

## ZEUGENSCHRIFTUM

ZS- 7594/7-7

Name:	ZS Nr.	Bd.	Vermerk:
W I R S I N G , Giselher Dr.	1594	I	
katalogisiert Seite: Sachkatalog: Propaganda III - Propeinheiten	Personen: Wirsing, Giselher Schellenberg, Walter		
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ZS-15947-2

Bitte zu diesen Akten legen

Die beiden Umschläge entsprechen zwei verschiedenen Lieferungen. Bitte getrennt halten. Die Begleitschreiben dürfen zu den Akten genommen werden.

Im Fritz Bauer-Institut in Frankfurt am Main sind einige Zusatzakten aus den USA (Zu: Herrenklub, Schellenberg (nur 1 Blatt), H. Brümig und Wirsing (ohne Bezug auf Egonal-B.)). Akten, die ich in Zukunft erhalte, werde ich ebenfalls dort abgeben.

D. Maier

Institut für Zeitgeschichte Archiv

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY ACTS PROCESSED DOCUMENTS

SUBJ.: GISELHER WIRSING

FILE #: 61-7850-1008

SEC. #: \_\_\_\_\_

Institute für Zeitgeschichte	
Nr. 3284/02	ZS 1594/1
Rep.	Ros

Institut für Zeitgeschichte - Archiv

25-75847-4

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

7 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

Section 552a

- (b)(1)
- (b)(2)
- (b)(3)
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- Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request.
- Information pertained only to a third party. The subject of your request is listed in the title only.
- Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

1 Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). ~~You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).~~ The other agency(ies) will correspond directly with you as to the releasability of this information. Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

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HQ 61-7850-1008

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25-159417-5  
April 2, 1946

DR. GISELHER WIRSING

Dr. Giseler Wirsing is known to be the Editor-in-Chief of the Munchner Neueste Nachrichten, a publication, in Munich, Germany. It is known that on October 8, 1941, [REDACTED] who has been closely associated with Wirsing, told Wirsing that his [REDACTED] claim is merely that of endeavoring to keep the United States out of war. He furnished Wirsing with newspaper clippings concerning his indictment, and he stated that it was only an incident of the perfidious plot to smear all opposition to the arbitrary forces cunningly at work to destroy the America we know and love.

[REDACTED] received funds from the German government prior to the time the United States entered the First World War for the collection and dissemination of German propaganda and was indicted in Washington, D. C., on July 23, 1942, and was convicted on a conspiracy charge and violation of Section 11, Title 18, USC, and Section 34, Title 50, USC.

Subsequent to the passage of the McCormick Act in 1938 which required the registration of agents of foreign principals with the Secretary of State, [REDACTED] filed a registration statement naming as his foreign principal the German newspaper "Munchner Neueste Nachrichten," indicating Dr. Giseler Wirsing as Editor-in-Chief. He alleged also to be a correspondent for this newspaper and that he was to receive \$500 monthly as a salary and \$1,000 to cover traveling expenses. He also reported to the Secretary of State that he had agreed to prepare certain material for [REDACTED] published by the German Library of Information in New York City.

As a result of [REDACTED]'s registration, close investigation developed that he had not fully described his activities on his registration statement and he was indicted on October 8, 1941, for failure to fully disclose his activities in that he was associated with [REDACTED] in the operation of the "Make Europe Pay War Debts Committee" and "Islands for War Debts Committee." He was also charged with acting as a public relations council in distributing through Flanders Hall, Inc., of White Plains, New York, and other information designed to influence American public opinion. These charges were borne out in the jury trial which followed and [REDACTED] was found guilty. He was sentenced to serve two to six years in a penitentiary and to pay a fine totaling \$1500.

Wirsing is stated to have studied political economy at the University of Heidelberg and was an assistant in the Institute of Political Economy

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DATE 7-29-97 BY SP3 BJS/ew

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ENCLOSURE

61-7850-1008

in the early 1930's. He graduated with a doctor's degree in political economy. Wirsing is known to have belonged to a group of young Nationalistic activists in Germany. The name of this political group was "Die Tat" meaning action. This group issued a magazine, "Action," and had certain influence in the intellectual circles and are stated to have paved the way for Hitler through their activities. Many people from this group later joined the SS, Hitler's elite guard, Schutzstaffeln. This group was investigated by the Weimer republic in the pre-Hitler days together with the National Socialists for their subversive activities directed against the government of the democratic German Republic.

Wirsing is stated to have been appointed originally as the editor of the newspaper "Munchner Neueste Nachrichten" and later as political editor in chief. The handbook of the German press in 1934 listed Wirsing as a political editor and in 1937 as chief political editor. Wirsing is considered to have been a German Schriftliester, who had official duties bestowed upon them by the Ministry of Propaganda, which was headed by Dr. Paul Josef Gobbels.

It is known that on April 17, 1941, [redacted] corresponded with Giselher Wirsing at Munich, Germany, and furnished Wirsing with four different avenues of discussion regarding a book, "The 100 Families," and [redacted] explained the manner in which it was intended to exploit funds advanced. [redacted] stated that he had hoped that he would receive authorization to advance amounts as his own and to use it in accordance with his best judgment, otherwise in case of an actual international break there would be all sorts of complications. [redacted] told Wirsing that several advertising agencies had refused to handle the advertising for this book which was published by Flanders Hall, and [redacted] stated that if the newspapers refused to accept the advertisement "other methods will be found to bring the book to the attention of American patriots who refuse to consent to the enumerations of the Declaration of Independence." It is believed that the German government used Dr. Giselher Wirsing and his publishing house as a means of rewarding [redacted] for his propaganda activities in the United States.

It has been stated that [redacted] had met Wirsing and that one of Wirsing's associates, [redacted] visited [redacted] while in the United States.

Wirsing's present whereabouts are unknown to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

25-1594(1) -7

FEDERAL BUREAU  
OF INVESTIGATION

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY ACTS  
PROCESSED DOCUMENTS

SUBJ.: GISELHER WIRSING

FILE #: 100-16892-42

SEC. #: \_\_\_\_\_

25-759417-8

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1  
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **BUFFALO, NEW YORK**

FILE NO. **65-475 (ONK)**

REPORT MADE AT <b>BUFFALO, NEW YORK</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>12/30/42</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>12/8-5; 12/7-9; 12/12, 14, 16/42</b>	REPORT MADE BY <b>[REDACTED]</b> <span style="float: right;">b7c</span>
TITLE <b>MAX SCHULZ</b>		CHARACTER OF CASE <b>INTERNAL SECURITY - G REGISTRATION ACT; SPECIAL INQUIRY; COUNTER INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, G-2 DENATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS</b>	

**SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:**

Subject born April 23, 1898 at Rummelsburg, Germany; arrived in United States of America on October 11, 1923 at New York City via SS America. Naturalization certificate #3033663 issued at Rochester, N.Y. on April 30, 1929.

**[REDACTED]** Subject states he was Sergeant in German Army and prisoner of World War #1; member of ELBERFELT, Secret German Police; member of DEUTSCHER VETERANEN VEREIN (League of German Veterans) aka, FRONT KAEMPFER; president of the DEUTSCHE AMERIKANISCHE BERUFGEMEINSCHAFT (German Vocational League); vice-president of the German-American Societies; friend of EMIL PIEPER - Buffalo German Consul; arranged German evenings and collected funds; purchased U.S. Naval uniform and forwarded to interned German prisoner in Canada. Said prisoner, escaped and was apprehended. Spoke in favor of flying Nazi flag on German day in 1939. Displayed picture of Hitler in home prior to December 9, 1941; recorded and transmitted short wave messages to prisoners in Canada from Germany; admits mental reservation in oath of allegiance. Neighbors state subject and business associates pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic. Confidential Informants consider him pro-German.

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o/s  
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11/6/43  
176-212  
1-16-42

*Teletype Buffalo 1-16-43*

- P -

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DATE 1/28/87 BY SP3/...

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: <i>[Signature]</i>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES	RECORDED
RECEIVED 20 JAN 1943 100-16892-42		INDEXED	D-75
RECEIVED 50 JAN 2 1943 COPY-IN-FILE			

25-759417-9  
Archiv

In an investigation of the "DEUTSCH-AMERIKANISCHE BERUFGEMEINSCHAFT (German-American Vocational League Recreation Resort, Inc., - D.A.B.) at New York City names of members as reflected at the National Headquarters were obtained. According to these records subject was a former member of this organization.

In connection with a letter addressed to subject at his home from Suite 913-5, 141 Broadway, New York City - the address of the HANSA SECURITIES CORP. - subject, in a subsequent interview, advised writer that he received literature from the Corporation concerning the purchase of German bonds and Reichsmark credits in Germany. However, he stated that he never answered the letter nor made inquiry concerning the data set forth in said letter. Further, he never purchased any bonds or Reichsmark credits and never intends to purchase any.

The HANSA SECURITIES CORPORATION was engaged as dealers in domestic and German listed and unlisted securities. The company also arranged, as a special service to customers, in accordance with the complicated German currency regulations, the handling of various blocked Reichsmark credits in Germany. This corporation, which has gone out of business since some time in April, 1942, was incorporated October 9, 1934. Its officers were [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In its early years, HANSA SECURITIES CORP. had branches in Cincinnati, Ohio; Hoboken, New Jersey; and Cleveland, Ohio. In 1935 it was soliciting business in German securities over the radio in Philadelphia. This corporation also provided facilities for the catering of food packages to Germany proper and the German occupied countries. American residents would pay over money to this corporation, and the latter would transmit the money to the Mid-European Food Package, Inc., which would cable the money to an agent in Germany, Holland or other occupied countries, which agent would then purchase the food packages and forward them to the relatives or friends to whom they were to go.

[REDACTED]

Pursuant to an Executive Warrant of Search issued by Honorable GEORGE L. GROBE, U. S. Attorney at Buffalo, N.Y. on December 7, 1942, on December 9, 1942, writer, accompanied by Special Agents [REDACTED] searched the premises of [REDACTED]

The following articles were taken from said premises by aforementioned agents:

OUTSIDE  
the  
SCOPE

(0/5)

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Insti

Title

MAX SCHULZ

Special Agent

[REDACTED]

Date

12/30/42

b7C

AMERICAN AID FOR WAR PRISONERS	22
[REDACTED]	27
[REDACTED]	27
[REDACTED]	28
[REDACTED]	5
[REDACTED]	19&20
[REDACTED]	5
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT #1	2
DEUTSCHE AMERIKANISCHE HILFES-	
GESELLSCHAFT	1, 19&20, 28
DEUTSCHER VETERANEN VEREIN	1, 27
[REDACTED]	3, 12
[REDACTED]	2, 4, 29
[REDACTED]	1, 27
[REDACTED]	21
FEDERATION OF GERMAN SOCIETIES	11, 29
[REDACTED]	9, 10
[REDACTED]	10
[REDACTED]	10
[REDACTED]	22
[REDACTED]	28
[REDACTED]	19&20
GERMAN-AMERICAN SOCIETIES	1
GERMAN LIBRARY OF INFORMATION	21
GERMAN VOCATIONAL LEAGUE	1, 19&20, 28
[REDACTED]	5
[REDACTED]	6, 8
GREENFIELD TAP AND LIE CORP.	21
[REDACTED]	22
[REDACTED]	6, 7
KANSA SECURITIES CORPORATION	19&20
[REDACTED]	21
[REDACTED]	21
[REDACTED]	28, 30

o/s

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[REDACTED]

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21  
21  
5, 7, 32  
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1, 27

ISSUES OF GERMAN VETERANS

21  
21  
36  
22  
17, 18  
21

[REDACTED]

MID-EUROPEAN FOOD PACKAGE, INC.

19, 20  
22  
21  
26  
29

o/s

[REDACTED]

1, 11, 12  
36  
11  
12, 13, 14

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2, 16, 19&20, 23, 24, 25, 34  
26  
9, 14, 15, 23  
2, 26

SECRET GERMAN POLICE

1  
19&20  
28

[REDACTED]

STRIMBERG CARLSON COMPANY

9  
21  
5  
27  
19&20

[REDACTED]

WAR TIME MAPS

21  
28

WIRSING, GISECHER

21  
36  
36

o/s

[REDACTED]

67C

Institut für Zeitgeschichte

Archiv

65-475

(1) One booklet entitled, "The War in Maps" edited by GISECHER WIRSING in collaboration with ALBRECHT HAUSHOFFER - WOLFGANG HOPKER HORST MICHAEL - ULRICH LINK and published by the New York German Library of Information in 1941. (in English)

(2) A portion of booklet issued by GREENFIELD TAP AND DIE CORP. from page 313 to 380 inclusive, containing data on drill sizes, hand taps, pipe sizes, tables of metal weights, etc. (in English)

(3) Set of notes on steam boiler design, airplane design, and the names of German individuals [redacted] on whom internal security cases have been opened in the Buffalo Field office, indicating they purchased certain amounts of tickets.

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(4) One letter, dated 11/14/41, addressed to subject at 632 Norton Street Rochester from [redacted] (in English)

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(5) One letter, dated 11/13/41, addressed by subject to the Internment Operations Dept. of the Secretary of State of Canada, stating that the subject had picked up a broadcast from the German short wave station advising certain named Canadian prisoners in Germany had not received news since their capture. A list of said names and a copy of the letter sent to their relatives is set forth. (in English)

(6) One clipping from paper entitled "The Axis Terms of Peace" written by WALTER LIPPMANN.

(7) One clipping from paper entitled "Prison Camp Status Found Better Than in World War", relating to Prison conditions in Germany and written by TRACY STRONG, Y.M.C.A.'s world committee for war prisoners. (in English)

(8) One letter addressed to subject at 632 Norton Street, Rochester from [redacted] (in German)

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
FEDERAL BUREAU  
OF INVESTIGATION

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY ACTS  
PROCESSED DOCUMENTS

SUBJ.: GISELHER WIRSING

FILE #: 100 - 394984 - 10566

SEC. #: \_\_\_\_\_



2-14

Urfile # 100-394984  
 PHfile # 66-2164-Sub B  
 9/2/66

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ENCLOSURE

10566

25-159417 -15

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DATE 7-27-97 BY SP3 BTJ/kw

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Section 552

Section 552a

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (100-394984)  
ATTENTION: FBI ANNEX

FROM : SAC, Philadelphia (66-2164-Sub B)

SUBJECT: CHIPROP  
INTERNAL SECURITY - CH

DATE: 9/9/63

ReBulet to Philadelphia, 7/30/63.

Enclosed for the San Francisco Office are Photo-  
stats of an envelope addressed to Mr. and Mrs. Dr. GISELHER  
WIRSING and accompanying typewritten letter in German,  
received by the Bureau from San Francisco by letter dated  
7/26/63. Also enclosed is the English translation of  
above material.

Enclosed for the Bureau is the English translation  
of above material, translated by SA [REDACTED]

b7c

### Descriptive Data:

One piece Air Mail letter and envelope, typewritten,  
addressed to Mr. and Mrs. Dr. GISELHER WIRSING, 7 Stuttgart-  
Vaihingen, Robert-Leicht St. 173-A; return address -  
[REDACTED] Letter is postmarked  
robn, 7/22/63, at Hong Kong.

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DATE 7-28-93 BY SP3BTS/ri  
402,361

- 2 - Bureau (100-394984) (ENCL. 1) (RM)
- 2 - San Francisco (105-2563) (ENCLS. 4) (RM)
- 1 - Philadelphia (66-2164-Sub B)

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EX-102

REC-29

100-394984-1056  
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ENCLOSURE

57 SEP 27 1963

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NAT. INT. SEC.

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
FEDERAL BUREAU  
OF INVESTIGATION

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY ACTS  
PROCESSED DOCUMENTS

SUBJ.: GISELHER WIRSING

FILE #: 105-66595-2

SEC. #: \_\_\_\_\_



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

75-15941-73

TO : Director, FBI ( )

DATE: 4/3/63

FROM : Legal Attache, Bonn (105-0-929) ( )

SUBJECT:  b7C  
IS-EAST GERMANY  
Reference



It is suggested that enclosure(s) ( ) be translated (verbatim) (in summary) and enclosure(s) and translation be forwarded to appropriate domestic field division.



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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR  
402,36/1-797

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REC-50 105-66595-2  
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3 - Bureau Enc. (1 ENCLOSURE)  
(1 - Liaison Section)  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY

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

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Please place "X" in appropriate box

- Classifying
- General Index
- Numbering Unit
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- Subject does not check. Our subject is \_\_\_\_\_
- Anonymous communication stamp omitted
- Case number omitted
- Circle subject
- Correct number is \_\_\_\_\_
- Corner number
- Cross reference
- Detached copies of reports
- Enclosure stamp omitted
- Enclosures detached
- Enclosures incorrect
- Expedite processing mail
- Expedite processing stamp not marked through
- For general file
- If no main file return to Classifying
- Incorrect block on mail
- Incorrect indexing
- Incorrect number
- Incorrect serial
- Incorrect subject
- Is subject circled correctly
- Key word \_\_\_\_\_
- Mail not blocked
- Mail not classified
- Mail not routed
- Main cards not prepared
- No file
- Number enclosures
- Number is OK. Both subjects  
Re: Each other
- Numbers illegible
- Personnel mail
- Place copies
- SAC's signature missing
- Serial omitted
- Subject omitted

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FEDERAL BUREAU  
OF INVESTIGATION

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY ACTS  
PROCESSED DOCUMENTS

SUBJ.: GISELHER WIRSING

FILE #: 109 - 12 - 232 - 462

SEC. #: \_\_\_\_\_

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
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25-15847-24

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HEADQUARTERS  
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY  
INTELLIGENCE CENTER  
INTERROGATION SECTION  
APO 403

25 JULY 1945

SUBJECT: Meeting between WIRSING and SCHELLENBERG end of April 1945 -  
Special brief Mr Reginald PHELPS, dated 1 July 1945.  
TO : SCI, 12th Army Group.

1. Contacts with SCHELLENBERG (First Version)

WIRSING persistently claimed to have seen SCHELLENBERG for the last time when taking leave on 28 March 1945. He repeatedly stated to have taken up residence in HEILBRUNN vic BAD TÖLZ (BAVARIA) and to have stayed there until the day of his capture, denying by implication that he had taken trips of any kind.

His subsequent contacts with SCHELLENBERG, he claimed, could be summed up in a report he wrote on President TRUMANN. Aside from that one report, he claimed, he had not taken any active part in political activities.

2. Contacts with SCHELLENBERG (Corrected Version)

When confronted with direct evidence, taken from SANDBERGER's interrogation, WIRSING finally conceded to have seen SCHELLENBERG once more, end of April 1945, in LÜBECK. He explained his reluctance to volunteer this information as due to apprehensions that a casual reader of interrogator's report might derive the erroneous impression that he was a man of consequence in the RSHA.

3. WIRSING's ALIBI

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In his interrogation WIRSING has consistently tried to play

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down his importance.

WIRSING also believes that the handle to his name - ~~Sturmbannführer~~ - is liable to lead an inexperienced interrogator astray, inasmuch as it tends to overshadow his true merit, viz to have disapproved of the Nazi concept of a 'New Order' in Europe and to have gauged Germany's plight correctly at a very early stage of the war.

4. ITINERARY

WIRSING left BERLIN on 1 April 1945 heading South. After a short stay at Burg LAHENSTEIN, one of the hide-outs of ~~Group~~ VI, he proceeded to TIGERNSEE (BAVARIA), where <sup>HE</sup> had been assigned a billet by SANDBERGER and, finding the place over-crowded with refugees, went on to HEILBRUNN vic BAD TÖLZ where he put up in a private residence, retained by PAPPE for the key personnel of VI D.

5. CALL TO LÜBECK

End of April SCHELLENBERG wired for WIRSING to look him up at the earliest possible moment. The message was conveyed to WIRSING at BAD TÖLZ by SANDBERGER who did not have the telegram on him and who could only offer conjectures as to WIRSING's mission.

WIRSING immediately offered strenuous objections. He told SANDBERGER that he had been out of touch with current developments for the last four weeks and that he did not feel qualified to tender any responsible advice.

6. PROBABLE MISSION

SANDBERGER told WIRSING that he assumed his call to LÜBECK had nothing to do with a general report on the political situation and more likely was connected with the negotiations HIMMLER had initiated. SCHELLENBERG probably wanted WIRSING to participate in some form in these negotiations.

7. WIRSING GIVES IN

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WIRSING again raised objections, telling SANDBERGER that he did not feel competent in the matter. SANDBERGER, in turn,

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urged him, to sink all objections inasmuch as SCHELLENBERG probably knew what he was doing. In deference to SANDBERGER's entreaties, WIRSING finally consented to taking the trip.

8. SANDBERGER'S AIDE-MEMOIRE ON AMT VI REFORMS

In the course of their conversation SANDBERGER produced a typewritten aide-memoire, covering one page and sub-divided into paragraphs, which outlined certain reforms to be undertaken on KALTENBRUNNER's orders.

WIRSING claims not to recollect the exact contents of the aide-memoire and who had signed it. The gist of it was that responsibilities were divided up between WANECK and SKORZENY, with GÖTTSCHE having been assigned to some sort of liaison job.

SANDBERGER asked WIRSING to take the paper along with him to LÜBECK and to show it to SCHELLENBERG.

9. WIRSING ON ILLUSORY CHARACTER OF REORGANIZATION

WIRSING told SANDBERGER that he considered any basic reorganization of Amt VI as out of keeping with the stark reality of Germany's impending military defeat. For this reason he did not pay any particular attention to detail. He noticed however and immediately commented upon the fact that the aide-memoire made no mention whatever of SCHELLENBERG.

10. SANDBERGER COMMENTS ON REORGANIZATION

SANDBERGER concurred with WIRSING to the extent of admitting that the reforms amounted to a virtual dissolution of Amt VI.

He emphasized that the solution arrived at was fraught with dangerous implications.

11. SANDBERGER ON WANECK AND SKORZENY

WANECK was altogether unsuited for the job, SANDBERGER stated.

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The choice of SKORZENY he described as grotesque.

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SEKORZENY had neither the military background nor the experience in intelligence work necessary for the job.

12. SANDBERGER ON AMBIGUITY OF ORDER

SANDBERGER pointed out that the aide-memoire had left a very important question unanswered:

Was the order to apply to the whole of Germany, or was it confined to the South of Germany which by virtue of the power of attorney given by HIMMLER had come under KALTENBRUNNER's jurisdiction?

13. SCHELLENBERG'S EXCLUSION

SANDBERGER pointed out that the re-organization as outlined in the aide-memoire could be taken as a dismissal of SCHELLENBERG by implication.

WIRSING asked SANDBERGER whether one could construe the organization as forming the basis for plans entertained by KALTENBRUNNER to continue resistance in the redoubt areas and also as a disavowal of SCHELLENBERG's attempts at negotiating a negotiated surrender to the Western Allied through Count BERNADOTTE as intermediary?

SANDBERGER conceded that this was a possible interpretation.

14. REASONS FOR SCHELLENBERG'S DISMISSAL

SANDBERGER told WIRSING that WANECK did not mention the name of SCHELLENBERG until SANDBERGER asked him point blank. WANECK had passed the matter off in a dilatory fashion and SANDBERGER did not see any sense in pressing the issue. SANDBERGER summed up that from his conversation with WANECK he carried away the strong impression of having been witness to a 'Lilliputian rebellion' resulting in SCHELLENBERG's ouster.

15. WIRSING TAKES OFF

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SANDBERGER made a last appeal to WIRSING's sense of responsibility. He argued that WIRSING knew very well that SCHELLENBERG would have nobody by his side in case of a surrender in

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of the shoulders.

Commenting upon his (implied) dismissal as chief of Amt he only said: 'At five minutes to twelve they take time for a thing like that!'

He made no derogatory remarks about KALTENBUNNER and to the matter with perfect equanimity. This, in WIRSING's opinion, proves his estimate of SCHELLENBERG as a man of affairs to be correct.

21. SCHELLENBERG ON WANECK

WANECK, SCHELLENBERG stated, was not exceptionally gifted for intelligence work and had been put in charge of VI B only at the request of KALTENBUNNER. He doubted that WANECK was a man with much vision.

22. SCHELLENBERG ON SKORZENY

About SKORZENY, SCHELLENBERG spoke with a great deal of acerbity.

His appointment to take charge of the military sector was merely the culmination of an intrigue of long standing. SKORZENY was the type of a mercenary (Landknecht) who probably cause a great deal of mischief while the German people would have to foot the bill.

23. WIRSING PROTESTS WERWOLF MISCHIEF, SCHELLENBERG CONCURS

When WIRSING expressed his indignation at the 'nihilistic' Werwolf propoganda in German broadcasts, SCHELLENBERG happened to reply that he had endeavored to stop this mischief practice. He added that he considered the incitement of children a downright crime.

To WIRSING's great astonishment SCHELLENBERG avowed that HIMMLER too was opposed to the Werwolf propoganda. Obergruppenführer PRÜTZMANN had been attached to HIMMLER's staff upon HITLER's specific orders.

24. SCHELLENBERG PROMISES FURTHER ACTION

When WIRSING stated that this explanation was not in accord with the facts - only a few days ago the MUNICH station broadcast a Werwolf proclamation - SCHELLENBERG appeared

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and promised to bring up the matter again. He added however: There are strong indications that HIMMLER was unable to assert himself against GOEBBELS.

25. SCHELLENBERG'S PRE-OCCUPATION WITH BERNADOTTE CONTACTS

WIRSING gained the impression that SCHELLENBERG, even at this late hour, concentrated all his energies upon creating domestic conditions conducive to resuming contact with the Western Allies.

HIMMLER, SCHELLENBERG complained, had failed to live up to his promises and no assistance from that corner would be forthcoming.

26. SCHELLENBERG ON KALTENBRUNNER

When asked to comment on KALTENBRUNNER's role, SCHELLENBERG stated:

KALTENBRUNNER is cooking his own broth in Austria.

I would not be the least bit surprised if his connections with the Austrian underground movement enter into the game. In the end KALTENBRUNNER is bound to get caught in the very trap he has baited so carefully for his opposite number.

27. WIRSING'S COMMENT ON POLITICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KALTENBRUNNER AND SCHELLENBERG

KALTENBRUNNER and SCHELLENBERG never saw eye to eye in matters of political strategy.

Around Christmas time 1944 WIRSING had a talk with KALTENBRUNNER in the Japanese Embassy during a dinner party of Ambassador OSHIMA. WIRSING tried to press his main argument home (see special report on EGMCOT Lageberichte), viz that a cleavage among the Allies would be a windfall, to base Germany's foreign policy on the expectation of such an occurrence a fatal error.

KALTENBRUNNER suggested to WIRSING to have another long talk on the political situation. WIRSING mentioned this to SCHELLENBERG and asked for his advice what topics to touch upon. SCHELLENBERG's answer was:

Try to make KALTENBRUNNER ~~realize~~ realize that matters

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of world policy are not synonymous with South-Eastern Europe and that the decisive questions of Germany's foreign policy cannot be decided from a vantage point in Europe's back.

28. WHAT NOW?

Before winding up their conversation, SCHELLENBERG asked WIRSING: What Now?

WIRSING's answer: All you can try to do now is to pick up where we left off in February/March 1945 (see special report on EGMONT Lageberichte), viz to disband the NSDAP and the Gestapo and to create all the necessary conditions for a transition period in which BRUNING could play his part.

29. SCHELLENBERG DROPS ALL RESTRAINT

WIRSING was struck by the candor with which SCHELLENBERG discussed all the topics brought up during their conversation.

In his thoughts Amt VI was evidently a thing of the past that had been written off or at least been relegated to a matter of secondary importance.

30. SCHELLENBERG ON GERMAN ATROCITIES

When WIRSING made a passing reference to conditions caused by Allied troops in German Concentration Camps, SCHELLENBERG replied:

I am fully aware of the significance of the Allied propaganda.

WIRSING:

I am not talking about propaganda, I am talking about the facts.

SCHELLENBERG:

I had nothing whatever to do with the executive, but I am not be the least bit surprised if the competent people who always caused trouble, have perpetrated deeds that will be put to the discredit of the whole German people.

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31. WIRSING RETURNS TO BAVARIA

As soon as SCHELLENBERG apprised him of the futility of further attempts to negotiate, WIRSING declared that he saw no sense in staying on in HOLLSTEIN and that he would return to BAVARIA to his family and his few remaining belongings. SCHELLENBERG offered no objections.

He offered to arrange for a trip to SWEDEN if WIRSING cared to quit Germany. WIRSING declined.

WIRSING returned by plane to HEILBRUNN on 3 May 1945.

32. COMMENT OF SS-STUEBENANFUHRER DR HOETTL, CHIEF REFERENT OF VI 3, RSHA

SCHELLENBERG'S DISMISSAL

WIRSING's assumption that SCHELLENBERG had been eliminated from the command of Amt VI is absolutely correct. This decision was made by KALTENBRUNNER himself, in the presence of WANACK, SKORZENY and DR HOETTL, at a meeting in Hotel Oesterreichischer Hof at SAIZBURG around the 25 April.

KALTENBRUNNER DISTRUSTS SCHELLENBERG

In talks that took place around the 20 April in Alt Aussee KALTENBRUNNER had already expressed the opinion that he had been double-crossed by SCHELLENBERG who had thrown in his lot with HIMMLER and BERGER.

BERGER'S ROLE

BERGER's power of attorney for South Germany, incompatible with his own, merely proved to KALTENBRUNNER that SCHELLENBERG was in on the game and probably with his usual skill hinged on the theme of KALTENBRUNNER's Austrian proclivities.

SCHELLENBERG CHIEF POLITICAL ADVISER TO HIMMLER AND BERGER?

KALTENBRUNNER was of the opinion that SCHELLENBERG advised HIMMLER and BERGER on matters of general policy.

He felt strengthened in his belief after learning through the press of HIMMLER's surrender negotiations with Count BERNA - DOMSTE.

KALTENBRUNNER who claimed credit for having introduced

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Count BERNADOTTE to HIMMLER, was sure that HIMMLER and LENBERG would use this connection for their own personal advantage.

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NO AUSTRIAN SOLUTION WITH SCHELLENBERG

What decided KALTENBRUNNER on parting ways with SCHELLENBERG was the realization that matters had come to a pass where an Austrian solution was the only possible way out.

KALTENBRUNNER very likely feared that SCHELLENBERG would pursue his own political line via certain Swiss connections which KALTENBRUNNER had reserved for his own use (e.g. ...)

KALTENBRUNNER'S PERSONAL DISLIKE FOR SCHELLENBERG

KALTENBRUNNER had more than once taken up the cudgels on SCHELLENBERG's behalf and for that reason what he came to be disloyal on the part of SCHELLENBERG incensed him even more.

KALTENBRUNNER once remarked:

I can almost hear SCHELLENBERG, in his unctuous manner draw HIMMLER's attention to the dangers inherent in Austrian separatism. At a skillfully chosen opportunity will then bring BERGER's personality into the discussion.

THE OLD AMT VI BEYOND REPAIR

The cue was furnished by DE MÜHLMANN who had just returned from INNSBRUCK and who told KALTENBRUNNER in SALZBURG (April) that SANDBERGER had asked Gauleiter HOFER of ... to arrange for billets for the personnel of Amt VI. ... and SKORZENY immediately hooked in, telling KALTENBRUNNER that there was absolutely no sense in trying to re-organize Amt VI, also in view of the circumstance that, according to SKORZENY, all telephone communications had broken down. SKORZENY also mentioned that the hide-out of Amt VI in ... LAUENSTEIN had been evacuated in a hurry with American forces dangerously close and that most of the group chiefs had sent out their personnel, loaded themselves and their gear into cars and taken off. Amt VI was therefore a thing of the past.

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REORGANIZATION BASED ON X-VI E AND VI S

Inasmuch as the only groups still existent were VI E (WANECK-FÖTTL) and VI S (SKORZENY), a re-organization appeared conceivable only on the basis of the Austrian concept esp in the field of intelligence. To KALTENBRUNNER and his advisers it appeared the logical solution to create something similar to the old Amt VI with VI E and VI S as the foundation.

KALTENBRUNNER'S ORDER

WANECK, assisted by SKORZENY, immediately drafted an order putting into effect their proposals. KALTENBRUNNER SIGNED. Besides giving an outline of the re-organization decided upon, the order directed LANDBERGER to liquidate the old Amt VI in accordance with directives issued by WANECK and SKORZENY for their respective sectors.

(1DH)

*Edmund L. King*  
EDMUND L KING  
Major, Inf  
COMMANDING

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WISNING, Dr. Giesler

17 Jul 1945

- 1. CIB Int. Cen. 17 Jul Reference Third Army TMI P-5218, 14 July 1945  
(Capt. Schluter) 1945 Desire to interrogate here Doctor Giesler, top secret reports for Schallerberg and Kiltzbrunn now at Third Army Interrogation Center.

T. : G. :  
Colonel, General Staff  
Chief, G. Branch

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1. REFERENCES

Report Dr Gieseler WIRSING, M; 3rd US Army IC, dtd 23 Jul 45.

2. PERSONAL DATA

a. ~~SIRENAME~~, ~~KIVSUNG~~

b. CHRISTIAN NAME(S): Gieseler

c. ALIASES: none

d. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 15 Apr 07

e. NATIONALITY CLAIMED: German

f. OCCUPATION: Writer (political and educational)

g. RELIGION: Protestant

h. DESCRIPTION:

- (1) HEIGHT: 1.69 m
- (2) BUILD: Stocky
- (3) FACE: Round
- (4) HAIR: Blond

i. LAST PERMANENT ADDRESS: BERLIN, Sigismundcorso 63

j. LANGUAGES: German, English, French, Spanish

k. FATHER: Friedrich (76)

l. MOTHER: Pauline, nee KARUS (72)

m. BROTHERS: None

n. SISTERS: ZIPPER, Elisabeth (45)

o. WIFE (or FIANCEE) Ellen, nee FOSCHER (39) WUBSER Hauptstr 52

p. CHILDREN: 2 daughters: Marlene (11) and Sybille (9)

q. IDENTITY DOCUMENTS: Wehrpass

3. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

a. SOURCE OF PRISONER, INCLUDING ARRESTING AGENCY: Arrested at BAD TOLEZ by US 1st 303.

b. ACCEPTED ON RECOMMENDATION OR REQUEST OF: G-2 (CIB) USFET

c. DATE OF ARRIVAL: 25 Jul 45

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DATE: 14 July 1945  
INIT: 774K

HEADQUARTERS  
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY  
INTELLIGENCE CENTER  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Interrogation Center  
APO 403

# 178

14 July 1945

SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No 1

Because of the nature of the subject matter, the following information has been extracted from routine interrogation reports, and is published for limited distribution.

In evaluating the information it should be constantly borne in mind that the sources, though now apparently friendly, co-operative, and truthful, were for the most part until recently the faithful servants of the Nazis. And although they may now have forsworn their allegiance, they make no pretense of having forsworn their international prejudices.

SWITZERLAND

Source. SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr HOETTL, Referent for the Southeast Section (E) of Amt VI of the RSHA.

Summary. This report deals with the several connections which SCHELLENBERG (SS Brigadefuhrer, chief of Amt VI and the Militarisches Amt of the RSHA) had in SWITZERLAND, specifically those involving

- General GUIBAN, of the Swiss Army
- Oberst MASSON, chief of Swiss Military Intelligence
- Prinz Dr AUERSPERG, former assistant air attache at the German Consulate in BERNE
- Hauptmann Dr LIENERT, police and intelligence officer of Kanton ST GALLEN
- DULLES, American representative in SWITZERLAND.

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The GUISAN Incident. In the Spring of 1943 SS Hauptsturmführer Dr GROEBL, Referent of Amt 71 at the SD Abschnitt INNSBRUCK, contacted HOETTL and told him

- a. that SCHELLENBERG was in touch with Oberst MASSON, chief of Swiss Military Intelligence, and
- b. that SCHELLENBERG should be a little more adroit in handling General GUISAN the next time they might meet.

GROEBL stated that he got his information from sources inside the Swiss Military Intelligence.

HOETTL conveyed GROEBL's message to SCHELLENBERG, who admitted his connections with MASSON, but denied he was in direct communication with GUISAN. The meeting between himself and GUISAN had been arranged through MASSON, he declared.

GROEBL later mentioned that SCHELLENBERG's relations with MASSON had gone much further than official business might be expected to lead.

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SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No 1

SWITZERLAND (Continued)

One piece of verbal evidence supporting this was SCHELLENBERG's statement - made when someone stated that the Swiss General Staff was very well informed - that he had access to all the material which the Swiss Military Intelligence had collected.

SCHELLENBERG visited SWITZERLAND frequently up until the time the Abwehr was taken over by the RSHA (end of April 1944). The additional work made necessary by this change kept SCHELLENBERG in BERLIN and in his stead he sent SS Sturmbannfuhrer EGGER as special agent to deal with his Swiss sources.

MASSON versus LIENERT. In March 1945, when HOETTL was in SWITZERLAND, he was questioned by Prinz Dr AUERSPERG, assistant air attache to the German Consulate in BERNE until 20 July 1944, and by Hauptmann Dr LIENERT, police and intelligence officer for the Kanton ST GALLEN. Both AUERSPERG and LIENERT were interested in what HOETTL knew concerning the connections between SCHELLENBERG and MASSON.

Following the questionings, HOETTL tried to discover why MASSON was permitted to remain chief of Swiss Military Intelligence when he was suspected of having such close connections with SCHELLENBERG. AUERSPERG gave him two reasons. The first was that the Swiss had not discovered any evidence which proved that MASSON had been paid for co-operating with SCHELLENBERG. The second was that LIENERT had never made a public issue of MASSON's activities, even though he may have had evidence of them.

AUERSPERG stated that LIENERT had his reasons for not wanting to expose MASSON:

a. LIENERT was known to be a confidential agent of the Americans, while MASSON served the Germans in the same way, and

b. since MASSON had made several visits to DULLES at the American Legation in BERNE with the purpose of forcing himself on the Allies as an agent, LIENERT did not want to appear to be acting as though he were jealous of these moves.

DULLES's Connections. SS Obersturmfuhrer WANECK, chief of VI E of the RSHA and HOETTL's superior, told HOETTL that SCHELLENBERG had admitted having a direct means of communication with DULLES and that this connection had existed for quite some time. HOETTL believes this connection was MASSON and that his visits to DULLES were directly involved.

WANECK also told SCHELLENBERG that he too had a direct line to DULLES.

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SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No 1

CHINA

Source. Dr Giseler WIRSING, in Amt VI of the RSHA, writer of confidential political reports for SCHELLENBERG.

SS Sturmbannführer WEIRAUCE of VI C 4 (East Asia) of the RSHA.

Summary. This report deals with the possible connections between the Chinese Government and SCHELLENBERG (see above). It also contains a note on German knowledge of a meeting between Japanese and American representatives in the USSR.

SCHELLENBERG's Informants. WIRSING states that SCHELLENBERG received reports on Far Eastern affairs from a source probably located in SWITZERLAND. Towards the end of February 1945 SCHELLENBERG told WIRSING that he had an important source of information in SWITZERLAND and stated that this same source had only recently informed him of a meeting believed to have taken place between US delegates to the YALTA Conference and Japanese representatives. The meeting was purported to have taken place in the vicinity of SEVASTOPOL.

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SCHELLENBERG stressed the fact that the source of this story was excellent.

WIRSING received special reports through SCHELLENBERG's office dealing with the Far East. These reports were marked with the code reference letter Y. WIRSING believes that this source was Chinese. SCHELLENBERG was reputed to have a direct radio connection with CHUNGKING.

WEIRAUCH (of Amt VI C 4 - East Asia) states that he received reports dealing with the Far East directly from SCHELLENBERG. These reports, unlike those WIRSING received, were marked with the code designation T 100.

WEIRAUCH questioned SCHELLENBERG with the purpose of finding out the source of these reports, but only extracted the information that the source was a personal one which SCHELLENBERG made use of to check the material arriving through regular intelligence channels. WEIRAUCH is of the opinion that this source was in direct communication with CHUNGKING and was located in SWITZERLAND.

SECRET SOURCES. WEIRAUCH stated that SCHELLENBERG used the following sources for the gathering of intelligence:

- a. Colonel (General?) ONODERA, Japanese Military Attache in SWEDEN (see Seventh US Army Interrogation Center Report No SAIC/29).
- b. In LISBON a source designated E.
- c. In BERNE a source designated Y 3, believed to be representatives of the CHUNGKING Chinese Government.

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SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No 1

CHINA (Continued)

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T 100. WEIRAUCH believes that T 100 might well be Dr Robert TSCHI-TSUN, confidential representative in SWITZERLAND of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK. He graduated from a German Institute of Polytechnics, and was reputed to have worked for SCHELLENBERG.

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**MEMORANDUM**  
**SEVEN SEVEN FIVE SEVEN SEVEN SEVEN**  
**SEVEN SEVEN SEVEN SEVEN SEVEN**  
**SEVEN SEVEN SEVEN SEVEN SEVEN**

13 December 1945

Subject: Prisoner Günther Wirsing, SS Stabaf

To: WIAF, AFSA Branch, USIA, APO 757, U.S. Army

1. Prisoner SS Stabaf Günther Wirsing is transferred to Det 14 for further interrogation, especially on journalism and press.
2. Stabaf Wirsing was previously interrogated in Third Army I.C. and at this Center, and was taken on a 2-week trip across the US occupation zone. He wrote an 80 page report about this trip which is not translated.
3. Stabaf Wirsing's past includes the writing of the anti-U.S. book "Der Hasslose Leutnant". He believes that we do not know that he also was one of the main contributors to the German Army newspaper "Signal".
4. Stabaf Wirsing's family lives at Schweinfurt, his mistress Mrs. Cirila Purgeman lives at Bad Neuenahr, (upper Rhenish) Rhine on Veld.
5. Stabaf Wirsing tried to hide a number of important facts from his interrogator and has never been completely broken, although he may appear cooperative, at first. He attempted illegal communication with the outside.
6. Stabaf Wirsing is one of the most dangerous Nazis in U.S. custody. On one side he considers the Americans degenerate and nihilistic; on the other, he strongly believes in a German nationalistic idealism.
7. He claims to have worked toward Hitler's abdication or dismissal, but actually, he attempted to have Himmler replace Hitler.
8. It is of utmost importance that SS Stabaf Wirsing be interrogated for a long time both as an automatic arrest and as a security threat.

For the Chief Interrogation Group:

*Samuel J. ...*

SAMUEL J. ...  
Major, MI  
Executive

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RESUME OF ANY REPORTS AND/OR DOCUMENTS SENT IN WITH PRISONER: Third US Army Report dtd 30 Jul 45 classified Top Secret; USFET SCI Report dtd 15 Aug 45

RESULTS OF NAME CHECK AGAINST PERSONALITY CARD INDEX: CPI Buff Cards 60429-60430.

g. BRIEFS UPON WHICH PRISONER WAS INTERROGATED: UK Base CI War Recd 48756 dtd 14 Aug 45.

h. NAME(S) AND UNIT OF INTERROGATOR(S): T/4 REEISLER, USFET-315 Center

i. PRISONER'S ATTITUDE AND REACTIONS: Cooperative

j. EVALUATION OF PRISONER'S RELIABILITY: Reliable

k. DATE, PLACE AND AUTHORITY FOR DISPOSITION OF PRISONER: Prisoner is being held for possible reinterrogation.

l. This report is in reply to brief mentioned under (f) above.

4. INTERROGATION RESULTS

a. Introduction

Wisselher WIRSING is a writer on foreign affairs and gained prominence in Germany as editor of Die Tat. XX Jahrhundert, and WUENSCHEMER Monats Fachrichten. His search for material carried him to the United States (1938), France, Spain, and the Balkans. In September 1944 he was drafted by SCHELLERBERG, head of Amt VI RSHA, as his advisor, and from that time until March 1945 wrote periodical reports known as the EGMONT Reports. These were sent only to HITLER and a few of his closest advisers and were meant to present a true picture of the international situation.

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b. WIRSING's Trips to Spain

WIRSING's two trips to Spain had nothing to do with GIS activities. In July 1943 he spent two weeks in Spain gathering material for three articles, one on the Eecorial, one on the Prado, and the third on Spain's position in the international picture. The articles showed Spain to be pursuing a course of neutrality which favored neither the allies nor Germany. In May 1944 WIRSING spent another two weeks in Spain doing research for an article on Hieronimus BOSCH, the 15th century painter. The article which he subsequently wrote pointed out certain political analogies and presented Nazi ideologies in a favorable light.

It should be noted that WIRSING was a personal friend of DICKHOFF, then German Ambassador to Spain, who was recalled to Germany in August 1944 because it was suspected that he had something to do with the 20th of July affair.

c. Source of Material for the ECHO Reports

WIRSING says that the material he received from SCHELLMIBERG for incorporation in the ECHO Reports did not mention the sources of information. WIRSING thinks that approx 40% of all the information came from Sweden, 30% from Switzerland, and the rest from Spain and Portugal. There was some Front aufklarungs information in the material he received but, being of a military nature, it could not be used in the ECHO Reports, which were supposed to be of a purely political nature.

CONCLUSIONS

None

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

WIRSING is a proponent of Nazi ideology and used his journalistic ability to support and spread the Nazi movement. He is considered a security threat. He is in the automatic arrest category as a result of having held the rank of SS Stabuf.

For the Commanding Officer:

*Leroy Vogel*  
LEROY VOGEL  
Captain, USAF  
Director

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER  
SCI/CIB-6-2 DIVISION  
APO 757

25-159417-06

15 August 1945

TO : Chief, CIB, G-2, USFET  
SUBJECT : Special Interrogation of SS-Sturmabfuhrer WIRSING.

1) Attached is a copy of a report on a meeting between WIRSING and SCHELLENBERG at the end of April 1945. This report is based on a special interrogation of WIRSING for which the brief was prepared on 1 July 1945, by Mr. Reginald PHELPS, then of SCI, 12th Army Group, and describes the circumstances behind the final dissolution of Amt VI of the RSHA.

*Andrew H. Berring*  
ANDREW H. BERRING  
Lt. Colonel, A.C.  
Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS  
US FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER  
INTERROGATION CENTER  
APO 767

1708

PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION REPORT (PIR) NO 46

25-759417-47

PRISONER: H/Staff Lt WIRSING, Gisselher,  
Editor of "XI Jahrhundert"

DATE: 8 August 1945

1. PERSONAL DATA

Gisselher WIRSING was born in SCHWEINFURT 15 Apr 07. He studied at MÜNCHEN, KÖNIGSBERG, BERLIN, and HEIDELBERG, working at the same time as co-editor and publisher of "Die Tat". From 1930 until 1932 he was a Dozent at the University of HEIDELBERG. Summer 1932 he went to BERLIN to study at the University, where he remained until end of 1933. During this period he did free-lance newspaper writing and published the book "Zwischen Europa". The following is a summary of his subsequent career as an author and editor.

- 1933 Joined the staff of "Muenchener Neuste Nachrichten"
- 1934 Editor-in-chief
- 1938 Spent four months in the United States. In Nov joined the Allgemeine SS
- 1940 Joined the NSDAP
- 1942 Published "Der Masslose Continent", a book in which he described his experiences in the United States. Drafted into the German Army, served in Central Russia and the Caucasus as a war reporter with rank of Lt. In Dec contracted jaundice. Sent to hospital in REIMAR
- 1943 Unfit for active service. Political writer for "Die Tat". Later editor-in-chief of "XI Jahrhundert". Made several trips to Spain with Ambassador DIECKHOFF.
- Apr 44 Published his philosophical work "Das Zeitalter des Ikeros".
- Aug War reporter in PARIS attached to the chief intelligence officer Obst MEYER-DETRING. Met ABETZ.
- Sep SCHELLENBERG asked him to write a series of reports on the world political situation. WIRSING asked whether it would be possible to convince the Fuehrer that further prosecution of the war would be senseless. SCHELLENBERG admitted that he was of the same opinion but doubted that the Fuehrer could be convinced. It was decided that the reports, later known as the "Egmont-Reports" should be designed to influence the Fuehrer. WIRSING continued the work until shortly before the surrender. He was not a member of Amt VI and was not paid for the work.
- Spring 45 Consulted with SCHELLENBERG about a surrender to the Western Allies. Nothing came of this effort.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

WIRSING was arrested in BAD KUELS 1 Jun 45 by CIC Det 303. He arrived at USFET Interrogation Center on 25 Jun 45 and was accepted at the request of G-2 (CIB) USFET. An arrest report dtd 6 Jun 45 and 3 US Army Int Cen Letter dtd 23 Jul 45 accompanied prisoner. Cf SHAEF Buff Cards 60429 and 60430.

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3. KNOWLEDGE BRIEF

- a. Suspects and propagandists in Germany
- b. Amt VI RSHA
- c. Personalities of the German Foreign Office

4. INTERROGATION PLAN

No interrogation is contemplated unless special briefs are received.

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

US Army Int Cen will publish reports on the "Egmont Reports" and WIRSING's mission in connection with German surrender overtures.

WIRSING asserts that he had very little to do with the SS and that his main interest in life was his profession. He says that he was not a member of RSHA and prepared the "Egmont Reports" as a personal favor to SCHELLENBERG. He gives the impression of sincerity although he may be concealing the truth about his activities in the Allgemeine SS.

The recipients of this report are requested to submit special briefs of any subjects upon which this prisoner should be interrogated and to indicate the desired distribution of the resultant report.

For Colonel PHILP:

*Robert T. Longstreth*  
ROBERT T. LONGSTRETH,  
Major, Infantry,  
CI Section.

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Y-12100A-150000-1

Reference No 2249  
No of Copies 2  
Copy No 3

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AUTH: CG Third US Army  
DATE: 30 July 1945  
INIT: *MS*

25-159471-48

HEADQUARTERS  
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY  
Interrogation Section  
APO 403

0-1708-11

SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No 2

Because of the nature of the subject matter, the following information has been extracted from routine interrogation reports and is published for limited distribution.

In evaluating the information it should be constantly borne in mind that the sources, though now apparently friendly, cooperative, and truthful, were for the most part until recently the faithful servants of the Nazis, and although they may now have forsworn their allegiance, they make no pretense of having forsworn their international prejudices.

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CONTENTS

1. The EG-MONT Reports
2. The Sources for the EG-MONT reports
3. Political aspects of the EG-MONT reports
4. An EG-MONT Report  
The World Situation in March 1945  
(Rewritten from memory)  
Appendix to the EG-MONT Report

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1708  
SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No. 2  
25-154917-50  
Z-648

Source. SS Sturmbannführer Dr Giselher WIRSING, writer of confidential reports, member of Amt VI of the NSDA.

SS Sturmbannführer Dr Giselher WIRSING, member of the Southeastern EUROPE section of Amt VI of the NSDA.

(Previous information given by WIRSING may be found in Third US Army Special Interrogation Report No 1, dated 14 July 1945. NOETTL has given information contained in Third US Army Interrogation Reports Nos 10, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, and Special Interrogation Report No 1.)

Summary. The ELCHT Reports were in the nature of policy-making political reports prepared by WIRSING for SCHEUBENBUCH, head of Amt VI of the NSDA. In a larger sense they are believed to have been the expression of the foreign policy which a HITLER Government might have followed, had it succeeded in gaining power. (Previous but incomplete information on the ELCHT Reports is contained in Third US Army Interrogation Report No 10, Item 2, dated 21 June 1945.)

### 1. The ELCHT Reports

Source. Dr Giselher WIRSING, of Amt VI of the NSDA.

A word about the author. WIRSING rose to journalistic prominence as co-editor and later as publisher of the magazine Die Tat, a nationalistic and pro-Nazi organ of a group of Fascist-minded writers, whose aim was a political program synthesizing their own "socialist" ideas with those of the left wing of the Nazi Party represented by STRASSER, the so-called Democrats, and the Social Democrats. Practically applied, this resulted in Die Tat's favoring HINDENBURG's re-election in 1932 and later SCHLEICHER's appointment as Chancellor.

In 1934 WIRSING joined the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten as editor of the foreign news department, became publisher later on, and retained this job even after HINDENBURG bought the newspaper in 1936.

Within the next two years WIRSING traveled abroad, visiting the Near East and, in 1938, the UNITED STATES, where he stayed for four months. (As a result of this visit WIRSING wrote a book about America, entitled Der masslose Kontinent, in which he examined what he considered to be America's claim to world domination.)

During his stay in the UNITED STATES he visited with Ambassador DIECKHOFF, and even paid a visit to President ROOSEVELT. Upon his return to GERMANY he reported his impressions of the UNITED STATES to WILHELM REYNTROP, DIETRICH (German Press chief), WILHELM, and WEIZSACKER.

During the winter of 1938-1939, WIRSING took part in a number of informal discussions, the aim of which was to influence the direction of German foreign policy away from the inflexible HITLER-REYNTROP policies. These discussions were attended by WIRSING, WEIZSACKER, DIECKHOFF, KIRCHER (chief editor of the Frankfurter Zeitung) and Generaloberst BECK. At that time their immediate concern lay in a settlement of the Polish problem with the consent and agreement of GREAT BRITAIN.

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25-7534/3-57

1. The ECOWIT Reports (Continued)

Shortly before the outbreak of war in 1939, WIRSING accepted REISEN-  
TRIEP's offer of a job in the propaganda section of the Kulturpolitische  
Abteilung of the Foreign Office in BERLIN. But intermeddine strife  
between his department and the Propaganda-Abteilung largely nullified  
his efforts, so that he resigned his position and returned to MUNCHEN.

In the spring of 1940, WIRSING wrote an article in the Munchener  
Neuzeit Nachrichten in which he expressed the opinion that Franco-German  
relations were bound to deteriorate unless a formal peace treaty between  
the two countries was signed. Although this was also the opinion of  
REISENTRIEP, WIRSING became quite unpopular and found it necessary to join the  
army.

He was posted to a War Correspondent Company (Kriegsberichterstatter Kompanie)  
and served on the Western front until the end of 1942, when he was mustered  
out of service.

Returning to BERLIN, WIRSING continued the publication of his Zeit-  
literatur until a government order prohibited it. In 1943 and 1944 he paid short visits  
to MUNCHEN.

In June 1944 he attended a one-day refresher course for officers,  
given in POTSDAM, and credits this circumstance with his not being involv-  
ed in the events of 20 July 1944. One of his closest friends, Legationsrat  
Dr. von THATT of the Foreign Office, was one of the chief conspirators.

In September 1944, WIRSING met SCHMIDTBERGER and from this meeting  
came the ECOWIT Reports.

His Books. Besides his newspaper and magazine work, WIRSING has  
written several books, which served as a guide.

1. In 1934 WIRSING wrote a book advocating a rapprochement with  
the SOVIET UNION.
2. In 1941, his book about America - Der grosse Kontinent - was  
published. In it he compared AMERICA's claim to world domination with the  
German principle of spheres of influence and arrived at the conclusion that  
the UNITED STATES is hopelessly shackled to the past. This book is reputed  
to have been the first source book for anti-American propaganda.
3. Following his release from the army in 1942, he wrote Das Zeit-  
literatur des Ikaros, in which he advocated that the Union of EUROPE be  
carried out by peaceful means rather than through the use of force.
4. Writing in April 1944, under cover of a dissertation on the  
fifteenth century Dutch painter Hieronymus BOSCH, WIRSING expounded  
allegorically the moral at the close of the era of German history just then  
coming to an end.

The Genesis of the ECOWIT Reports. About the middle of September 1944,  
SS Brigadefuhrer SCHMIDTBERGER, chief of Unit VI of the RSHA, and WIRSING  
met at the former's office to compare notes on the international situation.  
SCHMIDTBERGER, whom WIRSING had never met before, explained that he had  
followed WIRSING's political line closely, having read his analyses of foreign  
affairs in the Munchener Neuzeit Nachrichten, his Zeit and its successor,  
Der Ikaros, in tracing over the whole complex of questions raised  
by Germany's political and military situation at that time, SCHMIDTBERGER  
and WIRSING substantially agreed on the following issues:

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[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

1. The REPORT Reports (Continued)

- a. that GERMANY's position was hopeless, both militarily and politically,
- b. that it was imperative to terminate the war at the earliest possible moment,
- c. that peace negotiated on an equal footing with GERMANY's opponents was out of the question,
- d. that it might be worth while to try to ascertain whether unconditional surrender as conceived by the Allies left room for a change in the German government which would make the government acceptable to the Allies as a bargaining power, and
- e. that the formation of such a government would mean shoveling HITLER.

The Proposal. With the above understanding, SCHELLENBERG proposed that WIRSING should write reports on GERMANY's political situation abroad, giving an unvarnished picture of the hopelessness of the situation and proposing specific measures designed to save GERMANY from total ruin. SCHELLENBERG offered to put at WIRSING's disposal all the material reaching Amt VI from its intelligence agencies. The reports were to come out at two or three week intervals and would have a very small and select distribution.

WIRSING accepted and became an agent (Ehrenamtlicher Mitarbeiter) of the RSHA. He wrote the reports at his private residence where the Amt VI material was delivered by messenger. The only person in Amt VI with whom WIRSING had contact was SCHELLENBERG, who occasionally passed on to him Top Secret material which was not to be committed to paper, and by an exchange of ideas contributed materially to the final form of the reports. So as not to detract from the value of the reports, the identity of the author was to be kept a secret known only to the inner circle of the RSHA, because WIRSING's background as a prominent member of the Tat Circle would hardly be acceptable to the die-hards of the Nazi Party.

Distribution. At his first meeting with SCHELLENBERG, WIRSING emphasized the necessity of a strictly limited distribution, which was not to include RIBBENTROP and GOEBBELS in particular. The actual distribution as ordered by KALTENBRUNNER was as follows:

- a. to SS Gruppenfuhrer FEELEIN, HITLER's liaison officer at HITLER's headquarters, who would submit it to HITLER,
- b. HIMMLER,
- c. SEYSS-INQUART, close friend of KALTENBRUNNER and slated to take over the post of Foreign Minister if HIMMLER and his RSHA gang should come to power,
- d. Botschafter HEWEL, who was made to sign a declaration promising not to give copies of the reports to RIBBENTROP nor to mention their existence to him. The Foreign Office at no time availed itself of the information produced by Amt VI. RIBBENTROP had a very deep-rooted aversion to intelligence-gathering services, which he shared with HITLER. HEWEL represented RIBBENTROP at the Fuehrerhauptquartier.
- e. Probably GOEBBELS (in spite of WIRSING's objection, because WIRSING learned that the possibilistic vein of the reports was criticized in circles close to the Propaganda Minister).

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1. The ELBONT Reports (Continued)

25-75947-53

Long Range Policy. Over and above their immediate purpose - enlightening their readers on the true state of affairs - the ELBONT reports were a means toward still another end. Both SCHELLENBERG and WIRSING were of the opinion that the desirability of seeing HITLER removed from office...

Purposes and Results. WIRSING thought that the reports might be instrumental in maneuvering HITLER into a political stalemate where no alternative but resignation was left to him. At the end of November 1944, when it became evident that HITLER reacted unfavorably to the political line of the ELBONT reports, SCHELLENBERG told WIRSING, "It is thus an established fact that HITLER is incapable of accepting any view on the international situation that does not jibe with his preconceived ideas. We must therefore reconcile ourselves to the fact that we are dealing with a pathological case."

Both SCHELLENBERG and WIRSING realized that after the abortive coup of 20 July 1944, the only group capable of bringing about the required changes were HITLER and the SS. SCHELLENBERG probably envisaged HITLER's ascendancy as a lasting solution. When the advisability of going back to a two-party system came to be mentioned, SCHELLENBERG suggested BAESENG as leader of the opposition.

Each ELBONT report carried certain recommendations designed to create a sound basis on which negotiations with the allies could be launched, foremost among which were solutions of the Jewish question and the Church question. Both WIRSING and SCHELLENBERG feared that in the final phase of the war all Jews still in German concentration camps would be liquidated.

In line with an ELBONT recommendation SCHELLENBERG induced HITLER to give his consent to the release into Swiss custody of approximately 60,000 Jews of the 300,000 still in German concentration camps, but HITLER's veto brought the whole scheme to an abrupt end. This was a striking instance of HITLER's making promises to SCHELLENBERG which he later could not fulfill because of resistance on the part of HITLER or the die-hards in the SS.

Another instance was the release of certain prominent French personalities such as the family of General GÉRAUD, which had actually been ordered by HITLER but which SCHELLENBERG failed to carry out.

HITLER, according to SCHELLENBERG, was in accord with the findings of the ELBONT Reports and endorsed their recommendations. In the actual course of events it was to be HITLER who reputedly placed the full weight of his position behind the cogency of the arguments in the ELBONT reports. In two instances at least he used the reports as talking points in arguments with HITLER. After the first argument in November 1944, HITLER was rewarded with the unenviable task of disentangling Army Group G in the upper RHINE sector. According to SCHELLENBERG, this was HITLER's means of taking HITLER out of circulation, because HITLER's opinions on GÉRAUD's foreign policy were obnoxious to him.

At the beginning of December 1944 SCHELLENBERG went to call on HITLER, armed with an eight-page memorandum in which WIRSING had recapitulated all recommendations made in previous ELBONT reports which had not been acted upon as of that date. These recommendations emphasized that no negotiated peace could be contemplated until certain indispensable domestic prerequisites had been fulfilled. SCHELLENBERG came back from his talk with HITLER under the impression that HITLER personally agreed with the recommendations, but was powerless to carry them out.

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1. The ECACONT Reports (Continued)

After the abortive WIDENIS offensive, SCHULLENBERG's influence on HESSLER increased to the extent that HESSLER made another attempt to induce HITLER to conform to the ECACONT line. This time HESSLER's reward was the command of Army Group REICHEL.

A last attempt to refute HESSLER to political impotence was undertaken around 12 March 1945, when HITLER suggested that HESSLER take over the military command in HUNGARY. Somehow HESSLER managed to dodge this assignment.

The End. At the end of March 1945, WIRSING told SCHULLENBERG that he considered the ECACONT reports to have failed in their objective of bringing about HITLER's resignation and that all was lost. SCHULLENBERG concurred and the ECACONT reports were discontinued.

2. The Sources for the ECACONT Reports.

Sources. Dr Gisela WIRSING.

SS Sturmbannführer Dr Wilhelm HOETTL, Referent for the Southeast EUROPE section of Gruppe VI E of Amt VI of the RSHA.

In the course of his short-term association with the RSHA, WIRSING acquired little actual knowledge of its information-collecting processes. He was exclusively concerned with the evaluation of the material made available to him, and therefore his inability to identify any of the sources appears credible. He claims to have studiously avoided asking SCHULLENBERG questions about original sources of information. After material from a certain source was established as reliable, WIRSING was then able to rate the source without needing to know who supplied the information and by what means it was obtained.

Logberichte (Situation Reports). WIRSING received copies of all situation reports (Logberichte) as published by the various Referate of Amt VI. He always insisted on getting the raw material, that is, the reports as they reached Amt VI before processing and evaluation by the various Referate had taken place. He did not adhere to this practice in the case of the Russian Referat, where he relied on the compilation made in its evaluation section.

Berichte des Amtschefs (Reports of the Amt chief). A very important source of information were the Berichte des Amtschefs - reports submitted by SCHULLENBERG himself on the basis of exchanges he carried on with important personalities both in GERMANY and abroad, for example with the Swiss Bundesrat WESSLI, members of the Japanese Embassy in BERLIN (in particular with its naval attache, Admiral KOSHIMA), and with the Swiss and Swedish ambassadors.

SCHULLENBERG's Personal Channels. SCHULLENBERG had several personal channels of information, the operation and identity of which he did not reveal even to his closest intimates. He had a line into FRANCE connecting with an important personality close to BIDLOFF. He frequently received reports from a Spanish source who appeared well versed in VATICAN affairs.

SCHULLENBERG's Swiss connections included sources who reported on their conversations with Allen DULLES, a member of the staff of the American Legation at BERN. (For further details of SCHULLENBERG's Swiss sources see Third US Army Special Interrogation Report No. 1, dated 12 July 1945.)

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25-75347-55

2. The Sources for the H-OUT Reports. (Continued)

Several reports on statements attributed to DULLES were made use of in the H-OUT reports, although with a great deal of caution. WIRSING took note in particular of one report that reached ant VI in November 1944. It purported to corroborate the widely held opinion that upon achieving certain very far-reaching conditions the Western Allies might be willing to enter into negotiations with HITLER. This report dwelt at some length on certain remarks DULLES allegedly made, stressing the dangers of Bolshevism to Western civilization. When asked to comment on the authenticity of this report, WIRSING immediately told SCHELLENBERG not to attach too much importance to its contents.

WIRSING claims to have expressed doubts on frequent occasions as to DULLES's official position or powers of attorney. SCHELLENBERG, in WIRSING's opinion, overrated the importance of DULLES as a contact for peace overtures. At the same time SCHELLENBERG did not allow himself to be taken in by everything reported to him as representing DULLES's opinion, as shown by the following incident:

In January (?) 1945, SCHELLENBERG learned of a meeting between SS Obergruppenfuhrer WOLFF, Reichster SS und Polizeifuhrer in ITALY, and DULLES. In this connection he told WIRSING: "after having taken infinite pains in establishing connections with DULLES, after having checked and counter-checked through these connections to find out whether he can be considered an authoritative source or is merely expressing his own personal opinion, acting in behalf of the American Secret Service and conveying certain impressions for a specific purpose - this fool WOLFF acts like a bull in a china shop!"

OSTRO was the code-name of a source located somewhere on the Iberian peninsula, running at least twelve different lines. The reports were prolific and comprehensive, covering both military and political questions, and were exceptionally sound on English matters. After the YALTA conference OSTRO turned in some good reports evidently based on information furnished by somebody who sat in on the conference. (OSTRO may be found in circles close to the former Spanish Foreign Minister, SENER, who is supposed to have worked for ant VI, status HOETTL.)

NEBO (or LEANDER) represented a LISBON connection reporting exclusively on opinions prevailing in US State Department circles. The reports were few and far between, of excellent quality, and obviously the result of extended conversations. The impression always prevailed that matters had been injected into those reports which the US State Department felt should come to the attention of responsible circles in GERMANY. The informant obviously acted in an authoritative capacity, possibly with the consent of the US State Department. In October 1944 NEBO reported that according to official American sources there could be no basis for negotiations with HITLER, but that once HITLER were out of the way the situation might change fundamentally.

(According to HOETTL, NEBO stems from Hungarian sources located in MADRID and LISBON. The informants are to be found in circles close to the Hungarian Military Attache in MADRID and his representative in LISBON. This connection had been developed by HOETTL and turned over to ant VI. The chief of VI D (SCANDINAVIA, BRITAIN, UNITED STATES) got most of his information from this source. Channels ran from LISBON and MADRID to Department II, Hungarian General Staff (Oberst RUTHY), and from there to either HOETTL or his representative (SS Hauptsturmfuhrer HEINRICH in BUDAPEST.)

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2. The Sources for the ELIONT Reports (Continued) 25-75947-56

HASSO (or HECTOR) was an exceptionally good source in STOCKHOLM, which conveyed detailed and intimate reports on English trends of thought as they prevailed in the inner circles of the main British parties.

A line existed to PORTUGAL'S SAMZAR via his Father Confessor, the Archbishop (or Cardinal?) of LISBON.

In SPAIN an informant regularly compared notes with the Japanese Ambassador SUMA, a very good source.

The coverage of Italian affairs was centralized in MADRID and dealt mostly with routine matters.

The Russian sector was exceedingly well covered by sources located in STOCKHOLM. The information was in part planted material and had to be carefully sifted in VI C.

An important informant on the USSR who called himself BORODIN operated in SHANGHAI, evidently running his own intelligence net. The Abwehr was represented in both MUKDEN and SHANGHAI (by KO).

DUBLIN was a very disappointing source. WIRSING cannot recollect ever having seen a report originating there.

Cri-Berichte (Cipher Reports). The Cri-Berichte were transcripts of intercepted and decoded wireless messages and formed the solid core of foreign information, although there was no continuity of coverage and important gaps frequently occurred. WIRSING claims that more or less complete coverage of the traffic listed below was furnished:

- a. the Turkish Ambassador in MOSCOW to his government (complete),
- b. the Greek Ambassador in MOSCOW to his government,
- c. Ambassador HARRISON in MOSCOW who reported to the State Department on the Polish deliberations,
- d. Ambassador CAFFERY in PARIS who reported to the the State Department on DEGRULLE's visit to MOSCOW,
- e. the Bulgarian envoy in SWITZERLAND who reported to his government on Balkan affairs and was particularly well-informed on the Greek insurrection,
- f. the American representative in BULGARIA who had some trouble with the Russians and told his troubles to the State Department.

3. The Political Aspects of the ELIONT Reports

Source. SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr HOETTL, Gruppe VI B of the RSHA.

The ELIONT reports represent the culmination of SCHELLENBERG's plans to organize a central evaluation agency superseding the numerous evaluation branches of the various departments of Amt VI. In pursuance of his plans SCHELLENBERG activated a new Referat within Gruppe VI A - the Zentralauswertungsstelle - and placed SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr SCHINDOWSKY (formerly with VI C) in charge. The new Referat put out thirteen of Dr WIRSING's reports in the period from October 1944 to March 1945. The name ELIONT was chosen in order to camouflage the true character of the reports.

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3. The Political Aspects of the EGMONT Reports (Continued)

There were many indications that HITLER seriously entertained these plans. There was, for example, a sudden change in the Jewish policy, which was reflected in a temporary cessation of all exterminations. In frequent requests for special treatment of certain French, Dutch, and Belgian individuals, HITLER showed unbounded solicitude and in a great many instances authorized their repatriation via the Red Cross.

KALTENBRUNNER also took a hand in these matters in meetings with the President of the International Red Cross in March 1945, with Count BERNADOTTE (whom he introduced to HITLER), and in connection with the deliverance of a sizeable number of Jews into Swiss hands.

SCHELLENBERG also took a decisive share in this policy of preparing the ground. It is generally assumed that it was he who induced HITLER to launch his offer of surrender through Count BERNADOTTE. Another prominent member of HITLER's faction was SS Obergruppenfuhrer BERGER who had been slated to conduct the mass conscription behind the ROER Front in March 1945 and who, during the final stage of the war, was given plenary powers in Southern GERMANY.

In this connection also, HITLER's military ambitions should be noted. HOETTL does not agree with HIRSING that HITLER's assignment to command the southern sector of Army Group G was a mere device on HITLER's part to shelve him because of his strong views on foreign affairs. HOETTL thinks that, quite the contrary, HITLER had long been coveting military responsibility because he fancied himself a great strategist, especially after his supposed success in stemming the rout of the beaten German armies in September 1944.

The above indications point to the existence of a very specific program aiming at HITLER's overthrow and HITLER's accession to power. In this context the EGMONT reports may be considered a blueprint of GERMANY's foreign policy in the event of such a change in government.

4. An EGMONT Report

(The contents of this report correspond roughly to the last two EGMONT Reports (Nos 12 and 13), written at a time when the collapse of GERMANY had become inevitable. Events after March 1945 have not been taken into account. No documentary reference material was available to help compile these notes. They were dictated by HIRSING and later translated. The numbers interspersed in parentheses through the text refer to the explanatory notes contained in the Appendix which follows the report and which should be kept at hand while reading the report.)

Source: Dr Gisela HIRSING.

The World Situation in March 1945

Ever since the Americans crossed the RUINE at REMGEN the Allied political leaders have been convinced that GERMANY would collapse within a very short time (1). Simultaneously it can be gathered from frontline observations in the East that the Army Group ZHUKOV, having reached the lower ODER, has started concentrating large forces east of KUESTRIN and of FRANKFURT/Oder. The military situation on both main fronts displays, therefore, the often-discussed features of a race between West and East straight towards the heart of GERMANY.

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3. The Political Aspects of the EGOMT Reports (Continued)

The EGOMT reports were no mere situation reports, but political notes of an order usually prepared at the highest levels of policy-making agencies. Had they emanated from the German Foreign Office, they would have passed as routine surveys designed to orient the Foreign Minister. What lifts the EGOMT reports out of the ordinary is the fact that the GERMANS arrogated to itself policy-making functions in the field of foreign policy which rightly belonged to the German Foreign Office.

SCHULLENBERG may be able to shed some light on the connections between the EGOMT reports and HITLER's political aspirations. Dr HOETTL, one of the best informed functionaries of Amt VI, believes that SCHULLENBERG's primary aim in putting out the EGOMT reports was to inculcate in HITLER the belief that he was the man best suited to replace HITLER and to rule GERMANY in her hour of crisis.

According to HOETTL, President ROOSEVELT was rumored to have sponsored and encouraged HITLER's political aspirations. Late in summer 1944, Dr HOETTL was informed by SS Obersturmbannführer WANECK, chief of Group VI B (who claimed to have heard this from SCHULLENBERG), that President ROOSEVELT had dispatched a personal envoy to SWITZERLAND with the following proposition addressed to HITLER:

In order to prevent the total collapse of the Reich, which would lead to Bolshevism in GERMANY, a development not in the true interest of the UNITED STATES, the American government requires the cooperation of the only Machtfaktor in GERMANY: the SS and HITLER. GERMANY would sooner or later be called upon to uproot Bolshevism by force of arms. The essential prerequisite of any such arrangement would be the disappearance of HITLER who, in the eyes of the Allies, was Public Enemy No 1.

When these fantastic rumors first dropped up, they were the subject of a great deal of comment. On the basis of information received much later, HOETTL believes that President ROOSEVELT's alleged envoy was Allan DULLES, of the staff of the American Legation in BERN. The alleged middle-man between him and HITLER may have been SS Standartenführer BECHER. BECHER, in civilian life a business man in HAMBURG, was concerned with the Aryanization and expropriation of the WILHELM REISS works, HUNGARY's largest industrial concern, and frequently visited SWITZERLAND to arrange, among other things, for the barter of Jews against war materials. BECHER is supposed to have developed some very useful connections in SWITZERLAND which, in spring 1945, he had to relinquish to SCHULLENBERG on orders from HITLER.

At the beginning of December 1944, rumors concerning American peace overtures had gained wider currency. HITLER seemed to be much impressed. In a conversation with HEISS-HORSINGHAM he asserted that the war would have a favorable outcome for GERMANY after all, and that in 1948 GERMANY would defeat the USSR with American tanks and airplanes.

HOETTL learned that HITLER entertained very concrete plans on how the alleged ROOSEVELT offer could be turned to good account. HITLER's counter-proposal was not to eliminate HITLER altogether, inasmuch as that was bound also to bring about the collapse of the Government. Rather, HITLER would be savaged into the nominal position of Lord of State, and HEISS, as Chancellor, would be the man in power.

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4. AN EGONT Report (Continued)

The alliance of the three principal powers, again reaffirmed at YALTA, has withstood the political strain, as predicted in the previous reports. In the face of the newly-arisen military situation one can no longer expect the Russo-Anglo-Saxon coalition to be broken up by political needs. From the point of view of the major enemy powers (1), GERMANY is no longer in a position to conduct any negotiations.

On the other hand there are numerous indications that the differences between the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians will not diminish with the end of the war. On the contrary, they are bound to become more numerous. This fits in with the results of the YALTA Conference where, according to all sources at our disposal, there has been full agreement on only one decisive main topic: to see the war against GERMANY through together under all circumstances. Almost all postwar problems were left open at YALTA, or were settled only in such general terms that the wording agreed upon permitted various interpretations.

How great these difficulties are, has been shown most clearly by CHURCHILL's speech before the House of Commons on 28 February 1945, and by the reaction it brought forth among the opposition. From the now available detailed coverage of that debate in the House of Commons on 1 and 2 March, it can be gathered that it was not so much specifically the Polish question, but rather a matter of principle that was under discussion, namely, the fundamental ideal on which the future order of EUROPE should be constituted. Primarily it was therefore the question of whether ENGLAND would actually be made to accept unquestioningly the methods of brute force used by the Russians towards POLAND.

It is imperative, however, to refute unequivocally the opinion that the dissensions among the Allies will lead to a new war soon after GERMANY's defeat. From all our sources it appears rather that in the near future neither the western powers nor the SOVIET UNION will be willing to take up arms against one another. It is necessary to warn against any German plans in the present final phase of the conflict which are based on a new conflict among the Allies immediately after our defeat (2).

The signs of war weariness in ENGLAND, frequently commented upon, have been reinforced by further examples. The Labor Party particularly does not seem willing to extend the coalition with the Conservatives beyond the moment of German defeat. Therefore a significant portion of British attention is swinging increasingly towards long postponed questions of internal politics (3).

In the UNITED STATES, as far as can be seen from here, there is no psychological preparation for a sudden and abrupt turn against the SOVIET UNION, even though the enthusiasm for the USSR has long since passed its peak because of MOSCOW's methods displayed in territories occupied by the Red Army (4). President ROOSEVELT's basic policies remain unchanged. As before, the President aims at obtaining at least the indirect support of the SOVIET UNION in the war against JAPAN (5). For that purpose he is ready to relinquish certain positions in EUROPE that are of minor importance to American interests.

In the present phase, too, we maintain the point of view taken in the EGONT reports from the beginning, that the key to the political situation of the world cannot be looked for in EUROPE but in the PACIFIC.

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Improbable as it may appear that the tension among the Allies will develop into a conflagration immediately upon the termination of the war in EUROPE, nevertheless it is certain that in the long run the contrasts between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians are bound to become more marked. In the present initial stage, results of observation of the occupied German territories show entirely different methods in the West and in the East (6). Despite acts of violence committed by the Red Army - particularly the mass raping of German women in the occupied eastern territories - there is evidence that STALIN intends to apply the same policy of penetration sovietique to GERMANY which he has used in POLAND, FINLAND, BULGARIA and the Baltic States. Clear evidences of this are the German language broadcasts from MOSCOW, which are directed at a Communist underground movement (7).

To counter this single-minded policy of Soviet penetration in EUROPE - reaching even as far as FRANCE and SPAIN - there is on the American side only a vacuum in which meaningless phrases like "democracy" and "re-education" resound. There is no clear concept as to the actual meaning of an "education towards democracy" of the German people, which can be gathered from the discussions published in English and American periodicals. These contradictions were pointed out most clearly in an article Germany by the well-known English writer VOIGT in the February (1945) issue of Nineteenth Century. VOIGT, however, is an outsider as his writings are of symptomatic value only.

Disregarding the fact that the key to the world political situation is in the Far East, the imminent German defeat already heralded by current military events will very soon create most difficult problems for future Allied cooperation (8). In a new book US War Aims - recently received here for evaluation - the American publicist writer LIPPMAN explains that the SOVIET UNION would tip the world balance of power in an intolerably large measure, should she succeed in bringing GERMANY into her orbit after the present war. LIPPMAN concludes that all of GERMANY should remain under the control of the Western powers. This and a series of similar statements indicate that intelligent Americans have realized for some time what a penetration sovietique would imply for the UNITED STATES as well as for ENGLAND.

Since the report on the YALTA Conference there have been no additional instances of further unified Allied procedure in EUROPE. On the contrary, the SOVIET UNION continues systematically to consolidate her political and territorial position, regardless of English or American objections. Specifically, the following problems have now reached the action stage:

The Establishment of Allied Zones in GERMANY. It has been confirmed that only an approximate zoning and not a final one, has been agreed upon at YALTA. Also there appears to be only a negative agreement on methods of administration in so far as STALIN has agreed not to install the Communist-infested Free German Committee. Conversely, the Anglo-Americans will be fighting for the idea being for installing a government composed of exiles (9).

The Austrian Question seems to be just as unsettled. Agent reports indicate that Communist circles in the so-called Austrian resistance movement (Oesterreichische Widerstandsbewegung) have of late made the assertion that all of AUSTRIA would be occupied by the Red Army sooner or later (10). From the same sources we hear that the Soviets are intending to install a Communist-influenced government in AUSTRIA as soon as possible, contrary to their procedure in GERMANY. The master plan is obvious: Communist-controlled AUSTRIA would be a direct link between Germany and SWITZERLAND, thereby leading directly into western EUROPE.

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4. An NIGHT Report (Continued)

From MIRALLOVICH's entourage comes the report that TITO has lately intended to claim CARMENIA. It has not been possible to ascertain whether Marshal ALEXANDER's visit to BELGRADE in February 1945 had any connection with these unsettled questions, especially since the same Serbian sources seem to imply that TITO will not be satisfied with the reconquest of Fiume, but rather that he wants to extend the Yugoslav territory beyond TRIESTE up to the Venetian plain. Many of such Yugoslav aspirations have also made their appearance in ROKK, where they had a disquieting effect (11).

The Settlement of the Polish Question agreed upon at YALTA has failed substantially. In YALTA, ENGLAND as well as the UNITED STATES have made concessions to the Soviets that led to the extra limit of tolerance. In reality the decisions on POLAND constitute only an excuse for complete annihilation of the Polish territory by the SOVIET UNION.

The remarkable opposition encountered by CHURCHILL after his announcement on POLAND before the Commons on 28 February 1945 shows that the policy-makers (12) among the British Conservatives are no longer willing to make further concessions. Nevertheless the SOVIET UNION has made parleys with the former Minister President of POLAND, IKOLAJCZYK, impossible, and he was the only personality among the LONDON Poles who could have been used for a compromise. In addition, the SOVIET UNION has refused to prohibit the NKVD's policy of brute force, and has also refused admission to English and American newspapermen as regularly accredited reporters.

A reliable personality who maintains connections in Polish circles in western EUROPE claims that the LONDON Poles do not desire an extension of the western border to the CURIA as has been offered to them (13). They fully realize that this claim, advanced by the LUBLIN Poles, cannot be based on any historical foundation. In the opinion of Polish circles in LONDON these boundless territorial demands of the LUBLIN Poles are nothing but the preparation for a crushed annexation by the SOVIET UNION.

In the weeks since YALTA it has become apparent that STALIN is not ready to compromise with ENGLAND on the Polish question. It also seems that no consideration has been given in MOSCOW to repeated offers of mediation by the UNITED STATES in the face of STALIN's absolute demands. Ambassador MARSHALL has not been able so far to play the part in the Polish question that had been intended for him. Instead it can be gathered from numerous reports that the unabated use of violence by the NKVD is continuing against those Poles living in the territory of the LUBLIN puppet regime who still sympathize with LONDON.

Turke-Soviet Pact. It is established by now that when the Russians, on 18 March 1945, unexpectedly denounced (14) the Turke-Soviet pact of friendship of 1924, STALIN had not previously notified the English and the Americans. Shortly before this the Turkish Ambassador had been reassured by his English colleague that, because of her formal declaration of war, TURKEY was protected by the SOVIET UNION. The news of the denunciation of the pact was handed to Suleika, Turkish Ambassador to MOSCOW, as he was about to pay STALIN a parting visit before going to Ankara.

The significance of this move is that the Russians intend to settle the Straits question without British interference. Naturally the Turks will get a new pact of assistance only after they have handed over the control of the Straits to the Russians.

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4. An Effort Report (Continued)

SPAIN (15). It could not be ascertained whether any binding agreements concerning SPAIN had been reached at Yalta. Despite the USSR's radio has started a considerably more virulent campaign against FRANCO in Spanish language broadcasts. No important results have come from the conference with FRANCO in PARIS and FRANCO's visits in LONDON of FRANCO's representatives in that city.

FRANCO is continuing his efforts to adapt his politics to the wishes and the economic needs of the UNITED STATES, in spite of the bad opinion which the English and American public has of him. The new American Ambassador has arrived in MADRID at last, whereas the British have made no appointment to fill the vacant post of their ambassador. Apparently it was Soviet influence that wrecked SPAIN's negotiations with FRANCE (16).

From this contradictory situation it can be concluded that the American observers in SPAIN have clearly recognized the dangers of a change in government without thorough preparation. Such a sudden change would forcibly drive SPAIN into the arms of the Communists. Undoubtedly the Communist underground in SPAIN has been essentially reinforced by the successes of the SOVIET UNION, but without foreign intervention it should be impossible to overthrow FRANCO.

German-Spanish relations have not reached the nadir after the recall of the Spanish Ambassador in BERLIN (17).

ROMANIA and BULGARIA. In ROMANIA and BULGARIA the Soviet policy of planned Communist penetration is continuing. The ADESCU affair has accelerated this process, as clearly in ROMANIA. One must suppose that the British Intelligence Services have investigated ADESCU's actions. However, ENGLAND was not able to protect the former Prime Minister who had fled into the British Embassy at the outbreak of the crisis.

In BULGARIA, as well as in ROMANIA, the small groups of English and American representatives are able to move about only under certain restrictions. They are able to exert no little influence on the political shaping of these countries as they are on the safeguarding of their own economic interests (18). It is significant that news stories are hardly ever printed in the Anglo-American press with Rumanian or Bulgarian headlines. The rock trials in SOFIA, in which even strongly leftist politicians were sentenced to heavy penalties, were noted only briefly in American weeklies with sarcastic comments.

GREECE. In GREECE the situation has quieted down further. Various sources, however, indicate that TITO is still supporting the Macedonian movement, whose aim is to separate SLOVENIA from GREECE. Since GREECE has been recognized at Yalta as falling into the British sphere of influence, official USSR circles are reticent on this question. There is definite proof nevertheless that the above mentioned Macedonian movement operated entirely under Communist leadership.

Scandinavia. In SCANDINAVIA, in locations and in the increase that the Soviets intend to establish strongholds in Northern NORWAY, and above all in the KATTIKAT (19). Since the position of the German troops in DENMARK and in NORWAY is bound to become untenable sooner or later, it appears essential to see to it without delay that Soviet aspirations extending as far as BORNHOLM be countered (20). The military value of DENMARK and NORWAY remains to be seen in this respect. From the political point of view, however, it appears imperative that English or American troops arrive in DENMARK and in NORWAY before the Russians are able to take surprise moves.

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4. an EC-OPT Report (Continued)

Under any circumstances it must certainly be considered significant that according to Swedish sources the FOLLOWING (21), before leaving for the USSR, made it clear to the Swedes that the SOVIET UNION did not wish any intervention by Swedish troops or volunteer corps in NORWAY. The warning coupled with this advice has considerably lessened the relief in informed Swedish circles over the coming German defeat. Count SANDHOLM's well-known conferences in BERLIN are not without connection with the above mentioned worries of the Swedish Government.

No new points are discernible in the preliminary work for the SAN FRANCISCO Conference. The different interpretation by the USSR and the UNITED STATES of the vet. rights of the main powers constitutes only one proof of the fact that obviously the Conference cannot produce a more secure peace than any one of the major powers is willing to guarantee. It can also be seen unmistakably that the American Secretary of State, STETTINIUS, is very seriously pursuing the idea of creating a genuine world security organization and that he is trying to avoid the mistakes of the GENEVA institution. However, it is not possible to find more than a loose formula to reconcile the Anglo-Saxon and the Soviet Russian concepts of the future shape of the political world.

In the weeks since the Yalta conference English conservative circles have come to believe that the continental balance of power as desired by ENGLAND will not be reconstituted as the final result of the European war. Rather, ENGLAND is again facing a superior land power whose undistinguished aim is to control the entire European continent.

The POLAND debate in the Commons (1 and 2 March 1945) is not only important for the fact that twenty-five Conservative representatives voted against the Government and that forty were abstained from voting. Rather more significant is the fact that very influential elements within the Conservative Party, mostly members of the 1922 Committee (the inner circle), subjected EDEN's foreign policy to a criticism on fundamentals.

Conservative circles view with alarm the SOVIET UNION's sphere of influence as it continues expanding westward, while at the same time the USSR has disrupted plans prepared last fall for a closer alliance of the Eastern European states under English leadership (background to the surprise invitation (22) of DE GAULLE to MOSCOW in November 1944 and conclusion of the Franco-Soviet pact). These British conservative circles, therefore, are organizing and backing up all those forces in EUROPE that oppose total subjugation of the Continent under Soviet predominance. The VATICAN fills an important function in this situation. Without playing a political part of its own, it serves to catalyze all those forces in EUROPE that do not desire to have the Continent overpowered by Communism.

At present it is hardly possible to effect a change in the German policy towards the Church, as proposed from the beginning in the EC-OPT reports. Nevertheless, it would have been of importance for the future of the German people if before the final military defeat there had been at least an attempt towards a settlement with the Church (23).

From clerical circles in Northern ITALY we have been informed reliably that no satisfactory result has come out of the conferences which the Democratic politician FLIGH conducted on ROOSEVELT's behalf in the VATICAN as well as in MOSCOW (24). The bishops in Northern ITALY have been quite explicit about their anti-Bolshevist convictions. However, it took a demonstration of the Catholic bishops of SCOTLAND and a very noteworthy address by the Archbishop of WESTMINSTER (leader of the Roman Catholic Church in ENGLAND) on the Polish question to show the incompatibility of Bolshevist principles and methods on the one side and the doctrine of the Church on the other.

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SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No 2

4. AN FRONT Report (Continued)

No definite reaction has been noticed in the UNITED STATES to these discussions in leading English circles and in the European conservative camp. It may be surmised, however, that ROOSEVELT's government, also reformed along conservative lines will follow this development with a great deal more attention than heretofore. One cannot expect American initiative along these same lines as long as Far Eastern questions remain unsettled.

The above statements must be somewhat tempered by the fact that the conservative forces in ENGLAND are of an essentially reactionary character (25). Thus their efforts are restricted by certain limitations, since the English people as a whole undoubtedly long for a government considerably more progressive on social issues. In fact, a social remodeling in ENGLAND during the postwar period has to be expected which in the end will create institutions not very dissimilar to those that had been created in GERMANY up to the outbreak of the war.

It may be assumed that the Soviet observers (26), in their exact analysis, have already recognized this weakness of the conservatives in ENGLAND and in Western EUROPE. Therefore it is to be expected that in GERMANY the Soviets will very soon spread anti-capitalist slogans with anti-British and even anti-American allusions.

It is now confirmed in Japanese circles in BERLIN that TOKIO expects the Soviet-Japanese treaty of 1941 to be denounced on 15 April 1945. The SOVIET UNION intends no doubt to maintain a free hand towards JAPAN in the same manner she did with TURKEY. Furthermore the denunciation of the treaty is a friendly gesture towards the UNITED STATES, and a continuation of the policy under which STALIN embarked with his anti-Japanese reference on 7 November 1944.

Immediately after YALTA the American press sought to create the impression that Russian participation in the war against JAPAN, immediately after the German defeat, was a foregone conclusion. This will not be the case, however, according to Japanese interpretation. There is reason to assume that the Japanese are very well informed of the actual intentions of the Russians, despite STALIN's policy of detachment from JAPAN (27). The German Embassy in TOKIO has lately confirmed Japanese efforts to replace the KOISO government, as has already been reported several weeks ago. It can be expected that the next Japanese government will be formed from a circle of friends around the person of Prince KONOE. Court, nobility, and capital are intent on forming a government of transition that would lend itself to negotiating a compromise peace with the UNITED STATES. Because of JAPAN's internal political groupings it seems that Ambassador OSHIMA has not been kept posted on these endeavors (28).

The impression emerges that Japanese court circles are prepared to retain all overtures since 1941. Since, for the time being, these circles are trying to use the USSR as an intermediary, they may intend to make considerable concessions to the SOVIET UNION in MANCHURIA and INNER MONGOLIA (29). On the other hand, the appointment of Ambassador GRIFFIN as Undersecretary of State has been commented upon in Japan as indicating that even in the most intimate circles of AMERICA's political leaders no final decisions have been made yet as to whether the PACIFIC war should really be continued until unconditional surrender has been attained (30).

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4. REPORT Report (Continued)

In this connection it is noteworthy that neither in TOKIO nor in BERLIN has serious consternation over STALIN's publicized policy of estrangement been displayed. Japanese opinion has, on the other hand, read political significance into temporary stoppages of lend-lease deliveries to the SOVIET UNION in connection with the latter's Far Eastern policy. Regardless of the validity of Japanese conjectures, it is fairly well established that the SOVIET UNION has no interest in a total defeat of JAPAN. One should rather draw a parallel between the Russo-Japanese conferences in recent weeks in MOSCOW and General UGAKI's attempts to reach an accord with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK (31).

The Japanese are prepared to make considerable concessions to the Russians in CHINA should they succeed in attaining a compromise between JAPAN, CHINA, and the SOVIET UNION (32). The Japanese believe that on that basis (33) peace with the UNITED STATES could be considered. In that case, however, neither JAPAN nor the UNITED STATES would wield decisive influences in CHINA, but rather the USSR would (34). It cannot as yet be determined to what extent STALIN has already implemented those lines of thought. The Russian tactics in Far Eastern policy are those of not letting the parties concerned know in advance what her intentions in the Far East actually are. Thus the USSR will be able to maintain the key position which she has undoubtedly attained in the Far East at present.

UGAKI's parleys with CHIANG bogged down, and so did CHIANG's conferences with the YENAN Communists. CHIANG is anxious not to let himself be committed to a definite attitude.

The reformation of the cabinet after the STILLWELL crisis is of no fundamental importance, since both the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff have remained in office and since the brothers SUONG (35) still remain the Generalissimo's closest advisors.

In conclusion, the following picture can be seen: Soviet and American interests in CHINA were running parallel for a while. Both major powers desired a compromise on the part of CHIANG with the YENAN Communists, though prompted by different motives. The Soviets expected from such a solution the founding of a wider basis for the Communist Party in CHINA; the Americans hoped that with the YENAN compromise the best Chinese divisions would become available for the war against JAPAN after withdrawal from the SHANSI zone. In reality CHIANG has crossed Russian intentions by not embarking upon serious negotiations either with YENAN (36) or with the Japanese. He has, therefore, again taken up closer relations with the Americans in spite of his known reservations (37).

MOSCOW has countered by broadcasting intensified attacks against CHIANG in the Chinese language, as reported by our monitoring service. The conclusion can be drawn that the Russo-American community of interest is only of a temporary nature. Two possibilities emerge (38):

1. Total Defeat of Japan. In that case the SOVIET UNION will undoubtedly not only gain influence in CHINA and MANCHURIA, but she will also attempt to gain considerable influence in CHINA, according to Japanese reports the newly-built large-scale Siberian industries were already planned and equipped in such a way that later they would be able to cater to the export trade in the Chinese, Manchurian, and Korean markets. The same reports are in possession of documentary proof that during these last years of the war the SOVIET UNION has already reconverted a part of its Siberian industries for such tasks because, thanks to American lend-lease aid, they did not have to keep their own war production at a maximum pitch (39).

4. AN BLUNT Report (Continued)

The SOVIET UNION will have no interest in the PACIFIC booty islands and former NETHERLANDS possessions. The nucleus of the whole problem will rather be the allocation of future spheres of interest on the Chinese mainland. In anti-Communist propaganda the mention that TAIWAN territory, according to all sources, appears to be better and more firmly organized than CHUNGKING-controlled territory, has been completely omitted. The towering personality of Generalissimo CHIANG has been so much affected by conditions in CHUNGKING - there is considerably less corruption in TAIWAN - that, once JAPAN has collapsed, an internal dispute in CHINA itself appears unavoidable. In that event the SOVIET UNION will try to consolidate her sphere of influence, which will be more self-sufficiently, and will find herself confronted by American intentions in CHINA of an entirely different nature. It is from this point of view, much more than from the European one, that one has to consider the tactics and the attitude of the SOVIET UNION in questions of world security that were posed at the conference in SAN FRANCISCO.

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2. Negotiated Peace. The second and lesser possibility would be a Soviet-sponsored compromise arrangement between the UNITED STATES and JAPAN. This would be, in a sense, the inverse of the Peace of PORTSMOUTH (40). and in the same way that the Americans took advantage of the situation as honest brokers and consolidated their influence in the Far East, the Russians would undoubtedly follow an identical procedure in this case.

In both cases it is unavoidable that in years to come the center of gravity of Soviet politics will be shifted in the direction of EAST ASIA. This will happen regardless of developments in EUROPE, best implied in LENIN's famous words that "he who owns BERLIN owns EUROPE".

From the German point of view the most immediate concern is that with the impending defeat a cleavage of the German people will become unavoidable. Even if a reasonable uniformity of methods in the Eastern and in the Western zone of occupation can be expected, there will in the long run certainly be no compromise on basic fundamentals of government. At the present moment it is too late for a policy of action. It is deemed important that the certainly disastrous BERGOLF romanticism be done away with (41), inasmuch as the position of the German people can only be worsened by such actions.

It is of further importance to remove any illusions regarding an imminent American-Soviet conflict, for reasons that have been developed above. Even disregarding the fact that such hypotheses are in contradiction to reality, it is quite clear that such a conflict would not be in the interest of the German people (41). Should it actually break out, many millions of Germans would soon die of hunger (41). Furthermore GERMANY would become the battlefield (41). If at the present moment it is at all possible to consider the future, then everything should be undertaken on the German side that would tend to postpone the outbreak of such a conflict (42).

The dividing up of the German people signifies furthermore that sooner or later every single German will have to take sides either for the principles of the East or of the West (41). It is already evident now that as a consequence of the many bombing attacks which have rendered many millions of Germans homeless and destitute, the ground for a Communist movement has been much better prepared than would be due to the casual observer (41). The German people have been atomized to an extent that there is no core class of highest social and intellectual level, nor a group of men capable of assuming leadership. (42).

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As far as can be recognized up to the present, the Western powers do not oppose the practical sovietization with anything but a re-education program. It promises to be of little effect if at the same time the vast majority of the German people gain the conviction that in the end only their bare existence seems to be guaranteed.

In this tragic moment all that remains to be said is to record that everything is done, both politically and militarily, that will not prejudice an eventual collaboration with the western powers (43).

Appendix to the ELONT-Report

Source: Dr Giseler WIRSING.

(1) Typical examples of ELONT reporting style. Unpleasant truths had to be represented as coming from impeccable sources abroad. Misconceptions prevailing in highest German circles as to the luminance of a split among the allies had to be debunked by refuting the same idea when it was expressed in an allied newspaper.

(2) A warning that could be openly expressed provided it had factual support.

(3) Based on reports that came to hand in January and February 1945, predicting that CHURCHILL would choose the earliest possible moment after GERMANY's defeat to break up the coalition and to hold elections.

(4) An opinion based on an appeal by American authors addressed to STALIN in the autumn of 1944, in behalf of POLAND.

(5) Art VI never lost sight of the possibility that secret arrangements might have been made between the US and the USSR providing for the use of air bases on the Siberian coast by the UNITED STATES. Reports from the KO in CHINA passed on rumors of dubious validity claiming that in certain localities preparation were being made, suggesting that some kind of understanding along these lines had been reached.

This sentence was written in March 1945, before air attacks on the Japanese mainland were launched in force. WIRSING believes that they have changed the picture fundamentally.

(6) Mostly based on Frontaufklarungs material. The last ELONT report devoted a whole page to a detailed analysis of these reports.

(7) Direct appeals to the Communists in GERMANY.

(8) Phrased more cautiously in the original.

(9) Based on Swiss reports on negotiations with the former German Reichskanzler WIRTH.

(10) Based on detailed reports from sources within the Austrian Freedom Movement.

(11) Based on routine reports from BRID.

Another source which concerned itself specifically with church matters reported in detail on a very interesting conversation with the Bishop of LJUBLJANA, Yugoslavia, touching on TITO's negotiations in CARINTHIA and TRIESTE.

A Chi-Serient of January 1945 related certain statements made by MOLOTOV at a reception of a Bulgarian delegation, shortly after the armistice with BULGARIA had been concluded. In an informal address MOLOTOV outlined with greatest candor his conception of the exclusiveness of the Slav sphere of interest. MOLOTOV's speech lent a confirmation to WIRSING's belief that a critical situation was bound to develop in the TRIESTE sector.

(12) The inner circle.

(13) This information may have been gleaned from letters written by the Spanish ambassador in BATH, the Duke of Alba, to the director of the Spanish Foreign office. Copies of these communications have been obtained by unit VI.

(14) Counter-stroke to TURKEY's declaration of war against GERMANY, according to WIRSING.

(15) The original BEHNT Reports were a great deal more explicit on SPAIN, going into more detail.

(16) Information had been received to the effect that a modus vivendi had been agreed upon by BIDAULT and SALERNO, when the Russians intervened.

(17) WIRSING wrote several special reports in which he pointed out the folly of recalling Ambassador DIECKHOFF from LISBON at that juncture (September 1944).

As to Spanish-German relations WIRSING states the following:

The allied press has consistently erred in its interpretation of those relations. A rift began to evolve after the HENDAYE meeting between FRANCO and HITLER in 1940. On that occasion HITLER's request of the right of free passage for German troops who were to invade GIBRALTAR from the rear was turned down by FRANCO. He considered the war "by no means ended." In so doing FRANCO foiled Goebbels's designs which, if successful, might have spelled the end of the BRITISH EMPIRE. CHURCHILL, in WIRSING's opinion, was the only responsible statesman who saw things in their true perspective. The Germans, in particular HITLER, underrated FRANCO, whose military acumen is a matter of historic record.

In 1944 relations between SALERNO and Goebbels had reached their nadir. When SALERNO concluded a treaty with Great Britain on 2 Aug 1944, the Germans sent a very sharply worded note which DIECKHOFF delivered after some hesitation. The Spanish Government on its part concealed from GERMANY a secret clause in the treaty, providing the expulsion of GERMANY's consular staff from LISBON. In its usually calm reaction, GERMANY merely proved that the bark was still there, but that the bite had gone.

(18) In reference to NEGOTIATIONS with the USSR AT LISBON'S interests in the PLOESTI oilfields. The Russians removed machinery from certain oilfields over the protests of the British Government. Very detailed reports came to hand.

(19) This contention was borne out by reports from STOCKHOLM on the visit of the Norwegian Foreign Minister to OSLO in early 1945. Even prior to this visit the Northern NORWAY question had been under discussion and in Swedish circles apprehensions were entertained that the Russians had come to Northern NORWAY to stay. From a German Foreign office source WIRSING learned that SALERNO had indicated, quite unofficially, that the operations of the retreating army group WINTERG in Northern NORWAY would merely play into the hands of the Russians, who would move into the Swedish territory.

Fears were also expressed by serious Swedish sources regarding Russian designs on the KATTEGAT, and in this connection the pivotal importance of the NIEL Canal was stressed.

(20) BORNHOLM was dealt with in one of the last ECOWT reports, which stressed its potential value as a spring-board. Here again Swedish sources had expressed concern. Also the visit of Count Bernadotte to GARDNER should be noted in this light. WINSING believes that the mistake of not taking BORNHOLM in this case to be considered an oversight on the part of the British.

(21) Her return to the USSR coincided with increasing friction inside the Embassy. The KOMAROV, according to Swedish sources, had authorized a Secretary of the Embassy, who happened to be the representative of the NKVD.

(22) The Russian invitation is supposed to have reached DE GAULLE at the very instant CHURCHILL arrived in PARIS.

(23) Ex post facto observation, not in ECOWT style.

(24) according to Cardinal SCHUSTER, MILAN.

(25) The ALBERTROP wing has always tended to overrate the importance of the inner circle and underrated that of the men around EDEN.

(26) Especially in the periodical War and the Working Class.

(27) When in September 1944 SCHELLENBERG and WINSING compared notes on the international situation for the first time, WINSING pointed out that world affairs were gravitating away from EUROPE in the direction of Russo-Japanese relations. At that time WINSING expected that the USSR would fall in line with the UNITED STATES (as a result of US lend-lease implementing Russian Far East policy). SCHELLENBERG did not share this opinion, but promised WINSING that all resources of A & T VI would be thrown behind an effort to clarify Russian policy in relation to JAPAN.

When STALIN delivered his famous address on 7 November 1944, singling JAPAN out as an aggressor nation, WINSING, in a special report written at the request of SCHELLENBERG, ran into this sentence: "The accomplished fact of a fundamental change of Russian policy towards Japan again SCHELLENBERG occurred." Then, approximately three weeks later, a report by ambassador SATO to his government was intercepted in which he related a conversation he had had with MGLOTOV in connection with a Japanese note expressing concern over anti-Japanese utterances by a Russian colonel in a public address. MGLOTOV, according to SATO, availed himself of this opportunity to advise the Japanese Government not to mistake rhetorical exuberance for an expression of the considered policy of the Kremlin. However, MGLOTOV added, the time would come when certain outstanding questions of a more fundamental nature would have to be thrashed out between the two nations.

This report was inter-rated by both SCHELLENBERG and WINSING as indicating that the USSR was not prepared to join forces with the UNITED STATES in the Far East at this stage. All along, the members of the Japanese Embassy in BERLIN were sure that the USSR would intervene on the side of the UNITED STATES.

WINSING kept following the developments very closely. He believed he could discern indications of a desire on the part of the USSR not to see JAPAN go down in total defeat, although the Russian press seemed to lean in the opposite direction.

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SPECIAL INTERVIEW REPORT No 2

4. AN BEYOND Report (Continued)

Later SAITO reports, although full of cryptic allusions and therefore rather difficult to verify, seemed to be a bit more realistic. No evidence came forth at any time to suggest that the missions used their ostensible as leverage to gain any degree of undue repatriation from JAPAN. Early in 1945 agents in OSaka reported that a Japanese delegation, whose composition appeared to indicate that it had been given a mission beyond the discussion of border questions and fishery rights, passed through HARBIN en route to TISCHIT, a part of Lake Baikal, evidently bound for a meeting with a Russian delegation.

(28) OSaka had been kept on the outside for a long time. His consistently erroneous judgments on German affairs and the fact that to all intents and purposes he was merely echoing RIBBENTROP had not escaped the notice of his superiors in TOKIO. In 1944 Admiral ABE received GARDNER in a submarine, charged with a special mission. All efforts to have him and Admiral KOSAMA received by HITLER were to no avail. RIBBENTROP was afraid that such a meeting might lead to the dissolution of the RIBBENTROP - OSaka combination, and effectively countered any such move.

According to information received from Legationnaire BRONN, the East Asia Referent of the German Foreign Office, Admiral ABE represented the Japanese Navy and had been sent to bring about a conciliation between GARDNER and the SOVIET UNION. He was also to impress upon HITLER the necessity of setting up a joint German-Japanese General Staff. The only German official with whom he ever had contact was Admiral FUCHS.

(29) and KOSAMA.

(30) The Japanese in BERLIN showed great interest in GARDNER. In an EC-GMT report of December 1944, WASSINGHAM expounded his views on GARDNER's role in the State Department. He pointed out that in 1941 GARDNER was probably the only American statesman of consequence who correctly gauged JAPAN's drift towards war. WASSINGHAM quoted American sources to the effect that GARDNER had cautioned the State Department against a policy of bluff (as represented by HORNBECK), exerting increasing pressure on JAPAN on the one side, and not taking the possibility of an explosion into account on the other. WASSINGHAM stated that, although GARDNER had expressed himself publicly in a strongly anti-Japanese vein, it should not be ruled out that GARDNER, in view of his intimate knowledge of the Japanese question, and his reserved attitude towards the USSR, actually might not have been fully sold on the idea of total destruction of JAPAN.

(31) Source: BRONN.

OSAKA reportedly belongs to an extremist group in the Japanese General Staff. Beginning 1945 he went to SHANGHAI to establish contact with representatives of the General Staff. This attempt never passed the exploratory stage.

(32) The source of this information is secretary USUDA of the Japanese Embassy in BERLIN. He is an outstanding specialist on Chinese affairs and belongs to a political school of thought represented by the Japanese Foreign Minister SHIGI ITSU. Its basic tenet is to bring about termination of hostilities between the USSR and GARDNER, followed by a Russo-Japanese alliance and an effort of some kind to bring the UNITED STATES, backed by the USSR,

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SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No 2

4. PGMONT Report (Continued)

OSMID outlined these thoughts in conversation with WINSING, expressing the belief that on the basis of recalling out spheres of interest an understanding between JAPAN and the USSR could be reached. In the PGMONT report of peccaber WINSING based upon the likelihood of such development, pointing out that every thing hinges on the outcome of the Battle of the PHILIPPINES. provided American remain predominant in the PHILIPPINES, her chances in dealing with CHINA and the USSR should not be underrated.

(33) On the basis of a Japanese, Russian, Chinese confirmation.

(34) This represents the opinion expressed by WINSING's informants who adhere to the "Navy Doctrine" in JAPAN's foreign policy: disinterest in any exploits on the Asiatic mainland at the expense of southward expansion and creation of a Pacific island empire. From their point of view Russian preponderance on the Asiatic mainland would be preferable to American ascendancy in CHINA, which would jeopardize the Japanese lifeline to its projected empire in the South PACIFIC.

(35) Correction: The Minister of War remained in office as Chief of Staff. The Brothers SCONG may be incorrect. It may be some other brothers.

(36) Based primarily upon reports from the KO and Chinese and American sources. VI C 4 put out a special report, 30 pages long, on the YEMEN question.

(37) A reference to the STILWELL crisis. WELLSYER, according to reports received in Act VI, has been handling matters very skillfully, stressing the military angle of his mission.

(38) WINSING's deductions.

(39) A great deal of material has been gathered by means of PW interrogation. The economic section of Act VI has done extensive research in this direction.

(40) which was followed by an idealistic penetration of WANGCHUNG (by the HARRIS' interests).

(41) Not an ex post facto conclusion.

(42) Ex post facto.

(43) WINSING's political request to SCHEIDTBERG.

King Major  
for WINSING  
AC of S, G-

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Es kommen alle Themen und Fächer in Frage, bei denen sprachliche  
Gestaltung und mündliche Ausdrucksfähigkeit eine Rolle spielen.

Soweit der Text.

Beste Grüße

*Wescher*

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25-158417-73  
30 July 1945.

To: WFO (For Mr. Waldron)  
From: V/48/P  
Subject: Draft Reports from MFIU No. 3.

File in  
10-1708

Mr. Waldron

1. Enclosed are copies of the following draft reports, received last week from MFIU 3 (Third Army Interrogation Center):

- a. Introduction to Egnout Reports
- b. Annotation to Egnout Reports
- c. Introduction to Egnout Berichte
- d. The World Situation in March 1945
- e. Egnout Berichte
- f. Miscellaneous notes on the activities of the Japanese Intelligence Service in Europe.
- g. A character sketch of SCHILLER.

2. The first five of the reports are concerned with Giselher WIRNIG, an important member of act VI, and formerly editor of the *Münchener Feuille Nachrichten*, who is reported from MFIU No. 3 to have been requested from there for Eagle IO. The "Annotations" (i.e., above) evidently refer to copies of Egnout Reports which were not recorded.

3. Final versions of the draft reports (the originals of which have now been sent back to MFIU 3) will no doubt be forthcoming in the next few weeks from MFIU 3, but it was felt that the information contained in the drafts should be made available immediately to the War Room.

25-158410-7  
July 1945.

HRH

INTRODUCTION TO DEMONIC REPORTS

"Demons and the devil are not one and the same. Where the Gods have been banished also the devil has lost his right to dwell. There we find the grey twilight beyond good and evil. Faust and Mephistopheles are, as we have always known, the same thing seen from different angles. However, they are by no means 'Uppermensch' and 'Untermensch'. These terms are born in the domain twilight, on a plane where the good and the evil are realities no longer, where they have been extinguished by a simple act of volition. In reality this state of affairs engenders an iniquitous promiscuity of passions, and with it the corruption, not only of all spiritual but also of all moral fundamentals. This has been the predominant characteristic of all demonic epochs.

The confusion and pollution of man's innate moral sense of discrimination begins in that twilight where demons hold sway. He who appeals to the Gods must also comprehend the devil as a reality and as a power. Enormism of Mephistopheles as practiced in this epoch of human history is a worse desecration of fundamentals than to sell one's soul to the devil. As historical experience has taught us, by some wondrous means the Evil begets the Good. Only where Good and Evil blend, altars are built for the false Gods, as illustrated in an incident of modern history, when a streetcar was carried in triumphal pageant through the street of Paris as the Goddess of Reason.

In these words Dr. Giscler WIRSING, one of Germany's most outstanding publicists and writers, passed judgment on an era in German history that was about to draw to a close. That he launched this invective, couched in allegorical language and ill-concealed in a dissertation on a Dutch 15 Century author, Hieronymus BOSCH, at a time when the Gestapo was still omnipotent (April 1944), must be placed to his credit. WIRSING is undoubtedly a courageous man if compared to the common run of Germany's scribes.

*Abstract*

In 1941 WIRSING wrote a book on the United States, 140,000 copies of which sold up to 1943. It was based on material and experiences gathered during a four months stay in the United States in 1938. As title for his book he chose "Der masslose Kontinent", meaning boundless with the connotations of insatiable. In it WIRSING examined the American claim to world domination in its development since the United States was founded (die Entwicklung des Weltberedschaftsanspruches der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika) as opposed to the German principle of the delimitation of spheres of influence (Prinzip der Abgrenzung der Machtbereiche). In a chapter called the 'Petrification of the American myth', he went to great pains in convincing his readers that Oscar Wilde found the key to the problem of Americanism when he stated that 'America's youth is her oldest tradition'. He came to the conclusion that the terms 'Old World' and 'New World' could no longer be defined geographically. The United States, he argued, does not belong to the nations who fight for a better future of humanity, but is hopelessly shackled to the past. On this the central theme of his book, he rings through 450 pages the

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changes, in never ending variations of truth and half-truth, lies and distortions, in all an exhibition of poverty of thought, richly garbed in pseudo-historical objectivity supported amply by distortions and statistics.

Because few men in Germany had WIRSING's factual knowledge and journalistic aptitude, nor the nerve to put across such a smooth concoction of blatant propaganda and insidious distortions, his book was bound to become a fountain head of anti-American propaganda in Germany. The sub-total is a perfect example of Sir Edward Grey's dictum that the Germans have an admirable knowledge of facts but do not understand the meaning of them, that the 'Massacre Continent' was written by a man of high intellect, known for his erudition, journalistic skill and independence of thought, a pupil of Professor HILSHOFER and an apostle of Germany's claim to world hegemony, should be a powerful reminder not to look for the protagonists of the Prussian philosophy of might over right among the Nazi extremists alone. WIRSING came into prominence as co-editor, later publisher of a monthly magazine 'Die Tat', "in which a circle of neo-nationalistic and pro-fascist writers developed a program for a kind of national-socialism before the Nazis came to power". Their program, according to WIRSING, was socialist and aimed at bringing about a synthesis between their group, the left wing of the NSDAP (STRASSER), the Democrats and the Social Democrats. In 1932 'Die Tat' favored HUGENBERG's re-election. 'Die Tat' also identified itself with an attempt at staving off the Nazi rush to power by having General HEIKENHOFER appointed Chancellor of the Reich.

Since 1934 WIRSING worked for the 'Munchener Neueste Nachrichten', first as editor of the foreign department, later as publisher, a position he retained after AMMAN, the owner of the 'Volkischer Beobachter', had bought the 'Munchener Neueste Nachrichten' in 1936. In 1934 WIRSING published a book advocating a rapprochement with Russia, a political line he had followed consistently. In the following years he travelled abroad a great deal, visiting the Near East, in 1938 the United States, following the invitation of a friend, the then German Ambassador DIECKHOFF. He was introduced to President ROOSEVELT and found him exceedingly irritated about the annexation of Austria. Upon his return to Germany, in September 1938, WIRSING reported on his impressions to Foreign Minister von RIBBENTROP, the chief of the German press Dr. HERTHICH, the publisher AMMAN and Secretary of State WEIZACKER. The gist of his impressions: Should it come to an open conflict with England, the United States would enter the war little later, an opinion frequently expressed in Ambassador DIECKHOFF's reports to the Foreign Office. Of course little heed was paid to these warnings.

During the winter 1938/1939 a group of independent, influential German personalities met in the common endeavor 'to mitigate the inflexibility of the course HITLER-RIBBENTROP in the conduct of Germany's foreign affairs.' Without developing any cooperative aim, WIRSING, WEIZACKER, DIECKHOFF, Rudolf IRCHER (chief editor of the Frankfurter Zeitung), and Generaloberst BECK met in informal discussions. Their immediate

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concern was to see the Polish question settled with and not against Great Britain.

Shortly before the outbreak of the war WIRSING accepted an offer by von RIBBENTROP to work for the propaganda section of the Kulturpolitische Abteilung of the Foreign Office under Ambassador ALTENDURF. His co-workers were journalists like KIRSCHER, SIEBURG (Paris correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung), Graf PUEBLER (London correspondent of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung). When WIRSING found that internecine rivalry between the Kulturpolitische Abteilung and the Ministry of Propaganda largely nullified their efforts, he retired to Munich.

When, in spring 1941, WIRSING expressed the opinion in an article in the 'Muncheher Neueste Nachrichten', that Franco-German relations were bound to deteriorate unless a formal peace treaty were concluded, a policy also favored by Ambassador ABETZ, his position became untenable and he joined the Army. He was posted to Kriegsberichter Coy and served in the East until the end of 1942. He did not return to Munich, because he felt that expressing one's views with a modicum of freedom became increasingly difficult in the light of Germany's reverses in North-Africa and Stalingrad. He continued publishing 'Die Tat' in Berlin until the magazine was prohibited by government order. He also wrote a book 'Das Zeitalter des Imperiums', in which he advocated the creation of a Europe not founded on the principles of force. In 1943 and 1944 he paid short visits to Madrid.

In June 1944 WIRSING had to attend a one month refresher course for officers in POTSDAM, a fortuitous circumstance, to which he owed his not being victimized after the 29 July, although he was a close friend of one of the chief conspirators, Legationrat Dr. Adam von TROTT of the Foreign Office. In August 1944 WIRSING witnessed the collapse of Germany's Western armies in Paris and became convinced that a continuation of the war would be senseless and that further sufferings should be spared "the tortured German people and the other peoples". From the foregoing can be gathered that WIRSING has never identified himself to the fullest extent with extremist Nazi policies. On the other hand, he carries on inordinately large share in laying the ideological foundations upon which the conservative elements of Germany could surmount their dislike of the many repugnant aspects of the Nazi regime, on the supposition that they were dealing with passing phenomena indispensable in Germany's struggle for power, but to be shed once the goal had been reached. As seen from that point of view WIRSING must be considered an intellectual war criminal of the highest order. His contribution to the havoc wrought by the Nazis and the ensuing chaos, is a matter of historical record. No doubt, the exigencies of Germany's military defeat have forced him to jettison some of the ideological gallas that carried him safely across the rough seas of the Third Reich.

A start has been made already: no mention appears in his written curriculum vitae of the 'Masslose Kontinent'. More ballast is bound to follow. Nothing must stand in the way now of closest collaboration with the Western Powers, "so woefully unaware of the Bolshevik danger". No doubt, WIRSING will, if given the opportunity, throw the full weight of his journalistic skill and political astuteness behind an effort to cause a cleavage between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Allies.

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ANNOTATIONS:

1. Typical examples of Egoist reportage style. Unpleasant truths had to be represented as coming from impeccable sources abroad. Conversely, misconceptions prevailing in highest German circles as to the imminence of a split among the Allies had to be debunked in form of a rebuttal of opinions lending support to that misconception expressed in certain sections of the Allied press.

2. A warning that could be openly expressed provided it had factual support.

3. Based on reports that came to hand in January, February 1945, predicting that CHURCHILL would chose the earliest possible moment after Germany's defeat to break up the coalition and to hold elections.

4. A straw in the wind was an appeal by American authors addressed to STALIN in the autumn of 1944, on behalf of Poland.

5. Amt VI never lost sight of the possibility that secret arrangements might have been made between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. providing for the use of air bases on the Siberian littoral by the United States. Reports from the K.O. in China passed on rumors of dubious validity claiming that in certain localities preparations were being made suggesting that some kind of understanding along these lines had been reached. This sentence was written in March 1945, before air attacks on the Japanese mainland were launched in force. WIRLING believes that they have changed the picture fundamentally.

6. Mostly based on 'Frontaufklarungs' material. The last Egoist report devoted a whole page to a detailed analysis of those reports.

7. Direct appeals to the Communists in Berlin

8. Phrased more cautiously in the original.

9. Swiss reports on negotiations with the former German Reichschancellor BIRNH.

10. Very detailed reports from sources within the Austrian Freedom movement.

11. Routine reports from Madrid.

Another source which concerned itself specifically with church matters reported in details on a very interesting conversation with the Bishop of Ljubljana (Slovenia), touching on Tito's aspirations in Carinthia and Trieste.

A CHI-Bericht related (January 1945) certain statements made by MOLOTOV at a reception of a Bulgarian delegation, shortly after the armistice with Bulgaria had been concluded. In an informal address MOLOTOV outlined with greatest candor his conceptions of the exclusiveness of the Slav sphere of interest vis a vis any combinations of powers likely to impinge upon it. In MOLOTOV's also the word 'Adria' fell, which lends confirmation to WIRLING's belief that a critical situation was bound to develop in the Trieste sector.

## 12. The inner circle.

13. This information may have been gleaned from letters written by the Spanish Ambassador in Britain, the Duke of ALVA, to the director of the Spanish Foreign Office. Copies of that correspondence had been obtained by Amt VI.

14. Counter-stroke against Turkey's declaration of war, according to WIRSING.

16. Information had been received to the effect that a modus vivendi had been agreed upon by BILDHOLT and SANGRONIZ, when the Russians intervened.

17. WIRSING wrote several reports in which he pointed out the folly of recalling Ambassador KIERKHOFF from Madrid at that juncture (September 1944).

The Allied press has consistently erred in its interpretation of these relations. A rift already began to develop after the Monday meeting between Franco and HITLER in 1940. At that occasion HITLER's request of a right of a free passage for German troops who were to invest Gibraltar from the rear, was turned down by FRANCO who considered the war 'as by no means ended'. In so doing FRANCO foiled Germany's designs which, if attained, might have spelled the end of the British Empire. CHURCHILL, in WIRSING's opinion, was the only responsible statesman who saw things in their true perspective. The Germans, in particular, HITLER, underrated FRANCO, whose military acumen is a matter of historical record. Already in 1944 relations between Spain and Germany had reached their nadir. When Spain concluded a treaty with Great Britain on 2 May 1944, the Germans sent a very sharply worded note which KIERKHOFF delivered after some hesitation. The Spanish Government on its part concealed from Germany a secret clause in that treaty, promising the expulsion of Germany's consular staff from Tangier. In its purely emotional reaction Germany merely proved that the bark was still there, but that the bite had gone.

19. Cf. negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on Britain's interests in the Floesti Oil Fields. The Russians removed machinery from certain oil fields over the protests of the British Government. Very detailed reports came to hand.

20. This contention was born out by reports from Stockholm on the visit of the Norwegian Foreign Minister to Moscow in early 1945. Even prior to this visit the North-Norwegian question had been under discussion and in Swedish circles apprehensions were entertained that the Russians had come to Northern Norway to stay. From a German Foreign Office source WIRSING learned that Sweden had intimated, quite unofficially, that the depredations of the retreating Army Group RENOUILLIC in Northern Norway would merely play into the hands of the Russians who would move into territory despoiled of its inhabitants.

Fears were also expressed by serious Swedish sources regarding Russian designs in the Kattegat and in this connection the pivotal importance of the Kiel Canal stressed.

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21. Bornholm was dealt with in one of the last Egmont reports, its potential value as a spring-board being stressed. More again Swedish sources had expressed concern. Also the Germany visits of Count BERNADOTTE should be seen in this light. WIRSING believes that the omission of not taking BORNHOLM in time must be considered a geographical oversight on the part of the British.

22. Her return to Russia co-incided with increasing friction inside the Embassy. Mrs. KULLENLAI, according to Swedish sources, had antagonized a Secretary of the Embassy who happened to be the representative of the GPU.

23. The Russian invitation is supposed to have reached de GAULLE at the very moment CHURCHILL arrived in Paris.

24. Ex post observation, not in Egmont style.

25. According to Cardinal SCHUSTER, Milan.

26. The HIRSHWITZ wing has always tended to overrate the importance of the inner circle and underrated that of the man around Eden.

27. Especially in the periodical "Der Krieg und die Arbeiter-Klassen".

28. When in September 1944 SCHELLENBERG and WIRSING compared notes on the international situation for the first time, WIRSING pointed out that world affairs were gravitating away from Europe in the direction of Russo-Japanese relations. At that time WIRSING expected that Russia would fall in line with the United States (joint land-lance and Russian Far-East policy.) SCHELLENBERG did not share this opinion, but promised WIRSING that all resources of Mat VI would be thrown behind an effort to clarify Russian policy vis a vis Japan. When STALIN delivered his famous address on 7 November 1944, singling Japan out as an aggressor nation, WIRSING in a special report written at the request of SCHELLENBERG, read into this sentence the accomplished fact of a fundamental change of Russian policy towards Japan. Again SCHELLENBERG demurred. Then, approximately three weeks later, a report by Ambassador SITO to his government was intercepted in which, very cautiously worded, he related a conversation he had had with MOLOTOV in connection with a Japanese demarche expressing concern at anti-Japanese utterances by a Russian Colonel in a public address. MOLOTOV, according to SITO, availed himself of this opportunity to convey to the Japanese Government not to mistake rhetorical exuberance for an expression of the considered policy of the Kremlin. However, MOLOTOV added, the time would come when certain outstanding questions of a more fundamental nature would have to be thrashed out between the two nations. This report was interpreted by both SCHELLENBERG and WIRSING as indicating that the U.S.S.R. was not prepared to join forces with the United States in the Far East at this stage. All along the members of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin had been displaying a great deal of confidence regarding the prospects of an early Russian intervention on the side of the United States. WIRSING kept following up developments very closely. He believed to discern indications of a desire on the part of Russia, not to see Japan go down in total defeat, although the Russian press seemed to lean in the opposite direction.

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28. Later SAFO reports, although full of cryptic allusions and therefore rather difficult to evaluate, seemed to bear out this thesis. No evidence came forth at any time to the effect that the Russians used their abstinence as leverage to gain advantages of such proportions from Japan. Early in 1945 agents in Manchuria (conveyed through BORODIN) reported that a Japanese delegation, whose composition appeared indicative of its having been given permission beyond the discussion of border questions and fishery right, passed through Harbin en route to TILSCHITZ East of Lake Baikal, evidently bound for a meeting with a Russian delegation.

29. OSHIMA had been kept in the open for a long time. His consistently erroneous judgments on German affairs and the facts that to all intents and purposes he was merely echoing the observations of RIBBENTROP had not escaped the notice of his superiors in Tokyo. In 1944 Admiral ABE reached Germany in a submarine, charged with a special mission. All efforts to have him and Admiral KOSHIMA received by HITLER were unavailing. RIBBENTROP was afraid that such a meeting might lead to a denouement of the combination RIBBENTROP-OSHIMA and effectively countered any such move. According to information received from Legation-rat BRAUN, the East Asia referent of the German Foreign Office, Admiral ABE represented the Japanese Navy and had been sent to bring about a conciliation between Germany and the Soviet Union. He was also to impress upon HITLER the necessity of setting up a joint German-Japanese General Staff. The only German official he ever had contact with was Admiral DOWITZ.

30. And Corea.

31. The Japanese in Berlin evinced great interest in the person of GREEN. In an Egmont report of December 1944, WIRSING had expounded his views on GREEN's role in the State Department. He had pointed out that in 1941 GREEN was probably the only American statesman of consequence who correctly gauged JAPAN's drift towards war. WIRSING quoted American sources to the effect that GREEN had cautioned the State Department against a policy of bluff (as represented by BORNEBECK), exerting increasing pressure on Japan on the one side, and not taking the possibility of an explosion into account on the other. WIRSING stated that, although GREEN had expressed himself publicly in a strongly Anti-Japanese vein, it should not be ruled out that GREEN in view of his intimate knowledge of the Japanese question and his reserved attitude towards the U.S.S.R. might actually not have been fully sold on the idea of total destruction of Japan.

32. Source: BORODIN

UKAMI reputedly belongs to an appraiser group in the Japanese General Staff. Beginning 1945 he went to Shanghai to establish contact with representatives of the Generalissimo. This attempt never grew beyond the stage of exploration.

33. The source of this information is Secretary USHIDA of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. He is an outstanding specialist in Chinese affairs and belongs to a political school of thought represented by the Japanese Foreign Minister KISHIMOTO.

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31. (cont) Its basic tenet is to bring about termination of hostilities between Russia and Germany, followed by a Russo-Japanese alliance and an offer of negotiated peace to the United States, backed by Russia. USHIDA outlined these thoughts in conversation with WIRSING, expressing the belief that, on the basis of parceling out spheres of interest an understanding between Japan and Russia could be reached. In the Egmont report of December WIRSING passed upon the likelihood of such development, pointing out that everything hinges on the outcome of the Philippine battle. Provided Japan can retain a foothold on the Philippines, her chances vis a vis China and Russia should not be underrated.

32. Vis on the basis of a Japanese, Russian, Chinese combination,

33. This represents the opinion expressed by WIRSING's informants who adhere to the 'Navy Doctrine' in Japan's foreign policy: Disinterestedness in army exploits on the Asiatic mainland at the expense of southward expansion and creation of a Pacific island empire. From their point of view RUSSIAN preponderance on the Asiatic mainland would be preferable to American ascendancy in China jeopardizing the Japanese lifeline to its projected Empire in the South Pacific.

36. Not the Brothers BOONG, but another pair whose name has escaped WIRSING. They are supposed to wield influence in Chungking comparable to that of the brothers BOEMANN in Berlin. CORRECTION: The Minister of War remained in office as Chief of Staff.

37. Based primarily upon reports from K.O. China and American sources VI c 4 put out a special report, 30 pages long, on the Yanan complex.

38. STILLWELL crisis. WEISSNER, according to reports received in Art VI, has been handling matters very skillfully, stressing the military angle of his mission.

39. WIRSING's deductions.

40. A great deal of material has been gathered by means of PW interrogation. The economic section of Art VI has done extensive research in this direction.

42. Followed by capitalistic penetration of Manchuria (HARRISMAN interests).

43. Not an ex post conclusion.

44. Ex post.

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1. INTRODUCTION TO EGMONT GERICHTE:

About the middle of September 1944, SS-Brigadefuehrer SCHELLENBERG, Amtschef VI, RSHA, and WIRSING met at the former's office to compare notes on the international situation. SCHELLENBERG, whom WIRSING had never met before, explained that he had followed WIRSING's political line closely, reading his analyses on foreign affairs in the Munchener Neueste Nachrichten, 'Die Tat' and its successor, 'Das XX Jahrhundert'. In ranging over the whole complex of questions raised by Germany's political and military situation at that time, SCHELLENBERG and WIRSING substantially agreed on the following issues:

- a. That Germany's position was hopeless, both militarily and politically. Just about that time a last chance to come to a negotiated peace with Russia - Japan with the acquiescence of the USSR had offered to mediate - had been passed up.
- b. That it was imperative to terminate the war at the earliest possible moment.
- c. That peace negotiated on an equal footing with Germany's opponents was out of the question.
- d. That it might be worth while to try to ascertain whether 'unconditional surrender' as conceived by the Allies left room for a change in the government, acceptable to the Allies as partners across the peace table.
- e. That the formation of a 'Verwaltungsrat' or 'Regierung' would entail the shelving of HITLER. This matter was not touched upon expressly, but was implied by indication inasmuch as the whole discussion of what Germany could be able to offer in peace negotiations presupposed the removal of the prime stumbling block.

2. On the basis of the above and rest using SCHELLENBERG proposed to WIRSING that he should write reports on the foreign political situation of Germany, giving an unwornished picture of the hopelessness of that situation and proposing specific measures designed to save Germany from total collapse. SCHELLENBERG offered to put all the material reaching Amt VI through its intelligence agencies at WIRSING's disposal, withholding none. The reports would come out in intervals from between two and three weeks and would be distributed between a very small and select circle only. WIRSING accepted and thereby became as of September 1944 'Ehrenamtlicher Mitarbeiter' of the RSHA. The reports he wrote at his private residence where also the material of Amt VI was sent, usually by messenger. The only person in Amt VI WIRSING had contact with was SCHELLENBERG, in exchange of ideas and occasionally the passing on of top secret material which SCHELLENBERG did not wish to commit to paper, contributing materially to the reports in their final form. SCHELLENBERG did not retract from the intrinsic value of the reports, the identity of their author was supposed to be kept secret known only to the inner circle of the RSHA. SCHELLENBERG stated that HITLER's back room men would not accept of any peace negotiations and that the RSHA would not be able to

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3. At his first meeting with SCHELLENBERG, WIRSING emphasized that it was absolutely essential to keep the distribution confined to very few people, in particular not to include RIBBENTROP and Dr. GOEBBELS ("let Dr. GOEBBELS write his own editorials"). The actual distribution as ordered by KALTENBRUNNER was as follows:

- a. SS-Gruppenfuehrer FEGELEIN, HIMMLER's liaison officer at HITLER's headquarters, who would submit it to the Fuehrer;
- b. HIMMLER;
- c. SEYSS-INQUART (see KALTENBRUNNER report)
- d. Botschafter HEWEL, who was made to sign a declaration promising not to give copies of the report to RIBBENTROP or to mention their existence to him. HEWEL represented RIBBENTROP at the Fuehrerhauptquartier;
- e. Probably GOEBBELS, because WIRSING learned that the pessimistic vein of the reports was criticized in circles close to GOEBBELS.

4. Over and beyond their immediate, didactic purpose, of enlightening their readers on the true state of affairs, the EGANT reports were a means towards an end. Both SCHELLENBERG and WIRSING agreed on the desirability of seeing HITLER hors de combat. WIRSING accepted the commission to write the EGANT reports with the expectation in view, that HITLER appraised of all the pertinent facts that summed up Germany's impending doom would, if he had a spark of responsibility left, withdraw from the political scene of his own accord. At any rate, WIRSING figured, that the reports might be instrumental in unseating HITLER into a political stalemate where no alternative was left him but to resign. End of November 1944 when it became evident that HITLER reacted unfavorably to the political line of the EGANT reports, SCHELLENBERG told WIRSING literally the following:

"It is thus an established fact that HITLER is incapable of accepting any view on the international situation that does not jibe with his preconceived ideas. We have therefore got to reconcile ourselves to the fact that we are dealing with a pathological case (medizinischer Fall)."

Both SCHELLENBERG and WIRSING realized that after the abortive attempt of 20 July, the only group capable of bringing about the required changes were HIMMLER and his SS. But whereas WIRSING was convinced that once HITLER was out of the way, HIMMLER would in short order, be swept away by the inexorable logic of historical development and a 'verhandlungsfaehige Regiering' emerge eventually SCHELLENBERG never committed himself to that length and most likely envisaged HIMMLER's ascendancy as a more lasting solution.

When WIRSING suggested to SCHELLENBERG that, once things began to move, BRUNING's aid should be enlisted, SCHELLENBERG's answer was: "We cannot tell that to HIMMLER at the present stage. However, BRUNING is one of our assets (Bruning ist ein Kapital fur uns). In this connection also the advisability of going back to a two-party system came to be mentioned, SCHELLENBERG suggesting BRUNING as leader of the opposition. This, to WIRSING's mind, proves that SCHELLENBERG was not prepared to go the whole hog.

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SCHELLENBERG  
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5. HIMMLER, according to SCHELLENBERG, was in far-reaching accord with the findings of the EGMONT reports and endorsed their recommendations. This to SCHELLENBERG was of pivotal importance, inasmuch as HIMMLER's adherence to the Egmont line was an indispensable prerequisite of success. It would be an oversimplification to say that the reports were conceived as mere side-concoires for HIMMLER. However, in the actual course of events it was to be HIMMLER who, according to SCHELLENBERG, carried the ball and who repeatedly put the full weight of his position behind the regency of the representation in the Egmont reports. In two instances at least he used the reports as vehicle for a demarche with HITLER. The first time, in November 1944, he was, SCHELLENBERG claimed, rewarded with the invidious task of disentangling Army Group G in the Upper Rhine sector (as BUCK's successor). According to SCHELLENBERG this was conceived by HITLER as a means of taking HIMMLER, whose opinions on Germany's foreign policy were obnoxious to him, out of circulation. After the abortive Ardennes offensive, SCHELLENBERG's influence with HIMMLER increased to the extent that the latter made another attempt to induce HITLER to conform to the Egmont line. This time the reward was the command of the Army Group Weichsel, conferred upon him as HITLER's orders by BORLMANN. A last attempt to reduce HIMMLER to political impotence was undertaken after the Platten-see disaster when Russian troops pierced the German lines and routed the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. This happened around 12 March when HIMMLER was told by the Fuehrer that he should take over the command in HUNGARY. Somehow HIMMLER managed to dodge this assignment.

6. Each Egmont report carried certain recommendations designed to create a sound basis on which negotiations with the Allies could be launched, foremost among which were a solution of the Jewish question and the Church question. Both WIERING and SCHELLENBERG feared that in the final phase of the war all Jews still in German concentration camps would be liquidated. A report by the American reporter Edgar SNOW on conditions in the Maidanek camp near LUBLIN had painted a picture too realistic and too substantiated to be passed off as mere enemy propaganda. In line with the Egmont recommendation SCHELLENBERG induced HIMMLER to give his consent to the release of approximately 60,000 Jews among 300,000 still in German concentration camps, into the care of the Swiss, whose representative, Ruediger KESSI, was given assurances to this effect by SCHELLENBERG on behalf of HIMMLER. No sooner had one started to release Jews when HITLER's veto brought the whole scheme to an abrupt end. This was a striking instance of HIMMLER's making promises to SCHELLENBERG which, later on, he failed to live up to either because he met resistance on the part of HITLER or because the extreme wing of the SS failed to back him. Another instance was the release of certain prominent French personalities, associated with the de GAULLE movement, as e.g. the family of General GIRAUD, whose release had actually been ordered by HIMMLER and which MULLER of Amt IV, RSK., failed to carry out.

7. The Egmont reports represent the culmination of plans on which SCHELLENBERG had worked ever since he was put in charge of Amt VI, viz to organize a central evaluation agency superseding the numerous evaluation branches of the various referate of Amt VI. The idea was that only the 'Zentralauswertungstelle' would impart the intelligence

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collected by the agencies of Amt VI to the policy making organs of the German state. In its final form the 'Zentralauswertungsstelle' turned out a compromise; the referate retained their evaluation sections and the so-called Lagerberichte which, up to 1942, Amt VI had put out at regular intervals, were resuscitated only on a much higher plane than their forerunners which, due to their large circulation, could use only part of the available material and had to be written in a journalistic vein. In the place of his line SCHELLENBERG activated a new referat with group VI A, the 'Zentralauswertungsstelle', putting in charge SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr. SCHINDOWSKY, formerly with VI C. The new referate put out periodical reports, written by Dr. WIRSING, all told thirteen extending over October, November, December 1944, January, February, March 1945. The name 'Egmont' was chosen in order to camouflage the true character of the reports, obviating the use of the designation 'Auslandslagebericht' on reports etc.

NOTE: The information contained in this paragraph is supplied by SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr. HOTTB, deputy chief of VI-B (South-East), RSHA.

8. In the course of his short-term association with the intelligence service (RahL.), WIRSING acquired little actual knowledge of its information collecting processes (Erfassung). Being exclusively concerned with the evaluation (Verwertung) of the material made available to him and in the light of the common usage to withhold the origin of information procured by extraordinary means, WIRSING's inability to identify any of these sources appears creditable. He claims having studiously avoided asking SCHELLENBERG questions as to where certain information originated from. When this question was broached at all, the purpose was to bring out certain characteristics which could possibly have a bearing on authenticity and/or degree of accuracy of a report. In a case of that kind, especially when SCHELLENBERG's own personal contacts were involved, he would give WIRSING his own evaluation without, however, disclosing the identity of the source. After certain material had established its reputation as being generally reliable, WIRSING would be able to rate the source without knowing who exactly supplied the information and by what means it was obtained. Below it has been tried to reconstruct by way of induction some of SCHELLENBERG's and some of Amt VI's most outstanding channels of information.

2. WIRSING got copies of all 'Lagerberichte' as published by the various referate of Amt VI. In recognition of the fact that those 'Lagerberichte' did not always contain a factual compilation of the information received but by their very nature were the result of a process of evaluation by the resp. referat, WIRSING insisted on getting the 'raw material' i.e. the reports as they reached Amt VI. For technical reason he did not adhere to this practice in the case of the Russian referat where he relied upon the compilation made in its evaluation section.

A very important source of information embodied in the Egmont reports were the 'Berichte des Antschefs', reports rendered by SCHELLENBERG on the basis of exchanges he carried on with important personalities both in Germany and abroad, e.g. with Hundert + NUSSI, members

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of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, in particular with its naval attache, Admiral KOSHIMIZU, with the Swiss and Swedish Ambassadors. SCHELLENBERG had o.g. a line into France connecting with an important personality close to BIDAULT. He frequently received reports from a Spanish source, either a diplomat or an industrial, who appeared well versed in Vatican affairs. Regarding SCHELLENBERG's Swiss connections, see Special Report.

ART VI  
SOURCES.

10. OSTRO was the code-name of a source located somewhere on the Iberian peninsula, running at least 12 different lines. The reports were prolific all round, covering both military and political questions, exceptionally well-posted especially on English matters. After the Yalta Conference OSTRO turned in some good reports evidently based on information furnished by somebody who sat in on the conference.

HASSO (or HECTOR) was an exceptionally high quality source in Stockholm, well informed on domestic politics in England. It conveyed detailed and intimate reports on English trends of thought as prevailing in the inner circles of the main British parties. HASSO and OSTRO were the pillars of England information, providing excellent counterchecks on the reliability of either.

COMINT DR. HOTTL:

1. NERO stands for Hungarian source, located in Madrid and Lisbon. The informants are to be found in circles close to the Hungarian Military Attache in Madrid and his representative in Lisbon. This connection had been developed by Dr. HOTTL and turned over to Art VI. The group chief of VI D (Scandinavia, Britain, United States) drew his main subsistence from this source. Its channels ran from Lisbon resp Madrid to the II Department of the German General Staff (Oberst KUTNY), from there to either Dr. HOTTL or his representative SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer NEUNTEUFEL in Budapest, at first relayed via Group VI E in Vienna, later on specific orders of KALTENBRUNNER, shunted directly to the RSHA.

2. OSTRO may be looked for in circles close to the former Foreign Minister of France Spain, ~~UNTER~~, ~~Dr.~~ Dr. HOTTL claims, worked for Art VI.

11. There existed a line to Portugal's SALAZAR via his father confessor, the Archbishop (or Cardinal) in Lisbon. Considered a most important source.

In Spain an informant regularly prepared notes with the Japanese Ambassador SUMA, a very good source.

The coverage of Italian affairs was centralized in Madrid and mostly dealt with routine matters.

The Russian sector was exceedingly well covered by sources located in Stockholm. The information obtained was in part 'Spionmaterial' (planted) and had to be carefully sifted in VI C.

An important informant in Russia who called himself BORSCHIK sat in Shanghai, evidently running his own intelligence net. The abwehr was represented both in ~~CHINA~~ and in ~~CHINA~~ (K.O.)

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Dublin was a very disappointing source, WIRSING cannot recollect ever having seen a report originating there. He once asked SCHELLENBERG who told him that his predecessors had neglected the Irish sector and that it was now too late to start anything.

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12. The daily bread of all foreign reports were the so called GHI-BERICHTE i.e. the transcripts of intercepted and decoded wireless messages. They actually were the solid core of information, although there was discontinuity of coverage and irreverently important GHI, S.I. after the Yalta Conference when almost nothing from American sources could be obtained, marred their value as a whole. WIRSING claims that more or less a plate coverage of the traffic listed below was furnished:

- a. The Turkish Ambassador in Moscow to his government (complete).
- b. The Greek Ambassador in Moscow to his government.
- c. Ambassador HERNIMAN in Moscow who reported to the State Department on the Polish deliberations.
- d. Ambassador CAFFERY in Paris who reported to the State Department on de GAULLE's visit to Moscow.
- e. The Bulgarian envoy in Switzerland who reported to his government on Balkan affairs and was particularly well-informed on the Greek insurrection.
- f. The American representative in Bulgaria who had some trouble with the Russians and told his troubles to the State Department.

SUPPLEMENTS:

Add to Paragraph 4 on Page 10:

End of March 1945 WIRSING told SCHELLENBERG that he considered the Egoent reports to have fallen short of their objective, viz to bring about HITLER's resignation and that all was lost now. SCHELLENBERG concurred and the Egoent reports were discontinued.

Add to Paragraph 5, Page 11; after '... out of circulation'.

Beginning December 1944, SCHELLENBERG went to call on HITLER at his headquarters, armed with an eight-page aide-memoire in which at SCHELLENBERG's request, WIRSING had recapitulated all recommendations made in previous Egoent reports and not acted upon as of that date. These recommendations were couched in much stronger language than usual and made no bones about the fact that no negotiated peace could be contemplated unless certain indispensable domestic prerequisites had been fulfilled. SCHELLENBERG came back from his talk with HITLER under the impression that he personally stood behind these recommendations, but was powerless to carry them out.

Add to Paragraph 3 Page 10:

The Foreign Office at no time availed itself of the information produced by Unit VI. According to SCHELLENBERG, MALTENBRUNNER at one time tried to bring about some sort of cooperation by impressing upon RIBBENTROP that Unit VI is a 'servin' institution' (eine dienende organization). RIBBENTROP very curtly declined the offer. According to WIRSING, RIBBENTROP had a very deep-rooted aversion to intelligence-gathering services (gegen alles nachrichtl. dienstliche), an aversion he shared with HITLER.

THE WORLD SITUATION IN MARCH 1945NOTE.

The contents of this report correspond approximately to the last two EIGHT-Reports (Nos 12 and 13), written at a time when collapse had become inevitable and Germany's position had come to be considered hopeless. Events since March 1945 have not been taken into account. No documentary reference material was available for these notes.

POINTS  
OF  
GRAVI-  
TATION.

1. Ever since the Americans crossed the Rhine at REGEN, the ALLIED political leaders have been convinced that Germany would collapse within a very short time. Simultaneously it can be gathered from front line observations in the East that the Army Group ZHUKOV, having reached the lower Oder, has started concentrating large forces E of Kustrin and of Frankfurt a.o. the military situation on both main fronts displays therefore the often discussed features of a race between West and East straight towards the heart of Germany. The alliance of the three principal powers, again reaffirmed at Yalta, has withstood the political strain as predicted in the previous reports. In the face of the newly arisen military situation one can no longer expect the Russo-Anglo-Saxon coalition to be broken up by political means. From the point of view of the major enemy powers, Germany is no longer in a position to conduct any negotiations.

On the other hand there are numerous indications that the divergences between the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians will not diminish with the end of the war. On the contrary they are bound to become more numerous. This fits in with the results of the Yalta conference where, according to all sources at our disposal there has been full agreement on only one decisive main topic: to see the war against Germany through together, under all circumstances. Almost all other problems were left open at Yalta, or they were settled only in such general terms that the working agreed on, permitted various interpretations. Now great those difficulties are, has been shown most clearly by WELLESLEY's speech before the House of Commons on 28 February 1945, and by the reaction it brought forth among the opposition. From the now available detailed coverage of that debate in the House of Commons on the 1 and 2 March it can be gathered that it was not so much specifically the Polish question but rather a matter of principle that was under discussion, viz the fundamental ideal on which the future order of Europe should be constituted. Basically it was therefore the question whether England would actually be made to accept (unquestionably) the methods of brute force used by the Russians vis a vis Poland. It is imperative, however, to refute unequivocally the opinion that the dissensions among the Allies will lead to a new war soon after Germany's defeat. From all our sources it appears rather that in the near future neither the Western powers nor the Soviet Union will be willing to take up arms against each other. It is necessary to sound an insistent warning against any German plans in the present final phase of the conflict, warning on a new conflict among the Allies immediately after our defeat. The signs of a not considerable war weariness, in England frequently mentioned upon, have been implemented by further examples. Particularly the Labor Party does not seem willing to extend coalition with the Conservatives beyond the moment of German defeat. Therefore already now a significant portion of British attention is swinging increasingly towards questions, long postponed, of internal politics. In the United States, as far as can be seen from here, there is no psychological preparation for a sudden and complete turn against the Soviet Union, even though the enthusiasm for Russia has long since passed its peak because of Moscow's methods displayed in Red Army occupied territories. President ROOSEVELT's basic policies remain unchanged as before, the President thus at least the implicit support of the Soviet Union in the near future.

purpose he is ready to relinquish certain positions in Europe that are of minor importance to American interests. In the present phase, too, we maintain the point of view taken in the Egmont reports from the beginning viz that the key to the political situation of the world cannot be looked for in Europe but in the Pacific. Deprobable as it may appear that the tension among the Allies will develop into a conflagration immediately upon the termination of the war in Europe, it is certain, that in the long run the contrasts between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians are bound to become ever more marked. Already in the present initial stage results of observation of the occupied German territories show entirely different methods in the West and in the East. Despite acts of violence committed by the Red Army - particularly the mass raping of German women in the occupied Eastern territories - there is evidence that STALIN intends to apply the same policy of "penetration sovietique" for Germany which he has used in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and the Baltic States. Clear evidence of this are the German language broadcasts from Moscow which are aimed at a communist underground movement. To counter this single-minded policy of Soviet penetration in Europe - reaching even as far as France and Spain - there is on the American side only a certain vacuum, thinly disguised by phrases like 'democracy' and 'reeducation' (das nur notdurrstig durch die Worte Demokratie und reeducation verdeckt wird). There is no clear concept as to the actual meaning of "education towards democracy" of the German people, as can be gathered from the discussion published in English and American periodicals. These contradictions were pointed out most clearly in an article "Germany" by the well-known English writer VOIGT in the February (1945) issue of "Fifteenth Century". VOIGT, however, is an outsider and his writings are of sympathetic value only. Disregarding the fact that the key to the political world situation is in the Far East, the imminent German defeat already heralded by the current military events will very soon create most difficult problems for future Allied cooperation. In a new book "U.S. War aims" - recently received here for evaluation - the American publicist Walter LIPPMAN explains that the Soviet Union would tip the world balance of power by an intolerably large share, should she succeed in bringing Germany into her orbit after the present war. LIPPMAN concludes that all of Germany should remain under the control of the Western powers. This and a series of similar statements indicate that intelligent Americans have realized for some time already what a 'penetration sovietique' would imply for the United States as well as for England.

2. Since the report on Yalta Conference there have been no additional instances of further unified Allied procedure in Europe. On the contrary, the Soviet Union continues systematically to consolidate her political and territorial positions, regardless of English or American objections. Specifically the following problems have now reached the stage of actuality:

a. The Establishment of Allied Zones in Germany.

It has been confirmed that only an approximate zoning, though not a final one, has been agreed upon at Yalta. Also there appears to be only a negative agreement on methods of administration insofar as STALIN has agreed not to install the communist-infused Free German Committee. Conversely, the Anglo-Americans will refrain, for the time being, from installing a Government composed of emigres.

b. The Austrian question seems to be just as unsettled. Agent reports indicate that the communist circles in the so-called Austrian Resistance Movement (Osterreichische Widerstandsbewegung) have of late made the assertion that all of Austria would be occupied by the Red Army sooner or later. From the same source we hear that the Soviets are intending to install a communist-influenced Government in Vienna as soon as possible,

contrary to their procedure in Germany. The master plan is obvious: Communist-controlled Austria would be equivalent to a Russian corridor to Switzerland, thereby leading directly into Western Europe. From MOHAILOVICH's entourage comes the report that TITO has lately intended to claim CARINTELLA. It has not been possible to ascertain unambiguously whether Marshall ALEXANDER's visit to Belgrade during February (1945) had any connection with these unsettled questions, especially since the Serbian sources seem to infer that TITO will not be satisfied with the reconquest of Fiume; rather that he wants to extend the Yugoslavia territory beyond Trieste up to the Venetian plain: rumors of such Yugoslav aspirations have also made their appearance in Rome, where they had a disquieting effect.

c. The Settlement of the Polish Question agreed on at Yalta, has failed substantially. In Yalta, England as well as the United States have made concessions to the Soviets that let to the extreme limit of tolerance. In reality the decisions on Poland constitute only a thinly veiled travesty of complete annexation of the Polish territory by the Soviet Union. The remarkable opposition encountered by CHURCHILL after his announcement on Poland before the Commons on 28 February (1945) shows that the policy makers among the British Conservatives are no longer willing to make further concessions. Nevertheless the Soviet Union has made impossible parleys with the former Minister President of Poland, MIKOLAJCZYK, the only personality among the London Poles that could have been used for a compromise. In particular the Soviet Union has refused to palliate the policy of brute force by the NKVD and has refused admission to English and American newspapermen or regularly accredited reporters. A reliable personality who maintains connections to Polish circles in Western Europe, claims that the London Poles do not desire an extension of the Western Border to the Oder as has been offered to them. They fully realize that this claim, advanced by the Lublin Poles, cannot be based on any historical foundation. In the opinion of Polish circles in London are nothing else but the preparation for a camouflaged annexation by the Soviet Union. In the weeks since Yalta it has become apparent that STALIN is not ready to compromise with England on the Polish question. It also seems that no consideration has been given to Moscow to repeated offers of mediation by the United States in the face of MOLOTOV's obdurate demands. Ambassador HARRIMAN has not been able so far to play the part in the Polish question that, as a result of the Yalta decisions, had been intended for him. Instead it can be gathered from numerous reports that the unabated use of violence by the NKVD is continuing against those Poles living in the territory of the Lublin puppet regime who still sympathize with London.

d. TURCO-SOVIET Pact.

It is established by now that when the Russians, on 18 March 1945, unexpectedly denounced the Turco-Soviet pact of friendship of 1924, MOLOTOV had not previously notified the English and the Americans. Only shortly before the Turkish ambassador had been reassured by his English colleagues that finally because of her formal declaration of war, Turkey was protected by the Soviet Union. The news took SARKER by surprise when he was about to pay MOLOTOV a parting visit before going to Ankara. The only immediate significance is that the Soviets are intending to obtain a free hand vis a vis of England in the question of the Straits. Of course, the Turks will get a new pact of assistance only when they handed over to all intents and purposes, more or less directly the control of the Straits to the Russians.

e. SPAIN

It could not be ascertained whether any binding agreements

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concerning Spain had been reached at Yalta. Meantime the Moscow radio has started a considerably more virulent polemic against FRANCO in Spanish language broadcasts. No important results have come from the conferences with MAURA in Paris and from the visits in London of Don JUAN's representatives in that city. FRANCO is continuing his efforts to adapt his politics to the wishes and the economic needs of the United States, in spite of the negative attitude public opinion in England and America shows towards him. The new American ambassador has arrived in Madrid at last, whereas the British have made no appointment to fill the vacant post of their ambassador. Apparently it was Soviet influence that wrecked Spain's negotiations with France. From this contradictory situation it can be concluded that the American observers in Spain have clearly recognized the dangers of a change in government without previous thorough preparation: it would forcibly drive Spain into the arms of the communists. Undoubtedly the communist undercurrent in Spain has been essentially reinforced by the successes of the Soviet Union, but as long as there is no foreign intervention, it should be impossible to overthrow FRANCO. The German-Spanish relations have now reached the nadir after the recall of the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin.

f. ROMANIA and BULGARIA

In Rumania and Bulgaria the Soviet policy of planned Communist penetration is continuing. The RADESCU affair has accelerated this process, especially in Rumania. One must suppose that the British Intelligence Services have instigated RADESCU's action. However, England was not able to protect the former Prime Minister who had fled into the British Embassy at the outbreak of the crisis. In Bulgaria as well as in Rumania the small groups of English and American representatives are able to move about only under certain restrictions. They are able to exert as little influence on the political shaping of these // significant that news stories are hardly ever printed in the Anglo-American press with Rumania or Bulgaria datelines. The show trials in Sofia in which even strongly leftist politicians were sentenced to heavy penalties, were registered only briefly in American weeklies with sarcastic comments.

g. GREECE

In Greece the situation has quieted down further. Various sources, however, indicate that TITO is still supporting the Macedonians movement whose aim it is to separate EPIRONIA from Greece. Since in Yalta Greece has been recognized as falling under the British sphere of influence, official Moscow politics are reticent on this question. There is definite proof nevertheless that the above-mentioned Macedonian movement (Mazedonische Bewegung) operated under entirely communist leadership.

h. SCANDINAVIA

In Scandinavia indications are on the increase that the Soviets intend to establish strong points in Northern Norway and above all in the Kattegat. Since the position of the German troops in Denmark and in Norway is bound to become untenable within a definite period of time, it appears essential to see to it now already that Soviet aspirations extending as far as Bornholm be countered. The military value Denmark and Norway represent to us, cannot be gauged in this report. From the political point of view, however, it appears imperative that English and American troops arrive in Denmark and in Norway before the Russians are able to make a surprise move. Under any circumstances it must certainly be considered significant that according to Swedish sources Mrs. KOLLONTAI, before leaving for Russia, made it clear to the Swedes that the Soviet Union did not intend any intervention of Swedish troops or volunteer corps in Norway. The warning coupled with this advice has considerably dampened the relish over the coming German defeat in informed Swedish circles. Count BERGMAN's well known conferences in Berlin are not without connection to the above mentioned matters of the Swedish Government.

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3. No new points are discernible in the preliminary work for the San Francisco THE WORLD CONFERENCE. The different interpretation by Russia and the United States SECURITY of the Veto Rights of the main powers constitutes only one example of the QUESTION. fact that obviously the Conference cannot produce a more secure peace that each of the major powers is willing to guarantee. It can also be seen unmistakably that the American Foreign Minister STETTINIUS IS VERY SERIOUSLY pursuing the idea of creating a genuine World Security Organization and that he is trying to avoid the mistakes of the Geneva institution. However, it is possible to find only a partially fitting formula with which the Anglosaxon and the Soviet Russian concepts of the common political shaping of the world can be brought to a common denominator.

CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION IN ENGLAND

4. In the weeks since the Yalta conference the impression has gained ground in the English conservative circles that the continental balance of power as desired by England will not be reconstituted as the final result of the European war. Rather, England is again facing a superior land-power whose unequivocal aim is to control the entire European continent.

The Poland debate in the Commons (1 and 2 March 1945) is not only important for the fact that 25 conservative representatives voted against the Government and that 40 were abstained from voting. Rather more significant is the fact that very influential exponents within the Conservative Party, mostly members of the 1922 Committee subjected EDEN's foreign policy to a criticism on fundamental points. Conservative circles view with apprehension how the Soviet Union is expanding its sphere of influence westward, while at the same time also disrupted plans prepared last fall for a closer alliance of the Western European states under English leadership (Background to the surprise invitation of de Gaulle in Moscow in November 1944 and conclusion of the Franco-Soviet pact). These British conservative circles, therefore, are working to gather all those forces in Europe that oppose total subjugation of the Continent under a Soviet predominance. The Vatican fills an important function in this question. Without playing a political part of his own, it serves to mobilize all those forces in Europe that do not desire to have the Continent conquered by Communism.

At present it is hardly possible any more to effect a change in the German policy towards the Church as proposed from the beginning in the Spaatz reports. Nevertheless it would have been of importance for the future of the German people if before the final military defeat there would have been at least an attempt towards a settlement with the Church.

From clerical circles in Northern Italy we have been informed reliably that no satisfactory result has come out of the conferences which the democratic political group conducted, on ROOSEVELT's behalf, in the Vatican as well as in Moscow. The bishops in Northern Italy have been quite explicit about their anti-Communist convictions, whereas it took demonstrations of the Catholic bishops in London and, beginning of March, a very noteworthy address of the archbishop of Westminster (leader of the catholic church of England) to take the Communist question as an issue to reiterate the incompatibility of bolshevist principles and methods on the one side and the doctrines of the Church on the other.

A certain reaction has been noticed in the United States to those discussions in the leading circles and in the European conservative camp. It may be surmised, however, that ROOSEVELT's government, also revamped along conservative lines, will not take this development with a great deal more attention than heretofore. One cannot expect American initiative along these lines as long

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as Far Eastern questions remain unsettled. The above statements must be somewhat tempered by the fact that the conservative forces in England are of an essentially reactionary character. Thus their efforts are restricted by certain limitations since the English people as a whole are undoubtedly longing for a government considerably more progressive on social issues. In fact, a social remodeling during the period after the war has to be expected in England which in the end will create institutions not very dissimilar from those that had been created in Germany up to the outbreak of the war. It may be assumed that the Soviet observers, in their exact analysis, have already recognized this weakness of the conservatives in England and in Western Europe. Therefore it is to be expected that in Germany the Soviets will very soon spread anti-capitalist slogans with veiled anti-British and even anti-American allusions.

EAST.

5. Not, it is also confirmed in Japanese circles in Berlin, that Tokio expects the Soviet-Japanese treaty of 1941 denounced on April 14 1945. The Soviet Union intends no doubt to maintain a free hand towards Japan in the same manner she did with Turkey. Furthermore the denouncing of the treaty is a friendly gesture towards the United States. Thus the policy is continued upon which Stalin embarked with his anti-Japanese references on 7 November 1944. Immediately after Yalta the American press has sought to create the impression that Russian participation in the war against Japan, immediately after the German defeat, were a definite conclusion. This will not be the case, however, according to Japanese interpretation. There is reason to assume that the Japanese are very informed of the actual intentions of the Russians, despite Stalin's policy of detente with Japan. Lately the German Embassy in Tokio has confirmed Japanese efforts to replace the KOISO government, as has already been reported several weeks ago. It can be expected that the next Japanese government will be formed from a circle of friends around the person of Prince KONO. Court, military and capital are intent on forming a government of transition that would be itself to negotiating a compromise peace with the United States because of its internal political groupings it seems that Ambassador OSHIMA has been kept posted up on these endeavours.

The impression emerges that Japanese court circles are prepared to return all conquests made since 1941. Since, for the time being, these circles are trying to use Russia as intermediary, they may intend to make considerable concessions to the Soviet Union in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. On the other side the appointment of Ambassador GREW as Undersecretary of State has been commented upon in Japan as indicating that even in the most intimate circles of America's political leaders, no final decisions have been taken as yet whether the Pacific war should really be continued until unconditional surrender has been attained. In this connection it is noteworthy that neither Hitler nor in Berlin serious consternation over STALIN's publicized policy of arrangement has been displayed. Japanese opinion has, on the other hand, read political significance into temporary stoppages of Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union in connection with the latter's Far-Eastern policy. Regardless of the validity of Japanese conjectures, it is firmly established that the Soviet Union has no interest in a total defeat of Japan. One should rather draw a parallel between the Russo-Japanese conferences in recent weeks in Moscow and General UGAKI's attempts to reach an accord with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK. The Japanese are prepared to make considerable concessions to the Russians in China should they succeed in attaining a compromise between Japan, China and the Soviet Union. The Japanese believe that on that basis peace with the United States could be considered. In that case, however, neither Japan nor the United States would wield decisive influence in China, but Russia. As yet it cannot be

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determined to what extent STALIN has already implemented those lines of thought. The Russian tactics in Far Eastern policy are summed up in an attitude of not letting the parties concerned know in advance what her actual intentions in the Far East actually are. Thus they are able to maintain their key position, a position they have undoubtedly attained in the Far East at present, for as long a period as possible and in all directions.

... parleys with CHIANG wound down, so did CHIANG's conference with the Yenan-Communists. CHIANG is anxious not to let himself be tied down by commitment to a definite attitude. The reforming of the Cabinet after the Stillwell-crisis is of no fundamental importance, since both the Minister of War and the Chief of General Staff have remained in office, and since the brothers SOONG still remain the Generalissimo's closest advisers.

In conclusion, the following picture presents itself:

Soviet and American interests in China were running parallel for a while. Both major powers desired a compromise of CHIANG with Yenan, though prompted by different motives. The Soviets expected from such a solution the founding of a wider basis for the Communist party in China; the Americans hope that with the Yenan compromise the best Chinese divisions will become available for the war against Japan after withdrawal from the Channel zone. In reality CHIANG has crossed Russian intentions by not embarking upon serious negotiations either with Yenan or with the Japanese. He has therewith taken up closer relations with the Americans in spite of his known intentions. Moscow has countered by broadcasting intensified attacks against CHIANG in Chinese language, as reported by our monitoring service. The conclusion can be drawn that the Russo-American community of interests is only of a temporary nature. Two possibilities emerge:

... totally defeated. In that case the Soviet Union will undoubtedly fully claim Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, but she will also retain a certain considerable influence in China. According to Japanese reports the newly built large scale Siberian industries were already planned and equipped in such a way that later they would be able to cater to the export trade in the Chinese, Manchurian and Korean markets. The staffs of these are in possession of documentary proof that already during the course of the war the Soviet Union has reconverted a part of its Siberian industries for similar tasks, because, thanks to American lend-lease aid, they did not have to keep their own war production at a maximum pitch.

The Soviet Union will have no interest in the Pacific booty, islands and former Netherlands' possessions. The nucleus of the whole problem will rather be the allocation of future spheres of interest in the Chinese mainland. In the (popular) anti-communist propaganda the mention that Yenan territory according to all sources appears to be better and more firmly controlled than in Chungking controlled territory, has been completely omitted. The towering personality of Generalissimo CHIANG has been completely affected by conditions in Chunkin - there is considerably less sympathy in Yenan - that, once Japan has collapsed - an internal dispute in China itself appears unavoidable. In that event the Soviet Union will try to consolidate her sphere of influence, which will be here quite considerably, and will find herself confronted by American intentions in China of an entirely different nature. From this point of view, much more than the European one, one has to consider the tactics and the attitude of the Soviet Union in questions of world security that were posed at the conference in San Francisco.

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2. The second and lesser possibility would be a Soviet sponsored compromise arrangement between the United States and Japan. This would be, in a sense, the inverse of the policy of Portsmouth. And in the same way as the Americans understood to take advantage of their part as honest brokers to consolidate in a most decisive manner their influence in the Far East, the Russians would undoubtedly follow identical intentions in this case.

In both cases it is unavoidable that in years to come the center of gravity of Soviet politics will be shifted in the direction of East Asia. This will happen regardless of developments in Europe, already started and best defined in Lenin's famous saying that the war was Europe.

6. From the German point of view the most immediate concern is that with the impending defeat a change of the German people will become unavoidable. Even if a reasonable conformity of methods in the Eastern and in the Western zone of occupation can be expected, there will in the long run certainly be no compromise on basic fundamentals of government. At the present moment it is too late for a policy of action. It is deemed important that the certainly disastrous Werwolf romanticism be done away with, inasmuch as the position of the German people can only be worsened by such actions, is of further importance to drop any illusions regarding an imminent American-Soviet conflict, for reasons that have been developed above. Even regarding the fact that similar hypotheses are in contradiction to reality, it is quite clear that such a conflict would not be in the interest of the German people. Should it actually break out, many millions of Germans would soon die of hunger. Furthermore Germany would become a battlefield. If at present moment it is at all possible to consider the future, then everything should be undertaken on the German side that would tend to postpone the outbreak of such a conflict. The dividing up of the German people signifies furthermore that sooner or later every single German will have to take sides either for the principles of the East or of the West. It is already evident now that as a consequence of the many bombing attacks which have rendered many millions of Germans hopeless and destitute the ground for a communist undercurrent has been much better prepared, than would appear to the casual observer. The German people have become atomized to an extent that no longer will there be a class of highest social intellectual level, nor a group of men capable of assuming leadership. As far as can be recognized up to the present, the Western powers do not oppose the 'penetration bolshevique' with anything but a reeducation program. It promises to be of little effect if at the same time the vast majority of the German people will gain the conviction that in the end only their bare existence seems to be guaranteed.

THE  
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BY ODE USAINSCOM FOI/PO  
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30 June 1945.

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SUBJECT: EGDMONT DESIGNS.  
SOURCE: SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. HOETTL, Group VI B, RSHA.

In order to form a correct estimate of the role assigned to the Egmont reports at a time when Germany's military defeat had become a foregone conclusion, one must abstract their "political intelligence" trappings and the circumstances of their origin with the intelligence service of the RSHA. The Egmont reports were no mere "Lageberichte"; but political acts of an order usually prepared at the highest level of policy-making agencies. If they emanated from the German Foreign Office, they would have passed the routine surveys designed to keep the Foreign Minister posted and to enable him to make up his mind what to do next. What lifts the Egmont reports out of the ordinary is the fact that in publishing them and lining up behind their findings and recommendations the authority of men like SCHELLERBERG, ALBERT ZUMMER AND HIMMLER, the RSHA arrogated to itself policy-making functions in the field of foreign policy which by rights belong to the German Foreign Office.

WIRSING instinctively felt that behind the ostensible purpose of the Egmont reports, viz. to draw an unvarnished picture of Germany's national predicament, hid a more sinister objective linking their purpose with the person of HIMMLER. Most probably SCHELLERBERG will be able to shed light on the connections between the Egmont reports and HIMMLER's political aspirations. Dr. HOETTL, one of the best informed functionaries of Amt VI, believes that SCHELLERBERG's primary aim in putting out the Egmont reports was to inculcate in HIMMLER the belief that he was the man of the hour and that HITLER had to go.

Paras 3 and 4 omitted, in part.

.....In respect to frequent requests for special treatment of certain French, Dutch and Belgian individuals, HIMMLER showed unbounded solicitude and in a great many instances authorized their repatriation via the Red Cross. In these matters also ALBERT ZUMMER took a hand, e.g. in meetings with the President of the International Red Cross, Prof. DUNKHARDT, in March 1945, with Prince BERNADOTTE whom he introduced to HIMMLER, and in connection with the deliverance of a sizable number of Jews into the hands of the Swiss through Dandearot MÜSI. SCHELLERBERG also took a decisive share in this policy of 'preparing the ground'. It is generally assumed that it was he who induced HIMMLER to launch his offer of surrender through Count BERNADOTTE. Another prominent member of HIMMLER's faction was SS-Obergruppenführer BERGER, who had been slated to conduct the levee en masse in the West and who, during the final stages of the war, was given plenary powers in Southern Germany.

5. In this connection also the military ambitions of HIMMLER should be noted. Dr. HOETTL does not agree with Dr. WIRSING to the extent that HIMMLER's assignment to command the southern sector of Army Group G (Oberrhein) was a mere device on the part of HITLER, who wanted to shelve him because of his strong views on foreign affairs. Quite on the contrary, HIMMLER had been coveting military responsibility all along, because he believed himself to have the makings of a great strategist, especially after his undoubted success in stemming the rout of the beaten German armies across the Rhine in September 1944.

6. The sum total of the above-mentioned indications points to the existence of a very specific program aiming at HITLER's overthrow and HIMMLER'S accession to power. As seen in this context the Egmont reports may be considered a blueprint of Germany's foreign policy in case such a change in government should have taken place. Aside from their properties as an interesting piece of reportage they will find their place in the backstage struggle for power between two of the greatest gangsters the world has ever seen.

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER  
APO 757

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COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE  
FINAL INTERROGATION REPORT (CIFIR) NO 33

PRISONER: Stabaf WIRSING, Giselher  
Ehrenamtlicher Mitarbeiter NSMA

DATE: 2 October 1945

Giselher WIRSING, political writer and editor, was unofficial  
adviser to Otto ABEZ during the occupation of France and later became the  
political aide and advisor of SCHELLENBERG.

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MEMORANDUM  
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER  
APO 707

25-1594/17-98

15 December 1945

Subject: Prisoner Günther Wirting, SS Stabaf

Re: FIAT, AFM5 Munich, WEHR, APO 757, U.S. Army

1. Prisoner SS Stabaf Günther Wirting is transferred to Berlin for further interrogation, especially on journalism and press.

2. Stabaf Wirting was previously interrogated in Third Army I.C. and at this Center, and was taken on a 3-week trip across the US occupation zone. He wrote 80 page report about this trip which is not translated.

3. Stabaf Wirting's past includes the writing of the anti-U.S. book "My Faceless Nemesis". He believes that we do not know that he also was one of the main contributors to the German Army newspaper "Signal".

4. Stabaf Wirting's family lives at Schweinfurt. His mistress Mrs. Gerda Pöschgen lives at Bad Nauheim, (upper Hesse) Hesse am Main.

5. Stabaf Wirting tried to hide a number of important facts from his interrogator and has never been completely broken, although he may appear cooperative, at first. He attempted illegal communication with the outside.

6. Stabaf Wirting is one of the most dangerous Nazis in U.S. custody. On one side he considers the Americans degenerate and nihilistic; on the other, he strongly believes in a German nationalistic socialism.

7. He claims to have worked toward Hitler's abdication or dismissal. But actually, he attempted to have Himmler replace Hitler.

8. It is of utmost importance that SS Stabaf Wirting be interned for a long time both as an automatic arrest and as a security threat.

For the Use of Interrogation Group

*Samuel J. McLean*

SAMUEL J. McLEAN  
Major, MG  
Executive

*Erld*

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UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER  
APO 757

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE  
FINAL INTERROGATION REPORT (CIFIR) NO 32

PRISONER: Stubaf WIRSING, Gieselher  
Ehrenamtlicher Mitarbeiter RSHA

DATE: 2 October 1945

Gieselher WIRSING, political writer and editor, was unofficial  
adviser to Otto ABEETZ during the occupation of France and later became the  
political aide and adviser of SCHELLERBERG.

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BY CDR USAINSCOM FOUPO  
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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Institut für Zeitgeschichte  
D-1708

1. REFERENCES

Report Dr Gieselher WIRSING, HQ 3rd US Army IC, dtd 23 Jul 45.

2. PERSONAL DATA

- 29-159417-100
- a. SURNAME: WIRSING
  - b. CHRISTIAN NAME(S): Gieselher
  - c. ALIASES: none
  - d. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 15 Apr 07
  - e. NATIONALITY CLAIMED: German
  - f. OCCUPATION: Writer (political and educational)
  - g. RELIGION: Protestant
  - h. DESCRIPTION:

- (1) HEIGHT: 1.69 m
- (2) BUILD: Stocky
- (3) FACE: Round
- (4) HAIR: Blond

1. LAST PERMANENT ADDRESS: BERLIN, Sigismundcorso 63

j. LANGUAGES: German, English, French, Spanish

k. FATHER: Friedrich (76)

l. MOTHER: Pauline, nee KARUS (72)

m. BROTHERS: None

n. SISTERS: ZIMMER, Elizabeth (45)

o. WIFE (or FIANCEE) Ellen, nee POESLER (39) KUESSEN Hauptstr 52

p. CHILDREN: 2 daughters, Maria (19) and ...

q. IDENTITY DOCUMENTS: Wehrpass

3. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

- a. SOURCE OF PRISONER, INCLUDING ARRESTING AGENCY: Arrested at BAD NOLLZ by CIC Det 303.
- b. ACCEPTED ON RECOMMENDATION OR REQUEST OF: G-2 (CIB) USFET
- c. DATE OF ARRIVAL: 25 Jul 45

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15 Aug 45

- e. RESULTS OF NAME CHECK AGAINST PERSONALITY CARD INDEX: OPI Buff Cards 60429-60430.
- f. BRIEFS UPON WHICH PRISONER WAS INTERROGATED: UK Base C. War Room UK 48756 dtd 14 Aug 45.
- g. NAME(S) AND UNIT OF INTERROGATOR(S): T/A WEISLER, USJET HIS Center
- h. PRISONER'S ATTITUDE AND REACTIONS: Co-operative
- i. EVALUATION OF PRISONER'S RELIABILITY: Reliable
- j. DATE, PLACE AND AUTHORITY FOR DISPOSITION OF PRISONER: Prisoner is being held for possible reinterrogation.
- k. This report is in reply to brief mentioned under (f) above.

4. INTERROGATION RESULTS

25-758417-107

a. Introduction

Wiselher WIRSING is a writer on foreign affairs and gained prominence in Germany as editor of Die Tat, XX Jahrhundert, and MUNCHENER Neueste Nachrichten. His search for material carried him to the United States (1938), France, Spain, and the Balkans. In September 1944 he was drafted by SCHELLENBERG, head of Amt VI RSHA, as his advisor, and from that time until March 1945 wrote periodical reports known as the EGHOFF Reports. These were sent only to HITLER and a few of his closest advisers and were meant to present a true picture of the international situation.

b. WIRSING's Trips to Spain

WIRSING's two trips to Spain had nothing to do with OIS activities. In July 1943 he spent two weeks in Spain gathering material for three articles, one on the Escorial, one on the Prado, and the third on Spain's position in the international picture. The articles showed Spain to be pursuing a course of neutrality which favored neither the Allies nor Germany. In May 1944 WIRSING spent another two weeks in Spain doing research for an article on Hieronimus BOSCH, the 15th century painter. The article which he subsequently wrote pointed out certain political analogies and presented Nazi ideologues in a favorable light.

It should be noted that WIRSING was a personal friend of DICKHOFF, then German Ambassador to Spain, who was recalled to Germany in August 1944 because it was suspected that he had something to do with the 20th of July affair.

c. Source of Material for the EGHOTT Reports

WIRSING says that the material he received from SCHELLENBERG for incorporation in the EGHOTT Reports did not mention the source of information. WIRSING thinks that approx 40% of all the information came from Sweden, 30% from Switzerland, and the rest from Spain and Portugal. There was some Front Aufklarung information in the material he received but, being of a military nature, it could not be used in the EGHOTT Reports, which were supposed to be of a purely political nature.

5. CONCLUSIONS

None

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a. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

WIRSING is a proponent of Nazi ideologies and used his journalistic ability to support and spread the Nazi movement. He is considered a security threat. He is in the automatic arrest category as a result of having held the rank of SS Stubaf.

For the Commanding Officers:

*Leroy Vogel*  
LEROY VOGEL  
Captain, Inf  
CI Section

427

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~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER  
SCI/CIB G-2 DIVISION  
APO 757

#1708

ZS-759417-702

15 August 1945

TO : Chief, CIB, G-2, USFET  
SUBJECT : Special Interrogation of SS-Sturmabfuhrer WIRSING.

1) Attached is a copy of a report on a meeting between WIRSING and SCHELLENBERG at the end of April 1945. This report is based on a special interrogation of WIRSING for which the brief was prepared on 1 July 1945, by Mr. Reginald PHELPS, then of SCI, 12th Army Group, and describes the circumstances behind the final dissolution of Amt VI of the REHA.

*Andrew H. Bering*  
ANDREW H. BERLING  
Lt. Colonel, A.C.  
Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS  
US FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER  
INTERROGATION CENTER  
300 5th St  
WASH DC

1708

PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION REPORT (PIR) NO 46

PRISONER: R/Staf Dr WIRSING, Gieseler,  
Editor of "XX Jahrhundert"

DATE: 8 August 1945

1. PERSONAL DATA

Gieseler WIRSING was born in SCHWEINFURT 15 Apr 07. He studied at MUNICHEN, SCHWABENBERG, BERNLIN, and HEIDELBERG, working at the same time as co-editor and publisher of "Die Tat". From 1930 until 1932 he was a student at the University of HEIDELBERG. Summer 1932 he went to BERLIN to study at the University, where he remained until end of 1933. During this period he did free-lance newspaper writing and published the book "Taschen Europa". The following is a summary of his subsequent career as an author and editor.

- 1933 Joined the staff of "Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten"
- 1934 Editor-in-chief
- 1938 Spent four months in the United States. In Nov joined the Allgemeine SS
- 1940 Joined the NSDAP
- 1942 Published "Der Masslose Kontinent", a book which described his experiences in the United States. Drafted into the German Army, served in Central Russia and the Caucasus as a war reporter with rank of Lt. In Dec contracted gonorrhea. Sent to hospital in WEINAR
- 1943 unfit for active service. Political writer for "Die Tat". Later editor-in-chief of "XX Jahrhundert". Made several trips to Spain with ambassador WIEKHOF.
- Apr 44 Published his philosophical work: "Das Zeitalter des Irrsinn". War reporter in PARIS attached to the chief intelligence officer Oberst WYER-DITTING. Met ANSEL. SCHELLENBERG asked him to write a series of reports on the world political situation. WIRSING asked whether it would be possible to convince the Wehrmacht that further prosecution of the war would be senseless. SCHELLENBERG admitted that he was of the same opinion but doubted that the Führer could be convinced. It was decided that the reports, later known as the "Secret Reports" should be designed to influence the Führer. WIRSING continued the work until shortly before the surrender. He was not a member of Art VI and was not paid for the work.
- Spring 45 Consulted with SCHELLENBERG about a surrender to the Western Allies. Nothing came of this effort.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

WIRSING was arrested and interrogated by G-2 Det 303. He arrived at USPET Interrogation Center on 25 Jul 45 and was accepted at the request of G-2 (CIB) USPET. An arrest report dtd 6 Jun 45 and 3 US Army Int Can Letter dtd 23 Jul 45 accompanied prisoner. Cf SHAEF Buff Cards 60429 and 60430.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**  
S. KIRKMAN, Chief of the German Foreign Office  
of Headquarters and Propaganda in Germany  
of Headquarters of the German Foreign Office

**INTERROGATION PLAN**  
No interrogation is contemplated unless special briefs are received.

**COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**  
US Army and Gen will publish reports on the "Agent Reports" and  
KIRSING's mission in connection with German surrender overture.  
KIRSING agrees that he had very little to do with the SS and that  
his main interest in life was his profession. He says that he was not  
a member of SS and prepared the "Agent Reports" as a personal favor to  
SCHELENBERG. He finds the expression of sincerity although he may be  
concealing the truth about his activities in the Allgemeine SS.

The recipients of this report are requested to submit special briefs  
of any subjects upon which this prisoner should be interrogated and to in-  
dicate the desired distribution of the resultant report.  
For Colonel PHILP:

*Robert T. Longstreth*  
ROBERT T. LONGSTRETH,  
Major, Infantry,  
CI Section.

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Vernennung des Glaslher Wirsing  
am 10. Dezember 1947  
durch Dr. R. M. W. Kampfer.  
Assistent: Miss Jane Lester, Res. Analyst,  
Stenografien: Miss Carl.

Institut f. Zeitgeschichte  
München  
ARCHIV  
1948 156

Es erscheint aus der Haft vorgeführt Glaslher Wirsing,  
geb. am 15. 4. 1907 in Schweinfurt / Main.

Fr. Ist das Ihr richtiger Name?

A. Ja.

Fr. Und Ihre Nachnamen?

A. Ich habe keine.

Fr. Haben Sie nie welche benutzt?

A. Nein.

Fr. Nie? Ich glaube, doch.

A. Einmal in einer Broschüre.

Fr. Und?

A. Unter Pseudonym.

Fr. In welcher Broschüre haben Sie ein Pseudonym gebraucht?

A. In einer Broschüre unter Stalin habe ich es gebraucht. Das war, glaube ich, das einzige Mal.

Fr. Ich glaube nicht. Ich frage Sie, haben Sie noch andere Namen benutzt?

A. Ich kann mich nicht erinnern.

Fr. Sie müssen schwören, dass Sie die reine Wahrheit sagen, nichts verschweigen und nichts hinzufügen werden. Wollen Sie das?

A. Ja.

Fr. Sie schwören das?

A. Ja.

Fr. Sind Sie verheiratet?

A. Ja.

~~Fr. Und?~~

Fr. Mit wem?

A. Mit Ellen Wirsing, geb. Neudler.

Fr. Wieviel Kinder haben Sie?

Fr. Wo wohnt Ihre Gattin?

A. Sie wohnt in Haiminfur/Hsin, Alte Bahnhofs-Straße 27.

Fr. Ihre Kinder auch?

A. Ja.

Fr. Und wo sind die heryakommen?

A. Ich bin von Lager Hsuehsung gekommen.

Fr. Und wie lange sind Sie im Lager?

A. In Hsuehsung bin ich nur kurz.

Fr. Und was ist Ihr Haftgrund?

A. Mein Haftgrund? Automatischer Arrest, weil ich bei der SS war.

Fr. Was waren Sie?

A. Ich war SS-Strichwarenfabrikant, Schreibarbeit.

Fr. Hat Ihnen jemand gesagt, es ist nur eine Ermahnung, als Sie SS-Führer wurden? Ist Ihnen das gesagt worden? Sagen hätten Sie sich nicht um die SS zu kümmern brauchen?

A. Ja.

Fr. Wer hat Ihnen das gesagt?

A. Der Obersteine.

Fr. Was war der Zweck der Ermahnungen?

A. Das passierte nach der Münchener Konferenz. Sie sagten, ich musste eine Uniform tragen.

Fr. Wem wurde Ihnen eine so hohe Ehre gesagt?

A. Das war H. K. eine Persönlichkeit, wie es in allen Heften war.

Fr. Weil Sie ein Freund des Regimes waren. Waren Sie es oder nicht?

A. Ich glaube, dass ich mich als Freund nur in einer ganz bestimmten Periode bezeichnen kann.

Fr. Sie sind nicht Angeklagter hier.

A. Ich weiss.

Fr. Welches war die Periode?

A. Das war die Zeit zwischen 1936 und 1938.

Fr. Und die Festigkeit, die Sie später für das Dritte Reich ausgeübt haben, war das eine Festigkeit, die mit Ihrer Freundschaft zum Regime im Gegensatz stand?

A. Ich war Hauptschriftleiter der Münchener Neuesten Nachrichten bis Ende 1941, habe mich dann zur Wehrmacht gemeldet, war ein Jahr in Russland.

Fr. Als Soldat?

A. Ja.

Fr. In welcher Eigenschaft?

A. Ich war beim Stab eines Panzerkorps. ~~der Wehrmacht~~

Fr. Als Propagandakommandant?

A. Bei einer Propagandakompanie.

Fr. Lockhaft. Wenn man sagt, man hat sich gemeldet, wenn man eine Propagandatätigkeit in Feindesland ausübt. Wann waren Sie in Russland?

A. Ich war in Russland von April 1942 bis Dezember.

Fr. Das war gerade in der Zeit, als die Nordischen verkommen?

A. Davon habe ich an der Stelle, an der ich war, nichts bemerken können.

Fr. Sie wussten, dass Leute in Ostern umgebracht wurden, was Leben können?

A. Das passierte in dieser Form nicht.

Fr. Wie wussten Sie?

A. Dass in Russland eine für unser Gefühl unmögliche Unterdrückungspolitik geübt worden ist, gegen die ich mich im August 1942 in einer sehr ausführlichen Denkschrift gewandt habe.

Fr. Wo ist die Denkschrift?

A. Ich habe sie leider nicht mehr.

Fr. Wer hat die?

A. Sie hat Generalleutnant Fialdorer (?).

Fr. Wo ist der?

A. Er lebt in Garmisch-Partenkirchen.

Fr. In wem haben Sie sie geschickt?

A. Ich habe sie geschickt fuer General Heinrich, bzw. fuer den Stab der 1. Armee.

Fr. Welcher Heinrich? Der später in amerikanische Gefangenschaft kam?

A. Das weiss ich nicht.

Fr. Wo lebt er?

A. Das weiss ich nicht. Ich habe ihn nicht mehr gesehen. Diese Denkschrift entstand in enger Zusammenarbeit mit General Sebnal, später Militärbefehlshaber in Prag. Der schickte sie an Admiral von Troth.

Fr. Gebörten Sie zu dem Klub von Trotz?

A. Ja, seit Anfang 1943.

Fr. War er noch drin?

A. Ich hatte ersten Kontakt mit Trotz und einem etwas Lockeren vorher mit Keltus, mit Henbach und Hierondorf.

Fr. Das sind alles Tote, es klingt unglaubwürdig. Wer gehört noch zu den Lebenden?

A. Die einzige, die über mein Verhältnis weiss, ist Frau von Trotz.

Fr. Wo wohnt sie jetzt?

A. Sie wohnt in Hansen, in der Nähe von Bohra.

Fr. Hat Sie es Ihnen schon bestatigt?

A. Ja. Sie hat es mir eingeweiht bestatigt.

Fr. Wie ist ihre genaue Adresse?

A. Ihre Adresse ist: Imhusen bei Bohra.

Fr. Wir werden die Dame herbiten. - Wann haben Sie Ihre Propagandataetigkeit gegen die Vereinigten Staaten angefangen?

A. Ich habe das Ihnen wohlbekannte Buch ueber Amerika geschrieben.

Fr. Ja. Das ist nicht das einzige? Mit welchen amerikanischen Agenten standen Sie in Verbindung?

A. Ich war in Verbindung mit amerikanischen Agenten.

Fr. Mit welchen deutschen Agenten?

A. Im wesentlichen hatte ich mit Botschafter Dieckhoff Verbindung.

Fr. Mit deutschen Agenten?

A. Uebersetzt nicht. Es bestand Verbindung von Dieckhoff zu dem Ihnen wohlbekannten Viereck, der eine Reihe von Sachen aus Amerika geschickt hat.

Fr. Sie haben doch Korrespondenz gehabt mit Viereck. Ich will Ihnen mal etwas sagen, so unterhalte ich mich nicht mit Ihnen, das mache ich nicht. Dazu habe ich keine Zeit. Wenn Sie Lust haben, sich mit mir zu unterhalten, schreiben Sie. Sie koennen Sie jemand, der Ihr Leben kennt, Ihre Agenten usw. Nachrichten erschieben wollen. Sie sagen unter Eid, Sie hatten keine Verbindungen, wir wissen genau, dass Sie mit Viereck Verbindung hatten.

A. Ich habe gesagt, ich hatte mit Viereck Verbindung.

Fr. Sie haben erst gesagt, Sie haben keine Verbindung.

A. Ich wollte eben ausfuehren, dass ich mit Dieckhoff gewissen Material von Viereck bekommen habe.

Fr. Sie haben doch Material geliefert, Ihre Broschüren und all diese Geschichten. Sie wissen doch, dass die Adresse der Kuzneherer Heusenber Nachrichten fuer weitere Sachen gebraucht wurde. Viereck ist nicht der einzige. Wenn Ihr Gedächtnis schlecht ist, sagen Sie es. Es ist die letzte Gelegenheit

A. Ich bin ja gern bereit.

Fr. So unterhalte ich mich nicht mit Ihnen. Das nimmt mir die Zeit. Erzählen Sie alles runter, reinigen Sie Ihre Seele von Schmutz. Das ist besser. Ihre ganzen Verbindungen mit der AD.

A. Mit der AD. habe ich sicherlich keine Verbindung.

Fr. Kennen Sie Bohle?

A. Ich habe ihn erstmals in Oberursel gesehen.

Fr. Kennen Sie Herrn Ehrlich?

A. Ich habe ihn fuer ein paar Wochen in Lager wieder gesehen.

Fr. Haben Sie nie mit einem von der AD. gesprochen?

A. Das kann ich nicht sagen.

Fr. Aber ich kann es Ihnen sagen. Es war eine Rollenverteilung. Auf der einen Seite war die AD. und auf der anderen Seite war Viereck. So geht es nicht.

A. In der AD. hatte ich keine Beziehungen.

Fr. Haben Sie mal einen Atlas gemacht?

A. Ja, zusammen mit Albrecht H. ....

Fr. Was war der Zweck dieses Atlas?

A. Er war eine Darstellung der damaligen Weltverhältnisse.

Fr. Es war eine Propagandasache. Also, erzählen Sie die ganze Affäre.

Fr. Welche Affäre?

Fr. Ihre ganze Tätigkeit fuer das Dritte Reich. Von A bis Z. Schreiben Sie sie auf und schicken Sie sie mir. Dann werde ich sehen, ob es Wert hat. So hat es keinen Zweck. Ihre ganze Tätigkeit auf dem Gebiet der auswärtigen Politik, die Sie fuer das Dritte Reich entfaltet haben. Wann sind Sie das erste Mal mit auswärtiger Politik in Berührung gekommen? Was waren Sie 1937?

A. Ich war Schriftsteller in Berlin.

Fr. Fuer wen?

A. Fuer die "Deutsche Rundschau" und habe "Die Tat" herausgegeben.

Fr. Ja. Wann sind Sie der Partei beigetreten?

A. Ich bin 1940 in die Partei eingetreten.

Fr. Wann sind Sie NS-Führer geworden?

A. Ich bin Ende 1933 NS-Führer geworden.

Fr. SA?

A. Überhaupt nicht.

Fr. Wann sind Sie der Schriftstellervergewerkschaft von Goebbels beigetreten?

A. Gleich im Anfang.

Fr. Haben Sie in Heidelberg studiert?

A. Ja.

Fr. Was haben Sie 1934 und 1935 gemacht?

A. 1933 war ich in Berlin als freier Schriftsteller. Im Winter 1933/1934 bin ich nach München und habe an den Münchener Neuesten Nachrichten mitgearbeitet.

Fr. Wann sind Sie Chefredakteur geworden?

A. Ich wurde Chefredakteur im Jahre 1935.

Fr. Wann ist es Ihnen zum ersten Mal zum Bewusstsein gekommen, dass das Dritte Reich Krieg macht?

A. Die Situation am Martinstag 1938 war so, dass man grobste Bedenken haben musste, von Prag .....

Fr. Da war es Ihnen klar?

A. Ich hoffte, dass sich die Geschichte vermeiden lässt.

Fr. Wenn Sie sagen, "vermeiden", meinen Sie, dass die Polen und Tschechen auf alles eingehen sollten?

A. Dass die Leute, Hitler, nicht so wahnwitzig sein würden.

Fr. Es wäre Ihnen unangenehm gewesen, wenn die anderen einlenkten. Wann wussten Sie das erste Mal, dass die Politik so war: "Und bist du nicht willig, dann brauch ich Gewalt"?

A. Die ersten ganz schweren Bedenken sind mir gekommen bei der Besetzung von Prag. Das war fuer unter Gefuehl der eigentliche Stundenfall, weil man von nun ab nicht mehr glauben konnte.

Fr. Konnten Sie noch trennen nach dem 30. Juni?

A. Ich bin selbst mit grosser Muehe dem Tode entkommen.

Fr. Warum Sie, auf der einen Seite sind Sie dem Tode entkommen und auf der anderen Seite .....

A. Es gab eine Zeit, 1936 bis 1938, in der ich hoffte, dass sich die Dinge etwas vernünftiger entwickeln.

Fr. Hatten er einmal das Nordsee eingefangen hatte? 1933, 1934 usw., Kristallwoche. War das eine vermessungsfähige Basis?

A. Kristallwoche im November. Da fingen unsere Soldaten an. Ich kann nicht leugnen, dass es eine bestimmte Periode gab, wo ich glaube, die Woche geht mit den Basis nicht so schlecht, wie wir befürchteten.

Fr. Wer waren Ihre Freunde? Haben Sie mit denen gesprochen?

A. Friedel Zimmermann.

Fr. Sie haben Zimmermann gesprochen?

A. Er hat mir geschrieben.

Fr. Zimmermann ist viel offener. Er hatte mir als Marschen erwählt.

A. Ich erwählte keine Marschen.

Fr. Wenn Sie glauben, dass Sie noch das Dritte Reich verteidigen wollen, sagen Sie, ich will mich nicht unterhalten. Gut.

A. Das ist nicht meine Auffassung.

Fr. Es hängt über es raus. Also, überlegen Sie das ganze und schildern Sie Ihre Eindrücke. Sie können nicht auf der einen Seite erwählen, von der Kristallwoche kamen ihnen Befürchtungen und auf der anderen Seite, Sie haben es nicht gemacht.

A. Ich habe gesagt, ich habe es nicht in dem Masse erfahren. Ich glaube nicht, dass der Kommandierende General und Chef des Stabes das gemacht hat.

Fr. Sie haben nur Ausschnitte gesehen?

A. Ja.

Fr. Haben Sie an Dietrichs Pressekonferenzen teilgenommen?

A. Sehr selten. Ich hatte in Berlin Vertreter. Ich war sehr selten dort.

Fr. Warum?

A. Dietrich war eine Entscheidung, mit der ich nichts zu tun haben wollte.

Fr. Schön gut. Überlegen Sie. Lassen Sie sich die ganzen Dinge durch den Kopf gehen. Entweder ist es richtig, dass Sie mit Admiral Trott zu Solz verkehrt haben und gegen die Leute inniglich waren und dass Sie Berichte nach Berlin geschrieben haben, weil die Dinge so graushaft waren. Wenn es so ist, schön, gut. Das müssen Sie erwählen. Oder war es nicht so? Sie können nicht beides verneinen.

A. Ich möchte sagen, ich habe einige Formalisierungen mitverstanden, ich möchte keineswegs den Eindruck erwählen, als ob ich in den Jahren in einer bestimmten Linie verankert bin. Ich habe einen doppelten Bruch gehabt in meiner Entwicklung. Das muss ich sagen.

Fr. Das erste Mal?

A. Ende 1936. Als ich damals zu der Ansicht kam, nachdem ich diesen sehr schweren Schock in Verbindung mit Krusen am 30. Juni hatte, wird man es vielleicht mit Hitler doch gehen, Flottenabkommen mit England, so dauerte bis .....

Fr. Bis Prag?

A. Nein, nicht so lange. Sie erreichten den Kristalltag. Ich habe mit meinen Freunden .....

Fr. Das war Ihr erster Schock am 30. Juni 1936?

A. Ja wohl.

Fr. Ihr zweiter grosser Schock?

A. Mein zweiter grosser Schock war im November 1938 in der Kristallnacht.

Fr. Und der dritte grosse Schock ausserpolitisch?

A. Das war Prag.

Fr. Und trotzdem hatten Sie noch Verbindung mit Viereck usw.?

A. Die Verbindung Viereck lag aus dem Jahre 1936. Sie werden sagen, ich schneidete diese Verbindung, es war keine wichtige Verbindung fuer mich.

Fr. Bis dahin fuer heute. Sie ersuchten mich: "Was ich an der Politik Hitlers als verbrecherisch sah". Leitartikel fuer die Neuesten Nachrichten.

A. Ich will offen sagen, wie die Dinge sich entwickelt haben.

Fr. Sagen Sie es.

A. Was ich später gemacht habe, ich habe die grossen Risiken getragen.

Fr. Was war Ihr Rang bei der NSD?

A. Ich war Stabschefstabschef.

Interrogator: .....  
Dr. H. M. W. Kasper

Witness: .....  
Miss Jane Lester

Typographer: .....  
Juno Karl

ZS-1594/17-173

Beschaffungskorr. Dr. Maier  
u. US-Stellen betr. Wirsing

(Dokumente jeweils anhängend  
an entspr. Schreiben)

Institut für Zeitgeschichte ARCHIV	
Akt. 9284/01	Best. ZS 1594
Rep.	Kat.



25-75947-114

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND  
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

August 9, 1995

FOI/Privacy Office

Dr. Dieter Maier  
Severusstr. 87  
60439 Frankfurt  
Germany

Dear Dr. Maier:

References:

a. Your June 30, 1995 letter, requesting records concerning Giselher Wirshing under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

b. Our July 20, 1995 letter, advising that due to the volume of records located concerning Wirshing, we were unable to meet the statutory 10-day time limit in responding to your request, and providing you with your appeal rights.

We have located the enclosed Army records concerning Giselher Wirshing as responsive to your request. We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12356. As a result of this review, information has been sanitized from these records and 282 pages of records are denied in their entirety as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.1(a)(2), 1.1(a)(3), 1.3(a)(3), and 1.3(a)(4) of EO 12356. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1). It is not possible to segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release.

*Protest G. G.*  
*1 Brief/FOIA. PRO*

Section 1.1(a)(2) of EO 12356 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.1(a)(3) of EO 12356 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 1.3(a)(3) of EO 12356 provides that information pertaining to foreign government information shall be considered for classification protection.

Section 1.3(a)(4) of EO 12356 provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, sources, or methods shall be considered for classification protection.

Information has also been deleted from these records would reveal the identity of a confidential source and sensitive intelligence methods, it is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D) and Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(E). The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of (1) confidential sources and (2) sensitive investigative methodologies.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should

forward it to this office for necessary processing so that it reaches the appellate authority no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. Your appeal will then be processed to the appellate authority. After the 60-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts.

We are coordinating with another government agency concerning the releasability of their information contained in the Army records. We will inform you as to the releasability of the information upon completion of our coordination.

Fees incurred in processing this request fall below the fee waiver threshold and are waived. you have any questions regarding this action, please contact Ms. Galbreath at (301) 677-4742/ 4743. Please refer to case #946F-95.

Sincerely,

*for Robert Stone*  
William E. Pearce  
Chief  
Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

Enclosure



25-155411-177

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

MP DIETER MAIER  
HEIDELBERG HIGH SCHOOL  
CMR 419  
BOX 1619  
APO, AE 09102

Washington, D.C. 20535

Request No. 402361  
RE: WIRSING, GISELHER

SEP 15 1995

Dear Requester:

- This acknowledges your Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request submitted to the FBI.
- Based on the limited information you provided, we cannot make an accurate search of our records. Please furnish your complete name, alias, date and place of birth, prior addresses, employment, and any specific data that would permit us to locate the documents you seek.
- We ask that you provide your notarized signature or, in lieu of a notarized signature, you may submit a declaration pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1746. This procedure is designed to insure that documents, if located, are released only to an individual having right of access to the information.
- If you want a search of our Criminal Justice Information System records for any arrest record that might pertain to you, please comply with the enclosed instructions set forth in Attorney General Order 556-73. Fingerprint impressions are needed for comparison with records in the Criminal Justice Information System to insure that an individual's record is not disseminated to an unauthorized person.
- We are currently searching the indices to our central records system files at FBI Headquarters for any documents which may pertain to your request. Upon completion of this search you will be notified of the results.
- Provide the complete name, date and place of birth for the subject of your request. If subject is deceased, give date of death and any proof of death you have.
- The large number of FOIPA requests received by the FBI has caused delay in processing your request(s). We solicit your understanding and assure you that we will process your request(s) in due course.

Your request has been assigned the number indicated above. Please use this number in all correspondence with us.

Sincerely yours,

*J. Kevin O'Brien*

Chief  
Freedom of Information-  
Privacy Acts Section  
Information Resources Division

Enclosure



25-158417-798  
U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535

OCT 11 1995

AIRMAIL

Mr. Dieter Maier  
Heidelberg High School  
CMR 419  
Box 1619  
APO, AE 09102

Request No. 402361

Re: Giselher Wirsing

Dear Requester:

This is in further reference to your Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request.

We have located documents which may pertain to your request and will assign them for processing.

The FBI has over 200 employees assigned full time to comply with the disclosure provisions of the FOIPA. Despite this commitment, a significant increase in the number of requests received has strained our resources and resulted in a tremendous backlog of requests awaiting review. At the end of August, 1995, our total requests on hand in various stages of processing numbered over 14,500. These requests will require the review of an estimated 5.2 million pages.

In fairness to our thousands of requesters, we handle requests based on approximate order of receipt consistent with sound administrative practices. In view of the large volume of requests on hand, delays in excess of two years are not uncommon.

In order to reduce unnecessary correspondence, we will notify you only after the processing of your request has been partially or fully completed. Thank you for your anticipated patience and cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

J. Kevin O'Brien, Chief  
Freedom of Information-  
Privacy Acts Section  
Information Resources Division



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND  
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

25-7594/1-775

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

October 13, 1995

*dieft Wiring  
Uin!*

FOI/Privacy Office

Mr. Dieter Maier  
Severusstr. 87  
D 60439 Frankfurt am Main  
Germany

Dear Mr. Maier:

This is response to your letter of September 9, 1995, appealing the denial of information as specified in our August 9, 1995 letter. Your letter was received in this office on October 11, 1995.

Your appeal has been forwarded to the Department of the Army, Office of the General Counsel (OGC), for appropriate action and direct reply to you. For your information, the address is:

Department of the Army  
Office of the General Counsel  
Washington, DC 20310

If you have any further questions regarding this action, please contact Mr. Fisher at (301)677-4502. Please refer to case # 1374F-95.

Sincerely,

*William E. Pearce*  
William E. Pearce  
Chief  
Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

Copies Furnished:

OGC  
DAMI-CIS(L)

Institut für Angelegenheiten

ES-159417-720

United States Department of State  
Office of Freedom of Information,  
Privacy, & Classification Review  
Washington, D.C. 20520-1512

January 25, 1996

Dieter Maier  
Severusstr. 87  
D 60339 Frankfurt Am Main  
Federal Republic Of Germany

Case Number 9600181


Dear Requester:

On January 16, 1996, we received your correspondence in which you requested Department of State records.

The above noted case number has been assigned to your request for purposes of identification and control.

You will soon be receiving a more detailed acknowledgement letter which will address issues presented in your request.

Sincerely,



Rosemary Melendy, Chief  
Initial Processing Branch  
Office of Freedom of Information  
Privacy and Classification Review

Institut für Zeitgeschichte - Archiv



75-759417-727  
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dieter Maier  
Severusstr. 87  
D 60339 Frankfurt am Main  
Federal Republic of Germany

JAN 29 1996

Request Number 9600181

Dear Sir/Madam:

Thank you for your letter of August 19, 1995 in which you requested:

documents pertaining to Giselher Wirsing

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*with report of  
draft National  
Archives  
re:in*

The following information may explain certain boundaries of the Department's search for documents in response to Freedom of Information Act requests.

The cut-off date for retrieving documents is the date of the requester's letter. Accordingly, no documents which originated after the date of your letter will be retrieved.

Only existing documents are subject to the Freedom of Information Act. The Act does not provide for the creation of documents, compilation of data, preparation of lists, analyses of events, etc.

- [ ] We have begun to process your request based upon the information provided in your letter. As soon as responsive material has been retrieved and reviewed, we will notify you.
- [xx] Before we can proceed, we need the additional information requested in the marked paragraph(s) in Section A and/or B. (We attempted to reach you by phone on \_\_\_\_\_ to discuss the need for this information). We will hold your request open for ninety (90) days from the date of this letter pending receipt of the requested information.
- [xx] Please review the fee information provided in Section C.

SECTION B


**Information to Identify Records:** The Department of State is responsible for formulating and executing U.S. foreign policy and primarily maintains records dealing with U.S. foreign relations. The Department may maintain records about private individuals generally when individuals have had contact with it. For example, applications for U.S. passports and visas to enter the U.S., records on consular assistance given to U.S. citizens abroad, employment records, etc. The Department is comprised of hundreds of offices and overseas posts, so requesters should be specific about the records they seek.

(X) Please provide the information described in the paragraphs marked below regarding individuals about whom you have requested information:

- ( ) date and place of birth (include city and state)
- ( ) complete spellings of the name, and any other names or aliases by which the individual has been known
- (X) circumstances which lead you to believe the records exist, such as the date of the event which led to their creation; type of records created; subject matter of the records; country or countries concerned; and offices or consulates originating or receiving the records
- ( ) citizenship status (U.S. citizen, permanent resident alien of the U.S., or other)
- ( ) (for visa records) provide the location of the U.S. consulate where application was made; type (immigrant or non-immigrant); whether granted or denied; date of issuance or denial

**Third Party Requests:** The FOIA and Privacy Act restrict access to Federal records concerning private individuals by unauthorized third parties. In general, access to information about private individuals cannot be given to unauthorized third parties under the provisions of these laws absent the individual's written consent. The Department requires that written consent be in the form of a signed notarized statement from the individual, authorizing the Department of State to release the information to the other party. The statement should bear the original signature of the individual and original seal of the notary, and be dated within six months of the date of the request. In lieu of notarization, the individual may declare, certify, verify or state, under penalty of perjury, that the authorization attested to is correct (if inside the U.S.); or declare, certify, verify, or state, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the foregoing is true and correct (if outside the U.S.).

- ( ) For living individuals, provide written consent (see paragraph above), or tell us that none will be forthcoming. Requests can be processed without consent, but access may be limited as a result.
- ( ) For deceased individuals, provide proof of death, e.g., newspaper obituary, or copy of a death certificate, or tell us that none will not be forthcoming. Requests can be processed without such proof, but access may be limited as a result.



[X] SECTION C

The Freedom of Information Act permits Federal agencies to collect fees to recover the costs of processing requests, unless a fee waiver has been granted or the charges fall below a certain amount. The following marked paragraphs address these issues.

- [ ] Your request for a fee waiver has been granted.
- [ ] Your request for a fee waiver has been denied. Should you wish to appeal this decision, you may write to: Peter Sheils, Chief, Requests Management Division, at the address indicated below. Your appeal should address the points listed in the enclosed sheet entitled "Requests for Fee Waivers."
- [X] You have stated your willingness to pay the fees associated with the processing of this request. \$ 50.00
- [X] Based upon the information that you have provided, this request will be processed in accordance with the fee schedule designated for the following category of requesters. (See Subsection 171.14 of the enclosed Rules and Regulations).
  - [ ] commercial use requesters
  - [ ] educational institutions
  - [ ] non-commercial scientific institutions
  - [ ] representatives of the news media
  - [X] all other requesters

The Department's search and review fees are:

Administrative/Clerical	\$8.00/hour
Professional	\$17.00/hour
Executive	\$30.00/hour

- [ ] You have indicated your inclusion in a category different from the one above. Please provide the information asked on the attached sheet entitled "Requester Categories" to substantiate your inclusion in a particular category of requester.
- [ ] Before I can make a decision about your request for a fee waiver, I will need additional information as noted in the attached sheet entitled "Requests for Fee Waivers."
- [ ] Your request for a fee waiver is being reviewed. We will notify you as soon as a decision has been made.

[ 4 ]

[ ] The Material that you seek pre-dates 1964. Generally, Department of State documents which fall within this time period are in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration. To request access to documents responsive to your request, please write to: Clarence F. Lyons, Jr., Chief; Archives II Reference Branch; National Archives at College Park; 8601 Adelphi Road; College Park, MD 20740-6001.

[ ] The material that you requested appears to have been originated by another agency. Please contact the Freedom of Information staff of that agency at the following address:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

If you have any questions regarding your request, you may write to the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy and Classification Review, Room 1512, Department of State, 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20520-1512, or telephone: (202) 647-6070. Please be sure to refer to your request number in all correspondence pertaining to this request.

Sincerely,

*Rosemary C. Melendy*

Rosemary Melendy, Chief  
Initial Processing and Control Branch  
Office of Freedom of Information,  
Privacy and Classification Review

Enclosure(s):

- Rules and Regulations
- Request for Fee Waivers
- Requester Categories

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## 22 CFR Part 171

## Freedom of Information; Revision of Fees, Fee Waiver Policy, and the Law Enforcement Exemption

AGENCY: Department of State.

ACTION: Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** This rule implements certain provisions of the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99-370) regarding fees, fee waivers, and law enforcement records. It codifies the circumstances under which expeditious processing of FOIA requests will be provided. Expeditious processing has been recognized in custom and practice

since 1963 in accordance with Department of Justice guidance. The rule also revises the general fee schedule applicable to all requests under the FOIA, Privacy Act, Ethics in Government Act, and Executive Order 12356 as provided in Part 171.

**EFFECTIVE DATE:** September 23, 1987.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Frank M. Machak, Information and Privacy Coordinator, (202) 647-7740.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99-370) amended the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) by modifying the terms of exemption 7 and by supplying new provisions relating to the charging and waiving of fees. The Reform Act specifically required the Office of Management and Budget to develop and issue a schedule of fees and guidelines, pursuant to notice and comment, which OMB did on January 16. After consideration of comments received, OMB issued the final publication of fee schedule and guidelines implementing certain provisions of the Reform Act on March 27 (52 FR 10012). In addition to the OMB guidelines, the Department of Justice provided agencies with advisory fee waiver policy guidance regarding the Reform Act in keeping with its statutory responsibility to encourage compliance with the FOIA. This guidance was distributed to all agency heads in a memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Markman on April 2, 1987. Finally, based on administrative practice and judicial precedent, the Department of Justice developed guidelines for agencies to use in considering request for expedition of FOIA requests. Since this guidance reflects prior practice, the Department is codifying it in its rules at this time.

On April 20, 1987 (52 FR 12936) the Department published a proposed rule to implement the foregoing with an abbreviated comment period closing on April 23. In view of the considerable public interest and short public comment period, on April 29 (52 FR 15513) the Department issued an amendment to its notice of proposed rulemaking in order to extend the public comment period to May 20, thereby allowing a full thirty (30) days from the date of the original publication.

The Department received numerous comments regarding the proposed rules from the public including professional societies or public interest groups affiliated with the news media, a Member of Congress, and special interest groups or organizations. A variety of Department officials—attorneys, program managers, and information officers—gave careful consideration to all comments submitted. Most of the commentators focused on the Department's reliance on OMB's implementing Fee Schedule and Guidelines and on Justice's guidance; the short public comment period (which subsequently was lengthened to a full thirty days); the definitions of the "commercial use request," "educational institution," "noncommercial scientific institution," and "representative of the news media," including "freelance" journalists; and certain paragraphs regarding administrative requirements within the section pertaining to "Categories of Requesters for Fee Purposes" (§ 171.14). The final rule incorporates the changes deemed appropriate as a result of extensive review and consideration of the public comments received. In addition to editorial changes, the substantive revisions have been made to the provisions regarding the definition of "commercial use request"; the requirement regarding the affiliation between "freelance" journalists and a news organization; and the deletion of requirements regarding requesters' providing extensive information concerning themselves via a visa their eligibility for inclusion in non-commercial categories and the statement of verification (§ 171.14, proposed paragraphs (e) and (f)); and a change in the language regarding the impact on future requests (§ 171.14, proposed paragraph (g), revised paragraph (e)).

This rule does not constitute a "major rule" within the meaning of executive Order 12291. This rule is not subject to the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 through 611) since it will not exert a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This rule does not contain a collection of information for purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35).

Donald J. Bouchard,

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Administration.

## List of Subjects in 22 CFR Part 171

Administrative practice and procedure, Classified information, Freedom of information, Privacy.

For the reasons set forth in the preamble, portions of Title 22, Chapter I, Subchapter R of the Code of Federal Regulations, are amended as set forth below:

## PART 171—AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION AND RECORDS TO THE PUBLIC

1. The authority citation of Part 171 is revised to read as follows and the authority citations following the sections in Part 171 are removed:

Authority: Sec. 3, Administrative Procedure Act, as amended (Pub. L. 89-473, Stat. 250); The Freedom of Information Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. 552); the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a); E.O. 12333; the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (Pub. L. 95-625); 22 U.S.C. 2656 and 2628; and the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99-370).

2. Section 171-6 is revised to read as follows:

## § 171.6 Fees—General.

(a) The Department will charge a duplication fee of \$25 per page for copies of documents which are identified and made available to an individual pursuant to a request except that there will be no charge for requests involving costs of \$10.00 or less.

(b) The Department will charge the actual cost of production for copies prepared by computer (such as tapes or printouts), including operator time.

(c) The Department will charge the actual direct costs of producing the document(s) for methods of reproduction or duplication other than those described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section.

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(d) In those cases when estimated duplication charges are likely to exceed \$25, the Department shall notify requesters of the estimated amount of fees, unless they have indicated in advance their willingness to pay fees as high as those anticipated. Such notice shall offer requesters the opportunity to confer with Department personnel with the objective of reformulating requests to meet their needs at lower costs.

(e) Certification under the official seal that a copy or extract made from an official document is a true copy; the fee for certifying each copy of each page is \$2.00.

(f) The Department shall charge the actual costs for sending documents by special methods such as express mails, etc. when such is requested.

(g) Remittances shall be in the form of either a personal check or bank draft drawn on a bank in the United States, a postal money order, or cash. Remittance shall be made payable to the order of the Treasurer of the United States and delivered or mailed to the Information and Privacy Coordinator, Foreign Affairs Information Management Center, Room 1238, Department of State, 2201 C Street, NW., Washington, DC, 20520. The

Department will assume no responsibility for cash sent by mail.

(h) Fees must be paid in full prior to release of requested documents and/or provision of service described above.

(i) A receipt for fees paid will be given only upon request.

(j) See § 171.13 for additional fees chargeable for Freedom of Information requests.

3. Section 171.10 is amended by adding paragraphs (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), and (k) to read as follows:

§ 171.10 Definitions.

(d) The term "direct costs" means those expenditures which the Department actually incurs in searching for and duplicating (and in the case of commercial requesters, reviewing) documents to respond to a FOIA request. Direct costs include, for example, the salary of the employee performing work (the basic rate of pay for the employee plus 15 percent of that rate to cover benefits) and the cost of operating duplicating machinery. Not included in direct costs are overhead expenses such as costs of space, and heating or lighting the facility in which the records are stored.

(e) The term "search" includes all time spent looking for identifying and retrieving material that is responsive to a request, including page-by-page or line-by-line identification of material within documents. The Department will attempt to ensure that searching for material is done in the most efficient and least expensive manner so as to minimize costs for both the Department and the requester. For example, the Department will not engage in line-by-line search when merely duplicating an entire document would prove the less expensive and quicker method of complying with a request. "Search" should be distinguished, moreover, from "review" of material in order to determine whether the material is exempt from disclosure (see paragraph (g) of this section). Searches may be done manually or by computer using existing programming.

(f) The term "duplication" refers to the process of making a copy of a document necessary to respond to a FOIA request. Such copies can take the form of paper copy, microform, audio-visual materials, or machine readable documentation (e.g., magnetic tape or disk), among others.

(g) The term "review" refers to the process of examining documents located to determine whether any portion of any document located is permitted to be withheld. It also includes processing any documents for disclosure, e.g., doing all that is necessary to excise them and otherwise prepare them for release. Review does not include time spent resolving general, legal or policy issues regarding the application of exemptions.

(h) The term "commercial use request" refers to a request from or on behalf of one who requests for information for a use or purpose that furthers the commercial, trade or profit interest of the requester or the person on whose behalf the request is made. In determining whether a requester belongs within this category, the Department will look at the use to which the requester will make of the documents requested.

(i) The term "educational institution" refers to a preschool, a public or private elementary or secondary school, an institution of graduate higher education, an institution of undergraduate higher education, an institution of professional education, and an institution of vocational education, which operates a program or programs of scholarly research.

(j) The term "non-commercial scientific institution" refers to an institution that is not operated on a "commercial" basis as that term is referenced in paragraph (h) of this section, and which is operated solely for the purpose of conducting scientific research, the results of which are not intended to promote any particular product or industry.

(k) The term "representative of the news media" refers to any person actively gathering news for an entity that is organized and operated to publish or broadcast news to the public. The term "news" means information that is about current events or that would be of current interest to the public. Examples of news media entities include television or radio stations broadcasting to the public at large, and publishers of periodicals (but only in those instances when they can qualify as disseminators of "news") who make their products available for purchase or subscription by the general public. These examples are not meant to be all-inclusive. Moreover, as to methods of news delivery (e.g., electronic dissemination of newspapers through telecommunications services), such alternative media would be included in this category. In the case of "freelance" journalists, they may be regarded as working for a news organization if they can demonstrate a likelihood of publication through that organization, even though not actually employed by it. Likelihood of publication can be demonstrated through, for example, a publication contract or past publication record.

Similarly, the absence of a publication record, especially where the requester has previously received records from the Department as a "representative of the news media" will be taken into account in determining the likelihood of publication.

4. Section 171.31 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(7) to read as follows:

§ 171.31 Exemptions.

- (a) \* \* \*
- (7) Records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information—
- (i) Could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings;
  - (ii) Would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication;
  - (iii) Could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

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(iv) Could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source;

(v) Would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law; or

(vi) Could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.

3. Section 171.12 is revised to read as follows:

**§ 171.12 Time limits.**

(a) Whenever possible, the Department will furnish the requested records within 10 days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) of receipt of the request by the Information and Privacy Coordinator, except as cited in § 171.6 of this subchapter.

(b) The Department will consider requests for expeditious handling whenever the requester can demonstrate one of the following:

(1) An individual's life or personal safety would be jeopardized by the failure to process a request immediately.

(2) Substantial due process rights of the requester would be impaired by the failure to process immediately, and the information sought is not otherwise available.

8. Section 171.13 is revised to read as follows:

**§ 171.13 Fees.**

(a) In addition to fees cited in § 171.8, the following shall be applicable with respect to services rendered to members of the public under this subchapter:

(1) The following is the range of categories and average grade levels for employees within each category who perform the search and review functions involved in responding to a FOIA request:

(i) Administrative/clerical (to include GS-1 through GS-4 or FS-4): GS-4/1 or FS-4/1.

(ii) Professional (to include GS-6 through GS-13 or FS-3 through FS-13): GS-11/5 or FS-4/4.

(iii) Executive (to include GS-14 through SES or FS-2 through SFS): GS-15/1 or FS-1/1.

(2) The salary rates for these categories will be calculated based on the rates published on the "Department of State Salary Chart" effective at the time that the function was actually performed; copies of this chart are available in the Public Reading Room. The actual fee schedule for each category will be included in the Department's acknowledgment letter.

(3) The costs for manual search include the salary of the category of the employee who actually performed the search function (as provided in paragraph (a)(1) of this section) above plus an additional 10 percent of that rate to cover benefits.

(4) The cost for computer searches will be calculated based on the salary of the category of the employee who actually performed the computer search (as provided in paragraph (a)(1) of this section) plus 10 percent of that rate to cover benefits, in addition to the direct costs of the central processing unit, input-output devices, and memory capacity of the actual computer configuration.

(5) Only requesters who are seeking documents for commercial use will be charged for time spent reviewing records to determine whether they are exempt from mandatory disclosure. The cost for review will be calculated based on the salary of the category of the employee who actually performed the review (as provided in paragraph (a)(1) of this section) plus 10 percent of the rate to cover benefits. Charges will be assessed only for the initial review (i.e., review undertaken the first time in order to analyze the applicability of specific exemption(s) to a particular record or portion of a record) and not for review at the administrative appeal level of the exemption(s) already applied.

(6) If records requested under this subpart are stored elsewhere than the headquarters of the Department of State at 2201 C Street, NW, Washington, DC, the special cost of returning such records to the headquarters shall be included in the search costs. These costs will be computed at the actual costs of transportation of either a person or the requested record between the place where the record is stored and Department headquarters when, for time or other reasons, it is not feasible to rely on Government mail service or diplomatic pouch.

(7) When a specific fee has been established for a service, or the request for a service does not fall under one of the above categories due to the amount or size or type thereof, the Information and Privacy Coordinator is authorized to establish an appropriate fee, pursuant to the criteria established in Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-25, entitled "User Charges."

(b) Where it is anticipated that the fees chargeable under this subpart will amount to more than \$25 and the requester has not indicated in advance her/his willingness to pay fees as high as anticipated, the requester shall be promptly notified of the amount of the anticipated fees or such portion thereof as can readily be estimated. The notice or request for an advance deposit shall extend an offer to the requester to confer with knowledgeable Departmental personnel in an attempt to reformulate the request in a manner which will reduce the fees and meet the needs of the requester. Dispatch of such a notice or request shall suspend the running of the period for response by the Department until a reply is received from the requester.

(c) Search costs are due and payable even if the record which was requested cannot be located after all reasonable efforts have been made, or if the Department determines that a record which has been requested, but which is exempt from disclosure under this subpart is to be withheld.

(d) The Department will begin assessing interest charges on an unpaid bill starting the 31st day following the day on which the billing was sent. The accrual of interest will be based upon receipt of the fee, rather than upon its processing by the Department. Interest will be at the rate prescribed in section 3717 of Title 31 U.S.C.

(e) A requester may not file multiple requests at the same time, each seeking portions of a document or documents, solely in order to avoid payment of fees. When the Department reasonably believes that a requester or a group of requesters acting in concert is attempting to break a request down into a series of requests for the purpose of evading the assessment of fees, the Department will aggregate any such requests and charge accordingly.

(f) The Department will not require a requester to make an advance payment, i.e., payment before work is commenced or continued on a request, unless:

(1) The Department estimates or determines that allowable charges that a requester may be required to pay are likely to exceed \$250. Then, the Department will notify the requester of the likely cost and obtain satisfactory assurance of full payment where the requester has a history of prompt payment of FOIA fees, or require an advance payment of an amount up to the full estimated charges in the case of requesters with no history of payment; or

(2) Requesters who have previously failed to pay fees charged in a timely fashion (i.e., within 30 days of the date of the billing), the Department will require such requesters to pay the full amount owed plus any applicable interest as provided above or demonstrate that they have, in fact, paid the fee, and to make an advance payment of the full amount of the estimated fee before the agency begins to process new requests or pending requests from such requesters. When the Department acts under paragraph (f)(1) or (2) of this section, the administrative time limit prescribed in subsection (a)(6) of the FOIA (i.e., 10 working days from receipt of usual requests plus permissible extensions of that time limit) will begin only after the Department has received payments described above.

(g) In accordance with the provisions and authorities of the Debt Collection Act of 1982 (Pub. L. 97-363), the Department reserves the right to disclose information to consumer reporting agencies and to use collection agencies, where appropriate, to encourage repayment.

F. Section 171.14 is added to read as follows:

§ 171.14 Categories of requesters for fee purposes.

There are four categories of requesters: commercial use requesters; educational and non-commercial scientific institutions; representatives of the news media; and all other requesters. The Act prescribes specific levels of fees for each of these categories. The Department will take into account information provided by requesters in determining their eligibility for inclusion in one of these categories as defined in § 171.14. It is in the requester's best interest to provide as much information as possible to demonstrate inclusion within a non-commercial category of fee treatment.

(a) The Department will assess charges which recover the full direct costs of searching for, reviewing for release, and duplicating the records sought for commercial use. Commercial use requesters are entitled to neither two hours of free search time nor 100 free pages of reproduction of documents.

(b) The Department will provide documents to educational and non-commercial scientific institutions for the cost of reproduction alone, excluding charges for the first 100 pages. To be eligible for inclusion in this category, requesters must show that the request being made is authorized by, and under the auspices of, a qualifying institution and that the records are not sought for a commercial use, but are sought in furtherance of scholarly (if the request is from an educational institution) or scientific (if the request is from a non-commercial scientific institution) research.

(c) The Department will provide documents to representatives of the news media for the cost of reproduction alone, excluding charges for the first 100 pages. To be eligible for inclusion in this category, a requester must meet the criteria in § 171.10(k), and the request must not be made for a commercial use. In reference to this class of requesters, a request for records supporting the news dissemination function of the requester shall not be considered to be a request that is for a commercial use.

(d) The Department will charge requesters who do not fit into any of the categories above fees which recover the full reasonable direct cost of searching for and reproducing records that are responsive to the request, except that the first 100 pages of reproduction and the first two hours of search time shall be furnished without charge. Moreover, requests from record subjects for records about themselves will continue to be treated under the fee provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 which permit fees only for reproduction.

(e) In making determinations under this section, the Department may take into account whether requesters who previously were granted (b), (c), or (d) status did in fact use the requested records for purposes compatible with the status accorded them.

G. Section 171.15 is added to read as follows:

§ 171.15 Fee waivers and appeals.

(a) Waiver or reduction of any fee provided for in § 171.14 and 171.13 may be made upon a determination by the Chief of the Request Processing Section, Room 1238, Department of State, 2201 C Street, NW, Washington, DC 20520. The Department shall furnish documents without charge or at a reduced charge provided that: Disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government, and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester. Requests for a waiver or reduction of fees shall be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(1) In order to determine whether disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government, the Department will consider the following four factors:

(i) The subject of the request: Whether the subject of the requested records concerns the operations or activities of the government;

(ii) The informative value of the information to be disclosed: Whether the disclosure is likely to contribute to an understanding of government operations or activities;

(iii) The contribution to an understanding of the subject by the general public likely to result from disclosure: Whether disclosure of the requested information will contribute to public understanding; and

(iv) The significance of the contribution to public understanding: Whether the disclosure is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of government operations or activities.

(2) In order to determine whether disclosure of the information is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester, the Department will consider the following two factors:

(i) The existence and magnitude of a commercial interest: Whether the requester has a commercial interest that would be furthered by the requested disclosure; and, if so

(ii) The primary interest in disclosure: Whether the magnitude of the identified commercial interest of the requester is sufficiently large, in comparison with the public interest in disclosure, that

disclosure is primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.

(b) The Department will not consider waiver or reduction of fees for requesters (persons or organizations) from whom unpaid fees remain due to the Department for another information access request.

(c) (1) The Department's decision to refuse to waive or reduce fees as requested under paragraph (a) of this section may be appealed to the Chief of the Information Access Branch, Room 1238, Department of State, 2201 C Street, NW, Washington, DC 20520. Appeals should contain as much information and documentation as possible to support the request for a waiver or reduction of fees.

(2) Appeals will be reviewed by the Information Access Branch Chief who may consult with other officials of the Department as appropriate. The requester will be notified within thirty working days from the date on which the Department received the appeal.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND  
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

25-759417-729

June 5, 1998

Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

Dr. Dieter Maier  
Severusstrasse 87  
D 60439 Frankfurt  
Germany

Dear Dr. Maier:

Reference is made to our letter of August 9, 1995, forwarding Army records to you in response to your Freedom of Information Act request concerning Giselher Wirshing.

As noted in our letter, information in the records originating with another government agency was deleted. As also noted in our letter, the release of this information was being coordinated with the agency concerned and we would inform you of their decision.

Coordination has been completed with the Central Intelligence Agency and we have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order 12958. As a result of this review, it has been determined that the information in the records no longer warrants classification protection and is releasable to you (Enclosure). Fees for processing this request are waived.

If you have any questions regarding this action, please feel free to contact Mrs. Benear at (301) 677-3942. Please refer to case #1540F-98.

Sincerely,

*Russell A. Nichols*  
Russell A. Nichols  
Chief, Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

Enclosure



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND  
UNIT 30400, Box 1000  
APO AE 09128

June 23, 1998

25-1594/7-130

Manpower, Personnel and  
Administration Directorate

Mr. Dieter Maier  
Severusstr. 87  
D60439 Frankfurt  
FRG


Dear Mr. Maier:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act request of August 29, 1995, as referred to our office by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, concerning information on Giselher Wirsing. Our office received your request on June 10, 1998. The document referred to our headquarters for review and release is not under our cognizance. It has been referred to Headquarters, United States Army Europe and 7th Army, for action and direct reply to you. If you desire to contact that agency direct, their address is:

Headquarters, United States Army Europe & 7th Army  
Attn: AEAIM-SM-RA (Mr. Labonte)  
Unit 29351  
APO AE 09014

There's no charge for this service.

Sincerely,

  
SUSAN M. MEYER  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army  
Adjutant General

HQ USEUCOM/ECJ1-AXR (FOIA)  
Geb 2302  
Zimmer Numer 121  
PATCH BARRACKS  
70569. STUTTGART, GE



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Einwurf-  
Einschreiben

Übergabe-  
Einschreiben  
(Recommandé)

Eigenhändig  
(À remettre en  
main propre)

OK 912-688-300

Nachnahme  
(Remboursement)

Rückschein  
(Avis de réception)

MR. DIETER MAIER  
SEVERUSSTR. 87  
D60439 FRANKFURT  
FRG

25-15847-157  
BY THE DEPT OF DEFENSE  
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID FOR  
THE DEPT OF DEFENSE  
FOI EHT JSC AND AGTASC



Institut für Zeitgeschichte - Archiv



U.S. Department of Justice

25-759417-732

quitting

Executive Office for United States Attorneys  
Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Unit  
600 E Street, N.W., Room 7100  
Washington, D.C. 20530  
202-616-6757 Fax 202-616-6478

AUG 10 1998

Requester: DIETER MAIER Request Number: 98-1509-R

Government Component that referred material:  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Dear Requester:

This is in reply to your Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act request of June 4, 1998. Records were referred to us by the government component above for direct response to you.

The referred material has been considered under both the FOIA and the Privacy Act to provide you the greatest degree of access. Exemptions have been applied when deemed appropriate either for withholding records in full or for excising certain information. The exemptions cited are marked below. An enclosure to this letter explains the exemptions in more detail.

5 U.S.C. §552

5 U.S.C. §552a

- |  |   |   |                                  |
|--|---|---|----------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b) (1)       | <input type="checkbox"/> (b) (4)            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b) (7) (C) | <input type="checkbox"/> (j) (2) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b) (2)       | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b) (5) | <input type="checkbox"/> (b) (7) (D)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (k) (2) |
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|  | <input type="checkbox"/> (b) (7) (A)        | <input type="checkbox"/> (b) (7) (F)            | <input type="checkbox"/> _____   |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> (b) (7) (B)        |   | <input type="checkbox"/> _____   |

We have reviewed 8 page(s) of material; 0 are being released in full, 3 released in part, and 5 denied. If there is something additional we need to tell you, a continuation page will be enclosed. This is the final action my office will take.

You may appeal my decision to withhold records in this matter by writing within 30 days, to:

Office of Information and Privacy  
United States Department of Justice  
Flag Building, Suite 570  
Washington, D.C. 20530


Both the envelope and the letter of appeal must be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act Appeal."

Institut für... Rechte

-2-

After the appeal has been decided, you may have judicial review by filing a complaint in the United States District Court for the judicial district in which you reside or have your principal place of business; the judicial district in which the requested records are located; or in the District of Columbia.

Sincerely,



Bonnie L. Gay  
Attorney-in-Charge  
FOIA/PA Unit

Enclosure(s)

Institut für Zeitgeschichte Archiv

**EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS****SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552**

- (b) (1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
- (b) (2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b) (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b) (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b) (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b) (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b) (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life of physical safety of any individual;
- (b) (8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b) (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

**SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a**

- (d) (5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j) (2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals, except records of arrest;
- (1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12356 in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k) (2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k) (3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k) (4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k) (5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his identity would be held in confidence;
- (k) (6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k) (7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his identity would be held in confidence.

RECEIVED  
RIP Referred

67-7850-1008

Mr. O. John Rogge  
Special Assistant to the Attorney General

April 9, 1946

John Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

UNITED STATES vs.

EX 740

b7C (per FBI)

1254

RIP Referred

Reference is made to your communication of March 15, 1946, in which you furnished a list of fifty individuals whom you intend to interrogate while you are in Germany and other European countries.

RIP Referred

The first portion of identifiable information concerning these individuals was furnished to you by letter of March 26, 1946. A second portion of identifiable information concerning a second group of these individuals was furnished to you by letter dated March 28, 1946. The third and last portion of this information is enclosed herewith concerning the following individuals in separate memorandum form in accordance with your request.

(per FBI) b7C

Dr. Haeber Wirsing

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-24-97 BY SP3/BJH/rw  
402,361

GEJ:aop

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
RECORDED  
INDEXED  
APR 2 1946  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

30

58 APR 18 1946

b7C (per FBI)

RIP

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM : O. John Rogge, Special Assistant to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: United States v.

DATE: March 15, 1946  
146-28-106  
OJR:ms

b7c (per FBI)

I am attaching herewith a copy of a list of names of individuals whom I intend to interrogate in Germany and other European countries in connection with the above-captioned case.

I would greatly appreciate it if you could furnish me any information in your files which may be of assistance to me in my interrogation of these people. I am particularly interested in the factual background of these people, as well as their activities in the field of propaganda while in this country. Any details of specific connections they had with people in this country would be of extremely valuable assistance to me.

I am also attaching copies of a list of the defendants in the 7c case about whom I specifically wish to question the people in Germany. In this connection, my staff is making a complete review of the 7c and 7c files and exhibits for connections with the names in the first list mentioned above. Therefore, you need not include 7c or 7c in your check for connections with those on the list.

In submitting this matter, please include all information concerning each individual whom I intend to interview on a separate sheet of paper, furnishing as many copies as can be easily typed.

In view of my early departure on this mission, I would appreciate it if you make this information available to me no later than March 26th.

*Handwritten notes:*  
Rogge 3/28/46  
3-26-46  
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3-1-46

Enclosure  
No. 536073

EX-105

FBI  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-24-97 BY SR381/rw

402,361

*Signature:* O. John Rogge

RECORDED

61-7850-100

19 APR 5 1946

b7c (per FBI)

RIP  
b5, 7c

*Handwritten initials:* [Signature]

Institut

7C

Dr. Giselhel Wirsing (1911-1944)

Munich. Possibly held in Oberursel

7C

RIP  
7C

Institut für Zeitgeschichte - Archiv



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND  
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

Z S-158411-738

August 17, 1998

Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

Dr. Dieter Maier  
Severusstr. 87  
D 60439 Frankfurt  
FRG

Dear Dr. Maier:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated July 8, 1998, for records concerning Egmond Lageberichte. Your letter was received in this office July 24, 1998.

Utilizing the data you provided in your request, we have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request. No records responsive to your request were located. Fees for processing this request have been waived.

This no record response is made on behalf of Major General Robert W. Noonan, Jr., the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this determination to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office for necessary processing so that it reaches the appellate authority no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60 day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts.

If you have any questions concerning this action, feel free to contact Miss Jones at (301) 677-4011. Please refer to case #1888F-98.

Sincerely,

Russell A. Nichols  
Chief, Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

Institut für Zeitgeschichte - Archiv

Wald Reg  
FOIA

Im: wie sie  
weiter machen

DB Wald  
Feb. Schule



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND  
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

September 1, 1998

Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

25-159417-739

Dr. Dieter Maier  
Severusstrasse 87  
D 60439 Frankfurt  
Germany

Dear Dr. Maier:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act request of August 29, 1995, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for records concerning Giselher Wirsing. This correspondence was referred to this office along with a record retrieved from their files for a releasability determination. This correspondence was received in this office on August 26, 1998.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of this review, it has been determined that the information contained in the record no longer warrants security classification protection and is partially releasable to you. A copy is enclosed for your use (Enclosure). Fees for processing this request are waived.

Since the release of some of the information from these records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individual concerned, this information is exempt from the mandatory public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b) (7) (C).

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Robert W. Noonan, Jr., the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office for necessary processing so that it reaches the appellate authority no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. Your appeal will then be processed to the appellate authority. After the 60-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts.

W.  
12.9.98


Instanzrechte - Archiv

ZS-15947-940

In addition, we are coordinating with another government agency concerning the releasability of their information contained in the record. We will inform you as to the releasability of the information upon completion of our coordination.

If you have any further questions concerning this action, please feel free to contact Mrs. Benear at (301) 677-3942. Please refer to case #2080F-98.

Sincerely,



Russell A. Nichols  
Chief, Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

Enclosure

Copy Furnished:

FBI FOIA/PA (#402,361)

Institut für Zeitgeschichte - Archiv

25-75947-741

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

REF ID: A60101	CONFIDENTIAL	COUNTRY: GERMANY (Federal Republic)
REPORT NO: R-P174-50	WGS - INTELLIGENCE REPORT	I. D. NO: 11596
SUBJECT: German Foreign Office Personalities	REFERENCES: Ltd ID GSUSA to ID WUCOM 27 Dec 49	DATE OF REPORT: 29 June 1950
FROM: ID WUCOM	DATE OF INFORMATION: May 1950	SOURCE: 66th CIC Det.
EVALUATION: B-2	PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]	D/A Civ

**SUMMARY OR SID REPORT:**

The attached is a report on various former German Foreign Office personnel, submitted pursuant to expressed interest in the establishment of a Foreign Office of the West German Federal Republic.

It is believed that the list includes most of the more able persons employed by the old Foreign Office. Further it is estimated that a large number of persons listed are still politically active.

691315

50 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C. 81 and 82, as amended, its transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

REPRODUCED BY AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Ried from S. 2  
 8.31.50 [Signature]

REF ID: A60101  
 ON 1 Sep 98  
 BY CDR [Signature] FORPO  
 AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200 1-R

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 8-17-97 BY SR3(BT/jew)  
 40 2 361

INDEXED - 36

109-12-232-46  
 NOT RECORDED  
 25 SEP 1950

Institut für Zeitgeschichte

AGENT REPORT

GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

22 May 1950

Re: Personalities

The following information is available regarding former German Foreign Office personnel.

a. [redacted] is the wife of former Ambassador to France [redacted] who is now serving a prison term in France for war crimes. She has very close connections to many prominent members of the former Foreign Office (FO), such as [redacted] (see below) and especially to those who were affiliated with PARIS offices during the war.

b. [redacted] was for a considerable period a leading personality at the German Embassy in PARIS, where he served as Attache to the Embassy Councillor. At the outbreak of the last war he was transferred first to the Information Section of the Foreign Office and then to the Press Section, where he served as Referent for Western Europe. He is married to an American national who is now living in the United States. He is also a personal friend of [redacted] former Political Adviser to the US Military Governor in Germany, and Source has been told by [redacted] that [redacted] has assured him of an important role in the future German government. [redacted] speaks excellent English and French, in addition to his native German, having been educated at Oxford University in England. He is a very able diplomat. (B-2)

c. [redacted] In 1935 [redacted] lived at BERLIN NW 87, Siegmundshof 16 and functioned as Area Specialist for Austria and Hungary in the Foreign Office. Later he was appointed deputy Ambassador to Austria and remained in VIENNA briefly until the appointment of [redacted] as prelude to the annexation of Austria by the Nazis. [redacted] then became Director of the Information Section of the Foreign Office. Throughout the entire German occupation there, [redacted] was Minister at the Legation in ATHENS, Greece. (B-2)

d. Gottfried ASCHMANN, Geheimrat. Present address unknown (reported by [redacted] to have died in a Soviet prison camp). In 1932-1933 was Presse-Chef of the Foreign Office. After the assumption of power by the Nazis he was Leiter der Presse-Abteilung in the Foreign Office until 1939, at which time he served briefly as Press Chief (Presse-Chef) at the Embassy in PARIS. In 1939 or 1940 ASCHMANN was retired, probably because of his anti-Nazi convictions. (B-2)

e. (Fnu) [redacted] present address unknown. [redacted] was a close co-worker of [redacted] Embassy Councillor in PARIS during the early days of the last war. [redacted] rank at that time was Legation Councillor. Later he was appointed Consul General in CASABLANCA, where he remained until the occupation of North Africa by the Allies in 1942. During this entire period [redacted] was assigned to the Political Section of the Foreign Office. After the invasion of North Africa [redacted] was arrested by the Gestapo, charged with homosexual relations with the French politician [redacted] and sent to a concentration camp. (B-2)

f. [redacted] present whereabouts unknown. Before the last war, [redacted] was professor of history at the Hochschule fuer [redacted]

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[redacted] present whereabouts unknown. [redacted] was second in command to [redacted] when the latter was working in the Foreign Office in BERLIN. He was in charge of the publication of the "German-French Monthly Magazine" put out by the Foreign Office at that time. (B-2)

[redacted] OLDENBURG. He served for a time as head of the Information Section of the Embassy in PARIS. He was a very ardent Nazi and a personal friend of the Gauleiter of Oldenburg, LOEPER. In 1945 [redacted] was interned at Camp SANDBOSTEL (L54/R93) and was released in 1948. (B-2)

[redacted] In 1935 he was Ministerialdirektor in Section III of the Foreign Office in BERLIN. Formerly he had served as Ambassador to the United States and returned there for a short time prior to the last war. During the war he wrote articles for the Foreign Office's foreign policy bulletin. (B-2)

g. (Fnu) ~~VON~~ DIRKSEN, BERGEN (N48/262), Aicherhof. DIRKSEN was born on 2 April 1882. In September 1915 he entered the Foreign Office when he was appointed to the German civil administration in Belgium during the war. At this time he was attached to the staff of the German Minister in The HAGUE. He also served as a diplomatic representative at the KIEV Conference. In 1919 he was appointed Legation Councillor and served in WARSAW until 1921. In 1921-1922 he served as head of the Polish Section of the Foreign Office, in 1923-24 at the Consulate General in DANZIG, and in 1925-28 was director of the Eastern Section of the Foreign Office. In 1928 DIRKSEN was promoted to the rank of Ambassador and sent to MOSCOW, where he served as German Minister. In September 1933 DIRKSEN was transferred to the Embassy in TOKYO and later he was sent to LONDON, where he was Ambassador until the outbreak of the war. During the war, because of difficulties with RIBBENTROP, he served in BERLIN with the OKW/WFIV (the section engaged in propaganda work among German-held POWs) under [redacted] (see below). (B-2)

f. [redacted] present whereabouts unknown. [redacted] was born [redacted]. He was an ardent Nazi. In 1931-1932 he was a professor at the Bromley County School, KENT, England. In 1935 he was head of the Cultural Section of the Foreign Organization (Auslandsorganisation) of the NSDAP and as Gaubmann of the Auslandsgau of the NS-Lehrerbund. During the last war he served successively as Landesgruppenleiter of the NSDAP in France and then Italy. While never officially a member of the Foreign Office, the work of the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP was parallel to and intermingled with that of the Foreign Office. After the end of the war [redacted] was interned at Camp SANDBOSTEL. (B-2)

[redacted] She is the wife of [redacted] (see below). She is in touch with her husband and with other Foreign Office personalities. She is also a personal friend of Source. (B-2)

t. [redacted] allegedly in France, official address is the same as his wife, above. Before the last war [redacted] was head of the Franco-German Academic Exchange Service. During the war he served as Plenipotentiary for Propaganda in France. After the end of the war he was interned for a long time by the French authorities. It is believed that the propaganda activities in which [redacted] engaged in France were only a cover for a political information gathering service through his connections in student circles. (B-2)

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u. [redacted] BONN, Bundespraesidialkanzlei und STUTTGART, Rathaus, Bueró fuer Friedensfragen. His Foreign Office rank was "vortragender" Legation Councillor. He served with the Foreign Office in BERLIN between 1932 and 1940. (B-2)

v. [redacted] was sent to PARIS in about 1925 as representative for the "Koelnische Zeitung", from about 1931 he served as Press Attache in the Embassy in PARIS. During the last war he served as deputy to Minister [redacted] head of the Press Section at the PARIS Embassy. He testified as a witness during the trial of [redacted] for war crimes. He presently operates a translation bureau in KONSTANZ. (B-2)

w. [redacted] STUTTGART. From 1934 to about 1936 FORSTER was Embassy Councillor at the Embassy in PARIS. He was relieved from Foreign Office duty because of his Jewish wife. He lived in France as a salesman until the outbreak of the last war. He is known to be a good friend of and in contact with [redacted] (B-2)

x. (Fnu) von [redacted] FRANKFURT-Hoechst, Verwaltung fuer Industrie. Former head of the language service of the Foreign Office in BERLIN, a position he held during the last war. (B-2)

y. (Fnu) [redacted] (home address). Formerly with the Administration Section of the Foreign Office in BERLIN, [redacted] was Chancellor (Personnel Chief) of the PARIS Embassy during the war. Source is in touch with [redacted] (B-2)

z. [redacted] BERLIN (Soviet Sector). Before the last war [redacted] was deputy head of the German Chamber of Commerce in PARIS. During the German occupation of France he became head of the Economic Section of the PARIS Embassy. In spite of his being a member of the NSDAP, he was a secret member of the Communist Party. He had been active in writing pamphlets for the KPD to distribute among workers in the BERLIN factories before his assignment to the PARIS Chamber of Commerce. His attachment to the communist cause appeared to one of opportunism rather than of conviction. It is believed that [redacted] is now in contact with Soviet authorities and working with or for them. (B-3)

aa. (Fnu) [redacted] From about 1935 to the end of the war [redacted] was attached to the Embassy in PARIS as archives custodian with the rank of Embassy Councillor. (B-2)

ab. (Fnu) von [redacted] MUNICH, Bavarian Academy of Science and BAD KREUZ (M48/200) (home address). [redacted] was Sachbearbeiter in international law at the Embassy in PARIS and assigned to the Information Section under [redacted] (B-2)

ac. [redacted] TIENGER (K48/B49). [redacted] served in the Foreign Office in BERLIN as Sachbearbeiter on Franco-German relations. He was regarded by his associates as under the special protection of HITLER, since he was HITLER's lawyer at his trials in 1924 and 1928. [redacted] attitude toward his associates was not such as to give him popularity. He also appeared as a witness at the trial of [redacted] He also represented the Foreign Office at the trial in PARIS of the [redacted] GRYNBPAN who assassinated [redacted] (B-2)

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... Grosser, Hans, born [redacted] (M52/821), Hinder  
... economic geography, agrarian politics, and  
... of Leipzig at that time. During the last  
war GROSSE was employed by the FO as a Sachbearbeiter. He is presently  
affiliated with the newspaper "Das Volk" and with the "Sozialistischer  
Verlag" both in FREIBURG. (B-2)

... Little is  
known of [redacted] past activities. At present it is known that he  
maintains contact with [redacted] (see below). (B-2)

... (Fnu) [redacted] LUEDENSCHIED (K52/F98). Until  
1934 [redacted] was editor in chief for the "Telegraphenbuero" BERLIN, the  
largest news agency in PARIS, which was attached to the Embassy. Dur-  
ing the war [redacted] was a group leader in the OKW/WPr IV, Section for  
Russian POWs, Subsection for the VLASSOV Army. He was qualified for  
this position due to his Baltic-German background and the fact that he  
spoke perfect Russian. At the end of the war he was interned in Camp  
SANIBOSTEL. Released in 1948, [redacted] has remained inactive so far as  
is known. (B-2)

... (Fnu) [redacted] HAMBURG, [redacted] was attached as  
commissioner for commercial matters to the Embassy in PARIS during the  
last war. His duties were those of a combined economics expert and  
press correspondent on financial matters. At the present time [redacted]  
is head of the DPA (German Press Agency) in HAMBURG. (B-2)

... (Fnu) [redacted]  
[redacted] is a Baltic German who served as German Consul in  
FLAGENWURTH, Austria, in 1935. At a later date he became head of the  
courier service for the Foreign Office in BERLIN and served in this  
capacity during the last war. (B-2)

... present whereabouts unknown.  
[redacted] served as Air Attache at the Embassy in PARIS until the out-  
break of the last war. After the German occupation of France he became  
commander of the Luftstandort in PARIS and the personal representative  
of [redacted] of whom he was a very good personal friend. (B-2)

... (Fnu) [redacted] BADEN-BADEN. During the last war served as  
Sachbearbeiter in various departments of the Embassy in PARIS. At the  
present time he is employed by the newspaper "Lauterlot", published in  
BADEN-BADEN. (B-2)

... Dr Georg Werner Otto von HENTIG, GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN,  
(Steigstrasse 18 (home address) and FRANKFURT, Schaumainkai 23 (business  
address). HENTIG was born 22 May 1896. He married [redacted]  
in May 1923 and [redacted] on 27 December 1929. He has at least  
five children. He entered the Foreign Office in 1911, served until  
1912 as Attaché at the Embassy in PEKING, the Consulate General at  
CONSTANTINOPEL and the Embassy in TEHRAN. In 1914-1915 he served with  
the German Army in Russia and in 1916 was sent on a special mission to  
Afghanistan. Upon the completion of this mission he was assigned as  
Legation Secretary to the Embassy in CONSTANTINOPEL. From 1918 to 1923  
he served with the Foreign Office in BERLIN. In 1923 he was sent to the  
Consulate in REVAL, Estonia, as Consul. In 1924 he was transferred as  
Legation Councillor to SOFIA. From late 1924 until 1927 he was Consul  
General in POSEN, Poland, and from 1928 to 1932 in SAN FRANCISCO. From  
1935 to 1936 he was Consul General at BOGOTA, Colombia. During the  
period 1936 to 1939 he held an unknown post in Syria. During the last  
war he was oriental specialist in the Information Section of the PARIS  
Embassy. (B-2)

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al. [redacted], believed to be in TUEBINGEN. [redacted] is the niece of [redacted]. She was Cultural Referentin assigned to the PAR Embassy during the last war and retreated to Schloss Hohenzollern in SIGMARINGEN (L49/X14) with the BRINOW government. (B-2)

am. [redacted] Served as a Sachbearbeiter in the Information Section of the Embassy in PARIS during the last war. (B-2)

an. [redacted] presently reported to be in a Soviet internment camp. [redacted] who held the rank of Geheimer Regierungsrat, was head of the "Interner Auslandsdienst" (internal foreign service) of the Foreign Office. This was a form of intelligence service built up by [redacted] after 1933, when he was relieved as Press Chief of the Foreign Office. The purpose was to collect information against the Nazis from their activities outside Germany. [redacted] was charged with setting up German newspapers throughout the world and seeing to it that they were subservient to the Foreign Office. During the entire last war he was assigned to the Foreign Office in BERLIN, but spent most of his time travelling outside Germany. He was arrested by the Soviets in September 1945 in BERLIN-Schoenehaide. (B-2)

ao. Dr. (PhD) [redacted] HAMBURG, Rathaus, room 306 (Office for the Preparation of the Peace Treaty). [redacted] was formerly "vortragender" Legation Counsellor in the Commercial Section of the Foreign Office. He is presently manager of the above-named office. He states that his office works in close cooperation with the "Bureau fuer Friedensfragen" in STUTTGART. Most of the work is allegedly in the scientific and commercial fields. (B-2)

ap. [redacted] FRANKFURT/Spessart. [redacted] was Consul General in VLADIVOSTOK in 1935. He later became Sachbearbeiter and head of the Auslandsnachrichtenabteilung of the Foreign Office. He is known to be in contact with [redacted] (see above) at the present time (B-2)

aq. [redacted] probably in BERLIN (British Sector). He was an engineer and served with the German Embassy in PARIS during the last war as specialist for "Well- und Funksendungen" (tape and radio communication).

ar. Hermann KATZENBERGER, German Land Government, Northrhine-Westphalia. KATZENBERG was born 20 April 1891 in MANNHEIM. He served in the German Army in the first war and lost his left arm. In 1920 he became Secretary General of the Zentrum Party. He later worked in the Press Department of the Reich Government and worked closely with both [redacted] and [redacted] of the Foreign Office on French affairs. After the last war he was one of the co-founders of the CDU newspaper "Neue Zeit" and is presently press chief of the Karl ARNOLD government in Northrhine Westphalia. (B-2)

as. Heinz (?) [redacted] was secretary to [redacted] when the latter was in the Information Section of the Foreign Office in BERLIN. [redacted] married [redacted] sister and has been closely associated with him ever since. At the present time [redacted] is maintaining very close commercial connections with BERLIN (sector unknown) in a matter which he is keeping very secret. (B-2)

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...the German Embassy in  
...an old  
...MOSCOW in 1932 and in 1941 it is  
...that he went to work for the NKVD. It is known that in 1941  
...began to make German language broadcasts over the MOSCOW  
...in 1948 was appointed Deputy General Director of  
...the German East Zone Railroads. (B-2)

su. (Fnu) KRIBBEL. Address: Believed to have died from old  
age. KRIBBEL was born on 20 January 1876 at GERMERSHEIM (L50/R47)  
Pfalz. KRIBBEL was an old member of the NSDAP, having taken part in  
and being arrested after the 1923 putsch. In 1933 he entered the For-  
eign Office and was assigned as German Consul in SCHANGHAI (n.c.a.)  
China. In 1937 or 1938 KRIBBEL was made Personal Chef des Auswaertiges  
Amtes. (B-2)

av. [redacted], KIEL (L55/C53), street address unknown.  
[redacted] was a Kommissar in the Informationsabteilung des Auswaertiges  
Amtes. At the present time [redacted] is the editor of the SPD newspaper  
"Volkszeitung" published in KIEL. (B-2)

aw. [redacted] held the rank of General Consul and was employed in  
the Presseabteilung des Auswaertiges Amtes as a Sachbearbeiter for the  
Near East. [redacted] is still maintaining contacts in Turkey and Syria.

ax. Dr Richard von KUHLMANN, address believed to be RAMHOLTZ  
bei BOLLMERZ (L51/R39). KUHLMANN was born on 3 May 1873 in CONSTANTI-  
NOPEL, Turkey. KUHLMANN was an expert on Near Eastern affairs and a  
close co-worker of [redacted] (see below) at the time that [redacted] was  
working in the Informationsabteilung des Auswaertiges Amtes in BERLIN.  
(B-2)

ay. (Fnu) [redacted] present address unknown.  
[redacted] was the last German Military Attache in PARIS before the  
outbreak of World War II. (B-2)

az. [redacted], LUISSURG (K52/A31), street address unknown.  
[redacted] served as Cultural Attache to the German Embassy in PARIS from  
about 1927 to World War II. His activities during the war are unknown  
to Source. It is known that [redacted] has good connections of some kind in  
BONN and expects to move there in the near future. (B-2)

bb. (Fnu) [redacted], PARIS, street address unknown.  
[redacted] was an Amtsgehilfe in the Austrian Embassy in PARIS until Austria was  
absorbed into the Third Reich. [redacted] went to the German Embassy in  
PARIS with [redacted] (see above). Upon the outbreak of war [redacted] re-  
mained in PARIS with [redacted]. During the time of the German occupation  
of France he carried out a series of illegal requisitions and other  
shady deals for the members of both the German Embassy and other offices.  
[redacted] was supposed to have been involved with Under Secretary of  
State MARTIN LUTHER who was sent to a concentration camp for activities  
of this nature. As far as is known [redacted] has never been arrested or  
interned by the French authorities in spite of the fact that he has  
never left PARIS since the end of the war. (B-2)

bc. Dr Rudolf LAUN, HAMBURG, Woldsenweg 11, Telephone 525162,  
Law Faculty, University of Hamburg. LAUN was born on 1 January 1882  
in PRAGUE (O51/L78) CSR. From 1908 to 1911 LAUN served in the Ministry  
of Commerce of the Austro-Hungarian Government in VIENNA (n.c.a.). From  
1911 to 1919 LAUN served as a professor at the University of VIENNA  
except for a period of war service, which included service in the For-  
eign Office in VIENNA in 1918 and 1919. From 1919 to the present time

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LAUN has been registered as a professor in the faculty of the University of HAMBURG. In 1934 LAUN went to the University of Michigan as an exchange professor and stayed there until 1935. He returned to Germany and served as Professor in HAMBURG. About 1939 LAUN went to the Auswertiges Amt as Technical Consultant (WHA) in the 11. Abteilung of the Informationsabteilung. LAUN was often in PARIS during World War II. On 1 February 1950 LAUN was appointed to the Stadtgericht of BREMEN (157/479). (B-2)

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... address unknown. ... served as ... Belgium during the German occupation from 1941 to the outbreak of the ... had been a member of the so-called "Army Office" of the "RIBBENTROP Bureau" and had served as ABETZ agent in France and Belgium. (B-2)

... present address unknown. ... served as the Deputy Military Attache at the German Embassy in PARIS under ... (see above). (B-2)

... is a career policeman. ... was Chancellor of the German Consulates in PARIS, MOSCOW and TIFLIS before the outbreak of World War II. During the German occupation of France ... served as the Leiter des Staatsrechtsabteilung of the German Embassy in PARIS. Since ... was married to a Swiss citizen, he was able to leave Germany at the end of the war and take up residence at LAUSANNE, Switzerland. Late in 1949 ... returned to Germany and is now employed in the Staatssekretariat f. d. Fluechtlingewesen in MUNICH. ... is a good friend of ... (B-2)

bg. Dr Kurt MELCHERS, BREMEN, Bismarkstrasse 97. MELCHERS was born on 8 July 1881 at BAROP (K52/A61) bei DORTMUND. From 1919 to 1922 MELCHERS was attached to the Police Headquarters in ESSEN (K52/A41) during which time he served as representative to the French authorities in the Ruhr from 1923 to 1925. In 1922 MELCHERS was assigned to the Police Praesidium in BERLIN and in 1933 to the Chief Police Headquarters of the Province of Magdeburg. MELCHERS served as a vortragender Legationsrat at the German Embassy in PARIS during World War II. MELCHERS is in close contact with ... (B-2)

bh. ... was a Sachbearbeiter in the German Embassy in PARIS during World War II. He is presently practicing law in HAMBURG and specializing in the defense of former German diplomats who are being tried in front of foreign courts for various crimes. ... was connected with the defense of ... and is now taking up the defense of ... (see below). In the course of these defenses ... has been in PARIS, BRUSSELS, and ANTWERP recently. ... is in close contact with ... and ... (see below). (B-2)

bl. ... exact present address unknown, living in Italy. ... is of French extraction, probably born in Alsace or Lorraine. He was married to an Italian national and is living presently at her home. ... was a specialist in undercover missions and worked as the "right hand" of ... at the time that ... was assigned to the German Embassy in PARIS and in TUNIS. (B-2)

bj. ... BADEN-BADEN, street address unknown. ... served as the confidential secretary of ... at the time that ... was assigned to the German Embassy in PARIS. She handled all of his secret and internal matters. ... is presently employed as a secretary in BADEN-BADEN and it is believed that she is cooperating with or working for French organizations. (B-2)

bk. ... present location unknown. ... was for a period of time the Leiter der Passabteilung of the German Embassy in PARIS during World War II. It is not believed that he is related to ... (B-2)

bl. ... BODENSEE (I48/C29), exact address unknown. ... was the German Minister of the Vichy French Government during World War II. From 1939 to 1940 ... served as liaison

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was the German Ambassador to the Vichy Government during World War II (1940-1944) and was in the Schloss Hohenollern/Oberammergau with the German Government.

(B-2)

bt. [redacted] HOHENOLLERN, Post Ziegenburg Kreis KASSEL. RINTELEN entered the German Foreign Office in 1923 and served until 1928 as Legationssekretar in PARIS, France. From 1929 to 1932 [redacted] served as Legationsrat at the German Embassy in WARSAW, Poland. From 1932 to the end of World War II RINTELEN served as Oberreferent Frankreich in the Politischenabteilung des Auswaertiges Amtes Staatssekretariat. In 1955 [redacted] lived at [redacted] [redacted] was a close co-worker of State Minister Fackler [redacted] was an expert on France and the French problems.

(B-2)

bu. Dr. Karl RITTER, exact location in Southern Germany unknown. RITTER was born in 1884. He held the rank of Botschafter and was one of the foremost advisors to [redacted]. RITTER was tried after World War II and sentenced to four years imprisonment. On 1 May 1949 he was released from confinement. RITTER is the uncle of [redacted] (see above) but as far as is known has neither communist connections nor his opportunist tendencies.

bv. [redacted] HAMBURG/WOLKSTADT, Dr. Hans [redacted] served during World War II as the special assistant of [redacted] of the German Embassy in PARIS who was instrumental in securing [redacted] appointment to the Embassy. [redacted] was the head of the section for "French letters for Germany" in as far as the [redacted] was concerned in the matter. ROSSNIG was also charged with the [redacted] between the German Embassy and all of the High and Low German [redacted] representatives and the French Colonial representatives in PARIS. At the end of the war [redacted] was also the chief of the "Friedensarbeit" section of the Embassy. [redacted] is presently maintaining a file containing the names, addresses and present occupations of a large number of former Foreign Office personnel. [redacted] keeps in contact with these people both through the mails and through personal contact. [redacted] is presently employed as the commercial representative of a large [redacted] HAMBURG welfare agency, "Gesinnungstuechtige Gesellschaft", and arranges his business trips in such a way as to permit his contacting the people he wants to see. [redacted] is presently engaged in trying to gain help for [redacted] to whom [redacted] is distantly related, in his defense. The fact that [redacted] is condemned by a large number of the former Foreign Office personnel as an ardent Nazi has caused [redacted] considerable trouble in this project. It is possible that he may try to organize the former Nazi diplomats to help [redacted]

(B-2)

bw. [redacted] was a Referent in the Informationsabteilung des Auswaertiges Amtes in BERLIN during the early part of World War II and was later transferred to the Press Section of the German Embassy in PARIS as the head of a section. At the present time [redacted] is employed as an editor by the French licensed newspaper "Der Kurier" (The Courier) in BERLIN. [redacted] is now stateless. He has connections with [redacted]

bx. Horace Greely Hjalmar SCHACHT, BLAKEDALE near LUNEBURG (M54/S81). SCHACHT was born 22 January 1877 in ZINGLEFF (n.c.a.) Schleswig. He held leading positions in the Dresdener Bank and on the German and Belgian Banking Commissions from 1908 to 1923. SCHACHT served as President of the Reichsbank from 1923 to 1930 and regained the position in March of 1933. He was the guiding light in all of the internal and external economic movements of the German governments between World Wars I and II. SCHACHT was tried before the War Crimes Tribunal and acquitted.

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...in Eastern Africa and specialized in ques-  
(B-2)

...served before World War II in ANKHARA, Turkey, as Legationsrat.  
During the war [redacted] served as a Sachverstandiger fuer Vordere  
Orient in the Auswaertiges Amtes with the rank of Gesandter. (B-2)

...[redacted] address unknown. [redacted] served  
in the German Embassy in PARIS before and during World War II as secre-  
tary to [redacted] (see above) (B-2)

...cl. Dr Friedrich SIEBURG, TUEBINGEN, street address unknown.  
SIEBURG was born 18 May 1893 in ALTEHA (K52/W30), Westfalia. He served  
as an officer in the German Air Force during World War I. He married  
[redacted] actress, in January 1921, and [redacted]  
in 1942 by ABETZ in PARIS. He served as the PARIS representative of  
the "Frankfurter Zeitung" from 1925 to 1940 with an office at Place du  
Pantheon 6. During World War II SIEBURG was assigned to the German  
Embassy in PARIS as a political journalist with the rank of Botschafts-  
rat. SIEBURG is rated as one of the best informed of the former diplo-  
mats in regard to France and its problems. SIEBURG is presently engaged  
in writing books, most of which are being published outside of Germany.  
On 6 March 1950 SIEBURG was present as the journalist's representative  
in a conference held by the Evangelische Akademie in BAD BOLL (n.c.a.)  
near MAULBRONN (L49/R74).

...cm. [redacted] EADEN-BADEN, street address unknown.  
[redacted] served as the Leiter des Abteilung Kultur/Rahdfunk Abhoer of  
the German Embassy in PARIS during World War II. Among his associates  
there he was known as an ardent Nazi and was rated as a higher agent of  
the Gestapo. From his conversations in PARIS it was assumed that he had  
served with [redacted] in North Africa. [redacted] was rated as an adventurer  
by his associates. At the end of the war [redacted] was interned by the  
British in SANDPOSTEL Internment Camp but was successful in posing  
himself off as "harmless" and was made camp leader and then released.  
(B-2)

...cn. [redacted] HAMBURG, Rathausplatz, "Allge-  
meine Zeitung". [redacted] was charged with the preparation of the politi-  
cal reports of the Informationsabteilung des Auswaertiges Amtes during  
World War II. Before coming to the Foreign Office he had worked with the  
SCHERRL Publishing Company in BERLIN as a political journalist. [redacted]  
seems to have never been banned from newspaper work in spite of his Nazi  
connections, who made him responsible for the directives issued to the  
German Missions abroad for the control of their political activities  
and utterances, and is presently Chief Reporter of the "Hamburger All-  
gemeinen Zeitung". [redacted] is keeping in touch with many former German  
Foreign Officer personnel. Source rates [redacted] as characterless, an  
anti-semitic, and a trouble-maker. Source is in touch with [redacted]  
[redacted] in touch with Eugen Gerstenmaier (via "Abwehr"). (B-2)

...op. (Fnu) [redacted] INNSBRUCK, AUSTRIA. In  
1929 [redacted] was in BRUSSELS in press work for the Foreign Office. He  
went to the Pressabteilung des Auswaertiges Amtes in BERLIN in 1931.  
[redacted] served in the Auswaertiges Amtes during World War II in the Press-  
abteilung as the Stellvertreter Chief under "Presse-SCHMIDT". [redacted]  
held the rank of Minister. [redacted] is a millionaire. (B-2)

...op. (Fnu) [redacted] present location unknown. [redacted] served  
as a Sachbearbeiter in the Informationsabteilung of the Auswaertiges  
Amtes during World War II. [redacted] held the rank of Consul. (B-2)

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og. (Fnu) [redacted] HAMBURG, Trostbruecke, Patriotisches Haus, 7th Floor, Office of the Innere Mission of the Evangelisches Hilfswerk. Before 1929 [redacted] held a leading position in the Press Office of the Reichs Regierung. In 1929 [redacted] was sent to MOSCOW, USSR, as the 1ste Botschaftsrat. At a later unknown date [redacted] was transferred from MOSCOW to a post in Turkey. During World War II [redacted] served as an Abteilungsleiter in the Auswaertiges Amtes. [redacted] is presently the head of the HAMBURG office of the Evangelisches Hilfswerk, a position which was supposedly gained for him by British connections. He is active in the formation of a "Friendship Circle of Former Members of the Foreign Office" (Freundekreis der ehemaligen Mitglieder des Auswaertiges Amtes), which is dedicated to assistance of these members who are in financial difficulties. [redacted] is in intimate contact with [redacted] and [redacted] (see below). Source is in contact with [redacted] (B-2)

op. [redacted] BERLIN/NIEVERSCHOENHAUSEN. [redacted] was formerly the leader of the office of [redacted] in the Auswaertiges Amtes. In addition to work of the Foreign Office WREDE was the publisher of the catholic-affiliated newspaper "Querschnitt". (B-2)

os. (Fnu) [redacted] VIENNA, Austria, exact address unknown. [redacted] served as a specialist in oriental languages both in the Auswaertiges Amtes and in the German Embassy in PARIS during World War II. (B-2)

ot. (Fnu) [redacted] present address unknown. [redacted] served as a minor member of the Informationsabteilung of the German Embassy in PARIS during World War II. (B-2)

ou. [redacted] HAMBURG, Trostbruecke, Patriotisches Haus, 7th Floor, Office of the Innere Mission of the Evangelisches Hilfswerk. Nothing is known about [redacted] activities on the behalf of the Foreign Office. [redacted] is presently closely associated with [redacted] in his present activities. (B-2)

ov. Graf Johann von WELCZEK, Schloss Wasserleonsburg bei KLAGENFURT (n.c.a.), Austria. WELCZEK was born on 2 September 1878 in LABAND (051/138). He married [redacted] a Chilean national, in SANTIAGO (n.c.a.) in 1909. WELCZEK joined the German Foreign Office in 1904 at MURICH. In 1905 and 1906 he served in BERLIN and HAMBURG. In 1907 he was assigned to the German Embassy in SANTIAGO, Chile and was promoted to Legationssekretaer in 1909. In 1911 WELCZEK was transferred to DRESDEN (N52/F59) and in 1915 to the BERLIN Foreign Office. In 1919 WELCZEK left the Foreign Office but returned to duty in 1923 to be assigned to the German Embassy in BUDAPEST, Hungary. In 1926 WELCZEK was appointed Ambassador to Spain in MADRID and remained there until assigned as Ambassador in PARIS in 1937. WELCZEK served as the German Ambassador to France until the outbreak of World War II. During the war WELCZEK became closely connected with the resistance movement of [redacted] and was one of [redacted] closest co-workers and advisors. WELCZEK has applied for an exit permit to permit him to re-join his wife who is living in Chile. This request has been turned down. It is believed that within the next few weeks WELCZEK will be leaving Germany for MEXICO. (B-2)

ow. (Fnu) [redacted] Present address unknown. [redacted] was a member of the Travel Documents Section of the German Embassy in PARIS during World War II. He held the rank of [redacted] and was [redacted] not known [redacted] assigned to the Embassy staff. [redacted] considered [redacted] as a Gestapo agent. (B-2)

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ON 1 Sep 98  
BY CDR [redacted] COMFCMPO  
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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HAMBURG, street address unknown. [redacted] is an active communist member and is connected with the Kulturbund fuer die demokratische Erneuerung Deutschlands. [redacted] was recently denounced by another HAMBURG lawyer at a public meeting for his pro-communist stand.

cy. Dr Ludwig Adolf WINDECKER, present address unknown. WINDECKER was born on 14 December 1891 at FREEDBERG (L51/N79) 1/Hesse. He is married to [redacted] and surgeon and [redacted] daughter to [redacted] officer (family). WINDECKER served as a liaison officer to the Bulgarian Army throughout World War I. In 1921 WINDECKER entered the German Foreign Office as an Attache assigned at BERLIN. In 1922 WINDECKER was made a Legationssekretar and served at the Consul in KOWRO (n.c.a.) Poland. From 1923 to 1926 WINDECKER served in the German Consulate General at MEMEL. From 1926 to 1928 WINDECKER headed the Baltic Section of the Auswaertiges Amtes. From 1928 to April 1931 WINDECKER was a Gesandtschaftsrat in BELGRAD, Jugoslavia. From April 1931 until the assumption of power by HITLER WINDECKER was the Leiter der Referat fuer polnischen Fragen des Auswaertiges Amtes. From 1934 until 1936 WINDECKER was serving as the German Consul General in ROTTERDAM, Holland. (B-2)

cz. Eiseher WIRSING, present address unknown, believed to be in MUNICH. From 1929 to 1941 WIRSING was a member of the Information attelling of the BERLIN Foreign Office. He was the author of many books including one on the USA called "The Boundless Continent". WIRSING was born on 15 April 1906 in SCHWEINFURT (L51/N76). Before 1935 WIRSING served as the chief editor of the magazine "Der Tag" (The Action). From 1942 to the end of World War II, WIRSING served with GSW/WRP as publisher of "Signal". At his denazification trial [redacted] appeared as a witness. (B-2)

dd. Gerhard WOLF, FLORENCE-FIESOLE, Italy, Villa Kraus, 4 Via Fra Angelico. WOLF was born about 1905. WOLF served as German Consul General in MILAN and FLORENCE, Italy during World War II. WOLF is a very good friend of [redacted] WOLF is exceptionally well informed concerning German activities in Italy during the war. (B-2)

de. [redacted] present address unknown. [redacted] was born about [redacted] In 1935 [redacted] was serving as the Sonderreferant fuer Sudost Europe in the Auswaertiges Amtes. He became the official personal representative of ALTENBURG (see above) in the Auswaertiges Amtes when ALTENBURG was in VIENNA. [redacted] activities during the years of World War II are unknown, but it is believed he was in military service. (B-2)

df. [redacted] present address unknown. [redacted] was formerly an Under-Secretary of State in the Auswaertiges Amtes. After World War II he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for war crimes. [redacted] sentence was reduced and he was released from LANDSBERG (N49/Y34) Prison on 1 February 1950 with former State Secretary [redacted] (B-2)

dg. [redacted] From 1939 to the end of World War II [redacted] was leader of the Archives for Press and the Ministry in the Press Office of the BERLIN Foreign Office. It is known that [redacted] is presently maintaining very close relations with unknown personalities in Chile and makes frequent visits there.

2. An examination of the inter-connections of the above personalities shows the existence of the following groupings:

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)



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AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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The following personalities are known to have sided with the governments of the countries indicated.

a. USSR (B-3)

- 1. [REDACTED] living in BERLIN
- 2. [REDACTED] believed to be interned at a camp in the USSR.
- 3. [REDACTED] LIVING IN BERLIN, whose brother is a prominent official in the present East German Government.

b. France (B-3)

- 1. [REDACTED]
- 2. [REDACTED] living in PARIS
- 3. [REDACTED]
- 4. [REDACTED]
- 5. Friedrich SEIBURG

5. Spain (B-3)

- 1. [REDACTED]

d. Italy (B-2)

- 1. [REDACTED]
- 2. [REDACTED]

e. Chile (B-2)

- 1. [REDACTED]
- 2. Graf von WELCZEK

5. Field Comment:

(1) The large proportion of the names mentioned in this list are actually politically active in spite of the information collected. This opinion is based on the fact that most of the personalities were connected with the Informationsabteilung des Auswaertigen Amtes which was responsible for propaganda. These persons are undoubtedly doing their part in the present political field from their posts on the various named newspapers and publishing firms. Whether a planned action as the part of the ROEHRIG group is being carried out is difficult to judge from the information presently available.

(2) It is believed that this list of names includes most of the more able, western oriented, propaganda talent used by the German Foreign Office.

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REPORT NO. R-2174-60

PAGE NO. 19

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APPROVED FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE:

*M. J. Morin*  
 For M. J. MORIN Major, USA  
 Col GSC  
 Chief, Analysis Branch

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19

Institut für Zeitgeschichte

25-7594 (1) -160

0101  
 CONFIDENTIAL  
 GERMANY (Federal Republic)  
 REPORT NO. R-174-50  
 WGS - INTELLIGENCE REPORT  
 SUBJECT: German Foreign Office Personalities  
 I. D. NO. 11570  
 FROM: ID EUCOM  
 REFERENCES: Ltd ID GSUSA to ID EUCOM 27 Dec 49  
 EVALUATION: B-2  
 DATE OF INFORMATION: May 1950  
 PREPARED BY: [REDACTED] D/A Civ  
 DATE OF REPORT: 29 June 1950  
 SOURCE: 66th CIC Det.

SUMMARY OR SID REPORT:

The attached is a report on various former German Foreign Office personnel, submitted pursuant to expressed interest in the establishment of a Foreign Office of the West German Federal Republic.

It is believed that the list includes most of the more able persons employed by the old Foreign Office. Further it is estimated that a large number of persons listed are still politically active.

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
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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 1 Sep 98  
BY CCA  
AUTOMATICALLY BY FOI/PO  
DATE 11-16-03 DOD 5200.1-R

HAMBURG, street address unknown. [redacted] is conducting a law practice in HAMBURG. He is an active communist member and is connected with the Kulturbund fuer die demokratische Erneuerung Deutschlands. [redacted] was recently denounced by another HAMBURG lawyer at a public meeting for his pro-communist stand.

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de. [redacted] present address unknown. [redacted] was born about [redacted] In 1935 [redacted] was serving as the Sonderreferent fuer Sudost-Europa in the Auswaertiges Amtes. He became the official personal representative of ALTENBURG (see above) in the Auswaertiges Amtes when ALTENBURG was in VIENNA. [redacted] activities during the years of World War II are unknown, but it is believed he was in military service. (B-2)

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dg. [redacted] From 1939 to the end of World War II [redacted] was leader of the Archives for Press and the Ministry in the Press Office of the BERLIN Foreign Office. It is known that [redacted] is presently maintaining very close relations with unknown personalities in Chile and makes frequent visits there.

2. An examination of the inter-connections of the above personalities shows the existence of the following groupings:

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BY CEN  
AUTH PARA 1

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The following personalities are known to have ties with the governments of the countries indicated.

a. USSR (B-3)

- 1. [REDACTED] living in BERLIN
- 2. [REDACTED] believed to be interned at a camp in the USSR.
- 3. [REDACTED] LIVING IN BERLIN, whose brother is a prominent official in the present East German Government.

b. France (B-3)

- 1. [REDACTED]
- 2. [REDACTED] living in PARIS
- 3. [REDACTED]
- 4. [REDACTED]
- 5. Friedrich SEIBURG

5. Spain (B-3)

- 1. [REDACTED]

d. Italy (B-2)

- 1. [REDACTED]
- 2. [REDACTED]

e. Chile (B-2)

- 1. [REDACTED]
- 2. Graf von WELCZEK

5. Field Comment:

(1) The large proportion of the names mentioned in this list are actually politically active in spite of the information collected. This opinion is based on the fact that most of the personalities were connected with the Informationsabteilung des Auswaertiges Amtes which was responsible for propaganda. These persons are undoubtedly doing their part in the present political field from their posts on the various named newspapers and publishing firms. Whether a planned action as the part of the ROERIG group is being carried out is difficult to judge from the information presently available.

(2) It is believed that this list of names includes most of the more able, western oriented, propaganda talent used by the German Foreign Office.

SUSC 622 (1) (C)