two German states. But this requires consistent application of international law.

Brandt's efforts to foreground secondary and subordinate issues were manifestations of an attempt to avoid resolving the main question.

20 points by Brandt in Kassel:[137] destructive position; are rejection of international law, expression of Bonn's presumption of sole representation.

Several of these 20 points demand—in a skillfully disguised form—the GDR's capitulation and subordination (blackmail).

In addition, they aimed to throw dust in the whole world's eyes, e.g., by using "peace" and "understanding" phrases and even through demagogic use of the political terminology of the GDR (example: war must never again originate from German soil).

In addition, we in the GDR have been paying very careful attention to statements by Brandt and Scheel that the previous principles of Bonn's reactionary "inter-German policy" will be adhered to, that a "German reunification" will not be achieved in the foreseeable future, but that everything will be done to "mitigate the division."

What is behind this?

Our information suggests that with this statement and similar "offers" of so-called humanitarian relief, Brandt and Scheel want to bring the people of the GDR into opposition to the party and state leadership. Increased agitation against the SED and GDR government; more intense appeals to people's

feelings in order to trigger emotional effects; attempts to induce politically unstable groups within the GDR to take hostile action and to activate negative elements.

"Mitigation of division" is nothing but a slogan used by advocates of political-ideological diversion against the GDR. As is the slogan "preserving the unity of the nation" (It was not the GDR that destroyed the unity of the nation, but the West German imperialists and Western powers. As unity of the nation does not exist, it cannot be preserved.)

Key issue is establishing regulated peaceful coexistence between the GDR and West Germany on the basis of their equal rights under international law and mutual recognition under international law (GDR's draft treaty).[138]

This is our clear position in the interest of security and peace in Europe, the security of the Socialist state of the German nation against Bonn's aggressive policy.

Another aspect that we in the GDR must pay particular attention to in this context:

At the SPD party conference, Brandt stated that Bonn's goal

> is that by the end of the 1970s, "the barriers separating the German people will at least be made smaller."

Ahlers[139] emphasized that it is a matter of "making the inter-German border more permeable." (So fixed deadline [!] for Bonn's short-term goal, this stage of the campaign against GDR!).

Purpose of these Bonn activities [is] political-ideological penetration of the GDR

> directed first and foremost at the foundations of the Socialist social order.

Brandt has often propagandized his goal of "transforming" the system in the GDR.

Internally, experts in softening up talk about their goal of "moderating the Communist system," changing the domestic situation in the GDR, etc. In other words, disintegration and weakening of Socialism!

Brandt has stated that GDR citizens must be given the right "to organize themselves differently than they can today."

GDR consistently opposes these plans, intentions, and machinations of the SPD/FDP government. We confront them with our policy of all-round reinforcement and consolidation of the GDR and peaceful coexistence of the two German states based on international law.

This policy aims to prevent West German imperialism and its organs from

executing hostile policies and to resolutely repel this counterrevolutionary course of action.

GDR seeks establishment of firm guarantees under international law for peace in Europe, for security of GDR. Necessary, because—in addition to SPD/FDP government's attempts to deploy new means and methods to weaken GDR and to eliminate Socialism—at the same time there is evident in West Germany

> a powerful wave of open revanchism and aggressive intentions directed against the GDR, which

were ignited by CDU/CSU, revanchist organizations, and NPD.[140]

Extremely reactionary forces in West Germany which do not agree with SPD/FDP government in questions of tactical action against GDR and other Socialist states, demanding a harder course, intensification of campaign, more provocative stance. Their behavior also presents huge danger! (Especially in terms of provocative actions against GDR)[141]

Presence of this strong right-wing bloc consisting of the most reactionary forces in West Germany underlines need to force Bonn government to make binding agreements under international law in the interest of security, i.e., also to force German imperialism to recognize its defeat in World War II. (Still trying to win war after the event!)

SPD party conference proclaimed slogan which also suggests major acceleration of campaign against Socialist states: "Change also through trade" (Schiller).[142]

Evident that Bonn's intention [is] to exploit West Germany's considerable economic potential in an even more focused and targeted manner for foreign policy ends, especially *Ostpolitik*, i.e., to achieve its political goals with regard to Socialist states by making greater use of economic and trade policies.

Schiller: the aim is to support and safeguard the objectives of Bonn's foreign policy by economic means. Above all, it is important to

> better translate economic power into political action.

SPD party conference announced intensive efforts by Bonn to further

- economic rapprochement between Socialist states and the West,
- economic cooperation between Socialist states and West Germany,
- increased penetration of Socialist states by means of loans. (Concrete analyses by Bonn to find starting points for further action in this area.)

Slogans: "global economic integration," "inclusion of Eastern countries in international division of labor," "convergence."

This aims to prepare the ground for[143]

- disruption of Socialist integration within the CMEA[144]
- dissolution of economic and political ties between Socialist states,
- disruption of the unity and cohesion of the Socialist community of nations,
- fostering of new dependency of Socialist countries on the West,
- political-ideological penetration of Socialist countries,
- creation of new opportunities for hostile actions.

[What follow are MfS comments on another agenda item: "On Some Problems Arising in Cooperation with the Protection and Security Organs of Nation States in the Arab and African Regions."]

Notes

Translation by Sinéad Crowe

1. Text of the report drafted under the direction of Politburo member Norden, in *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik VI*, vol. 1 (hereafter *DzD* VI.1), ed. Bundesministerium des Innern and Daniel Hofmann (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2002), doc. 4, 9–16, here 10–11, 15. On the genesis and reception of this paper, see Hofmann's comments, ibid., xxiv–xxviii, and Hermann Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: Die DDR im internationalen System 1949–1989* (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2007), 320–24.

2. *DzD* VI.1, doc. 4, 9–16, here 15.

3. As quoted by Honecker in his notes on the extraordinary meeting of the Politburo on October 30, 1969, in *DzD* VI.1, doc. 9, 23–26, here 24.

4. Notes on the same meeting taken by one of Ulbricht's employees, in *DzD* VI.1, doc. 10, 26–31, here 28.

5. Ulbricht telegram to Brezhnev of October 30, 1969, which enclosed the Politburo's draft statement, in *DzD* VI.1, doc. 11 and 11A, 31–33.

6. See *DzD* VI.1, doc. 32 and 35, 88–95, 100–137, as well as Hofmann's introduction, ibid., xxv–xxxi.

7. Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [hereafter BStU], MfS, ZAIG (Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe) 24163, fols. 19–28, here fol. 22, "Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung/VII, Kurzeinschätzung über Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt, SPD-Vorsitzender, v. 11.11.1969." This is also the source of the following quote.

8. MfS documents do not indicate whether the meeting had been arranged long in advance or who else participated in it. On the venue, see BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5130, fol. 1, and

the (otherwise not always accurate) account provided by Markus Wolf in *Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg: Erinnerungen* (Munich: List, 1997), 247. See the detailed description of the meeting in Karl-Heinz Schmidt, *Dialog über Deutschland: Studien zur Deutschlandpolitik von KPdSU und SED (1960–1979)* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998), 211–19. On inter-German policy differences within the SED leadership, see *Machtwechsel von Ulbricht zu Honecker: Funktionsmechanismen der SED-Diktatur in Konfliktsituationen 1962 bis 1972* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997), 347. The briefing in Moscow took place on November 16 or 17, 1969; see BStU, MfS, SdM (Sekretariat des Ministers) 1473, fol. 1, and Detlef Nakath, "Die Gespräche von Erfurt und Kassel 1970 und ihre internationale Dimension," in *"Willy Brandt ans Fenster!" Das Erfurter Gipfeltreffen 1970 und die Geschichte des "Erfurter Hofes,"* ed. Steffen Raßloff (Jena: Glaux, 2007), 16–47, here 19.

9. Strategy plan for negotiations with USSR security organs, dated early November 1969, in BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5128, fols. 1–88. It is worth noting that the BStU archive has grown significantly in recent years. The strategy plan was obviously not available to Schmidt, *Dialog über Deutschland*, and Hofmann, *DzD* VI.1. The insights provided by this document would have been of considerable benefit to their seminal contributions.

10. BStU, MfS, SdM 1471, fols. 1–10, "Disposition für Beratung," undated with handwritten notes.

11. BStU, MfS, SdM 1471, fols. 2–3.

12. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5128, fol. 5, "Konzeption für Verhandlungen mit Sicherheitsorganen der UdSSR." On Brezhnev's speech in East Berlin on October 6, 1969, see *Neues Deutschland*, October 7, 1969.

13. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5128, fol. 27, "Konzeption für Verhandlungen mit Sicherheitsorganen der UdSSR."

14. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5128, fols. 39–43. The paper cited examples from the press of nearly all European allies expressing confidence that the change of government would lead to improved relations with Socialist states.

15. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5128, fol. 43. This is also the source of the following quotes.

16. Mielke is likely to have been familiar with the wording of the Norden paper discussed in the Politburo, since it was intended to be forwarded to ZK members; see *DzD* VI.1, 9.

17. Wentker, *Außenpolitik*, 322–23, 330.

18. BStU, MfS, SdM 1473, fols. 1–5, here fol. 2, "Protokollnotiz: J.W. Andropow zur Einschätzung der Lage."

19. Andrey Edemskiy, "Dealing with Bonn: Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Response to West German Ostpolitik," in *Ostpolitik, 1969–1974: European and Global Responses*, ed. Carole Fink and Bernd Schäfer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 15–38, here 17–20; Detlef Nakath, *Deutsch-deutsche Grundlagen: Zur Geschichte der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der Bundesrepublik in den Jahren von 1969 bis 1982* (Schkeuditz: Schkeuditzer Buchverlag, 2002), 115; Detlef Nakath and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, *Das Dreiecksverhältnis Bonn—Moskau—Ost-Berlin: Aspekte der sowjetischen Einflussnahme auf die deutsch-deutschen Beziehungen in den siebziger und achtziger Jahren* (Berlin: Helle Panke, 1999), 16–18; Wjatscheslaw Keworkow, *Der geheime Kanal: Moskau, der KGB und die Bonner Ostpolitik* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1995), 46–48, 61–62.

20. BStU, MfS, SdM 1473, fols. 2–4, "Protokollnotiz: J.W. Andropow zur Einschätzung

der Lage." This is also the source of the following quote. On the wording of the notes, see also *DzD* VI.1, doc. 20, 58–61. The MfS's preparatory documents were not available at the time this volume was published: see ibid., 58.

21. Daniel Kosthorst, "Sowjetische Geheimpolitik in Deutschland? Chruschtschow und die Adschubej-Mission 1964," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 44, no. 2 (April 1996): 257–93. Adzhubei was Khrushchev's son-in-law.

22. BStU, MfS, SdM 1473, fol. 5, "Protokollnotiz: J.W. Andropow zur Einschätzung der Lage." Hofmann, "Einleitung," in *DzD* VI. 1, xxviii, interprets the references to Adzhubei and Khrushchev as a veiled warning to the SED not to attempt an offensive inter-German policy of its own, and believes that Ulbricht's change in thinking in this regard was ultimately due to these remarks by Andropov to Mielke. However, if one considers the key messages of the strategy plan prepared by the MfS for the meeting with Andropov, this interpretation seems implausible. Thus, the KGB chief was attempting to reassure his visitors, not admonish them. The latter interpretation is shared by Schmidt, *Dialog über Deutschland*, 218.

23. The visit took place from January 5 to 15, 1970. For details on the visit program, see BStU, MfS, SdM 1432, part 1, fols. 99–122.

24. BStU, MfS, SdM 1432, part 1, fol. 102.

25. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5130, fols. 1–21, here fol. 1, "Hinweise für ein Gespräch des Genossen Minister mit führenden Vertretern der sowjetischen Sicherheitsorgane am 9.1.1970 u. am 14.1.1970." Mielke probably used the first copy, which contains what appear to be his own handwritten annotations, as supporting notes during the meeting: see BStU, MfS, SdM 1432, part 1, fols. 68–88.

26. BStU, MfS, SdM 1432, part 1, fol. 68.

27. BStU, MfS, SdM 1432, part 1, fols. 69–70.

28. See Egon Bahr, *Zu meiner Zeit* (Munich: Karl Blessing Verlag, 1996), 264, and Wolf, *Spionagechef*, 247.

29. BStU, MfS, HVA 163, part 2, fols. 270–82, "Information 342/70 v. 30.3.1970 über die westdeutsch-sowjetischen Gespräche im Februar 1970 in Moskau." The HVA sent the report to, among others, Ulbricht, Honecker, and Willi Stoph, but, unusually, not to the KGB.

30. BStU, MfS, SdM 1432, part 2, fols. 351–58, "Disposition für Vortrag vor den sowjetischen Genossen zum 20. Jahrestag des MfS am 9.2.1970."

31. BStU, MfS, SdM 1473, fols. 285–98, "Information 247/70 o.D. (März 1970) über Vorstellungen, neue Aspekte, Formen und Methoden des Vorgehens des westdeutschen Imperialismus und der SPD-Führung gegen die sozialistischen Länder." BStU, MfS, HVA 162, fols. 252–58, "Information 253/70 o.D. (März 1970) über einige Aspekte der Haltung und Absichten der westdeutschen Bundesregierung zu den Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der BRD." BStU, MfS, HVA 167, part 2, fols. 247–52, "Information 622/70 v. 23.6.1970 über die Diskussion der westdeutschen Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik in der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion am 25.5.1970." This was sent to Ulbricht, Honecker, Stoph, Norden, and Lamberz, among others.

32. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5131, fols. 42–72, "Konzeption (Thesen) für Verhandlungen mit führenden Vertretern der Sicherheitsorgane der UdSSR am [added by hand: Juni 1970]." The "Details" are not attached to this copy. A version of the document containing other

agenda items has been preserved in the files of Minister Mielke's secretariat: see BStU, MfS, SdM 1432, part 2, fols. 371–444. Other items included problems hindering cooperation between the two intelligence services in developing countries. It is unclear when exactly the meeting took place; these documents do not shed light on the date.

33. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5131, fol. 54, "Konzeption (Thesen) für Verhandlungen mit führenden Vertretern der Sicherheitsorgane der UdSSR am [added by hand: Juni 1970]." The manuscript is probably referring here to the meeting of intelligence services from Warsaw Pact states, which was scheduled to take place in Budapest in December 1970.

34. See document in appendix (hereafter 'Strategy Plan'), fol. 422.

35. 'Strategy Plan,' fol. 422.

36. 'Strategy Plan,' fol. 423.

37. 'Strategy Plan,' fols. 425–26.

38. 'Strategy Plan,' fol. 427.

39. 'Strategy Plan,' fol. 428.

40. 'Strategy Plan,' fol. 429.

41. 'Strategy Plan,' fol. 430.

42. The visit took place in the first week of June 1970.

43. 'Strategy Plan,' fol. 430, also for the following quotations.

44. 'Strategy Plan,' fol. 430. As Markus Wolf later stated, the HVA had obtained the draft from a senior "source" in the FDP, probably William Borm, and forwarded it to the SED leadership. See Wolf, *Spionagechef*, 253.

45. 'Strategy Plan,' fol. 443.

46. 'Strategy Plan,' fol. 430.

47. 'Strategy Plan,' fol. 431, also for the following quotations.

48. 'Strategy Plan,' fol. 431, also for the following quotations.

49. A small nonpartisan forum in which politicians and experts discussed German and European foreign and security policies. For an account of the trip, see *Die Zeit*, June 26, 1970, 4, and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 18, 1970, 3.

50. The visit took place from May 25 to June 2, 1970.

51. 'Strategy Plan,' fol. 432.

52. Mielke was similarly confrontational vis-à-vis senior KGB figures in spring 1989: see Walter Süß, "Erich Mielke und KGB-Vize Leonid Schebarschin über den drohenden Untergang des Sozialistischen Lagers: Protokoll eines Streitgespräches am 7. April 1989," *Deutschland Archiv* 26 (1993): 1015–34. See also Mielke's disparaging comments on glasnost and perestroika at the official celebration of his eightieth birthday on December 28, 1987, where he disrespectfully referred to the Soviet ambassador (who was not present) as a "High Commissioner." BStU, MfS, ZAIG 4600, fol. 67, "Stenographische Mitschrift des MfS."

53. Hofmann, "Einleitung," in *DzD* VI. 1, XXVIII, assumes that Ulbricht was briefed on what Mielke discussed with Andropov and so was also aware of the Soviets' reactions, which he took into account when deciding his tactics vis-à-vis the CPSU leadership.

54. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5130, fols. 1–21, here fol. 1, "Hinweise für ein Gespräch des Genossen Minister mit führenden Vertretern der sowjetischen Sicherheitsorgane am 9.1.1970 u. am 14.1.1970."

55. On Brezhnev's two-track policy toward the SED in these months, see Schmidt, *Dialog über Deutschland*, 263–65; Mary Elise Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Detente, and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 32–36, 67–71; Wolf, *Spionagechef*, 246–47; "Notizen Honeckers über die Besprechung der Führungen von SED und KPdSU am 2.12.1969 in Moskau und über seine Gespräche mit Breschnew am 28.7.1970 und 20.8.1970," in *DzD* VI.1, doc. 33, 167 and 191, 95–98, 669–72, 757–60.

56. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 1844, fols. 1–17, here fol. 1, "Information 863/70 o.D. (24.8.1970) über die Reaktion der Bevölkerung der DDR auf den Abschluss des Vertrages UdSSR–BRD und die Reise von Brandt nach Moskau." "Information 863/70" is also the source of the following quotes.

57. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 1844, fols. 18–30, "Information 1012/70 v. 28.9.1970 über die Reaktion der Bevölkerung der DDR auf den Abschluss des Vertrages UdSSR–BRD mit angefügten Hinweisen."

58. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 1844, esp. fols. 23–30. A "leading academic" was cited in the report as saying that the signing of the Treaty of Moscow was an "unpleasant business" and that hopefully the Bundestag would not ratify it (fol. 24). A visit to Moscow in September 1970 by a delegation of academics led by Minister of Education and Science Leussink revealed the Soviet Union's interest in academic cooperation with the Federal Republic, and therefore generated particular attention in East Germany. The HVA informed the SED leadership of the very positive report Minister Leussink had given in Bonn after his return and of the reaction of the US government, which was angered because no similar visit to the US had taken place. BStU, MfS, HVA 175, fols. 176–82, "Information 1268/70 v. 9.12.1970 über die westdeutsche Einschätzung der Reise einer Wissenschaftler-Delegation unter der Leitung des Bundesministers für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Leussink, in die Sowjetunion," and BStU, MfS, HVA 174, part 2, fols. 321–22, "Information 1146/70 v. 31.10.1970 über die Haltung der westdeutschen Diplomaten in den USA zur Außenpolitik der Bundesregierung." Both reports were also sent to the KGB.

59. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 1844, fol. 30, "Information 1012/70 v. 28.9.1970 über die Reaktion der Bevölkerung der DDR auf den Abschluss des Vertrages UdSSR–BRD mit angefügten Hinweisen."

60. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 1844, fol. 30.

61. See the report's (unextended) distribution list, in BStU, MfS, ZAIG 1844, fol. 18.

62. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5319, fols. 1–82.

63. Roger Engelmann and Frank Joestel, *Die Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe* (Berlin: BStU, 2009), 7.

64. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5319, fol. 8, "Entwurf der Information 976/70."

65. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5319, fol. 1. This is also the source of the following quotes.

66. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5319, fol. 2. This is also the source of the following quote.

67. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5319, fol. 3.

68. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5319, fol. 4. This is also the source of the following quotes.

69. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5319, fol. 5.

70. According to Valentin Falin in a conversation with Mary Elise Sarotte in 1997: see Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil*, 71.

71. See Schmidt, *Dialog über Deutschland*, 246, and *DzD* VI.1, 757, on Ulbricht's pointed absence from the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Member States on August 20, 1970, in Moscow, which focused on policy on West Germany after the signing of the Treaty of Moscow.

72. Brandt is claimed to have said this at a joint meeting of the Foreign, Inter-German, and Security Policy Working Groups of the SPD and FDP Bundestag caucuses: BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5319, fol. 26, "Entwurf der Information 976/70." This could be a spelling mistake; the author may have meant "moderating influence."

73. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5319, fol. 26.

74. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5319, fol. 81.

75. Werner Link, "Die Entstehung des Moskauer Vertrages im Lichte neuer Archivalien," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 49, no. 2 (April 2001): 295–315, here 313.

76. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 14386, fol. 273, handwritten note in the ZAIG report register.

77. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5319, fol. 8.

78. "Vermerk zur Gemeinsamen Besprechung der Delegationen der ZK der SED und der KPdSU am 21.8.1970 in Moskau," in *DzD* VI.1, doc. 192, 761–65, here 765.

79. Markus Wolf, *Die Kunst der Verstellung: Dokumente, Gespräche, Interviews* (Berlin: Schwarzkopf und Schwarzkopf, 1998).

80. Wolf, *Spionagechef*, 245–47.

81. It was not possible to ascertain the exact date of the conference. However, the texts indicate that it must have taken place after the signing of the Treaty of Warsaw, which normalized relations between West Germany and Poland, on December 7, 1970.

82. BStU, MfS, SdM 355, fols. 4–13, "Stellungnahme," n.d. The "Stellungnahme" (comments) appeared on pages 2–31 of the "Material."

83. BStU, MfS, SdM 355, fols. 23–45, "Beitrag der Delegation des MfS der DDR für die Beratung der Aufklärungsorgane in Budapest, Dezember 1970." The manuscript is written in the typeface used in the HVA. The fact that the manuscript was stored in the files of the minister's secretariat suggests that it was probably also checked by Mielke.

84. BStU, MfS, SdM 355, fols. 5–9, "Stellungnahme."

85. BStU, MfS, SdM 355, fol. 4–12.

86. BStU, MfS, SdM 355, fol. 24, "Beitrag der Delegation des MfS der DDR für die Beratung der Aufklärungsorgane in Budapest, Dezember 1970."

87. BStU, MfS, SdM 355, fols. 24–26.

88. BStU, MfS, SdM 355, fol. 27.

89. BStU, MfS, SdM 355, fols. 26–37.

90. BStU, MfS, BdL (Büro der Leitung), doc. 5670, vols. 1–10, here vol. 1, fol. 56, "Referat des Genossen Minister auf dem zentralen Führungsseminar vom 1.–3.3.1971."

91. BStU, MfS, BdL, doc. 5670, vol. 1, fol. 62.

92. BStU, MfS, BdL, doc. 5670, vol. 1, fol. 59.

93. BStU, MfS, BdL, doc. 5670, vol. 1, fol. 63.

94. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 3891, fol. 16, "Diskussionsbeitrag Mielkes auf der Delegiertenkonferenz der SED-Parteiorganisation der MfS-Bezirksverwaltung Erfurt am 6.4.1971." This is also the source of the following quote.

95. Jens Gieseke, *Der Mielke-Konzern: Die Geschichte der Stasi 1945–1990* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2006), 86–94, 192–201.

96. Walter Süß, *Staatssicherheit am Ende: Warum es den Mächtigen nicht gelang, 1989 eine Revolution zu verhindern* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 1999).

97. Siegfried Suckut, ed., *Die DDR im Blick der Stasi: Die geheimen Berichte an die SED-Führung 1976* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 49.

98. "Vermerk über die Gemeinsame Besprechung des ZK der SED und der KPdSU am 21.8.1970 in Moskau," in *DzD* VI.1, doc. 192, 761–65, here 765.

99. Süß, "Erich Mielke," 37.

100. Wolf, *Spionagechef*, 261.

101. Cited in Georg Herbstritt, *Bundesbürger im Dienst der DDR-Spionage: Eine analytische Studie* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 138. On Soviet attempts to influence voting in Brandt's favor by means of bribery, see also Keworkow, *Der geheime Kanal*, 110–20.

102. Wolf, *Spionagechef*, 244–47.

103. Date entered by hand. Another handwritten entry in the top margin of the page: Reg. # 47/70.

104. The first meeting of MfS and KGB chiefs after the change of government in Bonn.

105. Handwritten vertical mark in the left margin of this paragraph.

106. Passage appears at the bottom of the fourth page of the manuscript, with "pto" (please turn over) written by hand in the right margin.

107. Indented passage marked with a handwritten cross in the left margin.

108. The Federal Minister for Defense, Helmut Schmidt (SPD).

109. Rainer Barzel was the chairman of the CDU/CSU's Bundestag caucus.

110. During the years of the grand coalition in Bonn (1966–69), the SED provocatively shortened the Social Democrats' party name to "SP." After the formation of the Social Democrat–Liberal coalition, the SED quietly abandoned this practice. It appears that the authors of this strategy plan were unaware that they were using an outdated term.

111. "Internally" refers to non-public comments that the MfS, it is implied, learned about via its spies in West Germany.

112. Antonín Šnejdárek was director of the Institute of International Politics and Economics at the Academy of Sciences in Prague and one of the spokesmen for democratization of the CSSR in 1968. He emigrated to Britain in 1969.

113. Jiří Hájek, a supporter of the reformer Alexander Dubček, was appointed foreign minister in April 1968. After denouncing the Soviet invasion before the UN, he was forced to resign in September 1968.

114. Paragraph marked by hand on the left-hand side and highlighted with a large exclamation mark. "USSR" underlined several times the first time it is mentioned in the paragraph.

115. Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski, Polish-born American political scientist, adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

116. Paragraph marked by hand on the left-hand side and highlighted with a large exclamation mark. "USSR" underlined again by hand.

117. Paragraph marked with a handwritten cross on the left. On the right, at the bottom of p. 12 of the manuscript, there is the handwritten note "pto" (please turn over).

118. Sentence marked with a handwritten cross on the right edge of the page.

119. Sentence marked with a handwritten cross on the right edge of the page with the comment "pto" (please turn over), obviously a note to the presenter to present the material (which has not been preserved in the Stasi files) at this point.

120. Committee for State Security in the USSR's Council of Ministers.

121. This visit may have taken place on the anniversary of the founding of the MfS in February 1970; see "Disposition für Vortrag" (see note 30).

122. Probably referring to the conference scheduled to take place in Budapest in December 1970.

123. Paragraph marked with a handwritten cross on the right edge of the page.

124. Paragraph and following sentence highlighted with handwritten marks in the left margin.

125. Abbreviation underlined by hand.

126. Paragraph highlighted with a handwritten cross on the right edge of the page and a mark on the left side.

127. The news agency Agence France-Presse.

128. Refers to the 1952 General Treaty between the three victorious Western powers and the Federal Republic, in which the signatories emphasized that the German question was still open and pledged to work toward the reunification of Germany. The General Treaty came into effect in 1955 as part of the Paris Accords.

129. Bahr made this comment in an interview with the West German public television station ARD; see Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, *Bulletin*, no. 79, June 9, 1970, 790–91.

130. This and the following paragraph marked by hand on the left-hand side.

131. Paragraph marked by hand on the left-hand side.

132. See note 49.e

133. A press clipping containing a photo was attached to the manuscript.

134. Minister of Inter-German Relations, Egon Franke (SPD).

135. In the second half of the 1960s, Mieczysław Moczar was the nationalist-Communist rival of Władysław Gomułka in the Polish United Workers Party. However, after the latter resigned, the Soviet leadership opted for Edward Gierek as new party leader.

136. The meeting in Erfurt took place on March 19 and the one in Kassel on May 21, 1970.

137. Wording of the points presented by Brandt in *DzD* VI.1, doc. 143, 548–92, here 554–55.

138. On December 18, 1969, Ulbricht submitted the draft of a treaty on the "Establishment of Equal Relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany" to the Federal President. On the wording, see Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, *Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik*, vol. 4 (Bonn: Deutscher Bundes-Verlag, 1970), 144–47. This and the following paragraph marked by hand on the left-hand side.

139. Conrad Ahlers was the federal government's press spokesperson.

140. The following handwritten entry, underlined twice, appears in the left margin before this line: "Right-wing cartel."

141. Two handwritten marks appear in the left margin beside the last two lines.

142. Federal Minister of Economic Affairs, Karl Schiller (SPD).

143. A handwritten cross appears beside the first four of the following bullet points.

144. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

Relationships, Suspicion, and Secrecy in Germany's Early Cold War Secret Service Agencies

KRISTIE MACRAKIS

The three articles above—Thomas Wolf on the origins of the BND (West German intelligence), Siegfried Suckut on the Stasi's reaction to Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, and Rüdiger Bergien on Siemens and the Stasi—have two things in common: they promise new perspectives on their topics using freshly uncovered archival material and they focus on secret service agencies on both sides of divided Germany during the early Cold War. Though seemingly disparate, themes emerge in these articles upon closer analysis that tie them together: relationships/influence, suspicion, and secrecy. I will analyze each article separately before turning to the more general common themes.

The Origins of the BND

It has long been known that the West German Intelligence Service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), was founded with the help of, and eventually run by, General Reinhard Gehlen, in concert with US intelligence. Gehlen, who was the German army's intelligence chief for the Eastern Front during World War II, had already developed a new intelligence network in 1946; when the Gehlen Organization was transformed into the larger BND in 1956, he headed that agency from 1956 to 1968. But the extent of Gehlen's and the United States' employment of former Nazis and former war criminals was not publicly revealed until 2005, when a secret CIA history of their relationship with the BND was declassified and made available to the public—Kevin Ruffner's *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*—along with a treasure trove of declassified material for public use.[1]

Incontrovertible evidence that US intelligence collaborated with Nazis only saw the light of day thanks to the declassification of millions of US government records in response to the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. This

act allowed historians to view CIA operational documents that would otherwise be exempt from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, since they reveal the agency's sources and methods. For many years thereafter, German historians looked with envy at US colleagues who could use these declassified files to uncover secret histories. The BND had no declassification program, and most books or articles on the topic were written by journalists based on interviews or leaked information. This situation changed in 2011 with the creation of the Independent Historians' Commission for the Investigation of the History of the Federal Intelligence Service.[2] This commission in turn had its roots in other commissions created to investigate the role of the Nazis in other institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany. Thirteen volumes on BND history were published from 2016 to 2021, including one by Thomas Wolf on the agency's origins—the basis for his article in the present volume.[3]

Wolf presents the story of the relationship between Reinhard Gehlen and US intelligence as conveyed by the German archives. Although Gehlen has often been seen as the father of the BND, Wolf argues that it was really former Abwehr officer Hermann Baun who laid the foundation during the first few years after World War II. But Baun did not last long at the postwar intelligence agency. He was dismissed in 1949 for embezzlement and died of cancer in 1951. Gehlen, writes Wolf, developed his own BND narrative and reported in public about the creation of his service. Wolf does not cite specific passages from Gehlen's alleged self-promotion to substantiate these claims, but it is certainly true that Gehlen is usually credited with founding the BND's predecessor, the Gehlen Organization. Wolf is not specifically concerned with the issue of National Socialists and the origins of the BND, as was the case in the United States. He is interested in the administrative founding of the Gehlen Organization, its process and myths.

Unlike the case of the BND, where historical files were not opened until 2011, the files of the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS) became available soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Since then, historians and journalists have focused mainly on documenting the internal machinations of the Stasi, devoting less attention to its foreign intelligence arm, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA, the equivalent of the BND). The two articles under review explore two very different aspects of the Stasi's work. Siegfried Suckut, who was head of the Education and Research Division of the Stasi archives from 1997 to 2005, presents a policy piece exploring the Stasi's surprising reaction to Willy Brandt's new *Ostpolitik* in 1969. Rüdiger Bergien, currently a professor at the Federal University for Public Administration in Berlin, details how the Stasi bought data-processing equipment from the West

German firm Siemens, using a cover civilian institution to disguise the secret service nature of the sale and cooperation.

The Stasi and *Ostpolitik*

In his memoirs, Markus Wolf, the former spy chief of the HVA, lamented the fact that Willy Brandt was forced to resign as a result of the uncovering of one of his most famous agents—Günter Guillaume—who worked as an aide to Brandt. He claims he thought Brandt held real promise for East Germany.[4] Therefore, the results of the Suckut article and the appended Stasi document are very surprising. The document outlines the Stasi's suspicion of *Ostpolitik* and catalogs a list of anxieties about how the West actually planned to eliminate East Germany rather than easing tensions with the East, as official *Ostpolitik* proclaimed. Suckut also shows how the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) convinced East Germany and Wolf to believe in *Ostpolitik* and to trust the process. Until that time, Mielke and Wolf were old-fashioned German Communist Party hard-liners who believed that social democracy was dangerous for East Germany.

Suckut's analysis is detailed and contextualizes the explosive document from 1970 in which the MfS displays deep suspicion of the West. The document makes statements using the anti-West rhetoric so prevalent in the East German documents in party or Stasi archives: The West Germans were allegedly "imperialists" who wanted to "penetrate" Eastern Bloc countries including East Germany and the Soviet Union in a "campaign against Socialists." West Germany's real objective was to incorporate the GDR into the imperialist camp and annex West Berlin. The MfS document is filled with exclamation points and emotional phrases. West Germany was seen as allied to NATO and the US, an "arch-imperialist" country. Finally, the West German research institutes that undertook *Ostforschung* were said to be designed to infiltrate and spy on the East. Although it is not mentioned in the article, the East also beefed up its spying against the West during this supposed period of easing tensions.

Siemens and the Stasi

In his contribution on the West German company Siemens's sale of data-processing computers to East Germany in 1970, Rüdiger Bergien makes no reference to *Ostpolitik*. Did the prior easing of political tensions mean that there

was also a lowering of barriers in selling Western technology to the East? This would help explain the timing of the transaction, but perhaps it is not made explicit in any files the author examined. Certainly there were other thaws and freezes during the Cold War that affected how stringently the embargo rules of CoCom, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, were enforced. When Ronald Reagan was president of the United States, for example, he reinforced the embargo rules and added more restrictions on the sale of Western technology to the East.[5] As a result, it became increasingly difficult for the East to break the embargo.

Other scholars had already documented the fact that East German intelligence acquired Siemens data-processing and computer technology. In 1998, when staff members of the Stasi archives decoded a data set created by Siemens computers known as SIRA (System der Informationsrecherche der HVA, the HVA's System for Information Research), it made headline news.[6] But until now, no one had delved into the files of the internal data-processing unit responsible for the big sale described in Bergien's article.

Although Bergien refers to the CoCom embargo banning certain Western technology sales to the East, he might have offered further context to his remarkable story by taking note of other cases of illegal technology transfer of IBM and Siemens computer and data-processing technology to the East.[7] For unlike the case of the *illegal* computer technology transfer conducted by the HVA's Sector for Science and Technology, the sale of the Siemens 4004 machine to the civilian institute was quasi-legal. Bergien documents a trip Siemens officials took to Washington, DC, to get approval from the CoCom board for the sale to the East. It was a kind of embargo limbo—CoCom neither rejected nor approved the request. By December 1969, the Nixon government had banned selling machines with a high level of processing power, but the Siemens machine slipped through the cracks.

Bergien does, nevertheless, add an interesting new dimension to this technology transfer by exploring how the Stasi incorporated data processing into its own internal operations as early as 1970. The need for electronic data processing arose from the voluminous number of West Germans who traveled to the East and the desire to document the horde of people at the border. Readers old enough to remember the Friedrichstraße border crossing may recall that the young border control agents seemed to be looking up and registering every border crosser in a desktop computer. Bergien uses Stasi files from the internal Division XIII for electronic data processing to uncover the story in detail. The Siemens archive had no record of its cooperation with

East Germany, according to Bergien, despite the 1970 sale of three 4004 Siemens machines to the East Berlin Central Institute of Information and Documentation (a cover name for the Stasi's Division XIII).

The deal was organized by Horst Schuster. Schuster, in turn, worked for the foreign trade firm Interver, which was part of the Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski imperium known as "KoKo"—the commercial coordination section of the Foreign Trade Ministry.[8] Schuster later defected to the West and it seems that West German foreign intelligence learned of the deal by 1983. The accomplished Dieter Altdorfer, whom the Stasi dubbed a "bourgeois" scientist, took the lead in the relationship and made frequent trips to West Germany to facilitate cooperation and to learn how the machine operated. The Stasi files also document numerous visits by Siemens personnel to the East to service the equipment. The relationship between Siemens and undercover Stasi personnel and scientists was well-oiled by meals and recreational programs in the Alps when GDR personnel visited Munich for training.

Relationships, Suspicion, and Secrecy

The English poet John Donne famously said that "no man is an island"—that people, like countries, rely on interconnections and contacts to thrive. The same could be said of intelligence agencies. The articles illustrate this adage in a variety of ways. In the case of the West German intelligence agency, its formation relied on Reinhard Gehlen's relationship with the United States. While Gehlen and his predecessor shaped the founding of the forerunner to the BND, so too did the United States. In fact, the United States was a strong influence on the BND until the fall of the Berlin Wall, when the BND told the Americans to "get out."[9] Similarly, the Stasi was dependent on the Soviet Union and West Germany. While the Soviet Union is usually credited with founding the Stasi in its own image, the Suckut piece shows how the KGB influenced the Stasi's thinking on *Ostpolitik*. While *Ostpolitik* has often been seen as a lessening of tensions with the East and should have been something positive for East Germany, there was a great deal of suspicion that West Germany was, in fact, using the new pathways of détente to spy on the East and to prepare its dissolution and annexation. Last, with the advent of a highly technologized society dependent on computers and data processing, the East coveted Western technology to incorporate into its own infrastructure, both civilian and at state agencies. West Germany was the main secret partner. But with the trade embargo, the Stasi could not easily buy Western technology. Therefore, it disguised itself as a civilian institution. Siemens also hid its technology sale.

Suspicion is explicit in the Suckut piece about *Ostpolitik*, but implicit in the Wolf and Bergien articles. Trust is hard to come by in the intelligence world, even though the participants often try to build trusting relationships—as seen in the case of Siemens's interaction with the Stasi. It was, after all, a surreptitious sale using a civilian agency as a front for the Stasi institute for data processing. With all the hobnobbing in the West and sending of repair personnel to the East, Siemens must have known who it was dealing with. As to the BND, it is hard to trust former Nazis, and with good reason; they often peddled a large amount of false information to the CIA and BND alike. In the end, the BND was also riddled with Soviet/KGB penetration agents most notably Heinz Felfe.[10]

It may seem obvious that secrecy is the backbone of secret service agencies. But as Thomas Wolf shows, at first Gehlen appeared to be very open about his activities while he publicly discussed his role. Yet this apparent openness obscures the real secrets the organization had to hide. Not only did it cover up its relationship with former Nazis, but the BND never officially disclosed secrets or introduced a declassification program until the early twenty-first century.

As mentioned, all these articles reveal new secrets uncovered by archival research. This was not meant to be. The Stasi never imagined its files would see the light of day, and neither did the BND. Of the two, the Stasi was particularly good at keeping secrets. While its attempts to acquire Western technology during the Cold War were slowly revealed through defectors like Werner Stiller in 1979 and Horst Schuster in 1983, the extent of the theft of Western technology was a great surprise to Western intelligence after the fall of the Berlin Wall.[11] Western companies had no qualms about doing business with the East. Profits know no morals. The question was how to do it without getting caught. The Bergien piece on the Siemens sale of data-processing technology to the East adds a new dimension to the secret story of technology transfer by focusing on how the Stasi used this data-processing technology in its operations and for processing all the data it collected, whether at border crossings or internally. The popular image of the miles of files in sacks showcased how the old-fashioned way of collecting data on index cards helped keep the Stasi's technological secrets.

Finally, the cloak of secrecy that spy agencies covet has often hidden the real history of events. By uncovering previously secret stories, all the authors add a new dimension to the historical record. This is particularly the case with the Suckut piece on the Stasi's view of *Ostpolitik*, an important milestone during the Cold War. Although the BND and Siemens/Stasi stories are arguably smaller events than the larger policy world of *Ostpolitik*, uncovering previous

secrets can contribute to bigger stories, such as the founding of the West German intelligence agency and technology transfer from the West to the East. In the longue durée of history, these interactions and struggles between East and West Germany sometimes seem like a civil war. But, of course, with the strong push and pull of powerful ideologies and superpower countries holding sway, they also show the way in which smaller countries are hostage to larger ones. Since East and West Germany were split along the lines of the two great superpowers—the US market democracy vs. the Soviet Union's planned communist economy—they were also a microcosm of the larger struggle between the ideologies, with one difference: they were both German.

Notes

1. Kevin C. Ruffner, ed., *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945–49: A Documentary History*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, European Division, Directorate of Operations, 1999). On the 2005 declassification, see Tamara Feinstein, ed., "The CIA and Nazi War Criminals," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 146, February 4, 2005, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB146/index.htm.

2. For details, see the commission's website at http://www.uhk-bnd.de.

3. Thomas Wolf, *Die Entstehung des BND: Aufbau, Finanzierung, Kontrolle* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2018).

4. Markus Wolf, *Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spy Master* (New York: Times Books, 1997), 171–72.

5. Antony Blinken, *Ally versus Ally: America, Europe, and the Siberian Pipeline Crisis* (New York: Praeger, 1987); Alan P. Dobson, "The Reagan Administration, Economic Warfare, and Starting to Close Down the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 29, no. 3 (2005): 531–56.

6. For an overview of this finding, see "SIRA—System der Informationsrecherche der HV A," https://www.stasi-unterlagen-archiv.de/informationen-zur-stasi/themen/beitrag/sira-system-der-informationsrecherche-der-hv-a/.

7. See, for example, Kristie Macrakis, "Does Effective Espionage Lead to Success in Science and Technology? Lessons from the East German Ministry for State Security," *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 1 (2004): 52–77, here 69–70.

8. Matthias Judt, *Der Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung: Das DDR-Wirtschaftsimperium des Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski—Mythos und Realität* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2013).

9. Confidential interview with former CIA officer stationed in Germany.

10. On Felfe see Bodo V. Hechelhammer, *Spion ohne Grenzen: Heinz Felfe—Agent in sieben Geheimdiensten* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 2019).

11. Werner Stiller, *Beyond the Wall: Memoirs of an East and West German Spy* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1992).

“Keep It under Wraps”

The Arms Deals of the Austrian State Industry and the Noricum Scandal

THOMAS RIEGLER

The so-called Noricum scandal deeply unsettled the political system of the Austrian Second Republic between 1985 and 1993. So far, this case has not been the subject of historical research with the exception of journalistic or political science accounts. The affair was caused by illegal arms deals with Iran and Iraq, at a time when these countries were fighting against one another in the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88). The arms shipments were conducted by the Noricum Maschinenbau und Handel Gesellschaft m.b.H, a subsidiary firm of the Vereinigte Österreichische Eisen- und Stahlwerke-Alpine Montan AG (VOEST-Alpine AG), the heavyweight of Austrian nationalized industries. The sales encompassed 353 long-range howitzers (GHN-45), ammunition, and supplies. The deals constituted a clear violation of Austrian arms export laws, which forbade the sale of arms to belligerent states. After the affair gradually became public, political and criminal responsibility was clarified during several trials. This contribution explores the subject in regard to the overall context of postindustrial change in the 1970s and 1980s. The Noricum affair is interpreted as a continuation of problematic Austrian arms exports to Latin America and the Middle East. Furthermore, the circumstances of Austrian neutrality and the arms exports laws are highlighted, as well as the political-judicial consequences.

The Scandal and the Second Republic

Between 1985 and 1992 the Noricum scandal rocked the political foundations of Austria’s Second Republic. Although journalists have reported on this case and it has been a focus of political science research,[1] it has yet to be subjected to a thorough source-based examination.[2] The scandal was sparked by illegal exports of weapons to both Iraq and Iran while the two countries were at war between 1980 and 1988. The supplier was Noricum Maschinenbau und Handel Gesellschaft m.b.H, a subsidiary of Vereinigte Österreichische Eisen- und Stahlwerke-Alpine Montan AG (known as VOEST-Alpine AG), which

represented the core sector of Austria's nationalized industries, organized at the time as the Österreichische Industrieverwaltungs-Aktiengesellschaft (ÖIAG).[3] The deals involved clandestine sales of 353 long-range howitzers, complete with the required ammunition and supplies.[4] By supplying this weaponry Noricum broke Austria's War Material Act, a law that prohibited the sale and export of arms to countries at war. After the deals were made public one after another at the end of the 1980s, the issue of political and criminal responsibility arose. This was clarified in the framework of a parliamentary inquiry held in 1989/90 and in several court cases against managers and former politicians between 1991 and 1993.

This contribution examines four aspects of the case. First, it is necessary to understand how the Noricum scandal fits into the context of postindustrial change in Austria. Second, the case will be considered as the continuation of a series of problematic Austrian weapons exports to Latin America and the Middle East. Third, the rules governing arms exports as stipulated by Austria's War Material Act and by the country's neutrality will be delineated. It was almost inevitable that these rules would come into conflict with labor market policy regarding companies engaged in arms production and with business interests. Finally, the political and legal consequences of the affair will be summarized.

Sources on this affair are difficult to access. Many relevant documents of the parliamentary inquiry and pertinent holdings of Austria's Archiv der Republik (AdR) are excluded from release for fifty rather than the customary thirty years, in keeping with the terms of the Austrian Federal Archives Act for protecting personal data. Court records are available, but the huge number of documents pertaining to the so-called Manager Trial (a total of 147 volumes) represents a not insignificant challenge to the researcher. For reasons of secrecy, parts of some files were placed in a separate folder, the whereabouts of which has not been determined. Additional primary sources used in this contribution are found, inter alia, in the Stiftung Bruno Kreisky Archiv (StBKA), the archive founded in 1984 to house the political and personal papers of the long-serving Austrian chancellor.[5] This archive includes the diary of Josef Staribacher (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich, SPÖ), which he kept during his term as the federal minister for trade, commerce, and industry (1970–83). His diary entries offer a subjective glimpse into the inner workings of the Kreisky government, including Kreisky's final term in office when Austrian weapons production expanded.

The Austrian Arms Industry

As Peter Pilz, at the time a freelance social scientist, emphasized in his 1982 book *Die Panzermacher* (*The Tank Makers*), arms production in Austria was essentially "nothing new" in the early 1980s:[6] "Starting in the middle of the last century, production of everything that would later be deployed a million times over in both World War I and World War II was already under way in the heartland of the ruling monarchy." After 1945, arms production had to stop and did not resume until 1955, in connection with the founding of the new Austrian army.[7] At the beginning of the 1970s, only two firms—Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG and Hirtenberger Patronenfabrik—were heavily involved in this business. In 1975 Austria exported war material representing 0.8 percent of its total exports. By 1979 this figure had risen to 1.2 percent, after VOEST-Alpine massively expanded its business.[8]

By the mid-1980s, approximately 15,000 Austrian jobs were directly or indirectly linked to armaments production. The industry was dominated primarily by ÖIAG companies. By the end of the 1980s, 86 percent of revenue was being earned by VOEST-Alpine and its subsidiaries:[9] Noricum Maschinenbau und Handel GmbH, Hirtenberger Patronen-, Zündhütchen- und Metallwarenfabrik AG, Österreichische Schiffswerften AG Linz-Korneuburg, Ennstaler Metallwerke GmbH, and Vereinigte Edelstahlwerke AG (VEW).[10] Another important player was Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG, which in the early 1980s was the third-largest industrial conglomerate in Austria and majority-owned by the national bank Creditanstalt.[11] Other companies also joined the industry: Glock,[12] Voere, Südsteirische Metallindustrie, Dynamit Nobel, Swarovski Werke, and ÖAF Gräf & Stift AG.[13] The Kürassier tank destroyer produced by Steyr-Daimler-Puch became an export hit among "Third World" nations. The magazine *profil* quoted Steyr's own promotional material in its reporting on this product: "The hull, which in front can withstand the hit of a 2 cm armor-piercing shell, is supplied by VOEST. A strong 300 hp Steyr diesel engine makes the 17 ton tank, 'which is also wonderfully suited for routine military tasks' . . . able to reach a speed of 67 kmph [42 mph]."

In the first half of 1980, Steyr-Daimler-Puch recorded revenues of 1.5 billion Austrian shillings through the sale of small arms alone, specifically hunting rifles and the Armee-Universal-Gewehr (Steyr AUG, universal army rifle). The weapons sector was viewed as an important pillar for the entire corporate enterprise. Within five years, revenues from war material increased from 100

million to 3 billion shillings (1980) and thus comprised 20 percent of total revenue. Of the 23,000 employees of Steyr-Daimler-Puch, 2,000 were directly involved in the production of rifles, military trucks, and tanks.[14] Of course, compared with the major players in the arms industry, Austria's role was negligible. In 1978 the revenue earned through arms exports equaled 120 million US dollars, which put the country far behind the United States ($6,700 million), France ($1,350 million), the United Kingdom ($1,100 million), and West Germany ($1,100 million). Yet compared with its arms-exporting neutral counterparts like Sweden ($100 million) and Switzerland ($40 million), Austria had a substantially greater turnover.[15] However, even as production gradually expanded, revenues began to shrink. After its high-water mark of 7.8 billion shillings in revenue in the boom year 1978, total revenue fell and by 1984 was under 4 billion shillings. The weaponsmiths were relative lightweights at this point, representing only 0.7 percent of the country's overall industrial production.[16]

The main reason for the relatively late buildup of the armaments sector had to do with the country's economic development. From the mid-1970s, Austria evolved into a postindustrial economy. Economic growth rates fell year on year from 5 percent in the 1960s to a low of 2.6 percent in the 1970s.[17] The oil crisis of 1973/74 and the subsequent increase in energy prices hit the branches of industry that produced raw materials very hard, including iron and steel production, sectors that traditionally represented the core business of the state industries.[18] The cutback in capacity was so comprehensive that the countries of the European Community produced less steel in 1984 than they had thirty years earlier.[19] In light of this massive international downswing, the limits of Austro-Keynesianism were exposed. Austro-Keynesianism was defined as a set of economic policies designed to enhance buying power and secure jobs through an expansive budget policy, economic stimulus measures, a strong currency policy, and wage and price policies guaranteeing social stability. But this strategy proved increasingly difficult to adhere to.[20]

In the winter of 1980/81, the number of unemployed people surpassed the symbolically important threshold of 100,000. A series of company bankruptcies shook Austria's second-largest credit institution, the Länderbank, and in 1981 VOEST-Alpine recorded its worst operating results to date.[21] In 1982/83 the general economic situation worsened in the wake of the second oil crisis: the unemployment rate rose in 1982 to 3.5 percent.[22] Thus, the "campaign for full employment" became the "guiding policy of the state, to the point of becoming a dogma," according to Kreisky biographer Wolfgang Petritsch.[23] Anton Benya, the long-serving president of the Austrian federation of trade

unions, the Österreichische Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB), confirmed this priority when testifying as a witness in the Noricum "Manager Trial" in 1990: "What the government was interested in, be it at VOEST-Alpine or private firms, was employment! Employment, employment for the people." When asked by the presiding judge whether the unions had exerted pressure in this regard, Benya answered: "If you yourself have been unemployed once or several times, namely during the First Republic, and know what it means when the people want to work in order to be able to feed their families, then you say: the most important thing is to give the people work, otherwise economic disaster will ensue."[24] In a similar fashion, another witness, the SPÖ member of the Austrian parliament Jolanda Offenbeck, argued that securing jobs had been a "major concern" and that "it was said: 'unemployment leads to radicalization, and so forth.' We remember this from the 1930s. No one wanted that to happen ever again, and so this actually became one of the integral parts of our policy, namely to secure jobs so that mass unemployment would not occur."[25]

From the mid-1970s, the crisis in the steel industry and the subsequent slump in demand revealed the structural weaknesses of certain VOEST-Alpine locations. The company reacted by adopting a diversification strategy that would involve new technologies and fields of production, including weapons manufacturing. A board document on this topic from 1979 stated: "It had become clear that the Ferlach, St. Aegyd, Eisenerz, Liezen, and Kindberg plants could only be operated at a relatively large loss even under normal economic circumstances, and therefore we were forced to change the production structure of these plants." The Liezen plant was considered one of the "most worrying." In order to maintain this location and keep jobs at the plant, manufacturing weapons was envisaged as an "optimal solution." This option offered the chance "to financially stabilize Liezen over time and, by giving up the foundry, simultaneously to secure the Traisen plant."[26] Therefore, in 1978, Director General Heribert Apfalter began to expand the sale of arms. At the time, VOEST-Alpine was already producing high explosive shells, tank hulls, turret cupolas and superposed turrets, chain links, and various gun carriage components.[27] On September 1, 1979, a new company division known as "military technology" was established. The board was convinced that the company, as a foundry and steel processing business, possessed the "very best prerequisites" as far as production technology was concerned. Furthermore, it expected the market to prove particularly profitable as long as the company succeeded in "producing and marketing complete weapons systems on the basis of our own technology."[28] Noricum Maschinenbau und Handel GmbH in Liezen was restructured as a sales company. According to a board

resolution, Noricum was "(a) to sell the military technology products of the VA concern [VOEST-Alpine] to all customers and (b) to sell other products of the VA concern to the Aust[rian] army and foreign military entities."[29] The board justified its decision by emphasizing that the "national and geopolitical situation of Austria" required domestic production of "defense equipment" and that this step would "almost inevitably lead to export activities" with "all the economic ramifications (jobs, trade balance, image: Austria as a supplier of high-tech equipment, and so forth)." The concern's military technology division provided "indirect access to state-of-the-art application technology and thus was the basis for innovation in civilian fields (e.g., microelectronics, precision technology)." It also argued that the ÖIAG state industries would benefit from a "wider range of products" because this would help "cushion [the company] against future economic fluctuations."[30]

In the context of the modest level of weapons production up to that point, the decision to enter the field of military technology was tantamount to a sea change, one that provoked opposition from the start in the markedly pacifist and politically neutral Second Republic. There was even opposition within the concern. At a supervisory board meeting, for example, ÖIAG Chairman Oskar Grünwald noted that weapons production was "probably simply necessary." However, in a country "with such a strong Catholic and Socialist tradition" it was imperative to try to "be active in this sector only to a degree that is absolutely necessary and, furthermore, to focus economic activity to the greatest possible extent on promising products for the civilian market. All the more so since the manufacture of military products will always be geared to exports, owing to [Austria's] relatively limited needs and will therefore also be controversial within a foreign policy context."[31]

The stance taken by the governing SPÖ on the armaments issue was contradictory. The 1978 party program included a call to "eliminate the power of the armaments industry" and start an "initiative for disarmament."[32] For the government, however, employment policy carried more weight than ideological concerns. For example, Josef Staribacher, the minister of trade, was of the opinion that "just like other states we absolutely have to recognize the interests of Austrian industry in weapons sales. Ideologically, you can take whatever stance on this issue you want as a Socialist and a pacifist, which I would call myself. But for the sake of employment policy it is economically absolutely imperative for the Steyr Werke and other manufacturers like Hirtenberger and Assmann either to retain old markets or, even more important, to gain new ones, like Tunisia, for example."[33] There were many in the party who did not share this pragmatic view. However, as Fritz Edlinger,[34] a former functionary

for Socialist Youth Austria, noted in hindsight, the conflicts within the party over the Zwentendorf nuclear power plant (1978) and the occupation of the Hainburger Au (1984) had been "much tougher" than those "regarding the weapons trade": "These were effectively swept under the rug by the trade union wing. Furthermore, Kreisky himself did not get very involved. His relationship with Anton Benya was based on trust, so much was cleared up in advance. The protest against the weapons trade was carried out strictly by the SPÖ youth organizations in alliance with groups outside the SPÖ. With respect to the weapons trade, the issue concerned the export opportunities for a modest number of businesses—unlike, say, the energy issue, which in the eyes of the trade unions affected the entire industrial future of Austria."[35]

In selecting the products to be manufactured, VOEST-Alpine assumed that long-range artillery would have good prospects on the market. In May and November 1979, two license agreements were concluded with the Canadian Space Research Corporation to this end.[36] Gerald Bull,[37] the company's founder, was considered a leading authority in the field of artillery technology. VOEST-Alpine purchased from Bull the license to produce the Gun Howitzer Noricum, 45 caliber—known simply as the GHN-45—for 2 million US dollars.[38] An extended 155 mm howitzer that could be armed with both conventional ammunition and tactical nuclear weapons, it was supposed to be "the best howitzer in the world." With a range of 39 km, the GHN-45 surpassed that of all rival products by nearly 10 km.[39] If a specially fitted shell (base bleed) was used, the range could even reach as far as 45 km. "The business cooperation with Gerald Bull was conducted through completely normal channels," former Noricum General Manager Peter Unterweger emphasized in an interview in 2011. He added:

> One of our people met him and discussed a worldwide production license. You couldn't have much of a conversation with Bull because he drank about one and a half bottles of whiskey a day. But Bull was definitely an absolutely ingenious weapons engineer. When it came to artillery, his designs put anything else available internationally at the time in the shade. The idea began to take shape that this could be made in Liezen, in order to replace the loss-making production there with high-quality machine engineering. This decision was taken not on moral or ethical grounds but was justified entirely by the opportunity it offered to profit from the unique features of the GHN-45 and to secure jobs. By the way, the 45-kilometer range of the GHN-45 has not been surpassed even today.[40]

The manufacture of the GHN-45 employed 1,600 people in Liezen alone. The special ammunition, propellants, and detonators were produced by Hirtenberger Patronenfabrik, and VOEST-Alpine bought more than 73 percent of this company's stock in July 1981.[41]

As for politicians, Chancellor Kreisky viewed the entry of VOEST-Alpine into the field of military technology as a "far-reaching entrepreneurial decision, from which repercussions can be expected for Austrian foreign policy and foreign trade policy." For this reason, he asked the board of directors to explain "how they evaluate the risk to guaranteed revenue, considering the limitations resulting from the status of perpetual neutrality and the existing legal norms in Austria."[42] However, as the minutes of a VOEST-Alpine board meeting show, the chancellor must have already approved the new course the company was taking. It was reported in 1978 that a "conversation with Chancellor Dr. Kreisky on the topic of military technology" took place, in which the chancellor "deemed our approach reasonable in the context of restructuring the company, and pointed out that care should be taken in this process not to violate the Austrian State Treaty and to avoid a clash with Hirtenberger and Steyr-Daimler-Puch."[43] Kreisky's concerns were heightened when Thomas Nowotny, the Austrian consul general in New York at the time, informed him that the Space Research Corporation "was said to have been seriously compromised internationally" owing to "arms smuggling to South Africa."[44] According to him, Kreisky "emphatically" warned both the ÖIAG board and Apfalter "of the risks of such business transactions." The response of VOEST-Alpine management was to assure him "that the press reports about legal violations in connection with business dealings with Dr. Bull . . . are baseless."[45]

The majority of the SPÖ leadership supported the company's move into arms production. During a meeting of the party's extended executive committee, Kreisky raised his objections, albeit unsuccessfully: "The Upper Austrians, the Styrians, and the trade unionists in particular were against me. They argued that otherwise Liezen would have to shut down. I had massive opposition from others who said: 'No, please, we don't want any involvement; VOEST must take responsibility for this.'"[46] According to the recollections of then SPÖ General Secretary Karl Blecha,[47] who attended the meeting, only two votes were cast opposing it:

> those of Heinz Fisher and myself. Everyone else was for it. Kreisky had, as always, kept his opinion to himself until he realized the vehemence with which Anton Benya and various regional chairmen had lobbied for military technology. My argument against it was that it meant entering

> tricky terrain, because, as a manufacturer of military technology, the only chance you have to make a profit is to export it. And you can only export weapons to where they are needed, that is, where a war is going on or threatens to break out—which in the case of Austria inevitably means difficulties with its neutral status. This was absolutely obvious to me.[48]

Later the central argument in defense of the indicted Noricum managers was that they had gotten the green light from politicians.[49] "Not one politician was against" the company's involvement in military technology "from the workers' council to the national government," in the words of Anton Elmer, a Noricum general manager, in 1990: "When I now hear that Kreisky was against it, then I would like to share something that he really did say at the very end: 'Okay, then do it, but keep it under wraps.'"[50] Kreisky accused Elmer of "slander"[51] and emphasized that he had not been "the dictator of industry."[52] At any rate, the parliamentary fact-finding committee investigating the Noricum case in 1989/90 could not establish any "influence" exerted by politicians "against" the company's expansion into arms production. On the contrary, it reported that "during several official trips abroad by members of the government, attention was even explicitly drawn to this arms production."[53] Indeed, the arms trade was subsidized in many ways: export promotion, export guarantees by the Österreichische Kontrollbank AG (an export credit insurer),[54] help from national banks, and support by the Austrian army, which made available officers from the Amt für Wehrtechnik (Office of Military Technology) on a regular basis for presentational purposes abroad. Army technicians contributed to the development of an assault rifle, and the armed forces also helped relieve supply bottlenecks, such as in 1978 when twenty million rounds of ammunition were supplied from army depots to fulfill an export order for Bolivia on behalf of Hirtenberger Patronenfabrik.[55]

Arms Exports and Legal Regulations

The trade in weapons was anything but unproblematic for a neutral country like Austria.[56] According to international law, the Hague Convention (1907) prohibited neutral states from sending munitions to warring parties. However, this did not apply to private entities, which were only obligated to treat those at war equally.[57] In Austria, Section 320 of the Criminal Code prohibited unauthorized weapons exports "during a war or an armed conflict in which the Republic of Austria is not participating" because such exports "endanger

neutrality."[58] Until the end of the 1970s, legislation on weapons exports was based on a German law from November 6, 1935, on the export and import of war material. This had been applied to Austria through a decree by the Reich minister of the interior on February 13, 1939, that extended German weapons law to Austria.[59]

Not until 1977 was a new federal law adopted on the import, export, and transit of war material. According to Section 1, the export, import, and transit of weapons now required a permit. This responsibility fell to the federal minister of the interior, in agreement with the federal ministers of foreign affairs and defense following consultation with the chancellor. According to Section 3, clause 1, such permits would be issued "if the import, export, or transit does not run counter to the international commitments or foreign policy interests of the Republic of Austria with special regard to perpetual neutrality, or if there are no security or military grounds for opposing it, or if there are no other objections of comparable importance." The commentary accompanying the War Material Act cites humanitarian concerns as one such objection, for example in situations where "there is reason to assume that the supply of war material to the country of destination is to be used to repress human rights." Moreover, "taking into account these aspects, permits will not be granted for exports to regions in which armed conflict is taking place or threatens to break out or where other dangerous tensions exist."[60] The War Material Act was amended in 1982 to the effect that future exports were to be prohibited should, in the country of destination, "the danger exist that, owing to serious and repeated human rights violations, deliveries of war material will be used to repress human rights." Other obstacles cited to such exports were armed conflicts, the danger of war, dangerous tensions, and UN Security Council embargo resolutions.[61] In the opinion of experts, the Austrian regulations resembled "for the most part" those of other neutral countries, such as Switzerland and Sweden. Among the neutral nations of Western Europe at the time, Austria's export laws were by no means the strictest. "Rather, certain regulations in the war material export laws of Sweden and of Switzerland are stricter than those of Austria," such as the obligatory end-consumer certificate to be presented to the authorities or the right of the authorities in Switzerland to inspect weapons manufacturers at will. Otherwise, the reasons for refusing to grant export permits were practically "identical" in all three countries.[62]

However, considerable difficulties arose in implementing the War Material Act. "By prohibiting the sale of war materials to the best customers, namely 'to countries that really use the stuff' (according to National Council President Leopold Gratz, SPÖ),[63] it practically invites transgressions," commented *Der*

Spiegel.[64] In retrospect even the Noricum inquiry committee acknowledged that a major "conflict of priorities" existed: "The purpose of the law runs counter to the state industry ÖIAG's economic considerations—namely, to secure jobs and achieve positive company balance sheets."[65] Indeed, an "exact reading of the law" would have "practically ruled out" the export of war material.[66]

The interior minister at the time, Erwin Lanc (SPÖ),[67] had abstained from voting on the law in parliament in 1977:

> I had always opposed this War Material Act, because it was not enforceable in a real-case scenario. It is difficult enough to stay informed about what is going on in one's own territory—unless it is about some really major issue. Just as other things are smuggled, so too can weapons be smuggled out. At the time I tried to convince Prof. Ermacora,[68] one of the authors of the bill, that in effect they were using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. But there was a consensus among the government and the opposition that legislative regulation had to be passed for reasons of international law and human rights and whatever other good reasons there were. I said: This law is actually not enforceable for the simple reason that the prerequisites for monitoring are missing. The Austrian National Council cannot enact legislation requiring foreign authorities to submit to administrative monitoring to discern whether some approved delivery has actually reached its originally designated destination rather than some other destination.[69]

In 1981 the Ministry for State Security (MfS) of the GDR, which was interested in everything, gathered information on the amendment of the War Material Act through an allied intelligence agency. It analyzed the dilemma of the Austrian armament industry and found a loophole that was later used in the course of the Noricum scandal. Export-import firms were not to receive permits for weapons deals "if human rights are being violated in the country importing the weapons. Consequently, exports by Austrian weapons exporters may be blocked. They can be expected to engage the help of third countries, particularly help from Socialist countries, for their business of selling weapons and ammunition to such countries. . . . Austria's negative trade balance will thus force the Austrian government to forgo the strict enforcement of its own resolution."[70] The fact that many export licenses were granted despite the complex legal framework shows that the conclusions drawn by the MfS were spot on. Between 1978 and 1982, 873 export license applications were approved. The Federal Chancellor's Office blocked such applications in only

twenty-eight cases, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in twenty-five cases, and the Ministry of the Interior in only four cases.[71] It is clear once again that labor market considerations prevailed. The parliamentary inquiry committee would later determine that "when war material exports were approved, the primary considerations were not only legal but also often risky economic ones under the banner of job security. Therefore, it appears quite conceivable that this circumstance—consciously or unconsciously—attenuated the willingness to monitor war material exports closely and examine them in detail."[72] Ultimately, by the 1980s at the latest, the issue of Austrian arms production was facing the fundamental decision, as the *Wochenpresse* explained, either to liberalize the arms trade "and thereby supply dictators, warring countries, and terrorists [with weapons] or to largely cease weapons production."[73] In the end, the status quo prevailed, thus prolonging the conflict between restrictive regulations and economic necessities, a conflict which culminated in the Noricum scandal.

Arms Exports Prior to the Noricum Scandal

Since the European arms market was essentially saturated by the end of the 1970s, only the "Third World" was left to become the most important trading partner of the Austrian armaments industry. According to estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), about 85 percent of all Austrian weapons exports in the late 1970s went to developing countries. Heavy military equipment, valued at more than $400 million (5.4 billion shillings), comprised more than 1 percent of all exports.[74] In April 1976 Hirtenberger Patronenfabrik AG shipped ten million igniters to Chile, where the military junta of Augusto Pinochet had seized power through a coup only three years earlier. "Our company first supplied Chile with ammunition back in 1901," stated Director General Herbert Hadwinger. "They have been living in a state of permanent crisis there for the last 150 years. If we don't supply them, then others will."[75] In the mid-1970s the sale of 600 Steyr Mannlicher sniper rifles (SSGs) and 399,600 rounds of ammunition to Syria were declared—retroactively—to be a "violation of neutrality." The arms shipment had originally been halted by customs authorities. However, when the Defense Ministry failed to issue any instructions concerning this shipment, the 555 crates left Austria on December 17, 1976, in the direction of Yugoslavia, only to be sent back at the end of March 1977. The official consignor operated under the name of the arms dealer Alois Weichselbaumer, who had procured the ammunition from Austrian army stockpiles.[76] The case led to the resignation

of Defense Minister Karl Lütgendorf on May 31, 1977.[77] It was determined that his ministry had been involved in the "export of weapons and ammunition to a crisis region" in the following way:

> (a) It facilitated exports by an Austrian firm by issuing the necessary export certificate. In doing so, it saved the firm the trouble of getting an export license from the BMI [Bundesministerium für Inneres, Federal Ministry of the Interior] (in agreement with the BMfAA [Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs]).
>
> (b) It supplied ammunition for export "on loan" from its stockpiles. The ammunition manufactured by the company Hirtenberger Patronenfabrik will be replaced or rather refunded to the BMfLV [Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, Federal Ministry of Defense] by the company Steyr-Daimler-Puch.[78]

At the Council of Ministers meeting in which the resignation of Lütgendorf was discussed, Kreisky said: "half-truths are far more difficult to defend than the full truth and it is the small things that can play a major role in politics. Like this ammunition incident with Lütgendorf, for example."[79]

Following the complaint filed against Weichselbaumer by the Defense Ministry on January 17, 1977,[80] other planned deals that the arms trader had arranged for Syria and for which "no concerns regarding neutrality regulations" were said to exist suddenly hung in the balance. One such deal was the sale of 1,500 Pinzgauer military off-road vehicles to the tune of about 4.5 billion shillings.[81] "The Steyr Werke's attempt to pay off Weichselbaumer, that is, to exclude him from this activity, failed because he emphatically rejected it," noted Minister Staribacher, who recommended that the director general of Steyr-Daimler-Puch consult with Kreisky. "[Michael] Malzacher wanted the government to acknowledge that he needed to continue involving Weichselbaumer and was therefore protecting him," noted Staribacher. However, the chancellor wanted "neither to advise him nor to say anything." Kreisky preferred to stay out of it: "Should the deal fail because Weichselbaumer is not involved, then he [Kreisky] will be saddled with the responsibility. Should the deal be successful and Weichselbaumer be part of it, then the ÖVP[82] will attack him because he made recommendations to this effect."[83] Yet Kreisky also emphasized the "importance of such an order for the production capacity of the Steyr Werke" and eventually proposed to present the matter to the parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, a proposal that was

accepted "by all."[84] In order to communicate this, Staribacher "immediately" took Malzacher to Rudolf Sallinger, the head of the Österreichischer Wirtschaftsbund (Austrian business federation), a group affiliated with the ÖVP (Österreichische Volkspartei).[85] Apparently this step paved the way for an agreement, because on February 2, 1977, the Foreign Affairs Committee approved the Pinzgauer export deal with votes from all three of the parties represented in parliament at the time—SPÖ, ÖVP, and FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Freedom Party of Austria).[86]

The sale in 1976/77 of forty-five Kürassier tanks to Tunisia for 811 million shillings proved less problematic.[87] What is more, by 1980 that country had been supplied with a total of 52,000 Steyr AUG assault rifles.[88]

When Kenneth Kaunda, who had been serving as the first president of Zambia since 1964, visited Austria in June 1977, he told Kreisky in confidence that he was expecting an "attack" on his country. Staribacher was privy to this conversation and noted that Kaunda was in a hurry to negotiate the purchase of Austrian tanks, land mines, guns, and ammunition. "Since they don't have any money, Kreisky wants Steyr-Daimler-Puch, for example, to supply weapons like tanks and other items at cost, meaning without making a profit." Formal negotiations were to start only after Kaunda had had a chance to see the weapons "in use" for himself. Staribacher "immediately" informed Defense Minister Otto Rösch (SPÖ)[89] that "a demonstration will take place on Monday at the Army Garrison Baden driving school." When Rösch "rightly" objected that this was rather short notice to prepare such a demonstration, Kreisky and Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr[90] countered that "ostensibly the military has to be on constant alert anyhow and so organizing such an event should not be a problem at all."[91]

In 1978 Steyr-Daimler-Puch received a license to export 108 Kürassier tanks, 10 Greif tanks, and 3 Kürassier training tanks, complete with spare parts and ammunition, to Morocco. The export authorization had been issued even though King Hassan II had been waging a desert war against Polisario, the liberation movement of occupied West Sahara, since 1975.[92] The value of the order totaled 2.3 billion shillings, of which 10 percent was paid in cash and the rest financed through a ten-year-loan to Morocco by the Austrian bank Creditanstalt. However, Morocco soon fell behind in its payments, and in 1979 Polisario fighters captured four Kürassier tanks, which resulted in embarrassing media exposure.[93] Following the visit of a Polisario delegation to Vienna, Austria adopted a UN resolution on the independence of the West Sahara in the fall of 1979. In December of that year, Kreisky stopped all further military aid to Morocco through a decree of the Council of Ministers.[94] In

May 1980 it became public that thirty-one Moroccan soldiers were still being trained at the Steyr tank factory in Simmering. Kreisky responded to the signers of a protest resolution on the matter by stating: "I can assure you—and this holds for the entire federal government—that I am not pleased with any of the Austrian arms export deals but do consider them necessary in the interest of the country's defense and security."[95]

Reports circulated in 1979 that China had allegedly wanted to buy 300,000 Steyr AUG rifles but a Soviet veto had blocked the deal.[96] In an interview Erwin Lanc, the interior minister at the time who was responsible for authorizing such exports, confirmed that plans for such a sale had indeed existed:

> Director General Michael Malzacher badgered me about a huge order by China for Steyr assault rifles. He openly threatened to sue the Republic should I fail to approve things that require approval according to the War Material Act. The pressure was unrelenting, and Malzacher expressed the most bizarre ideas—for example, he reported that the Chinese People's Army wanted to buy a million assault rifles from him. I then asked him if he were out of his mind—to make such a proposal at a point when there was a border conflict going on between China and the Soviet Union on the Ussuri [River]. Were we really to approve an export shipment in such a situation? How would the Russians react? It was an idiotic idea.[97]

When, of all people, Nazi war criminal Klaus Barbie, who had fled to Bolivia, arranged an order of thirty Kürassier tanks for the Bolivian army, a shadow was cast over Austrian arms exports to Latin America.[98] Barbie, who had become the representative of Steyr-Daimler-Puch in Bolivia in February 1979, received a monthly expense allowance of $800. Equipping the Bolivian army with what was at the time a "state-of-the-art tank model" apparently cost a total of $1.477 million, for which Barbie received a commission of "between 1 and 3%."[99] In June 1980, seventeen of these tanks were deployed in the so-called cocaine coup of Colonel Luis Garcia Meza to crush the last remnant of resistance by miners in Oruro, La Paz, and Santa Cruz. Yet before the second consignment of Kürassier tanks could be shipped to Bolivia, the export license was revoked.[100] In August 1980, however, Hirtenberger began training twenty-one Bolivian army technicians in ammunition production, as "a sort of foreign aid," as Hirtenberger Director General Hadwinger explained.[101] In August 1986, three Kürassier tanks were to be deployed once again to put down a demonstration of striking miners in La Paz.[102]

At the peak of a border conflict between Chile and Argentina in 1978, Steyr-Daimler-Puch shipped fifty-seven Kürassier tanks valued at 800 million shillings to Argentina. According to Josef Staribacher's notes, Kreisky announced at a preliminary meeting of the Council of Ministers that nothing spoke against such a deal "from the standpoint of international law" because "Argentina is not at war." Other countries like Switzerland and Sweden were shying away from supplying the military junta, Kreisky noted. The United States had also imposed an embargo on arms shipments to Argentina. Staribacher noted that "therefore Austria will spark enormous protests both worldwide and especially within Austria. Despite this, Kreisky was in favor of supplying the arms in order to avoid being accused of doing nothing for the employees at Steyr."[103] Yet in 1979, when Chile likewise wanted to order tanks, Kreisky initially prohibited the export subsidies and the usual *Ausfallhaftung* (contingent liability) by the Kontrollbank. Steyr-Daimler-Puch Director General Malzacher therefore came up with another type of financing with the support of Finance Minister Hannes Androsch and ÖGB head Benya.[104] This time Kreisky signaled his approval, on condition that a written guarantee be drafted that "this equipment will not be used in internal conflict."[105] Such a clause was included in the contract.[106]

The planned deal with Chile divided the SPÖ. In early August, thousands demonstrated in front of the Federal Chancellor's Office, including a group representing the 600 Chilean refugees who had been granted asylum in Austria following the 1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende. ÖGB functionaries like Alfred Dallinger, Helmut Braun, and Sepp Wille and especially the SPÖ youth organizations categorically rejected the weapons export. The president of the railroad workers union, Fritz Prechtl, even announced a transport boycott for weapons to Chile.[107] The reaction of the chair of the Bund sozialistischer Freiheitskämpfer (Federation of Socialist Freedom Fighters), Rosa Jochmann, also carried some weight: "When she learned that we were sending weapons to a military dictatorship, she said: 'May the heavens darken over us, for with such a deed the absolute principles of Socialism and solidarity have been broken.'"[108] On the other hand, the board of Steyr-Daimler-Puch expressed its concern in a personal letter to Kreisky dated August 19, 1980, that the export had not yet been approved, because "we are concerned not only about those employees—this would be several thousand people—whose work is directly linked to it. We are also worried about the future existence of Steyr-Daimler-Puch, which can only be satisfactorily secured if the restructuring process begun several years ago can be successfully continued. With traditional products alone, i.e., without military production, this is unthinkable." The board emphasized that

it did not mean in any way to discuss the question of exporting weapons to Chile in terms of its "political import": "Instead, we submit our statement as an attempt to express our immense concern for our company. . . . We ask you to grant us the export license for which we have applied."[109]

In addition, the Chilean ambassador called on the Foreign Ministry to assure the Austrian government once again that the 106 tanks, 124 machine guns, and 360 pistols ordered from Steyr "were only intended for use by the Chilean army and exclusively for the defense of the national territory of the Republic of Chile." The ambassador acknowledged "the moral aspect of Austrian arms deliveries to dictatorships to be an Austrian matter," but he could not accept "Chile being portrayed as a special case given that human rights violations and the repression of the population are occurring in numerous countries, especially by the Soviet Union."[110] Addressing Kreisky, Benya also called for a positive outcome. He argued that, as an export-oriented country, Austria could "not hold back in such economically difficult times to the benefit of other nations that are willing to export arms anywhere and at any time." Within the ÖGB there were of course "many who have reservations; we both have our doubts, too, after all. But we must consider how Austria's metal industry is to continue if we don't take part in what I hope, in the interest of peace, is a temporary boom in the weapons trade."[111]

On August 20, 1980, Kreisky informed the Council of Ministers of the decision to go ahead. According to entries in Staribacher's journal, the chancellor made it clear that "the supply of tanks means such a major deal that it would have dire consequences for the Steyr Werke should it fail to happen—and not only with regard to saving jobs. In material terms the absence of profits would seriously endanger cooperation with others, such as Mercedes." From the standpoint of the Verfassungsdienst (Constitutional Service),[112] there was no legal problem in preventing the delivery, only possible "political reasons." Kreisky also warned that a rejection of the application for an export license might prompt Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG to file "enormous claims for damages." What spoke against the Chilean deal was that "following a period of temporary mitigation in the dictatorship, the people now in charge in Chile are once again clamping down harder." Chilean assurances not to deploy the tanks domestically could therefore "not be taken seriously." As far as the opposition within the party was concerned, Kreisky conjectured that "the protest would not have been so vehement had the deliveries been designated for Communist countries." However, should the deal go through, the "international echo" would be "negative" for Austria. Should Austria not deliver, then countries like Israel, Japan, and France would "immediately" jump

in. For these reasons, the decision in this special case would be "momentous." Kreisky then called on the assembled ministers to express their opinion on the matter. Defense Minister Rösch expressed his "clear 'yes' to the delivery" because, in his view, this would also have an impact on the Austrian army. "As a trade unionist," Building Minister Karl Sekanina (SPÖ) also declared his support, even if "the general mood" at the time leaned "rather toward 'no' than 'yes.'" Interior Minister Lanc, however, stressed political arguments: "Socialist shop stewards are asking outright: What's got into us?" At this juncture, Kreisky interrupted by remarking that "there are various takes on this including within the workforce." Justice Minister Christian Broda declared his "clear 'no'" to the deal: "He saw parallels between the Chilean repression and the events in Hungary in the 1950s." State Secretary Anneliese Albrecht also stated unequivocally that it would be "impossible" for her to vote in favor of a sale "that entails supplying a dictatorship violating human rights with weapons." Education Minister Hertha Firnberg also stated "emphatically" that she "was not able to vote for the deal."[113]

At a special meeting the following day, the differences between the opposing standpoints were "irreconcilable," according to Staribacher. Kreisky concluded that the ministers responsible for issuing the license for the tank exports would have to make the decision: "They cannot be forced into anything." And "since Interior Minister Lanc, who has to issue notification of the decision will not approve such an export, then the deal cannot go through." Even though Foreign Minister Pahr and Defense Minister Rösch would not have had any qualms, he continued, the interior minister would be able to present other equally significant reasons to reject the deal.[114] Lanc, who played a key role in the approval process, put his foot down. As he explained in 2011:

> On the basis of the War Material Act, I indicated that such an export could not be approved—because the possibility could not be ruled out that the tanks would be deployed to crush the democratic opposition and violate other human rights. The situation in this case was so clear that it was never a question for me. Anton Benya saw things differently. For him, the jobs in Steyr or in Simmering that would be saved by the manufacture of these "track vehicles," as Kreisky always called them, were more important. The Steyr Werke, on the other hand, cited the economic difficulties and the consequent collapse in export orders. Foreign Minister Pahr argued that, from an international law perspective, following exports to Argentina, Chile now also had to be supplied [with weapons]. But at the time there was no aggressive conflict between the

> two countries, while the tanks had already been deployed "domestically" in Argentina. I made it clear that I would uphold the existing law, and anyone who did not like it could have my job! That put an end to the discussion. After that, Benya hardly talked to me for a year, but we straightened things out later.[115]

The arms manufacturers were concerned about the decision. The VOEST-Alpine board feared "lasting negative repercussions for all future business deals with foreign militaries involving defense products." During preliminary talks with Kreisky, the following was to be "noted," according to the file memo: "As an arms supplier, Austria will be denigrated as unreliable and undependable (the competition is bound to ensure this happens); until now, after all, one of our strongest competitive arguments has always been [our] neutrality and stability. What would make everything even more difficult would be to have the entire matter dragged into the public eye and the customer vilified—and that in a business where discretion is key!"[116]

Nothing underscores the contradictory nature of Austrian policy more than the approval in 1981 of another weapons deal by Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG for Latin America:[117] 108 Kürassier tanks and 10,000 105 mm shells were sold to Argentina, where in 1976 a military regime had also grabbed power through a coup and crushed the leftist opposition in a years-long civil war.[118] Interior Minister Lanc said that it had been possible to deliver the shipment "just in time." There had been a previous delivery in 1978/79, and the Argentinian government was said to have kept its promise not to deploy the Kürassier tanks in domestic conflicts.[119] However, in a television interview, Fritz Prechtl spoke against the deliveries, calling the deal a "deeply moral and political matter."[120] In reference to the protest movement against the weapons exports, which were fueled by various sources outside the SPÖ youth organizations—ranging from leftist students, to the Working Group of Catholic Action Austria, to organizations like Amnesty International, the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ)—Prechtl stated: "This is not a Juso [Young Socialist] movement. . . . Our government wants to secure jobs, but for these people, moral values are simply more important."[121] Within the trade unions, Prechtl's stance was controversial, as the entries in Staribacher's journal indicate. He wrote that when the matter was discussed among government and trade union representatives, on June 23, 1981, Heinz Fischer, the former SPÖ party whip who would later become Austria's president in 2004, witnessed at the parliamentary group meeting held at the ÖGB "how unanimously the trade union faction supported these

weapons exports and how strongly it criticized Prechtl's move to go public and to bluster with big threats that he can never carry through." Vice Chancellor Fred Sinowatz was then reported to have said: "The government stands united behind the decision to export."

That very evening, Staribacher wrote: "50 students and certainly Cath[olic] and Soc[ialist] Youth [attempted] to prevent the shipment of the tanks and to block the train tracks." Thus the "feared confrontation" did indeed take place, "but it went propitiously, thank God."[122] The journalist Christian Ortner described this confrontation outside the Steyr-Daimler-Puch factory gates in the Simmering district of Vienna: "About 300 strapping Steyr workers did the police's job and beat everything to bits that in any way looked pacifist. . . . A few minutes after the fight, the train with about 30 tanks rolled off the factory grounds. Cheers and relief among the metalworkers: the tanks have gone, the long-haired demonstrators can have their injuries attended to by the paramedics on the other side of the street. The dividend is safe."[123] At any rate, Michael Malzacher, as the director general of Steyr-Daimler-Puch, did not want to be the "bogeyman" again. "Look, I would rather sell bicycles or roller bearings. But in moral terms, I am acting within the scope of the law. And the ultimate responsibility always lies with the government, which has to approve these exports."[124]

When the Falklands War broke out between Argentina and Britain in 1982, the second consignment of twenty-eight tanks was halted, representing a sale worth about 850 million shillings, a sum that, according to an informant, Steyr-Daimler-Puch needed "like a morsel of bread."[125] In hindsight, the sale to Argentina was one of the last big tank deals. In 1983 Steyr-Daimler-Puch only produced twenty-five tanks, and in the following year just two. Instead of the 245 mechanics working at the Simmering works in 1980, only 50 were employed there in 1985. At the same time, just the interest on the loan that had financed tank production burdened the annual budget to the tune of 300 million shillings. Thus there was a good reason for Kreisky's conclusion that: "The export of weapons is the worst business there is. Why? If these weapons are worn out and used, we can't sell them. And if they aren't needed, they'll rot away in some warehouse."[126]

Despite these considerable difficulties, the government continued to adhere to its arms export policy in the name of jobs. When the commission studying proposals to change the party's economic program met at the SPÖ headquarters on April 30, 1981, Kreisky spoke out "in detail and firmly" in favor of expanding the arms industry, because it represented an asset for the companies involved. "Both VOEST-Alpine in Liezen and particularly Steyr-

Daimler-Puch earn the money needed to subsidize the other economically nonviable areas of production from the export of tanks." In Staribacher's words, Kreisky "now played down, for example, the Kürassier [tanks] as strictly non-aggressive weapons that served primarily to transport personnel." He also noted that "naturally, insanely long discussions" were had on this and many other points. One woman, a "young comrade" from the Socialist Youth, wanted to convince him "in all seriousness" to expand the "peaceful production" of Steyr-Daimler-Puch bicycles and to "forgo arms production."[127] Another time—in the context of a Council of Ministers meeting on May 4, 1982—Kreisky reacted "very emotionally" to a proposal put forth by a party friend, the vice-mayor of Graz, Alfred Stingl. According to Staribacher's notes, Stingl had called for the establishment of a commission within the party executive to develop a "concept for converting the nationalized but also in part private industry" away from arms production. In countering this proposal, Kreisky mentioned the decision of VOEST-Alpine to produce artillery in Liezen in order to maintain the foundry "during an incredibly difficult situation," just as Steyr-Daimler-Puch had started and further expanded its tank production ("Kreisky still persisted in calling them track vehicles") "because it is the most profitable branch for them." Therefore, he was "strictly against this idea of a conversion concept" and dismissed the "huge discussion in Socialist Party bodies" that had ensued. On the other hand, the chancellor also advocated a tightening of the War Material Act, in order to exclude countries that violated the Human Rights Convention.[128]

Economic Interests and Foreign Policy

As a small industrial country, Austria was disproportionately dependent on foreign trade. Therefore, politicians were always attempting to find foreign markets, and the Middle East was particularly interesting in this regard. Chancellor Kreisky had established good contacts in the course of his policy of "active neutrality," a policy through which he hoped to help ease the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and thus reduce the terrorist threat for Austria.[129] In addition, this policy offered Austria opportunities to profit economically. Peter Unterweger, the head of Noricum, testified in court that Kreisky had "repeatedly encouraged" the industry through Director General Heribert Apfalter to make business contacts in Libya and the Gulf States: "One should bear in mind that Kreisky had an incredibly high profile in the Arab world; I don't want to exaggerate, but Kreisky really was a household name there. The chancellor was known everywhere, and he was an absolute

trailblazer for all the export deals of Austrian industry to this region."[130] Naturally, this included the arms trade, and here dilemmas arose that had not only legal ramifications. Herbert Grubmayr, a former ambassador to Iraq, testified in the "Manager Trial" in the early 1990s about the efforts of Austrian firms in the late 1970s to be in the running for major projects to expand the Iraqi infrastructure. Once, at an important lunch gathering at the embassy, an attendant approached him and said: "Herr Kreisky is on the phone." At first Grubmayr thought it was a "joke." But he then discovered that "it was indeed the chancellor, and he said to me: 'Look, standing before me is a group of Austrian industrial directors who are telling me that nothing is progressing in Iraq, that there are major difficulties with the projects there. What can you recommend to help me achieve a breakthrough?'" Grubmayr did not want to be very "explicit" on the telephone. He took the opportunity to answer the chancellor a short time later, when State Secretary Adolf Nussbaumer visited the embassy. Only then did Grubmayr advise: "If you want to be sure to get a civilian contract of this size, then you have to supply weapons."[131]

A relationship of great trust existed between Kreisky and Libya's Colonel Muʿammar al-Gaddhafi, who was considered to be the "patron saint" of international terrorism at the time. During an official visit in 1976, Gaddhafi's prime minister Abdessalam Jalloud had already set the course for economic cooperation, which culminated in a contract with VOEST-Alpine in 1981 to build the Misurata steelworks, the largest heavy industry complex in Africa at the time.[132] In 1982 Gaddhafi's first visit to a Western country was to Austria. VOEST-Alpine Director General Apfalter had arranged the three-day state visit.[133] The media speculated that the successful conclusion of a weapons deal was in the works,[134] which was also reflected in the files of the East German Ministry for State Security: "Although the Austrian government has officially denied these reports, we have information indicating that an agreement was reached during Gaddhafi's visit on the sale of 200 Austrian 'Kürassier' tanks."[135] There is no evidence to show that the deal came about in this form. However, in 1984 Kreisky, who was no longer chancellor by then, visited Gaddhafi in Tripoli for three days to promote economic interests: Steyr-Daimler-Puch wanted to sell Libya trucks, tractors, and tanks valued at between 2 and 3 billion shillings. "For my part, I have never actively set weapons deals in motion," stated Kreisky emphatically, and then added, "I will not deny, however, that I was asked to offer my good services."[136] What followed, on November 20, 1984, was an agreement with Libya for the largest arms deal in the history of VOEST-Alpine. The Libyan government bought 200 GHN-45 howitzers and more than a million shells for an estimated 10

billion shillings.[137] However, the export of the artillery was stopped in January 1986; after all, Libya had been at war with its neighbor Chad since 1981. The deliveries up until then had actually been shipped to Iran, and Libya had provided a false end-customer certificate for this purpose. Kreisky, at least, remained convinced that the Libyans needed "this deal" for themselves: "The Gulf of Sirte can only be defended with such artillery. I don't know whether it helps, but at least these guns can be aimed at targets, which are in abundance there."[138] During a short visit in February 1986, Kreisky was also assured by Gaddhafi that the artillery that had been delivered was still in Libya.[139]

As early as 1981, VOEST-Alpine had appealed to Kreisky to do what he could through his contact with India's prime minister, Indira Gandhi, to positively influence its chances of exporting GHN-45 howitzers to that country. In this case the international competition was enormous, as the former VOEST-Alpine press spokesman Franz Summer describes in his memoirs: "Since 1972, all the major artillery manufacturers in the East and the West as well as Sweden and Austria had been scrambling to secure the contract for 400 field howitzers, with which the artillery of the Indian army was to be newly equipped and modernized. The entire system was to have a contract value of around 20 billion shillings."[140] Austria was at a disadvantage in this competition since the Indian side insisted even before negotiations began that the deliveries had to be guaranteed without any restrictions. Since such a commitment could not be made owing to the War Material Act, the board feared that "our otherwise very good chances of concluding a contract will thus be lost." Yet there seemed to be a way out. "According to unofficial recommendations from Indian sources . . . a personal letter sent by you, Herr Chancellor, to the prime minister, Mrs. Gandhi, [could] help Austrian industry despite this problem."[141] Kreisky fulfilled this request and described to the prime minister the mutual advantages of an arms deal with VOEST-Alpine.[142] When this incident was used against Kreisky during the "Manager Trial," he justified his action by stating that "intervention on behalf of legal business deals in the interest of the Austrian economy is one of the essential tasks of a chancellor and is—as hundreds of (successful) examples demonstrate—nothing exceptional." After all, Kreisky added, in the initial phase of the project alone, direct shipments worth 6 billion shillings had been planned.[143]

During a state visit in the spring of 1984, Chancellor Fred Sinowatz (SPÖ)[144] tried to generate a measure of trust and to convince the Indian negotiators that Austria would indeed uphold its contractual obligations to deliver the weapons, should India become involved in a military conflict. There

had been a planned conversation prior to this between Sinowatz and VOEST Director General Apfalter. As Peter Unterweger recalled, Apfalter said "in his well-known, legendary diction, '*Fredl, da sagst yes*' [Freddie, you just say 'yes']." Sinowatz is said to have acted accordingly vis-à-vis the Indian defense minister. "It seems that Apfalter was the one who led the conversation. I think Sinowatz did not have a good command of English."[145] Unterweger went on:

> Our absolute competitive disadvantage—against all other competitors—was that we were not allowed by Austrian law to supply countries at war or countries in which conflict threatened to break out. For a buyer, this meant an incalculable risk: should a state of conflict suddenly develop, would we then fulfill our contractual obligations to deliver the goods ordered? In answer to the inevitable question concerning this dilemma at our meeting with the Indian defense minister, Heribert Apfalter prompted Chancellor Sinowatz during the state visit by saying: "*Fredl, jetzt sagst yes!*" And the honorable chancellor did indeed say "yes," and he had also received a correct translation of this beforehand. What I'm trying to say is that the impression of a consensus between politics and management has always been there for me, including at these talks. Actually, strictly speaking, the chancellor violated neutrality law on this occasion and made it clear to everyone that the state's welfare took priority: Yes, of course we will continue to deliver. We will come up with a way of doing it. Whoever I spoke to in this political landscape along the lines of "we need an approval," all of them said: "We'll do it, we will stand behind you and in front of you as well." No one said: The law is such and such and we would prefer to forgo a deal if it has not been thoroughly checked. Everyone was enormously interested, the political parties, the trade unions, the representatives from the federal states and local communities. At that point in time, the ultimate credo was to secure jobs and everything else took a back seat.[146]

Ultimately, VOEST-Alpine never stood a chance of winning the contract. In 1986 the Swedish arms company Bofors triumphed against the Austrian, French, West German, and British competition. As was later revealed, in 1985 Bofors had transferred 33 million Swedish kronor and later another 250 million kronor to Swiss accounts as bribe money that went to the party of the Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, and to important decision-makers in the Indian Defense Ministry.[147] Neutral Sweden, which actually had the strictest regulations of all concerning weapons exports, was subsequently rocked by its own version of the US "Irangate," much as Austria had been. It turned

out that, between 1981 and 1985, Bofors had shipped tons of propellants and explosives to Iran via East Germany. Two investigations of the company's top management in 1988 and the mid-1990s ended, however, by acquitting the managers.[148] The failure of the Indian deal increased the pressure on VOEST-Alpine. Encouraged by the excellent results of the technical testing run of the GHN-45 by the Indian military, the company had been producing a stockpile since 1984 to meet the obligations of what was thought to be an "almost certain contract expected from the subcontinent."[149]

Nothing came of it all. Since the company had obtained the license to produce the GHN-45, the only contract that had been fulfilled using that license was the delivery of ten howitzers to Thailand. Business deals with Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Nigeria had fallen through,[150] but the so-called Jordanian deal was finalized, following a state visit by Kreisky. Between October 2 and 5, 1980, the chancellor met with King Hussein, Crown Prince Hassan, the prime minister, and several ministers. One of the members of the Austrian delegation was the Director General of Hirtenberger AG, Herbert Hadwinger.[151] At a press conference held during the state visit, Kreisky stated that "tanks only play a subordinate role." Even though tanks were on the list of goods to be exported, the press reported Kreisky as having maintained that "he does not negotiate arms exports on principle; this would be a matter for the respective firms."[152] At any rate, a sales contract was finalized on February 8, 1981, between VOEST-Alpine and the Jordanian Defense Ministry for the delivery of 200 GHN-45 howitzers, 221 spare cannon barrels, 5 gun mounts, and 700,000 shells.[153]

There had been no legal reservations about this deal, even though on September 22, 1980, a war had broken out not far from Jordan, between Iraq and Iran, and it was known that the kingdom supported Iraq. It was also no secret that a permanent state of tension existed between Jordan and Syria.[154] In 1980 Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG had submitted an application for a license to export sixty tanks and ammunition, and no objections had been raised by the Federal Office of the Chancellor. Even the end-consumer certificate was considered to be "not necessary."[155] In fact, a large share of the arms was shipped to the Saudi port al Qadimah on the Red Sea,[156] from where the war material made its way to Iraq.[157] This situation certainly did not go unnoticed by the Austrian authorities. When Interior Minister Lanc visited Baghdad in April 1981, the minutes of the meeting note that President Saddam Hussein raised "the question of artillery" and said that "if supplies do not arrive immediately, indeed they are quite overdue, then this will become an important matter in the realm of politics. Any healthy and friendly relationship would be put

to the test by such bilateral matters." Lanc answered that "the artillery items were meant for Jordan" and then explained the "regulations regarding the position of Austrian neutrality." When Saddam Hussein then asked "whether the delivery could be accelerated if it were to go to a country other than Jordan, since the US might also have objections to Jordan," Lanc answered succinctly that "this was not where the problem would lie."[158] Lanc recalled this conversation in a 2011 interview:

> Saddam Hussein complained that we were not supplying Iraq with artillery. Then I said that the only chance for a neutral country would be to supply both of the warring parties—now that the war between Iran and Iraq had broken out. I told him that we would be glad to deliver but that Iran was also knocking on the door. I couldn't see any sense in having us make money so that even more Iraqis and Iranians would die—simply to get out of the situation in a neutrality-compliant fashion by supplying both sides. He could not then say "I don't care"; instead he accepted it between two puffs of a Havana cigar.[159]

The Noricum Scandal

In fact, Iran had indeed signaled its interest in Austrian war materials just about the time Lanc was visiting Iraq. On March 31, 1981, the head of the Austrian mission in Iran was summoned to the Iranian Defense Ministry, where the deputy defense minister asked him "whether Austria would be willing to supply Iran with weapons and ammunition (a) at short notice and (b) after the war with Iraq has ended." The Iranian government was aware "that Austria is a neutral country; however, when considering its answer, Austria should take into consideration that Iraq was the aggressor and Iran the country that was being attacked and thus had to defend itself. Therefore, Austria should help the Islamic Republic of Iran. Should a direct delivery not be possible, it could consider shipping through a third country." The Austrian diplomat mollified the situation by referring to the country's neutrality and stating that the matter of arms deliveries could only be reevaluated once the war had ended.[160] However, it never came to this. Only two years later, on January 20, 1983, the Iranian ambassador to Austria presented a "démarche" from his government. The diplomat declared that "his government was in possession of information, according to which Austria intended to deliver war equipment, namely track vehicles and artillery, to Jordan. . . . The Iranian government also possessed sound evidence that this war equipment would be sent on to Iraq. . . . Should

Austria be unable to respond to the request to prevent the transfer of the aforementioned war material to Iraq, then it would be acceptable to those in Teheran if Iran were also given the opportunity to receive war materials from Austria, even if the Iranian government chooses not to pursue this initially."[161]

Iran is reported to have subsequently issued major threats: a negotiated oil compensation deal worth 21 billion shillings remained unsigned, and negotiations on business projects with several Austrian companies were broken off.[162] "Iranian representatives complained bitterly that Austrian war material was 'blowing up in the face' of Iranian fighters, [material] that had previously been delivered in good faith to Jordan and then sent on to Iraq without our knowledge," recalled Peter Unterweger. "They made it very clear that they also wanted to receive the GHN-45, combined with the 'unspoken' threat of subjecting economic relations with Austria to a 'critical' evaluation. Generally, this caused quite a flap, along the lines of 'what do we do now?' Then the idea emerged to deliver to a third country. This was the consensus reached by everyone involved, even though no one ever said: That will work! Do it like that! Who could this country of destination be? And it was here that at some point the topic of Libya arose."[163] The marketing director of Noricum, Gaan Eisenburger, who took part in the negotiations with Iran, reported in his memoirs (published in 2021) how "absurd" the whole thing seemed to him. But it was also clear to him that the sale of the howitzers let VOEST "work without worry for many years": "I was not inclined to sentimentalities. But I knew that jobs were a political calculation and that with this deal, we could protect entire factories from closing."[164] According to Eisenburger, Libya agreed to serve as an intermediary for a two per cent commission.[165] There were to be no direct deliveries, payments, or contacts between Austrian and Iranian institutions. Noricum got a "green light" only for this one situation.[166]

According to the case put forth later by the state prosecutor's office, Noricum was interested in selling to Iran following the failed deal with India, and all the more so since weapons "valued at about 1 billion s[hillings] had been produced in advance in Liezen and no other potential customers were in sight."[167] Initial contacts had been made in 1983, and a contract was concluded with the Iranian Defense Ministry on April 29, 1984. In all, 200 GHN-45 howitzers, 200 spare cannon barrels with interrupted screw breeches, 120 spare barrels with muzzle brakes, supplies, and 190,000 high explosive shells were to be delivered between June 1985 and May 1988.[168] Of this order, 180 howitzers, 60 barrels with interrupted screw breeches, 120 barrels without interrupted screw breeches, and 98,000 high explosive shells were actually transferred in eight separate shipments.[169] After it was forced to grant discounts and after

the deal ended prematurely, VOEST-Alpine only made a profit of 3.3 billion shillings instead of the originally expected 6.8 billion.[170]As the report of the import-export expert in the Noricum case spelled out in 1989, the loss for Noricum amounted to 36.5 percent: "For VA [VOEST-Alpine] and Noricum together the result must have been just a tad positive or at least only slightly negative. Had the deal been terminated earlier to escape the risk of being caught, the result would have been worse due to the advance payments. . . . Leaving aside the performance bond and the discounts, Noricum and VA can be said to have got off fairly lightly." Noricum and VOEST-Alpine had thus maneuvered themselves into an "almost hopeless situation."[171] Furthermore, just under 800 million shillings—commissions of more than 20 percent—had apparently gone abroad between 1985 and 1987, although the background of many payments remained "unaccounted for."[172] That commissions were paid was a fact, according to Unterweger, but the actual amount doing the rounds was wrong:

> It is known after all that we also paid commissions for the deal to lobbyists and to our representatives. Naturally, these were included in the selling price. The court later traced all of the channels via which commissions were paid. They came to 10 percent of six billion shillings. In various branches and trades (insurance companies, banks, etc.) 20 to 25 percent is paid for the conclusion or the brokering of deals. Therefore, the size of commissions in the case of the Noricum deals was relatively small and on the customary scale—when compared, for example, with what was paid for complete industrial plants in Asian or African countries. When a steel mill was to be built for 16 billion, then 10 percent was also paid. At any rate, no commissions were ever paid unless there was something to show for it.[173]

As mentioned earlier, Libya acted as the feigned addressee for the first six shipments of the arms order. In his position as state secretary in the Federal Ministry of Trade, Commerce and Industry, Erich Schmidt (SPÖ) traveled to Tripoli beforehand on December 1, 1984, supposedly to help finalize a contract for Noricum howitzers. The state prosecutor's office later determined that, "tellingly," Schmidt held no talks or negotiations with Libyan representatives and left Libya "with no results."[174] In fact it was another member of the delegation to Libya, namely Unterweger, who finalized the deal with Gaddhafi:[175]

> Schmidt asked me: "What am I actually doing here?" Yet "politically" it was suggested that someone of ministerial rank should fly with the qua-

si delegation to give the "baby" a name, and that person was Schmidt. We were separated at Tripoli airport, and I alone worked out the details with Gaddhafi. For this I was hauled all over the place blindfolded—the destination was a gigantic tent in the desert. I remember that the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci was leaving the tent when I arrived. She had just had a conversation with the revolutionary leader. I was there for about half an hour, drank tea, and received a handshake. And at the end I was handed a contract bound in green.[176]

The first reports that Noricum was supplying Iran instead of Libya were sent in July 1985 by the designated Austrian ambassador to Athens, Herbert Amry. In four telexes to government offices, he reported the complaints of an Iranian middleman who had been excluded from the artillery deal and summarized the results of his own investigation into the matter as follows: the weapons deal was said to be "one with Iran, it was negotiated with Iran and the deliveries went there. . . . Thus, it was Iran who paid VOEST, from which it became evident enough that Iran was also the contractual partner. Libya appeared neither to have paid for nor received the goods. Iran was the contractual partner and therefore the payer and receiver."[177] A short time later, during the night of July 11, 1985, Amry died of a heart attack following a reception at the embassy.[178] Because "no conclusive suspicion" resulted from Amry's information, according to the minutes of the questioning of Interior Minister Blecha conducted later, in 1989, "it was therefore decided to confront the managers with this suspicion, and to have those documents inspected by a shareholder representative, who would report whether the deal in question was one with Libya and whether the goods were actually delivered to Libya."[179]

On July 11, 1985, Noricum management presented the contract with Libya and additional documents to the federal minister responsible for the ÖIAG state industry, Ferdinand Lacina (SPÖ). The results of the inspection were noted in a memorandum: "The inspected papers indicate a deal exclusively with Libya. No evidence could be found that would appear to justify the doubts that have arisen. No indication emerged of incorrect behavior on the part of the Noricum management."[180] On July 12 the Foreign Ministry certified that the Libyan end-consumer certificate was to be "considered as sufficient," whereupon a short-term and voluntary suspension of delivery was lifted and shipments were resumed.[181]

A few weeks later, the arms deals became the focus of public controversy for the first time. On August 30, 1985, two journalists from the magazine *Basta*[182] gained access to a Noricum container awaiting shipment at the Yugoslavian

port of Kardeljevo—today Ploče—and supposedly destined for Libya. At the end of the gun barrels in the container hung instructions on how to properly unload them. The text was not in Arabic, but in Persian.[183] Later a "sham unloading" of the goods was organized on October 3, 1985, for the Austrian trade delegation in Tripoli, in order to prove that Libya was indeed the country of destination for these arms. (This container was later loaded back onto the ship, which then sailed off in the direction of Iran.)[184] Yet doubt still remained. In February 1986 Chancellor Fred Sinowatz was asked, in allusion to a quote from Bruno Kreisky: "Do you prefer a few dead Iraqis over a few hundred unemployed?" Sinowatz denied this emphatically: "All leads in this direction have been checked and proven inconclusive. I do not know of any arms shipments to Iran, Iraq, or other warring countries. You surely don't believe that we would not go directly to the federal prosecutor if we knew something."[185]

Actually, the *Basta* journalist Burkhard List took precisely this step. Following his report, the first investigation of Noricum managers was initiated by the state prosecutor's office in Linz, but it was discontinued on April 30, 1986. In the meantime, the export license for Libya had been revoked. According to Interior Minister Blecha, "the reason was the crisis in the Mediterranean region, particularly the actions taken by the US against Libya, which were triggered by the Vienna and Rome airport terrorist attacks on December 27, 1985."[186] But this did not stop a partial shipment arriving in Iran in June 1986. The rest of the order was fulfilled by shipments with falsified papers registering the countries of destination as Argentina, Thailand, Brazil, Bulgaria, Poland, and Egypt, for which approval notices were issued until Iran refused to accept the ninth partial shipment in late 1987 when it was denied a discount.[187]

One of the people playing an important role in concealing these deals was the Syrian arms dealer Monzer al-Kassar, who had already established a branch of his business in Austria in the early 1980s.[188] In 1983 the trading company Alkastronic was established at Zelinkagasse 2 in Vienna. According to the investigation by the Austrian national police, this company was "chiefly active in mediating arms deals."[189] The activities of al-Kassar, who was also thought to be heavily involved in drug dealing and international terrorism,[190] caused harsh international criticism of Austria.[191] At the end of December 1985, the authorities intervened. The premises were searched and Alkastronic was closed. The former Interior Minister Blecha later emphasized: "I never met al-Kassar personally, but I knew of him through all sorts of reports. We did everything we could to get rid of him, and eventually we succeeded. Al-Kassar was furious with us, as far as I know."[192] Even after Alkastronic was shut down, al-Kassar continued to be an important business partner for handling arms deals with

Iran. In early 1986 his firm Overseas Company, based in Poland, transacted an "Argentina deal" for 18,000 shells produced by Hirtenberger for a 5 percent commission. The actual buyer was Iran, while Hirtenberger acted as the subsupplier for Noricum.[193] In January 1985 and October 1986, Noricum managers met al-Kassar in Marbella, Spain, for the purpose of obtaining an Argentinian end-consumer certificate for a partial shipment of sixty GHN-45 howitzers.[194] Overseas Company is said to have received a commission of 41.7 million shillings for this.[195] As Unterweger confirmed in an interview, al-Kassar was a useful contact owing to his connections with decision-makers worldwide. "His contacts ranged from the Saudi royal family, where he also worked closely with Adnan Khashoggi,[196] to Libya and even to what was then still Communist Poland; ditto for his South American contacts, such as in Argentina or Paraguay, which were excellent. He had the status of a highly paid global lobbyist. I met him in person twice in Spain. No other form of communication except a face-to-face conversation was possible for him for security reasons."[197] In 1986/87 al-Kassar used the company Cenzin, which belonged to the Polish Foreign Trade Ministry, as the buyer for a "Poland deal" with Hirtenberger for 50,000 high explosive shells, propellant charges, and propellant cartridges.[198] Such modi operandi held no negative consequences for al-Kassar, as the task force on fighting terrorism reported in 1988: "Despite extensive information, the courts do not intend to take any steps against al-Kassar."[199]

On the basis of information supplied by Gernot Preschern, a manager indicted for very costly oil deals, a judicial investigation of al-Kassar was revived. An article that appeared in *Basta* on December 23, 1986, named Preschern as an informant of the previous reports on the VOEST-Alpine's deals with Iran. The investigation that had been formally closed was now continued informally, and preliminary investigations against VOEST and Noricum managers started.[200] In mid-June 1987 Preschern submitted an affidavit he had written in 1986 and had left in the possession of a notary.[201] On March 3, 1989, the state prosecutor's office pressed charges against eighteen defendants,[202] while in November of that same year a parliamentary committee of inquiry started its work—a committee that had been established with the votes of the ÖVP,[203] FPÖ, and the Grüne Alternative (Green Alternative) against SPÖ opposition. The committee's final report of April 3, 1990, concluded that political responsibility had been violated on five counts: "1. By the untruthful answering of parliamentary inquiries and incorrect statements to Parliament; 2. By tolerating the coordination difficulties between the ministries responsible for upholding the War Material Act on exports; 3. By failing to deal with seriously suspicious facts in the analysis of the state prosecutor's office; 4. By supporting

a questionable company policy of state industry in critical areas; 5. By failing to make the necessary changes to the regulation relating to the War Material Act."[204] The committee found that "the Austrian authorities had been supplied with an immense amount of information indicating a 'diversion' of weapons exports to the warring countries of Iran and Iraq."[205]

In addition to domestic and international press reports, many foreign states sent communications to Austrian diplomatic representations, and foreign diplomats visited the Interior Ministry and the Foreign Ministry in Vienna. For example, in 1986 the Austrian ambassador in Washington was presented with satellite photos proving the deployment of GHN-45 guns in Iran.[206] The following year the Austrian ambassador to Iraq, Georg Potyka, reported that the deployment of GHN-45s on both sides of the Iran-Iraq War made an ambivalent impression: "The Iraqi military appreciates their own artillery, but what the inhabitants of Basra understand as an 'Austrian' is a strike by a heavy Iranian shell."[207] In late September 1987 the ambassador in Riyadh reported on a conversation at the Foreign Ministry there:

> (1) The Saudis possess information indicating that the Austrian state-owned company VOEST-Alpine, by way of its subsidiary "Noricum," has delivered approximately 200 pieces of heavy artillery via Libya to Iran. . . . (2) We are "most concerned" about this and would see it—insofar as it is true—not only as an unfriendly act but even as a direct threat to the security of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. . . . (5) Everyone knows that Libya supplies Iran with weapons. Thus it is very surprising that Austria, despite its good relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, is allowing Austrian weapons to be sent to Iran via Libya. . . . (8) It certainly must be clear that it is precisely these Austrian cannons that have been deployed for months against Basra and are responsible for the killing of thousands of civilians and innocent people. (9) We cannot understand why peaceful Austria is not helping to end the war instead of prolonging it by supplying Iran with weapons.[208]

Such information corroborated original suspicions but, as the investigating committee stated, "apparently economic and labor considerations continued to take priority and the actual level of information was often covered up by referring to a misconceived necessity for secrecy."[209]

Following the inquiry into the scandal by parliament, fourteen managers were charged and convicted in 1991 for "Neutralitätsgefährdung" (endangering neutrality), specifically for having violated the War Material Act. Two years later, the Austrian Supreme Court granted their appeal, which led to re-

duced sentences and seven acquittals. The so-called Politicians Trial then took place in 1993. Former Chancellor Sinowatz, former Interior Minister Blecha, and former Foreign Minister Gratz were acquitted of the charge of abuse of office and of contributing to the endangerment of Austria's neutrality, while Blecha alone was convicted of falsifying evidence and concealing documents, for which he received a suspended sentence.[210] In 2008 Blecha maintained that the federal government had followed "the strict Austrian regulations for arms transport" not to deliver to warring countries. "The fact that the delivery never went to Libya but landed in Iran is something I could not have known. Chancellor Sinowatz did not know this, nor did Foreign Minister Gratz. This is what I tried to make clear to the public. Through a variety of channels, many products of neutral countries ultimately ended up where they were needed, that is, where there was war. But Austria did not sell its Noricum artillery to warring parties."[211]

Conclusion

In the wake of the Noricum scandal, the importance of arms production in Austria waned rapidly. In 1989 SIPRI ranked the country at fourteenth place among the leading arms exporters of industrial nations with $151 million total revenue between 1984 and 1988. (In comparison, the United States exported arms in that same period worth $26,819 million, followed in second place by the Soviet Union with $17,923 million.)[212] In 1994 the revenue of the Austrian arms industry only amounted to 1.4 billion shillings, as compared with 7 billion in the early 1980s.[213] In 1989 Noricum Maschinenbau und Handel GmbH was renamed Maschinenfabrik Liezen GesmbH. Arms production was discontinued due to steadily decreasing demand, and Hirtenberger was sold to a private businessman, who dramatically reduced production. Steyr-Daimler-Puch began being carved up into several independent companies in 1987. Other businesses like Assmann went bankrupt, and Dynamit Nobel switched to the production of non-military goods. By the early 2000s this left only a few hundred people employed in the Austrian weapons industry, and the annual exports that had once been worth up to €500 million shrank to a tenth of this amount.[214]

According to a SIPRI report, Austria ranked in twenty-seventh place for worldwide arms production (0.14 percent) in 2009. The five largest weapons exporters were the United States (30.01 percent), Russia (19.74 percent), Germany (10.92 percent), France (8.18 percent), and Britain (4.52 percent).[215] In 2014, Steyr-Panzerwerk SSF in the Vienna district of Simmering—the last

component of classic Austrian arms production—stopped manufacturing tanks.[216] For the daily newspaper *Die Presse*, the fact that neutral Austria was still considered a "home for large weapons" despite the downward spiral of development represented one "of the many Austrian paradoxes": "it is in this small country, of all places, with its 'perpetual neutrality' and one of the strictest weapons laws, that two of the most successful weapons manufacturers in the world are based: Glock in Lower Austria, whose pistols are used worldwide by police units; and Steyr Mannlicher, on whose Armee Universalgewehr (AUG, army universal gun)[217] militaries and special units depend in 30 countries across the globe, while hunters in even more countries depend on its well-made hunting rifles."[218]

Domestically, the Noricum case was a symptom of what would become a decade of political and economic crises after 1980 and contributed to Austria's acquisition of the dubious epithet "republic of scandals." Other scandals during this period involved the construction of the Allgemeine Wiener Krankenhaus (1980), the international isolation of Austria due to the candidacy of Kurt Waldheim for president (1986), the "wine scandal" (1985), the housing scandals (1982, 1989), and the "Lucona scandal."[219] Together they shook the public's trust in the established political parties and helped steer support in the direction of right-wing populism.[220] The loss of the party's absolute majority in 1983 meant the end of the Social Democratic hegemony that had begun with the election victory of 1970. In 1986 the party landscape would anyway change fundamentally with the entry for the first time of the Grüne Alternative party and the rise of the FPÖ under the leadership of Jörg Haider.[221] In addition to the many corruption scandals, this shift was also considerably accelerated by the continued decline of the ÖIAG. In 1985 the financial participation of the VOEST-Alpine AG in the planned Bayou steel mill (US) incurred a loss of 5 billion shillings, while the oil speculation losses of the Intertrading subsidiary amounted to 4.3 billion shillings. The annual loss amounted to 12 billion shillings, whereby the Austrian taxpayer, through state guarantees, had to shoulder the debt burden of 71 billion shillings (excluding interest).[222]

For this reason, in 1986 Chancellor Sinowatz began a far-reaching reform of the ÖIAG, which overhauled the company structure and pushed out political influence.[223] In the longer term, Austro-Keynesianism and its nationally oriented focus on increased spending and job security were replaced by neoliberal concepts, namely privatization, deregulation, and the reduction of the public sector, as a consequence of advancing globalization and European integration.[224] Thus the ÖIAG was subjected to an "overhaul" or restructuring between 1986 and 1992. This was a preliminary step toward the first wave of

privatization between 1991 and 1995, a process that was de facto completed in 2005.[225] At the beginning of 2015 the Austrian state holding company still owned 52.85 percent of Post AG, 31.5 percent of OMV (formerly: Österreichische Mineralölverwaltung), and 28.42 percent of Telekom Austria, among other companies.[226] In 1980 a total of 630,000 people were employed in the 6,846 industrial companies of the ÖIAG—a number that represented 22 percent of total employment in Austria—and they produced 30 percent of the gross domestic product.[227] In comparison, only 50,000 people were still employed within the ÖIAG framework by 1998. In the case of VOEST-Alpine, the ÖIAG ownership share had shrunk to 2.25 percent by 2004. In late August 2005 all remaining shares were sold; the current voestalpine has been in private ownership ever since.[228]

In conclusion, let us return to the expansion of Austrian arms production at the end of the 1970s. This expansion clearly failed to achieve its main goal, namely to help stabilize the ÖIAG financially. Since arms production was geared to the export market from the start, conflict often ensued between ethical concerns and economic considerations as a result of existing Austrian law and the country's neutral status.[229] There can be no doubt that a series of controversial exports, especially to Latin American military dictatorships and autocracies in the Middle East, damaged Austria's credibility as a neutral and peaceful force in international affairs.[230] On the one hand, the repercussions of the Noricum scandal, as a result of the unlawful supply of weapons to warring nations, eventually helped enhance the options for the structural reform of the ÖIAG. On the other, however, these events must be seen in the context of the gradual decline of nationally focused Austro-Keynesianism and they shed light on the political and economic changes of the 1980s.

Notes

Translation by Dona Geyer

1. Michael Gehler and Hubert Sickinger, eds., *Politische Affären und Skandale in Österreich: Von Mayerling bis Waldheim* (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2007); Kurt Tozzer and Günther Kallinger, *Todesfalle Politik: Vom OPEC-Überfall bis zum Sekyra-Selbstmord* (St. Pölten: NP Buchverlag, 1999); Christian Dickinger, *Die Skandale der Republik: Haider, Proksch & Co* (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 2001).

2. In 2021, the former sales manager for Noricum, Gaan Eisenburger, published a memoir. It is the only personal account by an insider so far. Gaan Eisenburger, *Waffen für Teheran: Die Geschichte des Noricum-Skandals* (Vienna: edition a, 2021).

3. The nationalization of Austrian industry dates back to two laws passed in 1946/47. The economic sectors particularly affected were banking, iron and steel, oil and chemi-

cals, and electrical engineering. In 1967 what had been known as Verstaatlichte Industrie was reorganized into Österreichische Industrieverwaltungs-GmbH (ÖIG), to be followed three years later by another restructuring leading to the founding of Österreichische Industrieverwaltungs-Aktiengesellschaft (ÖIAG). In the 1970s, ÖIAG firms employed about 125,000 people, roughly 20 percent of the Austrian industrial labor force. In 2015 ÖIAG was converted into Österreichische Bundes- und Industriebeteiligungen GmbH (ÖBIB).

4. According to the parliamentary committee investigating the Noricum scandal, 213 Gun Howitzer Noricum, or GHN-45s, were shipped via Jordan to Iraq, and 140 GHN-45s to Iran. Bericht des parlamentarischen NORICUM-Untersuchungsausschusses [hereafter Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses (Noricum)], 1235 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XVII. GP, http://www.ejournal.at/Info/0010014/noricum.pdf, 42–44 (accessed November 25, 2015, site discontinued).

5. Dr. Bruno Kreisky (1911–1990) was chancellor of the Republic of Austria between 1970 and 1983. In 1971, 1975, and 1979 he and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) won absolute majorities in national elections. In the early 1970s Kreisky pushed through far-reaching domestic reforms, established a welfare state, and enhanced Austria's profile in foreign affairs.

6. In 1986 Dr. Peter Pilz won a seat for Grüne Alternative (Green Alternative) in the parliamentary elections. Two years later he became a member of the parliamentary committee investigating the Noricum case. He was a member of parliament from 1986 to 1991 and from 1999 to November 2017.

7. Peter Pilz, *Die Panzermacher: Die österreichische Rüstungsindustrie und ihre Exporte* (Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1982), 5–12, here 5.

8. Pilz, 13.

9. Hubertus Czernin and Otmar Lahodynsky, "Geschäfte mit Krisen," *profil*, February 24, 1986, 12–16, here 14.

10. Lucian O. Meysels and Hubertus Czernin, "Feuer frei!," *Wochenpresse*, July 6, 1982, 14–17, here 16–17.

11. Czernin and Lahodynsky, "Geschäfte mit Krisen," 14.

12. Initially, Glock made military field knives for the army. Then, in 1983, the Defense Ministry ordered 20,000 of the newly developed Glock 17 pistols, which started the rise of the company; see Paul M. Barrett, *Glock: The Rise of America's Gun* (New York: Broadway Paperbacks, 2013), 6–17. Currently, Glock grosses over 100 million euros annually, "according even to conservative estimates." The company's founder, Gaston Glock, is one of the richest people in Austria, possessing wealth estimated at nearly a billion euros; see Steffen Fründt, "Die geheimnisvolle Glock-Fabrik in Deutsch Wagram," *Die Welt*, March 12, 2012.

13. "Fast Hochverrat," *Der Spiegel*, September 21, 1987, 149–50.

14. Otmar Lahodynsky, "Flucht ins Ausland," *profil*, August 11, 1980, 39–41, here 40.

15. Pilz, *Panzermacher*, 17.

16. Czernin and Lahodynsky, "Geschäfte mit Krisen," 16.

17. Oliver Rathkolb, *Die paradoxe Republik*, new ed. (Vienna: Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 2015), 136.

18. Stiftung Bruno Kreisky Archiv (hereafter StBKA), VI.I Wirtschafts-, Energie- und Verkehrspolitik, box 170, "Dringliche Anfrage im Bundesrat, 22.10.1981."

19. Georg Turnheim, "Die Reorganisation und Sanierung der verstaatlichten Industrie als Voraussetzung für deren Privatisierung (Periode 1986 bis 1990)," in *Österreichs Verstaatlichte: Die Rolle des Staates bei der Entwicklung der österreichischen Industrie von 1918 bis 2008*, ed. Georg Turnheim (Vienna: Manz, 2009), 85–101, here 87.

20. Liselotte Douschan, *Anton Benya: Österreichischer Gewerkschafts- und Nationalratspräsident* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2011), 197–200.

21. Wolfgang Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky: Die Biografie* (St. Pölten: Residenz Verlag, 2010), 136–37.

22. Douschan, *Anton Benya*, 202.

23. Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 269.

24. Landesgericht Wien (hereafter LG Wien), 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 196, 6469–6470, "Protokoll der Hauptverhandlung, 3.10.1990."

25. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 192, 460–61, "Protokoll der Hauptverhandlung, 3.9.1990."

26. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 143, 619–41, "Aktivitäten der VOEST-Alpine auf dem Gebiet der Wehrtechnik, 19.10.1979."

27. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 143, 691, "Bericht für Herrn Generaldirektor Dkfm. APFALTER, 14.5.1979."

28. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 143, 619–41, "Aktivitäten der VOEST-Alpine auf dem Gebiet der Wehrtechnik, 19.10.1979."

29. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 143, 565, "Aktenvermerk, 28.8.1981."

30. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 143, 555, "Argumentation Wehrtechnik, 4.5.1982."

31. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 143, "Protokoll für die 2. Sitzung des Aufsichtsrates der VOEST-ALPINE AG im Geschäftsjahr 1981, 7.7.1981."

32. Otmar Lahodynsky, "Weine nicht, Argentinien," *profil*, June 29, 1981, 12–14.

33. StBKA, Tagebuch Josef Staribacher, "Eintrag vom 19.1.1977" (spelling and punctuation mistakes in the original have been corrected).

34. Fritz Edlinger was education secretary of Sozialistische Jugend Österreich (Socialist Youth Austria) between 1971 and 1973, after which he worked as a researcher at the Wiener Institut für Entwicklungsfragen until 1976. From 1996 he served as secretary general for the Gesellschaft für Österreichisch-Arabische Beziehungen (society for Austrian-Arab relations).

35. Interview with Fritz Edlinger, September 19, 2012.

36. Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses (Noricum), 6.

37. Dr. Gerald Bull (1928–1990) was a Canadian engineer who was murdered in Brussels on March 22, 1990, allegedly because he had been working on a "supergun" for Iraq to the point where it was ready for deployment (Project Babylon). See William Lowther, *Arms and the Man: Dr. Gerald Bull, Iraq, and the Supergun* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1991); Dale Grant, *Wilderness of Mirrors: The Life of Gerald Bull* (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1991); James Adams, *Bull's Eye: The Assassination and Life of Supergun Inventor Gerald Bull* (New York: Times Books, 1992).

38. Lowther, *Arms and the Man*, 170; Grant, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, 150.

39. Rudolf Stoiber, "Die Kanone, von der man spricht," *profil*, January 21, 1985, 38–40, here 38.

40. Interview with Peter Unterweger, February 9, 2011.

41. Peter Pilz, *Eskorte nach Teheran: Der österreichische Rechtsstaat und die Kurdenmorde* (Vienna: Ibera & Molden, 1997), 37.

42. StBKA, VI.4 Landesverteidigung, Waffenproduktion, Exporte, box 19, "Kreisky an den Vorstand der Österreichischen Industrieverwaltungs-Aktiengesellschaft, 8.10.1979."

43. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 143, 717, "Protokoll Vorstandssitzung der VOEST-Alpine, 21.8.1978."

44. StBKA, VI.4 Landesverteidigung, Waffenproduktion, Exporte, box 19, "Nowotny an Kreisky, 18.9.1979."

45. StBKA, VI.4 Landesverteidigung, Waffenproduktion, Exporte, box 19, undated letter.

46. Rudolf Stoiber, "Die Männer im Hintergrund," *profil*, February 4, 1985, 42–45, here 43.

47. Karl Blecha served as SPÖ general secretary between 1976 and 1981 and as federal minister for the interior between 1983 and 1989.

48. Interview with Karl Blecha, March 21, 2011.

49. "Kanonen-Roundtable: Die Politiker haben alles eingefädelt . . . ," *Basta*, no. 7–8 (1990), 40–42.

50. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 189, 134-35, "Protokoll der Hauptverhandlung, 18.4.1990."

51. StBKA, VI.4 Landesverteidigung, Waffenproduktion, Exporte, box 19, undated letter.

52. Herbert Langsner, "Widersprüchliches Bild bleibt bestehen," *profil*, January 2, 1990, 13-14, here 13.

53. Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses (Noricum), 7.

54. The Österreichische Kontrollbank Aktiengesellschaft is a key financial and information service provider for the export sector and capital market.

55. Otmar Lahodynsky and Christian S. Ortner, "Rüsten oder rosten," *profil*, July 6, 1981, 31–34, here 33.

56. With the withdrawal of all Allied occupying troops in 1955, Austria declared its "perpetual neutrality." This committed the country to nonalignment and prohibited the stationing of foreign troops and the possession of atomic and other offensive weapons.

57. Wolfgang Brandstetter and Gerhard Loibl, *Neutralität und Waffenexporte: Völkerrechtliche Überlegungen zum Tatbestand der "Neutralitätsgefährdung"* (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1990), 11–12.

58. Brandstetter and Loibl, 9–10.

59. Brandstetter and Loibl, 98.

60. Brandstetter and Loibl, 82–92, here 82 and 89.

61. Brandstetter and Loibl, 105–6.

62. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 170, 63, "Vergleich des Kriegsmaterial-Exportgesetzes in Österreich, der Schweiz und in Schweden."

63. Mag. Leopold Gratz (1929–2006) was mayor of Vienna from 1973 to 1984, then president of the National Council, Austria's lower house of parliament, and minister of foreign affairs from 1986 to 1988.

64. "Fast Hochverrat," *Der Spiegel*, September 21, 1987, 149.

65. Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses (Noricum), 6.

66. Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses (Noricum), 5.

67. Erwin Lanc (b. 1930) was minister of transport from 1973 to 1977, minister of the interior from 1977 to 1983, and then minister of foreign affairs until 1984.

68. Dr. Felix Ermacora was a member of the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) who held a seat in the National Council from 1971 to 1990.

69. Interview with Erwin Lanc, June 3, 2011.

70. Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (hereafter BStU), MfS 415/84, fol. 179, "Information der Sicherheitsorgane der VRB über den Verkauf von österreichischen Waffen, 1982."

71. Alfred Worm, "Nutzt's nix, schadt's nix!," *profil*, August 16, 1982, 14–15, here 14.

72. Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses (Noricum), 9.

73. "Made in A," *Wochenpresse*, no. 18 (1988), 18–19, here 19.

74. "Steigende Waffenexporte in die Dritte Welt," *Austria Presse Agentur*, August 15, 1989.

75. Otmar Lahodynsky, "Panzer als Entwicklungshilfe," *profil*, August 4, 1980, 31–37, here 34.

76. Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses zur Untersuchung österreichischer Waffenexporte ins Ausland und insbesondere aller Umstände des Exportes von 600 Gewehren der Firma Steyr-Daimler-Puch sowie von 399 600 Stück Munition, 538 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XIV. GP, 32–37.

77. Karl Lütgendorf (1914–1981) was assigned toward the end of World War II, specifically from February 1 to 20, 1945, to serve as a major on the general staff of the "Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East) intelligence department, headed by Major General Reinhard Gehlen, who would later become the chief of West Germany's federal intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst. See Walter Blasi, "Die Anfänge des militärischen Nachrichtendienstes in Österreich," in *B-Gendarmerie, Waffenlager und Geheimdienste: Der militärische Weg zum Staatsvertrag*, ed. Walter Blasi, Erwin A. Schmidl, and Felix Schneider (Vienna: Böhlau, 2005), 123–38, here 132. Between 1971 and 1977 Lütgendorf was minister of defense. He took his own life on October 9, 1981. The report of the Security Directorate of Lower Austria noted that, in view of the financial situation "and also regarding a motive for the suicide," no investigative inquiries were made, "since this was without doubt a case of suicide." StBKA, VI.4 Landesverteidigung, Waffenproduktion, Exporte, box 13, "Selbstmord des Karl Lütgendorf, GZ P 4200/81-SK/II-1."

78. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Archiv der Republik (hereafter ÖStA/AdR), Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Verkäufe österreichischer Waffen nach Syrien, Geschäftszahl 194. 05. 80/8-II.1/76, "Mitwirkung des BMfLV, 15.12.1976."

79. StBKA, Tagebuch Josef Staribacher, "Eintrag vom 31.5.1977."

80. Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses zur Untersuchung österreichischer Waffenexporte ins Ausland, 42.

81. ÖStA/AdR, Pol. Syrien, Zl. 7—Res/76, "Österreichische Botschaft Damaskus an Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, 3.5.1976."

82. The conservative ÖVP was in opposition between 1970 and 1987.

83. StBKA, Tagebuch Josef Staribacher, "Eintrag vom 26.1.1977."

84. StBKA, VI.4 Landesverteidigung, Waffenproduktion, Exporte, box 8, "Aktenvermerk, 1.2.1977."

85. StBKA, Tagebuch Josef Staribacher, "Eintrag vom 26.1.1977."

86. "Sturfighter Lü," *Der Spiegel*, February 14, 1977, 115–16, here 116.

87. Pilz, *Panzermacher*, 142.

88. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *Waffenexporte und Krieg: Rüstungsjahrbuch 4* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1984), 222.

89. Otto Rösch (1917–1995) was minister of the interior from 1970 to 1977 and minister of defense from 1977 to 1983.

90. Dr. Willibald Pahr served as minister of foreign affairs from 1976 to 1983. He had no party affiliation.

91. StBKA, Tagebuch Josef Staribacher, "Eintrag vom 18.6.1977."

92. Lahodynsky, "Panzer als Entwicklungshilfe," 37.

93. Otmar Lahodynsky, "Die Panzerfalle," *profil*, May 19, 1980, 48–49.

94. Otmar Lahodynsky, "Kriegerische Entwicklungshilfe," *profil*, May 19, 1980, 37–38.

95. Lahodynsky, "Panzer als Entwicklungshilfe," 37.

96. Alfred Worm, "Heikle Waffengeschäfte," *profil*, December 3, 1979, 63–64.

97. Interview with Lanc, February 11, 2011.

98. Otmar Lahodynsky, "Die Andenfestung," *profil*, June 3, 1986, 44–48, here 44–45.

99. Peter Hammerschmidt, *Deckname Adler: Klaus Barbie und die westlichen Geheimdienste* (Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fischer Verlag, 2014), 336.

100. Lahodynsky and Ortner, "Rüsten oder rosten," 34.

101. Pilz, *Panzermacher*, 123–24.

102. "Made in A," *Wochenpresse*, no. 18 (1988), 18–19, here 18.

103. StBKA, Tagebuch Josef Staribacher, "Eintrag vom 26.9.1978."

104. Otmar Lahodynsky, "Panzer auf Kredit," *profil*, August 18, 1980, 20–22, here 22.

105. "Kreiskys Chile-Sprüche," *profil*, August 4, 1980, 37.

106. Lahodynsky, "Flucht ins Ausland," here 39–40.

107. Lahodynsky, "Panzer auf Kredit," 20–22.

108. "Auszug aus dem Protokoll des Nationalrats XV. GP—123. Sitzung—1. Juli 1982," in Brandstetter and Loibl, *Neutralität und Waffenexporte*, 110–31, here 121.

109. StBKA, VII.1 Länderboxen, Chile box 2, "Schreiben Vorstand Steyr-Daimler-Puch an BK Kreisky, 19.8.1980."

110. StBKA, VII.1 Länderboxen, Chile box 2, "Vorsprache des chilenischen Botschafters beim Herrn Generalsekretär (Überreichung einer Endverbraucherbescheinigung der chilenischen Regierung), 11.8.1980."

111. StBKA, VII.1 Länderboxen, Chile box 2, "Anton Benya an BK Kreisky, 18.8.1980."

112. It is the responsibility of the Verfassungsdienst, an office of the Federal Chancellery, to prepare legislation in areas dealing with federal constitutional law and administrative procedural law.

113. StBKA, Tagebuch Josef Staribacher, "Eintrag vom 20.8.1980."

114. StBKA, Tagebuch Josef Staribacher, "Eintrag vom 21.8.1980."

115. Interview with Lanc, June 3, 2011.

116. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 143, 583–84, "Aktenvermerk, 25.8.1980."

117. On June 24, 1981, the German ambassador in Vienna reported that "Chancellor Kreisky had been emphatic in his support of the export of tanks and thereby nipped all resistance in the bud." *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1981*, vol. 2: *1. Mai bis 30. September 1981*, ed. Daniela Taschler, Matthias Peter, and Judith Michel (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 1448n34.

118. Joachim Riedl and Josef Votzi, "Panzer für Antisemiten?," *profil*, June 22, 1981, 20–21.

119. "Waffenexport-Diskussion geht weiter," *Austria Presse Agentur*, June 23, 1981.

120. "Prechtl zu Panzerexporten: 'Tiefgreifend moralische Sache,'" *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, June 23, 1981.

121. "Das ist keine Bewegung der Jusos," *profil*, June 29, 1981, 14–15, here 15.

122. StBKA, Tagebuch Josef Staribacher, "Eintrag vom 23.6.1981."

123. Christian S. Ortner, "Mir bringen euch um," *profil*, June 29, 1981, 12–13, here 13.

124. "Prechtl zu Panzerexporten: 'Tiefgreifend moralische Sache,'" *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, June 23, 1981.

125. Erhard Stackl, "Panzer auf Bestellung," *profil*, August 30, 1982, 12–13, here 12.

126. Otmar Lahodynsky and Hubertus Czernin, "Rosten statt Rüsten," *profil*, June 17, 1985, 26.

127. StBKA, Tagebuch Josef Staribacher, "Eintrag vom 30.4.1981."

128. StBKA, Tagebuch Josef Staribacher, "Eintrag vom 4.5.1982."

129. Austria acted as a transit country for Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe to Israel, which involved significant risk, as the 1973 hostage-taking incident in Marchegg showed; on this, see Thomas Riegler, "Das 'Spinnennetz' des internationalen Terrorismus: Der 'Schwarze September' und die gescheiterte Geiselnahme von Schönau 1973," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 60, no. 4 (October 2012): 579–601, here 600. In 1986, Kreisky emphasized that hundreds of thousands of Jews had immigrated to Israel thanks to his Middle East policies, "without having a bomb explode every month at Schwechat [Vienna airport]." Hans Rauscher, "Bruno Kreisky, 75, verteidigt sein problematisches Erbe," *Kurier*, January 22, 1986.

130. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 182, 853–54, "Protokoll der Hauptverhandlung, 3.5.1990."

131. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 200, 7108–9, "Protokoll der Hauptverhandlung, 12.10.1990."

132. "Libysche Stahlwerksaufträge für VOEST und deutsche Anlagenbauer?," *Austria Presse Agentur*, February 6, 1981.

133. At the end of January 1982, Kreisky wrote a letter to Gaddhafi: "Director General Apfalter gave me an extensive briefing on his interesting conversation with you. I, too, am

convinced that direct contact between us would offer the best chance to extensively explore all aspects of Libya's intensified economic and political cooperation with Austria, as well as the situation in the Middle East as a whole. To that effect, I would thus like to ask if you would be so kind as to accept an invitation to visit Austria." StBKA, VII.1 Länderboxen, Libyen, box 2.

134. "Gespräche auch über Steyr-Panzer? Unsere Wirtschaft erhofft sich Milliardenaufträge von Gaddafi," *Kurier*, March 10, 1982.

135. BStU, MfS 415/84, "Information der Sicherheitsorgane der VRB über den Verkauf von österreichischen Waffen, 1982."

136. Josef Votzi, "Panzer für Gaddafi," *profil*, January 2, 1984, 10–11.

137. Hubertus Czernin, "Was Österreich an Gaddafi liefert," *profil*, February 3, 1986, 20–23, here 21.

138. Czernin and Lahodynsky, "Geschäfte mit Krisen," 12.

139. "Kreisky sieht Möglichkeiten für Entkrampfung im Mittelmeer," *Austria Presse Agentur*, February 11, 1986.

140. Franz Summer, *Das VOEST-Debakel* (Vienna: Orac, 1987), 283.

141. StBKA, VI.4 Landesverteidigung, Waffenproduktion, Exporte, box 19, "Brief VOEST Alpine-Vorstand an BK Kreisky, 11.4.1981."

142. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 179, 183, "BK Kreisky an PM Indira Gandhi, 18.12.1981."

143. StBKA, VI.4 Landesverteidigung, Waffenproduktion, Exporte, box 19, undated letter.

144. Dr. Fred Sinowatz (1929–2008) was minister of education and art from 1971 to 1983. After Kreisky resigned, Sinowatz became chancellor of a coalition government of the SPÖ and FPÖ. He served in this capacity between 1983 and 1986.

145. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 182, 716, "Protokoll der Hauptverhandlung, 2.5.1990."

146. Interview with Unterweger, February 9, 2011.

147. Erich Wiedemann, "Lieber Gott, mach, dass es ein Verrückter war," *Der Spiegel*, December 7, 1987, 168–84.

148. Andreas Förster, "Gefährliche Geschäfte," *Berliner Zeitung*, January 22, 2011.

149. Summer, *Das VOEST-Debakel*, 283.

150. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, "Anklageschrift, Staatsanwaltschaft Linz 2 St 1305/89," 73.

151. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, 75.

152. "Kreisky: 'Tanks spielen nur untergeordnete Rolle,'" *Die Presse*, October 4, 1980.

153. Between 1981 and 1985 a total of 213 GHN-45s, 5 gun carriages, and 151 cannon barrels were exported to Jordan. Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses (Noricum), 44.

154. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, "Anklageschrift, Staatsanwaltschaft Linz 2 St 1305/89," 77.

155. StBKA, VII.1 Länderboxen, Jordanien, box 2, "Information für den Herrn Bundeskanzler, Waffenexport Jordanien, 16.2.1981."

156. After the Iran-Iraq War began in September 1980, both countries received shipments of arms; between 1984 and 1988, 30 percent of all arms sold to the Middle East went to the warring parties. While Iraq was supplied primarily by France (28 percent) and the Soviet Union (47 percent), China was the main supplier for Iran (more than 50 percent). In addition, Brazil, North Korea, and Egypt appeared on the scene as new weapons exporters.

See *SIPRI Yearbook, 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 196-97. Between 1984 and 1988, Iraq was the leading arms importer worldwide, while Iran ranked fifteenth; see ibid., 211. As the journalist Kenneth Timmerman noted pointedly in 1988, "an entire throng of smaller weapons-producing countries" were "quite happy" to sell to the warring parties "whatever type of weapon they wanted to have, while at the same time promoting their national interests in the region." Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Öl ins Feuer: Internationale Waffengeschäfte im Golfkrieg* (Zurich: Orell Füssli Verlag, 1988), 330. Even the United States violated an embargo imposed in 1983 and secretly supplied Iran between 1985 and 1986 with anti-tank weapons and ground-to-air missiles. The profits from these arms deals flowed to the "Contras" in support of their fight against the leftist government of Nicaragua (Iran-Contra Affair).

157. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, "Anklageschrift, Staatsanwaltschaft Linz 2 St 1305/89," 80.

158. StBKA, VII.4 Nahost, box 2, "Notiz, 6.4.1981."

159. Interview with Lanc, February 11, 2011.

160. StBKA, VII. 1 Länderboxen, Iran, box 1, "austroamb teheran an aussenamt wien, 1.4.1981."

161. StBKA, VII. 1 Länderboxen, Iran, box 1, "Vorsprache des iranischen Geschäftsträgers am 20.1.1983."

162. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, "Anklageschrift, Staatsanwaltschaft Linz 2 St 1305/89," 101.

163. Interview with Unterweger, February 9, 2011.

164. Eisenburger, *Waffen für Teheran*, 55.

165. Eisenburger, 71.

166. Eisenburger, 54.

167. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, "Anklageschrift, Staatsanwaltschaft Linz 2 St 1305/89," 111.

168. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, 131–32.

169. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, 141.

170. Herbert Langsner and Christian S. Ortner, "Feuer frei," *profil*, March 14, 1989, 37–44, here 42.

171. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 155, "Zwischenbericht '14.12.1987'," 929–30.

172. Herbert Langsner, "Endverbleib der Summe nicht belegt," *profil*, February 13, 1989, 32–35, here 33.

173. Interview with Unterweger, February 9, 2011.

174. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, "Anklageschrift, Staatsanwaltschaft Linz 2 St 1305/89," 125–26.

175. Noricum sales manager Gaan Eisenburger claims in his memoirs that he did discuss the framework of the deal with a Gaddhafi aide in December 1984. Eisenburger also states that he persuaded the Iranians to buy 200 instead of 400 Noricum howitzers. Eisenburger, *Waffen für Teheran*, 63, 69.

176. Interview with Unterweger, February 9, 2011.

177. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, "Anklageschrift, Staatsanwaltschaft Linz 2 St 1305/89," 233.

178. Even today, rumors still persist that Herbert Amry may have been murdered. In 1985 the Austrian national police carried out an investigation and reported: "with regard to the cause of death, the doctor determined unequivocally that death was due to heart failure following a heart attack. No evidence could be found of any symptoms of poisoning or any

other kind of influence that would indicate a violent death." LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 143, "Bericht, 9.8.1985," 247–51. For Blecha there was also no reason to doubt that Amry suffered a natural death: "Investigations were ordered by the Foreign Ministry. For us a heart attack was a plausible explanation because Herbert had health problems." Interview with Blecha, March 21, 2011. However, the former Middle East correspondent James Dorsey confirmed that Amry had received threats: "Herbert was a friend, and I saw him on the evening of his death. I was one of the last people to leave the reception in Athens late that evening. . . . Shortly before his death, Herbert had told me that he had received threats from an Iranian arms dealer. . . . Because there was no autopsy, many observers drew hasty conclusions. Whether it was a natural death or murder, there is no evidence—neither for one nor the other." Interview with James Dorsey, July 1, 2015.

179. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, vol. 160, "Vernehmung des Beschuldigten, 10.8.1989."

180. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 143, "Aktenvermerk, 22.8.1985," 262.

181. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 143, "Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten an das Bundesministerium für Inneres, 12.7.1985," 233.

182. Investigative journalism played a key role in publicizing the Noricum scandal. The monthly magazine *Basta*, founded in 1983 and discontinued in 1994, landed the greatest scoop. It was difficult for the public to follow the course of events over such a long period of time owing to the increasing complexity of the subject matter. Not without reason, the magazine *Spiegel* came to the conclusion in 1990 that "the interest of the Austrian people, long plagued ad nauseam with scandal," was "rather complacent" when it came to the Noricum trial. "Tot, blind und deppert," *Der Spiegel*, April 9, 1990, 160–61, here 161. By this point, the offense of illegal arms transport had long lost its priority, overridden instead by "the personal fate of the politicians involved, their difficult and complicated situation, a hard-to-administer law, all sorts of procedural questions, and a large measure of solidarity." Doris Schmidbauer, "'Nix seh'n, nix red'n, so lebst am besten': Der Noricum-Skandal," in Gehler and Sickinger, *Politische Affären*, 568–91, here 588–89.

183. Burkhart List and Otto Grüner, "Heavy Metal: Die geheimen Geschäfte der VÖST," *Basta*, no. 10 (1985), 12–15.

184. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, "Anklageschrift, Staatsanwaltschaft Linz 2 St 1305/89," 146–47.

185. Christian S. Ortner and Josef Votzi, "Bin ein erfolgreicher Krisenkanzler," *profil*, February 24, 1986, 18–20, here 20.

186. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 160, "Vernehmung des Beschuldigten, 10.8.1989."

187. Peter Pelinka, "Syndikat der Ehrenmänner," *Die Zeit*, September 22, 1989.

188. In 2008 a US federal court convicted Monzer al-Kassar of illegal arms dealing, money laundering, and supporting terrorism. He received a thirty-year prison sentence.

189. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 153, "Bericht, 19.12.1985," 137.

190. Manfred Morstein, *Der Pate des Terrors: Die mörderische Verbindung von Terrorismus, Rauschgift und Waffenhandel* (Munich: Piper, 1989); Andrew Feinstein, *The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).

191. Austria was sharply criticized in *Reader's Digest*: "Monzer Al Kassar is but one of 200 arms dealers who supply outlaw nations in the Middle East from or through Austria. He is also an example how official corruption and voter indifference have transformed Austria

into a major avenue for terrorist operations throughout Europe." This article mentioned Austria exporting the howitzer to Iran. Nathan M. Adams, "Profiteers of Terror: The European Connection," *Reader's Digest*, August 1986, 49–55.

192. Interview with Blecha, March 21, 2011.

193. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, "Staatsanwaltschaft Linz 2 St 1305/89," 160.

194. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 154, "Strafsachen 24 Vr 305/87 u. 24 Ur43/87 Zwischenbericht '14.12.1987', Teil 1," 11.

195. Herbert Langsner, "Der 'Prinz von Marbella'," *profil*, March 21, 1988, 20–21, here 20.

196. The Saudi businessman Adnan Khashoggi was already known as an arms dealer in the 1970s and was allegedly involved in the Iran-Contra Affair.

197. Interview with Unterweger, February 9, 2011.

198. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, "Anklageschrift, Staatsanwaltschaft Linz 2 St 1305/89," 166.

199. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 175, "Bericht Internationaler Waffenhandel, 26.1.1988."

200. LG Wien, 21 Vr 1193/89, "Anklageschrift, Staatsanwaltschaft Linz 2 St 1305/89," 336–37.

201. Summer, *Das VOEST-Debakel*, 12.

202. Heribert Apfalter, the VOEST general director who was fired in 1985, could not be questioned. He died on August 26, 1987. His death also prompted numerous rumors. The report issued by the Security Direction of Lower Austria stated: "The cause of death was . . . determined clearly to be a heart attack." Indications of third-party involvement were ascertained neither by the medical examiner's autopsy nor in the course of the inquiries." LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 178, "Bericht an die Staatsanwaltschaft St. Pölten, 9.9.1987."

203. Since 1987 the ÖVP had been ruling in a grand coalition with the SPÖ. By supporting the formation of a parliamentary inquiry, it had, for all practical purposes, broken the coalition pact. In 1985 the ÖVP National Council member Andreas Khol had been assigned by his party to be a "special representative" for the Noricum matter. However, Foreign Minister Alois Mock, also ÖVP, did not directly involve the Landesgericht (regional court) Linz until January 1988, after the Austrian ambassador in Iran had referred to an existing contract to deliver GHN-45s. Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses (Noricum), 17. This is also a reason why the parliamentary inquiry committee was criticized for being partisan.

204. Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses (Noricum), 35.

205. Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses (Noricum), 10.

206. Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses (Noricum), 10.

207. Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses (Noricum), 17.

208. LG Wien, 30 Vr 305/87, vol. 171, "austroamb Riyad an aussenamt Wien, 30.9.1987," 316–20.

209. Bericht des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses (Noricum), 34.

210. Dickinger, *Die Skandale der Republik*, 155–58.

211. "Interview mit Karl Blecha: 'Vergessen können hält jung,'" *Der Standard*, June 16, 2008.

212. *SIPRI Yearbook*, *1989*, 198.

213. Wolf Lotter, "Traurige Kanonen," *profil*, July 1, 1996, 20–22, here 20.

214. Michael Nikbakhsh and Martin Staudinger, "Land im Waffenstillstand," *profil*, April 26, 2004, 52–56, here 52.

215. "Die größten Rüstungsexporteure der Welt," *Austria Presse Agentur*, December 6, 2010.

216. "Panzerbauer Steyr beendet Produktion in Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, March 18, 2014.

217. The production of the AUG was transferred to Malaysia in 2004. In justifying the step, the company's owner said, "We will not produce any war material in this country. As a businessman, I am sick and tired of being lumped together in Austria with drug dealers and pimps because of my products." Nikbakhsh and Staudinger, "Land im Waffenstillstand," 32. Because the ownership of Steyr Mannlicher changed, the assault rifle is now also manufactured in Australia and the United States, among other places. See Wilhelm Theuretsbacher, "Österreichische Waffen in Syrien," *Kurier*, August 15, 2012.

218. Norbert Rief, "360 Grad Österreich: Neutrale Heimat großer Waffen," *Die Presse*, November 19, 2011.

219. The freighter *Lucona* sank in the Indian Ocean on January 23, 1977, following an explosion on board. Six crew members were killed. In 1992 the well-connected entrepreneur Udo Proksch (1934–2001) was sentenced to life imprisonment for having had the *Lucona* sunk with a time bomb, in order to collect the insurance sum for the ship's alleged cargo—a uranium processing plant.

220. Robert Kriechbaumer, *Die Ära Kreisky: Österreich 1970–1983 in der historischen Analyse, im Urteil der politischen Kontrahenten und in Karikaturen von Ironimus* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2004), 69.

221. In the National Council elections of 1986, the FPÖ, with Haider as its lead candidate for the first time, received 9.7 percent of the vote, an increase of 4.7 percent.

222. Rathkolb, *Paradoxe Republik*, 143.

223. Douschan, *Anton Benya*, 226–27.

224. Rathkolb, *Paradoxe Republik*, 152–53.

225. Georg Turnheim, "Die Privatisierung der verstaatlichten Industrie (Periode 1991 bis 2007)," in *Österreichs Verstaatlichte: Die Rolle des Staates bei der Entwicklung der österreichischen Industrie von 1918 bis 2008*, ed. Georg Turnheim (Vienna: Manz, 2009), 103–26, here 126.

226. *Verkauf von "Familiensilber" hat Tradition*, orf.at, January 12, 2015, accessed November 6, 2015, https://orf.at/stories/2260950/2260960/.

227. Rathkolb, *Paradoxe Republik*, 145.

228. Liselotte Palme, "Vollprivatisierung: Die Voest-Saga," *profil*, August 29, 2005, 40–41.

229. "Made in A," *Wochenpresse*, no. 18 (1988), 18–19, here 19.

230. Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 362.

Tanks for the Shah

Iran, the Leopard II, and Arms Exports in the Era of Oil Shocks

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When in the 1970s the government of Iran under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi submitted a request in Bonn regarding the export of state-of-the-art tanks, this posed a problem to the Social Democrat–Liberal government under Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD). Torn between its previous policies on weapons exports, the interests of the country's energy supply, and the foreign policy challenges of the Cold War, the federal government struggled internally to find an answer for Tehran. Simultaneously the occasion of the Iranian tank request was used in order to internally question West Germany's armaments policy.

Willy Brandt's government (1969–74) proudly bore the mantle of reform, "daring more democracy" at home while pursuing détente internationally. After a year and a half of deliberations, Brandt's cabinet endorsed a landmark reform to West German export policy in June 1971: the articulation of "Political Principles" governing the export of war weapons and other military matériel. Although they represented an administrative form of control rather than a legislative barrier, the Political Principles tightened several loopholes in the 1961 War Weapons Control Act and deepened West Germany's constitutional commitment to avoid stoking wars of aggression. The relatively permissive export regime of the late 1960s gave way to a period of tight restrictions on the sale of arms and military equipment outside the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Whether the Political Principles could withstand the strains of geopolitical shock remained to be seen. The quadrupling of oil prices in fall 1973, during what turned out to be the final year of Willy Brandt's chancellorship, gave rise to great anxieties in Bonn about how to secure vital energy supplies—and how to pay for them. A grand bargain with an oil-supplying country, exchanging guaranteed oil access for advanced military hardware, would serve to alleviate both supply and balance of payments concerns. As it happened, the govern-

ment of Iran under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi had set its sights on West Germany's Leopard II tank—then still in development—and in spring 1974 it submitted a request to outfit the Iranian army with these highly promising offensive weapons. Brandt's flailing and desperate administration, hoping to lock in oil supply contracts, did not say no.

Following Brandt's resignation as chancellor in May 1974, it was left to his successor, Helmut Schmidt, to take a more sober look at the implications of the Iranian request. This chapter, adapted from a dissertation on the Schmidt government's Iran policy, presents a case study in West German export controls.[1] The central finding is that bureaucratic chaos made it nearly impossible for Schmidt's government to define a clear and consistent line toward Iran's arms requests. Sometimes the Bonn ministries treated the Political Principles as infinitely malleable; at other times they expressed grave concerns about the precedent that might be set by equipping the Iranian army with Leopard II tanks. Decisions were avoided, then taken, then rescinded, then reconsidered again in a manner that thoroughly exasperated the Iranian side. Because the entire discussion took place behind closed doors, it was all the easier for the key players to avoid taking responsibility. In the end, Schmidt's cabinet approved a "terrain paper" that slightly loosened how the Political Principles might be applied. Yet it was too late for the shah's government, which fell victim to chaos of its own amid the revolution of 1978–79.

Military Ties between Bonn and Tehran

Bilateral relations between West Germany and Iran had their roots in imperial Germany, and by the 1920s, arms cooperation had become a dimension of those relations.[2] When the US military government in Stuttgart made a property available for the opening of an Iranian consulate in 1946, Iran became one of the first to send diplomatic personnel to war-torn Germany and to open a consular office there.

In 1965 the Iranian government began purchasing material in West Germany with which to produce infantry weapons and ammunition. It also bought production facilities for this purpose, as well as infantry weapons ready for use.[3] A year later, the German government granted Iran equipment aid amounting to 40 million deutsche marks (DM). This financed the establishment and the maintenance of production facilities to manufacture replicas of the G3 automatic rifle and the MG3-A1 machine gun, as well as partial deliveries of these products and machine tools for maintenance and repair. The G3 was made by the German company Heckler & Koch, and

from 1967 onward was manufactured by the Mosalsalsasi Weapons Factory, a state-owned enterprise of the Iranian Defense Ministry. The German military, the Bundeswehr, also began using both weapons, the G3 and the MG3-A1 produced by Rheinmetall, around the same time. The cost of training soldiers to use these weapons was also a component of Germany's aid to the Iranian government. This proliferation practice led to a situation where it was German, not US, equipment that dominated in Iranian military production facilities in the 1970s.[4]

Initially little changed in the close cooperation between Iran and West Germany after the Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt took office as German chancellor in May 1974. Even the protests against the shah in Berlin in 1967,[5] in the wake of which German-Iranian relations had reached a low point, did not fundamentally change anything in the arms cooperation policy. In the mid-1970s the federally owned machine-building concern Deutsche Industrieanlagen AG (DIAG) participated in the building of an industrial infrastructure for the manufacture of ammunition, anti-tank missiles, carbine rifles, and machine guns. DIAG received contracts encompassing a volume of around 1.5 billion DM.[6] In 1974 the German government approved a training program for the Iranian military worth 10 million DM to be conducted by the Federal Ministry of Defense. In October of that year, moreover, the government gave the go-ahead for the export of production facilities for bazookas to the tune of 283 million DM.[7]

The Iranian interest in German arms products reached a preliminary high point with a request for the delivery of Leopard tanks in 1973/74. This came at a time when, following the protests against the shah in Berlin, the West German government was still trying to smooth over the diplomatic ructions this had caused with Tehran. At the same time the economy and industry were suffering from the effects of the oil crisis. In that respect the Iranian request for the delivery of this complex military weapons system was no coincidence. For Tehran this seemed an opportune moment to persuade the Germans to deliver fully mounted tanks, which had until then been ruled out by the restrictive policies of all previous West German governments.[8] Another factor was the expertise in defense policy that Chancellor Schmidt had gathered as defense minister in the cabinet of Willy Brandt between 1969 and 1972, which the Iranians now hoped would improve their chances of receiving tanks from Germany.[9]

Whereas in the 1960s Iranian interest in arms purchases from West Germany had focused on the Leopard I tank, their interest now shifted to its successor model, the Leopard II. There were a number of reasons for this.

First of all, according to the plans of its manufacturer, Rheinmetall, this was to be one of the most modern weapons systems of its generation. Second, there were plans afoot to adopt the Leopard II for use by the Bundeswehr as a standard weapon system. The shift in Iranian interest to the new model was thus due not only to the Leopard II's greater range of applications but also to the Bundeswehr's plans to use this tank itself. This was an aspect that was repeatedly to play an important role in Iranian government decisions about all arms projects. If the weapons systems that Iran purchased were also being used by other members of the NATO, then this would underline Iran's status as a preferential partner in the alliance's arms policy and thus cast a favorable light on the Iranian government. In addition, the shah considered it politically important to have weapons on a par with the state-of-the-art Western standard in order in this way to achieve a system standard compatible with NATO equipment. Given the lucrative oil deals in which Iran was engaged and the generally hard line of the Iranian government with respect to pricing, Iran was not short of funds to finance these expensive ambitions.

Openness in Bonn: The "Lion of Persia" Project

The first talks on possible conditions for supplying tanks took place in Bonn in March 1974 between Schmidt's predecessor Willy Brandt (likewise a Social Democrat) and Iranian Prime Minister Amīr Abbas Hoveyda. At that point, it was still unclear which tank model or which other weapons systems were involved. Pro forma, at least, the German government signaled great openness vis-à-vis Iranian wishes. At the German-Iranian investment conference in Tehran at the end of April 1974, then German Minister of Economics Hans Friderichs of the liberal Free Democratic Party told the shah that the West German government was prepared to grant German firms "a general license" to enable them to begin "developing production in Iran for the Iranian military."[10] This generous attitude on the part of the German minister of economics corresponded with "the shah's proposals"; moreover, "the decision about types of weapons and weapons systems" would rest entirely with the Iranian head of state. The only plausible explanation for this extraordinarily lax attitude on the part of the German government with respect to weapons export licenses must have been the oil crisis, which in 1973/74 had plunged West Germany and all of Europe into major difficulties regarding their balance of trade. As senior officials at the German Foreign Office put it, the generous approval for the export of the Leopard II had been granted "not least in the interests of the country's energy supply." Therefore, so they argued, "everything should be

done to ensure that German-Iranian cooperation is successful including in the field of armaments." In fact, this cooperation turned out to be such a success that the Foreign Office recommended "becoming far more closely involved in the preparation and implementation phases to save the Iranians making wrong decisions and to avoid any glitches."

Until 1979 the repeated criticism by human rights organizations of the conduct of the Iranian government under Shah Pahlavi did not at any time play a role in the question of arms sales to Iran. At any rate, neither the relevant Foreign Office documents, nor the correspondence with the embassy in Tehran, nor the communication between ministries yield any hard and fast evidence of discussions to this effect. For Chancellor Schmidt, securing Germany's energy supply was a top foreign policy priority. Indeed, Schmidt generally cast German foreign policy very much in economic terms, regarding it, alongside security issues, as primarily a matter of foreign finance and trade policy.

The chancellor's decisions with respect to arms policy were thus often shaped purely by security or economic considerations. Voices demanding an embargo on imports of raw materials from states that were undemocratic or did not sufficiently respect human rights were repeatedly dismissed by Schmidt. In his view West German foreign policy should be guided by Germany's own needs in a manner akin to traditional interests-driven policy, and securing international peace and a maximum of political stability through a balance of power was part and parcel of this. During and after his period in office as chancellor, Schmidt repeatedly argued for a neutral foreign policy geared to national economic interests.[11] For Schmidt, his personal or moral evaluation of a government or a regime was more or less irrelevant.

During his period in office as chancellor he paid only one official visit to Iran: a thirty-six-hour stopover on the way back from a trip to China in November 1975. The opinion of the Iranian government and the shah's administration that Schmidt expressed following this visit was not exactly flattering.[12] Nevertheless, German and Iranian companies engaged in extremely close economic cooperation under the Schmidt government. By 1975 the volume of foreign trade between West Germany and the Imperial State of Iran had reached its highest level since 1949, amounting to some 5.2 billion DM; Iran thus rose to become Germany's most important non-European foreign market after the United States.[13] Leaving aside trade with the United States and West Germany's European partners, West Germany had more intensive ties with Iran than with any other country.[14] Schmidt was anxious to avoid any threat to stable oil production and transport routes at all costs. In his view this

entailed, above all, ensuring peace in the Persian Gulf, which could only be guaranteed through a militarily strong Iran.[15]

Disappointed Expectations

In Bonn the realization soon dawned, however, that the promises that Economics Minister Friderichs had made to Iran might have rather far-reaching consequences. Initially, there was no fundamental attempt to back-pedal but merely a decision to handle the matter "discreetly,"[16] away from the public eye, in other words. Internally, though, the Foreign Office pointed out that for all its generosity "in deciding to intensify military cooperation with Iran, the government had gone down a road that might have implications for German arms exports policy as a whole." Bonn was thus perfectly aware that Friderichs's promise had the potential to permanently shift Germany's previously restrictive line. By that point it would scarcely have been possible to find plausible arguments for backing off. But having recognized the danger, the state secretaries of the ministries involved in questions of arms exports agreed internally with their respective ministers to try to defuse the situation as far as possible. A general retraction by Bonn of the promised export licenses even for heavy war weapons would not be easy without a loss of face. Instead, in line with their internal resolution the state secretaries now definitively supported only the license to manufacture weapons in Iran and not the export of complete weapons systems.[17] This was confirmed in a personal conversation with the shah by the West German ambassador in Tehran shortly after he assumed office.[18]

In summer 1974, however, things came to an impasse in Bonn. This may have had partly to do with the new government and the summer break; at the same time, it revealed a method that, paradoxically, was simultaneously cultivated and resisted by the German Foreign Office: to allow unpopular decisions and the projects tied to them that promised little diplomatic gain to simply run aground in Bonn's ministerial bureaucracy. Concurrently the idea of granting a general license to Iran to build tanks came in for mounting criticism. Despite the appearance in the news magazine *Der Spiegel* (whose staff were known to have excellent contacts in government circles) of a report about the planned tank project,[19] the public debate about the Iran deal remained a good deal quieter and less emotional than in other cases. The intensive debates that did take place did so behind closed doors within the ministries concerned.

Although various doubts were voiced on quite a number of occasions about Chancellor Schmidt's restrictive approach to the export of heavy military equipment, the example of the planned tanks sales to Iran demonstrates that

the Chancellor's Office simply put its foot down when it came to the export of complete combat vehicles. "On no account," the Chancellor's Office stated in a departmental meeting at the Ministry of Defense at the end of September 1974, should "the supply of entire weapons systems, whether Leopard I or II," be made possible.[20] This position was shared by the Foreign Office. Its state secretary, Walter Gehlhoff, noted with respect to the same conversation that "our interest" lies in "deliveries as small as possible; complete deliveries are entirely ruled out." Although the representative of the Ministry of Economics Detlev Karsten Rohwedder took a more open view, emphasizing West Germany's vulnerability with respect to energy, Bonn's line on the matter was now clearly marked out, despite some differences of detail within the ministries. It was also agreed that Iran should be steered more in the direction of the older Leopard I; moreover, the general disgruntlement about the Iranian government's failure to come up with a promise of cheaper oil and gas supplies was conspicuous.

In Tehran, too, dissatisfaction was growing over the German government's inflexibility. Apparently, following the impact of the oil crisis, the Iranian government had expected the Germans to respond more quickly with a firm promise to deliver tanks. Iranian military planning for 1977/78 was working on the premise of being able to introduce and use the new tank model and generally of being able to deploy fully fitted vehicles, rather than merely receiving a license to build them. This expectation resulted not least from the major shortage of skilled workers in Iran and its inadequately trained military personnel, which would not be readily able to assemble and properly handle a state-of-the-art, complex weapons system like the Leopard II. In fact, it was virtually impossible for Germany to adhere to Iran's envisaged timetable for the delivery of the tanks. Since the Leopard II was still in the development and testing phase, Bonn was not anticipating it being ready before 1981. What is more, at an estimated 2.3 million DM the unit price for a Leopard II was comparatively high.

Ambassador Hans-Georg Wieck kept the government in Bonn well informed about Iranian wishes and deliberations in detailed reports,[21] which he wired not only to the Foreign Office but also to the other ministries concerned with the arms trade. The German government was therefore soon able to come up with a way to try to dissuade the Iranians from their Leopard II ambitions. The tactic it pursued was simply to make the Leopard II and its delivery conditions very unattractive: a long lead time, a high unit price, and no sufficiently qualified personnel. However, the messenger chosen in Bonn to convey the bad news was not a member of the government but

instead the CEO of the Munich arms concern Krauss-Maffei personally. After consultation with the German government, Helmut Wolf agreed to travel to Tehran for exploratory talks. To date it has not been possible to determine from the files how much he knew about the German government's intentions. At any rate, Wolf told the Iranian leadership that Germany would not begin manufacturing the Leopard II until 1981 and that around 2,000 tanks could be produced for Iran by 1987.[22] As Bonn had hoped, around four weeks after Wolf's visit to Tehran, the Iranian deputy defense minister told the West German ambassador that Iran had instead decided to accept a "more timely and cheaper" offer of tanks from Britain.[23]

The End of the Leopard II Deal

In 1976 the German ambassador in Tehran proactively took up the tank issue once again, even though it was basically dead. Rumors were circulating that the British were experiencing problems producing their Chieftain tank. For this reason, Bonn was anticipating a renewed interest on the part of Tehran in purchasing Leopards. Since 1974, however, Bonn had become a good deal more cautious. A reading of the sources certainly creates the impression that by 1975 Bonn had got cold feet about its former eagerness to link energy supplies with deliveries of arms. Members of the government were all too aware that not only would deliveries of complete Leopard II tanks exceed the boundaries of former export practice, but in addition Iran had failed to provide the favorable terms for oil deliveries that Germany had hoped for. At the same time Bonn had managed to manoeuver itself into a predicament that would require a great deal of diplomacy to get out of. As the head of the Department of Near and Middle Eastern Policy at the Foreign Office, Norbert Montfort, noted in an internal memorandum in October 1976: "In April 1974 we made an offer [to Iran] in the wake of the oil crisis, but today, two years later, we see some things differently. At the same time, we do not have a convincing reason that would make sense to the Iranians for retracting the promise we made back then. For better or worse, we must keep our word, even if the decision we took then did not entirely fit the framework of our restrictive arms exports policy."[24] Accordingly, Bonn tried very hard to somehow let the project simply peter out and instructed the German ambassador not to initiate any further talks.[25]

Another reason behind the Iranian government's decision in favor of the British tanks was that London had a much less restrictive practice for issuing export licenses for domestically produced arms than West Germany did, a fact that the Iranian government specifically mentioned to Bonn.[26] The accusation

had some justification, since the West German government, in particular the Chancellor's Office and the Foreign Office, had throughout the negotiations since 1973 always strictly ruled out supplying complete Leopard II tanks to Iran. This fundamental position did not essentially change even when in subsequent years the tank issue periodically flared up again between Tehran and Bonn.

The Revision of the Export Guidelines and the "Equilibrium Strategy"

The prospect of a tank deal with Iran had put the question of how far Bonn was prepared to go to ensure a guaranteed energy supply firmly on the table. In a letter to then Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in November 1974, the Foreign Office sought to determine the extent to which arguments could be found for making the self-imposed limits on arms exports more flexible.[27] Then, in early 1975, a request from representatives of industry reached the Chancellor's Office, seeking Helmut Schmidt's personal support in gaining approval for arms exports. Schmidt forwarded the letter to the responsible division head in the Chancellor's Office, who in turn contacted the Foreign Office. Ultimately, however, the export request—this time for the supply of complete construction kits for the Leopard I—was rejected.[28]

In late 1974, when the tank deal with Tehran was regarded as having been laid to rest, Bonn began to consider revising the existing practice for approving arms exports. For the West German economy as a whole, the manufacture and export of war weapons and other military equipment relevant to war played only a minor role: between 1968 and 1973 the commercial export of tanks and ammunition amounted to an annual average of 387 million DM. Hence its share of total West German exports was only 0.29 percent.[29] Between 1971 and 1974 weapons to the tune of 32.6 million DM were supplied to Iran, which represented a 0.45 percent share of all exports to Iran in those years.[30] The arms exports consisted mainly of light infantry weapons such as semiautomatic rifles and ammunition.[31] Thus direct exports of war weapons or war-related military equipment to Iran were only slightly above the average for all German arms exports. Although economic relations with Iran were booming at the time, these figures do not suggest that Iran enjoyed preferential status with respect to the approval of arms exports, and even if arms exports did increase markedly in the years leading up to 1979, they still remained at a comparatively low level.[32]

In mid-December 1974, the unpopular tank deal with Tehran resulted in

a top-level meeting at the Chancellor's Office that was to have far-reaching consequences. Besides Chancellor Schmidt it was attended by the ministers with portfolios relevant to arms exports. The meeting concerned the issue of whether the previous guidelines for the approval of arms exports should be revised. The guidelines that served the German government as a basis for its decisions on the approval of direct exports or production licenses were essentially based on the German Foreign Trade and Payments Act (AWG) and the War Weapons Control Act. These were supplemented by the so-called Political Principles[33] that had been adopted by the German government in 1971 when Helmut Schmidt was still defense minister. Foreign Minister Genscher continued to take a restrictive line at this meeting. He believed the wording of the Political Principles should remain unchanged, justifying his position with the argument that the development of arms exports had been modest.[34] The general view was that the situation of West German arms concerns was not exactly critical at that point. What is more, the responsible government representatives were aware that so far Iran had not held out any reliable prospect of a "barter trade" of weapons for oil. Bonn therefore doubted whether it had made sense, with an eye to a stable fuel supply, to make far-reaching promises of arms deliveries and whether these should be considered in the future. So the fundamental question was now: Should weapons be sold in exchange for oil in the future and should this be specified in the arms exports guidelines?

The Foreign Office, however, saw no reason to revise the Political Principles since it regarded them as a "flexible instrument" that could be bent in any direction with the right arguments. One possible addendum to the Political Principles, for example, might have been to specify areas of tension; the direct export of arms to areas of tension or the approval of manufacture on license to such areas was practically ruled out. Until April 1974 this regulation had applied to the states of the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, for example. In addition, a distinction was drawn between NATO and non-NATO states. NATO partners could fundamentally receive arms of any kind, whereas only "other military goods" not subject to approval could be exported to non-NATO states, and even then only in limited quantities. Only "special policy considerations" would constitute a reason for approving exports of war weapons. Such "policy considerations" usually meant either that the state in question was closely aligned with NATO or that it pursued a neutral foreign policy.[35] However, this was no guarantee that an export license would simply be waved through. In the early 1970s the Spanish government's wish to buy Leopard tanks was not granted. Purchase requests from Argentina and Venezuela (combat tanks), Peru (rocket launchers), the Philippines and

Indonesia (submarines), Thailand (armored personnel carriers), and Burma (automatic cannons) were likewise rejected.

There was, however, another reason for Bonn to consider changing the guidelines that was relevant for the practical procedures involved in obtaining an arms export license. Normally this was the job of the Federal Security Council. Comprising representatives of the ministries involved in arms exports and other participants, this body met at irregular intervals for consultations and to make decisions about export applications. At least since the adoption of the Political Principles in 1971, the companies involved were of the opinion that there had "repeatedly been excessively long delays."[36] Therefore the Foreign Office proposed reintroducing the "circular procedure" that had previously been customary practice. This involved informing all relevant departments in written form of all export cases awaiting a decision, including those involving war weapons. These were then either approved or rejected with a simple signature. This process was designed to speed up export decisions and allow them to be made without personal consultation. While the Federal Security Council remained the decision-making body when it came to approving arms exports, the goal was to use the "circular procedure" to enable a more flexible and faster decision-making process.

Although an unspoken consensus had been reached among the ministries involved in the consultations at the Chancellor's Office about revising formal procedures, there were certainly some differences of opinion during the talks. Ultimately all the other ministries agreed to follow the Foreign Office's restrictive line, but Minister of Economics Friderichs and Defense Minister Georg Leber (SPD) took a much laxer view during the talks on the question of which categories of arms should receive export licenses according to which criteria.[37] By comparison with Friderichs and Leber, Chancellor Schmidt was far more restrained.[38] Nevertheless, he disagreed with the view of the Foreign Office, which attached great value to having standard criteria that would be predictable for foreign trading partners. Schmidt favored "making decisions on a case-by-case basis after careful scrutiny."[39] In other cases, too, such as the controversial export of submarines to Argentina, Schmidt was decidedly opposed to the lax line taken by his fellow Social Democrat Leber.[40] Finally, at the turn of the year 1974/75, about four weeks after the high-level meeting at the Chancellor's Office, the federal government's Political Principles were essentially confirmed as a guideline for approving arms exports. What is striking is that there was neither a debate in the Bundestag, nor consultations in the Foreign Affairs Committee, the cabinet, or the leading party bodies of the governing coalition, nor indeed any public media discourse on the issue.

This was in line with the government's practice already employed in 1971 of keeping political bodies and especially the public out of the decision-making process.

It was not until 1975, when it became increasingly clear that the West German arms industry was running into economic difficulties, that the German government began discussing the possibility of expanding licenses for arms exports. The most important argument here was that while the export of war weapons systems like the Leopard could be approved in principle, the potential purchasing state would have to be a partner country on a par with a NATO partner.[41] In the view of the German government, potential partners of the Federal Republic needed to be states that "owing to their political and economic significance [fulfilled] a regulatory function in their respective region." This emphasis on a regional regulatory function had a major role to play in the chancellor's foreign policy concept. In particular the fact that Schmidt favored granting export licenses on a case-by-case basis showed the priority he accorded to stability and balance. This corresponded closely with his advocacy of a policy of strategic equilibrium.[42] It was a principle that informed all of the fundamental foreign policy decisions that Schmidt took: from Germany's position in the Middle East conflict to his position on the NATO Double-Track Decision and arms export issues. Schmidt had already publicly declared his advocacy of a "strategic equilibrium" in 1969.[43]

Thus, although Bonn was by no means uncritical of the potential granting of licenses for the export of arms to Iran, this had to conform with the imperative of maintaining a balance of power in the Persian Gulf. Particular attention needed to be paid here to the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. A further point was that by giving preference to one regional power over another, Germany risked undermining the credibility of its own policy toward the Middle East conflict. Nevertheless, in 1975 Bonn expressly rejected the idea of including Saudi Arabia among the ranks of states that could be treated as on a par with NATO with respect to arms policy. The admission of Iran to this circle was, therefore, despite the good bilateral economic relationship, de facto ruled out. The Foreign Office shared this view. An internal note for Foreign Minister Genscher stated: "Should the overriding view be that Saudi Arabia should not be discriminated against vis-à-vis Iran, then Germany should refrain from supplying the Leopard to Iran."[44] Export licenses that could potentially endanger or even jeopardize the maintenance of a regional balance of power should hence not be issued. A further argument for preserving a restrictive export license practice was that failure to do so not only would threaten the German government's foreign policy credibility on

the Middle East question but might also undermine the German position in the SALT II negotiations.[45] The Foreign Office was acutely aware of the sensitivity of the issue and the potential repercussions that might be triggered by a reconfiguring of the export guidelines in whatever form, especially if these were perceived by the public and by other countries as too lax. Thus in a government discussion of the issue it was the Foreign Office, as usual, that raised points of criticism.[46] The Ministry of Defense, on the other hand, spoke of a "desire . . . to continually . . . exploit our armaments capacity."[47]

Despite progress in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the German government's security policy remained focused on guaranteeing "cooperation in maintaining a sufficient Western counterbalance to the potential of the Warsaw Pact."[48] One explanation for this stance was that Bonn feared a gradual decline of NATO and hence of Europe's existing security architecture. Ensuring security by creating balanced and stable power relationships in the Persian Gulf as a counterweight to the Soviet Union was therefore perceived as being in the foreign policy interest of the German government. In April 1975 Foreign Minister Genscher and Defense Minister Leber had instructed the government to establish a mixed working group in order to hold consultations on the future of German security policy following the signing of the CSCE Final Act and to make long-term recommendations for West German concepts for this area of policy. This included the development of a foreign policy position on the Near and Middle East. The continuing focus on the idea of a strategic equilibrium is evident in the recommendation that the mixed working group made for future German policy toward the Near and Middle East: "Owing to the geographical and economic conditions in the Near and Middle East regions, the Federal Republic of Germany has a vital interest in an equilibrium in the Near East that will create stable foreign policy conditions in this region. . . . In this context the importance of Iran increases. It is already making a contribution to stabilizing the situation in the Persian Gulf. . . . The West should therefore pay particular attention to Iran as a possible focal point for a Middle Eastern counterweight to the outward radiation of Soviet power."

The Bonn Discussion of the "Flächenpapier"

The Chancellor's Office returned to the issue of revising the regulations for arms export licenses in March 1976. One reason for wanting to do this was that although the existing rules were adequate for German direct exports, they did not properly cover exports from joint production with other countries.

This applied primarily to weapons systems manufactured jointly with France. Chancellor Schmidt's initiative represented a continuation of the approach he had already advocated at the end of 1974, in which he envisaged moving away from generally applicable principles to more case-by-case decisions. The draft for this revised approach, which was known internally as the "Flächenpapier," or terrain paper, therefore outlined individual conditions and exceptions and listed specific states to which arms exports should be regarded as either critical or uncritical. In the view of the Chancellor's Office this would require expanding the "C" list of countries[49] to include South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, while ruling out entirely arms export licenses to South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia, Angola, and Chile.[50] In addition, all twenty-one states of the Arab League as well as Israel were likewise to be completely excluded from war weapons exports, but the export of other categories of military equipment was to remain possible under certain exceptional circumstances to be decided by the Federal Security Council. General restraint was to be exercised regarding arms exports to other states in the so-called Third World, unless "the political and economic interests of Germany" warranted such exports. Those interests could be argued depending on the case in question. At any rate, one of them was certainly covering Germany's energy requirements, which is why the traditional notion of interest-driven politics could now be replaced by the notion of needs-driven politics.

The Foreign Office took a critical view of these and other specifications from the Chancellor's Office, seeing it as a case of the chancellor having "taken casuistics too far."[51] This was aggravated by the fact that the Chancellor's Office regarded it as the Foreign Office's job to review the political situation in potential purchaser states and to make a fundamental evaluation of the legality of granting export licenses.[52] The Foreign Office staff were naturally not thrilled about the extra work this would involve. In particular, State Secretary Peter Hermes instructed the heads of the two political divisions in the Foreign Office as well as the head of the Foreign Trade Division to undertake a critical examination of the proposals from the Chancellor's Office.[53]

The preparation of a position statement on the chancellor's "Flächenpapier," however, caused major internal difficulties in the Foreign Office, revealing that this was a controversial issue.[54] Walter Jesser, head of Subdivision 31 in the Foreign Office, which was responsible inter alia for the Near and Middle East, complained in a letter to the head of the Foreign Trade Division that the term "Near East" was too vague, and instead the wording should be "the member states of the Arab League and Israel . . . must be regarded as an area of tension until a comprehensive peace agreement has been reached." In this way, Jesser

argued, the delivery of weapons could be ruled out and the export of other military goods to these countries would be subject to cautious approval in exceptional cases. What is more, he went on, "a category of countries that . . . have been in almost permanent conflict for thirty years with alternating wars and ceasefires was in a situation between not-war and not-peace" and was therefore "not covered by the envisaged formulation."[55] This proposed formulation did not, however, meet with the agreement of Department 403 of the Foreign Office, which was responsible for arms export controls. The deputy head of this department likewise wrote a letter to the head of Division 4, in which he expressed a completely different position.[56]

The "Flächenpapier" was only officially adopted by the Federal Security Council after a long delay in early 1977,[57] even though the final version had already been approved at state secretary level in June 1976.[58] It can be assumed that officials in Bonn's ministerial bureaucracy had once again resorted to their tried and tested tactic of dragging their feet in order to avoid having to make awkward decisions with respect to certain requests for arms deliveries.[59] An internal declaration of the Foreign Office stated simply that "owing to talks at ministerial level a fundamental decision cannot be expected before autumn [1976]" and that it "has not been possible" in this case to discuss French delivery intentions.[60] These spurious explanations in all likelihood did not get to the heart of the problem. More to the point was what Jesser had to say: "What we specifically do not want is to be held politically responsible . . . because of German deliveries for the production of war weapons." [61]

At almost exactly the same time the German government's internal reflections on the "Flächenpapier" became public. At an event at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College in Hamburg, Chancellor Schmidt had declared that deliveries of arms from the Federal Republic of Germany to countries outside NATO were not only conceivable but "in certain cases have already happened." This applied primarily to Spain and Iran, although he added that each case was examined individually.[62] This statement aroused the sensibilities not only of the public but also of a number of members of parliament,[63] especially since the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag had at no point been privy to the deliberations on revising the export guidelines and some members of parliament had only learned of this from the newspapers. This way of going about things was apparently not entirely unusual, however, since the Foreign Affairs Committee had not been informed either when the Political Principles were being adopted in 1971.[64]

In the tussle over the final version of the "Flächenpapier," Foreign Minister Genscher and the Foreign Office eventually prevailed over Chancellor

Schmidt and the Chancellor's Office. Although the original impetus for the "Flächenpapier" had been a desire to revise the regulations for arms exports from German-French coproduction, other controversial issues arose in the course of the internal discussion process. These included the question of how to treat the needs-driven argument of arms in exchange for oil. But ultimately the "Flächenpapier" did not yield a provision of any kind for this issue. The problem of exporting arms to oil-exporting states was covered in an amendment which at the same time was supposed to offer a solution for the German government's position on arms policy in the Middle East conflict. According to this amendment, "the countries of the Middle East that are parties to this conflict should be regarded as areas of tension. Therefore, the delivery of war weapons [to these areas] is excluded."[65] The "Flächenpapier" offered Germany an opportunity to be more assertive vis-à-vis Iran, since in no clause was it expressly mentioned by name. While Iran had not been declared to be on a par with a NATO partner[66] (as Shah Pahlavi had secretly hoped), it was not firmly excluded from the option of receiving deliveries of war weapons either.[67]

Conclusion

Although the Iranian government had requested not only tanks but also other heavy arms such as submarines and Type 122 frigates, and there had been some concrete negotiations, the incipient unrest in Iran meant that after 1978, if not before, practically all of the shah's requests for arms came to nothing amid the revolutionary upheavals.[68] At the same time Bonn was extremely concerned about the events taking place in Iran. At that time the Persian Gulf region accounted for almost 10 percent of West German exports. The three largest customers of West German firms in the region were Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria, with Iran in first place by a long chalk. Germany exported goods to the tune of 3.42 billion DM to Iran every year, while Saudi Arabia at 1.8 billion DM was far behind in second place.[69] In the first half of 1978 Iran rose to become Germany's biggest supplier of oil, accounting for some 22 percent of total German oil imports.[70] In view of this, it is hardly surprising that the German government's arms policy decisions from the mid-1970s onward, and in some cases into the early 1980s, were based primarily on a wish to guarantee Germany's supply of energy. This had been triggered by the two oil crises of 1973/74 and 1979/80, when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the revolution in Iran caused major economic upheavals. Germany's expectation that it would be able to exchange weapons for oil failed to materialize, since Iran

offered neither large volumes of oil nor favorable conditions for its purchase. The collapse of the political system in Iran and the more moderate price policy of the other Gulf monarchy, Saudi Arabia, meant that the latter subsequently became Germany's preferred partner for oil deals.

All in all, a certain shift in Chancellor Schmidt's attitude to arms exports was observable. Whereas he had largely rejected arms exports and the responsibility they entailed while he was still defense minister, his attitude became more pragmatic after he became chancellor.[71] The answer to our initial question about how robust were the government's own export guidelines must be that there were no firmly formulated, unshakable principles. Therefore there were no clear, unambiguous rules either that could have been seriously breached in any way. The only reliable constant in the policy of both the Social Democrat–Liberal governments under Brandt and Schmidt and the Christian Democrat–led government under Helmut Kohl was the absolute dictum of peace and stability as a yardstick for foreign policy activity. No German government ever called this constant into question.

The theory that a Social Democrat–Liberal cabinet might have been prepared to drop its strict rules in the face of an economic crisis cannot be substantiated, for two reasons: First of all, these supposedly strict rules simply did not exist in the first place; export licenses were always subject to a certain degree of discretion that was exploited to differing extents. Second, arms exports were such a sensitive issue that any movements in this field were immediately registered on Bonn's finely tuned radar. On the one hand, Bonn certainly did not want to endanger the disarmament talks between the Western alliance and the USSR or its own credibility in this regard. On the other hand, arms exports were certainly regarded as an active part of foreign trade policy and as something that could be used as a bargaining chip to advance Germany's own interests.

The disagreements between the various divisions in the respective ministries and in general between the different policy portfolios can be explained by the fact that responsibility for the approval or rejection of an export request was to be kept deliberately vague. No one in the government wanted to take responsibility for diplomatic ill feeling—whether the case was approved or rejected. It was only natural that the Ministry of Economics should place the emphasis on economic interests, while the Foreign Office was more interested in taking account of international sensitivities. Ultimately, all actors in the German government strove for damage limitation and sought to avoid laying themselves open to attack.

Surprisingly, the history of the arms export policy of the various German

governments has to date scarcely been considered against the background of the geopolitical circumstances and rivalries in the Persian Gulf—and where it has, the focus has been chiefly on the Wahhabi monarchy of the Al Saud, while imperial Iran under Shah Pahlavi has been largely overlooked. Yet it was the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the heightened conflict between the two Gulf powers—which now acquired a religious dimension—together with the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence in Afghanistan that upset the existing security balance and led to the German government shifting its foreign policy priorities to Saudi Arabia after 1980.

Notes

Translation by Melanie Newton

1. Bettina Weißgerber, *Die Iranpolitik der Bundesregierung 1974–1982* (Munich: utzverlag, 2019).

2. On the German-Iranian relationship before World War II, see Matthias Küntzel, *Die Deutschen und der Iran: Geschichte und Gegenwart einer verhängnisvollen Freundschaft* (Berlin: wjs, 2009).

3. On Iranian arms purchases in West Germany in the 1960s, see William Glenn Gray, "Waffen aus Deutschland? Bundestag, Rüstungshilfe und Waffenexport 1961 bis 1975," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 64, no. 2 (April 2016), 327–64, here 347–49.

4. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts Berlin (hereafter PAAA), AV Neues Amt, vol. 5781, "Aufzeichnung von Botschafter Wieck zur Vorbereitung des Kanzlerbesuchs, 13.10.1975."

5. A student was shot during the protests on June 2, 1967. See Eckard Michels, *Shahbesuch 1967: Fanal für die Studentenbewegung* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2017), and Uwe Soukup, *Der 2. Juni 1967: Ein Schuss, der die Republik veränderte* (Berlin: Transit, 2017). On the shah's displeasure at the critical reporting on the ruling couple in West German magazines, see *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* [hereafter *AAPD*] *1968*, ed. Mechthild Lindemann and Matthias Peter (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1999), doc. 120.

6. PAAA, AV Neues Amt, vol. 5781, "Aufzeichnung von Botschafter Wieck zur Vorbereitung des Kanzlerbesuchs, 13.10.1975."

7. PAAA, B 150, vol. 324, "Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats Heinichen, 13.3.1975, Betr.: Rüstungspolitik gegenüber Staaten am Persischen Golf."

8. In particular the government of Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) had already rejected supplying the Leopard I to Iran despite the clouding of the bilateral relationship that followed the shah protests in 1968. See the record in *AAPD 1968*, doc. 122.

9. *AAPD 1974*, ed. Daniela Taschler, Fabian Hilfrich, and Michael Ploetz (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2005), doc. 153, 649n6. It is astonishing that the Iranians should have thought this, given that Schmidt as chairman of the SPD parliamentary group had rejected the export of Leopard tanks. See also Gray, "Waffen aus Deutschland," 349.

10. On this and the following, see "Aufzeichnung Ministerialdirektor Hermes, 27.5.1974," in *AAPD 1974*, doc. 153, 649 and n3.

11. See also the contribution by Hubert Leber in this volume, as well as Schmidt's interview with Giovanni di Lorenzo on January 9, 2014, in *Zeit-Magazin* (supplement to issue 3/2014), accessed August 14, 2021, https://www.zeit.de/2014/03/helmut-schmidt-deutsche-aussenpolitik.

12. Helmut Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte* (Berlin: Siedler, 1987), 239.

13. Weißgerber, *Iranpolitik*, 234–35.

14. How far this went is demonstrated, for example, by the cooperation in promoting small and medium-sized enterprises between the state of Baden-Württemberg and Iran. See Weißgerber, *Iranpolitik*, 117–25.

15. Helmut Schmidt, *A Grand Strategy for the West: The Anachronism of National Strategies in an Interdependent World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

16. *AAPD 1974*, doc. 153, 650; the following quote is also to be found there.

17. *AAPD 1974*, doc. 153, 648.

18. *AAPD 1974*, doc. 166, 712.

19. "Geschäfte mit Leo," *Der Spiegel*, February 10, 1974.

20. On this and the following, see *AAPD 1974*, doc. 278, 1224–25 (quotes) and 1226–27.

21. Born in 1928, Wieck was German ambassador in Tehran from 1974 to 1977; his later posts included that of president of the German Intelligence Service.

22. PAAA, B 150, vol. 314, "Botschafter Wieck, Teheran, an das Auswärtige Amt, 2.10.1974, Betr.: Projekt Löwe Iran."

23. *AAPD 1974*, doc. 320, 1419. The British tank model now favored by the Iranian government was the Chieftain V, which in terms of military value and age corresponded more closely with the Leopard I. The British military had newly equipped itself with the Chieftain V in 1968. The unit price was around 1 million DM. See Weißgerber, *Iranpolitik*, 38.

24. PAAA, B 150, vol. 355, "Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrates I. Klasse Montfort, 21.10.1976, Betr.: 'Deutsch-iranische Rüstungskooperation.'"

25. PAAA, B 150, vol. 351, "Vortragender Legationsrat I. Klasse Dufner an die Botschaft in Teheran, Betr.: Deutsch-iranische Rüstungskooperation, 8.7.1976."

26. *AAPD 1974*, doc. 320, 1420.

27. PAAA, B 150, vol. 317, "Aufzeichnung von Staatssekretär Sachs, 22.11.1974, Betr.: Deutsch-iranische Rüstungsbeziehungen, hier: Panzerprojekt Leopard II."

28. PAAA, B 1, vol. 178592, "Schreiben des Vorstandsvorsitzenden von Krauss-Maffei, Helmut Wolf, an Bundeskanzler Schmidt (Beilage zum Schreiben des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Oldenkott, Bundeskanzleramt, an den Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Schönfeld, Auswärtiges Amt, Betr.: 'Kampfpanzer Leopard/Iran,' 26.2.1975."

29. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BArchK), B 102/204060, "Vorlage des Auswärtigen Amtes an den Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, 13.12.1974, Betr.: 'Rüstungsexportkontrolle und Politische Grundsätze, hier: Vorlage für die 7. Bundessicherheitsratssitzung, Exportüberblick.'" Since the note was written for the head of the Chancellor's Office shortly before the major departmental meeting with the chancellor, it can be assumed that Schmidt knew about it.

30. Weißgerber, *Iranpolitik*, 234.

31. BArchK, B 102/204060, "Aufstellung zur Kriegswaffenexportpolitik der USA, Frankreichs und Großbritanniens gegenüber Nahost, hier: 'Aufstellung der Exporte nach dem Iran,' 29.8.1975."

32. Dimitrios Gounaris, *Die Geschichte der sozialliberalen Rüstungsexportpolitik: Ein Instrument der deutschen Außenpolitik 1969–1982* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2019), 272.

33. The original wording of the Political Principles can be found here: http://www.bits.de/public/documents/Ruestungsexport/Politische-Grundsaetze-1971.html (accessed August 14, 2021); see also Gray, "Waffen aus Deutschland," 354.

34. On this and the following: BArchK, B 102/204060, "'Vorlage des A[uswärtigen] A[mtes] an den Chef des B[undes]K[anzleramtes], Rüstungsexportkontrolle und Politische Grundsätze, Exportüberblick,' 13.12.1974."

35. For example, the German government took a generally more lenient attitude to granting arms exports licenses for Switzerland, Sweden, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan. From the mid-1970s onward, Spain was likewise one of the non-NATO states that received preferential treatment.

36. BArchK, B 102/204060, "'Vorlage des A[uswärtigen] A[mtes] an den Chef des B[undes]K[anzleramtes], Rüstungsexportkontrolle und Politische Grundsätze, Exportüberblick,' 13.12.1974."

37. This applied primarily to the German-French cooperation to build the Milan and Hot anti-tank missiles, the Roland surface-to-air missile system, and the Alpha-Jet fighter plane. Agreement had been reached in the German government that France should be regarded as the final destination of jointly produced goods. This meant that the issue of which countries exports were approved for, and according to which criteria, was no longer the problem of German foreign trade policy. Friderichs and Leber now called for licenses to be granted for direct exports for all the countries that had been supplied with jointly produced goods by France. De facto this would have meant a complete departure from the German government's previous, more differentiated approval practice and a huge expansion in the export opportunities of German companies. See Gounaris, *Rüstungsexportpolitik*, 316–37.

38. On Helmut Schmidt's fundamental attitude to arms exports, see Gray, "Waffen aus Deutschland."

39. PAAA, B 1, vol. 178592, "Ergebnisvermerk von Ministerialdirektor Sanne, Bundeskanzleramt, Betr.: 'Ministergespräch mit dem Bundeskanzler über Fragen des Rüstungsexports,' 18.12.1974."

40. *AAPD 1971*, ed. Martin Koopmann, Matthias Peter, and Daniela Taschler (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2002), doc. 19, and *AAPD 1974*, doc. 378.

41. *AAPD 1975*, ed. Michael Kieninger, Mechthild Lindemann, and Daniela Taschler (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2006), doc. 286, 1324; the following quote is also to be found here.

42. See also Gunnar Seelow, *Strategische Rüstungskontrolle und deutsche Außenpolitik in der Ära Helmut Schmidt* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 211.

43. See Helmut Schmidt, *Strategie des Gleichgewichts: Deutsche Friedenspolitik und die Weltmächte*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1969); here his view of the relationship between strategic equilibrium and arms control is briefly discussed.

44. *AAPD 1975*, doc. 286, 1325. About half a year later, at the beginning of 1976, the question arose of whether the export of Leopard tanks, Marder armored personnel carriers, and howitzers to Pakistan should be approved. Hans Werner Lautenschlager, an undersecretary in the Foreign Office, criticized these exports, citing a possible prejudice effect with respect to Iran and Saudi Arabia: "It is to be expected that an export license for Pakistan would bring in its wake a renewed interest in arms deliveries on the part of Iran. Given the close political and arms cooperation between Iran and Pakistan, it would scarcely be possible to reject Iranian wishes. And then, in turn, it would be very difficult to take a negative decision on applications for arms deliveries by Iran's neighbor Saudi Arabia and other Arab states." See *AAPD 1976*, ed. Matthias Peter, Michael Ploetz, and Tim Geiger (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2007), doc. 44, 194.

45. *AAPD 1975*, doc. 286, 1326. Talks had taken place at the international disarmament conference in Geneva at the end of June 1975 in which the head of the West German delegation had expressed the German government's "positive attitude . . . to the American initiative" to the US ambassador and "stressed our restrictive rules for the export of such weapons." See ibid., 1326n15.

46. *AAPD 1975*, doc. 286, 1325.

47. PAAA, B 150, vol. 335, "Aufzeichnung von Staatssekretär Hermes, 29.9.1975, Betr.: 'Rüstungsexportpolitik—Export des Leopard nach Brasilien.'"

48. *AAPD 1976*, doc. 45, 200; the following quote is to be found at 205.

49. The implementation of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act is regulated by the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance (AWV). It determines the approval requirements for all exports of goods from the Federal Republic of Germany including armaments. The so-called C list of countries existed as an appendix to the AWV until 2013. It listed all those states to which weapons of war could not be exported at all or, at that time, only via a unanimous ruling of the members of the Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy. This Committee was responsible from 1950 to 1994 for regulating the export of Western technology to the states of the Warsaw Pact. For that reason, List C included Albania, Cuba, the People's Republic of Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the People's Republic of China in addition to the member states of the Warsaw Pact. See Jürgen Grässlin, *Schwarzbuch Waffenhandel: Wie Deutschland am Krieg verdient* (Munich: Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, 2013), 35–36.

50. At that time Rhodesia (which became Zimbabwe in 1980) was engaged in civil war. South Africa (which was occupying neighboring Namibia), Namibia, and Angola were also at war. In Laos there was a communist revolution in 1975, while in neighboring Cambodia the aftereffects of the Vietnam War and the bloody deeds of the Khmer Rouge had had a devastating impact on the civilian population. The Republic of South Vietnam, which only existed from April 28, 1975, to July 2, 1976, had a Socialist system. In Chile the military junta of Augusto Pinochet had been in power since 1973.

51. PAAA, B 150, vol. 345, "Aufzeichnung von Staatssekretär Hermes, 18.3.1976, Betr.: 'Neue Richtlinie der Bundesregierung für Rüstungsexporte.'"

52. PAAA, B 150, vol. 345, "Staatssekretär Schüler, Bundeskanzleramt, an Staatssekretär Hermes, 17.3.1976, Betr.: 'Übermittlung des Entwurfs einer Richtlinie für die Behandlung von Rüstungsexporten.'"

53. PAAA, B 150, Aktenkopien 1976, vol. 345, "Aufzeichnung von Staatssekretärs Hermes, 18.3.1976, Betr.: 'Neue Richtlinie der Bundesregierung für Rüstungsexporte'."

54. PAAA, B 150, Aktenkopien 1976, vol. 346, "Aufzeichnung des Bundeskanzleramts, 2.4.1976, Betr.: 'Rüstungsexportpolitik der Bundesregierung, Anlage: Kapitän zur See Borgemeister, Bundeskanzleramt, an Legationsrat I. Klasse Schlegel, Übermittlung der Aufzeichnung'."

55. PAAA, B 150, Aktenkopien 1976, vol. 346, "Aufzeichnung von Ministerialdirigent Jesser, 12.4.1976, Betr.: 'Neue Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zum Rüstungsexport'."

56. *AAPD 1976*, doc. 109, 495.

57. *AAPD 1977*, ed. Amit Das Gupta et al. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2008), doc. 16.

58. *AAPD 1976*, doc. 195.

59. See also Gounaris, *Rüstungsexportpolitik*, 329.

60. *AAPD 1977*, doc. 16, 95n12.

61. PAAA, B 150, Aktenkopien 1976, vol. 346, "Aufzeichnung von Ministerialdirigent Jesser, 12.4.1976, Betr.: 'Neue Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zum Rüstungsexport'."

62. PAAA, B 1, vol. 178592, "AFP-Meldung vom 11.6.1976: 'Schmidt: BRD-Waffenlieferungen an nicht-NATO-Länder denkbar'."

63. "Warum liefern die Deutschen keine Panzer?", *Der Spiegel*, September 14, 1975.

64. On this see n. 11 of the corresponding minutes of the 72nd cabinet meeting on June 16, 1971, accessed August 14, 2021, https://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/1000/k/k1971k/kap1_2/kap2_21/para3_4.html.

65. See the wording of the "Flächenpapier" in *AAPD 1977*, doc. 16, here 96.

66. This applied only to Ireland, Austria, and Spain.

67. This applied only to South Africa and Rhodesia. On the exact formulation of the "Flächenpapier," see also Gounaris, *Rüstungsexportpolitik*, 328–30.

68. On the Iranian government's other arms requests, see also Weißgerber, *Iranpolitik*, 31–86.

69. PAAA, B 1, vol. 178694, "'Aufzeichnung zu den wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland mit dem Nahen und Mittleren Osten' für Außenminister Genscher, 21.9.1977."

70. *AAPD 1978*, ed. Daniela Taschler, Amit Das Gupta, and Michael Mayer (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2009), doc. 258, 1304n6.

71. Gounaris, *Rüstungsexportpolitik*, 498.

Arms Exports and Holocaust Memory

Saudi Arabia, Leopard Tanks, and Bonn's Secret Israel Clause of 1982

HUBERT LEBER

When the Federal Security Council passed new Political Principles for Arms Exports under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in spring 1982, a secret protocol note was adopted, which became known as the Israel Clause. It stated that decisions about arms exports should also take into account "the historical responsibility of the Germans toward the Jewish people." The background was that Saudi Arabia wished to purchase hundreds of Leopard 2 tanks, which had led to months of controversy in Bonn and a deep crisis in German-Israeli relations. Hubert Leber is the first to utilize both German and Israeli government files to investigate the 1981/82 tank dispute. It is a story that connects international relations with the politics of the past. The Israel Clause, which Schmidt's cabinet approved on the initiative of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, marked a caesura in Bonn's Israel policy. While until then a sort of statute-of-limitations paradigm applied in relation to the Jewish state, the memory of the Holocaust was recognized in the early 1980s as a permanent factor in German governance.

The Protocol Note of the Federal Security Council

In early 1981 a heated debate occurred in the Federal Republic of Germany over a possible arms deal. At issue was whether the Bonn government should approve the export of German tanks to Saudi Arabia. The news magazine *Der Spiegel* had reported that Riyadh wished to buy the Leopard II battle tank, as well as other equipment, and that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was not averse to the deal.[1] The matter remained unresolved for more than a year, until the German government finally turned the Saudis down in the summer of 1982.

In the history of the Federal Republic, the controversy over tank exports to Saudi Arabia is significant in two respects. For one thing, it was an important milestone in German arms export policy. Riyadh's desire for weapons prompted the federal government to modify its political guidelines for arms exports, leading to a de facto easing of restrictions. For another, the controversy

was a major event in the history of relations between West Germany and Israel. Bonn's prospective export plans created enormous tension between the two countries and helped to unleash the Schmidt-Begin conflict of May 1981—a public confrontation between the two countries' leaders that marked a low point in the history of German-Israeli relations.[2] Israel viewed the arming of Saudi Arabia, a country with which it was officially in a state of war, as a threat to its national security interests. For both contemporaries and historians, the fact that Schmidt considered supplying the Gulf monarchy with highly modern tanks constituted proof that he sought a more distant relationship to Israel, perhaps even a "normalized" Middle East policy in which the Jewish state would not enjoy a special status conferred on it by obligations derived from the Holocaust.[3] Therefore, the debate about whether the Leopard II should be exported to Saudi Arabia was also a debate about the normative foundation of German-Israeli relations.

In the meantime, declassified government files have become available in the archives, allowing us to review the tank controversy of 1981/82. These files elucidate the internal decision-making process of the essential Bonn actors, who included, in addition to Schmidt, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Economy Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff, the ministerial bureaucracy, and the top leadership of the governing coalition's parliamentary parties.

The files tell a highly ambivalent and seemingly contradictory story. Concerning the early stage of the controversy, they confirm the long-held understanding of events whereby the coalition government of Social Democrats and Liberals, driven by Schmidt, was indeed moving toward the approval of an arms deal with Riyadh without any specific consideration of Israel. Nevertheless, by the end of the process, the Bonn government had secretly made a fundamental decision that ran counter to everything that Schmidt had uttered until then about his policy maxims toward Israel, at least in the context of the tank controversy. In fact, a key government document expressly acknowledged and even codified the special relations between the Federal Republic and the state of Israel—on the initiative of Foreign Minister Genscher but with the approval of Chancellor Schmidt.

Following a year-long revision process, the new "Political Principles of the Federal Government for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment" were approved in spring 1982 by the Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat, BSR), a cabinet committee chaired by the chancellor and comprising the heads of relevant key ministries. However, the council, which convened behind closed doors, also added a protocol note to the revised Political Principles, which was referred to internally as the Israel Clause.

The minutes of the BSR meeting of March 3, 1982, state: "BM [Bundesminister, federal minister] Genscher would like to have it on record that when weighing our overall interests, the historical responsibility of the Germans toward the Jewish people will be taken into consideration. On this point, the federal chancellor expressly declares general agreement."[4]

Such a statement may seem rather undramatic today, since Germany's historically based responsibility toward Israel and the Jews has in the meantime become a rhetorical commonplace among the country's political class. Yet the premises for German policy toward its past were rather different in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As this article will argue, this was precisely the period when a paradigm shift in policy toward Israel was taking place behind closed doors. The prevailing concept in Bonn up to that point, which one might call a statute-of-limitations paradigm, was being replaced by a postulate of lasting responsibility. This does not mean that from then on the Federal Republic gave its uncritical support to the state of Israel in all matters. However, the political mainstream was increasingly acknowledging that, despite the coming of age of a new generation, Germany's interaction with the Jewish state could not be decoupled from the Nazi past, and therefore German foreign policy was bound by commitments, at least when it came to tough questions concerning the existence and security of Israel. The Israel Clause of 1982 did not cause this paradigm shift, but as a token of official government policy it did manifest that change in a particularly striking way.

In the following pages I will consider how the clause emerged in the context of the debate about tank sales to Saudi Arabia, and why it marked a turning point whose trajectory continued well after the Schmidt/Genscher government was no longer in power. Given that the protocol note has been largely overlooked in the existing literature on the topic,[5] this analysis offers a new perspective on the continuities and ruptures in the history of German-Israeli relations.

So far, the development of German-Israeli relations under Schmidt's chancellorship has been only rudimentarily researched on the basis of archival sources.[6] There is also no comprehensive study that covers the controversy over a weapons deal with Riyadh using internal government sources.[7] One of the reasons for this is that researchers have long neglected the history of West German policy on arms exports.[8] None of Schmidt's numerous biographers has treated the tank controversy in any detail, let alone placed it in the larger context of Bonn's handling of weapons exports.[9]

For this article, relevant files were examined from the Federal Archives in Koblenz, the Political Archive of the Foreign Office in Berlin—published in

part as *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*—and the two Schmidt archives in Bonn and Hamburg.[10] Documents from the Israel State Archives in Jerusalem were also consulted that—thanks to the regular reports of the Israeli embassy in Bonn—provide a range of information on the West German decision-making process.[11] Since the role of nongovernmental actors is important for the argument presented here, press commentaries and parliamentary minutes from both countries were also used as sources.

The available archival material does not provide a complete picture of how the Israel Clause originated and what consequences it had. However, some basic features of the protocol note can be outlined. First, it was not only of rhetorical significance, but it had operative consequences for Bonn's arms export policy. During the internal decision-making process, officials at the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt, AA) and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, BMWi) treated the clause as one argument among several against supplying Saudi Arabia with battle tanks, even after power changed hands in October 1982 from the Social–Liberal coalition of Schmidt/Genscher to the Christian Democratic–Liberal government of Kohl/Genscher.[12] At the same time, the clause offered room for interpretation. As a BSR decision of December 1982 shows, for example, the clause did not preclude the shipment of German patrol boats to Saudi Arabia, as these were less threatening to Israel than battle tanks.[13] And to be clear: the central aim of the Israel Clause of 1982 was not to facilitate weapons sales to the Jewish state but to prevent certain arms exports to Arab customers.

Second, the protocol note had a specific function within the context of the revised Political Principles governing arms exports adopted in 1982. With this clause, Genscher sought to create an instrument that, specifically with respect to the Middle East region, could serve as a corrective to the general easing of restrictions in Bonn's arms export policy as permitted by the new guidelines. Without the Israel Clause, it would indeed have been possible to interpret the revised principles in a way that justified the tank deal with Saudi Arabia.

Third, whereas the new principles themselves were published, the Israel Clause remained top secret. Representatives of the federal government did not use the clause to appease the Israelis, not even in confidential settings. For months the Israeli foreign ministry and the embassy in the West German capital had meticulously followed the decision-making process in Bonn on arms exports to the Gulf monarchy, yet even they were completely unaware of the BSR decision.[14] Thus, the Israel Clause was a strictly internal, self-imposed commitment of the West German government.

Background

Generally speaking, one can say that German-Israeli relations were going through a difficult phase during Schmidt's chancellorship, even though societal exchanges between the two countries were on the upswing. The bilateral relationship between Bonn and Jerusalem had been repeatedly strained since the early 1970s, chiefly due to differences of opinion over the Middle East conflict.[15] These differences intensified when Menachem Begin became Israel's prime minister in 1977—as the first representative of the nationalist-conservative Likud party to head the government.[16] Although the Begin government signed a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, it faced international criticism for a series of political and military steps such as the acceleration of Jewish settlement in occupied Palestinian areas and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982.[17] In turn, the arms export policy of the Bonn government had already caused serious tension between Israel and West Germany in 1978. Contrary to Israeli demands, the Schmidt/Genscher government did not prevent the shipment of thousands of coproduced German-French anti-tank missiles from France to Syria.[18] As opposition leader, Begin had rejected any German-Israeli reconciliation for decades.[19] However, once he became prime minister, he adopted a pragmatic stance in his dealings with Bonn. This was demonstrated, for example, in 1977 when he renewed the standing invitation to Schmidt to visit Israel.[20] This was treated dilatorily by the chancellor and eventually rejected.[21]

The factors shaping the situation of West Germany in the early 1980s were an economic crisis, the heightening of the East-West conflict, and the growing importance of the Bonn government on the international stage.[22] All of them could help to steer West Germany along a path toward easing restrictions on arms exports, particularly to the strategically important oil supplier Saudi Arabia. However, as the 1980s began, a sociocultural change took place that has been characterized by contemporary historians as the "return of history"[23] and that may have played a significant role in influencing decision-making with regard to arms export deals. Whereas a future-oriented zeitgeist had predominated in the 1960s and early 1970s, now a revival of historical memory occurred on a broad scale that brought a renewed focus on the Nazi period and the mass crimes perpetrated during it. The American television series *Holocaust*, which was aired on West German television in early 1979, is generally considered a turning point in the history of remembrance for the Federal Republic.[24] That same year, the country witnessed the last political debate on the statute of limitations for Nazi crimes, at the end of which the Bundestag decided to remove time limits on prosecution for murder.[25] The

process of confronting and coming to terms with National Socialism and the Holocaust became an increasingly central aspect of the political culture of the Federal Republic. This change was evident on the local level, where civic engagement brought forth an abundance of commemorative initiatives.[26] It also affected the role of the federal government, as perceived by itself and presented publicly. This can be seen, for example, in the commemoration held in the Cologne synagogue in November 1978 and attended by the highest representatives of state and society to mark the fortieth anniversary of *Kristallnacht*, the "Night of Broken Glass."[27]

In the literature on West German commemorative culture, one question has remained rather neglected to date: Did this turning point in attitudes to historical remembrance have an impact on Bonn's foreign policy, particularly with regard to Israel? And if so, what kind of impact? Conversely, research on the history of German-Israeli relations has by and large hardly considered to what extent they were affected by changes in public remembrance of the Holocaust. Instead, scholars have often treated Holocaust memory as a fixed variable that has always shaped the relationship between the two countries in the same way. Therefore, this article also offers a case study showing that the dynamics of German-Israeli relations as an issue of international history can only be sufficiently explained if one includes the history of memory dimension.

Bonn's Interest in a Tank Deal with Saudi Arabia

Before the public learned in January 1981 that Bonn was considering tank shipments to Riyadh, the government had already been pondering the issue internally for several months, following a state visit to West Germany by Saudi King Khalid in June 1980. The visit was preceded by two letters, one from the Saudi king to German Federal President Karl Carstens, and the second from Crown Prince Fahd—the Gulf monarchy's de facto head of government—to Chancellor Schmidt. The key purpose of these confidential messages was to request approval for the purchase of German tanks, specifically the Leopard II battle tank, the Gepard anti-aircraft tank, and the Marder infantry fighting vehicle (IFV).[28] According to internal German government information, the Saudis wished to purchase 240 to 280 units of the Leopard II alone.[29]

The Leopard II first entered service in the West German Army in 1979 and was considered one of the best battle tanks in the world.[30] Fitted with a 120 mm smoothbore cannon produced by the Düsseldorf company Rheinmetall—at the time the most modern tank gun in the West[31]—it was superior in fire-

power not only to contemporary US models but also to Israel's new Merkava battle tank.[32]

Had Bonn approved the shipment of weapons requested by Riyadh, this would have been tantamount to a breach of West German guidelines for exporting arms. The Political Principles in force at the time had been approved by the Brandt/Scheel cabinet in 1971 and were fundamentally restrictive.[33] They stipulated that weapons of war, such as heavy tanks, could only be sent to the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and NATO-equivalent countries (such as Switzerland). Exceptions were possible in special cases, but then only if the recipient country was not located in an "area of tension." This criterion clearly excluded Saudi Arabia, since it was in a state of war with Israel. Although the volume of arms exports from West Germany increased rapidly over the course of the 1970s,[34] Riyadh's repeated requests to buy German tanks were always turned down by the West German government.[35] This did not mean that Israel was given any sort of preferential treatment—while the Social–Liberal coalition government was in power, Bonn also refused to deliver weapons of war to Israel.[36]

In the spring of 1980, the officials responsible for arms exports at the Foreign Office and the Ministry for Economic Affairs unanimously recommended the rejection of the most recent tank request from Saudi Arabia.[37] However, by that fall Chancellor Schmidt had shifted to a position of easing arms export policy toward the Saudi kingdom. The archival sources refute the legend that Schmidt propagated on his own behalf, and continued to cultivate into his twilight years, namely that, as chancellor, he had never had the political will to fulfill Riyadh's request for Leopard II tanks.[38] The question as to whether Schmidt ever made a pledge to that effect to the Gulf monarchy (as the Saudis later maintained)[39] or not (as he himself would insist) remains open.[40] However, proof that he argued internally in December 1980 in favor of the tank deal with Riyadh is provided by the minutes of the weekly meetings of the coalition partners at the time, when the top government leadership came together with the heads of the coalition parties and their respective parliamentary groups—the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Even though the notes are partly written in an abbreviated form, they indicate clearly that Schmidt advocated the approval of the Saudi request. The notes recorded, for example, that the chancellor "points to large Saudi deutsche mark holdings as an additional justification for his position."[41]

Schmidt did not receive wholehearted support for his stance from those present, but they did not categorically oppose him either. Genscher indicated

ambiguously that he "leaned" toward Schmidt's standpoint.[42] SPD Chairman Willy Brandt remarked that if the government "has to say 'yes,' well, I don't have to say 'Amen'"; he would "sell" a decision in favor of an arms deal "as well as I can." At the same time, together with the party's vice-chair, Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, Brandt recommended talking to Israel first.[43] Wischnewski predicted that the government in Jerusalem would ultimately not put up any resistance, but would "make considerable counterdemands"—something Genscher disputed: "Israel will say flat out 'no.'" Both the foreign minister and SPD Executive Director Egon Bahr urged consultation with the three Allied powers; if they agreed, said Bahr, "then we should act."[44] As a result of this internal discussion, it was agreed that the federal government would revise the Political Principles for Arms Exports.[45] What was needed, Genscher maintained, was a "new philosophy for arms exports."[46]

If the federal government was apparently leaning toward approving the Leopard II deal with Riyadh in late 1980, this can be understood as an expression of rational interest politics. The deliberations in Bonn were not just focused on securing jobs for the German arms industry.[47] Among other things, the backdrop to the Saudi tank debate was the second oil crisis of 1979/80.[48] The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the war between Iran and Iraq that broke out in September 1980 throttled oil production in both countries, thus making Saudi Arabia the most important oil supplier for West Germany.[49] In fall 1980, Schmidt personally interceded with Crown Prince Fahd to obtain an extension and quantitative expansion of the existing contract for the supply of crude oil between the German firm VEBA Oel AG and the Saudi state-owned corporation Petromin.[50] Fahd agreed, apparently in the tacit expectation that Bonn would reciprocate in the area of arms exports.[51] Shortly afterward, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal traveled to Bonn, where he is said to have offered Schmidt comprehensive economic and financial cooperation between the Gulf monarchy and the Federal Republic. *Der Spiegel* reported that, as a quid pro quo for shipments of German tanks, a package was offered consisting of Saudi loans at attractive conditions and the purchase of German industrial plants to offset the cost of the oil provided, as well as financial investments by the kingdom in German companies.[52]

In the face of the difficult economic situation in which West Germany found itself, this was an attractive offer. In 1979 and 1980 the country recorded current account deficits for the first time in fifteen years and was suffering from rising unemployment.[53] In 1980 the West German government had already received approximately 9 billion deutsche marks in loans from Saudi Arabia, its largest foreign creditor; in 1981 it requested (and received) additional billions

from Riyadh.[54] Moreover, the Saudi kingdom was a solvent customer of West German companies. In January 1981 Saudi Arabia accounted for no less than 70 percent of all foreign orders in the German construction industry.[55] The economic prospects of the German-Saudi relationship seemed likely to improve if the tank deal with Riyadh was realized—even if Bonn could not ultimately know whether these prospects would be endangered should the deal fail.

In addition, the East-West conflict injected a security dimension into all of this. In 1979 the Middle East experienced two earth-shattering events: the overthrow of the pro-Western shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which once again heightened Cold War tensions after a decade of détente.[56] In January 1980 President Jimmy Carter identified the Persian Gulf as a vital sphere of influence for the United States that would be defended with military means if necessary.[57] Western arms exports to the allied country of Saudi Arabia, whose chief supplier was traditionally the United States, became even more important strategically. In spring 1981, shortly after Ronald Reagan took office as the new president, Washington announced its intention to equip the Saudis with AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) surveillance aircraft—an armament project worth billions that Israel protested against vehemently but unsuccessfully.[58] At the same time, the United States demanded that its European allies help shoulder the burden incurred by the military protection of the oil resources in the Gulf region.[59] Against this backdrop, the Leopard II tank deal being considered by Bonn could also be depicted as a German contribution to an overall concept of Western defense.[60]

However, Bonn was in no way pressured by the United States to approve the tank deal; nor did the deal fail because the Americans vetoed it. The Reagan administration does not appear to have had a coherent standpoint on the issue. Washington officials gave the West German government encouraging signals,[61] while at the same time expressing reservations to Israeli diplomats about the controversial tank export deal.[62] Yet overall, the US government showed a striking reticence, bordering on indifference, regarding this issue.

The Public Debate from January to April 1981

The public discussion about a possible shipment of tanks to Riyadh peaked in the first four months of 1981—between the magazine exposé by *Der Spiegel* on January 5 and a visit by Schmidt to Saudi Arabia at the end of April, when it became clear that the Saudis could not count on an export permit any time soon. During this period strong resistance formed against the tank deal from

two sources in particular. While the coalition leadership had anticipated this resistance, it had underestimated the intensity.

One of the sources was Israel, whose government was just as surprised as the German public about Bonn's Leopard II plans.[63] The foreign ministry in Jerusalem decided to avoid a public confrontation with the West German government for the time being.[64] Even Prime Minister Begin held back during the initial months of public debate. However, Jerusalem let the West German government know unequivocally that it could not accept the German tank deal with Saudi Arabia, not even if compensatory arms deliveries went to Israel. The Israeli government also emphasized that, in light of Germany's Nazi past, it expected the Federal Republic to take special account of the security interests of the Jewish state.[65] In its protest to Bonn against the export plans, the Begin government knew that it could count on broad consensus within Israel, including from the opposition parties,[66] the parliamentarians of the Knesset,[67] and the press.[68] Schmidt alleged that the Israelis were deliberately exaggerating their sense of threat in order to demand compensation from the Germans—that is, to use it "as a pretense to hold out their hand," as the chancellor put it in a confidential setting.[69] However, he was mistaken. As their internal analyses at the time show, the Israeli security and secret intelligence agencies did indeed expect the military threat to Israel to increase significantly if Riyadh received several hundred Leopard II tanks. For one thing, they thought that the balance of power in the Middle East would shift appreciably in favor of the Arab side, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. For another, they feared that Saudi Arabia would deploy the Leopard II as part of an expeditionary force against Israel, should a full-fledged war break out in the region. (Riyadh had dispatched such a force in the Yom Kippur War of 1973.)[70]

The other source of emphatic resistance to the tank deal came from within the ranks of the coalition parties. The impact of objections from SPD and FDP Bundestag members was all the greater because they came from both the left and right wings of the two parties. Numerous spokespeople from the left-liberal spectrum opposed the tank deal, since they were generally critical of any expansion of German weapons exports. Other voices spoke out against the tank shipments by citing Germany's historically conditioned obligation to show solidarity with Israel. Prominent opponents of the tank deal included the SPD politician Annemarie Renger, chairwoman of the German-Israeli parliamentary group in the Bundestag.[71] Another was Burkhard Hirsch, head of the North Rhine-Westphalian FDP.[72] But the most prominent was Herbert Wehner, the leader of the SPD caucus in the Bundestag. During a one-on-one conversation in January 1981, Wehner "solemnly" promised the Israeli ambas-

sador Yochanan Meroz "that, come what may, the Saudi deal will not materialize."[73] Brandt and Bahr now changed their minds and opposed the deal, although they decidedly refrained from using arguments relating to Israel.[74]

This resistance in the coalition carried a special weight because, at the time of the debate on tank exports, Schmidt was fighting other policy battles with broad sections of the SPD. In addition to the strife over economic and energy policy, he was having an especially hard time in making the case for the NATO Double-Track Decision of 1979, then the dominant topic of West German foreign and security policy.[75] It was widely thought at the time that the chancellor could hardly ask his party to support him on yet another controversial issue, because otherwise he would risk losing his backing among the SPD Bundestag members on the missile deployment issue.

Publicly, Schmidt did not speak out explicitly in favor of the arms deal with Saudi Arabia, but he hinted that the federal government would consider Riyadh's request favorably in light of its economic and strategic implications.[76] Other coalition members campaigned hard to have the exports approved, including SPD Vice-Chair Wischnewski and the FDP foreign affairs expert Jürgen Möllemann.[77] Economy Minister Lambsdorff was also considered a supporter of the deal, although he refrained from taking a stand publicly.[78] The opposition Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was divided over the issue.[79] The party's leader, Helmut Kohl, signaled his conditional approval,[80] while the party's general secretary, Heiner Geißler, took the opposite stance.[81] The Christian Social Union (CSU) under Bavarian Minister President Franz Josef Strauß supported the tank deal.[82] In this regard it was said—including by Israeli diplomats[83]—that the party was primarily representing the interests of the Bavarian arms industry.[84] The commentaries in the West German press offered a broad spectrum of opinion, with proponents and opponents of the arms deal more or less balancing each other out. Here, too, the critical voices offered a mixed bag of arguments: some focused on the present-day situation, while others referred to Germany's role in World War II; some underscored the need for specific consideration of Israel, while others ignored this aspect.[85] The greatest pressure in favor of an arms export approval came from business representatives. In alarmist statements, the Federation of German Industries (BDI) and both the oil and the construction industries claimed that the Saudis would be likely to impose heavy economic sanctions on West Germany should their wish to receive the tanks be rejected[86]—a scenario that did not materialize. Among the opponents of the arms deal were the trade unions, including both IG Metall (Industrial Union of Metalworkers) and representatives of the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB).[87]

A "Raw Materials Criterion" for Arms Exports?

In light of the widespread opposition to the planned exports, there was some speculation in February and March 1981 that the West German government had already decided to say "no."[88] Certainly, Schmidt did not feel that he was in a position to give his Saudi hosts a positive answer on the tank issue when he set out, in late April 1981, on his highly anticipated visit to Riyadh. At the same time, however, Schmidt did not want this hesitancy to be interpreted as a final rejection. In a confidential talk with Crown Prince Fahd, he indicated that the sale of Leopard II tanks might be possible in the medium term, once the federal government had revised its arms export principles. Schmidt reassured Fahd that everyone in Germany knew "that he advocated the arms delivery to Saudi Arabia."[89]

By this time, the process of revising the Political Principles had already begun. The central actor in this process was the executive branch, represented by the Federal Chancellery, the AA, the BMWi, and the Federal Defense Ministry (BMVg). Parliamentary input was provided by two working groups of the SPD and FDP Bundestag caucuses.[90] Initially, the government appeared to be taking the tack proposed by the coalition talks, namely, revising the export guidelines in a way that cleared the path for tank deliveries to Saudi Arabia. On March 24, 1981, Schmidt and Genscher discussed the intended process of reform. Based on the "ideas expressed then," as the records note, the AA produced a paper in cooperation with the Chancellery, the BMWi, and the BMVg that laid out fundamental considerations for the future Political Principles. According to the paper, the term "area of tension" (*Spannungsgebiet*) was to be retained as a general concept, while at the same time criteria were to be defined that would permit the delivery of weapons to such regions in exceptional circumstances. Three possible criteria were listed, subsumed under the concept of "overriding security and alliance policy interests." The first two points were "strengthening the defense capabilities of a friendly state" and "enhancing regional stability." Whereas these two criteria might apply to Saudi Arabia in a general sense, the third was tailor-made for this country: "Also with regard to existential problems of securing energy and raw materials, exceptions should be possible in certain individual cases."[91]

The paper was conceived as the basis for a discussion on the arms export principles at the April 1 meeting of the Federal Security Council (BSR). At this meeting, the BSR formally commissioned the four relevant ministries—under the leadership of the BMWi—with the task of examining and revising the existing regulations from 1971. One of the central questions of this study

was to assess "whether and, if so, to what degree considerations that pertain to safeguarding the supply of raw materials and energy could and should be included in the decision-making criteria." As things developed, the BMWi would eventually propose to answer this last question positively by incorporating a "raw materials criterion"—the term used in the records—in the new arms export guidelines.[92] To that effect, the first BMWi draft for the new guidelines, presented in mid-June, stated that exceptions could be made to the ban on arms exports to areas of tension, should this affect the "existential economic interests of securing the supply of energy and raw materials" for the Federal Republic.[93]

Genscher's Dual Course

Foreign Minister Genscher's position in the controversy over possible tank exports to Saudi Arabia puzzled both the public and Israeli diplomats.[94] Outwardly, the FDP leader was a master at avoiding any appearance of taking a definite stand one way or the other.[95] Later he would maintain that he had always opposed supplying Saudi Arabia with tanks.[96] Yet the evolution of the proposed "raw materials criterion" for the revised arms export principles demonstrates that the minister was originally involved in the effort to create political leeway for weapons sales to Saudi Arabia. This is also supported by other evidence. On January 18, 1981, Genscher said in a ZDF television interview that West German arms exports could "be an instrument in pursuing our national security interests, our energy policy interests."[97] At the same time, the Foreign Office's policy planning staff presented an internal position paper that supported a limited relaxation of Bonn's arms export policy. The main argument became that shipments of arms to areas of tension in the Third World could, under certain circumstances, have a "peace-enhancing" impact, if they helped correct an imbalance of military power in the region.[98] This was a break—presumably brought about by Genscher—with the stance previously taken by the AA ministerial bureaucracy.

However, it is evident that Genscher was pursuing two different courses simultaneously, for he also committed himself early on to the principle that the West German government must live up to its historical responsibility toward Israel when deciding whether or not to export tanks to Saudi Arabia. He professed this in a confidential conversation with Ambassador Meroz on January 16, 1981, and repeated this commitment shortly afterward in the above-mentioned ZDF television interview and in a speech he gave in the Bundestag.[99] What is more, Genscher made this postulate of responsibility

toward Israel the official position of his party and its parliamentary group. On January 26 he publicly announced the contents of a position paper produced by the FDP parliamentary group on federal arms export policy. This happened after the group—in his presence—had held a tumultuous meeting. Numerous FDP Bundestag members had taken umbrage at a draft by Jürgen Möllemann, because they assumed its purpose was to pave the way for a tank deal with Riyadh.[100] Genscher now summarized the "agreement achieved" in six principles which the FDP later approved at a national party conference held in Cologne that May. The paper confirmed the restrictive nature of Bonn's arms export policy, but kept the door open for possible relaxations by stating that the criteria for arms exports "may need to be redefined and specified more precisely." Whereas the first five points were of a general nature, the sixth was directly applicable to the situation of a possible arms shipment to Riyadh: "Arms exports to the Middle East must take into account the security interests of Israel and the historical responsibility of the Germans toward the Jewish people."[101]

This wording in the FDP paper provided the draft formulation, as it were, for the Israel Clause that was approved by the BSR a year later on Genscher's initiative. In the perception of the West German press at the time and also of historians later, the impact of Genscher's program point went largely unremarked, as if this reference to the country's past had been mere rhetoric without any consequences for the decision-making process on tank exports to Saudi Arabia.[102] This view may have originated in the fact that, of all the established political parties, it was the FDP that had a reputation for keeping its distance from Israel; yet now the party was adopting a postulate of responsibility for Israel as its own.[103] For their part, the parliamentary groups of the SPD and the CDU/CSU did not include a call for any specific consideration of the Jewish state in their policy positions during the arms export debate of 1981/82.[104]

Thus, Genscher strove to achieve two objectives that were bound to come into conflict with one another sooner or later. He was working to create the conditions necessary for an arms deal with Saudia Arabia that the entire political class of Israel—for whose security he felt especially responsible—would protest against. While it is possible that Genscher just wanted to be prepared for any contingency, there is also a more obvious explanation for the apparently contradictory nature of his course. In the early months of 1981, Israeli Prime Minister Begin was expected to lose the upcoming Knesset elections in the early summer and to be replaced in office by the then opposition leader Shimon Peres.[105] This assumption turned out to be wrong. However, during a

visit to Bonn in January 1981, Peres had likewise given his German hosts mixed signals, leaving the impression that he might possibly accept an arrangement coupling the export of German tanks to Saudi Arabia with parallel arms shipments to Israel.[106]

"To Free Oneself from All These Things": Schmidt's Rhetoric of Drawing a Line

Genscher may have been banking on a transition of power in Jerusalem to reconcile the objective of arms exports to Riyadh with the claim of special solidarity with Israel. By contrast, various statements by Schmidt indicate that the chancellor sought the arms deal precisely as a way to demonstrate that West Germany's foreign policy had emancipated itself from the moral constraints resulting from the Nazi era.[107]

Shortly before he traveled to Saudi Arabia in late April 1981, Schmidt gave an interview to the editors-in-chief of three Saudi newspapers. When asked directly about West Germany's link to its wartime past, Schmidt emphasized that German-Israeli relations were treated as "normal relations."[108] In a ZDF television interview, the chancellor was asked whether "consideration for and an obligation toward Israel" were reasons for the Bonn government to place restrictions on arms exports to Saudi Arabia. Schmidt answered brusquely (and rather evasively): "No, we do not allow any other country or the government of another country to tell us what we can or cannot do."[109] Once in Riyadh, he had to disappoint his hosts for the time being on the tank issue. Speaking off the record with German journalists on his journey back from the Gulf region, Schmidt was asked how he might position himself in the future in order to still be able to realize the arms deal with the Saudis. He answered: "We Germans have to put behind us slowly and incrementally all of the eggshells that my generation brought with it from World War II. It cannot be that German foreign policy in the 1990s will still be overshadowed by Auschwitz." He conceded that this might be difficult for people of his age; but the next generation would have to learn "to conduct politics in the interest of our people." He added: "They have to be able to free themselves from all these things."[110] Later in this conversation, Schmidt accused those in Bonn who criticized the proposed arms deal with Saudi Arabia of "using German foreign policy to vent the all too justified guilt complex that followed Auschwitz."[111]

The tenor of these comments was echoed in a longer interview that Schmidt gave about his Middle East policy on ARD television on April 30, 1981, which would become the immediate catalyst for the Schmidt-Begin conflict.[112] Later

it was suggested by some that the Israeli prime minister only attacked Schmidt because he had spoken out in the interview for the rights of the Palestinians.[113] However, the Schmidt/Genscher government had been doing that for years, along with other member states of the European Community.[114] What critics—and not just Begin or other Israelis—found really scandalous was the ideas that Schmidt used to underpin his Middle East policy stance, coupled with a series of allusions and omissions regarding Germany's past. He used the terms obligation, responsibility, and morality exclusively to justify pro-Arab steps—which in the context of the interview included not only taking up the Palestinian cause but also German arms shipments to Saudi Arabia.

At one point Schmidt appeared to marginalize the Holocaust in his retrospective consideration of the Nazi era—or, interpreted more benevolently, at least to decouple it from German-Israeli relations. This was apparently not an oversight but rather the logical conclusion of Schmidt's train of thought. He had, after all, started out by emphasizing that German-Arab relations were so good because the Arabs had not had any negative experiences of the Germans during World War II. Here Schmidt spoke of a "historical advantage," without raising the problematic fact that some Arab actors had collaborated with the Hitler regime.[115] Schmidt contrasted the allegedly unclouded historical state of German-Arab relations with the strains encumbering West German foreign policy in relation to other peoples and countries on account of Germany's Nazi past. While he explicitly mentioned the Dutch, Danes, Norwegians, French, Greeks, and Italians, "to name but a few," his list excluded Jewish victims, the Holocaust, and relations with Israel, as well as Russians, Poles, and all other peoples of Eastern and Southeastern Europe.[116] In light of all his statements in this interview, it was easy to get the impression that Schmidt was determined to banish completely the memory of the Jewish annihilation from Bonn's Middle East policy. The impact of his words was intensified by the timing of the interview, which was held, of all days, on Yom HaShoah, Holocaust Remembrance Day in Israel.

Surprisingly, Schmidt's 1981 rhetoric of drawing a line under the Nazi past made far less of a mark on the critical consciousness of subsequent generations than, for example, the widely rebuked yet more moderate formulation of "the blessing of a late birth," with which his successor, Helmut Kohl, during a trip to Israel three years later, tried to signal his own unencumberedness with respect to Germany's past.[117] What helped Schmidt at the time was the reaction of the Israeli prime minister to the ARD interview—a reaction which was so polemical and overblown that the words that had prompted it paled into insignificance, at least in the eyes of some German observers.

Not only did Begin publicly accuse the chancellor of "arrogance and impudence" and insinuate that he was motivated by "greed" in his dealings with Riyadh.[118] The Israeli prime minister also reproached Schmidt for his personal past in the Wehrmacht and characterized him as an officer who had remained loyal to the regime and "never rescinded his oath of loyalty to his führer Adolf Hitler." At the same time, Begin suggested that Schmidt was at least indirectly complicit in the annihilation of the Jews owing to his deployment to the Eastern Front in 1941.[119] His claim that Schmidt was present at the execution of the conspirators in the plot to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944, was absurd. In fact, the former first lieutenant had been commanded by the Reich Ministry of Aviation to observe the trials of some of these men held in the so-called People's Court.[120] Furthermore, Begin explicitly accused the entire German war generation of being collectively guilty for the Holocaust, in which Begin's parents and brother had perished.[121] He said he had never forgiven the German people as a whole. He repeated variations of these reproaches, first made at a political party event on May 3, 1981, for an entire month—in a radio interview, at election campaign appearances, and in the Knesset.[122] His comments led to an intense controversy in the public sphere of both countries that would become known in the history of German-Israeli relations as the Schmidt-Begin conflict.

The Schmidt-Begin Conflict as a Turning Point

Until now, researchers have usually emphasized that the Schmidt-Begin conflict led to a general alienation and a strong polarization in German-Israeli relations.[123] This is not incorrect, yet at the same time this crisis also seems to have acted as a kind of catalyst that gave lasting validity to the postulate of historical responsibility for Israel, at least in West Germany's political class. It is true that politicians and the media in the Federal Republic were virtually united in their opposition to Prime Minister Begin's statements, while the Israeli public was united in its condemnation of Schmidt's interview remarks. Yet this does not mean that the chancellor received no criticism within Germany, just as Begin was accused by many commentators in Israel of having damaged the country's interests with his political style.[124]

The resonance in West Germany was actually quite nuanced. On the one hand, politicians and journalists were outraged.[125] They repudiated both Begin's personal attacks on Schmidt and the claim of a German collective guilt.[126] He was frequently accused of using this invective for electioneering purposes.[127] At the same time, the tenor of some comments was that Begin was abusing

the memory of the Holocaust to disqualify criticism of Israel's treatment of the Palestinians. Some voices drew parallels between Nazi crimes and Israel's policy of occupation, and referred to Begin's own past as a commander of the militant underground organization Irgun.[128] Other commentators accused him of ingratitude in light of the reparation payments made by the Federal Republic.[129] Sometimes antisemitic stereotypes shone through, such as when it was suggested that Begin was driven by an Old Testament desire for vengeance.[130]

On the other hand, the protests against Begin, vehement as they were, remained astonishingly defensive with respect to historical-political arguments. At any rate, the controversy with Israel's prime minister did little to advance Schmidt's original objective, namely, to free Bonn's Middle East policy from the "shadow of Auschwitz." In May 1981 it was rather exceptional to find a West German public opinion leader who explicitly called for decoupling relations with Israel from historically determined considerations.[131]

Indeed, the Schmidt-Begin affair appears to have advanced the opposite tendency in the Federal Republic. More clearly than ever before, politicians from both the governing and opposition parties invoked, during the Bundestag debate in which Begin's comments were discussed and unanimously repudiated, a historically rooted responsibility of the Germans for Israel.[132] Even Schmidt, who had just propagated drawing a line under Germany's Nazi past with regard to Israel, now spoke of the Federal Republic's "special historical responsibility" toward the Jewish people, which "naturally" included the state of Israel and also applied to the postwar generation in Germany.[133] However, the chancellor did not publicly address the accusations Begin had leveled against him. Foreign Minister Genscher, who had already accepted a historical responsibility for Israel's national security before the Schmidt-Begin conflict, now went a step further by relating this postulate to Bonn's own interests: "There is no contradiction between our interests and what we feel to be our historical responsibility."[134]

The reactions of the West German press were not limited solely to countering Begin's attacks. In numerous editorials, commentators asked critically whether the German government had recently failed to show the necessary solidarity with Israel. For example, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, a daily newspaper not known for taking a pro-Israeli stance, asked: "Haven't we . . . tried to suppress, more unconsciously than consciously, the always 'special' relationship with this country as something that is inconvenient in practice, and sometimes hinders the course of diplomacy and of commerce?"[135] The commitment to solidarity with Israel and the criticism of Begin were by no means mutually

exclusive; indeed, the tenor of many of the statements was that German-Israeli cooperation had to be protected from the attacks of the prime minister.

For West Germany's foreign affairs community, the Schmidt-Begin conflict was evidently a shock; as a result, the value of good relations with Israel was reassessed. For a time, there appeared to be a real danger that the entire process of German-Israeli reconciliation might collapse, which could hardly be in the interest of the Federal Republic. Moreover, the conflict also endangered Bonn's relations with the American Jewish community. This became plain inter alia during Schmidt's visit to the United States in the second half of May 1981—his first visit there since Ronald Reagan had become president—when a meeting with the top leadership of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations almost ended in embarrassment. Schmidt threatened at one point to leave the session when his Jewish counterparts repeatedly criticized him for his interview remarks.[136]

The decisionmakers in Bonn were certainly concerned that a rift with American-Jewish organizations could harm the reputation of the Federal Republic in the eyes of the US public, and thereby negatively affect German-American relations as such. The fact that public Holocaust remembrance had gained considerable weight in the United States during the 1970s also played a role—a development Schmidt was well aware of.[137] In January 1982 Yitzhak Ben-Ari, Meroz's successor as Israeli ambassador, reported from Bonn to Jerusalem that Schmidt had informed his advisers of his change of mind on the issue of shipping tanks to Saudi Arabia. It was assumed "that Schmidt had taken into account the relations between the United States and the FRG and had changed his decision for that reason as well."[138]

In light of the potential impact on international politics that could be anticipated—in addition to the domestic opposition—the cost-benefit calculation of a possible tank deal with the Saudis may have changed considerably in Bonn, even though the Reagan administration did not oppose the German arms shipments to Riyadh. Schmidt obviously had to acknowledge that there were red lines in German-Israeli relations that it would be risky to cross. The West German government drew at least one major lesson from the harsh conflict between Bonn and Jerusalem, namely, that a sensitive approach to bilateral relations with Israel was less an obstacle than a prerequisite for being able to play an active and balanced role in the Middle East conflict.[139]

From such a perspective, acknowledging its historical responsibility for Israel's security could well have appeared to be a necessary conflict-avoidance strategy for German policy; this postulate was thus no longer merely an expression of a moral (and, cynically speaking, dispensable) attitude. At the

same time, it can be argued that, ultimately, there was only one way out for the German government in the tank export controversy, if it wanted to avoid the humiliation of bowing to the pressure of Israel and its German supporters: to impose a commitment on itself to recognize Germany's responsibility toward the Jewish state by virtue of its own sovereignty.

Here it is important to bear in mind the difference between responsibility and obligation. During the Schmidt-Begin controversy, the Israeli public asserted more vehemently than ever before the Federal Republic's obligation to support Israel for historical reasons.[140] This was evidently a reflex reaction to Schmidt's message (as perceived by the Israelis) that the Germans were in debt to the Arabs. Bonn may have realized that rather than repudiate them, it was far more opportune to reinterpret the Israeli claims to suit its own interests; in other words, to accept not an obligation to but a responsibility for Israel. This could be left open to Germany's own interpretation and in cases of doubt could also legitimize criticism of the Israeli government.

It is explicable why this type of self-imposed commitment was kept secret in 1982. Apparently, Schmidt was concerned that both he and the Saudis could lose face if it looked as though the tank sales were being denied owing to Bonn's concern for Israel. The confidential protocol note, however, gave the German government an internal instrument with which to avoid clashes with Israel over arms shipments to Arab customers, while allowing Schmidt not to revise publicly his previous statements about deciding questions of arms exports without any historically determined qualms.

Turning Down Riyadh despite the New Arms Export Guidelines

For the German government, the Schmidt-Begin conflict was obviously a turning point in its policy toward Israel, which also had an impact on the decision-making process regarding tank sales to Saudi Arabia and the ongoing revision of its arms export principles. In the second half of 1981, Schmidt and Genscher abandoned the idea that Leopard II tanks might still be delivered to Riyadh, at least in the medium term. At two meetings with representatives of American-Jewish organizations that summer, the chancellor now boasted that he had turned down what would have been a lucrative arms deal for West Germany with the Saudis out of special consideration for Israel.[141] In early October, Genscher let it be known at a press conference in Qatar that in the future Bonn would not be approving arms sales to Israel or other countries in the Middle East—which was widely interpreted as an abandonment of the tank deal.[142] Genscher sent a similar negative signal when he met Saudi

Crown Prince Fahd later that month at the North-South Summit in Cancún, Mexico.[143]

As far as the revision of the arms export guidelines was concerned, that summer the AA directorate-general for economic affairs urged that, contrary to the BMWi's original intention, the "raw materials criterion" should not be explicitly declared as a new exceptional case for possible arms deliveries to areas of tension.[144] The point was to avoid giving the impression to the outside world that the West German government was creating a special arrangement for Saudi Arabia and planned to base its arms export policy on an "oil for arms" business model in the future.[145] At the same time, the directorate-general for economic affairs pointed out that the security of Germany's supply of energy and raw materials could be subsumed implicitly under the heading of "overriding security policy concerns," which would constitute a general criterion permitting exceptional arms exports to areas of tension.[146] The BMWi accepted the proposal to record this conceptual connection—in which security policy also encompassed securing raw materials—in a protocol note to the new Political Principles. Genscher reacted to this by announcing that he, for his part, would enter an "Israel caveat" in the record.[147]

At the working level, the other ministries and the Chancellery immediately approved the notion—as suggested by the AA—to take into account "the historical responsibility of the Germans toward the Jewish people" with regard to arms exports to the Middle East.[148] The records do not indicate that Genscher met with any opposition to his initiative from Schmidt, Economy Minister Lambsdorff, or the other ministers represented in the BSR. Subsequently, on March 3, 1982, the Israel Clause was accepted as worded above by the committee,[149] before the BSR passed the new arms export principles at another meeting on April 28, 1982.[150]

Without the Israel Clause, the revised guidelines could well have been interpreted in a way that would have justified the Saudi tank deal. For even though they tightened the regulations in certain ways,[151] overall they brought about a decisive relaxation. For one thing, the previous ban on shipping war weapons to areas of tension was replaced with the laxer stipulation that arms shipments to non-NATO countries were not allowed "to contribute to an intensification of existing tensions" (clause 13). For another, the new guidelines included a rather elastic clause stating that the export of war weapons to non-NATO countries could be approved if, "in individual cases, vital interests of the Federal Republic of Germany speak in favor of an exceptional authorization" (clause 9). Naturally, the safeguarding of West Germany's oil supply could have been considered a "vital interest."

When the main elements of the revised guidelines (excluding the Israel Clause) became publicly known in February 1982, the German press did indeed expect that it would now be possible to legitimize the tank deal with Riyadh.[152] The Saudi leadership also appears to have interpreted this in the same way. In early March, by way of the West German ambassador to Jeddah, the Saudis officially renewed their request to purchase Leopard II tanks.[153] However, by mid-March, that is, two weeks after the Israel Clause had been passed by the BSR, the Chancellery was preparing to issue a final rejection of Riyadh's request.[154] The negative news was delivered to the Saudis twice—first in early June in Bonn by Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, who handed the Saudi chargé d'affaires a pertinent non-paper from the Foreign Office, and four weeks later by the German ambassador to Jeddah, who met with Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikh Mansouri to inform him about the matter.[155]

Even before this, on May 26, 1982, Helmut Schmidt had made a public remark that attracted attention. At an appearance before the Foreign Press Association in Bonn, the Israeli TV correspondent Zvi Lidar asked him whether the shipment of tanks to Riyadh would be possible according to the new arms export guidelines. Schmidt answered by saying that he wanted finally to put a "legend" to rest. At no point in time, stated the chancellor, could any state in the Middle East have assumed that the Federal Republic "would have wanted to sell or permitted the sale of battle tanks [to it], neither according to the old principles nor according to the new ones."[156]

Historical Responsibility for Israel: A New Concept

The secret protocol note of 1982 had implications far beyond the short-term political context of a possible arms deal with Saudi Arabia. In fact, the norm then established by the BSR regarding the handling of Germany's past marked a turning point in the history of West Germany's Israel policy in general. This assertion might seem surprising. Today, the view is often expressed by Germany's political class that taking special account of the Jewish state in light of the Nazi past has been a constant feature of (West) German foreign policy since the founding of the Federal Republic. For example, Chancellor Angela Merkel depicted it in this way when she declared in her oft-cited speech before the Knesset in 2008 that Israel's security was part of Germany's raison d'être. She placed her declaration in the context of a continuity in German policy that had supposedly existed for decades: "Every German government and every German chancellor before me were committed to Germany's special historical

responsibility for Israel's security."[157] Similar assessments can be found in many journalistic or academic contributions.[158]

If one looks at Schmidt's two predecessors in the Chancellor's Office who were pioneers in foreign policy, the assumption that the Federal Republic has maintained a continuity in its Israel policy seems plausible at first. Both Konrad Adenauer and Willy Brandt are rightly regarded as historically aware statesmen who strove for reconciliation in the shadow of the Nazi era, keeping foremost in their minds the atrocities perpetrated against the Jews. Nevertheless, the protocol note of the Schmidt/Genscher government was not in line with the Israel policy of the two former chancellors.

This becomes evident when the characteristics of the 1982 BSR clause are examined more closely. First, the postulate of responsibility toward Israel was formally fixed and declared to be the general norm for an entire field of German foreign policy. Second, for Bonn's foreign policy, the Israel Clause obviously implied a lasting commitment that was not subject to any time limit, such as might have occurred with the passing of generations on the German and the Israeli side. Third, with the protocol note, the German government showed its willingness to accept political or economic costs on behalf of Israel—namely, by refraining from certain German-Arab arms deals that might otherwise have been justified for strategic or economic reasons. And fourth, the clause defined responsibility for Israel's security as part of Germany's own national interests.

With regard to the first point, no formal directive is known to have ever been adopted by the governments led by Adenauer[159] or Brandt[160] that made Germany's responsibility toward Israel a normative guideline for their own policies. The Christian Democrat Konrad Adenauer certainly did not use the term "responsibility" in connection with the Jewish state. The central concept of his Israel policy was moral obligation.[161] In the early years of his chancellorship, he conveyed the impression that the obligation ensuing from the Holocaust could be redeemed and thus overcome—namely, through the Luxembourg Agreement on reparations that in 1952 laid the foundation for future relations between the Federal Republic and Israel. Even beyond this agreement, Adenauer granted substantial benefits to the Israeli side, especially in the form of secret arms shipments and loans worth billions.[162] However, at that time the German government was under pressure to compensate Israel for refusing to establish diplomatic relations out of fear of Arab sanctions.[163]

In later years Adenauer stated that Bonn would remain obligated to Israel, even after the material reparations had been fully paid.[164] However, his attitude remained ambivalent. In his memoirs the former chancellor emphasized the

hope that a "normalization of relations" between Israel and the Federal Republic would evolve through the reparations and "the healing power of time."[165] Adenauer set a different emphasis in a journal article that he published after his (officially private) trip to Israel in 1966. In this article he spoke of "Israel's special place in our foreign relations" and advocated that the Jewish state continue to receive "special benefits" in the future.[166]

Even though the German government under Adenauer did not officially codify such a norm, he hinted at the postulate of a lasting commitment of the Federal Republic to Israel at least after he had left office. However, it is not evident that Willy Brandt, who became chancellor in 1969 as the head of a Social–Liberal coalition, supported such a position. In dealing with the Nazi past, Chancellor Brandt oscillated between future-oriented rhetoric and appeals for the Federal Republic not to shirk responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi regime[167]—a responsibility that he himself, although exonerated from any personal guilt, was willing to bear. He demonstrated this impressively when he fell to his knees before the monument honoring the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.[168]

Yet historical responsibility was not something that Brandt's government—with Walter Scheel from the FDP serving as foreign minister—would have made a guiding principle for its bilateral relations with Israel. Instead, it followed the stated paradigm of "normalization" vis-à-vis Jerusalem and modeled its stance toward the Middle East conflict on the idea of "evenhandedness."[169] Although the chancellor repeatedly signaled an emotional commitment to the Jewish state, he sought to reconcile this commitment with the claim of an operational Israel policy that was not to be subject to the principle of historically conditioned consideration.[170] Brandt's way of expressing this dual perspective was to refer to the rather self-contradictory concept of "normal relations of a special character" that existed between the two countries.[171]

In the domestic political debate about the Nazi past, Brandt emphasized that the advent of a new generation alone would not bring about an unbiased approach to German guilt.[172] At the same time, however, he apparently saw Bonn's political obligations toward Israel and the Jews as subject to a kind of statute of limitations. In the run-up to his June 1973 visit to Israel, Brandt claimed in an interview with Israeli television that, almost three decades after the Holocaust, a growing number of his compatriots no longer felt connected to the Nazi past.[173] During the trip itself, Brandt sent similar signals. When his hosts asked him about financial compensation for a certain group of East European Holocaust survivors who had received nothing up to that point, Brandt was reluctant to answer. Among the reasons for his reticence, he

said, was "the historical fact that already now over 50 percent of the German population has been born since Hitler's war. This segment of the population, at least, expects policies oriented toward the future."[174] The idea, in the context of Bonn's Israel policy, that the crimes of the Nazi era would gradually lose importance as a consequence of demographic change was a characteristic line of argument in all political parties in the 1970s.[175]

While Brandt did indeed speak about a "special responsibility" of the Germans in the Middle East context, he interpreted this claim exclusively to mean that Bonn was obliged to promote peaceful reconciliation between the warring parties in the region.[176] What this actually meant was that the Israelis could not expect more from the Federal Republic than the Arabs could. Such a handling of historical responsibility incurred little cost for Bonn and legitimized the "even-handed" Middle East policy pursued by the Brandt/Scheel government for its own present-oriented reasons. Brandt's government did not want to jeopardize its policy of détente with the (pro-Arab) Eastern Bloc; it was a co-initiator of the common foreign policy of the European Community states, which increasingly supported Palestinian rights; and it sought to renew West German-Arab relations, which had collapsed in 1965 in the wake of Bonn's diplomatic recognition of Israel. Since the first oil crisis of 1973, concerns about the supply of oil from the Arab region also played a role in this process.[177]

This did not prevent the Brandt/Scheel government from acting in Israel's interest in some cases. For example, after the Yom Kippur War broke out in the fall of 1973, the German government at first tolerated the American transport of supplies via West German territory before prohibiting it in a highly publicized manner.[178] Likewise, the Schmidt/Genscher government supported Israeli interests on certain issues. It played a key role within the European Community, for example, in promoting the 1975 European-Israeli free trade agreement.[179] In addition, it left intact Bonn's annual development aid for Israel of 140 million deutsche marks.[180] At the same time, Schmidt and Genscher campaigned hard for the Palestinians' right to self-determination, against Israeli protests, and repeatedly went beyond the common positions of the European Community countries.[181]

The fact that historically based responsibility for Israel was not the concept that shaped Bonn's foreign policy in the 1970s is particularly evident in the Foreign Office's handling of arms exports. At that time, those responsible in the diplomatic service always opposed fulfilling the requests of Arab countries for German weaponry, but they did not justify this position with concerns about the security of the Jewish state; instead, they used the postulate

of West German neutrality in the Middle East conflict. They feared that otherwise, if they supplied arms to Arab customers, they would have to approve arms exports to Israel as well. This, in turn, would ultimately put more strain on German-Arab relations than could be remedied by fulfilling Arab arms requests.[182] When Foreign Minister Genscher formulated the claim in January 1981 that the historical responsibility of the Germans toward the Jewish people should be taken into account in arms exports, he actually introduced a new element into the arms export policy of the Social–Liberal government.

The change in West German policy toward Israel that the BSR clause brought about in 1982 is reflected even more clearly in the position adopted by Helmut Schmidt. For the longest period of his chancellorship, he was not inclined to infer a special relationship to the state of Israel from the Nazi past. On November 9, 1978, for example, Schmidt gave a much-noted speech in the Cologne synagogue on the fortieth anniversary of *Kristallnacht*. The speech contained a passage about the Middle East in which Schmidt did not mention Israel's right to exist. Yet he stressed that one lesson learned from German history was the importance of championing peoples' right of self-determination—an obvious reference to the interests of the Palestinians.[183]

Above all, however, Schmidt claimed that there was an inherent contradiction between the interests of West Germany and a German governmental practice that embraced the historically based consideration for Israel as a norm. As he said to journalists traveling back from the Gulf with him in April 1981: "Conduct politics in the interest of our people" meant freeing Bonn's foreign policy from outdated obstacles, which in this specific case prevented a tank deal with Saudi Arabia.[184] The change in the meaning of the term "interest" makes the turning point associated with the 1982 Israel Clause particularly tangible. According to the protocol note, "the historical responsibility of the Germans toward the Jewish people" did not run counter to the "overall interests" of the Federal Republic—on the contrary, it was part of them.

Epilogue: A Sustainable Change

It remains to be considered whether the change in West Germany's Israel policy that took place in Bonn in 1981/82 was sustainable. After all, by October 1982 the SPD/FDP government had been replaced by a Christian Democrat–Liberal coalition led by Helmut Kohl. The fact that Genscher remained in office as foreign minister provided a measure of continuity. At the same time, the Israel Clause did not automatically rule out further conflicts between Bonn and Jerusalem over possible German arms exports. In 1983/84, plans by the

new German government to approve a tank deal with the Saudis again caused considerable tension in German-Israeli relations before this armaments project likewise failed.[185] As a matter of fact, the decision of spring 1982 to make historical responsibility for Israel a criterion for arms exports was not revised by Kohl's government, but rather readopted and thus reaffirmed. Although the CDU leader did not use the same rhetoric of normalization as Schmidt,[186] certain parallels are unmistakable. The original claim to be unrestricted in arms export matters was followed by heated arguments with Israel and ultimately by the commitment to historical responsibility for the Jewish state.

In this commitment the Christian Democratic chancellor eventually went even further than the Social–Liberal coalition government. Not only did the responsible officials of the AA and the BMWi cite the existing Israel Clause internally as an argument against tank shipments to Saudi Arabia,[187] Kohl in fact also changed Bonn's communications policy. Both in 1982 and 1984, historically based consideration for Israel was decisive in the refusal to approve the tank deal with Riyadh. Kohl and his government openly acknowledged this to the Saudis.[188] Schmidt, on the other hand, had signaled to Jewish interlocutors that it was Germany's Nazi past that prevented it from approving arms exports to Arab customers. However, vis-à-vis the Saudis, he maintained to the last that should his government not approve the tank deal, this would have nothing to do with any obligation to Israel.[189] Schmidt apparently felt that any historically based consideration for Israel was an expression of weakness that could have negative consequences for the international prestige of the Federal Republic.

By contrast, later German governments increasingly used the claim of responsibility for the Jewish state to project a positive image of Germany externally. Even though (West) German policy toward Israel has set different emphases since 1982, the commitment to historical responsibility as an overarching paradigm has not only remained intact but has even gained in significance. At the same time, one of the central lessons of German Middle East policy has been that a historically aware attitude toward Israel does not necessarily mean alienation from the Arab side. Thus, after the Oslo peace process began in the 1990s, the Federal Republic advanced to become a leading donor to the Palestinians. To a large extent this can be understood as an element complementing the special German-Israeli relationship. Still, despite everything, the relationship between the Federal Republic and Israel has remained ever conflict-prone to this day. Nevertheless, the controversies that arise with respect to Berlin's policy on German-Israeli relations usually revolve around the question of how historical responsibility for the Jewish state is to be interpret-

ed, implemented in practice, and reconciled with other interests—but rarely around whether such responsibility exists at all.

Notes

Translation by Dona Geyer

1. "Deutsche Panzer nach Saudi-Arabien?," *Der Spiegel*, January 5, 1981.

2. Werner Bergmann, "Realpolitik versus Geschichtspolitik: Der Schmidt-Begin-Konflikt von 1981," *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 7 (1998): 266–87.

3. Sabine Hepperle, *Die SPD und Israel: Von der Großen Koalition 1966 bis zur Wende 1982* (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 2000), 303; Michael Wolffsohn, *Ewige Schuld? 40 Jahre deutsch-jüdisch-israelische Beziehungen* (Munich: Piper, 1988), 40–43.

4. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (hereafter PAAA), B 150, 1982, "Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs (StS) Lautenschlager, 10.12.1982, VS-Bd. 10407 (422)." This document contains an excerpt from the minutes of the Federal Security Council (BSR) meeting held on March 3, 1982.

5. Hubert Leber, *Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, His Policy toward Israel, and the German Responsibility for the Jewish People*, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Transatlantic Perspectives, December 14, 2015, accessed May 7, 2021, https://www.aicgs.org/publication/chancellor-helmut-schmidt-his-policy-toward-israel-and-the-german-responsibility-for-the-jewish-people/. The protocol note is cited (without being explicitly identified as the Israel Clause) in "Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors (MD) Fischer, 6.12.1982," *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* [hereafter *AAPD*] *1982*, vol. 2: July 1 to December 31, 1982, ed. Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski, and Judith Michel (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013), doc. 330, 1710–713, here 1712; "Aufzeichnung des MD Fischer, 27.5.1983," in *AAPD 1983*, vol. 1: January 1 to June 30, 1983, ed. Tim Geiger, Matthias Peter, and Mechthild Lindemann (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2014), doc. 159, 833–42, here 838.

6. Remko Leemhuis, "*Ich muß deshalb dringend von jeder zusätzlichen Aktion für Israel abraten*." *Das Auswärtige Amt und Israel zwischen 1967 und 1979* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2020); Hepperle, *SPD und Israel*; Jenny Hestermann, *Inszenierte Versöhnung: Reisediplomatie und die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen von 1957 bis 1984* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 2016); Shlomo Shafir, "Helmut Schmidt: Seine Beziehungen zu Israel und den Juden," *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 17 (2008): 297–321.

7. The earlier study by Michael Wolffsohn, *German-Saudi Arabian Arms Deals, 1936–1939 and 1981–1985: With an Essay on West Germany's Jews* (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 1985), is based chiefly on press publications.

8. William Glenn Gray, "Waffen aus Deutschland? Bundestag, Rüstungshilfe und Waffenexport 1961 bis 1975," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 64, no. 2 (April 2016): 327–64, here 329. A comprehensive study has since been published: Dimitrios Gounaris, *Die Geschichte der sozialliberalen Rüstungsexportpolitik: Ein Instrument der deutschen Außenpolitik 1969–1982* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2019). While Gounaris deals with the reformulation of the arms export principles in 1981/82, in this context he mentions the

Saudi tank debate merely in passing and neglects the specific dimension of West Germany's Israel policy and its policy for dealing with the Nazi past. The Israel Clause is not mentioned in the study; see ibid., 269–97, 386–87, 501.

9. Hartmut Soell, *Helmut Schmidt*, vol. 2: *1969 bis heute: Macht und Verantwortung* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2008), 832, 837; Mainhardt Graf von Nayhauß, *Helmut Schmidt: Mensch und Macher* (Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Lübbe Verlag, 1988), 610–24.

10. Helmut-Schmidt-Archiv (hereafter HSA) in the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (hereafter AdsD) of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, and Helmut Schmidt-Archiv, Hamburg (hereafter HSA Hamburg).

11. All Israeli sources (except articles from the *Jerusalem Post*) are originally in Hebrew and were translated into German by Hubert Leber. The inventories used from the Israeli State Archives in Jerusalem (hereafter ISA) were those of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

12. "Aufzeichnung des MD Fischer," in *AAPD 1983*, vol. 1, doc. 159, 838. For references to the Israel Clause at the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs (BMWi), see, for example, the Federal Archives Koblenz (hereafter BArchK), B 102/286457, BMWi, "Ref. IV B 4 (Engel/Daase), an Minister Lambsdorff, 26.5.1983."

13. BArchK, B 102/286457, BMWi, "Ref. IV B 4 (gez. Engel), an Ref. IV B 5, 17.5.1983, 6. Tagung der deutsch-saudischen Wirtschaftskommission am 4./5.6.1983."

14. This finding is based on the evaluation of the following files from the Israeli foreign ministry, which document the view of the ministry and the embassy in Bonn on West German arms export policy with regard to Saudi Arabia from 1981 to 1983: ISA, MFA-6830/4, MFA-6830/5, MFA-6830/6, MFA 8900/15, MFA-8900/16, MFA-8936/1, MFA-8936/2, MFA-8936/3, MFA-8936/4. Examples of how Israeli diplomats—unaware of the secret protocol note—evaluated Bonn's arms export guidelines of 1982: ISA, MFA-8936/1, "Leshem-Stein, Bonn, to Europe 1 Division, Ministry, May 10, 1982, no. 381"; ISA, MFA-8936/3, "Megiddo, Europe Division, to Sufot, Assistant Director-General Europe, December 23, 1983, no. 74."

15. Carole Fink, *West Germany and Israel: Foreign Relations, Domestic Politics, and the Cold War, 1965–1974* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

16. Avi Shilon, *Menachem Begin: A Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012).

17. Additional controversial actions were the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak by the Israeli air force in June 1981 and the annexation of East Jerusalem (July 1980) and the Golan Heights (December 1981). See Markus A. Weingardt, *Deutsche Israel- und Nahostpolitik: Die Geschichte einer Gratwanderung seit 1949* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 2002), 257–66, 296–99; Ilan Peleg, *Begin's Foreign Policy, 1977–1983: Israel's Move to the Right* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987).

18. Hubert Leber, "Der deutsch-israelische Raketenstreit von 1978: Zum Umgang der sozialliberalen Bundesregierung mit Rüstungsexporten aus Koproduktion," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 67, no. 4 (October 2019): 621–60.

19. Shilon, *Menachem Begin*, 166–74, 271-72; Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 283–303.

20. AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAA006795, "Dr. Leister an Herrn Bundeskanzler (BK), 22.8.1977." See also "Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Schmidt mit dem israelischen Außenminister

Dayan, 28.11.1977," in *AAPD 1977*, vol. 2: July 1 to December 31, 1977, ed. Amit Das Gupta et al. (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2008), doc. 339, 1621–26, here 1621-22.

21. AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAA006795, "Besuch des BK in Israel."

22. Eckart Conze, *Die Suche nach Sicherheit: Eine Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1949 bis in die Gegenwart* (Munich: Siedler, 2009), 463–578.

23. Conze, 654–61; Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2014), 1010–22; Andreas Wirsching, *Abschied vom Provisorium: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1982–1990* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2006), 466–91, here 470–72.

24. Frank Bösch, *Zeitenwende 1979: Als die Welt von heute begann* (Munich: C. H. Beck 2019), 363–95.

25. Peter Reichel, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland: Die Auseinandersetzung mit der NS-Diktatur von 1945 bis heute* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001), 182–98.

26. Reinhard Rürup, *Der lange Schatten des Nationalsozialismus: Geschichte, Geschichtspolitik und Erinnerungskultur* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2014), 127–50, here 132.

27. Harald Schmid, *Erinnern an den "Tag der Schuld": Das Novemberpogrom von 1938 in der deutschen Geschichtspolitik* (Hamburg: Ergebnisse Verlag, 2001), 368–75.

28. These letters are reprinted in PAAA, B 150, 1980, "Vestring, Djidda, an das Auswärtige Amt (AA), Ref. 311, 27.5.1980, Fernschreiben Nr. 430, VS-Bd. 11162 (311)."

29. BArchK, B 102/265492, BMWi, "Zentralabteilung/Leiter Unterabt. Z B (gez. Bebermeyer), an Minister Lambsdorff, 30.1.1981." However, in the spring of 1982, the number of Leopard II tanks on the Saudi purchase list was 151 (plus 72 Gepard and 285 Marder tanks). BArchK, B 102/286429, BMWi, "Ref. IV B 4/Ref. V A 4, an Minister Lambsdorff, 26.4.1982, Anlage 8: Ref. IV B 4, Vermerk (gez. Seidel), 1.2.1982."

30. For the development and technical details of earlier models of the Leopard II, see Christopher F. Foss, ed., *Jane's Armour and Artillery 1987/88* (Coulson: Jane's Information Group, 1987), 22–25.

31. "Aufzeichnung des MD Lautenschlager, 13.11.1979," in *AAPD 1979*, vol. 2: July 1 to December 31, 1979, ed. Michael Ploetz and Tim Szatkowski (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2010), doc. 327, 1677–79, here 1678.

32. This was also the internal assessment of the Israeli government; ISA, MFA-6830/4, "Office of the Director-General, Discussion on the issue of the shipment of German war material to Saudi Arabia, January 12, 1981," 1. The same assessment was expressed two years later in a meeting at the Israeli military intelligence service Aman (Agaf Ha-Modi'in). ISA, MFA-8936/1, "Levi, Europe 1 Division, to Director Europe et al., June 29, 1983, no. 1912."

33. Gounaris, *Rüstungsexportpolitik*, 56–77; Gray, "Waffen aus Deutschland," 350–54.

34. Gounaris, *Rüstungsexportpolitik*, 272, 497.

35. On April 14, 1978, for example, a BSR resolution was passed against the delivery of the Gepard anti-aircraft gun tank to Saudi Arabia; see "Aufzeichnung des MD Lautenschlager, 18.4.1979," in *AAPD 1979*, vol. 1: January 1 to June 30, 1979, doc. 108, 480–83, here 481n6. On April 15, 1980, the BSR reaffirmed the ban on the deliveries of war weapons to Saudi Arabia. BArchK, B 102/286456, BMWi, "Ref. IV B 4/Ref. V A 4, Rüstungswirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit mit Saudi-Arabien, 4.6.1980."

36. Hubert Leber, "Nichts Besonderes: Bundesdeutsche Rüstungsexporte nach Israel in der sozialliberalen Ära (1969–1982)," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 16, no. 3 (2019): 520–48, here 538–40. As a buyer of "other military equipment" from the Federal Republic—a category that also included entire weapons factories—Saudi Arabia ranked well ahead of Israel, especially under Schmidt; ibid., 541–44.

37. PAAA, B 150, 1980, "Aufzeichnung des MD Fischer, 29.5.1980, VS-Bd. 9523 (422)"; PAAA, B 150, 1980, "Aufzeichnung des MD Meyer-Landrut, 12.6.1980, VS-Bd. 11154 (311); BArchK, B 102/286456, BMWi, "Ref. IV B 4/Ref. V A 4, Rüstungswirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit mit Saudi-Arabien, 4.6.1980."

38. "Keine Panzerlieferung," *Die Zeit*, March 27, 2008, accessed April 14, 2020, https://www.zeit.de/2008/14/Keine_Panzerlieferung.

39. "Aufzeichnung des StS Meyer-Landrut, 4.6.1984," in *AAPD 1984*, vol. 1: January 1 to June 30, 1984, ed. Daniela Taschler and Tim Szatkowski (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015), doc. 159, 770–74, here 771. See also "Waffenexport: Beweise genug," *Der Spiegel*, October 3, 1983.

40. "Peter Schellschmidt, Büro Helmut Schmidt, 'Dreimal gesagt' (Leserbrief)," *Der Spiegel*, August 29, 1983.

41. AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAA009379, "Chef des Bundeskanzleramts/StS Manfred Lahnstein, Koalitionsgespräch, 3.12.1980, Protokoll vom 5.12.1980," 3–5, here 3-4. The full quotation of the respective passage in Leber, "Chancellor Helmut Schmidt," n13.

42. AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAA009379, "Chef des Bundeskanzleramts/StS Manfred Lahnstein, Koalitionsgespräch, 3.12.1980, Protokoll vom 5.12.1980," 4.

43. AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAA009379, "Chef des Bundeskanzleramts/StS Manfred Lahnstein, Koalitionsgespräch, 10.12.1980, Protokoll vom 11.12.1980," 3.

44. AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAA009379, "Chef des Bundeskanzleramts/StS Manfred Lahnstein, Koalitionsgespräch, 3.12.1980, Protokoll vom 5.12.1980," 4.

45. AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAA009379, "Chef des Bundeskanzleramts/StS Manfred Lahnstein, Koalitionsgespräch, 10.12.1980, Protokoll vom 11.12.1980," 3. Contributing to this decision was the concurrent public controversy over Bonn's approval of submarine exports to Chile; see Wolffsohn, *German-Saudi Arabian Arms Deals*, 74-75.

46. AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAA009379, "Chef des Bundeskanzleramts/StS Manfred Lahnstein, Koalitionsgespräch, 3.12.1980, Protokoll vom 5.12.1980," 4.

47. Ulrich Albrecht, Peter Lock, and Herbert Wulf, *Mit Rüstung gegen Arbeitslosigkeit?* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1982).

48. F. Gregory Gause, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 51–54; Bösch, *Zeitenwende*, 305–32.

49. Saudi Arabia's share of West Germany's oil imports reached about 25 percent in 1980, up from 17 percent in 1979 and 15 percent in 1978. BArchK, B 136/17000, BMWi, "Ref. III C 2, Deutsch-saudische Erdölbeziehungen, 8.4.1981."

50. AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAA006615, "Helmut Schmidt an Kronprinz Fahd, 13.10.1980." VEBA Oel AG was part of Vereinigte Elektrizitäts- und Bergwerks AG, which was state-owned in part until the end of the 1980s.

51. BArchK, B 136/17398, "Vestring, Djidda, an AA, Ref. 311, 10.11.1980, Fernschreiben Nr. 868."

52. "Deutsche Panzer nach Saudi-Arabien?," *Der Spiegel*, January 5, 1981.

53. Gérard Bökenkamp, *Das Ende des Wirtschaftswunders: Geschichte der Sozial-, Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik in der Bundesrepublik 1969–1998* (Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2010), 139.

54. According to the figures known to the AA. PAAA, B 150, 1982, "MD Fischer an Minister Genscher, 17.12.1982, als Anlage: Ref. 412, Vermerk, 16.12.1982." According to this, a further 6 billion marks had been raised by April 1981.

55. BArchK, B 136/17000, "Vestring, Djidda, an AA, Ref. 311, 14.1.1981, Fernschreiben Nr. 15." According to this, the largest customer by far was the Saudi Defense Ministry.

56. Bösch, *Zeitenwende*, 18–60, 229–68.

57. Gause, *International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, 57.

58. Rachel Bronson, *Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 158–63.

59. "Die Krise infiziert Europa," *Der Spiegel*, February 4, 1980.

60. Schmidt's remarks to the Bundestag in Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 19. Sitzung, 9. Wahlperiode, January 30, 1981, 820–23, here 820, accessed March 18, 2020, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/09/09019.pdf.

61. "Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Schmidt mit dem amerikanischen Botschafter Stoessel, 22.1.1981," in *AAPD 1981*, vol. 1: January 1 to April 30, 1981, ed. Daniela Taschler, Matthias Peter, and Judith Michel (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2012), doc. 12, 66–72, here 68-69.

62. ISA, MFA-8900/15, "Eylon, Bonn, to Ministry, February 4, 1981, no. 94 (conversation of the Israeli envoy Ephraim Eylon with the American chargé d'affaires William Woessner)."

63. ISA, MFA-6830/4, "Meroz, Bonn, to Sasson, Ministry, January 6, 1981, no. 25."

64. ISA, MFA-6830/4, "Office of the Director-General, Discussion on the issue of the shipment of German war material to Saudi Arabia, January 12, 1981."

65. PAAA, B 36, vol. 135678, AA, "Ref. 310, Demarche des israelischen Botschafters Meroz beim Herrn Bundesminister (BM) am 16.1.1981, Vermerk vom 19.1.1981"; as an Israeli record: ISA, MFA-6830/4, "Eylon, Bonn, to Sasson, Ministry, January 16, 1981, no. 155."

66. "'Die Politik der Europäer ist falsch': Spiegel-Interview mit dem israelischen Oppositionsführer Shimon Peres," *Der Spiegel*, April 27, 1981.

67. Knesset, minutes, 429. Session of the 9th Knesset, March 4, 1981, Conclusions of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on the subject of German weapons for Saudi Arabia (Hebrew), 1970, accessed April 6, 2020, http://fs.knesset.gov.il/9/Plenum/9_ptm_254037.pdf.

68. "German Weapons for the Arabs," *Haaretz*, January 7, 1981 (Hebrew); "Bonn Whither?," *Yediot Achronot*, January 27, 1981 (Hebrew); "The Leopard That Forgot the Holocaust," *Haaretz*, February 6, 1981 (Hebrew); "Sell Weapons, Sell Your Soul," *Maariv*, March 6, 1981 (Hebrew).

69. "Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Schmidt mit dem amerikanischen Botschafter Stoessel," in *AAPD 1981*, vol. 1, doc. 12, 68.

70. One such agency was the Center for Political Research (Hebrew: Ha-Merkas Le-Mechkar Medini, abbr.: Mamad), a division at the foreign ministry that was also part of

the Israeli secret intelligence community: ISA, MFA-6830/4, "Ministry, Mamad, to Bonn, January 12, 1981, no. 102"; ISA, MFA-6830/5, "Ministry, Mamad, Topic coverage 24/81, German weapons for Saudi Arabia (Leopard II and Tornado deals), March 3, 1981"; also (no clear indication of author) ISA, MFA-6830/4, "Arms supplies from West Germany to Saudi Arabia—position of the security establishment," n.d., ca. January or February 1981. Such warnings were still being issued two years later by the Israeli military intelligence agency Aman, according to ISA, MFA-8936/1, "Levi, Europe 1 Division, to Director Europe et al., June 29, 1983, no. 1912." On Mamad, see Ephraim Kahana, *Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2006), 59–61.

71. "'Das ist eine Frage der Moral': Spiegel-Interview mit SPD MdB Annemarie Renger über Panzer-Exporte nach Saudi-Arabien," *Der Spiegel*, January 12, 1981.

72. ISA, MFA-8900/15, "Eylon, Bonn, to Bitan, Ministry, January 20, 1981, no. 88 (conversation of the Israeli envoy Eylon with Hirsch on January 19, 1981)."

73. ISA, MFA-6830/4, "Meroz, Bonn, to Sasson, Ministry, January 21, 1981, no. 201."

74. AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAA006800, "Egon Bahr an Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, 13.4.1981"; ISA, MFA-6830/4, "Meroz, Bonn, to Sasson and Sufot, Ministry, January 30, 1981, no. 274 (conversation Meroz - Bahr)"; ISA, MFA-8900/15, "Meroz, Bonn, to Sasson and Sufot, Ministry, March 9, 1981, no. 68 (conversation Meroz - Brandt)."

75. Soell, *Helmut Schmidt*, vol. 2, 837–48.

76. For example, in a speech to the Bundestag in Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 19. Sitzung, 9. Wahlperiode, January 30, 1981, 820–23.

77. "Wischnewski: Die Saudis nicht enttäuschen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* [*FAZ*], April 24, 1981; "In Bonn Befremden und Zweifel nach den Äußerungen Möllemanns," *FAZ*, March 20, 1981.

78. "Unmut in beiden Koalitionsfraktionen über Bonns Waffenpläne," *FAZ*, January 21, 1981.

79. ISA, MFA-6830/4, "Meroz, Bonn, to Sasson and Europe 1 Division, Ministry, February 11, 1981, no. 102 (conversation of Meroz with Manfred Wörner, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group)"; ISA, MFA-8900/15, "Meroz, Bonn, to Sasson and Sufot, Ministry, March 31, 1981, no. 230 (conversation of Meroz with Alfred Dregger, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group)."

80. Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 19. Sitzung, 9. Wahlperiode, January 30, 1981, 840–41.

81. "Doppelbeschluß der Nato, Finanzlücke bei der Bundeswehr und Waffenexporte," *FAZ*, May 4, 1981.

82. "Zimmermann für Waffenlieferungen," *FAZ*, April 13, 1981; "Strauß kritisiert Haltung Geißlers zu Waffenexporten," *FAZ*, May 5, 1981.

83. ISA, MFA-6830/5, "Meroz to Deputy Speaker of the Knesset Meron, March 10, 1981, no. 1491"; ISA, MFA-8900/16, "Ben-Ari, Bonn, to Ministry, November 10, 1981, no. 94 (conversation Ambassador Ben-Ari - Strauß)."

84. The general contractor for the production of Leopard II tanks was—besides Maschinenbau Kiel—the company Krauss-Maffei, located in Munich, but with an array of suppliers from all over West Germany; see Albrecht, Lock and Wulf, *Rüstung gegen Arbeitslosigkeit*, 31; "Kampfpanzer Leopard 2 A1-A4," in *Handbuch Ausrüstung Bundeswehr*,

ed. Jürgen Erbe and Peter Preylowski (Frankfurt a. M.: Report Verlag, 1997), 72-73. As defense minister, Strauß had arranged secret arms shipments to Israel (see Peter Siebenmorgen, *Franz Josef Strauß: Ein Leben im Übermaß* [Munich: Siedler, 2015], 164–66), but later he also supported arms exports to Arab countries. For example, during a visit to Saudi Arabia in October 1977, Strauß—who was directly linked to the defense industry, in his capacity as chairman of the supervisory board of Deutsche Airbus GmbH in Munich—encouraged his host to buy more military goods from the Federal Republic, "especially in the area of aircraft construction." "Botschafter Schlagintweit, Djidda, an das Auswärtige Amt, 23.10.1977," in *AAPD 1977*, vol. 2, doc. 300, 1439–41, here 1440. On Strauß's role in the aviation industry, see Horst Möller, *Franz Josef Strauß: Herrscher und Rebell* (Munich: Piper, 2015), 680–83.

85. This impression is conveyed by a collection of editorials from regional and national newspapers compiled internally by the BMWi. BArchK, B 102/286456, BMWi, "Ref. IV B 4, Positionen zum Rüstungsexport nach Saudi-Arabien, 14.4.1981."

86. AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAA007308, "Präsident des Bundesverbands der Deutschen Industrie Rolf Rodenstock an Helmut Schmidt, 17.3.1981." See "'Wir müssen Nachteile befürchten': BP-Chef Hellmuth Buddenberg über Ölgeschäfte und Waffenhandel mit Saudi-Arabien," *Der Spiegel*, April 27, 1981; "Geschäft vor Politik: Hochtief-Vorstand Harald Peipers plädiert für mehr Bonner Hilfe beim Export," *Die Zeit*, April 24, 1981.

87. "Loderer gegen Rüstungsexporte nach Chile und Saudi-Arabien," *FAZ*, January 15, 1981; ISA, MFA-6830/4, "Meroz, Bonn, to Sasson, Ministry, February 13, 1981, no. 120 (conversation of Meroz with the head of the German Trade Union Confederation, Heinz Oskar Vetter)."

88. "Noch keine Entscheidung Bonns über Waffenexporte," *FAZ*, March 17, 1981.

89. "Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Schmidt mit dem saudi-arabischen Kronprinzen Fahd in Riad, 28.4.1981," in *AAPD 1981*, vol. 1, doc. 119, 668–71, here 670.

90. The two working groups will be left out of the following because, according to the sources, they made no direct contribution to the emergence of the Israel Clause.

91. PAAA, B 150, 1981, "Aufzeichnung des MD Fischer, 30.3.1981, VS-Bd. 10269 (201)."

92. PAAA, B 150, 1981, "Aufzeichnung des MD Fischer, 29.6.1981, VS-Bd. 11604 (02)." The reform of the guidelines also affected a whole range of other issues that will be disregarded below because they had nothing to do with the Israel Clause. Examples of such topics include the coproduction issue and the role played by end-use clauses.

93. PAAA, B 150, 1981, "Aufzeichnung des MD Fischer, 24.7.1981, VS-Bd. 10372 (201)." The BMWi draft—adopted in a paper by AA division 422—is found in the appendix (citation p. 6), together with proposed amendments by the AA, according to an in-house meeting on July 14, 1981. The original version of the draft was not available in the BMWi and AA files evaluated. The draft was dated June 12, 1981, according to "Aufzeichnung des MD Fischer, 4.9.1981," in *AAPD 1981*, vol. 2: May 1 to September 30, 1981, doc. 249, 1300–1308, here 1300n3.

94. "In Bonn Befremden und Zweifel nach den Äußerungen Möllemanns," *FAZ*, March 20, 1981. Also ISA, MFA-8900/15, "Meroz, Bonn, to Ministry, January 9, 1981, no. 77."

95. On the specifics of Genscher's communication policy, see Agnes Bresselau von Bressensdorf, *Frieden durch Kommunikation: Das System Genscher und die Entspannungspolitik im Zweiten Kalten Krieg 1979–1982/83* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015).

96. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Meine Sicht der Dinge: Im Gespräch mit Hans-Dieter Heumann* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2015), 80.

97. ISA, MFA-8936/1, "Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (BPA), Interview mit Außenminister Genscher in der ZDF-Sendung 'Bonner Perspektiven,' 18.1.1981," 31. The interview is also cited in "Waffen-Exporte als 'Teil der Friedenspolitik,'" *FAZ*, January 19, 1981.

98. "Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse (VLR I) Seitz, 16.1.1981," in *AAPD 1981*, vol. 1, doc. 9, 46–53, here 49.

99. PAAA, B 36, vol. 135678, "AA, Ref. 310, Demarche des israelischen Botschafters Meroz beim Herrn BM am 16.1.1981, Vermerk vom 19.1.1981"; ISA, MFA-6830/4, "Eylon, Bonn, to Sasson, Ministry, January 16, 1981, no. 155." On the ZDF interview: ISA, MFA-8936/1, "BPA, Interview mit Außenminister Genscher in der ZDF-Sendung 'Bonner Perspektiven', 18.1.1981," 31. See also Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 17. Sitzung, 9. Wahlperiode, January 28, 1981, 658, accessed March 18, 2020, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/09/09017.pdf.

100. BArchK, B 102/234065, "Positionspapier der FDP-Fraktion [*sic*] zu Fragen des Rüstungsexports nach Saudi-Arabien, 26.1.1981" (signed by Jürgen Möllemann). See "FDP: Nachhilfe für Parteichef Genscher," *Der Spiegel*, February 2, 1981.

101. "Erklärung Genschers zu Fragen des Rüstungsexports," *Freie Demokratische Korrespondenz* [press service of the FDP parliamentary group], no. 62/81, January 27, 1981. See "Bundesparteitag Köln, 29.–31.5.1981, Politik für Frieden und Freiheit," in *Das Programm der Liberalen: Zehn Jahre Programmarbeit der F.D.P. 1980 bis 1990*, ed. Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990), 89–154, here 94.

102. Weingardt, *Deutsche Israel- und Nahostpolitik*, 292–93, 302–4; Wolffsohn, *German-Saudi Arabian Arms Deals*, 78–79; Inge Deutschkron, *Israel und die Deutschen: Das besondere Verhältnis* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1983), 415–18. Hepperle, *SPD und Israel*, cited Genscher's formulation on historical responsibility for Israel (299) but dismissed it as "lip service" (303). The program item is cited, but not put into any further context by Gounaris, *Rüstungsexportpolitik*, 277.

103. Shlomo Shafir, "Willy Brandt, die Juden und Israel," *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 19 (2010): 379–404, here 390; Daniel Gerlach, *Die doppelte Front: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Nahostkonflikt 1967–1973* (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2006), 29–35.

104. ISA, MFA-8936/1, "Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe Rüstungsexport der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion, 24.11.1981." Excerpts of the report are documented in Albrecht, Lock and Wulf, *Rüstung gegen Arbeitslosigkeit*, 183-89. Although the working group spoke out against the tank deal with Saudi Arabia, it did so without reference to Israel: ISA, MFA-8936/1, "Bericht," 11–13; Albrecht, Lock and Wulf, *Rüstung gegen Arbeitslosigkeit*, 184–86. On the CDU/CSU parliamentary group: ibid., 192-93 ("Grundsätze der CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion zum Rüstungsexport, verabschiedet am 10.2.1981, Deutschland-Union-Dienst, Bonn, 11.2.1981").

105. "Israel: Ende des Weges," *Der Spiegel*, January 19, 1981; "Begin am Ende," *Die Zeit*, January 16, 1981.

106. "Peres: Saudi-Arabien ist reich an Waffen," *FAZ*, January 28, 1981. See also an interview in the run-up to the Bonn visit: "Panzer für Saudis? Dann auch Waffen für Israel. Bild-Interview mit Shimon Peres, Vorsitzender der Israelischen Arbeitspartei," *Bild*, January 19, 1981.

107. This was also the tenor of the cover story "Sorge um die goldene Zukunft am Golf," *Der Spiegel*, April 27, 1981, which appeared shortly before Schmidt's visit to Saudi Arabia.

108. BArchK, B 145/12764, "BPA, Material für die Presse, Interview mit BK Helmut Schmidt in den Zeitungen 'Al-Madina', 'Al Yaum' und 'Ar-Riyadh', 22.4.1981," 7.

109. ISA, MFA-6830/5, "BPA, Material für die Presse, Interview mit BK Helmut Schmidt in der ZDF-Sendung 'Bonner Perspektiven', 26.4.1981," 2.

110. HSA Hamburg, 512/32, BPA/B, Rspr/He, "Informationsgespräch (vertraulich), BK Helmut Schmidt mit acht Journalisten auf dem Rückflug von Abu Dhabi nach Bonn, 30.4.1981," 7. Following his visit to Riyadh, Schmidt and his delegation traveled to the United Arab Emirates. Despite the fact that the conversation on the plane was classified as confidential, *Der Spiegel* quoted from it a short time later, namely the sentence that German foreign policy in the 1990s should not "be overshadowed by Auschwitz." "Deutsche und Juden: Kniefall wiederholen?," *Der Spiegel*, May 11, 1981.

111. HSA Hamburg, 512/32, BPA/B, Rspr/He, "Informationsgespräch (vertraulich), BK Helmut Schmidt mit acht Journalisten auf dem Rückflug von Abu Dhabi nach Bonn, 30.4.1981," 14.

112. *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, May 6, 1981, no. 40: "Zum Stand der deutsch-arabischen Beziehungen: Fernsehdiskussion mit dem Bundeskanzler (am 30.4.1981)," 341–47.

113. Martin Rupps, *Helmut Schmidt: Mensch—Staatsmann—Moralist* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2008), 284.

114. For example, in the context of the Venice European Council Declaration on the Middle East in June 1980; see Rory Miller, *Inglorious Disarray: Europe, Israel and the Palestinians since 1967* (London: Hurst, 2011), 81–95.

115. While the extent of Arab collaboration with the Nazi regime is disputed among historians, what is hardly contested is that at least some individual leaders, most notably the Palestinian Mufti of Jerusalem, Mohammed Amin al-Husseini, supported the antisemitic policies of the Nazis; see Jeffrey Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009); David Motadel, *Für Prophet und Führer: Die islamische Welt und das Dritte Reich* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2017).

116. *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, May 6, 1981, no. 40: "Zum Stand der deutsch-arabischen Beziehungen," 341. The Schmidt biographer Soell claimed that the chancellor had indeed addressed the Holocaust in the interview because he had used the phrase "Stichwort Auschwitz" (catchword Auschwitz) at the beginning of the controversial passage. Soell, *Helmut Schmidt*, vol. 2, 833. A similar line of argument is used by Gunter Hofmann, *Helmut Schmidt: Soldat, Kanzler, Ikone* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2015), 322. However, unlike today, in the early 1980s Auschwitz was by no means a self-evident cipher for the Nazi extermination of Jews. Schmidt himself had given a speech in Auschwitz in 1977 in which he appeared to portray the concentration and extermination camp exclusively as a place of suffering by

the Polish people. *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, December 8, 1977, no. 125: "Der Besuch des Bundeskanzlers in der Volksrepublik Polen vom 21. bis 25. November 1977," 1159. On the history of the depiction of Auschwitz after 1945, see Peter Reichel, "Auschwitz," in *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte: Eine Auswahl*, ed. Etienne François and Hagen Schulze (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2005), 309–31. If Schmidt had specifically meant the extermination of the Jews when he said "Stichwort Auschwitz," one might ask why he did not subsequently include the German-Israeli relationship among those foreign relations of the Federal Republic that were burdened by the Nazi past. That he did not do so corresponded to the inner logic of his train of thought at that point. Otherwise he would have indirectly undermined his initial assertion that there was a "historical advantage" in Bonn's relationship with the Arab world, because, in view of the Israeli-Arab conflict, a historically strained relationship with Israel also indirectly affected Bonn's freedom of action vis-à-vis Arab countries.

117. Soell, *Helmut Schmidt*, vol. 2, 833. In the context of the Schmidt-Begin controversy, Hofmann, *Helmut Schmidt*, 322, wrote that at the time "it was known that he [Schmidt] hardly missed an opportunity anyway to point out the eternal nature of the Holocaust." The Schmidt-Begin controversy is not addressed—except for one sentence in a footnote—in Kristina Meyer, *Die SPD und die NS-Vergangenheit 1945–1990* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2015), 386.

118. "Die Vorwürfe Begins: 'Es ist nackte Arroganz und Frechheit . . .'" *FAZ*, May 5, 1981.

119. BArchK, B 136/17579, dpa, "Wortlaut des Interviews mit Ministerpräsident Begin (durch den staatlichen Rundfunk Israels, übersetzt von dpa)," n.d. (broadcast on May 7, 1981), 4; English version: "Interview with Prime Minister Begin on Israel Radio, 7.5.1981," in *Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents*, vol. 7: 1981–82, accessed January 1, 2020, https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook5/Pages/12%20Interview%20with%20Prime%20Minister%20Begin%20on%20Israel%20R.aspx. See also "Angriffe israelischer Spitzenpolitiker gegen Schmidt dauern an," *FAZ*, May 7, 1981.

120. Sabine Pamperrien, *Helmut Schmidt und der Scheißkrieg: Die Biografie 1918 bis 1945* (Munich: Piper, 2014), 254–59.

121. BArchK, B 136/17579, dpa, "Wortlaut des Interviews mit Ministerpräsident Begin," 3. See "Neue Angriffe Begins auf Bundeskanzler Schmidt," *FAZ*, May 12, 1981. Begin's remarks to the Knesset on June 3, 1981, as cited in PAAA, B 36, vol. 135678, "Botschaft Tel Aviv an AA, Ref. 310, 4.6.1981, Fernschreiben Nr. 418."

122. Schmidt himself listed what he called a "string of put-downs and insults" in a letter to Herbert Wehner, the SPD parliamentary group leader. HSA Hamburg, 2327, "Helmut Schmidt an Herbert Wehner, 16.11.1981."

123. This is the tenor in Bergmann, "Realpolitik versus Geschichtspolitik"; Weingardt, *Deutsche Israel- und Nahostpolitik*, 294–96; Hepperle, *SPD und Israel*, 305–11.

124. "Germany is Furious," *Maariv*, May 5, 1981 (Hebrew); "Messianism and Statesmanship," *Haaretz*, May 8, 1981 (Hebrew); "A Foolish Kind of Blackmail," *Jerusalem Post*, May 8, 1981.

125. See Bergmann, "Realpolitik versus Geschichtspolitik."

126. As did, for example, the CDU politicians Kohl and Wörner; see Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 34. Sitzung, 9. Wahlperiode, May 7, 1981, 1722–23, 1740, accessed March 18, 2020, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/09/09034.pdf.

127. "Nichts ist vergessen oder verziehen: Die Angriffe auf den Bundeskanzler enthüllen die wahren Gefühle der Israeli," *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (*SZ*), May 5, 1981.

128. "Keinen zweiten Holocaust, bitte!" *Der Spiegel*, May 11, 1981.

129. Bergmann, "Realpolitik versus Geschichtspolitik," 282n19 (*Passauer Neue Presse*, May 6, 1981).

130. Bergmann, 273–74.

131. "Keinen zweiten Holocaust, bitte!" *Der Spiegel*, May 11, 1981. Bergmann, "Realpolitik versus Geschichtspolitik," 272, considered this comment by Rudolf Augstein as an "extreme position" in the Schmidt-Begin conflict.

132. Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 34. Sitzung, 9. Wahlperiode, May 7, 1981. The following particularly emphasized Germany's responsibility for Israel: Genscher (1730), the deputy chairman of the FDP parliamentary group Hans-Günter Hoppe (1729), and the CDU politician and later defense minister Wörner (1740). Somewhat vaguer were Schmidt (1711), Kohl (1722), and Wischnewski (1727).

133. *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, July 4, 1981, no. 65: "Geschichtliche Verantwortung und moralische Verpflichtung gegenüber dem Judentum. Ansprache des Bundeskanzlers vor ehemaligen jüdischen Bonner Bürgern (am 1.7.1981 im Palais Schaumburg)," 551.

134. Genscher on May 22, 1981, in a farewell address for Ambassador Meroz; ISA, MFA-6830/6, "Eylon, Bonn, to Europe 1 Division, Ministry, May 22, 1981, no. 208."

135. "Die besonderen Beziehungen zu Israel," *SZ*, May 6, 1981. See also "Es war nicht nur Wahlkampf: Begins Groll gegen Schmidt hat mehrere Ursachen," *FAZ*, May 12, 1981; "Warum wir Israel brauchen," *Die Welt*, May 5, 1981.

136. ISA, MFA-6830/6, "Hurwitz, Washington, to Foreign Minister et al., Ministry, May 22, 1981, no. 340." See Shlomo Shafir, *Ambiguous Relations: The American Jewish Community and Germany Since 1945* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1999), 278.

137. Hepperle, *SPD und Israel*, 271. On the development of Holocaust remembrance in the United States, see Shafir, *Ambiguous Relations*, 281–97. On the German reaction, see Jacob Eder, *Holocaust Angst: The Federal Republic of Germany and American Holocaust Memory Since the 1970s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

138. ISA, MFA-8936/1, "Ben-Ari, Bonn, to Europe 1 Division, Ministry, January 5, 1982, no. 25."

139. "Aufzeichnung des MD Fischer," in *AAPD 1983*, vol. 1, doc. 159, 837–38.

140. "Don't Release Germany from Its Obligations," *Haaretz*, May 4, 1981 (Hebrew); "Germany's Obligation—for Whom?," *Yediot Achronot*, May 13, 1981 (Hebrew).

141. PAAA, B 150, 1981, "Gespräch des BK Schmidt mit dem Vorsitzenden der Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Squadron, 7.7.1981," 3; PAAA, B 150, 1981, "Aufzeichnung des VLR I Höynck, Bundeskanzleramt, 16.9.1981, Gespräch des BK Schmidt mit Vertretern des American Jewish Committee am 10.9.1981," 2.

142. "Panzer-Exporte: 'Eine schizophrene Situation,'" *Der Spiegel*, October 12, 1981; Genscher's statement was made on October 4, 1981.

143. PAAA, B 150, 1982, "MD Fischer an Minister Genscher, 17.12.1982," as attachment: "Saudisches Interesse an deutschen Panzern (Chronologie)," 3.

144. PAAA, B 150, 1981, "Aufzeichnung des MD Fischer (head of the directorate-general for economic affairs), 29.6.1981, VS-Bd. 11604 (02)," 3; PAAA, B 150, 1981, "Aufzeichnung des MD Hansen (head of the AA policy planning staff), 9.7.1981, VS-Bd. 10403 (422)," 4; PAAA, B 150, 1981, "Aufzeichnung des VLR I Henze (head of division 422, responsible for arms exports), 11.8.1981, VS-Bd. 10403 (422)," 4.

145. "Aufzeichnung des MD Fischer," in *AAPD 1981*, vol. 2, doc. 249, 1302.

146. PAAA, B 150, 1981, "Aufzeichnung des MD Fischer, 25.8.1981, VS-Bd. 10372 (201)."

147. As recorded in a handwritten notation by Genscher on the document: PAAA, B 150, 1981, "Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten (MDg) Freiherr von Stein, 24.9.1981, VS-Bd. 10404 (422)," 1. Later two protocol notes of similar content regarding the "raw materials criterion" were intended for a while; PAAA, B 150, 1982, "Aufzeichnung des MD Fischer, 26.2.1982, VS-Bd. 10404 (201)," 2.

148. PAAA, B 150, 1981, "Aufzeichnung des MDg Freiherr von Stein, 30.9.1981, VS-Bd. 10404 (422)," 3.

149. In contrast, the protocol notes on the supply of energy and raw materials originally requested by the BMWi were omitted. PAAA, B 150, 1982, "Aufzeichnung des MD Fischer, 19.3.1982, VS-Bd. 11274 (220)," 2–3.

150. *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, May 5, 1982, no. 38: "Politische Grundsätze der Bundesregierung für den Export von Kriegswaffen und sonstigen Rüstungsgütern. Beschluß der Bundesregierung vom 28.4.1982," 309–11. These principles applied until 2000, when the SPD-Die Grünen coalition government issued new guidelines: see Michael Brzoska, "Rüstungsexportpolitik," in *Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik*, ed. Siegmar Schmidt, Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 650–59, here 653–54.

151. These included stricter standards for end-user certificates (clauses 7 and 14), consideration of the "internal situation"—meaning above all the human rights situation—of recipient countries (clause 12), and more restrictive requirements for the export of documents and facilities for the production of war weapons (clauses 2, 7, 14).

152. "Waffenexport: 'Teils komisch, teils frivol,'" *Der Spiegel*, February 22, 1982; "Jetzt steht die Tür sperrangelweit offen," *Der Spiegel*, May 10, 1982. On the reaction to the new principles at the time, see Gounaris, *Rüstungsexportpolitik*, 293.

153. PAAA, B 150, 1982, "Botschafter Freiherr von Stein, Djidda, an das AA, Nr. 127, 13.3.1982, VS-Bd. 10407 (422)," which includes the request of the deputy commander of the Saudi National Guard, Prince Badr, dated March 6, 1982.

154. PAAA, B 150, 1982, "Aufzeichnung des StS Lahnstein, Bundeskanzleramt, 17.3.1982, VS-Bd. 10402 (422)."

155. PAAA, B 150, 1982, "Aufzeichnung Schlote, Bundeskanzleramt, 7.6.1982, VS-Bd. 14114 (010)"; BArchK, B 102/286456, "Djidda an AA, Ref. 422, 5.7.1982."

156. Quoted ISA, MFA-8936/1, "Ashbel, Bonn, to Europe 1 Division, Ministry, May 27, 1982, no. 247." See also "Schmidt: Keine Panzer für Saudi-Arabien," *FAZ*, May 29, 1982.

157. *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, March 18, 2008, no. 26/1: "Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel vor der Knesset am 18. März 2008 in Jerusalem," accessed April 4, 2020,

https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/bulletin/rede-von-bundeskanzlerin-dr-angela-merkel-796170.

158. Wolfgang Schmidt, *Aus historischer Verantwortung, moralischer Verpflichtung und politischer Überzeugung: Wie sich Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt um Israel und den Frieden im Nahen Osten bemühte* (Berlin: Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung, 2014), 80; Werner Sonne, *Staatsräson? Wie Deutschland für Israels Sicherheit haftet* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2013), 49, 51.

159. See Niels Hansen, *Aus dem Schatten der Katastrophe: Die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen in der Ära Konrad Adenauer und David Ben Gurion* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2002); Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, *Deutschland und Israel 1945–1965: Ein neurotisches Verhältnis* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004).

160. Fink, *West Germany and Israel*; Schmidt, *Aus historischer Verantwortung*; Shafir, "Willy Brandt"; Michael Wolffsohn, *Friedenskanzler? Willy Brandt zwischen Krieg und Terror* (Munich: dtv, 2018).

161. Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, vol. 2: *1953–1955* (Frankfurt a. M.: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1968), 130–59; speech by Adenauer: Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 252. Sitzung, 1. Wahlperiode, March 4, 1953, 12092–96, here 12093, 12096, accessed March 19, 2020, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/01/01252.pdf.

162. Hansen, *Schatten der Katastrophe*, 479–502, 553–63, 618–37, 691–702; Jelinek, *Deutschland und Israel*, 300–11, 315–16, 401–29.

163. Hansen, *Schatten der Katastrophe*, 618; Jelinek, *Deutschland und Israel*, 401, 404; Hannfried von Hindenburg, *Demonstrating Reconciliation: State and Society in West German Foreign Policy toward Israel, 1952–1965* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 53.

164. Dominique Trimbur, "Verpflichtung und Pragmatismus: Adenauer und Israel 1961–1967," in *Adenauer, Israel und das Judentum*, ed. Hanns Jürgen Küsters (Bonn: Bouvier, 2004), 55–81, here 63.

165. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, vol. 2, 156.

166. Konrad Adenauer, "Juni 1966—Bilanz einer Reise: Deutschlands Verhältnis zu Israel," *Die Politische Meinung* 11 (1966): 15–19, here 19.

167. Meyer, *SPD und NS-Vergangenheit*, 330–52.

168. Rürup, *Schatten des Nationalsozialismus*, 127–50, here 131.

169. See, for example, the discussion on the fundamentals of Middle East policy that took place among politicians and top officials of the Social–Liberal coalition government in February 1970: "Aufzeichnung des MDg Gehlhoff, 11.2.1970," in *AAPD 1970*, vol. 1: January 1 to April 30, 1970, ed. Ilse Dorothee Pautsch et al. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001), doc. 48, 207–14, here 208.

170. For example, within the government, in February 1970 Brandt called for the implementation of a "policy without complexes" toward Israel: *AAPD 1970*, doc. 48.

171. During his visit to Israel in June 1973, Brandt used this phrase repeatedly, to the displeasure of his hosts: quoted in Schmidt, *Aus historischer Verantwortung*, 55; see also 38.

172. For example, he did so in a speech at the opening of the "Week of Brotherhood" on March 21, 1971, in Cologne; see Schmidt, *Aus historischer Verantwortung*, 82–85, here 83.

173. Fink, *West Germany and Israel*, 242.

174. Quote from "Ambassador von Puttkamer, Tel Aviv, an AA, 13.6.1973," in *AAPD 1973*, vol. 2: May 1 to September 30, 1973, ed. Matthias Peter et al. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004), doc. 191, 984–86, here 985 (Brandt's meeting with Israeli Finance Minister Pinchas Sapir).

175. For example, Foreign Minister Scheel told his Israeli counterpart Abba Eban in 1970 that 40 percent of the West German population at the time had been born after 1945; see "Aufzeichnung des VLR Redies, 10.3.1970," in *AAPD 1970*, vol. 1, doc. 105, 431–32, here 432. Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) had told a Knesset delegation already in 1969 that he estimated that 60 percent (*sic*) of all Germans alive at the time "no longer had any connection" to the Nazi years; see "Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kiesinger mit Abgeordneten des israelischen Parlaments, 20.3.1969," in *AAPD 1969*, vol. 1: 1 January to June 30, 1969, ed. Franz Eibl and Hubert Zimmermann (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2000), doc. 107, 418–20, here 419. And in June 1979 Foreign Minister Genscher told Libya's ruler, Muʿammar al-Gaddhafi, that the majority of Germans were born after World War II and that "they bear no collective responsibility." He maintained that the relationship of the Federal Republic to Israel then was "the same as to other states." "Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit Oberst Ghadafi in Tripolis, 19.6.1979," in *AAPD 1979*, vol. 1, doc. 180, 866–71, here 868–69.

176. Speech at the opening of the "Week of Brotherhood" in Cologne on March 21, 1971; quoted in Schmidt, *Aus historischer Verantwortung*, 84.

177. Fink, *West Germany and Israel*, 124–53, 163–64, 190; Miller, *Inglorious Disarray*, 27–42.

178. Fink, *West Germany and Israel*, 254–55. On the doubts about the often-cited contemporary witness account that Brandt secretly sent a vital electronic spare part to the Israeli army during the war, see Leber, "Nichts Besonderes," 539.

179. Weingardt, *Deutsche Israel- und Nahostpolitik*, 267–69.

180. Lily Gardner Feldman, *The Special Relationship between West Germany and Israel* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 100–111.

181. Hepperle, *SPD und Israel*, 222–25, 264.

182. "Aufzeichnung des MD Lahn, 4.11.1975," in *AAPD 1975*, vol. 2: July 1 to December 31, 1975, ed. Michael Kieninger, Mechthild Lindemann, and Daniela Taschler (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006), doc. 331, 1547–51, here 1549. Also PAAA, B 150, 1977, "Aufzeichnung des VLR Richter, 21.7.1977, VS-Bd. 9338 (422)."

183. Helmut Schmidt, "Wahrhaftigkeit und Toleranz," in Nahum Goldmann, Werner Nachmann, and Helmut Schmidt, *Mahnung und Verpflichtung: Ansprachen anlässlich der Gedenkfeier zum 9. November 1938 in der Großen Synagoge in Köln am 9. November 1978*, ed. BPA (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1978), 23–35, here 33; Schmid, *Tag der Schuld*, 374.

184. HSA Hamburg, 512/32, BPA/B, Rspr/He, "Informationsgespräch (vertraulich), BK Helmut Schmidt mit acht Journalisten auf dem Rückflug von Abu Dhabi nach Bonn, 30.4.1981," 7.

185. "Waffenexport: Sowieso nicht fahren," *Der Spiegel*, February 25, 1985. This controversy needs to be dealt with in a separate study.

186. Andreas Wirsching, "Helmut Kohls Israelbild: Historisches Erbe, politische Verpflichtung," *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen* 23 (2016): 215–27.

187. PAAA, B 150, 1982, "Aufzeichnung StS Lautenschlager, 20.12.1982"; BArchK, B 102/286457, BMWi, "Ref. IV B 4/V A 8 (gez. Engel/Daase) an Minister Lambsdorff, 26.5.1983." See "Aufzeichnung des MD Fischer," in *AAPD 1983*, vol. 1, doc. 159, 838.

188. "Bundeskanzler Kohl an König Fahd, 17.2.1984," in *AAPD 1984*, vol. 1, doc. 48, 243–45, here 243; "Aufzeichnung des StS Meyer-Landrut," ibid., doc. 159, 770–73.

189. "Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Schmidt mit dem saudi-arabischen Kronprinzen Fahd, 28.10.1981," in *AAPD 1981*, vol. 3: October 1 to December 31, 1981, doc. 310, 1644–53, here 1652.

Arms Exports: The Normality of a Scandalous Subject

A Comment

MICHAEL GEYER

On February 19, 2022, just a few days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a German opinion poll found that 63 percent of respondents opposed sending weapons into "war and crisis areas," against 34 percent who thought this might be justified in some cases. A mere 3 percent did not know.[1] The surprisingly high level of certainty in matters of arms transfers suggests deep-rooted convictions. A similar poll some five years earlier counted a whopping 83 percent who said they were opposed.[2] These polls must be taken with a grain of salt, but they do confirm the overall sense, reinforced by still more polls, that Germans want their foreign relations to be peaceful, or, as one op-ed remarked, "want to do good in the world, but preferably the soft way."[3] When on Sunday, February 27, Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced in a policy statement to the Bundestag the rearmament of the Bundeswehr and direct, if still tightly circumscribed, arms exports to Ukraine in light of the Russian invasion on February 24, this was an epochal change—in the first place because it met with the overwhelming approval of the German public.[4] Much will be written about this policy statement and what may come of it. Skeptics were quick to point out that nothing much or not enough came of it in the immediate aftermath, while critics feared that too much was happening already.[5] Their call for prudence (*Besonnenheit*) instantly produced a media storm of indignation.[6]

Retrospectively, on the question of arms exports, the more tantalizing and, for a historian, more answerable question runs as follows: How did Germany emerge as one of the world's top arms exporters—reaching an all-time high in 2021—even though German opinion roundly rejected such exports on principle?[7] This contrast need not be understood as contradictory, but the simultaneity of a high level of arms exports and widespread skepticism about them requires explanation. The argument here is that in order to find an answer to this apparent paradox we must examine the arms (export) control policy and

the politics of the social-liberal coalition governments of Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt in the long 1970s, a model that is unraveling before our very eyes in 2021/22 at the hands of another socialdemocratic-liberal-green coalition under Chancellor Scholz.

Implicit in this argument is a historical-temporal proposition. I will take the half century between the 1970s and 2020s as a single unit of analysis,[8] viewed as a fifty-year European interregnum. As an effect of détente, Germany and Europe in those years began to move beyond the Yalta/Potsdam truce in Europe that facilitated a tense, conflictual and highly militarized, but experientially "miraculous" postwar reconstruction. Typically, this period is associated with the uncertainties of rapid globalization (1970s–2008) on the one hand and the end of the Cold War in Europe in 1989/1991 on the other hand, with the 1989/1991 caesura as the main turning point. But I agree with those who mark 1979 as a watershed year, and while this may have appeared as a mere periodization game, the events in 2022, foreshadowed in developments since 2008, suggest otherwise.[9]

This framing might appear as somewhat of an overreach for a comment on a set of papers about German and Austrian arms exports and their control, but not if we consider that one, if not the key feature of the 1970s–2020s interregnum was the making and unmaking of a Europe-wide arms control and disarmament regime that reduced force levels in Europe—notwithstanding the continuing presence of tactical nuclear weapons—to an all-time low, at least by twentieth-century standards.[10] Arms export controls are an altogether minor, though not negligible, aspect of this overall regime of arms control. They can serve as a point of entry into the European arms control and disarmament regime that defined the era. This approach may even make sense of the initial puzzle of Germany and Austria "after the boom" with their simultaneous arms (export) controls and growing arms exports.[11] The solution may well be that while Europe and especially central Europe disarmed to a level unseen since the late nineteenth century, the world as a whole rearmed like never before.

How to Control Arms Exports?

The three essays in question here explore the politics of German and Austrian arms exports during the 1970s and early 1980s. They emphasize the key role of these two decades in shaping the future of arms exports. The public and political controversies extending into bureaucratic quarrels and legal challenges over arms exports are their focus.[12] The primary source of contention and the trigger for conflict were exports to the Middle East.[13] The essays show in rich,

empirical detail that (potential) arms exports unsettled domestic German and Austrian politics. They further demonstrate how the resolution of these tensions led to the assertion of state regulatory controls over arms exports in the Federal Republic in the one case and to a massive corruption scandal in Austria in the other. Above all they demonstrate—paradoxically one might think, until reading the three essays—that successful arms exports depended on comprehensive regulation. Austria failed this test with calamitous results, but Austria also proves that the collapse of an arms industry in scandal and prosecution was not the end of the story. Austria has since emerged as one of the eminently successful open-market small arms producers.

Each essay has its own agenda. For Bettina Weißgerber the main issue is the attempted reordering of arms export politics under Helmut Schmidt's chancellorship (1974–82).[14] The trigger was the political blunder of the liberal minister of the economy, Hans Friderichs, who promised Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran a general license for production facilities for the yet to be fully developed advance version of the main German battle tank, the Leopard II. Weißgerber shows how politically unpalatable such neoliberal initiatives in the arms sector were, even if they came from the German minister of the economy in the dire situation of the oil crisis of 1973. Equally important, the minister's initiative was made to sink in the morass of inter-ministerial negotiations. But it is also worth recalling that, while the proposed tank deal fell through, it was just one feature in a more expansive web of military and industrial commodity deals; that the export of technology and know-how extended into the field of (prohibited) chemical weapons; and that, as important as the crisis of the 1970s was as a German push factor, the decisive pull factor of this entire complex was the escalating tension over predominance in the Near East between Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.[15]

The upshot is that German arms exports remained within the purview of the state. Although Friderichs's initiative set in motion an intragovernmental process of loosening restrictions, his effectively neoliberal notion of exports of weapons and technologies found next to no support. The government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt nevertheless came to deviate from its predecessor under Willy Brandt (1969–74). The latter had instituted a series of "Political Principles," which set up and were to guide an inter-ministerial regulatory machinery for arms exports.[16] Interestingly, Schmidt, as minister of defense in the Brandt government, had pushed for these guidelines, which he subsequently set out to change after becoming chancellor. This has puzzled historians, and there is a debate about how and whether this change occurred. Weißgerber can show—and Leber's essay backs her up—that Schmidt's arms export pol-

icies did indeed change, but neither in the direction Friderichs had pursued nor in the direction Schmidt had intended. Schmidt continued the process of bringing arms exports under closer state control, but in a categorically different manner than Brandt. Schmidt intended to institute a new policy, but what he got was a simplified and flexibilized bureaucratic mechanism.

Brandt's Political Principles were distinctly history oriented and normative (not to repeat the past), whereas Schmidt's were security oriented and explicitly anti-historical. Schmidt sought to "securitize" Brandt's normative arms export policy. That is, if "never again" (no exports that might exacerbate international tensions or support autocratic regimes) was the defining principle for Brandt, Schmidt introduced balance of power considerations as guiding principles.[17] If Brandt's regime was part of the postwar normative rejection of power politics, Schmidt aimed at modernizing the *raison d'état* in a comprehensive security policy.[18] If Brandt's arms export politics excluded most of the world as recipients of German arms exports (with loopholes that permitted ample exceptions), Schmidt's approach was distinctly global and globalizing. Schmidt's security-minded, balance of power-oriented *raison d'état* in matters of arms exports fit hand in glove with his more general approach to East-West security politics. It is the better-known part of the story that this policy put him at odds with his own Social Democratic Party (SPD) and engendered the growing public revulsion against nuclear weapons that shaped Schmidt's final years as chancellor.[19]

The Schmidt government eventually settled on a new set of Political Principles in 1982 but it proved to be unable to translate Schmidt's policy vision into politics. It was not, as one might have expected, public protests that stopped Schmidt's initiative, though prospective weapons exports to the Near East (Iran and Saudi Arabia) caused a ruckus and were eventually denied. Rather, the policy failed because a state-driven, globalized, and more flexible arms exports regime, unhindered by normative concerns, would have meant introducing a case-by-case approach to all arms exports (beyond NATO) and linking it to a comprehensive, region-by-region risk assessment that covered the world at large. Comprehensive, global risk-assessment foundered because there was no global policy to guide it. The trial balloon for all this was what was inscrutably called a "Flächenpapier," as discussed in Weißgerber's essay: a region-by-region assessment of friendly states to be supported and unfriendly states to be thwarted. Its benighted helplessness in the face of a world in turmoil is astounding. Hence, new guidelines were instituted in 1982, but they were more of the same—normative principles that allowed for exceptions in practice and set up a decision-making process that was, if anything, more bureaucratic than before.

Arms export control politics was pushed out of the political limelight into the shadows of inter-ministerial politics, where the overwhelming number of cases were resolved without discussion. Schmidt's Political Principles of 1982 succeeded in streamlining the existing regulatory progress and by routinizing exceptions ended up de facto loosening restrictions. The result was a political process in which the arms export control regime moved ever more deeply into the ministerial bureaucracy, sidelining parliament and a public that became more active in mobilizing around normative concerns. German arms export control politics came to oscillate between the poles of bureaucratic politics and spasms of normative public agitation for the next forty years, while arms exports themselves increased by leaps and bounds. The missing piece was what the Political Principles had promised: an explicit and deliberate normative policy. It's not that normativity disappeared. Rather, everyone eventually got their own bit of preferred guidance.

Hubert Leber explores how tensions in the early eighties were resolved, leading to the Schmidt government's Political Principles of 1982. The eventual trigger was the intragovernmental debate and the national and international outcry over the potential delivery of German tanks to Saudi Arabia. Leber is especially interested in a short passage in the statement of the principles that determines that arms exports to the Near East need to take account of the "historical responsibility of the Germans in relation to the Jewish people." He attributes this admonition to the intervention of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Leber's essay is a marvelous piece of deeply researched diplomatic history and a reminder that this kind of punctilious history matters. Other historians have gone over the same terrain—and come up with nothing more than a footnote.[20] Leber thinks that there is a lot more to this footnote, and he is right up to a point. While thinking of the Israel footnote (the German is *Protokollnote*) as a clause or a condition (both are legal terms, covered by the German *Klausel*) is going too far, it is more than just small print. As an Israel proviso (*Vorbehalt*) the footnote is significant, in part because it sets up a caution that could be readily applied in inter-ministerial decision-making. It is a piece of normative guidance. But above all it demonstrates that ultimately West German politics could not do without a value-guided foreign policy. The Israel proviso specified a normative exception in the context of the 1982 Political Principles, which were intended to mark the transition toward a security-based regulatory regime.

Leber's reading of the proviso as an "Israel-political paradigm change" in German foreign relations instantly embroils him in historiographic

controversy. He sets himself up against a dominant strand in German (though not Israeli or Anglo-American) historiography, which holds that from Adenauer to Merkel German politics has always been pro-Israel.[21] The contrary view is that the alleged continuity at best amounted to little more than "whitewashing" German guilt and at worst served as a rhetorical ploy that waxed eloquent about Israel but, in fact, undercut Israel's very security in favor of a pro-Arab politics and its derivative, a pro-Palestinian orientation.[22] In its self-understanding and especially in biographical hindsight the Schmidt/Genscher government saw itself as pro-Israel, but this view papers over substantive—some would say existential—policy differences between Germany and Israel that exploded in the rift between the Schmidt government and the newly elected Likud government under Menachem Begin.[23] The relationship to Israel was and remains an extraordinarily sensitive issue that cut right to the core of German foreign policy; this much is well understood. It is striking, though, how decisively this fact is reflected in governmental arms export control policy. The actual intra-ministerial politics of arms exports to the Near East is another matter, and the recurrent public outcries about these exports is yet a third.

Schmidt pushed arms export policy toward a sovereign (balance of power) politics with the explicit goal of escaping what a historian has called a "diplomacy of guilt."[24] Stepping out of the shadow of the past, he sought to pursue "sober interest politics"—hence his rejection of a moral politics and his turn to a balance of power politics in the Near East, in which (German interests in) Israel and (German interests in) Saudi Arabia and more generally (the German understanding of) Israel and the Arab world were ideally in equilibrium. The goal of this policy was stability in interlocking regional and global equilibrating power relations. German scientific and public criticism of this security policy maintained, however, that this system could not possibly work, because it would in fact produce permanent instability and insecurity.[25] The debate is one aspect of a wider arms control controversy that mainly concerned nuclear weapons in Europe. In demonstrating that Schmidt's Near Eastern balance of power politics was above all politically untenable, Leber opens a new debate. As an astute historian of antisemitism has observed, Schmidt set *Realpolitik* against *Geschichtspolitik*—and he lost badly.[26] It is in this context that Foreign Minister Genscher's Israel proviso gains its true significance. It may have been no more than a proviso, but it signaled that Schmidt, with his insistence on the sovereignty of German arms exports and security politics, had overreached.[27] He was obliged to backpedal regarding Israel and the Near East—partly because of the enraged Israeli opposition

to a German panzer deal with Saudi Arabia and the moral opprobrium international opinion attached to it, partly because of the pushback from the Americans, but mostly because of the visceral critique by German public media and the massive opposition of Schmidt's and Genscher's own parties, the SPD and FDP, in parliament. Domestically there was no room for a *Primat der Aussenpolitik* (primacy of foreign affairs), not even a defensive, security-conscious one.[28]

Leber's basic point is well-taken: the Israel proviso reflects the rise of German memory politics. German politics vis-à-vis the Near East would have to recognize a historical responsibility for Israel. This historical responsibility was, as a chastened Schmidt came to formulate in hindsight, "in the interest of our [German] people." But quite apart from the fact that German (and eventually European) interest always also recognized the Palestinian cause, the main outcome of this entire affair consists in yet something else. The sober interest of German governments rather became the avoidance of these normatively loaded, national and international, public conflicts at all costs (*Konfliktvermeidungsstrategie*). And in this respect, German governments all the way up to 2022 succeeded for better and worse. The means to this end was a politics that adhered to normative standards of preserving peace and at the same time shielded conflictual choices (in arms exports and elsewhere) from public controversy by downgrading them to the inter-ministerial give and take. The 1982 Political Principles eviscerated a deliberate—be it normative or interest- or power-oriented—foreign policy.[29] Its most explicit policy statement (about Israel) ended up as a footnote. If Michael Brzoska speaks of a "non-activist foreign policy" as the foundational position for German arms export control, this is what he means.

This regime worked well in that arms exports increased significantly, being sheltered by routinized, inter-ministerial decision-making—until yet another crisis broke, this time over the export of German tanks to Turkey. In 2000, this moment elicited yet another set of Political Principles, again initiated by a social-liberal government. These new principles were praised for their insistence on human rights as a defining criterion for arms exports and a new transparency. The new regime became most visible in its yearly reports on German arms exports, which have produced an avalanche of data from 2001 onward that has yet to be fully evaluated.[30] At this point, however, the export control regime became, if anything, even more elaborate, with NATO and EU standards and international treaties like the UN Arms Trade Treaty (entry into force: December 24, 2014) intersecting with German law and German regulations. The expansion of German arms exports in the 2000s occurred with-

in a heavily regulated environment. Yet another set of principles followed in 2019, this one under Chancellor Angela Merkel, which attempted to rationalize these overlapping regulatory regimes.[31] Future historians have their work cut out for them. For the time being, fighting one's way through the thicket of rules and regulations, one is amazed that anything was exported at all.[32] But all statistics agree that with some further ups and downs German arms exports have multiplied, and their global reach has, if anything, widened in the new millennium. Chancellor Merkel may not have been a "merchant of death," but under her reign arms exports did flourish.[33] In 2021 the value of approved German arms exports reached an all-time high of 9.04 billion euros.[34] It's a pittance compared to the arms exports of the two leading exporters, the United States and Russia, and would have to be further scrutinized in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. But for a moment before Scholz's *Zeitenwende* Germany was the No. 3 arms exporter in the world.

This is the paradox of German arms export controls. German arms exports are highly regulated by the constitution, by law, and by an evolving set of Political Principles (1971, 1982, 2000, 2019). The German regulatory regime is still normative. If these norms were initially "historical," driven by the intent not to repeat the past, they are now proactive, seeking to "limit and control German arms exports with the goal to further peace and human rights, to contribute to the prevention of violence and to sustainable development in the world."[35] In light of growing arms exports, it could be argued that this normative framework was never fully translated into executive practice. But careful historical analysis of the 1971 and 1982 principles shows that this is not the case. "Flexibilities" were always built into the system, but robust political controversy remained a countervailing force. Once the record is public, this will no doubt emerge as one of the key findings about the 2000 Political Principles, as well as the newest set of principles of 2019.[36] The fact of the matter is that German governments set out to "further sharpen" export controls (and "to adjust to changed circumstances"), only to end up regulating an ever-increasing arms trade.

What gives? There are domestic push factors at work. The German armaments industry reconsolidated, in a process that only genuinely took shape "after the boom" in the 1970s[37] and has continued into the present. Add to this what one might call the slackening of domestic demand due to European disarmament and the outright neglect of the Bundeswehr, which pushed armaments producers into export. In this respect the German armaments industry mimics a general trend and a general complaint about Germany as a relentless export machine. But ultimately the pull factors appear more important. The

bottom line is that the world was industrializing, militarizing, and weaponizing, while Europe did the opposite.[38] This is the paradox of the European interregnum which needs explanation: Europe demilitarized, while the world at large militarized.

What is peculiar about the combination of normative political principles and a de facto bureaucratic regime of inter-ministerial decision-making stands out even more clearly in contrast to the case of Austria. Riegler's essay presents a host of individuals talking and wheeling and dealing—politicians, party functionaries, lobbyists, managers, trade unionists, even one or another arms dealer—and lo and behold they get themselves into massive trouble, and while some wiggle out of it, others get caught. The seeming contrast is, however, both right and wrong. It is wrong because while similar interactions have also happened in Germany, they have occurred not in public view but deep inside ministerial bureaucracies. It is right in that such interactions are framed by different regulatory regimes and climates and have had different outcomes. Simply put: what presumably happens at the level of ministerial bureaucracy in Germany is thrashed out in cabinet-level interactions, controversy, and public scandal in Austria.

Austria's arms exports were no less carefully hedged in by arms export control law than the German arms transfers. While Austria did not have a constitutional mandate for limiting exports as Germany did, it had stringent limits imposed by the international law on neutrality. As a result, the Austrian case would fit rather better a sample that included Sweden and Switzerland.[39] And yet the comparison with Germany is apt. Both the German and the Austrian arms export control legislation emerged out of and against laws and regulations instituted in the Third Reich. The latter were imposed upon Austria in 1938/39. Both countries have had to wrestle with the political and moral legacies of the Nazi past. Both countries also have had to deal with the remnants of the Nazi armaments industry. The latter appears more prominently in the essay on Austria than in the two essays on Germany. While this is in part a matter of research design, it also points to differences in state-industry relations and in terms of the makeup of the respective industries. Simply put, West German industry had undergone a far deeper conversion than Austria. There was continuity, but the German armaments industry reconstituted itself after demilitarization, breakup, and civilianization in a transnational process of Europeanization and a transatlantic division of labor within the context of NATO, while the Austrian remnant survived largely intact until it collapsed in the post-1970s structural crisis of old industries.[40] Again, a smoother comparison for the Austrian armaments industry would be the GDR, which

also inherited a sizable interwar German arms industry, or possibly Silesia, now in Poland, or even the mighty interwar Czech (and formerly Habsburg) armaments industry.[41] They all reemerged as arms exporters, though in the end it was the newly reconstituted West German armaments industry that came to dominate the field. The study of the prolonged, postwar dissolution of the interwar, Central European armaments complex, which fed the Nazi war machine, and the rebuilding of a new armaments industry, which seriously only commenced "after the boom," is one of the main desiderata of contemporary economic history.

Austria replaced Nazi law on arms exports only in 1977.[42] Domestic law never picked up on German normative politics but, overall, moved in tandem with German developments toward state regulation, eventually also incorporating a human rights perspective. Austria did not have "Political Principles" and did not need any, because the regulatory process remained political in the first place. The impression of wheeling and dealing by politicians, lobbyists, and industry with all its scandals and disasters reflects a reality in which chancellors and ministers did not delegate decisions to the ministerial bureaucracy but stood personally responsible for their actions. Parliament and parliamentary committees (and not subcommittees either) dealt with problem cases. And ministers not only disagreed sharply among each other about policies but encountered irate intra-party opposition face-to-face. Conflicting views also led to physical tussles between protesters and counterprotesters in front of factory entrances, which added bloody noses and concussions to a political process that was as up-front and personal in Austria as it was principled and impersonal in Germany.

The difference is palpable. Intragovernmental debates in both countries were intense, but in Germany borderline cases were drowned in bureaucracy and its legal contortions and thus for the most part neutralized. The recurrent public debates, for their part, focused on moral imperatives without bothering much for the details of politics. In Austria these controversies were fought out among ministers, parliamentarians, and constituents, though tempered by a regime-compulsion for compromise and a sense that compromise was more important than the law, if one wanted to survive politically. The assumption that there was always a solution, even if it meant pushing the limits of the law (or in fact breaking it) worked well—until it didn't, producing recurrent scandals like the Noricum scandal discussed by Riegler.

Austrian politicians, industrialists, and trade unionists faced competing domestic pressures without bureaucratic mediation—and chose to settle them, as the Austrian phrase goes, *unter der Tuchent* (under cover and in secret

and, if need be, just at the outer limits of the law or beyond). In the case of the Noricum scandal, it was the delivery of some 200 howitzers plus munition to Iran in a triangular trade with Libya (after previously supplying Iraq via Jordan). The matter became urgent because a deal with India had fallen through, allegedly because Bofors (Sweden) was more ruthless in bribing Indian politicians than were Austrian managers. In terms of comparison, it should be added that the Austrian deal was illegal, whereas French exports to Iran were not, and that the Austrian parliament was actively involved in investigating the scandal just as in the United States in the Iran-Contra affair, but in the Austrian case the scandal ended up in court and destroyed rather than made political careers.

Riegler's discussion of the Noricum scandal points to another issue that surfaces only at the margins of the two German essays. In the Austrian case economic interests were up-front and center. If German arms exports were treated as a foreign (economic) policy matter, in Austria they were subject to domestic industrial politics and policies.[43] Armaments exports in Austria were explicitly advanced as industrial policy. They were meant to salvage an ailing iron and steel industry. Indeed, as Riegler argues, arms exports were a deliberate business and trade union strategy to escape the crisis—a strategy that ultimately failed dismally and with fatal consequences not just for some politicians but also for industry. To be sure, similar initiatives could also be observed in Germany, but they never cohered into a salvage strategy for the emerging German rust belt (with the likely exception of the shipbuilding industry).[44] The reasons for this are manifold and had to do with the EU as much as with the size and differentiation of German heavy and capital goods industries. It also had to do with the different treatment of the military-industrial legacies of the Third Reich in Austria and Germany. Somewhat simplified, Austria nationalized the remnants of the NS arms industry and ended up with a powerful state-industrial complex (as did the GDR),[45] whereas West Germany privatized and marketized its former armaments complex or, like Wolfsburg, shifted it into complex, market-driven public-private arrangements. In West Germany, armaments became a privatized, highly regulated commercial enterprise, whereas in Austria arms exports became a salvage strategy for its state-owned rust belt industries. The dismal failure of this strategy, punctuated by the Noricum scandal, not only destroyed some prominent careers, but belatedly also eviscerated the nationalized Austrian remnants of the NS armaments-industrial complex. Austria's arms export future was not in howitzers and tanks, although this hardware of war was highly competitive at the time, but with a private (small) arms industry,

which produced such coveted items as the iconic polymer-framed, short recoil-operated, locked-breech, semiautomatic 9 mm Luger from Glock.

Austrian manufacturers of arms for export privatized and specialized after the Noricum scandal. With Glock the country has an iconic manufacturer of handguns (in contrast to the now troubled Italian Beretta and in competition with the popular Swiss-German-US based SIG Sauer) and with the Steyr Mannlicher AUG A3 it has one of the more robust multipurpose assault rifles, which is in stock and available at your local (US) dealer for as low as $2,199.00 in a variety of colors.[46] The Austrian future was in small arms. That said, Austrian small arms manufacturers like Glock or Steyr Mannlicher pale in comparison with the key European producer, the Belgian FN (Fabrique Nationale) Herstal. The latter expanded across the Atlantic as FN America, owns (formerly) Winchester and Browning, and is the primary supplier of US military small arms such as the M16 rifles and the M2 and M3 machine guns. European small arms manufacture thus came to flourish as a transatlantic and global business. But to achieve all that, you had to be part of NATO—or at least part of the Western community of nations.

Interregnum Politics

The approach of the three essays flies in the face of a grand humanitarian and pacifist tradition of thought dating back to the late nineteenth century, which placed arms exports in the "shadow world" of "merchants of death" and their nefarious dealings.[47] The history of the establishment of a state regulatory mechanism in Germany (and the absence of it in Austria) allows us to test two arguments about the 1970s: First, that the seventies were a decade of deep social, economic, and cultural transformation "after the [economic] boom"; and second, that they ushered in a crisis of (liberal) democracy.[48] Typically, this crisis is associated with the advance of neoliberalism and its impetus for deregulation. But the case of German and to some extent Austrian arms exports in fact suggests that state regulatory mechanisms advanced market power rather than diminishing it. Markets and states reinforced each other in an increasingly transnational entanglement.[49] If this is neo-liberalism, it is a distinctly continental European variant of it, which etatizes rather than deregulates market segments. Writ large, a similar process takes place in the EU. It is more difficult to assess the second argument about liberal democracy. The recurrent efforts to impose policy principles on the regulatory process of arms exports is striking and in the first instance might be taken as example of a lively, though not necessarily "liberal" democracy. However, the effect was not more but less

guidance. If the Brandt Principles had loopholes and the Schmidt Principles tried to assert efficiencies within a normative framework, the 2000 (Schröder) and 2019 (Merkel) guidelines offered a smorgasbord of options, in which most everything became possible—except when one or the other deal ran up against national public opinion or international pressures. Scandalizing some arms deals, however, did nothing to stop the overall increase of arms exports. Indeed, scandalizing some deals facilitated the strange duality of a public rejection of arms exports and their simultaneous expansion. This is a crisis of (liberal) democracy only, if and when a political system needs unequivocal policy decisions. The time for such decisions has come now in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the historian is left to wonder why Germany could do without them for so long. For answers we would have to look at the entire complex of armaments, arms control and, above all, security policy and politics over the past fifty years.

The essays are also an occasion to reflect, albeit briefly, on the pursuit of normative politics in international affairs and how historians might approach the assertion of norms[50]—less as a discussion about their feasibility and advisability than why and under what circumstances a norm-driven politics occurs in the first place.[51] The upshot here is that normative politics did play a role, but not quite the one that was expected. That is, as a set of policy and even as regulatory (bureaucratic) norms they were only as good as the political public and political debate. A normative politics needs regulation and it needs mobilized public opinion. Above all, however, it needs explicit policy that can be translated into actions and outcomes.

Looking for scandal one would no doubt find it. Indeed, scandal has been found and has elicited the kind of historicizing allusion to the Weimar Republic that is the specialty of German magazines like *Der Spiegel*.[52] Digging deeper would lead us from post-fascist (post-Nazi) networks (among others) of arms dealers and from shady arms exports within the context of the German regulatory mechanism to emergent global economies of trafficking in persons, drugs, and arms.[53] These submerged economies are far too large to be left outside the purview of serious study, and historical allusions to past "merchants of death" appear quaint in the face of these developments. Further, in the antiquarian pursuit of historical allusions one would miss what matters historically and what lends significance to the main conclusion of the three essays: that in Austria and Germany the controversies over arms exports led to the assertion of the primacy of politics and of the rule of law in the notoriously unwieldy market of (national) arms exports. But beware: it is the normaliza-

tion and regulation of the arms trade that made Austria and Germany, each in its own way, successful arms exporters.

There is still more than enough dirty business to generate excitement. But it is the economic "success" of a state-regulated business and the normative politics that set it up that makes post-1970s arms trade and arms trade politics historically relevant and interesting. By now, this politics is "historical" in the sense that this moment in the German and European past has come and gone. When on February 27, 2022, Chancellor Scholz (SPD) declared, in a special session of the Bundestag, his support for weapons exports to Ukraine to counter a Russian invasion, he undid what his predecessor Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) had established as a principle of German politics.[54] It could be argued that Scholz was pushing at an open door, because those principles had been hollowed out practically from the start. But Chancellor Scholz had a point when he spoke of a *Zeitenwende*, a turning point in history. I have suggested that this is the end of a historical epoch, one of whose characteristics was the demilitarization of Europe in a militarizing world. More modestly and more factually, we might note that sending tanks to Ukraine—that is, into a war zone—with the approval of the German Bundestag is a profound break with postwar German policy and politics.

Notes

1. IP-Forsa-Frage 3–4, February 19, 2002. Response to the question: "Are there circumstances under which the German export of weapons into war- and crisis-areas is justified?," https://internationalepolitik.de/waffenlieferungen-krisengebiete.

2. "83 Prozent der Bevölkerung sagen NEIN zum Waffenexport," Ohne Rüstung Leben press release, February 2, 2016, https://www.ohne-ruestung-leben.de/nachrichten/article/83-prozent-gegen-waffenexporte-33.html.

3. "Was will der Souverän? Er möchte gerne Gutes tun in der Welt. Aber am liebsten auf die sanfte Tour," *Internationale Politik*, July/August 2014, https://internationalepolitik.de/system/files/article_pdfs/ip_04_2014_umfragen.pdf.

4. "Policy Statement by Olaf Scholz," February 27, 2022, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-berlin-2008378.

5. Peter Dausend, "Bewaffneter Trachtenverein: Kann die Bundeswehr wirklich keine Panzer an die Ukraine abgeben—oder will die Regierung das einfach nicht?," *Die Zeit*, April 12, 2022, https://www.zeit.de/2022/16/bundeswehr-waffenlieferung-ukraine-marder-panzer.

6. Jürgen Habermas, "Krieg und Empörung," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, April 29, 2012. As instant riposte: Thomas Schmid, "Ukraine Überfall: Wo Jürgen Habermas irrt—und wo er richtig liegt," *Die Welt*, April 29, 2022.

7. "Neuer Rekordwert bei Rüstungsexporten," ARD Tagesschau, January 18, 2021, https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/ruestungsexporte-deutschland-rekord-ruestungsexportgesetz-101.html.

8. While the historians "after the boom" tend to look forward some ten to twenty years, social scientists in peace and conflict studies, like the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, tend to look back no more than five to ten years. In both cases the 1990s emerge as something of a threshold. See Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Lutz Raphael, and Thomas Schlemmer, eds., *Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart: Dimensionen des Strukturbruchs nach dem Boom* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016). For SIPRI, the newest data on the arms trade are: "Global Arms Trade Falls Slightly, but Imports to Europe, East Asia and Oceania Rise," March 14, 2022, https://sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/global-arms-trade-falls-slightly-imports-europe-east-asia-and-oceania-rise. The difference between SIPRI data (which show a slight decline) and official German data (which indicate a record high) on arms exports is due to deviating statistical criteria.

9. Frank Bösch, *Zeitenwende 1979: Als die Welt von heute begann* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2019). For a different take from Bösch and the one taken below, see Stephen Kotkin, "The Cold War never Ended: Ukraine, the China Challenge, and the Revival of the West, " *Foreign Affairs* 101, no. 1 (2022): 64–78.

10. James J. Sheehan, *Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008); Philipp Gassert, Hermann Wentker, and Tim Geiger, eds., *The INF Treaty of 1987: A Reappraisal* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020).

11. Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael, *Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970*, 3rd ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012).

12. Indispensable on the emergence of the regulatory regime in the 1970s: William Glenn Gray, "Waffen aus Deutschland? Bundestag, Rüstungshilfe und Waffenexport 1961 bis 1975," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 64, no. 2 (April 2016): 327–64. See also the assessment of the leading scholar in the field: Michael Brzoska, "Rüstungsexportpolitik," in *Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik*, ed. Siegmar Schmidt, Gunther Hellmann, and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 650–59. Up-to-date information can be found at *waffenexport.org: Informationen, Argumente, Einmischen!*, accessed March 17, 2021, https://www.waffenexporte.org/category/gesetze-normen/.

13. The prehistory of the essays under consideration concerns the 1960s trend of "military aid" exports often of deaccessioned arms to Africa. Bettina Fettich-Biernath, *Deutschland gibt: Zivile und militärische Entwicklungshilfe der Bundesrepublik an Afrika südlich der Sahara von 1956 bis 1974*, 2 vols. (Erlangen: FAU University Press, 2018).

14. Bettina Weißgerber, *Die Iranpolitik der Bundesregierung 1974–1982* (Munich: utz-verlag, 2019).

15. Harald Möller, *Waffen für Iran und Irak: Deutsche Rüstungsexporte und ihre Querverbindungen zu den ABC-Waffenprogrammen beider Länder. Ursachen, Hintergründe, Folgen* (Berlin: Köster, 2006).

16. There is an ample literature on the subject. Early discussions are summarized in Michael H. Creswell and Dieter H. Kollmer, "Power, Preferences, or Ideas? Explaining West Germany's Armaments Strategy, 1955–1972," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15, no. 4 (2013):

55–103. See also Gray, "Waffen aus Deutschland"; Dimitrios Gounaris, *Die Geschichte der sozialliberalen Rüstungsexportpolitik: Ein Instrument der Deutschen Außenpolitik 1969–1982* (Wiesbaden: Springer Vieweg, 2019); Hartwig Hummel, *Rüstungsexportbeschränkungen in Japan und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Die Bedingungen für eine nationale Friedenspolitik* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 1991); Michael Brzoska, *Rüstungsexportpolitik: Lenkung, Kontrolle und Einschränkung bundesdeutsche Rüstungsexporte in die Dritte Welt* (Frankfurt am Main: Haag und Herchen, 1986).

17. Helmut Schmidt, *Strategie des Gleichgewichts: Deutsche Friedenspolitik und die Weltmächte* (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1969); *The Balance of Power: Germany's Peace Policy and the Super Powers* (London: Kimber, 1971).

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50. Reinhard Mohr, "Kein Protest, nirgends—der deutsche Pazifismus folgt einer verqueren Logik," *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, February 24, 2022.

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53. In this vast context the 2014 UN Arms Trade Treaty signed by 130 state parties deserves attention.

54. "Policy statement by Olaf Scholz."

About the Contributions to this Yearbook

The articles and commentaries by Michael Geyer, Kristie Macrakis, and Bettina Weißgerber were written specifically for this volume and have not appeared previously.

Rüdiger Bergien's article was published originally as "Programmieren mit dem Klassenfeind: Die Stasi, Siemens und der Transfer von EDV-Wissen im Kalten Krieg," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 67, no. 1 (January 2019): 1–30.

Hubert Leber's article was published originally as "Rüstungsexporte und Holocaust-Erinnerung: Saudi-Arabien, der Leopard 2 und die geheime Israel-Klausel von 1982—ein Bonner Paradigmenwechsel," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 68, no. 3 (July 2020): 337–73.

Thomas Riegler's article was published originally as "'Macht's es unter der Tuchent': Die Waffengeschäfte der österreichischen Verstaatlichten Industrie und der Noricum-Skandal," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 64, no. 1 (January 2016): 99–137.

Siegfried Suckut's article was published originally as "Probleme mit dem 'großen Bruder': Der DDR-Staatssicherheitsdienst und die Deutschlandpolitik der KPdSU 1969/70," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 58, no. 3 (July 2010): 403–39.

Thomas Wolf's article was published originally as "Die Anfänge des BND: Gehlens Organisation—Prozess, Legende und Hypothek," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 64, no. 2 (April 2016): 191–225.

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

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