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As requested, I today interviewed Professor Dr Dr Ernst-Günter SCHENCK at his home, Aachen, Preussweg 50 (tel.: [0241] 72228), from 12 noon until 3.40 p.m., together with a "Stern" photographer, Herr Moldvay.

2. Schenck was principally a Ernährungswissenschaftler and Internist. In 1939 he was given the Auftrag, the Ernährung of sick people to rationalisieren. Im Frühjahr 1940 there had been a controversy at the highest level (Göring, Himmler, Hitler etc) about the Verpflegung of the deutscher Wehrmachtsteile: in the Polish campaign, the troops had been very badly fed, and it was agreed that a Sonderposten should be established, that of "Ernährungsinspekteur" in each of the services, der die ganze Frage durcharbeiten sollte. As it would be impracticable, in the middle of the war, to introduce this new post for all the services at once, the smallest service, the Waffen-SS, was chosen for the beginning, and Schenck (1942 appointed Professor) was appointed in April 1940 Ernährungsinspekteur der Waffen-SS (which may have been called Allg. SS at that time). He was in fact a Heeresarzt, but he was now given SS rank (Obersturmführer) and eventually was attached to the Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt under Pohl. This was however his sole association with the SS as such. In this position he followed the campaigns in Frankreich, Norwegen, Greichenland, Russland and finally Russland, where he was attached to the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. In June or July 1944, he was then appointed Ernährungsinspekteur der gesamten Wehrmacht.

3. In his period on the Eastern Front, he made the acquaintance of Morell's "Russla Puder". In Taganrog he saw that the troops were vollkommen verlaust, and that the "Russla Puder" had no effect. The Waffen-SS sent a sample of "Russla" to Berlin in a box together with Wanzen, to prove that they would arrive alive, and they did. The Wanzen were carriers of Fleckfieber, a disease of which the troops were dying in great numbers.

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4. A second reason why he had regarded Morell with great suspicion was that in 1940/1941, when Schenck was involved in high level discussions on the proper distribution of Vitamins - should they go preferentially to children, women, troops? etc - he received an imposing letter from Prof. Morell on headed notepaper of the Führerhauptquartier making huge demands himself for allocations of the scarce vitamin raw products. For example they had only 50 tons of Ascorbinsäure (d.h. Vitamin C) in the whole Reich; yet they needed 200 tons to meet all requirements, and Morell demanded - and got - priority supplies of Ascorbinsäure for his Vitamultin tablets. Schenck opposed the allocation, but was overruled by Backe, the Staatssekretär in the Ernährungsministerium. "Damals," so Schenck heute, "stiess ich zuerst auf den Namen von Morell." These were not the methods of a respectable doctor, und "das hat mich etwas misstrauisch gemacht."

5. One day in 1943, Schenck was sitting in his office, his Dienststelle as Ernährungsinspekteur der Waffen SS, when the door opened and a man, an SS officer, came in and laid a number of flat objects on the desk, each wrapped in gold paper. "Sehen Sie diese an," he said grinning. "Das sind die Vitamultin-Tablette, die nur der Führer von Morell bekommt." Schenck now has no idea who the man was, or how he got the tablets, and this forms the one weak link in his story. Otherwise his description of the tablets themselves is correct. He describes: there were two versions of the Vitamultin tablets: one version was whitish-yellow, Zucker mit Zitronensäure and the other ingredients, wrapped in a roll of white paper with the printed impression: "Vitamultin für die Deutsche Arbeitsfront" or something similar, not unlike a modern roll of peppermints to look at. The other version, the Vitamultin-dragees, were about 2,5 cm mal 3 cm, about 0,3 cm thick, chocolate brown and brittle, each wrapped in either gold paper, like those the man brought to him, or in silver paper. The Täfelchen weighed something over 2 grams each.

6. As Schenck was already Misstrauisch of Morell because of his "unethical" business attitudes, and because of the "Russla" affair,

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he thought to himself - "die untersuchen wir mal", and he asked the man to let him have the three or four Tafelchen. Here it should be explained that part of his work as a Nahrungsfachmann was to analyse the contents of the 200-gram food packages contained in the Abwurfbomben dropped by the British and Americans for their SIS and SOE agents in France, etc: his job was to see how the Allies fed their secret agents, analysis of survival rations, etc; these survival packs also contained cyanide pills, and "Pervitin" supplies for the agents. Each Versorgungsbombe contained about 200 such portions, and was about two or three meters long. In each case, he sent any new substances, unfamiliar to him, to a special Untersuchungsstelle des Heeres in Berlin.

7. Upon receiving now the three or four Vitamultin tablets said to be those specially prepared for the Fuhrer, Schenck unwrapped them from their gold wrappings, and pounded them up into a uniform powder in his Morsel. Das Pulver he put into a Glasflasche with a special number on it, and sent it to the Lebensmitteluntersuchungsstelle des Heeres, as mentioned. A few days later, he had the analysis: the brown powder contained - according to Schenck's memory now - Kakao, Koffein, Ascorbinsaure (Vit. C), Hagebutten, Weizenkeime, usw., -- und Pervitin. Pervitin has a definitely fixed chemical formula - its chemical name is *N*-1-phenyl-2-methylaminopropan, and while it had in the first years of the war been regularly taken by Luftwaffe and other troops as a means of keeping awake, etc., its peverse side-effects had subsequently been detected, and Schenck knew that am 1. Juni 1941 war die Unterstellung des Pervitins unter das Opiumgesetz erfolgt (das Verschreiben von Pervitin ist seitdem nur gestattet, wenn der Arzt "nach strenger Prufung der Besonderheiten des einzlenen Krankheitsfalles mit anderen Mitteln nicht auskommen kann" - so heisst es im neuen Gesetz.).

8. Schenck was sufficiently concerned about his discovery to reveal it secretly to his ultimate superior, WVHA-Chef Pohl, damit er das dem Reichsfuhrer SS weitermelden wurde. A few days Schenck

was told verbally by Pohl that Himmler had ordered that Schenck sich überhaupt nicht in der Sache einzumischen hätte. Despite this, Schenck went to Dr Leonardo Conti (Reichsgesundheitsführer, kam nicht gut mit Morell aus, aber noch grösserer Gegner des Prof. Brandts) and told him the whole affair. As soon as Conti heard that Himmler had ordered Schenck to drop the matter, Conti also decided against taking it any further.

9. So much for the details of the case. What must be borne in mind is the possibility that if Pervitin was in the tablets, Morell was aware of this but was giving the Pervitin in such small quantities that even taken seven or eight times a day it would not be harmful. Schenck stresses himself that he did not find out from the Untersuchungsstelle what concentration of Pervitin was contained in the powder, and having studied the remaining medication given to Hitler by Morell (from my records) and having pointed to the tiny doses given by Morell of most of the medicines (Schenck on Morell: "he was obviously what we call a doctor obsessed with Polypragmasie - 'Vielbeschäftigkeit'; he wanted to give Hitler a bit of everything, but he was frightened to give Hitler big enough doses of anything.") he thinks it possible that there was not enough in the tablets to harm Hitler, and that Morell just added it as a further "something", to give the so-called Vitamultin-"F" tablets extra boost.

10. Schenck also agrees that whether the golden wrapped tablets were the Vitamultin-"F" tablets specially made for Hitler is also uncertain; he was just told this by his informant, otherwise there is no proof at all. Morell was asked by the Americans whether he ever gave Hitler "Pervitin", and he denied it emphatically, and we see from his letter of late 1944 that he advised other patients against trying Pervitin.

11. Schenck had strong words of condemnation for Morell's tendency to use only his own factories' preparations on his patients - "Ultraseptyl" etc. It was morally wrong for a doctor to do this, he stresses. Apart from this, many of the medicines Morell admits using were most unorthodox. Schenck: "Ein Tanz auf einem Vulkan war es, das er [Morell] gemacht hat!"

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12. The best penicillin work was done by Professor Vonkennel in Leipzig, late in 1944. Schenck says it would have been a terrible waste of penicillin if Morell had applied penicillin in powder-form to Hitler's hand injury after 20th July 1944, and he agrees that this makes it unlikely that Schenck was telling the truth there. At my request, he is going to comment on each of the medicines and dosages applied by Morell to Hitler, using the textbooks of the day.

13. On the night of 29th/30th April 1945, Hitler summoned Schenck and von Haase, who had been operating in the operating room of the Neue Reichskanzlei on hundreds of wounded soldiers, almost nonstop for several days, together with two Krankenschwester, and met them at the top of the winding staircase leading up from his bunker. He took leave of them, and talked with them for five minutes, apologising for having called for them at such a late hour (1 or 2 Uhr morgens). One of the Krankenschwester began to make a hysterical speech about her belief that Hitler would after all bring them to the Endsieg, and after listening for a minute or so, Hitler lost patience and abruptly cut her short with the words, "Man darf seinem Schicksal nicht feige entziehen wollen" -- words that Schenck particularly remembers. The next morning, at about 9 Uhr, von Haase came up to him as he was operating again and whispered in his ear: "Heute nachmittag um 15 Uhr wird der Führer aus dem Leben scheiden", so the whole thing had been planned that far in advance. Stumpfegger could not assist in the operating theatre, as he had to be at Hitler's side. Von Haase volunteered to work in the Reichskanzlei for the last days, although he was very ill with schwere Lungentuberkulose and could hardly move. He advised von Haase during the operations.

14. After Hitler's death became known, everybody in the building was seized by a panischer Angst. Von Haase announced that he was going to stay, weil er nicht mehr gehen konnte. About six groups were formed of people who were going to attempt to break out: Schenck was attached to the group containing besides himself Hewel, Günsche, Fr. Junge and three other females, together with Mohnke. There was a short assembly of all

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those concerned in the bunker, and Mohnke read out to them the two Testaments, which caused a great stir. Then he discussed their break-out plans. Schenck thought things were going to get tough from that point on, and in loosening his pistol in its holster accidentally fired a shot into the Reichskanzlei floor during the Befehlsausgabe - a shot which nobody paid any attention to whatsoever!

15. He was with Hewel until shortly before the end. Botschafter Hewel showed him the cyanide pill he was carrying, and said that he had promised the Führer that when the Russians entered the room he would kill himself. Schenck tried to persuade him, in his naivete, to make use of his "diplomatic immunity" as a Botschafter, but Hewel insisted that he could not break his promise to the Führer.

16. On Schenck's last confrontation with Hitler, he noticed the stooping posture he had seen already on the Wochenschau photos, and he believes it was caused by Bechterev'sche Krankheit, a chronische Entzündung der Gelenksäule. The comic result of this disease is that der Rücken krumm ist, der Kopf etwas in die Höhe geht. Schenck stresses that this was purely his subjective assessment.

17. When Mohnke read out the two Hitler Testaments, Schenck does not recall the Goebbels Testament (Zusatz) being read out.

18. In 1940, he was Chefarzt am Krankenhaus, München-Schwabing. In 1940 he published a handbook, "Grundlagen und Vorschriften für die Regelung der Krankenernährung im Kriege", an official booklet which was sent to every German doctor. He has few documents, and no photographs, having been in Russian captivity for ten years.

19. He makes an honest and truthful impression, but he was the first to admit the dangerous gaps in his memory of the whole "Pervitin" affair.

DAVID IRVING.