

Name: KAMPHCEVENER, Kurt von LegRat in AA	ZS Nr. 2066	Bd. I	Vermerk:
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Kamphaevener

**HISTORICAL INTERROGATION COMMISSION  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF, G-2  
HISTORICAL BRANCH, LHD**

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G-2 Pm 241

Source : Kurt von KALPHOEVENER, Vortragender Legationsrat in the Foreign Service.  
Date : 14 August 1945  
Place : SAIO  
Interrogator : Lt. Col. O.J. Hale

*By Authority*  
*25 2066*  
*28/45*

Institut für Zeitgeschichte	
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**C O N T E N T S**

- I. Transfer of Population following Polish Partition-1939
- II. Transfer of Volksdeutsche from Croatia
- III. Outbreak of War in the Balkans - 1941
- IV. Partition of Yugoslavia and Occupation Policies.

Personal Data: Source is held as a PW as he served in the grade of Captain (Res) in the present war. He is 57 years of age and began his career in the German foreign service in 1911. He joined the "Democratic Club" in 1919 and the Social Democratic Party in 1930. Under pressure he joined the NSDAP in 1942. He has never been promoted or decorated under the Nazi regime. During the present war he served as an intelligence (Abwehr) officer in Athens and in Vrnjachka Banja, Serbia. Also FO Liaison officer with Army Group Mitte, in Russia, and Army Group Löhr in Zagreb. Source speaks English fluently, having served for many years in consular and diplomatic posts in Britain and the Dominions. He is highly cultured and a bitter critic of the Nazis.

**I. TRANSFER OF POPULATION FOLLOWING POLISH PARTITION - 1939**

Source states that when the Nazis came to power he concluded that they would have Bolshevism in Germany within seven years so he began the study of Russian, in which he acquired some proficiency. As all the other qualified Russian experts were occupied with more important negotiations in the autumn of 1939 - boundary agreement and trade treaty - and the FO had no one else to call upon, source was sent as head of the German Commission to negotiate with the Russians for the transfer of populations from the areas adjacent to the new boundary. The German minorities in the part of Poland occupied by Russia were the principal consideration. On his commission were various representatives of government agencies including Himmler's Volksdeutsche Mittelstellen. The Russian Commission was headed by "Mali" Litvinov although the real power was held by the GPU representative, and later Lt Gen, Moslenikov. The negotiations required about one week, but it took three weeks for

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the Russians to secure Moscow approval. Once made, the Russians executed the agreement loyally. About 250,000 Germans from Volhynia emigrated to Germany or German occupied territory but only a few thousand persons, mostly Jews, took advantage of the opportunity to emigrate to Russian territory. About 150 German commissioners went into the Russian Area to contact the German minorities. On these missions each German worked with a Russian representative.

*(Racial Germans)*

II. TRANSFER OF VOLKSDEUTSCHE FROM CROATIA

In the autumn of 1941 source negotiated a similar agreement with the Italians covering the ancient German colony in the mountains south of Laibach. About 50,000 Volksdeutsche were affected by this transfer. At first the negotiations were conducted with Italian officials, later with the Italian High Commissioner in Laibach. When the Germans moved out of their villages the bandits moved in as the Italians had procrastinated and were not ready to take over the territory. The Germans were resettled in Carinthia.

Previously, in April 1941, source headed the German Commission that fixed the new boundary between Independent Croatia and Germany, the original line having been roughly defined in the general partition of Yugoslavia by Ribbentrop and Ciano.

III. OUTBREAK OF WAR IN THE BALKANS

In the spring of 1941, source was chief of the Control section in the FO where he saw all incoming and outgoing messages. On basis of information thus acquired he states that the Balkan war was unwanted and unexpected. The German Ambassador in Belgrade warned the German leaders that the pact which they had concluded was made with a weak government, that the published agreement had stirred up strong opposition that might overthrow the regime. He urged that the secret protocol, which stated that Yugoslavia would not be called on for military assistance and that transport of troops through her territory would not be requested, be published to strengthen the hands of the Yugoslav government. This was refused as was also his request that he be allowed to show the secret protocol to the leaders of the opposition. This was likewise refused. He then asked to be permitted to come to Hitler's Hq to explain the situation. This too was refused and when the crash came, the Ambassador was sacked by Hitler for not having disobeyed his orders by coming anyway. Hitler said he lacked courage.

IV. PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND POLICY IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS

The partition of Yugoslavia was effected by Ribbentrop and Ciano without the assistance of Balkan experts. Ciano had rather good racial maps and he and Ribbentrop drew the new boundaries in accord roughly with racial distribution in the area. When minister Coudius saw the proposed delimitations he pointed out that with regard to mineral and industrial resources they wanted quite a different boundary. Ribbentrop then drew new boundaries and persuaded Ciano to accept them. The Italians did not get a single ore mine

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as the new boundaries were fixed.

Source states that German authorities had no political plans for the Balkans and improvised throughout. The Austrians came forward with all sorts of impossible proposals. The Army would have preferred to keep Yugoslavia as a single territorial and political entity. In their opinion it would have been easier and simpler to control as a single political unit.

1. Slovenia

In Slovenia the demarcation line divided the area and Ljubljana, the capital, became an Italian city. German troops occupied the part that fell to the new state of Croatia. At the same time the SS began to transfer by force Slovene population groups from Carinthia to areas further south. The local German military authorities were opposed to these measures as they created unrest and disorder and fostered insurgent activity. The Italians in their sphere cooperated closely with the native Catholic clergy, but were unsuccessful in controlling the situation. The Germans leaned heavily upon the Slovene General Rupnik who organized the White Guards, and with the support of the clergy closely cooperated with the occupying forces. Rupnik's role in Slovenia was not dissimilar to that of Nedich in Serbia. After Badoglio's capitulation, all of Slovenia was occupied by German troops with a resulting improvement in conditions.

2. Croatia

In Croatia the Wehrmacht's policy of pacification was greatly hampered by Italian policy, which was directed against the national consolidation of the Croat state. The Ustascha regime was a destructive and undermining factor from the beginning with their policies of liquidating Jews, Serbs, and Mohammedans. The Ustascha were always ready to suppress brutally all political opponents but they were unreliable allies in the struggle against the Partisans. A widening rift developed between the Ustascha and the German Army authorities. The Army Command cooperated with groups of Mihailovic's Chetniks operating in Croat territory against the Ustascha and the Partisans. This led to constant friction between Genobst. Rendulic, Commander of the 2d Panzer Army, and the Military Plenipotentiary Gleise-Horstenaus, on the one hand, and the German envoy in Croatia, Amb. Kasche, on the other. Kasche had personal instructions from Hitler to promote national socialist principles and policies in Croatia.

3. Serbia

According to source, the pacification of Serbia proceeded rapidly after the Mihailovic uprising in the summer and fall of 1941. Gradually local Chetnik leaders and local German detachments began to cooperate in fighting the "Communist bands" i.e. Partisans. This cooperation led to a kind of "gentleman's agreement" providing for concerted action against Tito, and mutual

non-interference as far as other activities were concerned. Chetnik requests for ammunition were occasionally met by allowing German supplies to be "stolen" by Chetnik bands. At first this was disapproved by Hq in Belgrade but with the appointment of Minister Neubacher as FO Plenipotentiary in the Southeast, this policy of cooperation was officially recognized. Negotiations formerly conducted through local channels, mostly Abwehr, were now taken over by Neubacher and his staff. Hitler distrusted such cooperation. Neubacher and the military authorities were quite aware that this cooperation was limited to the fight against the Partisans, and that in the event of an Anglo-American invasion of the Balkans Mihailovic would join the Allies. Source participated in many of these negotiations which were conducted on the Serbian side by Ljotich, Jovanovich, Djurichich, Djulavio, Arsovic, Djujich, and Perusic. While they emphasized their pro-Allied sympathy they made it clear that in the fight against Partisans and Communism the Germans could fully rely upon them.

To the Ustasha regime, Serbian centralism was as hateful as "Communism", so all attempts to bring Mihailovic and Pavelic together were unsuccessful. At the end of the war, in April-May 1945, Mihailovic's representatives were negotiating for a common Serbo-Croat-Slovene "nationalist" front against the Partisans. Mihailovic wanted to withdraw his forces to the West to link up with the Allies and needed Pavelic's consent and guarantee of safe conduct. Apparently this was not realized as only small groups of Mihailovic's followers were able to work their way west.

Between Nedich and Mihailovic relations were at first strained but later on they were stabilized on the tacit understanding that Mihailovic recognized Nedich's function as the official collaborator as a necessary one, while Nedich in turn approved Mihailovic's more obscure methods.

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GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN  
REINTALSTRASSE 6 A  
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18. Aug. 67

Schr. geö. e. Gnädige Frau!

Auf Ihr Schreiben vom 14.8.-Az.v.K./K. erwiedere ich ergebenst, dass ich im Oktober 1939 als Leiter einer Delegation zu Verhandlungen über Umsiedelung nach Moskau entsandt wurde. Die Delegation bestand im Wesentlichen aus Funktionären der Partei, die mir als nicht P.G. alle erdenklichen Schwierigkeiten machten und das Ganze als Sache der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle und der S.S. aufziehen wollten. Da sich die Rückführung der Deutschen über das besetzte Polen erstrecken musste, bestand ich auf Mitwirkung der obersten Heeresleitung. So wurde der Delegation auch ein russisch sprechender Offizier zugeteilt, dessen Name mir aber entfallen ist. War es Major Döhring? Jedenfalls habe ich an seine loyale Mitarbeit die besten Erinnerungen. Mir gelang es, das Abkommen mit den Russen, trotz verschiedener Intrigen gegen mich, mit Unterstützung von Graf Schulenburg unseren Maximalwünschen entsprechend abzuschließen konnte im November unterzeichnen und reiste nach Berlin zurück, übrigens über Riga, wo mich mein Freund und hochgeschätzter Kollege Ihres Namens empfing. Meine Aufgabe als Verhandlungsführer war erfüllt, ich erhielt andere Aufgaben im Auswärtigen Amt. In Moskau blieb mein jüngere Kollege Sauken,<sup>x</sup> und wurde dann wohl Mitglied der entstehenden Umsiedelungskommission. Ich bin in Russland später nur als Soldat wieder gewesen, nachdem es mir gelungen war, aus dem Bereich Ribbentrops zu scheiden.

Mit dem Bedauern, nicht mehr zur Aufklärung des Falles beitragen zu können, bin ich Ihr sehr ergebener

Lds: Kurt von Kamphaeuser

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x Als der im  
Ausdrück bitten  
Kordt z.