

Institut für Zeitgeschichte - Archiv

Institut für Zeitgeschichte ARCHIV	
Akz. 5816/78	Best. ZS/A-33/4
Rep. Cu	Kat.

Frau Emmi Bonhoeffer
Frankfurt/M. - Bornheim
Berkersheimer Weg 81

3. August 53

Lieber Herr John,

nach zwei Monaten Kur in Davos bin ich wieder zu Hause und sehr gestärkt. Ich muss nun endlich Frau Lebers Anfrage erledigen, habe mit Frau v. Dohnányi darüber korrespondiert, jedoch ohn dadurch weiter zu kommen. Christel ist gegen all diese Publikationen und meint, man solle warten, bis sich Berufenere finden. Ich finde nicht, dass man das Recht hat, nein zu sagen, wenn man keine triftigeren Gründe hat, denn für ganz unberufen halte ich A. Leber nicht. Schlecht scheint mir das Buch von Sadde und Lütches über den 20. Juli.

Wenn "ein Freund" den Text schreiben soll, kann ich ja nur Sie bitten, obwohl ich weiss, wie ungern Sie es tun würden. Als erste Widerstandsreaktion erinnere ich mich nur aus einem Gespräch um das Jahr 50, als es darum ging, ob man gewisse Dinge anerkennen könne und ob man Hitler eine Chance geben sollte, dass Klaus den Kopf schüttelte und sagte, "Nein, principiis obsta." Erinnern Sie sich daran? Sollte man das aufnehmen? Schriftliches dieser Art habe ich nicht. Man schrieb ja solche Sachen aus Gründen nicht auf.

Die Kinder kamen sehr beeindruckt aus Berlin zurück, Walter besonders von dem stehend angehörten "Ich hatt einen Kameraden", Thomas sehr angetan von der Ansprache am Denkmal von Reuter. Ich besuchte Thomas in Heidelberg, fand ihn sehr vertieft, fast versponnen in sein Studium, jedenfalls aber hat er das Gefühl, auf dem richtigen Pferd zu sitzen und das ist alles, was man wünschen sollte. Die Kinder haben sich auch sehr gefreut, Ihnen in Berlin begegnet zu sein.

Ich habe in Stuttgart noch kurz Station gemacht, weil ich auf dem Hilfswerk etwas zu besprechen hatte, und habe die sehr freundliche Gastfreundschaft von Haussens wieder genossen. Sie hat mir wieder gut gefallen in ihrer unvoreingenommenen, klugen, selbständigen und sehr hilfsbereiten Art. Die Zeit, in der wir uns um Ihren lieben Bruder kümmerten, verbindet uns fürs Leben.

Grüssen Sie Ihre liebe Frau bitte herzlich, ich hoffe, es geht Ihnen gut. Sie wissen, dass ich mich immer freuen werde, wenn Sie beide hier einmal auftauchen. Für bescheidne Ansprüche kann ich sogar Nachtquartier im Keller bieten, z.Zt. von Klaus Wahl aus Berlin wahrgenommen, der mit einer Schauspielertruppe aus Berlin auf 10 Tage hier gastiert. Ihren lieben Frau würde ich aber Cornelies Zimmer einräumen und sie, zu Walter auf ein Harmonikabett quartieren.

Herzliche Grüsse

Stets Ihre Emmi Bonhoeffer

49 Barkston Gardens,
London N.W.5.

29. Juni 1950

Verehrte Gräfin Dönhoff,

gleich nach Ihrer Abreise wollte ich Ihnen schreiben und das Gespräch, für das ich Ihnen aufrichtig dankbar bin, als Monolog fortsetzen. Wie es blich ist, waren die Abende und Wochenenden so sehr mit Arbeit ausgefüllt, dass es längere Briefe gemaht zu denken war (und der Brief an Sie wäre sehr lang geworden). Ich muss die Gedanken über die Vertriebenen, die Parteien und landwirtschaftliche Fragen, die ich Ihnen mitteilen wollte, noch eine Weile zurückstellen. Heute schreibe ich Ihnen aus einem sachlichen Anlass.

In der "Zeit" vom 23. Juni steht auf der zweiten Seite in der Chronik "Die Woche" als vorletzte Nachricht eine Meldung über die Schwierigkeiten, die Schlinge von der deutschen Emigration in London zu erwarten habe. Diese Meldung ist aus der Züricher "Tat" vom 16. Juni übernommen worden. Der erhebliche Unterschied zwischen den beiden Veröffentlichungen besteht darin, dass auf der Reise von Zürich nach Hamburg sich die Worte "In Londoner diplomatischen Kreisen wird damit gerechnet, dass... eingefunden haben, wodurch die sowohl für "Die Tat" als auch für "Die Zeit" peinliche Meldung für "Die Zeit" noch blamabler wird.

Erlauben Sie mir, Sie in der Nachricht enthaltenen Behauptungen richtigzustellen.

Es gibt nicht "die" deutsche Emigration in London. Sie existiert so wenig wie nationale, konfessionelle oder berufliche Kollektive. Nach meiner Kenntnis gibt es kaum etwas weniger kollektives als "die" deutsche Emigration in London. Es ist deshalb auch nicht zutreffend, dass "die" deutsche Emigration "unverschämlich" ist. Ich weiss nicht, was mit dem Wort "unverschämlich" gemeint ist. Wenn es sich um Unverschämlichkeit gegenüber Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels usw. und ihren Mittstern handelt, dann besteht wohl kein Unterschied in der Unverschämlichkeit zwischen "der" Emigration und den Redaktionen der "Tat" und der "Zeit". Sollte aber vielleicht zum Ausdruck gebracht werden, dass die angebliche "Unverschämlichkeit" in individuellen Reaktionen bestanden habe?

Das wäre eine derart minderwertige und erbürliche Unterstellung, dass jeder, der darauf eingeht, sich besudeln würde.

"Die" Emigration also soll die "formidable Opposition im "eigenen Haus" darstellen. Das ist der erste Beweis für die Ahnungslosigkeit des Verfassers hinsichtlich der Tatsachen. Ich schätze, dass etwa 95% der ehemaligen Emigranten naturalisierte britische Staatsbürger sind. Sie "wohnen" also nicht "in eigenem Hause" des Generalkonsulats. Die soziologische Zusammensetzung der einstigen Emigranten ist so, dass die grosse Mehrzahl politisch vollkommen uninteressiert ist und an der Errichtung des Generalkonsulats wahrscheinlich so interessiert ist wie an der Neubesetzung der Peruanischen Gesandtschaft.

Ich komme zu dem zweiten Teil der Nachricht. Ich schicke voraus, dass ich mich dadurch nicht getroffen fühle. Ich arbeite, wie Sie wissen, im Research Department des Foreign Office, nicht im Foreign Office. Ich nehme auch keine "machtvolle und einflussreiche Position" ein. Ich kann Ihnen versichern, dass es im eigentlichen Foreign Office überhaupt keine ehemaligen Deutschen Staatsangehörigen gibt, in der German Section des Foreign Office gibt es eine minimale Zahl; keiner von ihnen nimmt eine "machtvoll und einflussreiche Position" ein.

Der erste Teil der Meldung enthält Behauptungen, die der Verfasser mit den in solchen Fällen üblichen "Hindrieken" und "Stimmungsbildern" zu stützen versuchen mag. Der zweite Teil ist nachweisbar erlogen. Deshalb ist der Zusatz "in Londoner diplomatischen Kreisen wird damit gerechnet, dass...." so ungeheuer blamabel! Es wird diesen Kreisen - d.h. den Mitgliedern diplomatischer Missionen - die gleiche Ignoranz unterstellt, die dem Verfasser der Meldung ausreicht (ganz abgesehen davon, dass die Mitglieder diplomatischer Missionen in London mit so Sicherheit gegenseitig Wahrscheinlichkeit wichtigeres zu tun haben, als sich um die Stimmung in "der" deutschen Emigration zu kümmern).

Die "Zeit"-Meldung ist das Produkt eines miserablen verantwortungslosen Dummkopfs, der nichts weiss, nicht denken und nicht schreiben kann. Wenn Ihnen dieses Urteil zu hart erscheint, lesen Sie bitte die Meldung "Vogelstrausspolitik im englischen Unterhaus" in der Ausgabe der "Zeit" vom 28. Juni. Ich habe seine Berichte bisher als erheiternde Expectorationen eines Produkts der Kenton-Universität in Selwynia gewürdigt. Aber die Sache hat einige ernstere Aspekte.

- 3 -

Es besteht vielfach die Ansicht, dieser kümmerliche Wicht werde von den Lehrgängern einer bestimmten Richtung informiert, die auch die Meldung "Schlange-Schoeningens wird es nicht leicht haben" inspiriert hätten in der Hoffnung, sie werde in Deutschland nachgedruckt werden.

Ferner bedauere ich sehr, dass Herr Gerwin, der wegen seiner sorgfältigen und verantwortungsbewussten Berichterstattung allgemein geschätzt wird, natürlicherweise als der Verfasser der Nachricht in der "Zeit" angesehen wird. "Die Zeit" hat hier viele, "Die Tat" wenige Leser. Wer kommt auf den absurden Gedanken, dass "Die Zeit", die einen gut unterrichteten Korrespondenten in London hat, diese Histortreppengeschichte auf dem Umweg über Zürich bezieht?

Endlich ist die Meldung ein Schlag gegen alle, die sich um Verständigung bemühen - um die Deutsch-britische Verständigung und um die Verständigung zwischen Ausgewanderten und Deingebliebenen. Es wird den Ausgewanderten eine schlechte Gesandung - die "Unversöhnlichkeit" - und implizite ein verderbliches Wirken in "machtvollen und einflussreichen Positionen" unterstellt. Es wird der britischen Regierung implizite unterstellt, dass ihre Deutschland-Politik von den Inhabern dieser Positionen beeinflusst, wenn nicht gar gesteuert wird. Ich werde nicht überrascht sein, wenn Berlin, Richter usw. demnächst behaupten werden, dass die Demontage und andere Argernisse von "der" deutschen Emigration erfunden seien - unter Berufung auf eine so seriöse Quelle wie "Die Zeit".

Bitte betrachten Sie diesen Brief als persönlich - er ist weder im ganzen noch teilweise zur Veröffentlichung bestimmt. Sie können ihn natürlich Herrn Wügel und anderen Redaktionsmitgliedern mitteilen.

Kaufmann

Institut für Zeitgeschichte – Archiv

Abschrift eines Briefes von Justus Delbrück
 an seinen Sohn Klaus- Waldemar
 aus dem Gefängnis Lehrterstrasse im Advent 1944

Wie soll ich Dich empfangen
 Und wie begegn' ich Dir,
 Du aller Wäit Verlangen
 Du meiner Seele Zier.
 O Jesu Jesu setze mir selbst die Fackel bei
 damit, was Dich ergetze, mir kund und wissend sei.

Was hast Du unterlassen
 zu meinem Trost und Freud,
 da Leib und Seele sassen
 inihrem grössten Leid,
 Als mir das Reich genommen, da Fried und Freude lacht,
 Da bist Du mien Heil kommen, und hast mich froh gemacht.

====888=====

Mein lieber Klaus !

das hübsche kleine Buch kommt mir gerade
 recht, so habe ich auch einen Platz, um mit Dir etwas zu
 schwätzen. Seitdem Du in Demmin bist, denke ich immer besonders
 an Dich, weil Du nun auch schon so allein bist. Wenn der Frei-
 tag kommt, denk ich: nun freut sich der Klaus schon auf das
 Wochenende, un dann am Sonnabend male ich mir aus, wie Du an-
 kommst, und wie Muschka sich freut und Feli und Hänschen und
 wie auch unsre süsse kleine Gabriele lacht und Dich anstrahlt,
 wenn sie Dich erkennt.- Und dann bete ich, Gott möge Dir einen
 schönen Sonntag schenken.

So ein Sonntag hat nach meiner Erfahrung oft
 zwei Klippen: eine morgens, eine abends.

Am morgen, wenn es so recht schönes Wetter
 ist, und alles da ist, was wir lieben, da kommt plötzlich so
 ein merkwürdiges Gefühl der Leere, als fehlte da doch noch
 irgend etwas zu unserm Glück, und wir ärgern uns über eine Klei-
 nigkeit, die nicht nach unserm Wunsch ist, so wie der alte Faust
 sagt: so sind am härtesten wir gequält, im Reichtum fühlend, was
 uns fehlt." Klaus, mein liebster Klaus, ~~xxxxxxx~~Morgen, danke

Gott am Morgen, dass er Dich das Licht seines Tages sehen lässt und Dir Menschen gegeben hat, die Dich lieben und die Du liebst.

Kommt aber der Abend heran, so fällt uns auf einmal ein, dass der schöne Tag vorüber geht, und die Woche mit ihren Sorgen fällt uns auf die Seele und das Glück, das uns am Morgen so selbstverständlich schien, dass wir darüber hinweggesehen haben, scheint uns am Abend so bedroht, dass wir es vor Angst nicht mehr geniessen können.

Klaus, mein lieber Klaus, bete am Abend, damit Du erkennst, dass unser Glück hier nur ein schwacher Widerschein des ewigen, unverlierbaren Glückes ist. "Darum sorget nicht für den morgenden Tag, es ist genug, dass jeder Tag seine eigene Plage habe."

Du wirst nun schon 14 Jahre, und ich denke an die Zeit, als ich 14 Jahre alt wurde. Das war am 25. November 1916, mitten im ersten Weltkriege. Bomben gabs ja damals nicht in Berlin, und so brauchten wir unser schönes Haus im Grunewald nicht zu verlassen.

Aber sonst war's ähnlich und im Essen schwieriger, jedenfalls der Kohlrübenwinter ist mir in nicht angenehmer Erinnerung. Die Reifen von den Rädern wurden beschlagnahmt und das hat mich am meisten betrübt. Dann sah ich in dem bitterkalten Winter 1917 uns in zwei Zimmern um Gas- und Petroleumöfchen hocken. Dann waren wir Jungens auch immer irgendwie beschäftigt mit Sammlungen und auf andre Weise, obwohl es nicht so durchorganisiert war, wie heute. Zur Landarbeit kam ich zum ersten Mal im Herbst 1917, also mit 15 Jahren. Wir hackten Kartoffeln auf einer Domäne in der Neumark. Ich war der Jüngste und fand es recht anstrengend. Schön war es dann im nächsten Sommer, wenn auch die Arbeitszeit lang, die Hitze gross und die Schuhe hart und schlecht waren. Ich blieb aber mit zwei Kameraden noch länger und wir vertilgten täglich 30 Pfund Kartoffeln. Am Sonntag waren wir zum Mittag auf dem Gut eingeladen und da gab es richtigen Braten und ich ärgerte mich jedesmal, dass wir nicht den richtigen Wochenhunger hatte, weil am Sonntag auch das Frühstück gut und spät war. In der letzten Zeit des Krieges waren wir auch als Sanitäter eingesetzt. Wir erwarteten die Lazarettzüge auf den Bahnhöfen und halfen als Träger beim Transport in die Lazarette.

In der Schule gab es immer neue Hilfslehrer als Ersatz für die Eingezogenen. Das war zum Lernen nicht sehr förderlich, trug aber zu unserer Belustigung bei.

So erinnere ich mich noch an einen schwächtigen Mann, den lehrer H e n r i, der trug selber gern Gedichte vor, obwohl er mit der Zunge anstiess und spuckte. Wir feuerten seinen Rifer natürlich an und belohnten ihn mit einem tobenden, brüllenden Beifall, sodass mir das Männchen schon leid tat. Aber nach der Stunde sagte es zu mir und einigen Kameraden, er hätte sich heute doch gefreut, eine solche Begeisterung hätte er garnicht erwartet -- da muss ich heute noch lachen.

Auf gute Schulzeugnisse legte zum Glück für mich mein Vater keinen besonderen Wert, nur, dass man nicht sitzen blieb. Und als ich einmal mit einem unangenehmen Lehrer Schwierigkeiten hatte, erzählte er mir die Ermahnung meines Urgrossvaters Henning an seinen Sohn Ottobald: "Betrachte Deine Lehrer als wilde Tiere und sieh zu, wie Du mit ihnen fertig wirst", "Ich sage Dir das nicht" fügte er auf die besorgte Einwendung von Mama hinzu, "ich erzähle es Dir nur."

Aber abgesehen von dem despektierlichen Vergleich ist die Lebensregel garnicht so schlecht, da man nach Hagenbeck den wilden Tieren am besten mit einer mit Vorsicht gepaarten Freundlichkeit begegnet.

Im übrigen war aber sonst in unserer Schule ein netter und freier Ton zwischen Lehrern und Schülern, sodass es besonderer Vorsicht nicht bedurfte, um mit den Lehrern auszukommen, und in den höheren Klassen gab es auch zwei ausgezeichnete Lehrer, Martin Havenstein und Walter Krantz, von denen man etwas haben konnte. Nur fehlte es mir in griechisch zu sehr an den Grundlagen, wie ich überhaupt bedaure, nicht mehr in der Schule gelernt zu haben. Auch in den Naturwissenschaften wüsste ich gerne mehr.

Es liegt also schon in Deinem Eigenem Interesse, auf der Schule alles zu lernen, was man lernen kann, denn nichts holt man später schwerer nach.

Nun kommt aber auch die Zeit, wo ein eignes Interesse für dies oder jenes Gebiet bei Dir erwachen wird. Dann halte Dich dran. Das ist noch wichtiger als Schulfleiss. Als ich mit 15 - 16 Jahren anfang, mich für Geschichte zu interessieren, da erinnere ich mich noch, dass ich mir zu Mommsens römischer Geschichte selbst ein Pensum gemacht habe, eine Seitenzahl, die ich täglich lesen wollte, denn zwischen den Partien, die mich interessierten, standen auch manche, zu denen ich mich zwingen musste. In der schönen Literatur waren es die historischen Romane und die Gedichte von C.F. Meyer, die mich begeisterten. Ich habe sie aber später nicht mehr zur Hand genommen. Lene schickte mir eben etwas von ihm und unter den Gedichten finde ich gute alte Bekannte, und die Ballade vom Tode des Vercingetorix finde ich wieder sehr schön. Die Klassiker Goethe und Schiller und auch Shakespeare las ich auch erst in dem Gefühl, man müsste sie gelesen haben, viel zu früh. Zu diesen Sachen soll man sich nicht zwingen. Die Wunderwelt der Poesie kommt zu uns, wenn wir ihrer bedürfen. Aber wenn Du ein Gesicht schön findest, so lerne es auswendig, es ist ein unendliches Vergnügen, den Wohlklang einer schönen Sprache zu ahnen - das ich eben sehr geniesse, eine Scene nach der andern aus dem Faust lernend.

Im November 1918 stand ich vor meinem 16. Geburtstag. Mit dem preussisch-deutschen Kaiserreich zerbrach das Reich, dem die Familie Delbrück seit Generationen eng verbunden war, und der 70. Geburtstag meines Vaters am 11. November 1918 war ie eine Totenfeier. Aber wenn man jung ist, kann man nicht nur um Verlornes trauern, und ich spürte etwas Neues. Mit der Inflation, die nun einsetzte, ging auch die materielle Grundlage des Bürgertums weithin verloren, und gerade darin fand ich etwas, das meine Phantasie reizte. Ich erinnere mich noch, dass ich einmal zu meinem Vater sagte, ich hätte von der Zeit vor 1914 die Vorstellung von einer vergoldeten, weisslackierten Kinderstube, und jetzt wäre es mir wohler. Die Einschränkungen des Krieges hatte ich aus Patriotismus gerne auf mich genommen bis zu einem Versuch, barfuss zu laufen. Nun war mir der alte Sokrates ein geliebtes Vorbild. Seine Lehre, dass man niemals etwas auf die Meinung der Menge geben dürfe, und sich stetes nur um das Urteil der Guten und Edlen - oder Schönen, wie es die Griechen ausdrückten - zu kümmern habe, legte ich

mir so aus, dass alle, die etwas auszusetzen hatten an meiner alten Militärjacke mit Schillerkragen, den unordentlichen Wickelgamaschen, den lange nicht geschnittenen Haaren - gehörten dann nicht zu den Guten und Edlen, auf die es allein ankam. Ich erinnere mich noch, wie ich als Primaner einmal mit Wohlbehagen erzählte, dass man mich in der Stadt für einen Laufburschen gehalten habe, und Hanni machte mir Vorhaltungen und sagte, jeder müsse sich nach seinem Stande kleiden. Ich rief meinem Vater zum Schiedsrichter an und war sehr erstaunt, als er nur ruhig sagte: "Hanne hat recht.". Nach seiner Art machte er aber gar keinen weiteren Versuch, mich von meinem verkehrten Standpunkt abzubringen.

In der Schule fühlte ich mich in den letzten Jahren durchaus wohl. Die damals versuchsweise eingeführte Wahlfreiheit in einzelnen Fächern benutzte ich, um mehr griechisch zu nehmen, und wenn es auch mit der Grammatik leider schwach war, so erkannte man doch mein Interesse an. Die weiteren Segnungen der Revolution, der Schülerrat und die Vollversammlung in der Aula, benutzte ich allerdings nur, um mich darüber lustig zu machen und Verwirrung zu stiften. Im februar 1920 machte ich mit einiger Mühe mein Abitur und nun wartete ich in Verachtung aller Formen die feierliche Verabschiedung in der Aula garnicht ab, sondern setzte mich in der dunklen Frühe in einen Wagen 4. Klasse, um nach Dortmund zu fahren. Dort wollte ich bis zum Beginn des Semesters im Bergwerk arbeiten. Damals hatten die Personenzüge noch die 4. Klasse, die Wagen waren ohne Abteile, wie die Gepäckwagen, mit nur einer Bank an jeder Wand. Eine Fahrt 3. Klasse für den D-Zug, mit dem ich in der halben Zeit hingekommen wäre, hätte mir mein Vater auch gegeben, aber das ging auf keinen Fall. Ein anständiger Mensch konnte nicht in der 3. oder gar 2. Klasse fahren, da fuhren nur engherzige Philister. In der 4. Klasse dagegen fuhren die freien Menschen, die sich gegenseitig halfen und sich freundlich unterhielten.

In Dortmund suchte ich mir ein Quartier und ging treppauf, treppab, da kam mir schon auf der Strasse ein Arbeiter nach und sagte, die Frau in der Wohnung oben wollte mich doch aufnehmen, sie hätte gedacht, ich würde sonst zu den Leuten unten im Hause gehen, und das wären schlechte Menschen, und ich könnte mit in seinem Zimmer schlafen. So hatte ich denn Quartoer in der Tremonias 30, den Namen der guten Leute habe ich vergessen. Der Mann war d.h. auf der Zeche Tremonia und mein Zimmergenosse Heinrich arbeitete dort auch. Er besass ausserdem eine kleine Landwirtschaft, dort wohnte seine Frau, und er fuhr übers Wochenende hin. Da er meist in der Nachtschicht arbeitete, sah ich ihn wenig. Dann bekam ich auch meine Grubenlampe und fuhr mit in den Schacht. Immer 24 Leute hockten sich in einen Aufzug, und dann raste es abwärts, dass die Ohren sausten. Unten musste ich noch 40 Minuten wandern, oft mich bückend, bis ich zum 10. Bau, einem kleinen Kohlenaufzug, kam. Hier wurde erst noch eine kleine Schmökpause gemacht bis der Letzte heran war - 700 Arbeiter fuhren in 20 Minuten ein - und dann blieb ich allein, denn meine Aufgabe war es, die leeren Wagen hin und die vollen hinaus zu ziehen und mit einer Gabel auf dem ständig laufenden Drahtseil auf die Fahrt zu

schicken.

Zuerst war ich in der Nachmittagsschicht eingesetzt, da wurde mehr gebaut und weniger Kohlen gefördert. So hatte ich ein bequemes Leben und das verdross mich gewaltig, denn ich war doch nicht nur hergekommen, um das Geld für das Studium zu verdienen, sondern wollte auch etwas schwieriges erleben, da ich doch den Schützengraben nicht mehr kennen gelernt hatte.

Nachher kam ich dann mit in die Frühschicht und da ging's flott zu und man musste aufpassen, dass es keine Stockung gab durch entgleisen beim Heraufziehen, denn von dem Zeitlauf der leeren Wagen hing die Förderung und der Akkord der Arbeiter ab. Mein grösster Wunsch, selbst mit vor die Kohle zu kommen, erfüllte sich hier aber nicht. Das lernte ich erst später im alten Wilhelmsschacht in Zwickau kennen. Dort lag ich mit in einem heissen nur etwa einen meter hohen Flöz und arbeitete mit Feuereifen mit Spitzhacke und Schaufel bei anfeuernd taktmässigem Geratter der Kohlenrutsche. Und als mir ein Arbeiter sagte: "Du machst aber garnicht schlapp", da war das die herrlichste Auszeichnung.

Während ich aber so stolz war, ein Bergarbeiter zu sein, konnte ich mich nicht genug wundern, dass die Arbeiter selbst immer nur davon sprachen, wie verachtet der Stand der Bergarbeiter sei, und dass sie ihre Kennzeichen, die blauen Kaffeeflaschen, beim Gang durch die Stadt sorgsam versteckten. Auch noch anderes fiel mir auf. So konnten meine Kumpels es nicht mit ansehen, dass ich keinen Hut hatte, und schliesslich schenkte mir einer einen alten schwarzen Filz, den ich auch in der Grube tatsächlich getragen habe. Auch fragten sie mich bald, warum ich mich nicht rasierte, denn die jungen Arbeiter waren stolz darauf, sich möglichst früh zu rasieren. Mein Hauswirt genierte sich, mit einem uneingewickelten Brot über die Strasse zu gehen. So merkte ich bald, dass Sitten dieser Art hier genau so fest geachtet waren wie bei den Bürgern. Das eigentümlich freie und unbefangene im Wesen des Arbeiters im Gegensatz zum Bürger liegt nicht in weniger festen Sitten - wo sie weniger fest sind, ist es nicht gut - sondern darin, dass der Handarbeiter sich und seine Tätigkeit nicht so wichtig nimmt wie der Beamte seinen Dienst oder der Kaufmann sein Geschäft. Ein Mensch, der sich wichtig nimmt, ist unfrei, er muss immer aufpassen, dass auch ja alle seine Wichtigkeit anerkennen. Bei den Bauern im Kreis Stade habe ich es später auch gesehen: Unbefangen, offen in ihrem Wesen und gastfreundlich waren die armen Geestbauern, während es viel schwieriger war, zu den dicken Marschbauern ein menschliches Verhältnis zu gewinnen. Und bei den klugen Leuten ist es so wie Claudius an seinen Sohn schreibt: will einer dich lehren, so sieh, ob er sich etwas dünkt. Dünkt er sich was, so lass ihn ziehn." Beim Adel heisst's "Noblesse oblige."

Zum Sommersemester fuhr ich dann nach Heidelberg. In eine Studentenverbindung einzutreten, kam bei meiner Anschauung natürlich nicht in Frage. Ich ass nicht einmal in der Mensa, dem Studentenm Mittagstisch, sondern in der Volksküche, und anstatt Fechten lernte ich Boxen. Aber zum Glück für mich, hatte der alte Sokrates das Weintrinken nicht verschmäht, ja nach dem Bericht von Plato im Sym-

position beim Gastmahl sogar erstaunliche Trinkfestigkeit bewiesen. So habe ich mit meinen Freunden nicht nur dem Pfälzer, sondern auch dem süßen griechischen Wein in der alten Weinstube in Neckergmünd sehr genossen, dabei konnte man dann auch das Biersaufen herrlich verachten. Zu Pfingsten aber wanderten wir durch den Schwarzwald zum Bodensee, dem himmlischen Bodensee, und noch ein Abstecher nach Vorarlberg in die Alpen. Das Schönste aber ist der Schwarzwald mit seinen grünen Tälern, den dichten dunklen Wäldern und den klaren Wasserbächen, so schön zum abkochen.- Das wäre was, wenn's der liebe Gott erlaubte, dass wir's nochmal zusammen machen.

Was das Studieren angeht, so fing ich gleich ernsthaft an, denn ich hatte das Gefühl, ich müsste gegenüber der Schule etwas ausgleichen. So trieb ich nicht nur meine Liebhaberei Geschichte, zu der sich jetzt auch die Philosophie gesellte, sondern fing auch frühzeitig an, mich in die Juristerei zu vertiefen. Dass ich Jura studierte, und nicht der Modestimmung folgend, die Volkswirtschaft, die Nationalökonomie, hatte ich meinem Vater zu verdanken. "Die ganze Nationalökonomie kann die Katze am Schwanz wegziehen", sagte er, und das genügte mir. Und ich bin froh, dass ich auf der Universität keine Zeit damit vergeudet habe. Ich habe es später durch Lektüre von Zeitungen und einigen Büchern gut nachgeholt. Die Juristerei ist aber eine schwierige Materie und braucht ein richtiges Studium, wie das Latein auf der Schule. Nimm mit in Demmin, was Du kannst, Man holt es später nicht nach und möchte es doch gern haben.- Ueber das juristische Denken schilt man zwar viel, aber das sind die vielen schlechten Juristen, die es in Verruf gebracht haben- wie die Frömmler die Frömmigkeit.- Den ersten Begriff vom Recht bekam ich durch das alte Buch von Ihering über den Geist des römischen Rechts. Ich las es in den Semesterferien, wenn ich aus der Grube in Zwickau kam. Das juristische Arbeiten liess ich mir aber schon ~~zum~~ im zweiten Semester von einem sogenannten Pepetitor beibringen : ein Rechtsanwalt, der Lehrtalent und praktische Erfahrung besass. Die Professoren besitzen beides meist nicht , und ich habe nicht sehr viel Kollegs gehört , auch darin bestärkt von meinem Vater, der mir einen Ausspruch von Gneist, einem berühmten Rechtslehrer seiner Jugend, erzählte: er hätte dreierlei Studenten, die einen sähe er täglich vor sich sitzen und fleissig mitschreiben, das wären die künftigen Amtsrichter, die anderen sähe er zweimal im Semester, nämlich beim an- und abtestieren des Kollegbesuches, und das wären die künftigen Kammergerichts- und Ministerialräte. Und die dritten, die lernte er überhaupt nicht kennen, und das wären die zukünftigen Minister."-- In den andern Fächern habe ich manch interessante Kollegs gehört, aber keinen Lehrer gefunden, der mich besonders beeinflusst hätte. Bei weitem das Meiste habe ich aus Büchern gewonnen. Mein Vater las schon seit 1918 nicht mehr an der Universität, aber von ihm erhielt ich für Geschichte und Philosophie zwei Richtpunkte: Ranke und Hegel . Von Ranke habe ich im Laufe der Jahre alles gelesen und manches mehrfach, und immer den grössten Genuss daran gehabt. Bis zu Hegels schwerer Metaphysik bin ich nicht vorgedrungen. Ich habe mich mit Kant, Fichte und den abgeplagt und schliesslich entdeckt, dass die Frage, die mich am meisten bewegte, die der Willensfreiheit, im Christentum ihre Lösung

findet in der paradoxen Form, in der Luther es in der Schrift 'Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen' ausdrückt: Der Christ ist ein Herr aller Dinge und niemand untertan, und ein Knecht, jedermann untertan.

Mein Vater hat mich auch einmal gefragt, ob ich nicht Lust hätte, Geschichte zu má nem Hauptfach zu machen. Die grossen Perioden der Weltgeschichte seien allerdings durch Ranke - und seine Ergänzung durch Einfügung der Kriegsverfassung in das politische Bild - endgültig aufgeheilt. Auf einzelnen Feldern gäbe es aber doch noch manche Nachlese zu halten. So sehr mich aber auch die Geschichte interessierte, der Forschung, und noch dazu der Nachlese, wollte ich mein Leben nicht widmen. So hoch ich die Welt in den Büchern schätzte, so wollte ich doch selber nicht durch Bücher wirken, sondern von Mensch zu Mensch. Mein Vater hatte aber Bedenken, ob mir die Beamtenlaufbahn behagen würde, weil es mir an der hierfür nötigen Fügsamkeit fehle. So sehr ich aber auch von meinem Vater den Geist der Unabhängigkeit und sogar des Widerspruchs geerbt habe, so habe ich mich doch in der Verwaltung nicht unwohl gefühlt - mit Ausnahme der Referendarjahre, in denen der Widerwille gegen schulmässigen Zwang mit verstärkter Gewalt erwachte. Manchmal habe ich anders gewollt, aber auch meinen Willen gegenüber Vorgesetzten durchsetzen können. Ein Grund, weshalb ich mich auch als Beamter nicht unfrei gefühlt habe, ist, dass ich mir mein Glück nie von einer Carrière abhängig gemacht habe. Dazu hat mir wieder die Philosophie verholfen. So war ich schon als Student überzeugt, dass es keinen Unterschied macht, ob man der Nachwelt, wie mein Onkel Clemens Delbrück, als Minister eine Reichsversicherungsordnung hinterlässt, oder als Amtsrichter auf dem Dorfe eine Reihe guter Entscheidungen und besonders im Andenken in den Herzen der Menschen - darin sehe ich auch beim Beamten den eigentlichen Sinn des Lebens.

Ich erinnere mich auch noch, als einmal, während des Studiums durch die fortschreitende Inflation die wirtschaftliche Situation meines Vaters so bedroht schien, dass es fraglich war, ob ich weiter studieren könne, ob sich das bei den allgemeinen Niedergangserscheinungen überhaupt lohne. Da sprach Papa davon, es wäre besser, man würde Moorsiedler mit Kuh und Ziege und in meiner Phantasie habe ich mich lebhaft mit diesem Gedanken beschäftigt. Tante Lene schrieb mir, ich sollte doch auch noch mehr Erinnerungen an Grosspapa aufschreiben, aber das hat ja Grossmama so herlich von jedem Jahr aufgeschrieben, und von den Jahren, die noch fehlen, da fehlen mir die Schriften und Briefe, die Grossmama alle benutzt hat.

An ein Gesprächsthema anscheinend der Zeit nach dem Kriege erinnere ich mich noch besonders: das Frauenstudium. Grosspapa war garnicht dafür und er mochte die Studentinnen aus der Universität nicht sehen, besonders gar, wenn sie in Sandalen ohne Strümpfe herum liefen. Einmal, das war wohl schon vor dem Kriege, hat er in einer Rede gesagt, es hätte ihm garnicht gefallen, dass bei einem Universitätsfest Frauenzimmer zwischen den Studenten an den Kneiptischen gesessen hätten. Da kam nachher eine Führerin zu ihm und beschwerte sich über den Ausdruck "Frauenzimmer". Grosspapa lachte aber nur und sagte mit erhobnem Finger "Frauenzimmerchen, Frauenzimmerchen!", wie der Wachtmeister Werner in der Minna von Barnhelm. Ja, "chen", sagte sie, "das ist was andres!"

Also gelehrte, und besonders schriftstellernde Frauen

mochte Grosspapa (mit wenigen Ausnahmen) nicht. Das ist aber mehr etwas für Feli- also Feli, werde mir nicht zu gelehrt! Wie? das willst Du auch garnicht? Du willst es machen, wie die Müllerstochter, die nicht spinnen wollte? na so was, da pass man auf, dass der Prinz auch kommt. Und mein Hänschen, wie willst Du es machen? Wie Hans mein Igel? wie Hans im Glück? einen fröhlichen Mut hast Du ja, so kann's nicht fehlen. Passt nur auf, alle drei, dass Ihr das graue Männchen, oder den Fuchs nicht überseht, der Euch hilft, den goldnen Vogel aus dem goldnen Schloss zu holen und fliegt auch nicht fort wie die sieben Raben, dass meine süsse kleine Gabriele Euch suchen muss in allen vier Winden ..

Klaus, ja, und wenn Du einmal eine Frau suchst, so musst Du sicher selber wissen, welches die Rechte ist, - nur vor einem ist mir bange- denn weisst Du, Du hast eine Mutter - solch eine Mutter, das wissen wir beide - und da wirst Du am Ende vergleichen und das tue nicht, da rate ich Dir gut, Du würdest nirgende eine Frau finden - der liebe Gott wiederholt sich nicht ..

Aber Feli und Gabrielchen, Euch kann ich da noch einen ganz guten Rat geben: stellt den Kerl neben die Brüder. hält er's aus, so könnt Ihr's zufrieden sein.

Aber ich bin abgekommen, und ich überlese, was ich von meinem Primitivitätskult, der Verachtung aller Aeusserlichkeiten aufgeschrieben habe. Ich erzähle Dir das nicht zur Nachahmung. Alle Güter der Welt, und dazu gehören auch die sogenannten Aeusserlichkeiten, sollen wir geniessen, wie sie uns zufallen. Wir sollen uns nur nicht von ihnen abhängig machen, und nur insofern ist es nicht schlecht, dass man sich einmal selbst zeigt, dass es wirklich nicht darauf ankommt.

Allerdings bleibt immer die Frage zu beantworten, wie weit uns die guten Dinge wirklichen Genuss bieten, und ob wir uns nicht manchmal täuschen lassen. Wenn ich lese, wie vergnügt mein Grossvater Berthold Delbrück mit seiner ganzen Familie als Kreisrichter in Bergen auf Rügen lebte in dem kleinen Haus, das Du gesehen hast, mit einem gewiss kärglichen Gehalt und ohne Radio, Auto, Eisenbahn und auch ohne Centralheizung und W.C., so scheint mir die Frage sehr nahe zu liegen, ob uns die Wunder der Technik nicht in Wahrheit goldene Ketten geschmiedet haben. Sie haben uns die Grosstadt mit ihrer Unruhe und allgemein eine viel zu lange Arbeitszeit gebracht. Früher gab's keine Ferien, aber nicht, weil man mehr arbeitete, sondern weil man jeden Tag mit einem richtigen Feierabend beschloss. Es gibt doch nur zwei Quellen menschlichen Glücks: die Natur und die Geselligkeit, und sind wir da weiter gekommen, oder sind wir nicht viel mehr in der Lage Faustens, von dem der Teufel sagt:

Ihm hat das Schicksal einen Geist gegeben,
der ungebändigt immer forwärts dringt, und dessen übereiltes Streben
der Erde Freuden überspringt.

Ihn schlepp ich durch das wilde Leben
durch flache Unbedeutendheit,
er soll mir zappeln, starren, kleben,
und seiner Unersättlichkeit
soll Speis- und Trank vor gier'gen Lippen schweben.
Er soll umsonst Erquickung sich erflahn.
Und hätt er sich auch nicht dem Teufel übergeben

er müsste doch zu Grunde gehn.

Und als am Schluss der alte Faust sein stolzes Bekenntnis zum Erdenglück im rastlosen Vorwärtsschreiten ausspricht - da erwidert ihm höhnisch die Sorge :

Wen ich einmal mir besitze,
dem ist alle Welt nichts nütze,
Ewiges Dister steigt herunter
Sonne geht nicht auf noch unter,
bei vollkommen aussem Sinnen,
wohnen Finsternisse drinnen,
und er weiss von allen Schätzen
sich nicht in Besitz zu setzen,
Glück und Unglück wird zur Grille,
er verhungert in der Fülle,
ist der Zukunft vorgewärtig,
und so wird er niemals fertig .-

Es gibt auch noch andere böse Lebensgefährten, die uns necken und quälen. Auch die Eifersucht - die mit Eifer sucht, was Leiden schafft - ist so ein unheimlicher Geselle. So verneigt sich der heilige Greis vor dem jungen Dimitri Karamasoff bis zur Erde in Ehrfurcht vor den künftigen Leiden, da ihm sein Anblick eine edle aber wilde und eifersüchtige Seele enthüllt. Nun, wir sind friedlicher, und haben nicht das wilde Blut der Karamasoffs. Aber ein wenig schwer machen wir es uns doch auch. Ich will Dir aber auch erzählen, was ich Gutes über die Eifersucht gelesen habe. So ist die Eifersucht eine notwendige Begleiterscheinung der menschlichen Liebe. Jede Liebe will das Geliebte ganz und ausschliesslich besitzen, und je stärker die Liebe, desto eifriger wacht sie darüber, dass sich kein Dritter hineinmische.

Wie steht es aber vor Gott damit, gehört nicht ihm alle unsere Liebe und allen seinen Geschöpfen? Da sind wir alle in der Lage des ungerechten Haushalters. Wir gehen mit der Liebe Gottes um, als wenn es unser Eigentum wäre. Wir verteilen sie nach Gutdünken, und wen wir lieben, den machen wir gross in unserm Herzen, und erlassen ihm nicht nur, was er uns schuldet, sondern wir erlassen ihm auch und rechtfertigen seine Schuld vor Gott - so erlässt auch der Haushalter den Schuldnern seines Herrn etwas von ihrer Schuld .-aber siehe, der Herr lobte den Haushalter, weil er sich mit dem ungerechten Haushalter Freunde gemacht hatte, und er will ihm die Schätze der Liebe, die er sich bei seinen Freunden gesammelt hat, anrechnen. So ist es herrlich zu wissen, dass unsere Liebe hier immer ein Durchbrechen zur göttlichen Liebe ist, dass, wenn wir in der Liebe vereint sind, uns nichts-nichts nichts trennen kann.---

So ist's und so hab ichs geschrieben, und nun hoffe

- 10 -

ich sehr, Du kannst es schon zum Geburtstag haben und die gute beste Tante Lena holt es ab und schickt es Dir. Weisst Du, es ist schön, eine Schwester zu haben. Mit der Schwester gehen wir durchs ganze Leben. Mann und Frau kennen ihre Jugend, die Eltern unser Alter nicht. So ungefähr lässt Sophokles seine Antigone sagen. Das musst Du auch lesen, überhaupt die Griechen, aber davon können wir später noch viel schwätzen.

Grüss und küss Muschka, meine liebe Feli, mein Hänschen und die süsse holde Gabriele

Dein treuer Vater.

Auszüge aus Justus Delbrücks letztem Tagebuch
im Gestapo- Gefängnis in Berlin Lehrterstrasse 1945
an seine Frau Ellen.

..... mein ganzes Wesen webt in Dir. Eben habe ich Dir
wiedermal die dramatische Scene vorgespielt, in der Faust sich dem
Teufel verschreibt - ach ganz durch Dich fühle ich den Jammer
seiner Hoffnungslosigkeit -

"Des morgens wach ich mit Entsetzen auf
und möchte heisse Tränen weinen
den Tag zu sehn, der mir in seinem Lauf
nicht einen Wunsch erfüllen wird, nicht einen.."

Beim deklamieren enthüllt sich mir erst die ganze wunderbare Musik
der Sprache. Wie kein Kirchenlied klingen mir die Verse aus der
1. Scene, als er die Glocken und die Chöre hört, die ihn zurückhalten
das Gift zu trinken.

"Welch tiefes Summen, welcher helle Ton
zieht mit Gewalt das Glas von meinem Munde.
Verkündigt Ihr dumpfen Glocken schon
des Osterfestes erste Feierstunde ?
Und Ihr, Ihr Chöre singt Ihr schon
den tröstlichen Gesang,
der einst in dunkler Nacht von Engelslippen klang ?
Gewissheit einem neuen Bunde .--

Ach und weisst Du, auch den letzten Akt, den ich Dir noch vor
kurzem- war es nicht im vorigen Herbst ? - einmal vorlas, auch
ihn kann ich jetzt auswendig - die entzückende Scene mit den beiden
Alten, Philemon und Baucis - Du musst sie immer wieder lesen. Manch-
mal denke ich auch, Klaus sitzt schon dabei und hört zu.

"Liebe, menschlich zu beglücken
nähert sie ein edles Zwei
doch zu göttlichem Entzücken
bildet sie ein köstlich Drei.--

Und in der Scene, in der Faust mit Mephisto in der Walpurgisnacht
auf den Brocken wandert, da denke ich, dass ich mit Klaus die ver-
sprochene Wanderung mache und wir haben uns auch die Zeit des Vor-
frühlings ausgesucht, da noch kein Volk da läuft .--

"Der frühling webt schon in den Birken
und selbst die Fichte fühlt ihn schon
sollt er nicht auch auf unsre Glieder wirken ?

Und auch wir wandern in der Nacht bei Mondschein

" In die Traum- und Zaubersphäre
sind wir, scheint es, eingegangen--

" Uhu schuhu tönt es näher
 Kauz und Kiebitz und der Häher
 Sind sie alle wach geblieben?
 Sind das Molche im Gesträuche
 Lange Beine, dicker Bauch?
 Und die Wurzeln sind die Schlangen,
 aus den Steinen aus dem Sand
 strecken wunderliche Bande
 um den Wanderer zu fangen! --

Ach meine Lieben, weint nicht zu sehr, wenn Ihr dies lest, und es hat nicht sollen sein- ich habe es genossen, und Ihr genießt es auch, schöner und wirklicher, als es unsere ärmliche sogenannte Wirklichkeit je geben kann.

Ach, wohl denke ich und träume ich, wie schön es wäre, zusammen alt zu werden wie Philemon und Baucis - aber doch wäre auch dieses Glück nur ein Traum - sind wir doch nicht nur zu zweit - verbunden mit so vielen Lieben, und so könnten wir dem Todesschmerz nicht entgehen.

.....Ich lese jetzt Goethe- Schillers Briefwechsel und da erwacht meine Lust zu philosophieren und ich denke manchmal ich könnte noch einmal ein Wörtchen sagen und es tut mir auch deshalb leid, dass ich schon abtreten soll- aber das ist Dummheit. Wenn Gott es will, so kann er durch den Tod eines Menschen mehr sagen als durch sein Leben.

Lene hat mir auch ein Buch von meinem Urgrossonkel Friedrich Delbrück geschickt. Das Buch ist seiner Mutter gewidmet und er spricht in dem Vorwort so rührend von seinem und seiner Geschwister Verhältnis zu ihrer Mutter nach dem frühen Tode des Vaters, dass es mir ganz ins Herz gegangen ist - so kann Gott auch in diesem Leben die Wunden heilen, die er geschlagen hat.

..... In den Züricher Novellen von Keller, "Radlaub" finde ich auch den Schlusspruch aus dem Schwabenspiegel, dem berühmtesten deutschen Recht sbuch aus dem Mittelalter :

"Es ist niemand so ungerecht, dem es nicht unbillig dünkt, das, wenn man ihm Unrecht tut. Darum bedarf man weiser Rede und guter Künste, sie in den Rechten zu verwenden. Wer zu allen Zeiten nach dem Recht spricht, der macht sich manchen Feind. Dem soll sich der Biedermann gern unterziehen um Gottes und seiner Ehre Willen und zum

- 3 -

Heil seiner Seele. Der gütige Gott verleihe uns, dass wir das Recht also lieben in dieser Welt, und das Unrecht schwächen in dieser Welt, dass wir dessen geniessen dort, wo Leib und Seele scheiden. "

Dies für die Jungens, ob sie nun Juristen werden, oder sonst als Männer durch die Welt gehen.-

--- Der 83. Psalm beginnt: Gott, schweige doch nicht also, und sei doch nicht so still. Gott, halte doch nicht so inne.--

----- Was Wilhelm Meister am Ende des 15. Kapitels des 4. Buches über das Schicksal sagt, ist wohl wahr.--

(Es ist die Rede von Hamlet. Wilhelm sagt: Hier in unserm Stücke, wie wunderbar: das Pegefeuer sendet seinen Geist und fordert Rache, vergebens! Alle Umstände kommen zusammen und treiben die Rache, vergebens! Weder Irdischen noch Unterirdischen kann gelingen, was dem Schicksal allein vorbehalten ist. Die Gerichtsstunde kommt. Der Böse fällt mit dem Guten. Ein Geschlecht wird weggemäht, und das andere sprosst auf.)

In der Züricher Novelle "Ursula" finde ich das eigentümliche religiöser Schwärmerei, der Lösung von der geheiligten Form, ganz ausgezeichnet dargestellt. Ueberhaupt gibt diese Novelle ein schönes kulturhistorisches Bild der Zeit der Reformation in der Schweiz. Aber das interessiert Dich ja weniger - wie Goethe und Schiller, in deren Briefwechsel ich häufig verächtliche Aeusserungen für die "gemeinen Tatsachen" finde. So schreibt z.B. Schiller bei der Bearbeitung zum Wallenstein, dass ihn die historischen Vorgänge ganz kalt liessen.

Nun lese ich den "Grünen Heinrich", da ich den Wilhelm Meister unterbrechen musste. Der gute Keller zieht mich wieder ganz in den Zauber seiner Poesie und weisst Du was? ich berufe mich doch auf seine Stummheit und nun finde ich im grünen Heinrich, in dem er je sich selbst beschreibt, wirklich eine gewisse Seelenverwandschaft. Weisst Du, diese trotzige Scheu, sein Inneres zu offenbaren, kommt mir sehr bekannt vor.- Auch bei mir hat es schon in der Schule Schwierigkeiten gemacht - hatte ich mich doch beim Abitur geweigert, einen Aufsatz über "Mein Bildungsideal" zu schreiben.- Dann aber die reizende Geschichte mit Anna, wie ist sie in diesen Eigenschaften des grünen Heinrich bestimmt! - Und Du kennst sie ja zur Genüge an mir, besonders aus der Zeit

meines ersten Briefes.---

Aber nicht nur der Grüne Heinrich und ich, sondern auch, nach Ansicht meines guten Lehrers Havenstein, ist auch Shakespeares Brutus durch diese Eigenart charakterisiert. Jedenfalls bemerkte Havenstein dies einmal meinem Bruder Max gegenüber, wobei er allerdings hinzusetzte: "Ihr Bruder hat diese Schamhaftigkeit der Seele schon zu einer besonderen Art von Unverschämtheit ausgebildet!" Beim Lesen des Cäsar konnte ich diese Eigenschaft bei Brutus nicht besonders ausgeprägt finden. Antonius charakterisiert ihn am Schlusse auch nur in der Art, wie er uns aus der Geschicht bekannt ist:

Dies war der beste Römer unter allen, denn jeder der Verschwornen, bis auf ihn, tat, was er tat, aus Missgunst gegen Cäsar. Nur er verband aus reinem Biedersinn und zum gemeinen Wohl sich mit den andern. Sanft war sein Leben, und so mischten sich die Elemente in ihm, dass die Natur aufstehen durfte und der Welt verkünden: Dies war ein Mann! ---

Es ist heute Klaus' Geburtstag und zu seiner Ehre habe ich sein Bild in die Mitte gerückt und "Befiehl du deine Wege" für ihn gebetet - es birgt eine wunderbar einfältige Kraft in allen Versen.

Der schöne und fröhliche 98. Psalm fällt auf den heutigen Tag.--

Ich finde auf einem Zettel etwas aus Goethes Sprüchen, das ich für Klaus notiert habe:

"Verfahre ruhig, still,
brauchst Dich nicht anzupassen,
nur wer was gelten will,
muss andre gelten lassen.--

Mit Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahren bin ich zu Ende. Du und Schiller habt doch recht, es ist ein herrliches Buch-- es ist herrlich, obgleich es sich an einer unmöglichen Aufg be versuchte, das Glück auf Erden als möglich zu erfassen. Es ist ein happy -end.

roman, und das unterscheidet ihn von allen berühmten Nachfolgern des 19. Jahrhunderts.--

Wilhelms Wunsch, durch die Person zu wirken, war auch bei mir das Ende meiner philosophischen Studien. Es kam aber bei mir nicht durch Goethe - denn zu Goethe habe ich erst viel später mit Dir und durch Dich ein Verhältnis gewonnen - sondern bei mir war dieser Wunsch eine Auswirkung der christlichen Wahrheit. Es ist sehr merkwürdig, dass Goethe das Christentum so verkennt; denn er glaubt doch offenbar, in der beschaulichen, auf sich selbst zurückgezogenen "schönen Seele" das spezifisch christliche zu schildern.

Noch mehr verkennt aber Gottfried Keller das Christliche in dem Kapitel "Glaubensmühen". Er ist durchdrungen davon, Gott in der Natur zu schauen, aber vom Glauben und der Liebe und der Seligkeit hat er nur die schwachen Vorstellungen des Verstandes. An Gott glauben ist wohl etwas anderes als zu glauben, dass $2 \text{ mal } 2 = 4$ ist, denn an den durch Christus offenbarten Gott glauben, heisst an die Liebe Gottes glauben und das ist Vereinigung mit Gott, wirkliche Vereinigung, so wie auch an die Liebe eines Menschen glauben, wirkliche Vereinigung bedeutet, denn in der Liebe sind und leben wir wirklich, und werden nicht alt und sterben nicht .-

Es ist Sonntag abend, den 28. Januar. Obwohl die Tage ja hier ziemlich gleichmässig verlaufen, so geniesse ich doch jedes Wochenende und jeden Sonntag so, als hätte ich eine Arbeitswoche hinter mir, und der Sonntag abend wird dann auch richtig von dem besorgten Gefühl beherrscht, was wird die Woche bringen.---

Alarm,- Geballer.-- Feuerwerk und ein ferner Einschlag, es ist vorbei. Berlin hat ja diesen Winter nur wenige und meist leichte Angriffe gehabt.

Diesen Sonntag lebte ich ganz im letzten Teil vom Grünen Heinrich, weisst Du, die Münchner Zeit, das Faschingsfest

mit den beiden Malern, na Du hast es sicher auch vergessen, aber beim Lesen fällt einem da manches wieder ein, aber wir ist es dann so, dass ich auf das, was kommt, denn der Reiz liegt ja nicht in der Handlung, sondern in der entzückenden Schilderung, und dann kommt auch wieder sehr vieles, was man vergessen hat. Ich weiss es, dass er endlich zur Mutter zurückkommt, aber ich kanns garnicht abwarten, morgen die letzten Kapitel zu lesen und dabei zu sein.--

Ach meine Liebste, wie weit ist der Weg ins Heimatland -- so weit, so weit .--

Es ist doch immer wieder schwer, es Gott anheim zu stellen und nicht in eignen Luftschlössern sich zu verlieren.--

Das ist das eigentlich Schöne an den Psalmen, dass sie diese menschliche Not so ganz zum Ausdruck bringen

"Ich glaube, darum rede ich--

ich werde aber sehr geplagt.Ps. 110

Es könnte übrigens sein, dass unsere evangelischen Kirchenlieder deswegen so trocken wirken, weil sie von einer falschen Sicherheit ausgehen. Darin muss man Keller Recht geben, unsere Kirche posaunt uns den Glauben ins Ohr wie $2 \text{ mal } 2 = 4$, eben als ob es nur eine einfache Sache des Begreifens mit dem Verstande wäre - so ist es aber nicht. Der Psalmist ringt mit dem Glauben wie Jakob mit dem Engel- ich lasse Dich nicht, Du segnest mich denn.-- und so ist's.---

Montag. Jetzt habe ich den Grünen Heinrich zu Ende gelesen. Ich hatte es doch wieder ganz vergessen. Die ganze Geschichte mit Dorothea, die nicht ausgesprochene Leidenschaft-- und auch, dass er die Mutter nur sterbend antrifft - ich war selber ganz erschüttert - und schliesslich das Wiedersehen mit der merkwürdigen Judith . Der freisinnige Graf, sein letzter Freund, sagt zwei Dinge von ihm, von denen ich gern hätte, dass man sie auch von mir sagen könnte ; er nennt ihn einmal einen wesentlichen Menschen und ein andermal einen masshaltenden Menschen.

Es ist eine Woche vergangen, es ist schon der erste

Sonntag im Februar vorbei. Ich lese den letzten Satz und ich fürchte beinahe, ich habe nicht Mass gehalten, als ich Dir mein Heft schickte, Du erwähnst es garnicht, bin ich Dir so fremd geworden - freilich wohl, ich wusste es, Du würdest es nicht aushalten, so ausgesprochen zu sehen, was Du doch weisst - Du meinst vielleicht gar, es hiesse den Teufel an die Wand malen, wenn man davon spricht. Es ist aber nicht der Teufel, es ist ein Schnitter, der heisst Tod, der hat Gewalt vom höchsten Gott - mir war es socher Trost davon zu sprechen, und auch jetzt noch freue ich mich, dass Du das Heft in Händen hast, denn kommt die Zeit, wirst Du sehen, dass ich auch hier ganz Dein alter Justus bin.

Der 11. Februar, der zweite Sonntag. Ich lese im Eckermann, wie er eine Reise nach Frankfurt/Main macht und freudig die fortgeschrittene Vegetation beobachtet - in Weimar waren die Bäume noch in Knospen, hier sind die Triebe schon eine Viertelelle lang u.s.w. und dies Tagebuchblatt bringt das Datum vom 24. April 1830. Da musste ich doch lachen und daran denken, wie wir die gleiche Freude auf unserer Reise vom 24. April 1930 erlebten.

Bei Eckermann finde ich auch einen Ausspruch von Goethe, den Papa oft mit Vergnügen zitiert hat: ein Vater, der sechs Söhne hat, ist verloren, er mag sich stellen, wie er will. Goethe sagt das als Illustration zu dem Ausspruch von Mephisto: am Ende hängen wir doch ab von Kreaturen, die wir machten.

Der 80jährige Goethe sagt einmal zu Eckermann, dass jede Produktivität höchster Art in niemandes Gewalt stehe, über alle irdische Macht erhaben sei.---

"Dergleichen hat der Mensch wie unverhoffte Geschenke von oben, als seine Kinder Gottes zu betrachten, die er mit

freudigem Dank zu empfangen und zu pflegen hat ...- In solchen Fällen ist der Mensch oftmals als ein Werkzeug einer höheren Weltregierung zu betrachten, als ein würdig befundenes Gefäß eines göttlichen Einflusses.

Das ist doch schön gesagt, aber wie anders klingt das: "auch werden wir alle nach und nach aus einem Christentum des Wortes und Glaubens immer mehr zu einem Christentum der Tat kommen" ist die letzte Aeusserung Goethes zum Christentum.

Es ist wirklich sehr merkwürdig, dass Goethe so in den Gedanken einer mystischen Vereinigung mit der Natur lebt, dass er in den Wanderjahren als Bundesheilige eine sündenvergebende Tante erdichtet, welche wahrhaftig im Sonnensystem lebt und dass derselbe Goethe so in den platten rationalistischen Vorstellungen der Aufklärung befangen ist, dass er die Möglichkeit der Vereinigung mit Gott im Glauben und in der Liebe einfach übersieht.

Aber das ist der Fluch des Protestantismus: das Ueberbordwerfen der heiligen Tradition und der Glaube nur an das "Wort" ist der Anfang des Rationalismus.

14. Februar. Lene schickt mir Deinen Brief vom 3. ds. Mts.....

.... alle erfliehen ein Wiedersehen, aber wenige, dass ER uns segnen möge, weil keiner zugeben will, dass Gottes Segen mehr ist, als ein Wiedersehen - und es ist auch sehr schwer.

.... Augustin sagt, die Ursachen des Bösen finden zu wollen, sei dasselbe, wie wenn jemand das Dunkel sehen, oder das Schweigen hören wolle - denn das Böse sei nur das Fehlen des Guten, kein Wesen (natura), sondern ein Nichts.

Den Menschen liegt es nahe, vom Herrn alles mögliche Weltliche zu verlangen, aber nicht ihn selbst, gleich als könne das, was er gibt, beglückender sein, als der Geber selbst. Gott hört auf Dein Rufen, wenn Du ihn selbst suchst, nicht, wenn Du durch IHN anderes suchst "

" Wenn die Tugenden nicht auf Gott zurückbezogen werden, so sind sie viel mehr Laster als Tugenden-- weil sie ohne Demut sind, und daher aufgeblasen und stolz"

"Von zwei Seiten her laufen die Menschen Gefahr, durch Hoffen und durch Verzweifeln.--"

"Die Guten gebrauchen die Welt, Gott zu geniessen; hingegen die Bösen wollen Gott gebrauchen, um die Welt zu geniessen.--"

" Irdische Güter sind an sich gut, und damit man sie nicht für etwas Böses halte, werden sie auch den Guten gegeben; damit man sie aber nicht für ein grosses oder das höchste Gut halte, werden sie auch den Bösen gegeben."

"Aller Sünden letzte Quelle ist der Hochmut..... Ihm steht das Wort gegenüber : "Was hast Du, das Du nicht empfangen hast !"

"Die Zahl der Gerechten, die nach dem Vorsatz Gottes berufen sind, ist die Kirche..... Zu dieser Zahl gehören auch solche, die zur Zeit noch in Sünden leben oder als Ketzer und im heidnischen Aberglauben - dennoch kennt der Herr auch dort die Seinen.

 "Wahr ist, was von alters her in der ganzen Kirche mit lautem katholischen Glauben verkündigt und gepredigt wird, auch wenn kein Verstand es nachweisen und keine Darstellung es ins Klare zu bringen vermag.-----

" Ich würde dem Evangelium keinen Glauben schenken, wenn mich nicht die Autorität der katholischen Kirche dazu bewegte.----- "

Diese Sätze des Augustin klingen absurd für Jeden, der ausserhalb der Kirche steht, oder der die Kirche nur als menschliche Organisation ansieht $\frac{1}{2}$; sie sind aber gesprochen von jemand, dem die Gemeinschaft des Glaubens in der Kirche eine Realität ist, eine Wirklichkeit des Lebens, und sie bedeuten, dass der Mensch in der Vereinzelung die Wahrheit des Evangeliums schlechterdings nicht fassen kann, und das ist der Grundirrtum des Protestantismus.

- 10 -

Heute ist nun Dein Geburtstag und eine neue Woche beginnt. Diese Woche sollte nun doch etwas Gutes bringen! -- Ich sehe ängstlich nach der Sonne, ob sie Deinen Tag auch durchhält, denn sie hat leider eine leichte Neigung zur Trübung, dafür ist es noch wärmer -- jetzt sind auch die dicken Mauern schon durchwärmt und ich sitze den ganzen Tag beim offenen Fenster.

Mit der Kirche habe ich nun meinen Beschluss gefasst und will ihn auch Euch mitteilen, denn dies ist keine Sache zu warten- bis nachher.

Habe heute die Karamasoffs beendet. Das Buch ist mir wieder als das erschienen, als das ich es zuerst mit 20 Jahren, dann mit Dir mit 30, und nun wieder las, -- als ein heiliges Buch.--- Entzückend sind immer auch die Kinder, die er schildert, sie sind so ganz Herz und Natur -- übrigens im Gegensatz zu den Kindern, die Goethe im Wilhelm Meister schildert, Mignon und Felix, die mir allzusehr romantisch und unnatürlich erscheinen.- Was Aljoscha, der jüngste Bruder, am Schluss über Erziehung sagt, ist ganz wahr, und ein Trost in diesen wilden erziehunglosen Zeiten:

".. Denn wisst, es gibt nichts, das höher, stärker und gesünder und nützlicher wäre für das Leben als eine gute Erinnerung aus der Kindheit, aus dem Elternhause. Man wird Euch vieles über eure Erziehung sagen, aber eine schöne und heilige Erinnerung, die man noch aus der Kindheit sich aufbewahrt, kann oft die allerbeste Erziehung sein. Wenn der Mensch viele solche Erinnerungen aus der Jugend hat, so ist er fürs ganze Leben gerettet. Und wenn auch nur eine einzige gute Erinnerung in seinem Herzen bleibt, so kann auch dies einmal zu seiner Rettung dienen.---

Osterdienstag. Am Sonnabend habe ich den Brief an Klaus geschrieben- ich denke, Ihr seid wohl sehr erschreckt und wisst garnicht, wie Ihr's anfangen sollt.-----

In den Tiefen, die kein Trost erreicht,
lass doch Deine Treue mich erreichen,-
in den Nächten, wo der Glaube weicht,
lass nicht Deine Gnade von mir weichen;
Auf dem Weg, den keiner mit mir geht,
wenn zum Beten die Gedanken schwinden,
wenn mich kalt die Fenster eis umweht,
wollest DU in meiner Not mich finden.

Wenn die Seele wie ein irres Licht
flackert zwischen Werden und Vergehen,
wenn des Geistes Kraft zu nichts zerbricht,
wollest DU an meiner Seite stehen.
Wenn ich DEINE Hand nicht fassen kann,
nimm die meine DU in DEINE Hände,
Nimm Dich meiner Seele gnädig an,
führe mich zu einem guten Ende.

Aus einem andern Tagebuch aus derselben Zeit.

"Gestrost, das Leben schreitet zum ew'gen Leben hin,
Von innerer Glut geweitet, verklärt sich unser Sinn.--

"Die Lieb ist frei gegeben, und keine Trennung mehr,
Es wogt das volle Leben, wie ein unendlich Meer-
Nur eine Nacht der Wonne, ein ewiges Gedicht-
und unser aller Sonne ist Gottes Angesicht .--

Institut für Zeitgeschichte – Archiv

S C H U L D

=====

Von Albrecht Haushofer

Ich trage leicht an dem, was das Gericht
mir Schuld benennen wird: an Plan und Sorgen,
Verbrecher wär ich, hätt ich für das Morgen
des Volkes nicht geplant aus eigener Pflicht.

Doch schuldig bin ich. Anders als ihr denkt!
Ich mußte früher meine Pflicht erkennen,
ich mußte schärfer Unheil Unheil nennen -
mein Urteil hab ich viel zu lang gelenkt

Ich klage mich in meinem Herzen an.
Ich habe mein Gewissen lang betrogen,
ich hab mich selbst und andere belogen -

Ich kannte früh des Jammers ganze Bahn -
ich hab gewarnt - nicht hart genug und klar !
Und heute weiß ich, was ich schuldig war

-.-.-.-.-

Dieses Gedicht ist der Sammlung " Moabiter Sonette " des jungen Dichters und Geographen Albrecht Haushofer entnommen, der wenige Stunden vor der Befreiung Berlins durch Genickschuß der SS starb.

O Herr, mache mich zum Werkzeug Deines Friedens,
 daß ich Liebe übe,
 da, wo man sich haßt,
 daß ich verzeihe,
 da, wo man sich beleidigt,
 daß ich verbinde,
 da, wo Streit ist,
 daß ich Hoffnung erwecke,
 wo Verzweiflung quält,
 daß ich ein Licht anzünde,
 wo die Finsternis regiert,
 daß ich Freude bringe
 wo der Kummer wohnt.

ach Herr, laß Du mich trachten,
 nicht, daß ich getröstet werde,
 sondern, daß ich tröste.

nicht, daß ich verstanden werde,
 sondern, daß ich verstehe,
 nicht, daß ich geliebt werde,
 sondern, daß ich liebe.

Denn wer da hingibt, der empfängt,
 Wer sich selbst vergißt, der findet,
 Wer verzeiht, dem wird verziehen,
 Wer da stirbt, der erwacht zum ewigen Leben.
 Amen.

Berlin-Eichkamp, 23. Juni 1949.
Zikadenweg 76.
Telefon: 926474.

Lieber Otto!

Heute ist mir noch eine ausführlichere Notiz aus dem "Tagesspiegel" zugeschickt worden. Darin werden auch die Foltermethoden erwähnt, unter denen gerade unsere lieben Gefangenen zu leiden hatten. Ich habe schon Anfang September 1944 davon gerufen, als ich für Hans G. Mol in der Woche

A m A b e n d

=====

Von Hanns John.

Wir sahen den Tag nun sich neigen
und waren bereit -
Wir sahen den Schicksalsreigen
vergangener Tage der Zeit
und standen nur da
in frommem Schweigen:
so groß war unser Leid .

Dann erlosch auch in der Ferne mild
des stetig dunkelnden Raumes
das mahnend-stumme Bild
eines tagesmüden Baumes - - - - -

Gelöst nun war der Wolken trunkene Pracht:
dann fiel vom Himmel
in Schatten - sacht -
die traurige Stunde der stillen Nacht !

Institut für Zeitgeschichte – Archiv

Dr. Otto John,

10, Green Hill,

London - NW 3,

den 5. August 1946.

Erklärung.

+ Einstellung

Ueber die politische Einstellung und Betätigung S.K.H. des Prinzen Louis Ferdinand von Preussen unter dem nationalsozialistischen Regime gebe ich nachstehende Erklärung ab:

Prinz Louis Ferdinand ist mir im Herbst 1937 durch meine Tätigkeit bei der Deutschen Lufthansa bekannt geworden. Gemeinsame Interessen und Aufgaben im internationalen Luftverkehr haben uns zunächst nur dienstlich zusammen gebracht. Daraus entwickelte sich aber bald auf Grund der gleichen anti-nationalsozialistischen, ein engeres persönliches und politisches Vertrauensverhältnis. Die immer gleiche politische Haltung des Prinzen Louis Ferdinand und seine Entschlossenheit, sich selbst fuer den Kampf gegen das Naziregime einzusetzen, wurde die Basis unserer gemeinsamen politischen Aktivität in der Verschwörung gegen Hitler, die erst mit dem misslungenen Staatsstreich am 20. Juli 1944 ein Ende fand.

Unmittelbar nach Ausbruch des Krieges ergab sich die Notwendigkeit, die zersplitterten Oppositionsgruppen der früheren politischen Parteien Deutschlands zusammen zu fassen, um eine gemeinsame Aktion mit den oppositionellen Kräften in der Wehrmachtführung gegen Hitler vorzubereiten. Im Verfolg dieses Zieles kam erstmalig im Winter 1939/40 eine Einigung zwischen den Führern der verschiedenen zivilen und der von Generaloberst a.D. Beck geleiteten militärischen Oppositionsgruppen zustande. Dieser erste Zusammenschluss einer Opposition gegen Hitler im Kriege wurde im wesentlichen dadurch möglich und bewirkt, dass sich Prinz Louis Ferdinand der Verschwörung gegen Hitler zur Verfügung stellte. Dies kann ich aus eigener Kenntnis bezeugen, weil ich selbst bei der Zusammenführung der verschiedenen zivilen und militärischen Oppositionsgruppen mitgewirkt habe. Ausschlaggebend waren dabei vor allem

1. die seit der Machtübernahme bewiesene persönliche und politische Haltung des Prinzen Louis Ferdinand, seine kompromisslose, nie geänderte Einstellung gegen Hitler und dessen Anhänger,
2. in Verbindung mit diesen persönlichen Voraussetzungen die rechtliche Stellung des Prinzen Louis Ferdinand als legitimer Nachfolger des letzten deutschen Kaisers,
3. das besondere Vertrauensverhältnis zwischen dem Prinzen Louis Ferdinand und dem inzwischen verstorbenen Praesidenten Roosevelt.

Dieser erste Zusammenschluss der Opposition gegen Hitler unter Generaloberst a.D. Beck im Winter 1939/40 wurde nach Zustimmung von Wilhelm Leuschner und Julius Leber in einem Memorandum von Ernst von Harnack niedergelegt, von dem mir eine Durchschrift ausgehändigt wurde. Von diesem Zeitpunkt an hat Prinz Louis Ferdinand im engsten persönlichen und politischen Einvernehmen mit mir an den Vorbereitungen eines Staatsstreichs gegen Hitler mitgewirkt, wobei er selbst aus Sicherheitsgründen und auf Anraten der Generalobersten a.D. Beck und von Hammerstein nur zeitweilig in Erscheinung treten konnte.

Im März 1940 hat Prinz Louis Ferdinand wegen einer bevorstehenden Abkommandierung an die Front (als Ob. Lt. d. Res. der Luftwaffe) noch einmal seine eindeutige Einstellung gegen den Nationalsozialismus und seine Einsatzbereitschaft fuer einen kompromisslosen Kampf gegen Hitler und seinen Anhang gemeinsam mit mir in einem Memorandum schriftlich festgelegt, zu dem auch I.K.H. Prinzessin Kira ihre uneingeschränkte Zustimmung erklärt hat.

Unmittelbar vor der Offensive gegen Frankreich hat Prinz Louis Ferdinand noch einmal den Versuch unternommen, durch einen Brief an Generaloberst a.D. Beck auf die Führung der deutschen Wehrmacht im Sinne einer Beseitigung Hitlers Einfluss zu nehmen, um eine Ausweitung des Krieges und seiner Folgen zu verhindern.

Auch in der nachfolgenden Zeit ist Prinz Louis Ferdinand seiner kompromisslosen Einstellung gegen das Naziregime treu geblieben und ist darin auch nicht wankelmuetig geworden als die Niederlage Frankreichs und die anfänglichen Siege der deutschen Wehrmacht in Russland

einen Sieg des Nationalsozialismus moeglich erscheinen liessen.

Zusammenfassend kann ich nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen bestaetigen und bezeugen, dass Prinz Louis Ferdinand von Anfang bis zu Ende unter staendigem Einsatz seines Lebens sich fuer den Kampf gegen Hitler und sein Regime eingesetzt und auch bei den Vorbereitungen des Staatsstreichs vom 20. Juli 1944 taetig mitgewirkt hat.

gez. Dr. Otto John
(Dr. Otto John)

Copied: The above signature of Dr. Otto John of 10,
Green Hill, N.W. 3. is hereby certified as genuine.

London, 6th August 1946

2 Clement's Inn, W.C. 2.

E. J. Cohn,

of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law.

C o p y

(Translation)

Dr. Otto John

18, Green Hill, London N.W.3

5 August 1941

Statement

I wish to make the following statement concerning the political attitude and activity of H.R.H. Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia during the years of the national-socialistic regime:

I became acquainted with Prince Louis Ferdinand in the autumn of 1937 while I was working for the "Deutsche Lufthansa". Mutual interests and duties in the service of the international air-traffic brought us together, at first only on a business footing. But there soon developed between the Prince and myself a closer relationship both personal and political, which arose out of the same antagonistic feelings towards national-socialism. The politically consistent attitude of Prince Louis Ferdinand and his resolve to take a personal part in the fight against the Nazi regime formed the basis of our common political activity in the conspiracy against Hitler which came to an end only with the unsuccessful coup d'etat of the 20 July 1944.

Immediately after the outbreak of war the necessity arose of bringing together the scattered opposition groups of the former political parties of Germany, in order to prepare a combined action against Hitler with the oppositional forces within the High Command of the Army.

To achieve this object a first accord was reached in the winter of 1939/40 between the leaders of the various civilian opposition groups and of those under the guidance of retired Colonel General Beck. This first concentration of an opposition against Hitler during the war was made possible mainly due to the fact that Prince Louis Ferdinand put himself at the disposal of the conspiracy against Hitler.

I am able to testify to this, owing to my own share in the work of establishing contacts between the various civilian and military opposition groups.

In this connection the following facts were decisive:

- 1) The personal and political behaviour of Prince Louis Ferdinand since Hitler came into power, his uncompromising and unchanging attitude towards Hitler and his followers.
- 2) Besides these personal qualifications, the juridical position of Prince Louis Ferdinand as legitimate successor of the last German Emperor.

- 2 -

3) The friendly relations existing between the Prince Louis Ferdinand and the late President Roosevelt.

This first union of the groups opposing Hitler under General Beck in 1939/40 was agreed to by (the Labour leaders) Wilhelm Leuschner and Julius Leber in a memorandum written down by Ernst von Harnack, a copy of which was handed to me.

From that date forward Prince Louis Ferdinand cooperated with me in closest personal and political agreement in preparing the overthrow of Hitler.

For reasons of personal safety and upon the advice of General Beck and General von Hammerstein, Prince Louis Ferdinand came into evidence only occasionally.

In March 1940 Prince Louis Ferdinand expected an assignment to the front (as first Lieutenant in the Air Force Reserve) and before leaving he once more expressed, this time in writing, with my collaboration, his unmistakable antagonism towards national socialism and his readiness for a relentless fight against Hitler and his clique. To this written statement Prince Louis Ferdinand's wife, Princess Kira, also agreed without reserve.

Shortly before the offensive against France Prince Louis Ferdinand hoping to still prevent an expansion of the war and its consequences, made one more attempt to influence the leaders of the German Wehrmacht by writing a letter to this effect to General Beck.

Also in the following years Prince Louis Ferdinand kept to his violent negation of the Nazi regime. His convictions were not shaken by the defeat of France and the initial successes of the German Wehrmacht in Russia, which made a victory of national socialism seem possible.

Summing up the facts stated above I am able to testify, to the best of my knowledge, that Prince Louis Ferdinand from the start to the finish and at the constant risk of his life was actively engaged in the fight against Hitler, and took part in the preparations for the coup d'etat of the 20 July 1944.

signed: Dr. Otto John

The above signature of Dr. Otto John, of 10 Green Hill, London, N.W.3, is hereby certified as genuine.

London 6 August 1946

2 Clement's Inn, W.C.2, E.J. Cogh of Lincoln's Inn
Barrister-at-Law.

Greta Kuckhoff
 Berlin-Friedenau
 Wilhelmshoerstr. 18
 Tel. 246326

Berlin, den 1. Februar 1947

Bericht.

Ich gehoere zum Dr. Harnack-Schultze-Boysen-Kreis, der durch das Reichskriegsgericht im Jahre 1942/43 abgeurteilt worden ist. Der Anklaeger war Reichskriegsgerichtsrat Oberst Dr. Roeder. Die letzte Entscheidung behielt sich als oberster Gerichts- und Kriegsherr Adolf Hitler selbst vor. Die Voruntersuchung wurde im Reichssicherheitshauptamt durchgefuehrt, etwa zwischen September und November 1942, zu welchem Zeitpunkt wir dem Reichskriegsgericht uebergeben wurden. Die in der Voruntersuchung angewandten Methoden moegen durch folgendes Erlebnis beleuchtet werden. Nachdem man mir in der ersten 13stuendigen Vernehmung immer wieder gesagt hatte, dass keinerlei Folterungen im Reichssicherheitshauptamt vorgekommen seien und dass auch im Falle des im Jahre 1933 verstorbenen Schauspielers, meines Mannes Schwager, Hans Otto kein "peinliches Verhoer" stattgefunden habe, wurde ich - erinnere ich mich recht - am 13. Oktober 1942 zu Kommissar Henze gerufen, der mir erklarte: "Nachdem Ihr Mann und Arvid Harnack 4 Wochen lang nichts dazu beigetragen haben, den Fall zu klaeren, haben wir jetzt die richtigen Mittel angewandt, sie zum Sprechen zu bringen." Auf meine Frage: "Leben sie noch?" erhielt ich die Antwort: "Ja, aber es wird von ihnen abhaengen, ob sie das naechste Mal ueberstehen." Daraufhin las man mir ein Protokoll meines Mannes vor, in dem er sich einer umfassenden antinationalsozialistischen Arbeit bezichtigte, wobei er ausdruuecklich betonte, dass ich von den Vorgaengen nicht unterrichtet worden bin und hoechstens seine kritische Stellung gegenueber dem Regime kenne, aehnlich lautete das Protokoll von Harnack. Gleichzeitig hatten beide die Namen von Freunden angegeben, die in unserem Hause verkehrten und die bisher nicht in unseren Prozess hineingezogen worden waren. Diese Freunde waren 3 Wochen zuvor gewarnt - beide glaubten sie in Sicherheit. Als meinem Mann (Harnacks Hinrichtung hatte schon vorher stattgefunden) die Protokolle aus jener Zeit vorgelegt wurden, hing die Entscheidung ueber Tod und Leben der unter Folterung Genannten von kleinen Ausdrucksverschiebungen ab. Mein Mann verlangte deshalb, dass der vernehmende Kommissar vorgeladen wuerde, da er selbst unter Folter immer wieder bemueht gewesen sei, den Wortlaut der Protokolle so zu geben, wie es den Tatsachen entsprach und zugleich eine belastende Interpretation im Sinne der Anklage ausschloss. Es hat sich in dieser Verhandlung am 2. Februar 1943 durch ein bestimmtes Experiment offen gezeigt, dass die Kommissare falsch protokollierten und die Unterschrift verlangten unter Androhung von weiterer Folterung. Nach der Schilderung meines Mannes, der die Wundmale der Folterung (vom Oktober!) noch im Februar sichtlich trug, wurden die zu Folterenden in das "Stalin"-Zimmer gebracht. Dort wurden ihnen Wadenklammern angelegt, ihr Kopf wurde in Tuechter gehuehlt, Arme und Beine auseinandergerissen (wahrscheinlich an eiserne Betten gespannt), dann wurden sie mit der Knute bearbeitet und mussten wiederholen, was man ihnen an Schimpfnamen zurief. Gleichzeitig wurde ihnen angedroht, dass man sich ihrer Verwandten, bei meinem Mann besonders meiner und seiner beiden Soehne, bemaechtigen und der gleichen Folter unterwerfen, resp. sie "erledigen" wuerde. Mein Mann hat in der Reichskriegsgerichtsverhandlung mit klaren Worten auf die Entstehung dieses Protokolls hingewiesen, wurde jedoch von Herrn Dr. Roeder aufs heftigste unterbrochen und zum Schweigen verurteilt. Herr Dr. Roeder war also ueber die geuebten Methoden im klaren, trotzdem hat er die Protokolle gegen die muendlichen Vernehmungsaussagen im Gericht zur Grundlage seiner Anklage gemacht, ohne sie im geringsten durch die Ergebnisse der Vernehmung selbst zu modifizieren.

Ich erwaehne nebenbei den noch nachzupruuefenden Verdacht, dass es die Uebung der Gestapo gewesen ist, etwa 6 Durchschriften der Protokolle unterschreiben zu lassen, von denen das eine ohne Blaubogen und Text eine Blankounterschrift darstellte, zu der der Text des tatsaechlichen Protokolls hinterher fabriziert wurde. Ich kann den Beweis dafuer nicht antreten, jedoch wurde es mir ~~erklart~~ von vielen Seiten erklart, leider sind die Zeugen tot, die Unterlagen vernichtet.

Ueber meinen eigenen Fall habe ich folgendes zu bemerken: Einwendungen gegen die primitive Fassung der Protokolle, die keinerlei sprachliche Nuancen erlaubten, obwohl die Anklage nachher sich gerade auf diese Nuancen stuetzte, waren nicht erlaubt. Eine von mir geforderte Gegenueberstellung fand nicht statt. Als Belastung ergab sich in meinem Fall nur, dass ich zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt von der illegalen Arbeit meines Mannes und unseres Freundes Harnack Kenntnis erhielt. Beide hatten bestaetigt, dass ich diese Arbeit nicht guthiess und dass sie sich von diesem Augenblick an bemaechten, jede weitere Taetigkeit vor mir geheimzuhalten.

Bei meiner Uebergabe an das Reichskriegsgericht im November 1942 beschimpfte Herr Dr. Roeder in unflaetigster Weise meinen Mann, der als Nichtsoldat und "ausgesprochener Feigling" keinerlei Rechte habe, ueber die Gestaltung Deutschlands mitzusprechen. Nur diejenigen, die draussen fuer ihr Vaterland zu sterben bereit sind, waeren berechtigt, die Formen zu bestimmen, die es endgueltig bekommen sollte. Empoert liess ich mich zu folgender sorniger Gegenfrage verleiten: "Machen Sie nicht den Fehler, denen die Macht ueber das deutsche Schicksal zu geben, die zwar nicht draussen zu sterben bereit sind, aber die bereit sind, andere draussen sterben zu lassen?" Herr Dr. Roeder hat mit einem Blick darauf geantwortet und mich aus der Tuer gewiesen, der mein Schicksal klar besiegelte. Ein Prozess war eigentlich nicht mehr noetig. Als wir 6 Angeklagten dann zwischen dem 1. und 3. Februar 1943 vor dem 2. Senat des Reichskriegsgerichts standen und Herr Dr. Roeder seine Urteilsantraege stellte, "beantragte er die Todesstrafe fuer 4 der Angeklagten" und fuhr dann mit bitterer Schaerfe fort: "Auch fuer Frau Kuckhoff verlange ich die Todesstrafe." Ich sehe noch heute das Gesicht des Richters vor mir, mit dem er darauf reagierte. Obwohl mein Fall aus Mangel an Belastungszeugen nicht mehr als eine Mitwisserschaft ergeben konnte, hat man mich dann in ein besonders eindringliches Verhoer genommen, das laenger dauerte als das irgend eines der anderen Angeklagten einschliesslich des Hauptangeklagten ohne weiteres Belastungsmaterial zu finden. Mein Oficialverteidiger bemaechte sich, die Haltlosigkeit des Antrags auf Todesstrafe mit rein juristischen Argumenten nachzuweisen. Er wagte es angesichts des eindeutigen Willens des Anklaegers nicht, auch nur ein persoenliches Wort fuer mich zu sprechen und versuchte, auf Grund geschliffener juristischer Begrueudungen das Gericht davon zu ueberzeugen, dass es keinen Paragraphen gebe, auf Grund dessen die Todesstrafe fuer mich ausgesprochen werden koennte. Am 3. Februar 1943 faellte das Gericht den Spruch, den Herr Dr. Roeder verlangte. Selbst die Gestapobeamten aeusserten darueber ihr Befremden. Der Anklaeger in meinem zweiten Prozess, der im Oktober 1943 stattfand, nachdem bereits im Maerz (?) der Gerichtsherr die Unterzeichnung des Todesurteils fuer mich abgelehnt hatte (nicht etwa auf dem Gnadenwege) vertrat den Standpunkt, dass man mir hoechstens eine Mitwisserschaft nachweisen koenne, dass die Anzeigepflicht zwar formal juristisch gegen Dr. Harnack bestand, aber dadurch, dass mein Mann betroffen worden waere, von mir nicht verlangt werden koennte. Er beantragte - und auch das mit Widerstreben -, was er ausdruecklich erklaerte, eine Freiheitsstrafe von 5 Jahren und fuegte mit Nachdruck hinzu, dass ein Entzug der buergerlichen Ehrenrechte nicht gerechtfertigt sei, dass ich mich keiner ehrlosen Tat schuldig gemacht haette. Das Gericht sprach ein Urteil von 10 Jahren aus. Zu erwahnen ist ferner, dass Frau Dr. Mildred Harnack, deren Prozess am 19. Dezember 1942 gemeinsam mit den Hauptangeklagten stattfand, so wenig belastet war, dass selbst Herr Dr. Roeder eine Freiheitsstrafe von 10 Jahren beantragte, die das Gericht dann auf 6 Jahre festlegte. Die Graefin Erika von Broekdorf wurde trotz des auf Todesurteil lautenden Antrags des Reichskriegsanwalts zu 10 Jahren verurteilt. Herr Dr. Roeder hat dann unmittelbar mit Hitler und Goering Ruecksprache gehalten und Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens verlangt. Ueber beide wurde dann dem Willen des Reichskriegsanwalts gefuegig das Todesurteil ausgesprochen. Frau Dr. Harnack soll ausserdem gezwungen worden sein, der Exekution - s. Bericht Dr. Falk Harnack - ihres Mannes am 22. Dezember 1942 persoenlich beizuwohnen, es war die erste Vollstreckung eines Todesurteils durch den Strang.

Am 22. Mai 43 besuchte mich Herr Rechtsanwalt Valentin, der sich jetzt in Muenchen aufhalten soll, und teilte mir mit, dass fuer meinen Mann "wenn alles so geht, wie wir alle es mit Sicherheit erwarten" eine sehr erfreuliche Aenderung eingetreten sei und dass man auch fuer das Schicksal einiger der zum Tode verurteilten Frauen Hoffnung haben koenne. Er sprach von einer kurzen Freiheitsstrafe fuer mich und einer laengeren Freiheitsstrafe fuer die anderen. Am 5. August erfolgte dann jedoch die Vollstreckung des Urteils gegen alle. Ich allein blieb uebrig. Herr Dr. Roeder soll dabei seine Hand eindeutig im Spiel gehabt und die Vollstreckung binnen kuerzester Frist erwirkt haben. Am 29. Juli hat noch meines Mannes Sohn ihn in Ploetzensee besuchen duerfen, eine Erlaubnis, die nicht gewahrt zu werden pflegte, wenn die Vollstreckung beschlossen war. Ich halte es fuer dringend notwendig, diese Sonderaktion des Herrn Reichskriegs-anwalts, die mindestens 10 jungen Frauen, deren Vergehen gewiss nicht schwer wogen, das Leben kostete, zu untersuchen. Unter den Hingerichteten des 5. August befanden sich allein 2 Frauen, die waehrend dieser Haft geboren hatten, die eine war noch nicht einmal muendig (Hilde Coppy, Liane Berkowitz).

Als "Klaerung des Falles" betrachtete Herr Dr. Roeder Belastung der Angeklagten. Er behandelte die Angelegenheit als "geheime Kommandosache" und drohte jedem schwerste Strafen an, der nur ein Wort ueber den Fall verlautbaren liess. Versuche, aus der Vergangenheit der Angeklagten beweiskraeftiges Material zu erbringen, dass es sich hier um Personen von charakterlicher Lauterkeit und erwiesener Vaterlandsliebe handelte, wurden von vornherein unmoeglich gemacht. Selbst die Mitteilung der Urteilsvollstreckung wurde unter Strafe gestellt.

Das Reichskriegsgericht hat die Unterlagen in Torgau vernichtet. Ich bin der Ueberzeugung, dass in diesem Prozess gegen den Herrn Reichskriegsanwalt Roeder die strengste Untersuchung noetig ist. Durch die erbarmungslos einseitige Behandlung des Dr. Harnack-Schultze-Boysen-Prozesses wurde eine der klarsten und ausgewogensten Widerstandsgruppen vernichtet. Es handelte sich hier um eine Gruppe, die in realer nuechterner Weise die Moeglichkeiten einer Ueberwindung des Naziregimes von innen geprueft hatte und zu der Ueberzeugung gekommen war, dass nur die Zusammenarbeit mit den demokratischen und sozialistischen Voelkern Erfolg versprach. Es ist die einzige Widerstandsgruppe, in der auch eine Amerikanerin mitkaempfte, eine Amerikanerin, die die Ehre hatte, vor dem Krieg Praesidentin des Amerikanischen Frauenklubs in Berlin zu sein. Herr Dr. Roeder hat die Gefahr fuer den Nationalsozialismus - nicht fuer Deutschland - besonders deshalb gefuerchtet, weil keine einseitige politische Ausrichtung sondern eine breite sich auf alle Schichten stuetzende und nach allen Richtungen auch des Auslandes sich auswirkende Arbeit geleistet wurde. Die Verhaftungen geschahen in einem Augenblick, als er als hoher Offizier die militaerische Lage Deutschlands uebersehen konnte und verpflichtet gewesen waere, die Notwendigkeit der Erledigung des Nationalsozialismus zum Wohle Deutschlands und der Welt zu erkennen. Aus persoenlicher Eitelkeit, die aus jedem seiner Worte sprach und aus persoenlicher Machtgier und Rachelust hat er dafuer gesorgt, dass die Urteile schwerer ausfielen, als sie vor dem 2. Senat des Reichskriegsgerichts sonst ausgefallen waeren. Er hat die Methoden der Gestapo-Voruntersuchung, ueber die er informiert war, gutgeheissen - wenn er nicht sogar die Befehle zu den Methoden gegeben hat. Er hat in einem Fall wie dem meinen ohne Gesetzesgrundlage ein Urteil aus persoenlicher Antipathie verlangt und die Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens gegen 2 bereits Verurteilte ueber seinen Antrag und den Spruch des Hoechsten Deutschen Gerichtes hinaus durchgefuehrt.

gez. Greta Kuckhoff

Ergaenzend moechte ich meinen Bericht betreffend Reichskriegsanwalt Oberst Dr. Roeder noch folgendes hinzufuegen:

1. Es wird behauptet, dass Herr Roeder an dem grossen Bromberger Blutprozess kurz nach Beginn des Krieges beteiligt gewesen ist.
2. Am 16. Februar 1943 - dem Tage der Hinrichtung von Frau Dr. Mildred Harnack-Fish - begab sich Herr Dr. Roeder mit einem Richterstab aus dem Reichskriegsministerium nach Frankreich, um eine franzoesische Widerstandsgruppe, die, wie es scheint, in Verbindung mit uns stand, abzuurteilen. Auskunft darueber muessten u.a. die Offizialverteidiger, Herr Rechtsanwalt Valentin und Herr Rechtsanwalt Dr. Beese geben koennen. Herr Dr. Beese, der auch mein Offizialverteidiger war, hat allerdings auf Befragen durch mich kuehl erkluert, dass er in jenen Jahren so viele Todesurteile habe verkundet werden sehen, dass er sich an Einzelheiten (!) wie die Verbindung dieser franzoesischen Gruppen mit der Dr. Harnack-Schultze-Boysen-Gruppe nicht erinnern koenne. Herr Dr. Valentin hat von sich aus erkluert, dass er die ganze Sache auch heute noch als "geheime Kommandosache" betrachte und die Verurteilten als Landesverraeter, sodass ich fuerchten muss, dass keinerlei Klaerung von dieser Seite aus zu erreichen ist. Wieweit in Frankreich Moeglichkeiten, die Dinge nachzuprueren, bestehen, kann ich von hier aus nicht uebersehen.
3. Wichtig scheint mir auch folgendes: Zu Beginn des Krieges wurde - es ist mir leider nicht gelungen, in der Kuerze der Zeit exakte Daten zu erhalten - der sogenannte Feindbeguenstigungsparagraph geschaffen. Danach wurde jede Taetigkeit, auch Beihilfe, im antinationalsozialistischen Sinne zugleich als Feindbeguenstigung angesehen und mit der Todesstrafe belegt. Praktisch: Die Weitergabe einer Flugschrift, die technische Herstellung derselben, ja die Begleitung einer Person, die z.B. ein antinationalsozialistisches Blatt klebte, kann, will es der Anklaeger, ueber diesen Par. zu einem Todesurteil fuehren. Dieser Feindbeguenstigungspar. ist meines Wissens erst im Verlauf unseres Prozesses angewandt und konsequent durchgefuehrt worden. Herrn Dr. Roeder trifft die Schuld, das Gericht ueber diesen Par. gefuegig gemacht zu haben, obwohl praktische Praezedenzfaelle nicht vorlagen. Als unser Prozess begann, wurden die Angeklagten des 19. Dezember unter starker Bedeckung durch Soldaten mit aufgepflanztem Bajonett zum Reichskriegsgericht gebracht und dort bewacht, weil man fuerchten zu muessen glaubte, dass trotz der Androhung strenger Strafen fuer das Bekanntwerden dieses Prozesses Einzelheiten durchengesickert seien und ein Aufstand anderer Widerstandsgruppen zu befuerchten waere. Nachdem diese Befuerchtung sich als unrichtig erwies, hat man dann in allen weiteren Prozessen den Feindbeguenstigungspar. ueberall zur Anwendung gebracht, sodass tausende von Opfern unmittelbar und mittelbar durch Herrn Roeder zum Tode gebracht wurden.

Klaerende Auskuenfte koennten wahrscheinlich geben:

Frau von Dohnanyi, Muenchen, Aeussere Prinzregentenstr. 10
 Pfarrer Dr. Harald Poelchau, Berlin-Zehlendorf
 P.A. Zentralverwaltung fuer Justiz, Abt. Strafvollzug,
 Berlin NW 7, Dorotheenstr. 47

gez. Kuckhoff

Wiedergabe eines Berichtes ueber den 2. Termin gegen Frau Dr. Mildred Harnack-Fish und gegen die Graefin Erika von Brockdorf-Rantzau durch Frau von Brockdorf, Mitte Januar 43.

Erika von Brockdorf berichtete aus dem Fenster ihrer Zelle im Polizeigefangnis Alexanderplatz nach Rueckkehr von ihrem 2. Termin, dass der 2. Senat des Reichskriegsgerichts bei der erneuten Vernehmung der beiden Angeklagten in Anwesenheit dieser Angeklagten wiederholt darauf hingewiesen habe, dass der gefundene Tatbestand bei beiden, besonders aber im Falle von Frau Harnack zu einer Todesstrafe nicht "ausreiche". Es habe einen fast offenen Kampf gegen den Reichskriegsgerichtsrat Dr. Roeder als Anklagevertreter gegeben, der mit zynischer Offenheit erklarte, dass der "Fuehrer" und er die Verurteilung zum Tode verlange. Dem Gericht waere der Feindbeguenstigungsparagraph bekannt, der die entsprechende Gesetzesgrundlage boete, man moege sich gefaelligst seiner bedienen. Das Gericht zoegerte noch immer, bemuehte sich neue Tatbestaende zutage zu foerdern, musste aber schliesslich dem harten Draengen nachgeben.

Diesen Bericht wiederholte Frau von Brockdorf, als wir im April 43 einen Tag lang im Gerichtsgefangnis Charlottenburg eine Zelle teilten. Ich versichere an Eidesstatt, ihn wahrheitsgetreu wiedergegeben zu haben.

gez. Greta Kuckhoff

Institut für Zeitgeschichte – Archiv

Kunrat Labouren (2)

B e r l i n, den 23. Oktober 1941.

Auf einer Fahrt in das Operationsgebiet
im Osten gemachte Beobachtungen und
Feststellungen.

I.

Russische Kriegsgefangene.

- 1.) Die sich auf den Strassenbewegenden Zuege der russischen Kriegsgefangenen machen einen stupiden Eindruck von Tierherden. Die im Verhaeltnis zur Zahl der Gefangenen ausserst gering gehaltene Wachmannschaft, die zum Teil von nichtmilitaerischen Formationen, wie z. B. Arbeitdienst, gestellt wird, kann nur mit Hilfe von koepertlicher Gewaltanwendung (Schupsen, Stockschlaege) einigermassen Ordnung halten. Infolge der koepertlichen Anstrengung der Maersche, der geringen Ernahrung und schlechten Unterbringungsverhaeltnisse in den einzelnen Lagern brechen Kriegsgefangene oft zusammen, werden von ihren Kameraden weitergeschleppt oder liegengelassen. Die 6. Armee hat Befehl gegeben, dass alle schlappmachenden Kriegsgefangenen zu erschliessen sind. Bedauerlicherweise wird dies an der Strasse, selbst in Ortschaften vorgenommen, sodass die einheimische Bevoelkerung Augenzeuge dieser Vorgaenge ist. Im rueckwaertigen Gebiet ist es schon des oefteren vorgekommen, dass deutsche weibliche Angestellte des abends auf dem Weg zu ihrer Wohnung an erschossenen Kriegsgefangenen vorbeimarschieren.

- 2.) Die Verhaeltnisse in den Lagern sind ueberaus schlecht. Infolge der mangelnden Ernahrung entstehen meistens des Nachts Schlaegereien um die geringfuegigsten Nahrungsmittel. Ausserdem haben sich die Faelle von Menschenfressere immer mehr gehaeuft. Bei der auch hier aeusserst geringen Bewachung besteht die Gefahr des Ausbrechens und hiermit die Gefaehrung der in der Naehel der Gefangenenlager untergebrachten Dienststellen (z.B. Ast. Krakau, z. Zt. Rowno).
- 3.) Die zum Arbeitsdienst eingesetzten russischen Kriegsgefangenen (Wegebau, Kabelverlegung, Strassenreinigung usw.) werden zum groessten Teil im rueckwaertigen Gebiet vom ukrainischen Ordnungsdienst bewacht. Es ergibt sich hier also die eigenartige Lage, dass Kriegsgefangene von ihren eigenen, inzwischen aus der Kriegsgefangenschaft entlassenen Kameraden bewacht werden.
- 4.) Auf den Hauptstrassen ist in beiderseitiger Richtung eine Voelkerwanderung im Gange. Zum Teil handelt es sich um zurueckflutende Zivilbevoelkerung, zum groessten Teil aber um entlassene Kriegsgefangene. Eine Kontrolle, ob es sich aber tatsaechlich um entlassene Kriegsgefangene handelt, ist bei dieser Massenwanderung und dem geringen Ueberwachungspersonal einfach ausgeschlossen. Die Partisanenbekaeampfung ist dadurch aeusserst erschwert.

II.

Juden.

Auf Befehl werden die Juden "umgesiedelt". Es geschieht dies in der Weise, dass die Juden ganz kurzfristig den Befehl bekommen, sich in der folgenden Nacht mit ihren besten Kleidungsstuecken und ihrem Schmuck an festgesetzten Sammelorten einzufinden. Es wird

zwischen Staenden, Geschlecht und Alter keinerlei Unterschied gemacht. Von dem Sammelplatz werden sie dann an einen ausserhalb des betreffenden Ortes liegenden, vorher ausgesuchten und vorbereiteten Platz gebracht. Hier muessen sie unter dem Vorwand, dass gewisse Formalitaeten noch zu erfuellen seien, ihren Schmuck und ihre Kleidungsstuecke ablegen. Sie werden abseits der Strasse gefuehrt und liquidiert. Die sich hierbei entwickelten Situationen sind so erschuetternd, dass sie nicht beschrieben werden koennen. Die Folgen auf die deutschen Kommandos sind unausbleiblich. Im allgemeinen kann die Exekution nur unter Beteaubung durch Alkohol durchgefuehrt werden. Ein als Zuschauer befohlener SD-Offizier hatte nach seiner Schilderung in der folgenden Nacht Angsttraeume fuerchterlichster Art durchzustehen.

Die einheimische Bevoelkerung nimmt die ihr durchaus bekannten Vorgaenge dieser Liquidierung mit Ruhe, teilweise Genugtuung und unter Beteiligung der ukrainischen Miliz auf.

Auslaendische Journalisten, die Kiew wegen der bolschewistischen Zerstorerungen besichtigten, haben dem Hptm. K o c h, dem es mit vieler Muehe gelungen war, ihnen die Tatsache der Judenerschiessungen zu verheimlichen, gegenueber geaussert, dass sie hierueber doch genau Bescheid wuessten.

III.

Allgemeine Beobachtungen.

1.) Bevoelkerung:

Die Bevoelkerung begruesst die deutschen Soldaten als Befreier vom bolschewistischen Joch. Es besteht jedoch die Gefahr, dass diese fuer uns ausserst guenetige Stigmung, die sich in groesster Gastfreund-

Abschrift

-4-

schaft und Geschenken zeigt, durch falsche Behandlung in das Gegenteil umschlaegt. Es ist bei verschiedensten deutschen Stellen der Ansicht Ausdruck gegeben worden, dass mit der deutschen Gefuehlsduselei Schluss zu machen ist und den Ukrainern der Herr gezeigt werden muss. Dieses Herrentum besteht in allgemeinen jedoch darin, dass gegen Ukrainer, die sich gegen Wegnahme von Moebeln, Bildern u. dergl. wehren, Gewalt angewandt wird. Dieses Vorgehen ist bereits zu einer gewissen Art von Pluenderung ausgeartet, deren Berechtigung darin gesehen wird, dass es sich nicht um Privat-, sondern russisches Staatseigentum letzten Endes handle.

Eine feste Vorstellung ueber ihr zukuenftiges politisches Schicksal haben die Ukrainer noch nicht. Von verschiedensten Personen sind jedoch schon entsprechende Fragen an den Verbindungsoffizier des Ostministeriums und der Abw. II gestellt worden.

2.) Kulturstand.

Die Wohn- und Lebensverhaeltnisse der Bevoelkerung sind aeusserst aermlich und primitiv. Waehrend der Russe es ablehnt, sich in stehendem Wasser zu waschen, da er sich nicht in seinem eigenen Schmutz waschen will, fehlt ihm vollkommen das Gefuehl fuer die Sauberkeit bei der Verrichtung der taeglichen Notdurft. Die von der russischen Industrie gelieferten taeglichen Gebrauchsgegenstaende sind sehr einfach und mangelhaft.

Die von der deutschen Militaerverwaltung wieder freigegebenen Kirchen werden sehr rege besucht. Der griech. Gottesdienst besteht in der Hauptsache aus Absingen religioeser Lieder und Choere.

Abschrift

-5-

Die Sprache ist im allgemeinen russisch, wenn auch die Sowjets fuer eine ukrainische Nationalisierung bei weitem mehr getan haben als je die Zarenregierung.

3.) Ernte.

Die Ernte ist westlich des Dnjepr zum groessten Teil geborgen und gut. Bei einer entsprechenden Kultivierung des Bodens laesst sich der Ernteertrag, selbst wenn zusaetzlicher Duenger fehlt, bedeutend steigern. Die Winterbestellung ist nach den oertlichen Bedingungen verschieden, im Durchschnitt zum groessten Teil durchgefuehrt.

Ostwaerts des Dnjepr sind die Verhaeltnisse bedeutend schlechter. Die Russen haben den groessten Teil der Ernte fortgeschafft. Die Winterbestellung kann jetzt erst in Angriff genommen werden.

Die auch von den Russen fortgefuehrten, jedoch ostwaerts des Dnjepr zurueckgelassenen Viehherden werden von der einheimischen Bevoelkerung zurueckgeholt.

4.) Wege.

Die russischen Wege sind unbeschreiblich. Erschwert wird das Zurechfinden durch mangelhaftes Kartenmaterial. Die wenigen vorhandenen Autostrassen verbinden nur die Hauptpunkte. Bei den uebrigen, auf den Karten als Strassen bezeichneten Wegen handelt es sich um ungepflasterte Landwege ohne festen Untergrund. Sie haben oft eine Breite bis zu 100 m und werden nach Belieben befahren. Ihre Oberflaeche bildet eine dicke, mehr oder minder hohe, zaehe Schlammschicht, die bei langsamen Fahren den Wagen festhaelt und ihn bei schnellerem Tempo ins Rutschen und Gleiten bringt. Ein Ausweichen auf diesen Strassen ist trotz der Breite aeusserst schwer, da alle Fahrzeuge in beiden Richtungen

Abschrift

-6-

möglichst dieselben ausgefahrenen Geleise benutzen, aus denen ein Herauskommen sehr schwer ist. sodass sich bei diesen Gelegenheiten oft Zusammenstöße ereignen. Besonders angestrengt werden die Federn der Fahrzeuge. An einigen Stellen sind die Wege nur mit Traktoren passierbar.

- 5.) Aus dem Tagebuch eines gefallenen deutschen Feldwebels geht hervor, dass die Russen die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen bei lebendem Leibe schinden.

(Papier zerbroeckelt)

Institut für Zeitgeschichte – Archiv

Wuppertal Loberfeld

9. Mai 1947

Beh. **Nannartz**

An **Kristleitung** „Blick in die Welt“

947

Soeben lese ich im Heft 6 der Zeitschrift „Blick in die Welt“ den Aufsatz von Dr. Otto Johen über Ernst v. Hardeck und bin tief erschüttert, erst heute zu erfahren, dass auch dieser kluge, feinsinnige u. menschenfreundliche Arbeiter sein Leben hergeben musste.

Meine persönlichen Erinnerungen an Ernst v. Hardeck gehen zurück in die Jahre 1916/17 des ersten Weltkrieges, als er im damaligen von uns besetzten Russisch-Polen in Stape der Civil-Verwaltung tätig war. Der kleine Wesenszug von ihm, den ich schildern möchte, möge ein kleiner Beitrag sein zu seinem Charakterbild.

Winter 1916/17 Lipno in Polen Soldatenheim, abends gegen 9 Uhr, eine Schwester am Klavier, neben ihr ein Feldgärtner, beide spielen 4händig aus „Lampy“, als dies verklingt, spielt Musikdirektor Arbace (alias John des dann. Domorganisten ²¹¹ Breslau) auf dem Harmonium Rubinstein's „Romance“. Die Tür knit sich auf, ein schlauer, ^{hochgeopochener} elegantester Offizier

in Gegenwart einer Witt. Person, welche
Leute springen auf u. nehmen militä-
rische Haltung an. Ich war im ersten
Moment traurig, dass unsere schöne
musikalische Fierstunde so früh gestört
wird u. will dem Offizier sogleich an-
deuten, dass das hier ein Soldatenheim
und kein Offiziersheim ist u. er deshalb
hier keinen Zutritt habe, doch da-
winkt er ab u. lässt die Leute rühren
u. sagt: „Verzeihen Sie liebe Schwester
wenn ich hier ungebührlich und stö-
rend eintrete, doch die gute Musik
liess mich aufhören als ich vorbeu-
vorbeikam, ich spiele Flöte und
bitte Euch, meine lieben Kamera-
den, mich in Euren Cirkel aufzu-
nehmen, ich will in meine Quartier
und hole meine Instrumente.“ Nach
knapp 20 Minuten trat er mit
Flöte u. Koffer bewaffnet wieder
bei uns ein mit Goethes Pass-
seufzer auf den Lippen: hier bin
ich Mensch, hier darf ich sein.
Von nun an erschien Ernst v. Hat-
wack fast allabendlich bei uns, nicht
als Vorgesetzter, sondern als Diener
u. Geliebter der Frau Musica. Nur
ein einziges Mal kam er zu spät
sodass Pianist, Clavierist u. Violin-

Menschen erst einmal in solcher Harmonie miteinander verkehren wie wir hier, so müsste es einmal mit allen Kriegen vorbei sein.

Dieses Ziel hat er nun nicht mehr erreicht. Vielleicht wird eine spätere Geschichtsschreibung auch mit einer Seite Ernst v. Hasenacks Kampf um das Gute im Menschen würdigen.

Frau Hildegard Limberg
geb. Dietrichs.

Wuppertal - Elberfeld
Helmholtzstr. 8^{II}

spieler enttäuschte Gesichter machte
"wo mag er nur bleiben, unser Flöten
er ist sonst so pünktlich! Doch bald
knarrte die Türe u. mit glücklichem
Lächeln trat der Lämmige^{ein} da bin ich
endlich, Ihr lieben Freunde, verzeiht
dass ich auch warten liess, mein Herz
ist so übervoll von Glück u. Freude
es kam ein Telegramm von Hause,
ich bin Vater geworden! Nun, die
erste freie Stunde galt einem
Brief an meine liebe Frau, doch
nun wollen wir unser Einverständ-
nis voraussetzend, dem jüngeren
Erdenbürger ein Häubchen brin-
gen! Und während Mozarts unver-
gänglichste Töne strahlend den Raum
durchklingen, aufperchte Schwester He-
degard in der Küche von neuem das
Feuer Feuer im Ofen u. braute, im Er-
nackelung von Wein, einem Kaffee
u. in der Pfanne brüteten eine
paar Pfannkuchen. Und so wurde
dann in der kleinen Runde gleich-
gestimmter Menschen das neue
Reis am alten Tische derer
v. Harbach geerd. Und noch hei-
se klingen wir erst v. Harbachs
Worte in den Ohren: wenn alle

Institut für Zeitgeschichte – Archiv

Dr. iur. Adolf Möller
Admiralintendant
P.O.W.No. 560 398

Island Farm Camp - Bridgend,
24.9.1947

POW

Ally...

G u t a c h t e n
=====

Betreffend: Internierung von Offizieren wegen Verdacht von Kriegsverbrechen oder Sicherheitsgefahr.

Am 18.9.1947 ist einer Anzahl von Kriegsgefangenen im Generalsrang eröffnet worden, dass sie nicht entlassungsfähig sind und zur Festhaltung in Zivilinternierungslagern in der britischen Zone Deutschlands überführt werden sollen. Die in Frage kommenden Offiziere haben mich gebeten, mich in einem Rechtsgutachten zur Zulässigkeit dieser Massnahme zu äussern. Ich komme diesem Wunsche mit den folgenden Ausführungen nach:

1.) Die in Frage kommenden Offiziere sind zur Zeit zweifellos Kriegsgefangene. Für die Behandlung von Kriegsgefangenen ist das Genfer Abkommen vom 27.7.1929 massgebend. Es ist gegenüber deutschen Kriegsgefangenen nicht etwa dadurch ausser Kraft getreten, dass Deutschland bedingungslos kapituliert hat und zur Zeit kein souveräner Staat ist, da Art. 82 des Abkommens ausdrücklich bestimmt, dass das Abkommen auch dann verbindlich bleibt, wenn ein Kriegsführender nicht mehr Vertragspartner ist. Das Abkommen ist auch nicht gekündigt worden, eine Kündigung würde auch gem. Art. 96 erst nach Friedensschluss wirksam werden. Im übrigen hat die Britische Regierung ihr Recht, die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen noch zurückzuhalten, auf Art. 75 des Abkommens gestützt, sie erkennt dieses also selbst noch als massgebende Rechtsgrundlage für die Behandlung deutscher Kriegsgefangener an.

2.) Die Kriegsgefangenschaft endet nach ihrem Wesen mit der Heimsendung des Kriegsgefangenen, das heisst mit seiner Entlassung in die Freiheit. Die als nicht entlassungsfähig bezeichneten Offiziere sollen zwar in die britische Zone Deutschlands überführt, aber dort nicht in die Freiheit entlassen, sondern durch den bisherigen Gewahrsamsstaat in Zivilinternierungslagern festgehalten werden. Praktisch verbleiben sie also in Gefangenschaft, verlieren aber als Zivilinternierte wichtige Schutzrechte, die ihnen durch das Genfer Abkommen gewährleistet sind; zum Beispiel:

- a) sie werden entgegen Art. 49, Abs. 1 des Genfer Abkommens ihres militärischen Ranges entkleidet,
- b) sie werden entgegen Art. 21 nicht mehr ihrem Rang und Alter entsprechend, sondern zusammen und in gleicher Weise wie rein zivile Häftlinge untergebracht und behandelt,
- c) sie erhalten keinen Wehrlohn mehr,
- d) soweit sie im Verdacht stehen, strafbare Handlungen begangen zu haben, richtet sich ihre Behandlung nicht mehr nach den in den Artikeln 45, 47, 49 und 63 enthaltenen Bestimmungen, da ihre weitere Behandlung nicht mehr den für britische Wehrmachtangehörige geltenden Bestimmungen entspricht, da sie zum Teil ohne dringenden Verdacht in einer Art von Untersuchungshaft festgehalten werden, da sie ihres militärischen Ranges ent-

kleidet sind und da die über sie urteilenden Gerichte nicht so zusammengesetzt sind wie bei den britischen Offizieren gleichen Ranges. Es darf in diesem Zusammenhang daraufhingewiesen werden, dass Art. 53, Abs. 2 des Genfer Abkommens ausdrücklich bestimmt, dass Kriegsgefangene, die strafrechtlich verfolgt werden, bis zur Beendigung des Verfahrens und gegebenenfalls bis zur Verbüßung der Strafe von der Heimsendung ausgeschlossen werden können. Aus dieser Bestimmung ist zu schliessen, dass Kriegsgefangene während eines gegen sie laufenden Verfahrens und sogar während der Strafverbüßung als Kriegsgefangene und nicht als Internierte zu behandeln sind.

3.) Nach Vorstehendem führt die Zivilinternierung zu einer Schlechterstellung der betroffenen Personen gegenüber den übrigen Kriegsgefangenen, die mir im Widerspruch zu Art. 4 des Genfer Abkommens zu stehen scheint, da nach dieser Bestimmung eine unterschiedliche Behandlung von Kriegsgefangenen nur zugelassen ist, soweit es sich um Verdünstigungen handelt. Die in Frage kommenden Offiziere sollen zwar früher in die Heimat überführt werden als es nach den allgemeinen für deutsche Kriegsgefangene in Grossbritannien geltenden Repatriierungsplan vorgesehen ist, da es sich aber um eine vorzeitige Entlassung zwecks Internierung handelt, so liegt meines Erachtens keine Vergünstigung, sondern eine mit Art. 4 nicht zu vereinbarende Schlechterstellung der Betroffenen vor.

4.) Es besteht vielleicht die Ansicht, dass das Genfer Abkommen deshalb nicht auf die internierten Angehörigen der ehemaligen deutschen Wehrmacht anwendbar sei und dass deshalb auch ihre Sonderbehandlung nicht im Widerspruch zu Art. 4 steht, weil die betreffenden Offiziere gelegentlich der Überführung in die Zivilinterniertenlager formell aus der Wehrmacht und aus dem Verhältnis als Kriegsgefangener entlassen werden. Wie aber bereits ausgeführt, verschlechtert sich gerade durch diese Art der Entlassung die Lage des Betroffenen, und wie ferner bereits ausgeführt, bleiben sie durch die Internierung im Gewahrsam eines Staates, der sich noch mit Deutschland im Kriegszustand befindet. Die Entlassung von Soldaten der Wehrmacht eines Feindstaates unter Überführung in ein Zivilinterniertenlager führt deshalb meines Erachtens zu einer Umgehung des Genfer Abkommens, die mit dem Sinn dieser Vorschrift nicht zu vereinbaren ist. Mindestens bis zur Beendigung des Kriegszustandes ist nach meiner Ansicht die Zurückhaltung von Angehörigen einer feindlichen Wehrmacht nur in der Form der Kriegsgefangenschaft entsprechend dem Genfer Abkommen zulässig. Es darf in diesem Zusammenhang besonders daraufhingewiesen werden, dass diese Abkommen nach Art. 82 unter allen Umständen eingehalten werden muss.

5.) Zu einer Abweichung von den Bestimmungen des Genfer Abkommens besteht meiner Ansicht auch keine Notwendigkeit.

- a) Sowelt Offiziere als sicherheitsverdächtig angesehen werden, kann die Festhaltung ohne Schaden für die Besatzungsmacht bis zum Friedensschluss auch in der Form der Kriegsgefangenschaft durchgeführt werden.
- b) Sowelt es sich um Offiziere handelt, die wahrscheinlich für ge-

3.

richtliche Untersuchung als Kriegsverbrecher gebraucht werden, kann und sollte meines Erachtens die gerichtliche Verfolgung unter Aufrechterhaltung des Status als Kriegsgefangener gemäss den Artikeln 60 bis 64 des Genfer Abkommens durchgeführt werden. Soweit es sich um die Verfolgung von Angehörigen von Organisationen handelt, die durch das i. Nürnbergger Urteil für ~~kriegsverbrecherlich~~ erklärt worden sind, mögen zwar für das gerichtliche Verfahren und die Rechtsfindung die inzwischen erlassenen Verordnungen massgebend sein, dies schliesst aber nicht aus, dass auch diesen Personen bis zur rechtskräftigen Verurteilung die Eigenschaft als Kriegsgefangener belassen wird.

c) Sollten sich unter den nicht-entlassungsfähigen Offizieren solche befinden, die nur deshalb in ein Zivilinternierungslager überführt werden, weil sie vielleicht noch als Zeugen in einem Kriegsverbrecherprozess gebraucht werden, so erlaube ich mir darauf hinzuweisen, dass auch diese Offiziere für den gedachten Zweck ebenso gut als Kriegsgefangene zurückgehalten werden können und dass meines Erachtens für sie die Zivilinternierung eine besondere Härte bedeuten würde.

6.) Die Internierung ist nach meiner Überzeugung eine gegenüber der Kriegsgefangenschaft wesentlich verschärfte Form der Beschränkung der persönlichen Freiheit. Es darf deshalb schliesslich auch noch darauf hingewiesen werden, dass nach einem wohl allgemein anerkannten Rechtsgrundsatz eine Untersuchungshaft wegen des Verdachtes einer strafbaren Handlung nur auf Grund einer richterlichen Entscheidung angeordnet wird und dass diese Entscheidung erst ergeht, nachdem der Festgenommene durch einen Richter vernommen worden ist, wobei ihm die Verdachtsgründe mitgeteilt worden sind und er Gelegenheit hatte, sich zu diesen zu äussern. Diese richterliche Vernehmung soll spätestens 24 Stunden nach der vorläufigen Festnahme erfolgen. Den für die Internierung vorgesehenen Offizieren ist meines Wissens bisher nicht mitgeteilt worden, welche Verdachtsgründe gegen sie bestehen, sie hatten deshalb nach meiner Kenntnis auch noch keine Gelegenheit, sich zu äussern.

Nach Vorstehendem rechtfertigt sich meines Erachtens die Bitte:

- 1.) Die Angelegenheit nochmals zu überprüfen und die getroffenen Massnahmen aufzuheben,
- 2.) Den in Frage kommenden Offizieren baldigst die gegen sie bestehenden Verdachtsgründe mitzuteilen und ihnen Gelegenheit zu ihrer Verteidigung zu geben.

Stollen

20.7.44

Erich Stoll
Kameramann

Hamburg, den 1. Okt. 1945

Bericht über die Wochenschau-Aufnahmen des Prozesses zum 20. Juli 1944

Eines Tages bekamen die Kameraleute der "Deutschen Wochenschau" von dem ehemaligen Reichsfilmintendanten Hans Hinkel den Befehl, von dem Prozess des 20. Juli 1944, Filmaufnahmen herzustellen, die angeblich in der Wochenschau erscheinen sollten.

Wir wurden zu dem Volksgereichtshof geführt und dort wurde uns erklärt, dass wir so unauffällig wie möglich Tonfilm- und Situationsaufnahmen von dem Prozess herstellen sollen. Wir richteten daraufhin eine unauffällige provisorische Beleuchtung ein und bauten unsere Tonkameras hinter den dort befindlichen Türen auf, um durch ein Loch die Aufnahmen zu machen. Ein Kameramann musste im Saal Situationsaufnahmen und die allgemeine Atmosphäre aufnehmen. Der ehemalige Reichsfilmintendant Hinkel bestimmte den Kameraleuten, wer und welche Aufnahmen zu machen waren. Er liess sich auch jeweilig die gedrehte Meterzahl angeben, damit jeder Meter abgeliefert wurde. Mit Begeisterung hat der Präsident des Volksgereichtshofs Dr. Freissler die Zustimmung zu den Filmaufnahmen gegeben, und sich dafür eingesetzt, dass ja alles aufgenommen wurde.

Die Aufnahmen begannen damit, dass die Angeklagten hereingeführt, die Handfesseln abgenommen und ihnen die Plätze zugewiesen wurden. Dann kamen die Richter unter den Vorsitz des ehemaligen Präsidenten Dr. Freissler und der Prozess begann. Jeder wichtige Angeklagte musste mit Ton aufgenommen werden. Von den weniger wichtigen wurden nur stumme Aufnahmen gedreht. Nach der ersten Pause verkündigte sich der ehemalige Reichsfilmintendant Hans Hinkel und der ehemalige Präsident des Reichsgerichtshofes Dr. Freissler, wie die Aufnahmen geworden sind. Wir mussten dem Präsidenten mitteilen, dass er den Angeklagten gegenüber zu laut geschrien hat, dass es dem Tonmeister nicht möglich war, den Ausgleich zwischen der schreienden Stimme und der leisen Stimme des Angeklagten auszugleichen. Leider wiederholte bei den anderen Vernehmungen der Präsident des Gerichtshofes sein Schreien, sodass die Aufnahmen tontechnisch nur als ungenügend bezeichnet werden konnten. Nach dem der Prozess der ersten acht Angeklagten, darunter der ehemalige Generalfeldmarschall v. Witzleben, Generalleutnant Stief und Generaloberst Hübner beendet war, wurden wir kurzfristig vom ehemaligen Reichsfilmintendanten Hinkel nach dem Gefängnis Plötzensee beordert, um dort Aufnahmen von der Urteilsvollstreckung aufzunehmen. Im Gefängnis angekommen stellten wir fest, dass der Raum für Filmaufnahmen viel zu dunkel war. Auf unseren Einwand hin, dass Aufnahmen hier nicht möglich wären, entgegenete der ehemalige Reichsfilmintendant, dass auf alle Fälle Aufnahmen gemacht werden müssten, gleich wie sie ausfallen würden. Mit den Verurteilten hatten wir noch eine Auseinandersetzung und zwar wollten diese die Verurteilten nackt aufhängen, da sie angaben, dass die Hosen während des Hängens beschmutzt werden würden und sie nicht dafür da wären, diese Hosen wieder zu reinigen. Wir lehnten dies entschieden ab und setzten es schliesslich durch, dass die Verurteilten mit Hosen bekleidet erhängt wurden. Im Gefängnis wurden dann Aufnahmen gemacht, wie die Verurteilten in der Sträflingskleidung mit Holzspantoffeln, von je zwei Wörtern zur Exekutionshalle geführt wurden. Nun schildert Ihnen Herr Sasse, einer der Kameraleute, die die Exekution aufnehmen mussten, diesen Vorgang.

Das Gebäude, das durch frühere Luftangriffe stark beschädigt sein mußte, war wieder notdürftig hergerichtet. Der Raum war ca. 4m breit und 8 m lang. Ein schwarzer Vorhang teilte diesen Raum in zwei Hälften. Der Raum bekam nur durch zwei kleine Fenster etwas Tageslicht. Unmittelbar vor diesen beiden Fenstern befanden sich an der Decke ca. 8 Haken, woran die Verurteilten aufgehängt werden sollten. Weiterhin befand sich im Raum noch eine Vorrichtung zur Enthauptung.

Als 1. Delinquant wurde der ehemalige Generalfeldmarschall v. Witzleben von zwei Henkern durch den schwarzen Vorhang in den Raum hineingeführt. Zuvor hatte in dem Vorraum der Staatsanwalt dem Verurteilten nochmals das Todesurteil mit folgenden Worten vorgelesen:

"Angeklagter Erich v. Witzleben, sie sind von dem Volksgerichtshof zum Tode durch den Strang verurteilt worden, Scharfrichter walten sie ihres Amtes." Der Angeklagte ging mit erhobenen Haupten, zwar von den Henkern eines schnelleren Schrittes genötigt, zum Ende des Raumes. Dort angekommen, musste er eine Kehrtwendung machen und dann legte man ihm die Hanfschlinge um den Hals, worauf der Angeklagte von den Henkern hochgehoben und die obere Schlaufe des Hanfstrickes in den Haken an der Decke eingehangen und der Delinquent nun mit grosser Wucht fallengelassen wurde, sodass ihm die Schlinge sofort sehr stark den Hals zuschnürte. Meines Erachtens trat der Tod sehr bald ein. Nach dem das erste Urteil vollstreckt war, wurde ein schmaler, schwarzer Vorhang vor dem Erhängten gezogen, sodass der nächstfolgende Todeskandidat dem ersteren nicht gewahr wurde. In kürzester Folge kam dann der 2. Delinquent, der ehemalige General v. Hase, welcher ebenfalls selbstbewusst seinen letzten Gang antrat. Nach jeweiliger Vollstreckung des Urteils wurde jedesmal so ein schmaler, schwarzer Vorhang vor dem Erhängten vorgesogen, sodass es auch dem letzten der acht Verurteilten nicht möglich war, die Vorangegangenen zu sehen. Auf die Reihenfolge und die Namen der weiteren sechs Verurteilten entsinne ich mich nicht mehr genau. Die Urteilsvollstreckung ging in sehr rascher Folge vor sich und die Verurteilten gingen alle ohne ein Wort der Klage, aufrecht und männlich ihren letzten Gang.

Unter anwesenden Zuschauern erinnere ich mich noch an den ehemaligen Reichsfilmintendanten Hans Hinkel, sowie mehrere höhere Wehrmachtsoffiziere und Zivilisten, deren Namen mir nicht geläufig sind. Ausserdem ist mir noch bekannt, dass diese und auch weitere Urteilsvollstreckungen sowie alle Gerichtsverhandlungen im Volksgerichtshof in der Triftstrasse in der Nähe des Winterfeldplatzes in Berlin, vom Pressefotografen des Heinrich Hoffmann Verlages aufgenommen worden sind.

Es wurden von den weiteren Prozessen nur noch die Wichtigsten aufgenommen, die wiederum von dem ehemaligen Reichsfilmintendanten befohlen wurden. An den Aufnahmen hatten abwechselnd 9 Kameraleute teilgenommen, es geschah deshalb, da jeder Kameramann mit Unlust diesen Befehl Folge leistete. Weitere Aufnahmen von der Vollstreckung wurden abgelehnt, da ich erklärte, meinen Kameraleuten nicht zuzumuten zu können, solche Grausamkeiten noch einmal aufzunehmen, wobei ich die Unterstützung aller Kameraleute hatte.

Institut für Zeitgeschichte – Archiv

Wagner, Karola:

Reichsfinanzministerium : Bestand R 2 / bearb. von Karola Wagner. -

Bremerhaven : Wirtschaftsverl. NW. - 24 cm

(Findbücher zu Beständen des Bundesarchivs ; Bd. 100)

SW: Koblenz / Bundesarchiv ; Deutschland / Finanzministerium ;

Geschichte 1871-1945 ; Inventar (345126)

DBN: 97,151126.8 XA-DE-11B

SG: 010;020;350

Kuhn

16.1.07

Miss Sedgewick

FI

K

1) ~~2~~

2) ~~ATTT~~

3) JNS.

Directorate of Army Psychiatry.
Research Memorandum 45/03/14.

PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS

TO DEFEAT.

A Discussion of probable modes
of German behaviour

by

Lieutenant-Colonel H.V. Dicks

(The views expressed in this memorandum
are those of the individual research
worker concerned, and do not necessarily
represent War Office or Government policy).

RESTRICTED.

The information given in
this document is not to be
communicated either directly
or indirectly to the Press
or to any person not authorised
to receive it.

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I - INTRODUCTORY	1
II - VARIETIES OF REACTION TO STRESS	1
(a) DISSOCIATION	2
(b) PROJECTION	3
(c) MANIC DENIAL	4
(d) THE ANARCHIC-DELINQUENT RESPONSE	4
(e) WITHDRAWAL	6
(f) DEPRESSION	6
(g) THE REALISTIC-ADAPTIVE RESPONSE	9
III - APPLICATION	9
(a) Selection	9
(b) Public Safety	10
(c) Publicity and Re-Education	10
IV - CONCLUSION	10

I - INTRODUCTORY

This paper sets out to indicate in terms as simple as possible the more common attitudes likely to be met with among various sorts of Germans faced with the reality of total defeat and its consequences.

In that catastrophic change of the whole social field, the boundaries which hitherto defined rulers and ruled, soldiers, party-troopers and civilians will have become obliterated. "Nazis" will have disappeared. Superficially at least there will be all but universal subservience and collaboration with the Allies. Many distinguishing marks will be blurred or lost.

We therefore now need an approach which cuts across the old lines of morale study that served their purpose during the phase of military operations against the organised resistance patterns of armies, civilian and party agencies.

In the flux, only the basic attributes of human psychology in general, and their special combination in the German character-structure will remain to serve as a rough guide to what we are likely to meet. Clichés of classification into Nazi and anti-Nazi (a ragbag containing all sorts of promising as well as impossible human types) will have to be largely given up in a realistic attempt to get at the heart of the problem.

This paper is not the result of detailed or prolonged study of the problem and has no statistical basis. Such a thorough examination of the new psychological forces in the greatly disturbed German social field has yet to be made. Here we survey only the possibilities on the basis of responses already encountered among Germans by the writer and by other observers. It is assumed rather than proved that certain reactions will be more characteristic of certain sub-varieties of Germans, familiar to us from previous studies, when confronted with national, social and personal disaster, disgrace or loss. It is further assumed that character will run true to form.

It is proposed first to define and explain these various reactions to defeat and point out roughly in what group of Germans they are likely to occur. In a further section some important practical uses for this information will be briefly outlined.

II - VARIETIES OF REACTION TO STRESS.

Human beings differ in their capacity to tolerate psychological as well as physical stress. Psychiatry studies and defines a number of spontaneous responses to adversity. Some of these are of the nature of mental "buffers" against a hard reality which cannot be faced. They are attempts to protect the subject from excessive mental pain (usually called "anxiety") occasioned by fear, shame, guilt or loss of a precious relationship or object. If severe such reactions fall within the realm of the pathological. The denial of reality is the essence of maladjustment to life which may amount to insanity. Other reactions facilitate adaptation and enable the subject to face the crisis, perhaps because of his favourable background and constitution. These reactions can thus be described as "healthy". In psychology it is often not merely the kind of reaction which is important, but also the degree to which it dominates the total personality.

It is in practice rare to find a single reaction in "pure culture". More often there is a mixture of responses. Usually, however, one can decide on the predominance of one or other main trend or mode of reaction at any given time. Over a longer period, an individual may change. As one response fails him, he may be driven into another in the face of fresh or continuing stresses or he may so overcome and adapt to the situation that the protective reaction fades out, leaving him well-adjusted.

It should be remembered that in the complex situation of a whole great nation, the individual psychological stress will vary greatly according to the degree of discomfort or loss suffered, according to the previous attitude to the war, to the Nazis or the Allies, and so forth, to mention only the most obvious factors.

For the sake of simplicity the reactions will be described singly, so as to bring out their alien points.

The following psychological responses to defeat are dealt with:

1. Dissociation.
2. Projection.
3. Manic denial.
4. Anarchy and Delinquency.
5. Withdrawal.
6. Depression.
7. Realistic adaptation.

(a) DISSOCIATION.

This is a common reaction of human beings to circumstances which have become too hard to bear. We would like to know how common it is in Germans. In extreme pathological form it leads to such phenomena as stupor or "loss of memory". A curtain descends over past events or over present reality. The subject is completely apathetic, passive and, most importantly, free of anxiety due to guilt, or outer danger. Sometimes there is blindness of a hysterical nature, or paralysis of limbs and the like instead, serving the same psychological purpose.

In the lesser degrees of dissociation which are our concern here, there is still a characteristic loss of continuity or integration of personality, a kind of forcible "forgetting" or inability to feel. This degree of dissociative response is frequently met in German Prisoners of War. We find them denying, in all apparent sincerity, even when they are among themselves, past feelings and attitudes. This leads to inconsistency, self-contradictory behaviour, such as denial of former allegiance to National Socialism, of participation in atrocities, "traitorous" collaboration - all in a bland matter-of-course way. It is an expression of the ambivalence and duality of the German character of which much evidence has been presented in my earlier memoranda and on which many observers agree. This "not letting the right hand know what the left hand is doing" leads to such ludicrous remarks as the following:-

"I hate the English and would take no prisoners.
But if I felt the British were obviously going to win,
I would serve under them. If I had no relatives in
Germany, I would not object to settling in Canada".

The line between this German capacity for forgetting, for what their own psychologists call "Ungeschehen machen", and conscious lying is often difficult to draw. Dissociation is on the whole more naive, betrays its own inconsistency (as in the above remark) and yet satisfies the defective introspective power of the subject.

Distribution.

This reaction is likely to be found among a large number of former semi-Nazis, opportunists, unstable unpolitical men, lately calling themselves anti-Nazis, who reverse their allegiance and submission from the German to the Allied authority. They "never wanted war", they "always knew Hitler would be bad for Germany" etc. Higher officers of the Wehrmacht and nationalist circles may especially display this attitude, which is a typical symptom of shallow emotion or of lack of deeper values.

There is no need to enlarge on the dangers of reliance upon such personalities with their protestations of loyalty, ingratiating compliance with the Allied viewpoint and their ready betrayal of former objects of devotion. This capacity for rapid "conversion" and forgetting of the past works both ways. A slightly different line of cleavage of the personality is that in which we find the old time Nationalist-Conservative-Militarist uphold every principle of National Socialism except the movement itself, without being aware of the incongruity and

Diagnosis.

The essential point in the recognition of this reaction is the already mentioned bland, innocent denial of ever having been involved emotionally in any aspect of Nazidom; the inconsistency and contradictoriness of many attitudes; the absence of strong, convincing feeling and moral decisiveness. A debonair unconcern about deep issues, human suffering, even about the tragedy of their damned nation, characterizes these personalities, as their fickleness is typical of the crowd-man. It is not as a rule difficult to elicit this response on almost any set of questions relating to the outcome of the war, Germany's future, feelings about the Allies and so on.

(b) PROJECTION.

This form of personality defence against guilt and uncomfortable feelings has previously been defined. It consists in self-justification, in scape-goat hunting and blame-shifting. Like dissociation, it results from an inability to face unpleasant reality in relation to one's own ego or to the wider group with which one is identified.

The prevalence of new stab-in-the-back legends among prisoners shows that projection is also likely to be a stubborn, unhelpful reaction to defeat. The scape-goats are divisible into two groups:-

- i) Former "inside the group" figures, such as the Wehrmacht officers, Nazi leaders, etc. This reaction will characterize renegade unstable persons, to some extent overlapping with the dissociative category, since the mental attitude involves an act of forgetting former loyalties. It is this type of response that leads people to denounce each other. If they can blacken their neighbour, they feel whiter themselves.
- ii) Foreign "outside the group" symbols, such as international Jewry; treason by Axis satellites, especially the Italians; secret "Bolshevik" plotting; and so on. Such a projection means that fundamentally, and despite any protestations to the contrary, the individual still identifies himself with the military and Nazi cause which through the projection is shielded from blame or loss of prestige.

The unacceptable sense of guilt over German misdeeds will lead to another form of projection - i.e. the expectation of atrocities perpetrated by the Allies against poor Germany; the gleeful emphasis on any Allied acts which savour of cruelty or injustices; and a search for evidence of cynicism and heartless power-politics in other nations, to justify the reaction "they are no better".

Distribution.

It is likely that the projection ("paranoid") response to defeat will be most prevalent among nationalists and disappointed Nazis to whom Germany must always be right. But denial of guilt is so general a German reaction that we must also be prepared to find anti-Nazis indulging in scape-goat hunts, the Nazi leaders providing a good "alibi" for the rest of the nation, innocently traduced by the "bad men".

The large mass of Germans is also likely to continue to expect terrible retaliation from the Slav peoples, especially the Russians, who stand for that barbarism which the German always wants to deny in himself.

Diagnosis

The paranoid response is probably best elicited by informal discussion on war guilt, expectations about post-war life in occupied Germany and general historical or political topics. The degree of underlying hostility and anti-social tendencies is greater in the paranoid, projection-minded person than in the dissociator, and the unpleasant, suspicious or snarling atmosphere he creates will be readily felt by any moderately sensitive interviewer.

(c) MANIC DENIAL

The term mania is usually given to behaviour which in extreme form is characterised by great excitement, a flight of ideas, exaltation and instability of mood, and by a restless, purposeless over-activity. Psychologically, it can be interpreted as an abnormal reaction to a deeper, unrecognised sense of depression, with which it is often as closely linked as are the two sides of a coin. An individual so predisposed, when faced with a very depressing, intolerable situation, may rush into this state of frenzied exaltation in order to deny the reality of his desperation.

Applied to the German situation, we find this type of reaction expressed as over-optimistic, truculent denial of defeat; in the "fervent faith" in ultimate victory and the everlasting triumph of the "Idea of Nazidom"; in enthusiastic self-sacrifice and similar forms of fanaticism. I have seen young men who literally foamed at the mouth as they laid down the law in gesticulating, earnest zeal to me as to why German soldiers would master their adversaries and rise superior to all setbacks "through will and heroism".

Distribution

This reaction is less and less commonly observed among prisoners as the war proceeds - possibly because few are so pathological as to be able to maintain such a degree of denial of reality in the changed military situation, or perhaps because that sort are more likely to rush headlong into death which puts an end to their availability for psychological scrutiny! My impression is that the manic reaction occurs in rather a "better" sort of young man, one who has genuinely invested his feelings and loyalty in an idea and who cannot bring himself to face the bankruptcy of the thing to which he has given his best. He has to make a loud, over-confident noise in order to drown despair and depression. He rushes about, if still in the fight, organising, threatening, inspiring, carrying some of his fellow men with him by his infectious zeal and spate of output. Sometimes this reaction has won great victories in a crisis and has justified itself in the eyes of society. Here we are concerned only to point out that mania conceals despair, or the fear of despair, and may easily change into it.

Diagnosis

The diagnosis will be left until the next section, as there are superficial resemblances which have to be discussed together.

(d) THE ANARCHIC-DELINQUENT RESPONSE.

This reaction is fairly defined by its name. It must be remembered that when a strongly authoritarian group, such as an army or the German nation, loses its leader-figures (psychologically or actually) and its cohesion, the pent-up negative, anti-social feelings are no longer held in check. Then it depends on the strength and quality of the mental equipment of individuals as to how they will deal with the uprush of primitive aggression hitherto canalized by group leadership and common aims into acceptable channels.

We have already seen the dissociative, the paranoid, and the manic reactions to this situation. These imply some power in the personality to cope, however poorly, with strong impulses in a way which confines these within the individual's mind, i.e. they are internal psychological responses. But primitive, brutal, anchorless people are not even thus far integrated, and to them release from group authority and collective aim means anarchy. Such people, lacking capacity for digesting such a situation internally, act out their impulses on the environment. This, in practice, signifies criminal destructive behaviour. The typical mental process is: "All constraint has now gone - I can do what I like". This results in acts of wanton brutality, sometimes vaguely directed against the enemy, but primarily against all that symbolizes order, restraint, social or parental authority. Greed, lust and sadistic hatred rule the behaviour.

Distribution

This reaction is likely to predominate among the lawless, bestialized Nazi

of the gang leader. It will also be found among the adolescents of large cities who, in the destruction and dissolution of ordered existence, have read the signal for the cessation of all social sanctions. In the former case their dim realization of common guilt may hold them together in gangs which the Nazi underground will exploit through blackmail and through a primitive sort of ideological hold. In the case of the anarchic gangs of youths, most of whom claim to be "anti-Nazi", the rebellion against authority is the chief motive uniting them.

Diagnosis.

The chief difficulty is to distinguish the criminal, anti-social reaction of the convictionless thug from the manic denial response of the basically social but desperate man. Their behaviour is outwardly very similar. The mouthing of patriotic slogans such as "resistance to the last drop of blood", or "every bridge, every forest shall be a fortress", will be no criterion, because it will attract both types for totally different motives.

The disillusioned idealist will follow such slogans because he needs frantic action and affirmation of the validity of his cause. A species of extreme egocentricity, so typical of fanatics, will moreover forbid him to suffer the emergence of a new order, not of his brand or making. This sort of response has been most strikingly outlined by the German war-writer E.v. Salomon in his "Die Geächteten" (The Outlaws). In Chapter XX ("Kern and I") he gives the views of the 1918 "Free Corps" type of disappointed, spiritually bankrupt ex-officer nationalist, the murderer of Rathenau:

"Between them (the Weimar leaders who tried to restore Germany) and us no agreement is possible; for they are no longer capable of the final sacrifice that (power) it is our task to destroy that power in the nation who have allowed their Teutonism to be submerged in a flood of Western culture. They are surprised that the Germans continue to be feared! It is not they who are feared - it is us! "

"I couldn't bear it if once again something great were to arise out of the chaotic, insane age in which we live we are not fighting to make the nation happy - we are fighting to force it to tread the path of its destiny. But I will not tolerate that this man (Rathenau - whose greatness the speaker had earlier obviously conceded - H.V.D.) should once again inspire the nation with a faith"

And again:

"I did not survive it (9th Nov. 1918). As honour demanded, on November 9th I blew out my brains What survives is another thing. Since that day, I have lost my ego I died for the nation were it otherwise, I could not bear it my actions (frantic underground, and free corps activity against the French occupation, Fohm-murder, sabotage etc. H.V.D.) are the sole motive force within me This force is destructive - hence I destroy. Who sips with the devil, must have a long spoon. I know that I shall perish in the moment in which this power no longer has any use for me Nothing is left to me except to reconcile myself to the noble suffering imposed on me by Fate".

These quotations illustrate the relation of manic-over-activity to underlying emptiness, despair and depression, a thinly veiled death wish that staves off suicide only through mad destructive activity in the service of a very poorly idealised ego-centric jealousy, dog-in-the-manger sulking and obstinacy. The masochism and lust of suffering, the self-pitying dramatization and denial of the right of others to happiness because one's own wish-world has collapsed, is clearly illustrated. There is clear evidence of a sense of guilt and personal damnation recalling both the Faust story and the conduct of an obstinate naughty baby.

It is fair to point out that such a man has, but denies, a sense of values, he kicks against the pricks. Once converted, he is possibly one of the best focus-points of social change. The practical question of who is going to put in the time and effort at "saving" these souls makes it likely, however, that this type of man will go on to destruction - first of things and people - and then of himself.

No apology is made, however, for giving a good deal of space to what is perhaps the core of the diagnosis and treatment problem of German intransigence and anti-social behaviour, with which the more educated "sober" German has so much secret sympathy and at which even the outsider stands aghast as at the wicked perversion of some potential good.

The other form of criminal behaviour - that of the thug - has to be rated on a much less tragic level. It is the primitive lust for booty, orgy and rape, for defiance of bosses and of anyone who stands in the way, in short - for the satisfaction of sadistic impulses, unvarnished and evil. It is also a way of selling one's life as dearly as possible, and with the maximum of excitement and transient "fun".

The main point of difference between the two types will be their willingness to confess and stick to their convictions; but a fanatic of high intelligence bent on worming his way into our confidence for ulterior motives may well be able to dissimulate. Here only thorough and expert methods can help. A sense of incongruity, of latent volcanic hostility, restlessness and inner hardness will, however, strike any interviewer who is not content with a perfunctory set of political "questions and answers" and has some intuition.

(c) WITHDRAWAL.

A totally different picture is presented by a set of people who respond to life's challenge by withdrawing into a private phantasy world of mysticism and cults; recondite and unworldly studies unrelated to any problems of the present; art in various forms; queer hobbies; or fully-fledged mental illness or other forms of invalidism. Such are the refuges of highly refined, cultured and often neurasthenic natures.

We would need to say little of such reactions to defeat were it not for the possibility that out of even such harmless ways of shutting out reality, the German mind could again construct a philosophy in accord with its basic character fault. Who would have predicted that Wagner's mythological operas or Frau Eudendorff's astrology and Wotan cult might become stones in the house that Hitler built? When dealing with Germany, the murky depths of the archaic unconscious phantasy mind are always to be reckoned with, and they are attractive to many, especially the more sensitive among us.

There is not a great deal of evidence to tell us to what extent the solace of one of the great religious denominations is being sought by Germans. The impression is that the "under forties" are not much influenced by Christianity except in a vague ethical sense.

A reaction related to withdrawal is that of burying oneself in routine work as a defence against thinking. This is, as it always has been, a likely German response to trouble.

The above five reactions to defeat have all been met with or recorded. They represent unhelpful responses to the reality situation. They all deny, run away from or displace the truth, and are difficult to pierce or influence. A rough estimate of the proportion in which they are found would give us some idea with how much negativism and uneducable material in the adolescent and adult sections of the German people we shall have to reckon.

The two remaining reactions must be considered as the more hopeful symptoms among Germans, as carrying within them the potentiality for change and reform.

(f) DEPRESSION.

Depression differs psychologically from all the above mentioned responses to stress and defeat, in that it contains an acceptance of involvement of the self in the situation. Whereas the dissociators, the projectors and so on deny or evade responsibility, the depressive person tends to go to the opposite extreme, to blame himself, or at least to search his heart as to whether he could have been blame-worthy. In depression we can find evidence of an identification of the self with the object around which the depression centres. Thus, if an important person in one's life fails one, the unconscious mind interprets this as one's own failure. This, it will be noted, is the exact reversal of projection, where blame is thrown on to the outside. In depression, the self carries the burden so that the other shall escape blame. Another way of putting it is that the depressed person suffers from a "swollen conscience".

The behaviour picture of depression will differ according to the degree of depression; according to the sufferer's consciousness of it; and according to the impulse which the individual feels towards making amends or restitution for the situation for which he blames himself. Without going into the further clinical complexities of the subject, one should, in other words, discern three types of depressive reaction, according to the degree of severity, according to the awareness of the sufferer of the real nature of his depression, and according to the capacity to undertake restitution, to heal and undo the harm he feels he has brought about.

(i) Severe Depression.

This condition consists in a state of hopeless gloom and self-tormenting misery, not infrequently culminating in suicide as the logical outcome of self-punishment. In Germany suicide has become to some extent institutionalized, notably in the officer caste, when honour, i.e. outraged status vis-a-vis a social situation of impasse, demands it. This honour is closely related to the internalised group conscience and functions like any other important object, e.g. like an avenger, angry father. The depressed person succumbs to the hate he feels his conscience to mete out to him and feels helpless in its grip. Such degrees of depression are likely to be rare even in a defeated German people, and are chiefly of medical importance. An estimate of the present suicide rate among Germans would be of great interest. The probability is that it is at least 10 times as high as in Britain at present. Deep depression is compatible for a time with relatively normal external behaviour, and maybe masked by forced cheerfulness, overwork, or one of the substitutes about to be described.

(ii) Substitutes for Depression.

Under this convenient, though somewhat inaccurate, head can be classified a number of reactions which have the psychological purpose of defending the personality from succumbing to depression.

One of these - manic denial - has already been described. It can now be seen as a kind of defiance of the conscience - a shutting down of guilt. There are bound to be, as there have been already, a fair number of cases of this denial who have collapsed into depression and apathy like pricked balloons, e.g. on capture. A typical case is that of some young elite soldier who begins captivity full of swaggering over-assertion of confidence in the Nazi cause, but rapidly becomes overwhelmed when he sees the reality of Allied supplies and strength, and the hollowness of Dr. Goebbels' boasts. This collapse is a potentially wholesome thing and opens the door wide to re-educative influence - that is to the creation and internalization of new and perhaps better objects with which to identify oneself. In the meantime the period of depression is akin to a kind of angry mourning for the lost object which had been loved and revered as good, but which has turned out to be bad, and which is punished in one's own person during the depression. It must not be inferred that all Germans who react in this way to defeat are ipso facto the chosen ones who will be converted and live happily ever after. It is only suggested that the chance exists of some of them passing through their "purgatory" to a helpful and constructive attitude. This topic will be taken up in the next section.

Other forms of "abortive" or substituted depression are such well-known anodynes as alcoholic or sexual excess and some forms of religious escapism. In all these the purpose is to find something "good" in a world which through collapse of the central objectives has become "bad".

A strong tendency to self-undoing is implied in riotous living under conditions when rejoicing is out of place, and when the quality of the orgy is bitter and forced.

Liability to a number of non-specific illnesses may also not be unconnected with depression.

(iii) "Benign" Depression.

Some degree of depression must be regarded almost as a normal reaction to a situation such as Germans now find themselves in. The mood of the masses in Germany is often described in terms of apathy and gloom suggestive of a mass depression, among which the clinically severe forms are likely to constitute a

statistically small fraction.

In psychological terms a depression is more likely to be benign if the causes lie in reality and not in morbid pre-history and phantasy of the individual subject. Much also depends on whether the individual has in himself enough conviction of godness. Irrespective of political attitude, such a conviction is ultimately based upon the feeling of being love-worthy. Good and tender parental background and, at times, the perhaps related faith in a benevolent, forgiving Deity (provided both these are genuine and not protestations of the opposite) favour such a feeling. It is likely that a reasonable, institutionalized religious faith will be of great help to its votaries. In order to accept and tolerate a depression one has to have in oneself some credit balance of faith in forgiveness or mercy. If this is lacking, one resists the feeling of depression by every means; defiance, withdrawal, projection, dissociation, etc., or if unable to do so any longer, one becomes mentally ill and is likely to attempt suicide, actual or symbolic.

Hence, paradoxically, those who are most likely to have a lively sense of guilt are the people with the socially and ethically most responsive background. This is perhaps the psychological basis of the religious assertion that only true repentance leads to forgiveness.

Distribution.

It is clear that even in the depressive reactions which were earlier described as hopeful or potentially good responses to defeat, only one fraction is really benign. Suicidal depression from a sense of frustrated conceit or status, various asocial escapisms such as drinking, self-punishment, or persistent, aimless lamentation, are devoid of constructiveness. These useless reactions are likely in older, rigid, authoritarian types. One visualizes the austere, "buttoned-up" representatives of the nationalist officer and official caste breaking down in this manner; even their bleak, world-denying Lutheranism would emphasize rather than lighten their wooden, ponderous and angry guilt-depression.

Suicidal breakdowns are likely in a fair number of ex-SS men, of youthful idealists of the "who shall live if Germany die" sort (always so incomprehensible to the man of ordinary sound sense!), as well as of those who feel too bad to live. Suicide is, in short, likely to be the fate of those who completely identified their own status with Germany's grandeur, power, importance and glory (fanatical Nazis and Nationalist Nazi supporters), and of those who managed to keep their unconscious guilt under control while they could rationalise their bestiality as being demanded or sanctioned by their country's interest.

In short we can hope for self-elimination of a certain percentage of people who would make the post-war period difficult.

The substitutive depressions will affect all sorts and conditions of men, white, grey and black, though the better types will not remain permanently in the grip of riotous living which is a general post-war reaction.

The type of depression we have called benign will afflict a large proportion of people, one fancies, of the sort who have some degree of social feeling, whatever class they may belong to. One would expect them to over-lap with the more definite anti-Nazi fraction of the nation, but also to include some basically decent people who never questioned the Nazi creed until they saw it crumble, or were undecieved in some striking way.

Diagnosis.

The touchstone of the social value of a depression is what comes out of it. In this case we must ask:- what, and how much, is the depressed person willing and anxious to do in order to make restitution, to wash away guilt, to show change of heart?

It is not primarily important to discover to what extent he or she will want to help us. That merely means, or might mean, subjection to and propitiation of a new authority symbol. No - the crucial point is, how much are they willing to do for their own people in a constructive, but humble, un-selfseeking way? This question should be asked especially about those who formerly basked in the sunshine of superior status - high public or business officials and executives, with their still mediaeval sense of superiority and basic contempt for the little man. I venture to think the proportion of genuine restitution-makers among these will be small; it may be somewhat greater among the older age-group of the professional

middle-class and the upper working-class, i.e. men or women who relied less on status and more on their real functional value to the community as skilled persons. Their children may reflect this constructive urge.

It is important that a genuine constructive sense of guilt and consequent desire to make amends be given its chance. Not only will willing work be produced, but also lasting gratitude. The diagnosis is one which tests the human understanding and fine feeling of our own people. The absence of self-seeking, of wangling, of currying favour or toadying, in fact sincerity, is the hall-mark. The recognition of such things cannot be taught. Once recognised, it is a cardinal mistake to rebuff it.

(g) THE REALISTIC-ADAPTIVE RESPONSE.

We close the circle with that reaction which should be the ideal normal response to life's trials, but which usually, under any degree of stress or loss, leans either towards the dissociative or towards the depressive end of the scale.

Adaptation towards a new reality with a minimum of pathological disturbance characterizes those who live close to nature and also the very young, the very intelligent, and those who have something in common with both - the mentally flexible, well integrated individuals. Such persons do not need to rely on stereotyped institutions and symbols for their mental balance, but, enjoying life and change, or having a broad outlook into which events fit, can remain stable amidst surrounding strife and chaos, taking things as they come.

Examples of this reaction have occurred among representatives of the agricultural population and in some highly individual, cosmopolitan, cultured personalities, in addition to youths. People who did not invest any of their feeling in the foamy concept of German status would also tend not to suffer much through the bursting of this bubble. There are German peasants who say genuinely: "We've had the Kaiser, and then the Republic, then there is that man Hitler - and now the Allies, but we still have to milk our cattle".

Diagnosis.

The diagnosis is chiefly from the dissociative type of response. The main difference will be the congruity and naturalness of the one as against the strain and self-contradictoriness inherent in the other. When we are left in doubt - then it is dissociation or dissimulation, such as one finds among crafty German rustics (Bauernschlauheit). The genuine article is more likely to be on the depressive than on the slick, airy dissociative side of the thin line we call normality. Even a good German democrat, if he has love for his country or his people and is not merely a cynical renegade, is bound to be somewhat depressed and horrified, keen though he may be to seize the opportunity of helping in reconstruction, and genuine though his relief at our coming may have been. In fact, unless there was this underlying depression, the need to rebuild is unlikely to be strong.

III - APPLICATION.

The foregoing analysis of reactions to defeat among Germans is not a mere academic exercise in psychiatric theory. Its practical importance lies in the probability - pending large-scale survey it can be no more - that certain political and social groups will react fairly consistently in one or another of these ways. This will help us to find the right people to place in positions of cultural influence.

(a) Selection.

As already mentioned, the valuable groups are those who feel genuinely guilty and want to make adequate restitution for all the wrong done in their name. Provided we can spot such a reaction we are on fairly safe ground. As a keen sense of guilt, a well-developed conscience, is the mark of socialized being, we should encourage the placing in public employment or influential positions of people with such an attitude. This should not be construed to mean either persons in a state of hopeless gloom, nor yet the fussy, over-punctilious type, whose ritualized plodding life is ethically but a sham of genuine, constructive guilt.

gild men. A stillness reliable group of the same type will be constituted by those who project all the guilt and blame on to the top Nazi leaders or generals, for about this reaction there is a vicious quality which will as quickly be turned round on us.

In other words, if we were faced with the choice of two equally qualified men for an urgent post to be filled, one of whom was silent and glum, not too forthcoming, perhaps somewhat anxious, whilst the other was a cheerful fellow rubbing his hands, greeting us all smiles, saying "Hitler kaputt" or spitting at the Fuhrer's picture, there would be no doubt as to which was likely to be the more valuable man. For the same reason one should regard a silent, crest-fallen German population as a much surer sign that we are succeeding in our war aim than a frolicsome one registering rapid change of heart.

This point especially needs to be understood by those who report on the state of German civilian morals on general impressions.

(b) Public Safety.

The prevalence of anarchic elements - whether they be pro-or anti-Nazi scarcely matters - is of considerable concern to public safety officers and L. of C. Commanders. Some estimate of a given region must be attempted, by questioning of bright young members of some of the anti-authoritarian youth movements. While we must carefully distinguish the minority of constructive people in such groups from the destructive mass movement, there is no doubt that nothing would serve the Nazis so well as general lawlessness.

(c) Publicity and Re-Education.

Selection of the right sorts of people to occupy posts of importance and to exert cultural influence is perhaps the best prelude to successful re-education. We then get a leaven within the group, altering the climate of social life and so changing the meaning of many things that are being done.

People learn by identifying themselves with those who teach them or do things for them, i.e. through leadership. If they are not open to having the truth placed before them - then no amount of excellent publicity and literature will do more than scratch the surface.

The man who has been "through it all", who has suffered his penance and is now genuinely persuaded and convinced, is the type of person to convey the right atmosphere, to set the tone, in a community tending by national character towards dissociation and projection. Even the staging of trials of war criminals must aim at making the Germans say: "There but for the grace of God go I", rather than: "Serve him right - thank God I was never like that".

In brief, until an atmosphere of repentance pervades the length and breadth of the country, the truth about German political history, conduct of the war, atrocities and so on will not be believed, and the tendency to dissociation and other forms of psychological stone-walling increased. Goebbels has thoroughly prepared Germans to dismiss all news or publications as "propaganda". The respect for, and penetration of the truth and its healing power can only be restored by placing among all significant groups of Germans men and women who have learnt this lesson through their own bitter experience. It is unlikely to be accepted from people who have themselves remained outside this experience - emigres, shallow turncoats, quisling types, etc.

It might not even be considered worth while to attempt any major re-education efforts until such a plan of "guilt mobilization" has first been carried out. We should conduct experiments with limited social groups on the effectiveness of such measures.

IV - CONCLUSION.

If it is granted that lasting re-orientation comes from within the group through the action on it of key individuals, then the practical need for differentiating various possible responses to defeat becomes clear.

It is by their capacity to face the reality of the greatest disaster in their national history, rather than according to former social and political attitudes alone, that we shall have to judge the Germans' fitness to dwell among us. It is therefore well to have an estimate of the quantitative distribution of these

/various

11.

various kinds of response, correlated with the usual social and regional factors customarily recorded.

The method is not essentially different from any other attitude survey by direct interrogation with the aid of a schedule-questionnaire.

This study will help to prepare the way for the fusion of "civilian" and "Wehrmacht" morale surveys, and focus attention on the primitive, human responses to life through which all mass change has to be attempted.

There is little doubt from the psychiatric angle that a sense of depression, defined as above, is the socially - and ethically - most favourable reaction on which to work, provided that in this matter we apply the maximum discrimination and human insight of which we are capable.

PREFACE

This study is a dispassionate examination of the psychological drives underlying the Esprit de Corps of the Wehrmacht.

Much has been written on the formal organization, strength and order of battle of the Wehrmacht, but hitherto no systematic psychological assessment of the ideas, feelings, and impulses which animate the human beings composing the enemy's Armed Forces has been attempted. In justification of such an attempt one may recall that Napoleon wrote, in one of his letters, "A la guerre les trois quarts sont des affaires morales. La balance des forces réelles n'est que pour un autre quart".

The report which follows is based on fourteen months study of newly captured prisoners, captured German military documents and propaganda material, German newspapers, books, technical treatises and personal documents such as private letters etc. In making the study the author has been constantly indebted to the Directorate of Military Intelligence, not only for making much of this material available, but for collaboration in its appraisal. He would like to take this opportunity of expressing his thanks for this assistance without which such a study would have been impossible.

February, 1944.

H.V.D.

CONTENTS

	Page	
<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	1	
The Scope of the Enquiry.....	1	
<u>PART I</u>		
<u>THE RAW MATERIAL</u>		1
A. Psychology of Personality.....	1	
1. Mechanisms of the Mind.....	2	
2. Guilt.....	3	
3. Authority.....	4	
B. The German Character.....	5	
1. The Authoritarian Tradition.....	5	
2. The Cult of Manliness.....	5	
3. Submissiveness.....	6	
4. Power drives.....	7	
5. Need for Status.....	8	
6. The Search for Solidarity.....	9	
7. Projection.....	9	
8. Ambivalence.....	10	
9. The Mental Split.....	11	
<u>PART II</u>		
<u>SOME GERMAN SOLDIER TYPES</u>		13
A. Officers.....	14	
1. Senior Officers.....	14	
2. Junior Officers.....	17	
B. Other Ranks.....	19	
1. N.C.Os.....	19	
2. The Rank and File.....	20	
<u>PART III</u>		
<u>THE WEHRMACHT'S INTERNAL LIFE</u>		24
A. Introduction.....	24	
1. What is Morale?.....	24	
2. The Wehrmacht as a Tribal Institution.....	25	
B. Paternal Functions - Authority, Power and Justice.....	26	
1. The Need for Status.....	26	
a) The People's View.....	26	
b) The Soldiers' View.....	27	
c) The Lure of Prestige.....	28	
d) Attitudes towards Civilians.....	29	
2. Authority and Submission.....	30	
a) The Appeal of Power.....	30	
b) The Spirit of Obedience.....	31	
c) Discipline.....	31	
d) Relations between Leaders & Led.....	33	
e) Punishments & Rewards.....	37	

C. Maternal Functions - Protection, Nurture & Welfare	41
1. The Need For Security & Protection	41
2. Food	43
3. Medical Care	43
4. Welfare	44
5. Political Indoctrination	45
6. Brothels	45
7. What does the German Soldier need most?	45
8. The Homeland as a Maternal Symbol	47
D. Comradeship - Group Solidarity	48

PART IV

GERMAN MORALE IN THE BALANCE 50

A. Comparisons of FW opinions on the war at various stages	51
1. Attitude to the Regime and to Hitler personally	51
2. Belief in Victory	52
3. Attitude towards their Enemies	52
4. Post-war Expectations	52
5. Charges towards occupied Peoples	53
B. Psychological Needs	54
1. Power and Aggressiveness	54
2. Submissiveness	56
3. Split Feelings	57
4. Impressionability	58
5. Group Solidarity	59
6. Rivalries	60
7. Status	63
a) General	63
b) Status Reactions of particular service levels	64
(i) Leaders	64
Reactions to Enemy	65
Reactions to Subordinates	66
(ii) The Followers	68
8. Tendencies towards Loss of Army Identification	70
9. Physical Self-preservation	72
10. Other Indications of Changes in Morale	74
a) Superstition	74
b) Rumour	75
c) V.D.	75
d) Abuse of Alcohol	76
e) Food Interests	76

CONCLUSION 77

APPENDIX I 81

The Material and Methods of this Report	81
A. Theoretical Basis	81
B. Material	81
C. Methods	82
D. Criticism of the Method	82

APPENDIX II 83

Morale Questionnaire	83
----------------------	----

INTRODUCTION

The Scope of the Enquiry

It has always been a first principle of strategy to know as much of the enemy as possible and to assess his strong and weak points objectively without heat or prejudice. For this intelligence to be complete, it should include an estimate of the moral cohesion of his forces. This moral cohesion is the chief factor which distinguishes an organised force of troops from a mere rabble of armed men. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to state that if one succeeded in counteracting or destroying the invisible bonds which link men together into a unit, a harmoniously co-operating team, one would have eliminated that unit as an effective force. The result can be achieved in three ways: physical death or maiming; demoralisation by show or force of arms; or by "persuasion". Two out of three methods are clearly action on the enemy's mind, and consist of steps taken to loosen the invisible mental bonds which constitute the cohesion, or morale, of the force.

War is, in the last resort, decided by the durability and depth of union between these organised groups of individuals which make up a fighting army. That it is possible to weld large numbers of average or intelligent or stupid, peaceable folk, who would not harm a fly in their individual lives, into well-disciplined, loyal, aggressive troops is in itself a remarkable fact. To bring about circumstances in which the bonds break and the hitherto closely knit elements of a unit fall asunder and say "No more for me," is the essence of war.

This enquiry is, therefore, concerned with the highly important questions:

- (1) What are the psychological factors - the human relationships - on which the cohesion of the German armed forces depends?
- (2) Can we learn anything from the enemy in the successful management of these factors? (i.e. "morale-building".)
- (3) Where are his strong points and where his weaknesses to be avoided or exploited respectively in our methods of fighting him?

Diagnosis in this case must, as always, precede "treatment."

PART I

THE RAW MATERIAL OF THE WEHRMACHT

Before proceeding to an account of how the Germans create the fellowship among their men which maintains the coherence of their forces, we must set out the elements in human nature which are the raw material for such a job. These reduce themselves to a number of basic features common to all mankind. Nothing can be used which is not already present in man's mental equipment, although the ingredients are differently mixed in various races and individuals.

A. The Psychology of Personality

Every human being sooner or later displays certain needs and strivings: self-preservation; power or mastery; acquisitiveness; love and hate; being valued; dependence; sex. Somewhat later he acquires the specially human capacity to think, more or less well, and thereby to help satisfy or control the promptings of the fundamental strivings which declare their pressure by characteristic feelings.

Gradually, out of this sorting process of feeling by thought, certain enduring ideas and ideals are built up, commonly called "sentiments". This does not happen in the void, but from the first the child is brought into contact with other human beings: mother, father, brothers and sisters and, later, outsiders, both children and adults. All these people influence us constantly in either satisfying or thwarting our needs, strivings and demands, and are accordingly judged "good" or "bad". These first relationships create in us the fundamental feelings and notions about the world and favour certain ways of tackling difficulties, overcoming hurts, and responding to advances. Conscience, sense of duty, feelings of love, gratitude, hate, envy, rivalry, friendship and co-operation, lines of interest, ambition, courage or timidity, self-esteem or inferiority, all these and many other attributes of the human individual are formed in the experimental workshop of the family by the clash between instinctual demands and the responses of other people; that is by the impact of human society on the raw material of mental nature. It is found that the way we live later in the larger groups - school, factory, etc. -

is mostly conditioned by our earliest experiences, and that other people may come to represent members of our family though we may not be aware of it. For example, it comes about that certain people (rulers, judges, teachers) become bearers of authority - because they stand for our fathers. Certain situations satisfy our feelings because they remind us, perhaps unconsciously in roundabout ways, of a similar good event or relationship in childhood, while other experiences evoke painful responses in us for similar reasons. These events in the developing human mind are subject to certain laws which modern psychology has succeeded in defining and understanding. A brief exposition of the main facts is essential to a proper grasp of all that follows, and will now be attempted.

1. 'Mechanisms' of the Mind. In the clash between primitive instincts and the demands which the requirements of civilization make on their control, the child's reason is not at first capable of helping. There exist within us a number of so-called mental 'mechanisms' which come into operation very early, and which are designed by nature to protect the growing organism of the mind against the unchecked violence of primitive feeling. They work more or less automatically and, in so far as they are successful, without the individual's knowledge. The most important ones among them are called (a) Repression; (b) Projection; (c) Introjection; (d) Displacement; (e) Identification; (f) Compensation. While not worrying unduly over these technical names, we must give a meaning to them.

(a) Repression. This is the power to blot out forcibly and unknowingly any feeling, thought or impulse which we cannot tolerate. A simple instance of its action is the maddening inability to recall a familiar name or action. Repression leaves a kind of mental void or veil in relation to the experience that is subject to it. Thus, an over-ambitious student, who had worked with increasing worry and fear of failure for his final examination, on the morning of the latter was found wandering with 'loss of memory'. He had 'repressed' the impending trial - it just did not exist, because he was too afraid of submitting his capacities to the test. The tension had brought about a sudden check, freeing him from his immediate anxieties, irrespective of his reasonable wish to obtain his degree. The mental forces - feelings, thoughts and impulses - do not cease to exist because they are repressed. Denied direct outlet, they seek by-paths. The remaining mechanisms about to be described provide some of the main of these by-paths, by which their pressure can be ventilated.

(b) Projection. This tendency gives expression to 'forbidden', repressed feelings of the individual's own by attributing them to the outside world, without awareness of this happening. 'We see the mote in our brother's eye, but not the beam in our own.' In Genesis, Adam, reproved by the Lord, projects the blame on 'the woman Thou gavest me'. This relieves him of fear and guilt. In public life this unreasonable shifting of the intolerable from within to outside has far-reaching consequences in suspicion, persecution, the creation of scape-goats, etc. A striking instance from purely private spheres is that of a woman who made her devoted husband's life intolerable by suspicion and jealousy of his faithfulness. She searched his pockets for incriminating mail, cross-examined and observed his every movement and so forth. It emerged finally that she herself had been guilty of infidelity, but had completely repressed the memory of this transgression. No better example from recent political history can be quoted than the Nazi projection of their unpleasant qualities: acquisitiveness, secret plotting etc. onto the Jews. Projection clearly relieves guilt, and enables one to feel good and righteous.

(c) Introjection. This is almost the exact opposite of projection, and just as little subject to conscious will and intention. It results from our inability to tolerate hostility or disapproval of others, whether real or imaginary. Instead of reacting with attack or facing the issue, we turn the attack on ourselves. In consequence we either feel 'bad' morally and behave as if we were that hostile person, or we may feel physically 'ill'.

A large number of people, instead of having a good row with an opponent develop a pain or headache, or they may 'kick themselves' or 'take it out of themselves'. Unreasonable depression is a frequent result of introjection. Sometimes the two mechanisms, projection and introjection, occur in alternative phases in the same person: in one mood they feel that everybody is against them, in another mood they imagine they have some internal disease or suffer from inferiority. The purpose of this mechanism is also to neutralize some intolerable human relationship. By shifting the undesirable qualities inside oneself, the 'goodness' of the other person is preserved.

(d) Displacement. We may introduce this mechanism by the ~~125-11-93~~ ~~example~~ ~~70~~ the man who, when annoyed with his wife, kicks the cat. Conscience, fear and love forbid primitive anger at the one, for which the less valued creature becomes a substitute, whom it is safe to attack. Objects of love or veneration may be similarly displaced, as when a schoolboy makes his house-master into a father-substitute. Inanimate objects, e.g. a keepsake, may by this mechanism acquire value or other emotional significance. The whole subject of symbolism falls into this category. Thus it comes about that objects in themselves trivial or 'neutral' may come to have strong sentiments attached to them, e.g. devotion to a national flag.

(e) Identification. By this is meant the capacity of human beings to feel themselves to be, or unconsciously to play the part of someone else. In childhood, as anyone can observe for themselves, identification can take place with anything. A small boy chugs along working his arms like connecting rods and is whole-heartedly imagining himself a railway engine. In general, identification happens in regard to persons or things one greatly admires or loves. A devoted daughter, having nursed her mother during a last illness, discovers she has the same symptoms (though not necessarily caused by any disease) as the departed. Sons take on the careers and manners of their fathers. This mechanism is sometimes wrongly thought to be an effect of heredity. It may be equally intense with regard to heroes who are not related to the person who suffers from the identification. It is akin to auto-suggestion. The stronger or admired personality impresses the other, who then unconsciously moulds himself, often unsuccessfully, into a semblance of the ideal figure. Here again, abstract or historical characters - the Saint, the Perfect Knight, the cowboy etc. may become the models for identification, but these are usually derived from some living original who impressed the subject in earlier life.

(f) Compensation. Compensation or 'over-compensation' is the emphasis of some quality the opposite of an unacceptable one. We are struck, for example, by the obsequious mildness of people with much repressed aggressiveness, and by the bravado and boastfulness of men with a hidden inferiority feeling. Many an unconscious dread or tension is successfully concealed behind compensatory facades.

2. 'Guilt'. There are a few other points about the natural history of the human mind which require mentioning at this stage.

Reference has already been made to feelings of guilt. Guilt is a very early manifestation in human beings - it is even shared by one or two of the most highly developed animals, notably dogs. Its origin is not scientifically settled, but it is certainly conjured into activity by earliest educational influences. It there appears as the response of the infant to parental disapproval, which gradually becomes introjected as a kind of rudimentary, automatic conscience, a censorship of unacceptable impulses and feelings. This faculty is indeed the force which accomplishes and maintains repression, and is thus also responsible for the persistence of other evasive mechanisms, protecting the owner from unwelcome intrusions, and it can do so while itself partly or wholly unconscious. Dread of losing love or approval, or of being punished, is itself such an unwelcome feeling that it may never be admitted to the light of day.

We thus arrive at the notion of hidden conflict in the depths of the mind between two sets of antagonists, one representing primitive impulses, the other a special dread aroused by the impact of outside control (authority) which has come to act as authority's agent within the unconscious mind. It is because of this conflict which is at its most intense in the first few years of life that many aspects of instinct become 'sealed off' from direct expression and control. It is a special feature of human development that such forces press to seek new forms of outlet, via the various mechanisms. This makes for a certain drive behind intellect, culture and civilization, absent from animal groups. In fact such 'frustration' may be the very condition of civilization.

Yet it cannot be denied, with the evidence of history before us, that under this crust of attenuated instinct life there still smoulder the unmodified urges, ready to sweep away the barriers which authority-guilt has impressed on men through its education and social institutions. Moreover, it seems that in every individual there will be a certain degree of 'unmodified' primitive feeling whose strength and quality will depend on the type of prohibition and the time in a child's life at which it took effect, i.e. at what point in the natural history of instinct-development repression came down on it. Man can devote only part of this 'arrested' instinct to civilised ends. The residue continues in uneasy equilibrium with the repressing forces. This tension at various points is responsible for the different traits of character human beings display. For example, ruthless ambition is a compromise between primitive drives towards complete mastery and aggressiveness and the need to bow to society's demands. Such a trait may result in valuable achievement, though perhaps at the cost of many hurt rivals and opponents, and accompanied by guilt.

3. Authority. The chief problem of any human group is that of freedom and authority. It is apparent that the latter operates chiefly through the inner compulsion which we called guilt. If a person is lucky enough to have experienced a predominantly benevolent, loving parent authority, which acted in fair accord with his needs, he accepts the authority as 'good' and introjects, or identifies himself with it. There is little conflict, his personality matures, and what was originally an outer demand is smoothly transferred into inner consent to limit freedom within the bounds of social good. His compliance is willing and in harmony with his own development. He will not fear outer authority so much as his own conscience, and he will measure authority by this standard. A group composed of many people who have been brought up in the tradition of tolerant benevolence, will be a mature society needing little outer compulsion and regulating its affairs by the free agreement of unafraid men to subject themselves to the necessary restraints and disciplines.

On the contrary, a man reared harshly or perfunctorily will resort to repression of his 'unapproved' needs. His resulting inner authority will be mixed. He must swallow it, but, with the inescapable necessity, there will be a bitter taste, a 'bad' blended with the 'good'. This will lead to a conflict between his stifled needs and a stern, half-hated conscience. Such a person will have only a limited range of free development, because he will be held under inner restraint. Authority will remain something terrifying, to be outwitted and appeased. His development is likely to follow either the path of projection, or of introjection. If he projects his hostility towards authority, he will see threatening authority figures in all those who are his superiors, and his attitude will be deferential and even cowed, because he feels guilt about his own repressed but persisting primitive needs. He feels the same 'bad' child as originally. He may escape into uneasy rebellion in defiance of authority, but his conflict is likely to make such a false quest for 'freedom' futile and negative, because the inner tyranny remains. This will enhance a sense of resentment and inferiority for which he may try to compensate by various forms of exaggerated self-assertion and search of power. If the reaction to his conflict is introjection he is likely to become a rigid personality with a self-punishing attitude. This also results in a sense of inferiority which is compensated by a restless inner drive to work, success, or self-improvement, sometimes to self-sacrifice. In this case he feels he is wrong, authority is right, and he can only expiate his guilt by submission and continual proof of being praiseworthy. He has no confidence in his own rightness, but remains dependent on the approval of others. This conflict has a further consequence in his relation to other people. This relation follows the pattern imposed by authority - the pattern of uncertainty, a mixture of love and hate attached to the same person.

To this type of split or duality in feelings for others we give the term ambivalence. (ambo = both, valere = to have force). It is not hard to see that such a split will cause tension and that therefore the individual will be driven to try and heal it. Common solutions are again either projection or introjection. In projection the two aspects - love and hate - are distributed to different persons, who are now either 'white' or 'black', and represent the contradictory elements in false separation. In introjection there is an inward-turning of both aspects on the self, resulting in abnormal self-love, with the self-hate in the background taking the form of self-frustration, by ill-health or depression. This results, for instance, in the familiar type of person who is so enamoured of himself that he feels he should be perfect, and is therefore always failing through introspection, when he has to fall back on excuses, such as bad health. The term sadism is often applied to the half-stifled, arrested, undeveloped form of aggressiveness which results from the above-described emotional situation, brought about by repressive authority, guilt and inner uncertainty. It may be described as an unconscious determination to take by force the things authority would not let us have 'decently', and to behave like authority did. The pleasure in brutality - mental or physical - comes from the love element which was originally present in the parent-child relation. Typical sadism alternates between hurting and fussing of the victim, according as one or the other side of the ambivalence gains the upper hand.

With these preliminary definitions and concepts we can turn to an examination of the German character. Various nationalities differ in the stress they place on certain virtues, strivings or failings, (i.e. in what they call 'good' and 'bad') thereby creating their own mental atmosphere, or backgrounds, which influence and are unconsciously absorbed by the children as 'tradition', part of their assumptions which 'go without saying', widely shared by members of the same group. Social institutions and communal life are manifestations of these attitudes.

Certain components or traits of character have emerged very clearly from detailed analysis of many Germans. In speaking of 'the' German character, frequency of recurrence of certain distinctive characteristics in conjunction with each other is meant. No absolute German character exists, and the same traits are found in nationalities other than the Germans, but the proportions and distribution among the population are significant. Flour, eggs and butter in varying proportions result in many different kinds of cakes. There is nothing German that is not also found elsewhere, nor do all Germans show it. From the nature of our subject, the description will predominantly apply to German men.

1. The Authoritarian Tradition. The most striking feature of German social history has been the victory of the principle of rule by authority. The exceptions have been short-lived failures of attempts to bring about 'liberal', democratic ways of life. Political freedom, of the kind alluded to in the preceding section, has taken no roots in the German character, and it is a fair assumption that this is due to something in that character. It would take us too far to trace the steps in German history by which authoritarian rule has established itself. There is, however, a great consensus among intelligent Germans of widely differing attitudes to Nazism that they need a strong authority - preferably one man - to rule them, that it is 'their way'. Some, with more understanding of foreigners, add that Germany is not ready for freedom, and that they need a strong arm to prevent internal strife and disunion.

In the Spartan state of Prussia, the softer, divided, docile Germans saw a kind of heaven-sent bringer of political order and unity for which they had ineffectively longed. This achievement by the Prussian military state in 1871 seemed almost like the overpowering of a passive, indeed feminine-minded people by a show of ruthless masculinity. The foolish saying that 'every girl loves a soldier' has become a crucial and solemn fact of German history sealing the uneasy marriage of these two sides of the national character.

It has been Hitler's contribution to push to its logical conclusion among the masses the process which Bismarck and the imperial regime had started in the upper class: the identification of the national strength and virtue with 'soldierliness' and the 'Führer' - principle. Early during the Nazi regime, Goring said: "The step of the Potsdam Grenadiers shall henceforth become the step of the German people." This propaganda, falling on a dispirited people, galvanized into activity what must be a deep-seated personal need, something essential to Germans: the idea of power, domination, status, 'honour', expansion - 'hunger' (Lebensraum!), mass movement, glorious unity in subordination to a great Being.

2. The Cult of Manliness. It is not stretching the imagination to see in the German devotion to authoritarian rule the derivative of father-rule or patriarchy, with its emphasis on the virtues of manliness, by which they usually mean 'hardness'. The Germans have persuaded themselves and the world that they are the most virile and martially-minded people on this earth. There are many symptoms in their mentality and behaviour which, to the trained observer, prove that this loud assertion and striving after manliness is in large measure based on an unconscious fear of the opposite. That is to say it is an over-compensation. The Prussian tradition of discipline, ruthless force and domination was eagerly accepted by them precisely because they are an impressionable, 'soft-skinned' people, to whom the cover of virility was as acceptable as a shell to a snail. Men with plenty of metal in their core do not need steel-helmets or jack-boots to brace themselves. Even in their chief national epic the hero, Siegfried, has to bathe in dragon's blood before he acquires an invulnerable skin - the virtue of heroism. This legend, as that of Parsifal, also emphasises that there remained a fatal weakness through which the hero failed or was slain, like the story of Achilles' heel. Such a myth is an indication of their dim awareness of a real chink in the armour of 'manliness' and show of strength which hides an inner conflict and lack of self-confidence.

The cult of masculinity can be seen in many aspects of contemporary German life. No race, except the Japanese and perhaps the Jews, places such a premium on boys. Many EWs hold up their hand in horror when asked if they would like daughters. The children's allowance to parents paid by the State is considerably higher for boys than for girl children. Women's status is lower in proportion. A young German Air Force ace, asked about his treatment in a British military hospital, said "Oh, very good, but the greatest insult was offered me. A sister pushed me about and bundled me into bed. Then I exploded with rage - we Germans will not stand for that from an old dragon of a woman". Many German soldiers of all classes and ranks express fear or doubt as to the capacity of their wives to bring up their sons in their absence, as if manliness was something not inborn but to be instilled artificially into their boys.

It is characteristic of this 'manliness' cult that it identifies femaleness with inferiority and instils a sense of guilt about any qualities connected in some way with the tender relation between little boys and their mothers. This perfectly natural relation becomes one of the 'forbidden' needs, condemned by the German equivalents of such expressions as 'milk-sop', 'Mummy's boy', 'cry-baby' etc. A German General, whose opinions will be repeatedly quoted in Parts II and III, expressed the quintessence of this Spartan view of upbringing when he said with grudging admiration: "The Russians are so tough because they are taken from their mothers' breast for communal education, and those who are not absolutely fit are allowed to die." While quite untrue in respect of Russia (a strongly 'female-ruled' country for generations, in which women have high status), this view is highly characteristic of the Prussian ideal. The relegation of the German woman to menial status, as a child-bearer and housekeeper, is traditional, and while the upper class cover it with a veneer of exaggerated courtesy and sentimentalizing the ordinary German men composing the main body of our human evidence are quite frank about their sense of superiority over their women, and give evidence of a 'taboo' on their tender ties to their mothers and wives, as something weak and unmanly. The main attitude is one of sheepish, school-boy confusion about the subject. The father is described as 'complete master in our home'. "Mother would never have questioned my father's decision." "Mother had nothing to say in our family" and so forth. And, as indicated, the father does not trust his wife to make a man of his boy, but appears to interfere at all stages.

This strong pressure results in repression of the tenderness need, and a mechanism of introjection of, and identification with, the paternal sternness occurs in the son. That the 'weakness' is not thereby destroyed but merely spirited out of ken is shown by the constant fear of Germans in later life to betray it. The paternal authority, now established as a severe conscience in respect of weakness or softness, harps on such standard moral clichés as 'iron duty', 'brutal will', 'self-mastery', 'determination', exhorting to hard work, industry and diligent self-improvement, which at one time was inspired by the bleak form of world-despising Lutheranism to which the Prussian spirit so readily responded. Frugality, severity, tense rigidity and discipline evolved as the group ideal. The reaction of small boys subjected to this sledge-hammer grimness of basic social ideal must in most cases be acquiescence and compliance, especially if he sees his mother doing the same, and powerless to shield him from the 'old man'. At best they would be spoilt and fussed by the mother behind his back, leading to further guilt and furtiveness in self-indulgence. It is significant that a large number of German men reveal with a queer sort of pride how they were thrashed mercilessly by their fathers, that they richly deserved such beatings and would always be grateful for them. Several men, in random samples, have related that their fathers would beat them until neighbours intervened, mother meanwhile hiding and sobbing. In no case was any criticism of the father expressed. Plenty of half-joking contempt of women is, on the other hand, frequent.

With the aid of general psychological experience, the consequences of this conflict between childish need and stern patriarchy must now be traced.

3. Submissiveness. This aspect of the German character is so well known to the world that it need not be greatly elaborated. Owing to the necessity of having to be protected, the sons accept their parents and reevaluate the sternness of the father as part of his love. Making 'virtue of necessity', the father-principle is exalted into an ideal, after the pattern of which social institutions are moulded by those subject to its compulsion. In their 'revolution', the Nazis have recreated the complicated pyramid of ranks in all branches of the state, so that the need to submit as well as to rule can be satisfied. The tradition is so strongly established (and not only in Prussia) that where boys are brought up leniently or even spoilt, it still produces its effect. From many similar stories, the following will serve as a striking illustration of what uneasy guilt can be felt by an adolescent German:

A young soldier confessed that he was spoilt at home. He was given freedom and plenty of pocket money spent as a member of cycling and football clubs. One day he crossed the Rhine from his native town into French territory where he saw youths walking arm in arm with girls, with ornamental handkerchiefs in their coat pockets. He felt a pang as he recalled Hitler's motto for German youth: 'tough as leather, hard as Krupp steel, fleet as a greyhound'. He forthwith decided he was a weak, wanton fellow who must have his animal spirits beaten and trained out of him and join the service, where he would be 'hammered' into a man. Lacking will in himself, he must submit himself to a stern outer authority and so volunteer for the Navy in the spirit of 'mortifying the flesh'. The drill, the discipline, the marching in step - all these thrilled his soul. It was a good 'Ersatz' for self-mastery. Subsequently he volunteered the

opinion that Germany was bound to lose the war. "I have seen 25-A-33-184-101-72- I know my people's character. . ." was the reason he advanced. He also added: "Germany is too divided and we can only hold together under the strongest leadership; hence our love of submitting ourselves to discipline. The Wehrmacht is our school. We are a proud and virile cultural nation like Sparta'. When it was pointed out to him that most of the culture originated in democratic Athens which, moreover, defeated Sparta, he meekly agreed. He recognised in himself what the old legends tell us: the existence of an underlying softness and lack of unifying will.

This case shows in a nutshell the points made earlier. There is the fear of being weak and undisciplined, and a conviction of lack of personal power to achieve 'salvation' through personal effort. An authoritative institution is sought out to take on the responsibility for one's education - in this case the Wehrmacht. The story has the flavour of a religious experience, reminding us of the initiation rituals among primitive tribes for young men. Here the lad found the strong bracing father-principle which he had missed in his life, and which was to heal him of his conviction of softness and inferiority. His direct reference to this feature as a national characteristic is also instructive. The search for an ideal father may lie latent in much older men.

In this connection the war diary of a German naval rating of the Kaiser's fleet, 1914 - 18, is a reminder that this characteristic did not originate with the Nazi regime. This intelligent, observant ex-factory worker from the Rhineland writes as follows in 1917:

"When talking to his Navy he (Kaiser) becomes tender-fatherly, talks of his 'boys, his dear children'. When he says (in Fleet order) "It is my will" or "I hereby command," then common sense struggles against the possibility of believing that here speaks only an ordinary man." In 1918 the writer is pondering the appeal of the Allies' democratic propaganda, and concludes: "Our Kaiser - and our great General Staff - subject to a Reichstag! What would be left? Only a kingship like England or Denmark? Unthinkable!"

But in other passages the image of the Kaiser is seen to become rather tarnished, and though the writer shifts the blame mostly to 'those above' in general, he now dreams of a really good, benevolent 'Volkskaiser'. By October 1918 he has become disillusioned and infected by the rebellious spirit of the fleet at that time, but deplors this division and expresses his longing for a 'Man' who shall arise and reunite Germans.

A naval commander (Korvettenkapitän) tells us in this war:

"I was from the Peoples' party (Strossemann) by background, and brought up in quite a different tradition from the Nazis. But at the launching of a ship which I had to attend the Führer came and looked into my eyes. It was as if an electric current passed through you - from that time I was completely under his spell. He carried you away with his inspiration..."

By idealizing this submission into an act of love and duty, it comes to be the supreme expression of 'manliness', a good example of the frequent paradoxes in human psychology by which a thing can be itself and its opposite at the same time.

4. Power Drives. The known effect of thwarting a primary human need, such as early dependence on a mother's tenderness, by severity is protest by helpless rage followed by regression. This leaves an unsatisfied tension, which can express itself either in rebellion (such as defiance, sullenness, truancy), or in outward acquiescence. Rebellion is very rare among the broad mass of Germans. Few among the many whose life histories have been collected, have defied their fathers, run away from home, swung to views or modes of living opposite to their parents'. Most of them have 'come to heel', or if they broke away, sought out other leadership. In this respect the Nazi youth movements have provided a substitute for paternal authority (youth leaders, Hitler himself), while their radical, tradition-breaking, iconoclastic bogus revolutionary appearance at the same time satisfied the rebel element of the German adolescent.

The common German solution of the conflict of ambivalence between the helpless rage of the weak and the loved authority of the strong is identification with the stern father, as mentioned. This means that the son will strive to be like his father, and will tend to exert power over others - at all events over something. In his experience this means both mastery and control, and destructive, threatening sadism - the infliction of pain. The latter he at first wanted to inflict on his father, but since this was impossible, he displaces his sadistic propensities to other targets.

Sadism is clearly at work in the pompous pleasure with which many Germans exert gross or petty tyranny and severe authority, where they do not resort to acts of physical brutality, even within their own community. One can almost feel the little

boy lording it over still smaller boys and swelling with importance as he feels himself 'being father', in payment of old debts. To have no such power is weakness.

The need to be strong, to master a situation, results in the inclination to methodical study, close organization and planning 'for all eventualities', leaving nothing to chance. When travelling, he must have a good dictionary and guide-book. That which is outside his control is dangerous. It is better to be master of it. This feeling applies also to the fear of people not under surveillance, hence prompting both territorial conquest, and police rule with complete dossier systems for the unknown. The vicious circle ends as it began, with the next generation of sons. For the primitive, mother-attached baby is too like one's own 'past' to be tolerated by the new group of fathers.

The following extracts from notes of a conversation with a young German fighter pilot officer, the only son of a General, are perhaps as revealing as any other example of the compelling nature of the father tie, the rejection of softness, and of its results:

- PW: I was my mother's all. But of course it is necessary for Father to have the upper hand, to rescue one from Mother's apron-strings.
- Interviewer: Here in England we send boys to boarding schools for this purpose.
- PW: That is a great mistake; then a father can't have his boy to shape him to his own liking. If I had a son I would devote myself entirely to his upbringing. With a daughter I could not do that ...of course it would be nice for me if she were very beautiful.....
- Interviewer: What made you decide to become an officer?
- PW: Flying - the fun of it. And, of course, the beauty of educating very young men - to mould their training and their development.....
- Interviewer: And what would you have done if you hadn't joined the service?
- PW: Well, I really like art; interior decorating etc. My mother is very artistic.

The same boy is known to have greatly enjoyed machine-gunning what looked like a garden fête at Eastbourne. He is described by other British officers as 'rather a nancy type, easily influenced by others'. He approved of the atrocities against the Czechs and Poles, "considering that they permitted themselves dirty intrigues against an old and great cultural nation like Germany who could not allow an indignity like that."

Here we see, in original words, several of the psychological factors discussed earlier. The conflict between two sides of his character which is solved in favour of becoming like father; the adoption of a sadistic, inhuman attitude, giving full vent to destructive impulses when it comes to using his aerial fire-power; the adoption of the father's authority as his own; the underlying femininity; the sense of corporate 'German might'.

5. Need for Status - the Over-Valuation of Self. The sense of inferiority and weakness arising from forcible submission results not only in sadistic tendencies, but also in the need to bolster up one's defective self-valuation by external means. Doubt in one's intrinsic worth prompts search of outward status. This begins in Germany with schoolchildren whose first question to a newcomer in the class is apt to be "What is your father?" Rank, uniform, title are methods of enhancing prestige, and are used with serious formality. 'Herr Sanitätarat Professor Doktor' prefaces the name of many a second-rate medical man, and even the chimney sweep derives satisfaction from being addressed as 'Herr Schornsteinfegermeister'. The many ranks and offices of the Nazi party organizations have multiplied the little man's chances of wearing a uniform and bearing a rank as a pocket-Hitler. It gets one over the awkward problem of standing on one's own merit, risking criticism and humiliation which the authoritarian milieu is apt to deal out to the plain, unplaced man. We shall see in subsequent parts of this document that this motive plays a large part in the urge to join the highest caste of all - that of a soldier.

This feeling of compensated inferiority is easily extended to the idea of the group or nation as needing status, and hence of over-valuation. Among themselves, as individuals, and towards the foreigner, Germans are touchy and on the defensive so far as status - their so-called 'honour' - is concerned. As an illustration we may use a frequent German argument excusing militarism: "We are a great nation and our dignity demands adequate military forces." This is, of course, bound up with the uncertainty of status, the sneaking sense of inferiority. Without a murmur of protest he often has his dignity taken away by his superiors and he does the same to his inferiors. The balance is adjusted by over-stressing the demand for national 'honour' and pride, so that he can accept more easily the pressure of

authority from within his own community. 'Freedom' is sought not inside but outside the frontiers. The idea of the master-race is thus a satisfying redress of the lack of true self-assurance. To be a heroic, virile people, the chosen leaders of the coming era, unique but misunderstood. The German is stirred by the sense of power and order of belonging to such a mighty national organism and naturally does his part to enhance the legend of German strength and invincibility. It helps him personally to feel better. This is the attraction of merging himself in his group from which he derives reflected power and status. The greater, furthermore, the leader of his group, the more 'manly' and noble it is to submit to such a figure. Hence the tendency in Germans to idealize and magnify their authority-figures.

6. The search for solidarity. The uncertainty of the German's self-valuation confers on him as a permanent characteristic the features of adolescent mentality. He likes 'getting together' in gangs or groups in which he finds his own personality mirrored. The group must therefore be uniform in aims and beliefs. If wavering and unsure, it is a heartening experience to find others who feel the same. Mass feeling gives courage to do things one would not dare to do alone: defiance, brutality, enthusiasm shielded by anonymity of the crowd. To be accepted as a 'comrade' is a cure for the sense of painful isolation and uneasy ambivalence towards other people, and helps to allay doubts and guilt, and facilitates primitive self-expression and projection onto scapegoats. That is why the German has always readily flocked into 'Youth movements', students' corps and similar associations in which he could lose his cramping pre-occupation with his 'personal problem' and self-conscious introspection. This escape has consequently been greatly romanticized and idealised. It has been fully exploited by the Nazis as a means of silencing doubt and intellectual criticism, by extolling the 'liberating' influence of the gang of brothers, merging their personalities in the emotion of the group, and experiencing an intoxicating access of the sense of power and conviction of their rightness vis-à-vis 'outsiders'.

7. Projection. What is the fate of those hostile impulses which were directed originally at the father-authority? It has been stated earlier that such forces do not cease to exist by the mere fact of repression, but that they have to find a way round the barrier. As a matter of practical experience it is found that they are very apt to be worked off as projection, in which a sense of injured innocence is automatically restored by attributing to the outside world (and this for a German identified with his group means other races and nations) the traits one wishes to disown. Two such examples of projection - the Jews and the Russians, have already been mentioned. In the course of this paper the frequency of projection - blame-shifting and the search for scape-goats - will be so amply illustrated that it is not necessary to labour the point. It is a favourite Nazi propaganda method, based no doubt on Dr. Goebbels' very clear understanding of his people's intolerance of accepting themselves as brutal. What is perhaps not so well known is that this squeamishness about being guilt-free is due to the sources of the brutality - viz. the protest and hate against inner restraint. The German has great need to feel good and virtuous.

Coupled with projection is the well-known tendency to self-justification - really the other side of the medal. Some further typical political arguments will show the connexion, the way in which the German's personal psychology determines their state philosophy (as Nazi propaganda - often sincerely believed).

The first argument runs:-

"We are weak and exposed; anyone can do what he likes with us unless we have a powerful army." This is a faithful reflection of the personal pliability and softness to hide which 'the hard skin' has to be put on. The wishful, irrational element is obvious, for in arming and playing the strong man they thereby arouse their neighbours' fears, and consequently these also arm and conclude defensive alliances. This is to some extent also true of Germans' private affairs; their personal relations are marked by quarrels and heat. The 'strong' man is one who can make the other afraid.

The second argument is similar, but shows more projection, as well as displacement of hostility from father-authority to 'outsiders':-

"We are surrounded by enemies who envy our greatness, or who want to keep us impotent." This is an extension of the sense of being dominated by envious, hostile powers, which springs from the root of the German father-son relationship. The individual German has felt so small and helpless in this personal relation that he tends to project the situation into his national fate. This is the famous 'encirclement fear' which rests largely though not entirely on the impotence feeling implicit first of all in their family life. The reality element consists in the fear aroused in their neighbours by German policy, rationalized as French

and Slav designs against German lands. Conduct inspired by persecution fear does at last bring about the hostility of neighbours. What was imaginary then becomes reality.

"War is the natural condition of man and brings out the best qualities and noblest virtues. The stronger has the right to use his power to achieve his ends. It is so in nature - the bird devours the worm".

This appeal to nature in the raw, while faithfully reflecting the brute creation, is another assertion of 'strength', and the affectation of despising moral considerations. The subtle admission of guilt lies in the necessity to idealise the effect of war (primitive behaviour) on the individual, and in the appeal to modern 'materialist' Darwinian philosophy, as if it were directly applicable to the conduct of mankind.

"You British did the same. England has an Empire which she conquered by guile or force of arms." Psychologically it is comforting to believe that one is not the only criminal. This is again an expression of a sense of guilt, half rationalized and half projected.

"Lebensraum." The urge to expand and conquer new territory is rationalised as lack of living space by use of elaborate 'geo-political' and economic arguments. The essence of the logical fallacy is that in a world at peace the actual political possession or sovereignty over a piece of land makes little practical difference. Before 1914, German settlers and traders were everywhere treated on a par with others. The 'possession' motive is thus linked with prestige and status rather than with real economic need, i.e. with the urge of mastery and of self-aggrandisement arising from a feeling of weakness.

Such rationalizations make us aware that behind the façade of 'splendid ruthlessness' lies a solid mass of guilt feeling which the Germans have persistently sought to ignore and repress in themselves. The ruthlessness is a derivative of their primary, repressed hate of their own methods of upbringing.

8. Ambivalence. A feeling of split and inner disunity runs through the German character. It was expressed by their greatest poet, Goethe, as "Two souls, alas! within my breast!" It was explained earlier that ambivalence arises as the result of the dilemma of dealing with a father-authority which is loved and hated at the same time, to which one has to submit with apparent devotion and fervour. The submission is made palatable by identifying oneself with the 'oppressor' and becoming like him. The residue of hate is chiefly dealt with by projection and by turning brutality against substitutes. But when this way of settling the conflict fails, the negative, hostile feelings against authority are ready to emerge. When the idea of unifying controlling authority weakens, the split comes to the surface. This can be verified both in individual conduct as double-facedness and obsequiousness (with a snarl behind one's back), and on the group level in the nature of German patriotism. It is worth pausing for a moment to consider the latter.

Patriotism. It should be remembered that as a unified national state Germany is only seventy years old (and this delay in 'finding herself' cannot be an accident), and that regional separatisms have begun to submerge only with the advent of Hitler. One finds many men who primarily love the narrower region in which their homes lie - the Bavarian mountains, the Rhineland, the Black Forest, East Prussia, etc. This regional patriotism is real and based on deep feeling: the lakes, the forests, the peace of some pretty valley, the local dialect, the indigenous cooking, customs and ways of life, the old farmstead where the family has tilled the soil for generations; these have meaning and strength. Such feelings connect up with maternal functions. In some men the extension has occurred of the healthy 'local' feeling to the whole of 'Germany', but such people usually add with a sigh that "unfortunately there is as yet no true unity among us." "We haven't yet got to the stage of the Englishman who says 'My country right or wrong!'" is another frequently heard remark among the more educated. To the German, his country is 'right' so long as it shows 'might'.

The unification of the German Empire in 1871 on the initiative of the victorious Prussian authoritarians, Bismarck and his soldier colleagues like v. Moltke, corresponded to a widely felt political need. The fact that this unity was achieved in this particular manner and by this set of militarists focussed the enthusiasm of Germans on the Prussian army as the carrier of the imperial idea. The resulting notion of 'all-German' (as against regional) patriotism was thus a vision of a successful aggressor, armed and glorious. When the Prussian Empire fell in 1918 the underlying lack of deep unity was revealed in the spectacle of warring factions, a caricature of democracy, in which the needs of the country as a whole were apt to be forgotten. Tested by this criterion, German patriotism was found deficient. A similar picture is beginning to appear under the stress of military reverses to-day, even among the regular N.C.O. type.

25/8-33 / 04...74.
A Chief Petty Officer says: "If we lose the war they'll clip our wings... perhaps there won't be a Germany. Then I should come to England and bring my wife and family. If things go wrong Adolf will have the whole German nation after his blood."

A lieutenant just captured after the Alamo defeat exclaimed: "To hell with the Fatherland."

The wish to emigrate if Germany loses is one of the most frequently expressed among all types of German Prisoners of war.

In other words, German patriotism is unstable, dependent on the success of German policy and armed power and evaporates quickly when the state no longer corresponds with the idea of strength and invincibility with which the German chiefly connects it. Hitler had induced a frenzy of patriotic emotion in his vision of a resurgent powerful state, once again 'honoured' abroad and at home because fully armed. Under this impulse many flocked to the colours. The emotion was, however, essentially an expression of the need to belong to something great and strong which was examined in sections 4, 5 and 6. German 'Reich' patriotism is thus something rather abstract, a fair weather sentiment based on glory and success rather than on a deeply-rooted sense of 'belonging'. This latter feeling exists chiefly for one's own village or locality. That such a concentrated attempt had to be made by Nazi doctrinaires to infuse the 'all-German' or 'Greater German' idea into the mass proves that it was not there spontaneously. Expressions of it on the part of Germans bear a cliché-like and stereotyped character, but are perhaps all the more demonstrative on that account.

We hear reliable stories of the deterioration in consideration for others, and especially of the hostile attitude of inhabitants of one area towards evacuees from another. Because of the essential lack of unity and patriotic feeling, so much loyalty and mystical 'faith' is always felt to be necessary, and for the same reason criticism or grumbling about the government is so much more dangerous. A German prisoner, a hotelier of considerable experience and knowledge of various nations, put the matter very well: "The English have a basic unity and love of country, so they can curse as much as they like on the surface. We Germans have the hostility and division deep down, so we have to make a parade of our unity and patriotism and cannot tolerate differences of opinion."

A romantic and high-falutin' type of patriotism is to be found among strongly nazified young men. It takes the form of a belief, an ardent faith in an 'idea' writ large, somewhat as follows (quoting the words of a young regular pilot officer): "First, you can kill the system but not the Idea. It is rooted in our people. Hitler has exactly formulated it, but it was not his - it has always existed. This idea is to have a great Reich in which all Germans are united. (In the Second Reich the Austrians were missing and in the First Reich certain others.) Then, it should have enough territory to support its population and, placed as we are, we should have full 'Wehohheit' (military sovereignty) to have the right to have the armed forces we want. We are a soldierly nation placed as we are in the middle of Europe. We want to be respected and have our rightful place as the largest nation and want to run our own community, which the genius of our Führer has revealed to us, in our own way. This involves a Man at the head etc. We could not be content with someone else deciding our fate - some court of arbitration or league. We are nationalists."

It is clear that this form of patriotism is really another variant of the strong pyramid of soldiers, to which the Nazis have joined the creed of the mystical 'Volk' - the chosen people, unique and misunderstood. The idea is inseparable from military power, status of the country in the eyes of the world, and the supremacy of a Leader. It is for this reason that patriotism, as understood in Britain, is not comparable with the German variety which is a composite of the various drives described earlier in so far as it exists at all.

Further evidence of the existence of division of loyalty and a pull in two opposite directions within the German character will emerge in the subsequent pages.

9. The Mental Split. Many skilled observers have emphasized the duality which permeates the German character. A case in point was that of the pilot officer who with a feminine, artistic strain derived from his mother combined a sadistic power-urge on the basis of identification with his father. This is but a random example of this cleavage, which Forster (Europe and the German Problem, p.56) describes as characterizing the men bred in that school:

"As soon as the conversation turns on politics their speech and thought suddenly breathe an arctic chill. It is not even political paganism. For the pagan believes in Divine government concerned even with political crime. But these men seem to be victims of a peculiar disease

Even a man of such high intellectual and artistic endowments as Frederick the Great gave proof, in the sphere of international politics, of what was little short of moral insanity Those statesmen live untroubled in this complete contradiction they have deprived the political thought of their people of every higher light and thereby of any realism which penetrates below the surface."

- It is the writer's contention that this deep division in the German character is due to the conditions of rearing and is perpetuated as a vicious circle. He has to bow outwardly to severe authority and even admire it, with results already described. But the repressed, rejected portion of him continues to exist in undeveloped form, as a kind of outcast. It contains the stifled wish for being the favoured and irresponsible baby; the hidden protest and rejection of paternal authority and order, and resentment against it, with consequent deep guilt and inferiority feelings. In order to try and cure himself of this guilt sense he projects it, attributing all 'treason' and falsehood to scapegoats, such as the Jews 'who made Germany weak'. All guilt is rejected: Germany is good and blameless, and the 'Versailles powers' are the greedy bad ogres who would not let little Germany live.

This accounts for the lack of unity and integration of German life, which had outwardly accepted the civilized restraints of the Western Christian tradition and, indeed, assumed a role of protecting this heritage against 'the barbarism of the East'. Yet there is this, other, shadow-side of the German which he has conveniently called 'Eastern barbarism', but which is the renegade in himself. The repressed primitive has continued to exercise its fascination for him, he has never really given it up. Much of the 'search for the depths', of typically German 'mysticism' and introspective self-analysis has been at bottom a need to justify and idealise this undigested archaic force. The Nazi philosophy, culling the products of many earlier writers' rationalizations of the theme, is the climax of this turning back of the renegade from civilization to the sources of guilt and tension, and sanctifying them as 'springs of German power'. The individual German, feeling in desperate need of healing the split, seized on the promise of unity, on the perfect Hero-leader, on the blazoning forth of his innocence and virtue, on the rightness of returning to 'Nature' in the raw and asserting one's strength against the external 'oppressors'. He gladly responded to the call to exalt this harking back into primitive group life as signifying acceptance of himself as good and beloved by his Führer. It could all be explained - there was nothing wrong inside him - the weakness and oppression was caused by the foreigner - the Jew in his midst and the encircling plutocrats and bolsheviks. He can abandon his uneasy soul-searching and quest for unification - it had all been accomplished, and the rejected and despised little man had become the Great Healer.

These events prove the existence of a complete barrier inside the German mind, a Jekyll and Hyde situation. When functioning privately they adhere to all the traditions of civilization, within the limits of its German application. When participating in group life or when concerned with group matters - such as politics - 'Hyde' comes to the surface, and is hardly ever questioned or criticized. The chief symptoms of guilt are projection and the need for self-justification. These have become so imprinted as clichés by nationalist and Nazi propaganda that they are sincerely believed. In seeking unification by plunging into the self-adulating group which stands above law and is always right, the German has cut himself off from the capacity for true and beneficent self-criticism. Instead of healthy maturing which results from being able to see the greedy selfish baby in oneself and correcting it, the German takes his 'deep urges' terribly seriously and creates systems of philosophy about them. In seeking to disown it he has become caught by his repressed savagery and likes it defiantly but guiltily. He shouts and glorifies it en masse to drown the sense of guilt. He creates institutions and authorities which shall tell him how right he is and to absolve him. Finally, he cheats himself in an act of expiation and atonement when he sacrifices himself to a stern authority. This was well shown in the example of the young soldier who joined the army to be made strong. Instead of parting with his secret demand for the primordial irresponsibility, he submits meekly to a system and makes it responsible for his good order. Thereby he is enabled to preserve his uncivilized self intact, he can indulge this in the very act of bowing to the stern demands of the older generation - a generation which has passed through a similar cycle of development. Despite its pompous seriousness, therefore, the German sense of sternness and dutifulness has a bogus, self-dramatizing quality. This split, moreover, makes them unable to see others in correct perspective, and makes them abstract, academic and doctrinaire in their appreciation of the outside world, which they can only comprehend through the distorting lens of their projections. They are, in short,

One sometimes gets the impression - and it is only a hunch - that the Germans' submissiveness, the urge to touch the depths, is their strongest driving force; hence, that they put up a tremendous fight, flinging away what they have laboriously managed to build up in a great provocative orgy whose unrecognized aim is to be beaten. It is as if their stern discipline and orderliness caused an accumulation of tension which has to find a way out, come to a climax and then leave them powerless, weak and at the mercy of the strong. This resembles the cycle of:

- (1) frustrated rebellion;
- (2) resentment against authority;
- (3) the futile attempts to break out in a violent act, always discovered, followed by
- (4) punishment;

such as one finds frequently in the neurotic type of delinquent. As Hartshorne (see also Part III, D) says, the Germans live on the myth of a past weakness and wrong which they have to make good by a great future victory followed by a 'thousand years of peace'. Happiness always eludes them, it is always ahead in some great reconciliation, but their unconscious life demands suffering and strife in the present; hence perhaps their frantic efforts at armed strength, their legend of invincibility, their restless and disturbing 'dynamism', and their preoccupation with 'plumbing the depths'.

If this hunch has any truth in it, it goes a long way to explain the apparently meaningless blunders through which with a sure touch Hitler has led his great forces, like the Pied Piper, to destruction. This march reminds us of the annual trek of certain Norwegian rodents, called lemmings, to mass suicide by drowning in the North Sea.

More than a hundred years ago, their greatest man - Goethe - said the following sentences to his friend Eckermann about what he saw brewing in the German mind:

"Not this pig-headed craving to be a unique nation, this national narcissism* that wants to make its own stupidity a pattern and power over the rest of the world! Unhappy folk! They will end in a smash. They do not understand themselves - that makes the world laugh at them at first; but after a while the world hates them for it, and that is dangerous. Fate will smite them for betraying themselves and not wanting to be what in fact they are Their best always lived in exile among them, and in exile only will they develop all the good that is in them"

PART II

SOME GERMAN SOLDIER TYPES

Study of the morale of the Wehrmacht will be made easier if we first look at the mentality and types of different soldiers found in the German forces and their typical attitudes towards their duties and themselves. First of all, a brief historical background.

During the Napoleonic occupation of Germany, certain statesmen and patriot soldiers, especially in Prussia, began to plan to put into action a militant philosophy of state absolutism proclaimed in theory by some of their notable philosophers such as Fichte and Hegel, which bore military fruit under Blücher. The Prussian military tradition is many centuries old and would appear to be compounded of two contradictory elements: one is derived from the spirit of the Crusades which drew a number of German knights together to carry Christianity to the shores of the Eastern Baltic at the point of the sword; this was a sworn ascetic brotherhood of warrior monks. Whatever the result of the brutal practices of this Teutonic Order in a dark period of history, one might call this element the chivalrous or idealistic one in the composition of the Prussian tradition. The second element, which goes much deeper, springs from the blending of these ascetic motives with fear of being swamped by the savage Slav tribes. Mediaeval Prussian policy was one of conquest, extermination and suppression in the worst colonial tradition. The conquered populations who subsequently became embodied and absorbed in this warrior state as serving men brought to it their own savage sullenness and hardness and adopted the worst features of their German overlords whom they were powerless to

*Narcissus - legendary Greek youth who admired his own image.

overthrow. This Spartan state was developed by the Great Elector and especially by the sadistic Frederick William I, with the help of Huguenot officers. It sacrificed all to military and bureaucratic efficiency and (especially since Frederick the Great, who was a victim of his father's sadism) gradually imposed its will and tradition on the much more dreamy, pliable and more civilised Western German who was fascinated by the spectacle of administrative efficiency and military success. The savage Prussian becomes the disciplined, submissive Prussian grenadier. Through conscription the tradition was spread throughout German manhood.

For convenience we shall deal separately with senior officers, junior officers, N.C.Os. and men.

A. OFFICERS

It is well known that the formation of the Prussian General Staff, which was later to become the "Great General Staff" of the German Empire, harnessed a large number of able men to the service of their martial idea and continued something of the self-sacrificing ascetic brotherhood spirit in the one-pointed pursuit of military planning and organisation.

At the fusion of Germany's many principalities to form the Empire in 1871, these sombre Prussian "warrior saints" played the leading part, and the capture of power by their spirit in once liberal Germany was completed. The settlement of disputes by armed threat or resort to war continued to be an instrument of national policy in the hands of Bismarck and his successors. In this the German has stood still as compared with the rest of the civilised world who subscribed to new doctrines. This tradition did not die out through the realisation that it had failed after the first world war, but was allowed to live on, at first underground and later openly in the small professional army permitted to Germany under the Versailles Treaty.

An officer career is regarded as the noblest and most intellectual outlet for Germany's best boys, such as would in this country largely enter the learned professions or large-scale business.

A sketch of the General Staff illustrates the kind of position it occupies in German esteem:

"This work of art in which a many-sided organism yet appears outwardly as a unity the high purpose, the strictness of soldierly breeding of the German officer type, well-known throughout the world as the German General Staff Officer, admired and feared." (A German newspaper, 1941.)

The motto of the General Staff, coined by Scharnhorst: "Be more than you seem," ("Mehr sein als scheinen"), is regarded as the self-effacement of strong personalities in the service of superior duty and is therefore held up as a model for the nation of almost silent yet enduring effort.

(1) Senior Officers. The fortunes of the North African campaign have provided a fine assortment of prisoners of war of this category, in which only a Field Marshal is lacking. It has been possible to gain considerable insight into the minds of these pillars of the Wehrmacht. These are men from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel upwards, and chiefly representatives of the upper classes, aged from 32 to 58 and including all three services. Among them are Army Commanders, Corps and Divisional Commanders, as well as C.Os. of regiments, C.R.As., Air Force Commanders, General Staff Officers of the Army, the Air Arm and the Navy. Nothing that has been said about the characteristics of the German "cult of manliness", the instability of their sentiments and loyalties, and their emphasis on status need be amended in respect of these High Priests of the brotherhood. A few exceptional individuals are exempt from some of the grosser features of inconsistency and deflated self-importance, but make up for it by gleeful defiance of the group and, in one case, almost exultation in their own army's defeats because they are able to say: "I told you so." The renegade tendency is fully at work, and a Major General echoed the cry of many a humbler soldier not long ago when he said: "I shan't stay in Germany unless they keep me by force. I'm fed up with this wonderful Fatherland!" He further stated that he no longer cared about the threatened destruction of the Officer Corps as he was technically trained and could earn his living. Most of the others, he said, would be threatened by ruin and so they were prepared for any alternative, even an alliance with Russia, if they could thereby keep themselves in power! Somewhat illogically he himself was prepared to adopt this course rather than continue the war on several fronts. His ideas are borne out by the feverish thinking of many of his high fellow prisoners. "Of course, it would mean the end of western civilisation, but it is the only chance of winning."

Splitting of allegiance and the search for self-justification and for scapegoats is very marked, betraying the underlying, now emerging duality of feelings.

"This oath to Hitler in 1933 was extracted by false pretences - Hindenburg was still alive then - what could we do? Always the appeal to 'national' and patriotic reasons (i.e. by the Nazi leaders) and then it was too late."

All these high officers feel it was not up to them to do anything; they were simple soldiers. "But the higher ones, the ones in the O.K.W., should have put their foot down and said: 'I am not playing.'"

"That is the tragedy of obedience: when we are ordered we have to obey."

"These men were all yes-men, that's all the General Staff men ever are - spineless creatures."

"Nobody had the courage to resist and if necessary permit themselves to be chucked out of G.H.Q."

One General stated, a propos of the military reverses since Stalingrad, that what annoyed him most was the impression given to the world that the German High Command were a lot of fools. He deplored most earnestly the political manipulation of high army commands as "so unsound". Others agree with him and feel that the body of Generals can no longer make its voice heard and that indeed orders now exist for the "vetting" of Generals as to the soundness of their National Socialist principles.

In spite of these admissions, which some of them make bitterly and after heart-searching, most of them still hold that the Wehrmacht is "the finest in the world", and that it is the only organisation capable of taking over control in Germany after the now longed-for disappearance of the Nazis. They also blame themselves for not having infiltrated the Waffen S.S. which some of them now fear will be the "Army of the Future", displacing their own organisation. It can be said that no morale among P.S.W. is lower than that of these high officers if measured by the criteria of faith in the goodness of their cause, belief in the Wehrmacht's technical efficiency, trust in leadership, or indeed solid anchorage in the esteem of their people. To judge from their comments the state of mind of most of their colleagues not in captivity would seem to be the same. Asked why they have accepted the ascendancy of the dictatorship lying down, one of them said: "Because of the way in which the Generals allowed themselves to be shouted at like street urchins (by Hitler)."

In somewhat ludicrous contrast are the attitudes of the two most senior Generals who are trying to "keep up the morale of the youngsters", i.e. mere Major-Generals and Colonels. They hold solemn harangues to them forbidding "subversive talk" and listening to the B.B.C. German service, and talk about the "stiff upper lip" and not betraying weakness before the enemy. These two are at least consistent, even though they resort to spying and sneaking on the naughty ones with whom they hope there will be a day of reckoning when they get home again. Gossip about and criticism of their colleagues in camp and in Germany are a favourite pastime with these two. Comparison of careers, who had been promoted over whose head, the dissection of reputations and the judging of who is a "real gentleman" are fairly prominent topics.

The façade of "honour", in the German-Japanese sense of "face", is kept up. Thus, much criticism was expressed of Paulus for not shooting himself when his capture at Stalingrad was imminent:

"If I were a Field Marshal and so many had lost their lives under my command I should not let myself be taken. His sons are both officers; they could have been proud of their father, they and their children's children. Wouldn't it have been worth much more? What a figure he will cut in history! Let me tell you I was promoted over his head. What a career I have missed!"

The excuse for all weakness is always physical. There is much talk of "so-and-so's" bad heart or nerves. "Poor Paulus's nerves were at breaking point completely worn out." As is well known, a large number of high German Generals appear to break down and are described as nervous wrecks. Medically this is without doubt not primarily a matter of "exhaustion" but the result of tension and inner conflict. The man does not break down, only his facade crumbles if he is not of a piece inside.

"A gallant German Major, recovering from jaundice, was asked by a British M.O. whether he was not feeling depressed. He said: "I am much too well disciplined to feel depressed. Of course, the O.Rs. in Africa with jaundice all felt depressed." Reassured by the M.O. that depression was a common symptom in that disease, he replied with a sigh of relief: "Oh, thank you for telling me it is only my illness, for I have felt very pessimistic. I could not permit myself to feel depressed otherwise!" This is a typical piece of self-deception for the sake of appearance.

The concern for health, fear of catching colds, faith in patent medicines and preoccupation with the ailments of their colleagues is not exclusive to the middle-aged officers though most marked in their case. It is a well understood psychological symptom of anxiety and uneasiness, briefly alluded to in Part I.

The fear of authority, as we have seen, is a result of German family culture. It extends right through the scale of the Wehrmacht. The resulting guilt finds many ways out. With one exception, none of the harangued "junior Generals" appears to have dared express his resentment at being dressed down like a schoolboy, but instead they made nasty remarks behind the "old man's" back and ordered anti-Nazi books, as well as turning on the radio in defiance.

One of the Generals himself tells a story how a certain urgent problem of policy had to be worked up in memorandum form by a branch of the G.H.Q. staff. As it was feared to be unpalatable to the Führer, the high officer concerned solved his difficulty by waiting till he had something else to submit and decided to slip in the urgent problem "as a footnote" which perhaps Hitler would notice. Other examples of lack of moral courage abound.

Perhaps as a compensation to their feeling of lack of political power a number of Generals show a tendency to boast: "To think that I was the third commander in history to take Belgrade! And I did it with one division. My predecessor,..... Prince Eugen." But it must on the other hand be added that much first class culture and intellect and obvious pride and competence of the good professional sort are also found, with intolerance of bogus claims and modesty (perhaps arising from super-conceit, such as "I wouldn't dream of wearing my decorations."). Not a few are artistic, connoisseurs, or widely read.

Turning now to their attitude towards junior officers and men, there is noticeable a basic doctrine of condescending paternalism which, in the case of Germans, errs more on the side of severity than benevolence, at least in manner. There appears to be no relaxation of rules of etiquette and dutiful formality, such as obtains in a British mess. A Major General will never address a Lieutenant General by his Christian name but always by title. Correspondingly, more junior officers are hardly noticed and sometimes brusquely "shut up". Some of Rommel's popularity with the rank and file was clearly "theatrical", for many young and keen officers complained that he never bothered about them and did not even return salutes. "We were nothing but coolies", said one such affronted lieutenant. Similarly, Rommel is said to have had no respect for his subordinate commanders' feelings for he encroached on their rights and moved their troops about without consulting them. That a mere medical officer, however senior, has no standing follows logically. His policy and measures can be and not infrequently are over-ridden by the executive commander, even in the purely professional sphere. This attitude is not incompatible with individual cases of genuine sympathy and a real fatherly attitude. The PW Generals' treatment of their German batmen is notable for its decent and generous concern, including instructions to their wives to look after the batmen's families. There is further an impression that senior officers are very easily taken in by charm and good manners and are vulnerable to this aspect of young men. A very famous Air Chief is said to weep helplessly every time he hears of losses of his nice young pilots, whereas another, equally famous, is called "the Butcher" - ruthless, regardless of loss. Soldiers are mostly referred to as "troops". These traits are, of course, not incompatible.

Blame shifting on to juniors is common: "The fact is, they have undertaken too much and now nobody wants to look a fool; the fool is always someone lower in rank," says a Lieutenant Colonel. The reluctance to admit the merits of younger men is often found, but praise for efficiency is also given behind their backs. Praise must not be given too often. A battalion commander, after a review, made it his principle to say to his men on parade: "It could have been better." The tendency to class snobbery and contempt for people lacking in good form has already been alluded to. Here the senior officers' cadre is the chief upholder of the caste spirit and is suspicious of the new type of junior officer who does not come from the "right people" and who is a vulgar Nazi nominee. The exception is usually made for

General Staff Officers, the *crème de la crème*. These, however, ²⁵⁻¹⁰⁻³³⁻¹⁰⁴⁻⁷⁷ are considered by some fighting soldiers as too clever, too academic or too spineless because they are accustomed to be somebody else's "Number Ones", never to command. Despite psychological selection the officers of a regiment still had until recently the final choice of their juniors and intending regulars have to run the gauntlet of their comment and appraisal. Strangely enough, this is one of the few instances where a ballot decides an appointment in Germany.

It is hard to form an opinion on the fighting and professional qualities of German senior officers. The impression is that they have given much study and interest to their job and that the best of them are very good. The tradition is to leave the donkey work to their 1 A (G.S.O.1, B.G.S, etc., whatever the level of formation) and concern themselves with leadership. A General laid it down that "the quieter the situation, the further back you can be. When things get lively or unpleasant you have to be right in front;" a doctrine he obviously carried out in view of the circumstances of his capture. He had contempt for some of his subordinate commanders whom he found trying to run the battle 20 km behind the front line and ordered them to go up. At the same time it is widely held that trained Staff Officers and seniors are valuable and must be got away to escape loss. This would not be considered cowardice. Stories abound to the effect that under this pretext many senior officers are in fact apt to leave unprofitable battles to their juniors and make their getaway. Further, through friends in the personnel branch, they are apt to have themselves transferred from unpleasant jobs "where there are no further laurels to be gained." This, however, may be cattiness on the part of the individuals who were themselves unlucky and from whom the information has to be derived.

It must be said that the old type of caricaturable Prussian officer is a rarity, though he has been met. The lower middle class wind of Nazi influence seems to have blown away a good many of the more obvious parlour tricks of this type but in essence he has remained. A General of this type has been encountered; he is cold, intransigent, incredibly conceited, wears his monocle and his Knight's Cross even in bed and is the laughing stock of his peers, by whom he has been rockingly dubbed: "The last of the Prussians." This man has been known to sob like a child with anger and depression over Germany's military fate.

There is also, among some of the older men, a contempt for the technician, e.g. a General (ex-Cavalry) commanding armoured formations:

"Then one of those what-d'ye-call-ems - chemist fellows or something - came along and tried to tell me I couldn't run my panzers on this petrol..... wrong octane or something..... I don't know what all that means.... that's what we have those fellows for."

There is also evidence that during the crucial weeks in Tunisia von Arnim was suffering from a state of pathological indecision, a trait which he shows even now in the simple duties of senior officer of his camp.

The conclusion is that German senior officers, besides sharing most of the distinctive mental traits of their nation, are a group no longer certain of their exclusive caste status; they are defeatist and feverishly thinking of ways to preserve their caste. With some notable exceptions they disclose, on deflation from their positions, woefully inadequate civic courage and very little originality, and their attitudes show the characteristic results of the authoritarian tradition and inner uncertainty.

(2) Junior Officers. The line is drawn at the rank of Major because the larger number of Majors and equivalent ranks have been men in the early thirties or younger and thus really much more the products of the Nazi revolution than of the "old Germany". Here, therefore, the primary distinction is by social class, even among the regulars. There are the society men who took the opportunity of the expanding Wehrmacht to join as tradition and status dictated. These people have some breeding, a good deal of conceit and the peculiar blend of steely cold arrogance and effeminate fastidiousness which is to the medical eye a sure sign of a good deal of latent homosexuality which they themselves do not know about. It was a revelation to observe the type of arrogant, swaggering but effeminately dandified young German airman who appeared among those taken prisoner during the Battle of Britain. Immaculately groomed and manicured, they behaved like spoilt mother's boys and their chief anxiety in some cases was to obtain face creams and hair nets. The assumption of blasé sophistication; the pursuit of women as scalps to be counted, without affection; the seeking of decorations and other prominence are some of their characteristics, usually wedded to excellent intellects and professional keenness. These men's political allegiances are often of the split kind. A patronising acceptance of Hitler's genius is mixed with contempt for the petit-bourgeois ways of his Party men. This snobbery is tending to disappear in the

very young, unless they come from families with strong aristocratic traditions. Many rich industrialists' sons have been met. In nearly all such types the career and status or the fun of flying or the love of playing soldiers, rather than sincere Nazi conviction, has been the determining factor. They have little understanding for the common man, have felt themselves rather as young demi-gods and are frequently very callous, if not consciously sadistic, though superficially well-mannered, deferential and charming. From time to time one meets a much more solid young warrior of the upper class who quite frankly admits he loves war and military life, is absorbed in his profession and of excellent fibre. Strangely enough, such people are not infrequently strongly anti-Nazi. Their attitudes do not differ greatly from those of their elders, but they are more enthusiastic and less defeatist. Their general culture is much lower than that of the seniors and their talk nearly all technical shop, drunken parties and prospects of decorations. Their general interests and knowledge are poor. The flying men usually like to feel that a chivalrous kinship exists between themselves and the R.A.F. The primary allegiance of this sort of young officer is to the Wehrmacht.

The other sort are striving, plodding middle to lower class men, mostly rather serious and dull, narrow professionals without much veneer. Some of them were embodied from the police, others came in because of the prospect of joining the cream when Hitler broadened the selection by merit and psychological tests. Sporting proficiency counts a good deal among them. In this group the sincerity of Nazi beliefs is much higher, and the relationship between earlier training in the Hitler youth and their "service" as the Führer's soldiers much clearer. Many, up to senior captains, had had civilian careers, e.g. as bank clerks. Their feeling of solidarity with their men appears to be greater; also, as judged by these men's comments, many of them still have excellent morale, others quite the reverse. This seems to vary with their sense of guilt and need to propitiate the enemy, against whom the more ardent Nazis cherish really extraordinarily sadistic feelings.

Among the men there are frequent charges of unfair dealing, e.g. that officers are not sharing rations and canteen wares with them. We have been able to verify that in fact German officers, especially naval officers, do steal food from stores in a big way, and that all who can illogically cart masses of stuff, food, tobacco, wines, etc. into Germany from occupied countries, indeed that some do not shrink from currency deals with their own men as the victims. This is no doubt the kind of reason why older officers shake their heads over the poor types now finding their way to commissioned rank: "A poor lot - always drinking and running after women." "No idea of weapons - he let them be in the filthiest conditions." In passing it need hardly be mentioned that the Germans have a poor opinion of their Austrian confrères, taken over after the Anschluss of 1938, excepting "the very young who were lively, enthusiastic, intelligent and keen."

There is evidence that when young officers first come from their military college they are sorted at once by the men into braggarts who will turn out to be the cowards, and "the decent, quiet sort whom one can follow."

Thirdly, mention must be made of the various sorts of temporary, war-time officers. Unlike those commissioned before the war, these men, who may be of any standard of education but in fact seem to be chiefly of the high school type, have to prove their capacity for leadership and other qualities by front line service for at least six months, and this applies in war-time also to preselected candidates for regular commissions. This method has superseded the previous elaborate selection boards including psychological experts. It is an older reserve officer's opinion that mistakes as to character are frequent. A keen regular officer bewailed the fact that psychiatric selection for officers had been thrown overboard, regarding this as a very retrograde step leading to bad choice simply by Party influence or other favouritism.

In the group of war officers and other specially commissioned people (administrative officials, interpreters, welfare officers, technical men etc.) a fair cross section of the German black-coated worker, commercial and professional class is seen. This shows a wide variety of types. Some owe their promotion to Party influence, others have even been in Gestapo prisons for political reasons but have redeemed themselves by good service in the field. None can hold rank higher than Oberleutnant (1st Lieutenant) in combatant arms. The general impression is that a fair proportion of these young, temporary officers have thoroughly identified themselves with the Wehrmacht under the stress of war but that the source of their morale is more directly the feeling of duty, as they see it, to a wrongfully attacked fatherland. Some of the most determined and patriotic have been the anti-Nazis who, perhaps analogously to our British conscientious objectors, have been out to prove that they too had guts.

The worst type of officer seen has been the temporaries who are at the same time ardent Nazis. With a sense of mission and a religious light in their eyes they have apparently a knack of putting up the backs of other officers and men. They try to be "plus royaliste que le roi", talk vociferously about "soldierly honour" and are down on any slackness in giving the Hitler greeting, on anti-Nazi talk etc. but seem to be little thought of in their units. It is often believed that they owe their rise to their Party zeal and not to military efficiency. A very bad specimen of this kind was a weedy youth of 21 who had been educated at a Hitler School which he compared with a "German Eton". He made himself very unpopular with his colleagues by constant heresy hunting and, when more or less boycotted and told to wash before breakfast by his senior, he wrote a long complaint to a senior officer, whining about his "honour" having been offended. He also happened to have kept a diary in which he recorded his very hectic, neurotic sex life "without which he could not exist". Needless to say, he described himself as a great idealist.

Comment from the men, especially N.C.Os. of the Army and Navy, is usually terse and to the point. "Look at the fellows who are being made officers today - all these great leaders of the Hitler youth." "Fancy having to salute such young fools!" etc. A number of very young officers, temporary as well as regular (the Air Force and Navy especially) have been seen who would not satisfy the criteria of leadership; wide-eyed, callow striplings, half-baked and crude and lacking in any smartness or grasp of the world, mere parrots of German official propaganda. Of their narrowly technical competence it has not been possible to judge.

A word or two on that peculiarly German institution, the Officers' Court of Honour, may be of interest as a factor of morale building. It was taken over from the old Army and in intention it is very laudable. The idea is that as between gentlemen a code of honour should rule, and that if their differences, quarrels etc. cannot be adjusted in a direct friendly approach and reconciliation, their peers (i.e. officers of the same seniority) shall adjudicate between them with fairness. There shall not be, in theory, outstanding disagreements and unpleasant tensions between brother officers in professional or private affairs which might endanger group solidarity and harmonious life in the unit. The settlement is to be arrived at in secret, with a minimum of publicity, to the satisfaction of both parties accepting an impartial verdict. The Court of Honour, which has minutely detailed rules of procedure, also has power to deal with the "bouncer" by recommending suspension from duty and even loss of commission, simply on the grounds of "dishonourable mentality" contrary to the interests of the officers' caste and status.

Every newly made officer receives a copy of the official pamphlet entitled "The Preservation of Honour" (Wahrung der Ehre), urging him to exemplary conduct as a leader and educator of men, but it rather lamely fails to define what honour consists of apart from loyalty to "Führer and People" and death on the field of honour. "There is no room," says the preamble, "for outworn conceptions of honour and exaggerated (or over-sensitive) notions." In practice, the provisions seem to reduce themselves to prevention of mutual affronts, such as are common in humourless, rigid relationships, and of trouble over women. An officer is responsible for the behaviour of his wife and a Court of Honour may call upon him to divorce her or resign his commission. It will be recalled that, as far as is known, Field Marshal Blomberg fell victim to such a Court of Honour because he had married an unacceptable "common" girl. The Court of Honour thus works largely as an instrument for removing undesirables and for saving the internal homogeneity of the Offiziers Korps without losing "face" by publicity. The function is parallel to the disciplinary powers of the British General Medical Council who can also erase people's names from the register "for infamous conduct in a professional respect", irrespective of, or in addition to, possible legal proceedings against the parties. Even duelling with pistols is provided for as the last resort. The document, in this case a Luftwaffe copy, somewhat ludicrously has an appendix in which the officer is also enjoined to observe the hunting code. It will be remembered that Göring is of course Chief Hunting Master of the Reich and has no doubt insisted on slipping this in!

It is noteworthy that balloting and trial by peers thus survives in the brotherhood of the Wehrmacht officers.

B. OTHER RANKS

(1) N.C.Os. For this purpose the initials denote all those below the rank of Lieutenant and above Obergefreiter. This large class of men still consists, at the top, chiefly of regular long-term soldiers.

Looking back on the hundreds of German soldiers of all arms studied, the impression remains that the N.C.Os. of the Unteroffizier, Feldwebel and senior grades are

the most solid asset that the Wehrmacht possesses. These men have a high sense of duty and devotion to their job and service. More than half of the senior N.C.Os. and Warrant Officers examined as PsW belonged to the old "100,000 Reichswehr" of pre-Hitlerian days, or at least of the pre-conscription era before 1935. These men are real professionals with a good deal of the security-seeking, "eye-on-promotion", time-serving attitude typical of their class. They are neither very interested in politics nor very aggressive, but thoroughly trained, solid men who are doing their job and carry a picture of wife and baby about. N.C.Os. are not lumped together as O.Rs., have separate messes, travel in a higher railway class and are very keen to preserve their dignity. One wonders whether the German railways have not preserved a three-class railway system expressly for the proper segregation of their service personnel!

During the war the N.C.Os. are frequently of better social and educational background than their officers, and many are, of course, on the way to commissions. Officer candidates have to have proved their leadership capacity by acting as section or equivalent leaders at the front. Where a batch of PsW from the same unit has been studied, clothed in British prisoner garb, there has usually been no difficulty in spotting N.C.Os. from their bearing. Naval P.Os. and higher ranks have perhaps been the least impressive, corresponding to the generally lower status of the Navy. Here promotion in the engineer branch especially has been more by technical than by "soldierly" considerations. Air crews are in a class by themselves and hardly come into the picture as their functions, like those in the R.A.F., do not go by rank and their disciplinary duties are minimal. Having the actual handling of men from day to day, N.C.Os. are often rather more tolerant than officers of the equivalent social and military status (i.e. regulars or temporaries). Even in a little bunch of very inferior troops captured by a Commando on the Norwegian coast, their Feldwebel was quite a smart soldier with a high sense of duty, unpopular for that reason. He was, incidentally, a section commander in complete charge of two detached coastal guns. In the Infantry, too, N.C.Os. may be platoon commanders and their duties are much more interchangeable with those of commissioned officers in war-time, quite apart from emergencies due to losses. Their political views are varied and can be placed in any of the categories from rabid Nazi to anti-Nazi. The temporary men have more interest in politics than the regulars. They have a highly developed sense of responsibility, loyalty and tutelage for their men. One gets the impression of vigilant sheepdogs. One also finds the tendency to bag the best rations and collar the finest cooks. That they are sometimes bullies and martinetts is also clear. The important role these conservative men play is amply recognised by the officers who treat them with considerable respect, but the feeling is not always reciprocated by the N.C.Os.

Among N.C.Os. may also be found men who are patriots but object to a Nazi regime, or else have other reasons for not taking commissions even where, on personality and educational grounds, they would have seemed much better types than some of the officers. Scores of really civilian-minded men, e.g. a sergeant who is a University lecturer in oriental languages, a Naval Interpreter who is an art gallery curator, a corporal of Flak who is a theological student, a sergeant of Panzer Grenadiers who was a church deacon (to quote at random), have submerged their very diverse personal interests and their ethical and political objections to the regime to give themselves to really arduous service. The pull of doctrine and feeling has been too great. They frequently explained their non-commissioned status as being due to the fact that they wanted to be in the thick of the fighting and not be removed from their familiar units to be sent on courses. This may point to deeper motives of fear of higher responsibility rationalised as joyous self-surrender, and indifference to rank "if only we can do our duty," but sometimes to known "political unreliability" against their name.

(2) The Rank and File. A full survey of all the varying types of German common soldier or sailor would require a vast amount of space. No one generalisation will do justice to the great variety of German manhood between 18 and 44 years who have been examined. We may omit men who are officer candidates. For convenience we can distinguish volunteers and conscripts.

(a) Volunteers, who are the only ones who choose to join, divide into two main types: the enthusiasts and the sensibly calculating (often technicians and specialists), with a third sub-group which is a mixture. The enthusiasts need little description. In them the psychological motives which have been enumerated as the essence of the German character, usually worked at full pressure. The German gift of seriousness and over-emphasis would make such a man - more often a youth - respond to the appeal of "now come and play the man, give your all to the glorious Fatherland, march in the serried, invincible ranks of Hitler's band of

heroes and, if need be, lay down your life for the greatest Führer of all time." This would be felt with a lush, near-to-tears (manfully suppressed) 25/8-33-04/r-79 The views or identity of "the enemy" would be a secondary consideration as compared with imagining oneself as "a soldier", following the footsteps of the great Frederick who said: "The people to whom my love is pledged is the only Godhead I serve. My highest God is my duty." This identification with the stern patriarchal injunction of the past is further strengthened by the political propaganda of Hitler which plays on this motive quite openly and consciously. The enthusiasts, in short, are the young men who have wholeheartedly accepted the bulk of Goebbels's and Hitler's teaching and argument and, with a certain simple faith, have offered themselves on the altar of such convictions.

Technicians - Choice of arm. German service regulations permitted the man liable for his military service in peace-time to express a preference for his favourite arm so long as he volunteered before he was due to be called up. Young men who wanted to carry on with their flying or driving of tanks or other acquired technical skill, for which they had developed a taste in civil life or in the special branches of the Hitler Youth, frequently anticipated the matter in this way so as to avoid the risk of being drafted into the infantry. This process was facilitated by the organisation of medico-psychological selection at the pre-military stage. Intending candidates for technical arms - Luftwaffe, Panzer troops and the like were summoned to testing stations either during their period of Labour Service or, if they were at secondary schools, during their year in the sixth form. The knowledge that they had been found suitable for this elite form of service was in itself a strong factor in promoting keenness and feeling of superiority. Peace-time entrants of this type are mostly among N.C.O.s. and war officers now.

Similar types of men see an advantage in volunteering during the war because, up to a point, they are still able to choose their arm of service. The Luftwaffe and Navy have many applicants who rightly, from their own point of view, prefer these "clean" services, which also have technical interest, to "mucking about" in the infantry. The Luftwaffe and U-boat service and Panzer units especially carry enhanced pay or prestige. They feel they can do a better job there too, and think it best to get in on the ground-floor.

To this perhaps partly unselfish type can be added another: the many able-bodied men who, on the testimony of their own countrymen, wangle their way into various soft "chair-borne" branches of the service, often through Party influence, nearly always with a hope of officer status. Evidence of this comes from many sources, tainted only to the extent that all combatants tend to suspect "base wallahs" of being wingers and shirkers.

It should be added that no significant differences in political complexion were discovered between this sort of volunteer and the enthusiast type of man. The town proletarians and the skilled factory workers are the solid core of these technical troops, specialists like tank crews, signallers etc., and among them there is more political consciousness and understanding of what the war is about. It would be a mistake to count on their being to any marked extent actively anti-Nazi.

The mixed type is one in whom enthusiasm and more sordid motives are blended. Here some degree of patriotic fervour is reinforced by the fear of criticism. "All my chums in the factory joined up, so I did not want to be the only one left behind." "The Luftwaffe is a fine service and I have always wanted to fly. Besides the pay is better and one gets better leave." "I want to do my best for the Fatherland but I could not stick the monotony of the poor foot-sloggers. With us (Air Force) there is more equality and less drill." etc.

The usual run of youths who join for the "fun of the thing", who would not "miss it", whose girls would despise them if they remained in civilian life, but who also felt the call of duty, is also frequently encountered.

In general, of volunteers in war-time it may be said that their psychological attitudes are not very different from those who enlisted as peace-time soldiers, because the mentality of the German civilian was much more ready to concede the superiority and virtue of a soldier's life than is the case in other countries. Few even of the not inconsiderable proportion of anti-Nazis seen among PsW have objected to military service as such or lacked pride in their armed forces. Not without justice, in view of the evidence of our senses, does a German pamphlet claim: "The erstwhile split of life into a civilian and a military form is superseded. We, as National Socialists, are all soldiers of our Führer." This consideration makes the question of allegiance to the military aspects of the regime and personal devotion to, or at least acceptance of, the Führer himself as supreme commander an important morale issue in the armed forces. Method of enlistment - voluntary or conscripted - becomes a secondary matter.

(b) Conscripts. There are two categories of German nationals who are conscripts. There is a further category seen not infrequently who have been pressed into service, willingly, passively or unwillingly. This consists of men who were not German State subjects at the outbreak of Hitler's aggressions in 1937, but who may be in varying degrees German or non-German in nationality or race from the welter of border folk all round Germany.

The first category are the men who are conscripted for the first time in the war without previous service. At one end are the young, from seventeen upwards, who constitute the new age groups; at the other end those who were too old to have served their two years when peace-time conscription was reintroduced in 1935. As the Military Service Statute provided for conscription of men aged 20, pre-war service was compulsory only to some four age groups, i.e. those now aged 24 to 28. Part of the latter group constitute the reservists recalled to the colours, being already trained soldiers. The men older than 28 constitute a so-called supplementary reserve (Ersatzreserve) and those over 35 the "Landsturm" (militia), until at the other end of the scale, we get veterans of the first world war, now aged at least 43.

In these conscripts the mental attitudes towards service have been very varied. Since their country is at war certain emotional elements on which, as we have seen, the German lays stress, work powerfully and in some cases very compellingly. Whatever condemnation is justifiable in the case of the aims and methods of Germany's war policy which seems to have had few and ineffectual opponents inside the Reich, the private qualities evoked in response in her sons are sometimes very praiseworthy. They have abandoned farms, trades and shops because the Wehrmacht needed them and have entered with zest into the job of "defending their country." Military service in war is to them the milieu in which they can best express their devotion to the State and to the visible symbol of unity - the Führer.

There are, however, other types who have stayed, or relapsed into being, individualistic, unwilling soldiers. Mostly their other emotional claims, such as families, business or outlook on life have been responsible for their inability to transfer their feelings into the military situation. This was the case not only in a fair proportion of men over 35 where it might have been expected, but also in some much younger men. In the latter political or ethical convictions were dominant factors in their objection: that is to say this group did not conform to the prevalent mass mentality and hence could neither believe that their cause was good nor have a warm regard for their comrades or followers. They had not become disaffected; they had been so before enlistment. Some nine to ten per cent. of any random sample of German serving men of all ranks are usually of this kind. Their individual resistance to conscription and service was however readily overcome by the powerful negative incentives: fear of retribution by a State where conscientious objection is not in the Statute Book; some degree of fear of the consequences of defeat, and by the suggestive effect of mass propaganda and popular feeling. Paradoxically enough, however, some of the opponents of Hitlerism were good soldiers and some of the worst soldiers scarcely anti-Nazis. The crucial test was the failure to switch their loyalties and emotional drives to the Wehrmacht; these men had remained "private individuals". We shall study these "failures" in greater detail in a subsequent portion of this memorandum.

Attention will now be focussed on this mass of common, average men, usually conscripted, who are found in all the services as ordinary seamen, riflemen, gunners, signallers, drivers, storemen or members of the many ground troops of the Luftwaffe.

The simple countryman who forms the bulk of the Army is not very different from any other European peasants. The German peasant is least touched of all classes by Nazism or by Allied propaganda. He is hard-working, asks for occupation and a useful job, is docile and obedient and has a limited horizon. He accepts any regime that will let him work in peace. He is frequently politically apathetic and takes it as a matter of course that he will have to change his political complexion after the war. Though he cares chiefly about his acre and his family, he is loyal and apt to stress that he is a German soldier. He is curly, tough, stolid and apparently little affected by such things as prolonged concentrated fire. He "suffereth long and endureth all things." He is capable, if a driver, of obeying the following religiously:

"I had to dig a trench for him (his C.O.) and me every day. The vehicle also had to be dug in. That took 5 to 6 hours, every single day. It was an Army Order (in Libya)."

The Pomeranians and the East Prussians, frequently with names and features suggesting Slav origin, are particularly bovine, insensitive men, indifferent to carnage, hardship or severity, which are all part of the soldier's lot. These men do not approve of Party "smart Alecks" nbr of atrocities, but their moral indignation is seldom great enough to inspire protest or disloyalty. Their nerves are strong.

The seaboard man who may have been a fisherman or in the merchant service, of much the same class, has an equally simple attitude. He is a soldier and has to fight, but has a fellow feeling once it is over. This type does not talk of going off abroad when Germany has lost. Occasionally such coast-dwellers betray more independence of thought through nautical contact with the outside world and come out with very pertinent criticism of dictatorship humbug and national megalomania. This is especially true of Hamburgers who call themselves "Hitler's headache".

The small-town artisan type contains a great majority of equally simple, almost unworldly folk with a sprinkling of rabid Nazis, usually from among small shopkeepers who are the backbone of the "petit-bourgeois" Nazi Party.

To return to the factory worker type. Some of the older men, but chiefly the fathers of the present soldiers, are the former left-wing voters and trade unionists. The present generation have benefitted from the Nazi regime, have undergone prolonged drilling and, though grouzers, are thoroughly militarised. The exception are some nine per cent. of men who, for various reasons, are consciously anti-Nazi. (See Part IV, "Political Attitudes".) There is certainly no mass disloyalty in this class.

As a whole, the German soldier is much less individual or outspoken than the British soldier; one finds far fewer "characters", except among Austrians. His dull, unrealistic, awkward bearing is, however, belied by the good score he puts up in the standard British Army intelligence test. This discrepancy is explained by his inability to use his brains except as ordered, within a narrow sphere. He thus creates a "half-baked", unfinished impression, but on a job - technical or constructive - he comes to life and is keen and efficient. Interest in sport is very marked, especially football and athletics. He is restless without active employment, orderly, tidy, greedy, loquacious and gullible, very docile and amenable to discipline, and easily intimidated and impressed. His sexual morals are rather worse than his British opposite number's and much more cold-bloodedly animal, with the support of his authorities. This statement has to be amended for a proportion of good Catholics and for the occasional strict Evangelical. A noticeable sprinkling in a random sample consists of quite queer people whose unaffectedness by war and horror is due to a peculiar "daft" detachment from life's realities, not usually due to mental defect. They are apt to talk about wanting to go back to "Mummy". They constitute a kind of lunatic fringe and are mostly found to have been employed as cookhouse men, regimental tailors, mule-driver's mates (sic) etc.

The Air Force ground troops are noticeably smarter and of better type than the infantry; this is due to Goering's insistence on having "first pick", and to the attraction of the air arm for the young German, so that there has always been an abundance of volunteers. These, if not selected for air crews or technical ground staffs, have been formed into special field divisions of which the Hermann Goering Division is the best known example. Even down to the lorry drivers these men feel themselves to be and give the impression of being élite troops. Tank crews, anti-tank gunners and medical personnel are also considered specially selected good men. The paratroops' rank and file are fine specimens, nearly all hand-picked, and compare individually and as a group very favourably with a random assortment of German junior officers. Their bearing and discipline recall that of the Brigade of Guards.

Among the conscripts drawn from recently occupied countries, Sudeten and Baltic Germans, Austrians, Memellanders, Upper Silesians, Poles, Czechs, Alsations, Luxemburgers, Estonians and Russian emigrés have been met and all degrees of hostility or enthusiasm for their army encountered, based largely on their sense of solidarity with the Third Reich rather than on purity of racial background. The motives of those who were anything but press-ganged or else enthusiastic Nazis have often been those of love of some aspect of military life (flying, driving, etc.), security, the improved rations and political status for their relatives, and a sense of greater stability and interest in the German army as against the amenities of civilian life for a "second class citizen." There are among them those who had cheerfully submitted to their lot and who only began to allege hostility to the Germans after capture. They made good friends among their comrades and seem to have been "carried" quite easily. Others produced evidence of being forcibly enlisted but helpless owing to dispersal among overwhelming numbers of Germans. These men, apparently a minority, were only held by fear and blackmail through the safety of their relatives, but these stories may not be entirely truthful. It has

struck many observers as odd that the O.K.W. makes such free use in technical jobs (paratroops, signallers, etc.) of these quite unreliable, disloyal men. This is either lack of realism or reliance on rigorous field security. It may be a question of man-power.

Finally, elements of a division composed almost exclusively of criminals were found. This included "politically suspect" men as well as unpolitical gaol birds, the latter often of considerable soldierly loyalty. One such, being asked whether he was "in" for being an anti-Nazi, replied haughtily: "No, Sir, major robbery."

PART III

THE WEHRMACHT'S INTERNAL LIFE

A. INTRODUCTION

We might now repeat our question: "On what factors does the cohesion of this medley of human types in the German Army depend?" in a different form. "What basic strivings, feelings, ideas and traditions, common to German men does the Wehrmacht satisfy in its members, and what are the special German ingredients which distinguish its morale tradition?" For this much is certain: if and when an armed force ceases to satisfy the vital strivings of the human beings composing it, or when other strivings and needs gain the upper hand, then that force is bound to disintegrate.

1. What is morale?

The definition of the notion of "morale" - a word very freely used about troops - is a matter of opinion. It is proposed to adopt the simple definition that morale is

"a conviction of personal power; competence and worth animating a group in relation to the task in hand."

The strivings or needs of men which may be brought into play in the creation and maintenance of morale are those which tend towards the stabilisation of any group.

It is clear that group membership tends to enhance greatly the sense of personal power by seeing oneself multiplied in one's many fellow members (uniform, drill, etc.), all equipped with weapons further enhancing the sense of personal and group potency. This feeling would be reinforced by leader-prestige. In this sense even the tendency to submit to the authority of leaders is a help, for group solidarity has in it an important element of common devotion to a chief. The leader is indeed the focus point of group loyalty. Each member, through identification with him, has at least that quality uniting him with all other members. A leaderless group is a rabble.

Competence is another aspect of the sense of manly prowess, but more in the sense of technical pride in the control and mastery of weapons, technical equipment and tactics. This gives a sense of confident team work and is again much enhanced by the example of technical superiority of the leader. Competence and power presuppose a belief in the qualities of one's training, one's weapons and one's leadership.

The need of comradeship and solidarity is closely related to the status which one enjoys in the group and which the group itself enjoys in the eyes of others - rival groups or the nation itself. A man needs to be valued and appreciated for what he is doing and to believe that what he is doing is right and virtuous. He likes rewards and other marks of appreciation, especially from his leaders because that raises his self-esteem. Loss of the sense of being in the right and estimable is a serious matter. Further, the group must provide him with a sense of protection and security. He needs to feel that it will stand by him and do all it can for his well-being and safety. That also makes him feel he is valuable and of concern to someone. Dangers faced and completely overcome by the group yield further material for mutual ties of esteem and solidarity. It lies in the feeling of having seen each other with all the veneers off, each man as he really is.

It will be seen how much morale depends on the intelligent planning and personality selection of leadership, which is capable of acting as a good or bad authority, fostering or disturbing mutual respect and fellowship.

The group must obviously try to enhance the satisfaction of these needs and discourage the emergence of competing needs dangerous to group solidarity, status, sense of power and submission. This it attempts to achieve both by a legal code (military law) and by a set of moral prohibitions - a code of honour and tradition. Among the needs which fall into this category are the striving for personal safety, for individual satisfactions (home, family, business interests); the tendency to express hostility to the group; and the liability to displacement

2. The Wehrmacht as a Tribal Institution

This strange sub-title is chosen to emphasise the point of view stated in an earlier part that the essential bonds between members of groups are modelled on the pattern of the basic human social units: the family, clan or tribe. A man, in order to remain a co-operative member of any group, must be able to satisfy a variety of his needs within it. To illustrate this point by reference to the simplest human unit, the family, we can say that a member ideally receives satisfaction of the following needs: (a) love and valuation; (b) sustenance, shelter, clothing; (c) education, i.e. guidance and discipline, justice and authority meted out as punishments and rewards, encouragement; the handing on of tradition and parental wisdom; (d) companionship and a sense of "belonging"; (e) fun and games.

Some of these needs are satisfied by all the members of the family, while others clearly fall into the ken of the mother or the father, or of the brothers and sisters respectively. In a good home the individual member is likely spontaneously to return feelings of love, gratitude and solidarity; to give willing help and have a strong sense of loyalty, respect and also of freedom, knowing that his personal qualities are esteemed and that he can be himself, within the limits of the family discipline. In a bad home there may be discipline, but if it is enforced by fear, there will be a sense of injustice, favouritism, loneliness, unfairness, insecurity, suppressed or open rage and hate, inferiority and worthlessness, often overlaid by a false mask of good behaviour, a bogus facade in order to appease the parent. These platitudes have an obvious parallel in the life of military units and formations, under the broad headings of Administration and Welfare, Discipline and Training in all its aspects; Personnel matters - rewards, punishments, promotions, and the spirit of comradeship which grows up between men who share the same life for any length of time. Such headings, when reduced to simple human terms and stripped of administrative complexities due to the necessity of dealing with large numbers, really amount to the functions and relations in a family between the father, the mother and the children (more exactly, the brothers). That this equation is based on a psychological reality can be seen in such examples as a sovereign being called the father of his people (e.g. former Tsars of Russia, or Frederick the Great), or the already mentioned naval diary-writer who clearly felt the Kaiser to be his father when he addressed his sailors in Imperial Orders of the Day. Men who enter the armed forces do, as a matter of common observation, undergo a certain change. Hitherto responsible heads of families go back to school when they join the ranks and behave much more childishly; they lose something of their grown-up individuality.

It appears that the German Wehrmacht encourages this. They refer to their institution as a school, and we have seen that the young German male is on the whole pre-disposed by tradition, by family relations and by their joint effect on his character to regard this surrender to group life under authority as a virtue. It has for him the value of a tribal initiation, such as we find widespread among primitive peoples. The common feature of such rituals is that the boy, at adolescence, is subjected to a mock death or similar ordeal by the old men of the tribe, is sometimes deprived of a part of his anatomy (notably a tooth, a forelock, or his foreskin) to denote surrender of his person and, withdrawn from all feminine influence, eventually admitted as an equal. He is said to have given up his soul to an ancestral spirit in the shape of a monster or animal (called the Totem) who kindly restores it to him, and only then is he fit to be entrusted by his elders with the traditions of the tribe, and to approach women sexually. It is noteworthy that a candidate for the Wehrmacht has to fill in a complicated form in which, among other items, he has to declare that he is not a member of any secret society such as Freemasonry. He must belong to no other "Totem clan". The Army claims him exclusively. Hitler's regime has made much of the revival of the ancient traditions of the Teutonic knights, and the whole "myth" of "sacredness" of a youth's service bears an unmistakable resemblance to primitive tribal practices. The Nazi Brotherhood Castles (Ordonsburgen) are the holy places of initiation for the elect of the Party, while the Wehrmacht is to be the school of manhood for the mass. The entry of recruits is solemnised within a few days by taking the oath to Hitler, which is a special parade with colour and band. Before taking the oath they are instructed in its meaning and seriousness and also in the meaning of discipline and "superior officer". The likeness to "confirmation class" springs to mind. Thus even externally the German soldier is in a different world. Here the youth is to be forged into a man, vowing steadfast service unto death. We shall presently quote some instances of the attitudes of German youths which support this view.

This self-sacrifice call, away from mother's apron strings to the great brotherhood of arms and training at the hands of elders has thus quite an ancient pagan religious flavour. The sources from which German military morale draws its strength spring from the depths of human ancestor worship and custom. This is perhaps the most profound meaning of the Wehrmacht for a German - the sense that the individual has had to surrender his own soul and gets it handed back to him in a new form suitable for the "Great Spirit" of the Fathers.

"Our Fatherland is in us..... this secret something which fills the least among us as the noblest, this spiritual air which we breathe, precedes all institutions and gives life to all its forms."

"A German's life is nothing if it does not fulfil itself in the life of his people. His achievements, sacrifices, will and courage belong to this people..... If we are prepared to fulfil this obligation..... then we serve the values of all great Germans of the past, whose faith is our faith."
(Rudiger writing in a Party pamphlet, 1941.)

Perhaps it is not out of place to quote also the following sentence:

"The strength of this Idea is underestimated by our opponents."

In "The Golden Bough" Frazer says about the meaning of Totem initiations:

"That thought is the possibility of establishing a sympathetic relation with an animal, a spirit, or other mighty being, with whom a man deposits for safe-keeping his soul or some part of it and from whom he receives in return a gift of magical powers."

The task of Allied warfare would appear to be to persuade the German soldier that his soul is safer in his own keeping and that the magical power of his totem-brotherhood is an illusion.

How, in detail, does the Wehrmacht solve the problems of maintaining this spirit especially in conditions of war?

We must look more closely into the way in which membership of the Wehrmacht satisfies the needs of the German's personality; the kind of psychological satisfaction he hopes to get and mostly does get out of the service.

B. PATERNAL FUNCTIONS

AUTHORITY, POWER AND JUSTICE

In so patriarchal a culture as the German, this aspect of the Wehrmacht is in some ways the most obvious and important. It can be stated at the outset that the paternalism the soldier looks for is not wanting in the set-up of the Wehrmacht. It meets him from the moment of joining in the insistent demand for absolute obedience, in a rigid principle of subordination right to the highest levels, and in the chain of leadership. Rewards, punishments and certain aspects of welfare also come under this heading. The success of military training will, of course, largely depend on the quality of his leaders and the relation with them. It is not proposed to discuss it except to illustrate its human methods. Formal training is well and fully described elsewhere and its results can be directly observed in the field.

1. The Need for Status

Perhaps the first consideration is the question of status, i.e. of the regard which a soldier hopes to enjoy as the result of his membership of the Wehrmacht, as incorporating the German ideal of manliness, power, discipline and authority. Reasons have been shown to exist for the German to seek a milieu where esteem is derived from the rank one holds rather than from the sort of person one is. By identification with the corporate might of the Wehrmacht, individual prestige is pleasantly enhanced, if not created.

(a) The People's View

The tradition of the many times victorious Prussian army perfected since Frederick the Great's time has engendered the myth of invincibility for the land forces. The army is thought of by the people as its chief pride and embodiment of the national spirit and as a school for its young men in the kind of citizenship that their fathers want them to emulate. In this connection the relation between army and navy is practically the reverse of that which normally obtained in peace-time in this country, whilst the Luftwaffe (G.A.F.) occupies a position very similar to that of the R.A.F. in public esteem. Basically all three services are referred to as "our soldiers" and not very clearly separated as is the case in this country where the feeling about 'Jack Tar' is quite different from that about the 'Tommy'.

For example, in some of the recent newspaper articles about the following expressions:

"The German soldier, the expression of the mobilised German people's soul...."

"This soldier, with a unified inner control, with the nervous hardness of the highly trained warrior.....this stormer, his face passionately moved and formed by a mighty spiritual revolution.....the opponent has nothing to match this."

"Not armed citizens but the warrior sons of a revolutionary people."

Even the women have succumbed to this exaltation of the military spirit. To illustrate this, many girls in Germany are asking departing soldiers (not necessarily old friends) to give them a baby to be a son for the Fatherland. A mother writing of her little boy of six and his joining of the new type of boys' organisation, said:

"It was farewell to my little boy. However, it must come some day and he told me with pride that he liked this wild and warlike gym...your heart must quicken to know that you have a boy at home who is becoming a little soldier."

German taxpayers have not begrudged the enormous cost of providing all necessary facilities and establishments. At a time of apparent economic bankruptcy the Nazis found all the money they needed to reorganise the Wehrmacht on the most lavish scale. "Our boys must have it" was not a painful conclusion such as a British citizen might come to in time of war but the proud peace-time boast of a nation that regarded the equipment of its armed forces like a favourite daughter's dowry. There can be no doubt that the provision of barracks, training establishments, accoutrements and medical facilities, not to mention weapons and fighting equipment, were planned "regardless of cost". In war especially they make a distinction in rations and privileges between the "civilian" and the "soldier" which is to our mind phantastically one-sided. While the British people were cracking unkind jokes about "brass hats" and "Whitehall warriors", the Germans described their General Staff as "the first military leader-community of the world", as the real makers of German history and a model for every German. On these grounds alone, i.e. on the complete emotional identification of the majority of the German people with their armed forces, what young man would not enter this great privileged élite of his nation? The influence on morale must be very great.

(b) The Soldiers' View. The Wehrmacht, under Hitler, has endeavoured to preserve and in some respects to enhance its exclusive status above politics and all other interests, as a kind of state within the State, the bearer of its best traditions.

An interesting contrast in status can be provided by comparing the opening paragraphs of King's Regulations 1940 and the German "Defence Law" of 1935. The former states soberly that the Army consists of officers and men serving for various periods. The German equivalent says that "Military service is a service of honour for the German people." (Para. 1). "The Wehrmacht is the arms bearer and the soldierly school of the German people." (Para. 2). An early paragraph excludes criminals, enemies of the State and Jews from the service, designating such as "Wehrunwürdig," i.e. unworthy of military service. The High Command, which is really the Ministry of Defence (hereinafter alluded to as O.K.W.) takes precedence over all ministries except the Führer's Chancellery.

Soldiers are forbidden to take part in active politics, their membership of the Nazi Party or any of its associated organisations is held in suspense, and they are likewise not entitled to take part in public elections and voting. They may not join any societies or form associations within or without the Wehrmacht except by permission of the Commanders, and the same applies to marriage. They or the members of their household require the consent of the Superior Officer for the carrying on of a trade or other gainful secondary occupation whilst on the active list.

Against these limitations which, as we have seen, are not without attraction, is set the specific ruling that soldiers are to have preference in public and private places of employment over all other candidates, and that their return to civilian employment should carry no disadvantages.

A later paragraph deals with the exemptions, among which, in addition to various reserved occupations and hardship clauses, the functionaries of the Nazi Party are specially mentioned.

Officers and men, if non-Nazis or primarily identified with the Wehrmacht's point of view, frequently express sentiments dissociating themselves from specific atrocities which they say no soldier would do. "That is a job for these S.S. security people," even though no serious moral disapproval may be implied of the acts as such. In the main, there is a sense of chivalrous tradition, usually called "soldierly honour".

The regular soldiers are anxious to preserve their independent status and are apprehensive of the encroachment of political, i.e. Nazi, influence by the backdoor.

Here we shall not pursue this point any further nor turn to consider inter-service rivalries and splits. The essential conclusion it was intended to illustrate is the existence of an esprit de corps, of being soldiers as opposed to all other kinds of Germans, Party men and civilians, women included, and despite the general notion that "every German is a soldier".

Little need be added to emphasise that the Army at least considers itself to be the best in the world, and the German soldier a matchless fighter and gentleman. This naive pride can be heard expressed by all ranks and it is maintained even in the face of defeats and reverses. They are very touchy about their "soldierly honour" in captivity and both high and low like to feel that they are being chivalrously treated and are appreciative of such treatment. In response to military interrogators they reply: "I cannot answer; I am a German soldier." They like to feel that their opponents honour their "soldierliness". They are apt to be more hurt by slight to their rank than to person and greatly worried if taken unawares and improperly dressed. They take themselves and their soldiering very seriously and a number of them have been genuinely shocked when it was suggested that war was a form of national sport to them: "How can you say that? It is a most responsible and serious honour to die for the Fatherland."

In this connection may be mentioned the existence of administrative orders laying down the behaviour of troops in occupied countries and Italy. For example, in France:

"Each of you is a representative of the Reich.... behave decently.... you have come as friends.... severest penalties for ill-treatment or looting of civilians."

German soldiers going on leave in Italy (pre-surrender) must not crowd civilian trains. Troops travelling must not be seen on platforms or at carriage windows without tunic, cap or boots, but always properly dressed and sober. The guiding motive of such instructions is "not to lower the dignity of German arms."

(c) The Lure of Prestige. The need "to be somebody" though poorly equipped drives many a youth into the service. A father counselled his son (as related by him): "It's either prison for you or you make good in the Army." The man in question earned the Knights' Cross in the Luftwaffe.

"A soldier is honoured everywhere" said a young guttersnipe fellow from Gelsenkirchen who found this way of acquiring status easier than doing an honest day's work at the turner's bench.

A naval rating relates how when he was working as a civilian he used to gamble and drink. His girl's father objected to his marrying her, "but when later I appeared in uniform all at once I was one of the best." As already mentioned, it gets one over the awkward problem of standing on one's own merit without outward badge, uniform or title.

Young officer candidates accepted for the Wehrmacht are automatically excused their matriculation examination which some of them do not feel confident of passing. Two such said they felt intellectual light-weights, and that soldiering was the most honoured profession in the Reich.

Another type of man is clearly satisfying a need for status based on an urge to self-display, strutting and personal glory. He is driven by self-love, not by interest in others expressed in such ways, as following someone, obeying, or even beneficent ruling. The self is the centre - the important figure in the smartly cut uniform to be admired against a suitable background of military might. Such a man, if also intelligent, can be styled a careerist, usually unscrupulous. We have encountered him among some officer types. It is, however, true to say that this type of conceit and need to pose usually conceals an underlying uncertainty or inferiority.

A subsidiary form of self-love, much more familiar to us, is that of the young man who joins because of the cult of bodily fitness - the army as a cheap "keep fit" club, but not otherwise particularly liked.

E. G. A Prussian P.O., aged 25, was the youngest son of a well-off baker and was supposed to inherit the business. His chief interest was sport and he liked cutting a figure at diving, running and gym. He therefore not only avoided joining any political parties but even the company of girls, and spent his spare time in sport clubs. He thought baking would be bad for his lungs (what with dust and damp heat), so he joined the navy. Here he tried to qualify as a P.T.

instructor. Otherwise he took little interest, kept himself rather apart, and despised the merry sailor lads who "used to get swine". He was an unusually intelligent, fastidious, crinkly-haired young man with a cynical detachment from the "common herd", dislike of discipline and considerable personality considering his past and background.

A number of airmen of similar type who joined for swank and the satisfaction of purely self-admiring tendencies were also found, especially among the fighter pilots.

There is no doubt that Hitler's motto for German youth: "Tough as leather, hard as steel, fleet as a greyhound" has had considerable influence among the young and stimulated a "pride of the flesh". They are very obsessed with physical fitness and have gone in for sport in their usual earnest way. No environment provided such easy means of satisfying the new worship of bodily prowess as the Wehrmacht where unquestionably a good time could be had in peacetime by any young fellow.

(d) Attitudes towards Civilians

The civilian's deference to the soldier has already been alluded to and there has been very little evidence that this feeling has undergone much change during the war. Now and again stories percolate of friction or other trouble, but the interesting part of such stories is always the soldier's point of view, i.e. of moral outrage that civilians have permitted themselves the unheard-of insolence of claiming privileges or criticising the Forces. Thus some sailors at Hamburg beat up a civil policeman for daring to interfere with their drunken progress through the street, and the naval authorities saw to it that "he did not dare to put in an official complaint." In the same town they wrecked a tobacconist's shop for refusing to serve them "as his stock was reserved for regular customers and had they not better go and win the war?" Nevertheless, Hamburg is preferred because the civilians are nice and polite to sailors, get off the pavement and offer their seats in the trams. "In Keil things are very bad - the civilians take no notice of you; they crowd the places of amusement so that a sailor cannot get in." The same complaint was made about a theatre at Weimar that soldiers on leave could not get a good seat, and somewhere else wounded men had to stand in the circle while civilians bagged the accommodation. An Air Force man complains that people pull faces when soldiers enter their train compartment and "one man had the cheek to ask how it was that the British were flying over Germany."

A fairly typical story, illustrating the view which a soldier has of his rights, is the following: A corporal voices his contempt for the fellows at home. He had returned from the Russian front and went to the local food office to get his leave ration cards. Arriving at 12.20 he found the counter was closing at 12.30 and a long queue of women was waiting. "I immediately went to the head of the queue. The women began to grumble. I got my cards, but exactly at 12.30 the counter was closed and the women sent home. So they began to grumble again and I naturally saw them off the premises."

Another typical story is one told by an Austrian naval lieutenant who, whilst on leave, found his flat on the requisitioned list for bombed-out evacuees. "I immediately went to the police wearing my full uniform." There was an ugly exchange of words, the clerk finally saying: "Well, you should be thankful you are at the front." The officer said: "We can change places." The clerk: "Don't forget I am a Party member." The officer: "I don't give a damn - I am a lieutenant in the Wehrmacht." The clerk meekly: "Then for the moment we'll leave the question of requisitioning your home." The officer: "Requisition! You may be able to requisition the property of Jews, but not the home of a German officer!" For this purpose the officer, moreover, not only wore his best uniform but also put on a special "Reich"-German accent for greater penetrating power.

Perhaps the most remarkable tale is one related by some PsW about a fastidious well-dressed woman in a café who objected to two badly wound-disfigured airmen sitting near her and called the manager to have them moved. An army officer who witnessed the scene advanced on her and shot her dead on the spot. He was later exonerated from all blame by the authorities.

If this is the attitude taken up as a matter of course towards their own civilians, it is not surprising that they deal even more firmly with the inhabitants of occupied countries.

"If any Greeks got at all cheeky or out of hand General S. had them all hanged. A very smart fellow - plenty of go!" (A naval officer.)

"If, as a German soldier, you wanted a flat at Thorn (Poland) and Poles lived there - well, they just had to get out." (A sergeant, G.I.F.)

"People at Gdynia were herded at a moment's notice to the railway station. That's how it was done and that's how it should be done." (A naval Lt. Comdr.)

2. Authority and Submission

The appeal to manliness represented by military service is directed towards a very vulnerable aspect of a German's character. By it he signals the rejection of his dependence on his mother, but in so doing submits himself, with awe and respect, to the stern paternal authority. A nice mental trick presents this surrender as a fine masculine thing to do, lets him bask in the reflected glory of his superiors and in the hope of recouping himself at the expense of his inferiors, while participating in the exhilaration of collectively owning and managing great engines of power and destruction.

(a) The Appeal of Power

In addition to the sense of irresistible, almost superhuman power which is felt to dwell in the mighty unity of the armed forces, the recruit for the Wehrmacht also felt other attractions. These are the promise of control over human beings and the feeling of power over machines. Both these are usually called by German soldiers "responsibility", in direct allusion to being the strong man who can be trusted.

The attraction of working and controlling powerful mechanisms - tanks and aircraft especially - has a strong appeal in the present era, and the armed forces offer much greater opportunities for it than civil life except to a few individuals (civil pilots, steam-hammer or train drivers, etc.). The destructive impulse to knock things down is a well-known propensity of the young which is added to the general fun of command over a great mechanism. The consciousness of killing is not admitted; it is just "action" and so less guilty. Among German youth the cult of mechanics had reached a very advanced stage, making the distinguished German philosopher, Count Keyserling, write disapprovingly: "We are living in the epoch of the chauffeur." (1929 approx.) The Hitler Youth have full scope to this "chauffeur urge" by establishing various special organisations, no doubt fully aware of the military importance of such pursuits. The ordinary Hitler Youth played games of war with model guns and weapons. The National Socialist Glider Youth learnt to build and control aircraft, and the N.S. Motor Corps the use of motor-cycles and cars on the largest and most "democratic" scale. The motive for becoming a peacetime technical soldier, first stimulated by membership of one of these bodies, has been found frequently in the stories of PsW of all social classes. Psychological research has established beyond doubt that this form of obsession with machines is based on the wish to be as strong as the father of one's early memories.

In this connection there has been interesting evidence of the reassuring value the mere sight or possession of weapons gives them. German paratroops are reported by one of their commanders to feel safer if they are holding a rifle while jumping. The naval diarist quoted in Part I has an entry for 1917, describing his fear and apprehension resulting from the entry of the U.S. into the war. He continues: "Suddenly a Zeppelin flies over with thundering noise! Away are all my gloomy thoughts and sadness of spirit. Come often, oh Zeppelin, and chase my gloomy thoughts away! What seemed a moment ago so heavy and depressing has now become so light and rises so airily and victory-certain into the scented realm of phantasy."

This passage leaves little doubt of the symbolic role of armed power in the unconscious life of the German.

The wish to have control over other human beings was also found as an avowed reason for becoming a soldier. This urge predominates among young officers and N.C.Os. and is usually idealised under the guise of "the beauty of having younger people under one's care." We have had evidence of this motive in a young pilot, but it is well to quote some further cases.

A good type of regular officer of the Air Force, aged 30, spoke of the "privilege of educating young men" - but God forbid that he should have had to do it as a schoolmaster! He recalled with a shudder his own start in life as a bank clerk before Hitler came to power and stressed that the Germans were a "soldierly people".

Another young officer, who was rather apologetic about the German "warrior spirit" as a national characteristic which he could not explain, stated that he joined the Wehrmacht because he wanted to lead and influence youth. He also ridiculed the suggestion that this could be better done in civilian life.

This group demonstrates not only the need for special status, but also another aspect of becoming equal with father through identification by gaining influence and the power to mould the lives of those under one - an urge capable of developing in a good or in an evil direction. We shall be able to see to what varying use this power has been put in the officer/man relationship. The worship of corporate might, with complete absence of any consideration or scruple, is illustrated by the remarks of many German soldiers who only know one way of asserting authority, e.g.

"People in Norway would have killed us. We have treated them too well."
(Air Force officer.)

"The Dutch have a terrific respect for us; after all we laid Rotterdam waste in 20 minutes."

The speakers quite honestly expect the victims to share their own conviction of the finality of this valuation of force, about which there is no more to be said. They also take it for granted that their captors are restrained by the same considerations and prompted by the same outlook.

"Don't fear that the English will shoot us if the balloon goes up.

They are much too afraid of us."

(b) The Spirit of Obedience

There is another side to the attractiveness of the Wehrmacht as a patriarchal institution, closely allied to the striving to become a man. That is the already discussed tendency to submit - the passive element in the German's makeup which results from his early training and which is satisfied by seeking service in an authoritarian milieu. This is illustrated by many men's statements:

"Only if there is cadaver-obedience (sic) will there be complete success. All German soldiers accept this." (A naval engine-room artificer.)

"If I were ordered to dive with my aircraft on to the deck of a battleship I should do it without a murmur." (A dive-bomber officer pilot. This was another rather "spoilt boy" type.)

"It is in us to like obedience and discipline; I gladly surrendered my freedom and found fulfilment in the service." (A senior P.O., Navy.)

The urge to this form of submission is often spontaneous, as for example: A leading stoker, aged 24, the only son of a retired railway guard and alternately spoilt and beaten, developed a love of drill and war games such as formed the staple activities of the Hitler youth and was expelled from school because this organisation was forbidden during the Weimar régime. He was pleased as he was now free to join the Navy as soon as possible. He enthused about the beauty of becoming a soldier which, he said, taught young good-for-nothings obedience and self-command. "Before they re-introduced conscription youngsters in Germany used to push old women off the pavements. When they are soldiers they become men and learn the duties of responsibility and chivalry. It was wonderful how Frederick the Great had addressed his soldiers as "Men"; this seemed such an honour. The Führer, knowing the weakness of Germans, decided he must make them hard and steadfast like the English and therefore instituted his propaganda service." (It must be added that all this was said with the utmost earnestness.)

P.s. have also described the training to obedience which consists in the N.C.O. instructor giving senseless orders that have to be responded to without question. A man may be pulled out of bed, told to dress, deliver something and return. He may then be inspected minutely to see that he had dressed properly according to regulations and receive punishment if, e.g., he had kept his night clothes on under his uniform.

Training instructions also harp on the necessity of "forcing the will" of the recruit to extreme exertion, until he becomes a ready instrument in the hands of his leader.

(c) Discipline

Discipline is sometimes confused with morale. On closer examination it is clear that these two can vary independently. Discipline can be only an outer husk, concealing bad morale; conversely certain types of soldiers are impatient of discipline and make a poor showing on inspection but prove their individual and group morale in action. The discipline which is based on good morale is stable and voluntary. Otherwise discipline is a tense, wooden, lifeless thing, usually the product of fear. German military discipline is much more thorough-going and severe in some respects than British and does not admit of deviation by the men

from its standards. This is in conformity with the different underlying views on the value of the individual, the claim of the group and indeed the whole psychology of authority which has received our attention. The men's discipline has a quality of earnestness, tenseness and something undefinable which can only be described as submissiveness. It is a mixture of subservience also implying devotion, and conveying the impression that they do it gladly, with a kind of artificiality and sheepishness. This respectful deference is also shown towards their captors in the majority of cases.

German officers nevertheless frequently bemoan the fact that discipline is not what it was in the good old days and advocate greater severity. They are themselves great sticklers for "correctness" of their own bearing. It was a revelation to both officers and men to find a British officer thanking his orderly for some service and our men greeting their officers with a cheery smile and "Good morning" when saluting. Their own discipline is deliberately based on awe (which contains the element of fear), and it seems to work, as severity conforms with the German idea of authority. To smile under circumstances of "showing respect" would be most improper.

Saluting is rigidly carried out between all ranks, all the time and everywhere. The intention is that members of the Wehrmacht shall always recollect their allegiance, obedience and comradeship. The Hitler greeting is used indoors. Valiant efforts have been made to make this discipline intelligible and to humanise it. The success of these measures is doubtful, as accounts are confusing. We find the voices of old-timers decrying the new-fangled ideas and saying that discipline is going to the dogs, that the officers are soft, e.g. a sergeant pilot:

"Our officers have forgotten what it is like to act with iron determination."

The new "humanitarian" wind is also suspect as applied to such things as C.Rs. travelling in higher railway classes at their own expense, common messing etc. "There should be the proper distance."

Perhaps the most typical manifestations of German discipline are to be found in the early training of recruits. This period is commonly referred to as "grinding" (schleifen) and concerning this period the men use the same sheepish grin as they have when telling about their fathers' chastisements. "You are certainly put through it but it does you good - puts you on your mettle." That it corresponds to the needs and expectations of the men themselves is shown by the following fragment of a "case history", by no means isolated:

An A/B, native of Lübeck, aged 24 and characterless, envied his sister for being more spoilt at home than himself. He had volunteered for the Navy in 1937 and described his recruit training with enthusiasm bordering on ecstasy. "Nobody comes out as they went in - you are a soldier, not one of those pampered louts who hang about dance halls with long manes. It was my happiest time of life to be put through it and made into a man." etc. Joining the Navy meant being a man, which he had not felt before.

Shirkers or slow men have a very bad time by British standards. Some of the punishments within the drill N.C.O.'s power are: press-ups, crawling across the parade ground on all fours, "knees-bend" with rifle held in front and arms outstretched horizontally, repeating "I am a soldier, I do it gladly. I like being a soldier." In one town where recruits were being "broken in" women watching became so angry that they threatened to hound the officer in charge from the place. The soldier relating the story said: "Of course, civilians are not supposed to see our training." One is reminded again of the ordeals during the initiatory rites which women must not witness.

Apart from a small number of individualists who are usually anti-authoritarians, it does not seem wrong to the majority; "it is what one expects."

In the field, discipline is very severe and stories of immediate and summary shootings for trivial breaches are common. Thus, a lance corporal relates a story about an officer in his unit who reported to his C.O. that a certain order could not be executed. "It must be done!" was shouted at him. "But it can't be done," replied the officer, whereupon he was shot then and there and the matter closed. The value of strict, unquestioning obedience from the earliest days of training upon which the Wehrmacht insists, is best demonstrated under the stress of certain types of action. When "drill" has sunk into the subconscious, the automatic response to orders which it provides relieves the soldier from decisions and uncertainty. He reacts automatically following a previously instilled pattern. There is plenty of evidence that the German soldier realizes this function of discipline and accepts it. It is also true that in doing so he satisfies a characteristically German

psychological need to be dominated - there is, therefore, no lack of voluntary assent to a discipline, the harshness of which would not be tolerated by the average British soldier. There are few soldiers who admit to finding fault with such a system, though others grumble at the inhumanity, especially as there appears to be a tendency to take it out of timid, more sensitive men. Special orders and lectures are given to counteract this severity. The authorities seem in doubt as to the right line. Fatherly, considerate dealing, with emphasis on benevolence, due weighing of good intentions etc. is counselled, and the old "Prussian" type of disciplinarian is officially discouraged, but tradition is strong. Instructions usually have a confusing mixture of humanity and counsel of "no softness" in their contents. The powers of commanders are wide. A company commander can order a man to be shot at the front. A sergeant can inflict what would seem to us very humiliating punishments. It seems as if certain modern tendencies, in line with the Nazi policy of favouring the small man, backed by welfare officers and perhaps also by the Wehrmacht's psychological advisers, have tried to take the part of the under-dog in awareness of the negative effects of a wooden, inhuman discipline, but that the old rigid spirit is far from dead, and is gaining ground.

The basic German character reveals itself especially with the mounting shortage of man-power and the emergence of less well trained leaders.

It is worth recording the points on which discipline is especially severe and those on which it is indulgent.

Desertion, absence without leave, refusal of duty rank above violence in the list of crimes. Untidiness, improper turn-out, stealing from a comrade, all forms of insubordination, self-mutilation (which by extension covers nearly all "simulation" or malingering), are rated very bad in practice.

In theory drunkenness, having a woman in barracks or billet, scrounging from civilians are equally bad, but in practice these are often overlooked and excused. The emphasis is, in brief, on those crimes which lower the internal loyalties, but the soldier can do pretty well what he likes outside the brotherhood, especially in occupied and enemy countries. Much weight is, however, given to keeping up the dignity of the Wehrmacht before outsiders, as in dress and neatness, i.e. in appearances. Grumbling about service matters is regarded as the natural right of every soldier, so long as he does his duty.

(d) Relations between Leaders and Led

This is perhaps the crux of all morale problems, in view of the authoritarian nature of the organisation. Here the father-son relation comes into full play. We must try and see by what means the attempt is made to enlist the positive love feelings of the soldier and to banish hostile, negative impulses, bearing in mind what the authoritarian character expects.

*Farago's summary of the psychological ideas underlying the modern Wehrmacht's man-management system is borne out by official manuals, instructional literature and pronouncements that have fallen into our hands.

Personal talks with what must be considered very good types of PW officers, some of anti-Nazi views, show that the reliance on severity governs the attitudes of the German officers towards their men, although exceptions prove the rule. The most rigid and stern attitudes are on the whole found in the Army and in the large units of the Navy. This policy is based on their view, as leaders, of the qualities of human beings. A young, exceptionally talented regular artillery officer, admittedly of ancient lineage, bred in the tradition of his land-owning and military forbears, distinguished sharply between the qualities required in officers and men, which he stated was orthodox teaching among his elders of the influential school.

"No soldier will do more than is necessary to keep him out of trouble. Even the N.C.O's. are lazy. Fear must be the basis of authority. A man must be so dominated by his leader that he fears him more than the enemy. I do not admit the slightest deviation from duty. An officer is there to find and correct faults and slackness. Nobody should be praised - the standard is set so high that it is never attained, so there is no

* "German Psychological Warfare", Ed. by L. Farago for the Committee for National Morale, New York, 1944.

occasion for praise. A C.O. may say 'I received quite a favourable impression of your company.' Or an officer may have a man who has done very well out before the ranks as an example to show the others. But if he does so he should say: 'This time he has done it right, better look at him.' Then the man will know he has done well but without feeling there is any certainty that he will succeed again unless he tries very hard. Praise makes a good man feel he can relax a bit. For that reason also promotion to N.C.O. often ruins a keen man.

At the front men will only face the enemy because they have a chance of not being hit, whereas they know that the officer's pistol will certainly hit them. Of course, there are exceptional idealists who know what they are fighting for. But the common soldier, the 'Tommy', has no business to know, only to obey."

This same officer also asserted that political indoctrination and the "pop" talk were "all rot"; it all depended on the personality of the officer whether men would follow him. He laid down the requirements of the leader as follows:

- (i) He must look after his men's needs.
- (ii) Be able to do all the men's duties better than themselves and to answer all their queries authoritatively and correctly.
- (iii) Do all they do in action. Men will follow where he leads for they would assume there must be a chance of success if he does it.
- (iv) Therefore he must be fearless for he alone knows that he must sometimes lead them into danger they do not expect.
- (v) They must be sure that he is duly considerate of their lives. They can soon tell whether he squanders life or conducts his operations with minimum and justified loss.

This officer has had wide experience of training regiments, front line service in Russia and Tunisia, and states that on this basis of leadership he was popular and his old men write to him even after a year.

The men are always aware if an officer is inefficient or gets flurried because he is uncertain. Especially with the newer war-time intakes of educated and intelligent men, criticism is severe and the German soldier loses no chance of exposing his officer's weaknesses during "question time" in training. If in these circumstances he loses his temper and attempts thereby to restore his authority, then "of course, the men will obey and stop their questioning, but they will know he is bogus."

"The very new officer is forgiven early battle fears and seasoned soldiers will help him if they judge he will be good stuff later. The persistently windy officer is a menace and the unit he commands will not hold together."

This brief exposé of the German officer's traditional point of view cannot be bettered by other examples, but many officers have contributed touches providing further light on their point of view.

The officers as a whole accept and approve messing out of a common kitchen with the men, equality of canteen services and the sharing of hardships. In practice these criteria are often not observed: many of them shirk going on route marches, leaving these to N.C.Os. or else driving or riding along while their men are slogging it. This is not contrary to orders but contrary to the spirit which the Wehrmacht has tried to instil and which the above quoted gunner officer represents. Privileges in leave, canteen-wares, etc. are also abused a good deal.

The greater number of officers insist on maintaining distance. The men, they say, feel uneasy and despise officers who are always trying to ingratiate themselves, and it is said to be no road to popularity. This is confirmed by the men. An engine-room artificer in a U-boat said: "The C.O. always addressed us as 'My comrades!' But he was the strictest officer I have ever known. He held the crew together."

The young officer is supposed to develop his critical faculty and may express unorthodox opinions, and "the smarter he is the more he does it." Yet many fail in this virtue according to informants at all levels. The general atmosphere of discipline and obedience is against it. The men's criticism is limited to question time during training.

A major of Flak, who began his career as a Prussian police officer and was transferred to the Wehrmacht on the embodiment of his force, expressed the following sentiments:

"The Austrians got on much better with their men from the human point of view than we did. It was always our (the Prussians') worst side that was brought out by our men!"

He was contemptuous of his men: the rising generation were all slack and lazy. Even the N.C.Os. would not wash their tropical kit though they were by the sea. He believed in the "old fashioned" discipline (his age was 35) and no concessions. He thought the trouble with Germans was that they were too humane and dispassionate in their dealings with the enemy or with their own men. He would put them all on the spot. Then came the interesting statement: "It looks to me as if my men let me down on purpose, the swine! No D.R. to tell me where my W/T station had moved to!" This same fire-eater was pathetically, though falsely, deferential on capture and proved to have practically no moral courage. He was a convinced Nazi and was one of the "new type" of officer, promoted from police ranks. He also believed in astrological prophecy. Against these two examples of a common, indeed orthodox attitude of officers towards their subordinates, may be cited those who have attempted to practise the doctrine of the "officer as the soldier's friend." An infantry lieutenant expressed the view that "officers exist for the men." The outward discipline is preserved but the spirit must be cordial, benevolent and understanding. An officer must be the parent-substitute for his men, know their circumstances and their troubles, share their food and their hardships. The hard Prussian type is said to be officially frowned upon.

In policy-making circles it is realised that this produces the best results.

A naval officer said:

"I have always found a better response to orders when they are explained than to a peremptory command. Over severe officers, especially rankers, are looked upon with disfavour in the Navy."

A German General holds the view that the company commander is the key man of an army.

"In a company there are ten per cent. of real soldiers. The rest follow the crowd. When these few are lacking the company goes to pieces. If there is a first class company commander who grips his men - well and good. The battalion commander can do a little, but the real man is the company commander. The élite troops do not know this. I have had company commanders in my corps who hadn't even fired a training course. How can you expect such men to prepare their companies for attack?"

One reason for the ineffectiveness of the field officer as a living force to the rank and file is that he is not considered able or obliged to get to know his men. The men have often confirmed that they seldom if ever saw anybody above their company or equivalent commanders, beyond which level officers are shadowy figures of awe in the background who blow in and blow everybody up - a dreaded occasion for all in the company.

In U-boats, now the most important and live arm in the Navy, officer/man relationship varies. In the close and intimate social group which a confined ship's company is bound to be relationships are in the main friendly and there are no superior officers to interfere with this comradely spirit. On return to base there are joint celebrations, the commander thanks his crew and there is general fraternisation, to the "surprise of the Base Commandant." Others remain more aloof and tend to squeeze the men in matters of petty discrimination re leave, fatigues etc., while generally not slow to take privileges themselves. The officers have a separate ward-room.

In the Luftwaffe the flying crews seem to have very close relations, but the officers and men of ground organisations fall into the above pattern except that technical duties necessitate greater informality.

Even in the Army off-duty relations may be friendly and informal. The familiar German "du" (thou) is sometimes used, parties of officers and men hold joint celebrations in which ranks mix freely. The "old school" (to which quite young officers may belong in spirit) are as a rule stand-offish and unadaptable. From the men's point of view the difference between being ridden over rough-shod and treated without humanity on the one hand and being handled with benevolence on the other is very clear. Their expectations in this respect are ludicrously modest as compared with British standards. Most resentment is always unleashed at "unfair

privileges" of officers, themselves breaking the rules they impose on their men. They get leave when the men do not, they smuggle food out of theatres of operations or ships to their families but prevent men from doing the same. Another thing which the German soldier resents is the improper conduct of those whom he regards as symbols of order and examples of good behaviour. "In Paris whole streets were full of officers' cars in front of brothels where drunken officers mingled with soldiers." Officers who ordered them to hold positions while they themselves disappeared are also a source of anger.

Contempt for the incompetent, ill-educated officer who gives himself airs, perhaps on strength of his Party membership, is widespread. "All the wrong people are promoted." "Utter swine! Should have a bullet in his back." The uppish youngsters who come from the officers' schools are tolerated. "They soon settle down. The overbearing type usually fails in action and loses his head. The quiet decent man is the best." "Officers have to be decent to make their men do things for their sakes in action."

Rommel, criticised by his peers and by junior officers, was adored by the men because he would come and chat, ask for men's grievances and then, to their delight, blow up officers in front of the men.

The readiness of captured soldiers to denounce and vilify their officers in general is perhaps significant, showing the latent renegade feelings stored up against authority. One man was delighted with a British newspaper caption: "General's son peels potatoes." "These things are much better organised in England!" was his comment.

A corporal thought it was common men like him, who fought and died for their country, that made Germany - "not those who get commissions and cushy jobs." The German soldier is not slow to perceive bogusness and bad leadership or to appreciate good officers. A sergeant of an anti-tank unit described the visit of a divisional General whom he called "a stupid fool who had no idea of anything." This General had expressed the hope that the British would come soon "as every man with a gun like ours was like a fortress."

That such a volume of hostile, deprecating criticism (of which only a few examples are given) is expressed, shows not that the relationship between leaders and led is bad in action, but that a fund of negative feeling exists which comes to the top on release from discipline. Stories are beginning to come in of men actually shooting the die-hard type of officer who leads them into impossible situations.

N.C.Os., Sergeant-Majors, etc. come in for much less criticism except by the officers. The men trust them more generally and they seem to be more considerate. Several opinions as to their function were expressed by such N.C.Os.

"It is no good being a martinet. You have to treat your men as individuals, encourage them and see that they don't get inferiority feelings. That bend or break stuff is no good."
(Sgt. Major.)

"I was strict but popular because I tried to enter into my men's minds." (C.P.O.)

"Each boy had to be tackled differently. Some were real frightened mother's chicks; if one had used nothing but severity one would have made them doubt themselves. Others had to be tackled with constant strictness or they become slack." (Bosun.)

"The men used to come and confide their private and political worries to me; one had to be prepared to give them a bit of wisdom." (Bosun, Minelayer.)

Personal observation has been convincing that, in the actual handling of their men, the N.C.Os. really have adopted the "new spirit" proclaimed in the Wehrmacht by the Party. Their faults are petty advantages, subservience and over-conscientiousness. N.C.Os. frequently think they are fitter people for commissions than those who get them. In the main, their attitude is very dependent on orders from above. "If those above us are inefficient how can they expect us to know what to do?" With regard to leadership they are, in general, more "motherly" and in regard to insubordination they behave much as the men and express the same grievances and criticisms of their officers.

A captured lecture-script to welfare officers by a German Air Force psychiatrist whose appointment specifies that he is responsible for morale policy and welfare in an Air Command shows that officer/man relationship is a live problem in the German forces. This lecturer warns his hearers against creating an atmosphere of distrust and sullenness owing to authority being wielded by hectoring

N.C.Os. and officers ("sometimes even of higher rank" he hints cautiously) who have grown too big for their boots and who use discipline without bothering to know the men and their problems.

The importance of crime and dereliction of duty in a unit as an index of bad leadership is clearly stressed. "We want to achieve (implying it has not yet been achieved) a human atmosphere between leaders and men.....It is easy to help a man in difficulties.....if a man is granted an interview to unburden his soul.....such help can gain for the superior officer the confidence of his entire unit.....Thoughtlessness and ill will (of the men) are not always the only motives." (It is implied that many leaders think it is because the man is a soldier.) "Simultaneously with confidence in their superior officers the men gain the will to resist and a steadiness which uproots in advance all symptoms of disintegration." The lecturer next placates the opposition by saying:

"Such sympathetic understanding is not to be confused with unmilitary softness. The superior officer is not a rubbish dump for every trifle. Training to mental toughness must run hand in hand with inner benevolence. Authority and discipline remain the foundations of military life. The practical application of psychological welfare is compulsion tempered with humanity."

"It is remarkable how many people who have once been set on the right path repay a strict but essentially kind superior officer with years of respect and gratitude - even if he was forced.....to administer severe punishment."

In view of the tendency of German superiors vis à vis their subordinates to become excitedly angry and blustering, the lecturer also suggests "No signs of exasperation, and guarding against petty moralising."

Stern measures and repeated punishments lead, in "certain types" only, to damming-up of emotion which is then explosively discharged in further acts of unprovoked aggressiveness.

This point of view, which is psychologically sound, shows the continued necessity of persuading officers to be human and confirms the fact that unduly severe handling is a cause of fall in morale. We have already seen the evidence of it in the hostile attitudes of men for inhuman superiors.

It remains to say that a little elementary kindness evokes in POW a quite surprising degree of emotional response. Some diary entries of a captured officer show how a British captain is described as a "kind, fatherly friend." "I was quite sad at leaving the camp. Our dear Captain J. had been so good to us, quite like a father." "He has not been to see us for five days; has he forgotten us? We miss him terribly." This about an interrogator who was wise enough to take advantage, in the interests of the Service, of this strong craving of the average German for a good father.

Summing up, it is clear that the officer-man relationship rests almost entirely on the feeling of boss and underling, with little question of human equality. If the latter exists it is as a concession, a surprising gift. The German officer, even when he feels benevolent, is at pains to put on the authoritative, stern mask and fears to become human as that would be interpreted by his subordinates as weakness. Constant pressure, insistence on duty and subservience, an unattainable standard and hence a scarcity of praise are his methods. The recognition that men are men leads in the majority of cases mainly to consideration of animal comforts, an appeal through the stomach. Among senior officers the topic of man management has receded completely into the background. The burden of human relationship rests on the N.C.O. class and on certain officers with whose duties we shall deal in the section on welfare.

A commanding Officer, already quoted, holds this motto which he put for us into broken English: "Show severe - no joking - everybody is afraid," as his recipe for leadership. He was the same man who "needed a hold" himself, to save him from utter pessimism.

(c) Punishments and Rewards

(i) Punishments. The avowed principle of all German officers is that a man can best be taught good behaviour if the consequences of his failings are made too unpleasant for him. An interesting sidelight on the place which punishment holds in the German soldier's mind is thrown by an example quoted in the above mentioned psychiatrist's lecture.

Dealing with the attitude to be adopted towards backward men he urges that they should not be frightened by their comrades' remarks such as: "They'll chop your head off for that," because the dull-wit may take this seriously and run away or even kill himself. The same precautions have to be taken, he says, in the case of "sensitive" people who are over-conscientious and who by excessive severity of handling will be driven to despair and possible self-destruction. Incidentally, the suicide rate (pre-war) in Germany was four times that of England and Wales.

The military law code as such does not differ materially from that of the British Army. What appears to be peculiar is the frequency with which it is invoked. It contains clauses, inserted by Hitler's personal orders, that crimes arising out of "dishonourable mentality" should not have the advantages of "honourable detention" in a fortress. Otherwise the influence of the Nazi régime appears to be an attempt to minimise the hurting of the self-respect of men.

The interest, from our point of view, centres largely on disciplinary punishments, as against real criminal proceedings.

Many soldiers seem to grumble against the arbitrariness and the triviality of offences for which punishments are administered in the field. "These gentlemen think they are still in the barrack square." "Officers can get away with it, but we are put up before Courts Martial for stealing a packet of biscuits." A PW, admittedly a disgruntled man with good reasons for being an anti-Nazi, related that in North Africa the following cases occurred within his personal ken: A man was shot at his company commander's orders for stealing a chicken. Another man was shot for being two hours late after retreat. A third man, holder of the Iron Cross, 1st Class, and with long desert service, was irritable and struck a N.C.O. who "interfered" in the servicing of a lorry. He was shot two hours later on the company commander's orders. Even on home service a man who was absent without leave for 24 hours was sentenced to eight years' detention with hard labour. "The only question asked is: 'How did he behave in the last engagement against the enemy?' If he was not very good he is shot."

Idlers are singled out for all the unpleasant jobs. The worst humiliation, and one described gleefully by an elderly reserve officer, is condemnation to latrine cleaning; this, and extra guards and pack-drill, soon bring them to heel. But they are also talked to in a fatherly way by the C.S.M. ("Spieß") of whom more will be heard. The other men, continues the informant, take pleasure in bullying such men who are morally boycotted.

Now this idler type may sometimes be an ill man. According to several good sources, a man has to be completely prostrate before he is sent to the M.O., who usually returns him to duty. A soldier of the Panzer Grenadiers was behaving peculiarly in Russia; he was absent-minded, failed to salute, lost his kit etc. after many months of front line duty. Seen by a M.O., he was called "perfectly normal" but recommended for transfer to France. Here his strange conduct continued, whereupon he was sent to a penal company.

Penal companies are a means of utilising the services of officers and men with bad records. In it are found both political and ordinary defaulters. The idea is that a man may expiate his crime by good conduct in the face of the enemy. They are all demoted and wear no insignia of rank, though services are still distinguished. The men are unarmed and carry out suicide tasks, such as minefield clearance under shellfire. The 25 per cent. who survive some 20 to 25 such assignments are "redeemed" and reinstated after transfer to another unit, to "try again". These units have largely supplanted detention barracks, such as the dreaded naval prison at Heligoland. The barracks are used as depots for the penal companies.

In peace-time there existed an institution midway between these two. It was called euphemistically Special Unit and described as an educational, not a penal establishment. It was used for those whose bearing, either on recruitment or later was found to be detrimental to a unit. This meant "criminals, psychopaths (an elastic term which in Germany includes individualists and opponents of the régime), self-mutilators, men who were to be rehabilitated after serving prison sentences", etc. These places still exist but under the name of "Test Camps" (Prüfungslager). Before a man is sent there the ordinary disciplinary powers of a C.O. and all other attempts at education and influence must have been exhausted. A G.O.C.'s decision is necessary. The staffs are specially selected from model N.C.O.s. The camps are used for men who repeatedly commit the same crimes. Service is of the severest: no rest days, no leave, confinement to barracks, no alcohol, no tobacco, and specially hard arrest for any default. This set-up is described in a captured document, analogous to an A.C.I., followed by an appreciation of its good results in reclaiming a high percentage of the men after three months of "grinding" when they are said to be well behaved, keen and

especially good at drill. If this fails, then the chronically undisciplined are handed to the police to be sent either to a concentration camp or to a mental home. In the mean time they have also been reduced in rank and lost their "Wehrwürde", i.e. their worthiness to bear arms. This deprivation, as the analogous degradation of officers by a Court of Honour, is in itself considered the greatest moral punishment a German soldier can suffer. Loss of rank is another. Whereas it is not unusual in the British Army, it is widespread in the German forces. A whole U-boat's company, including the commander, were reduced and sent to a penal company for refusal to put to sea. A full colonel, commanding a regiment, was arraigned before a Court Martial because, after being surrounded in Russia for three days, he lost half his vehicles when he fought his way out. He was acquitted, but said:

"After that, when I saw the Knight's Cross hanging at the end of such-and-such a mountain pass, I said to myself: 'Let it dangle!' When people come out of this inquisition suddenly stripped of all their rank they say: 'I am not playing any more.'"

A junior officer says:

"An army can't be run on field Courts Martial and threats of them, especially not in the case of officers. If officers are to lead their men only when the P.C.M. is lurking in the background, then there is something rotten in the State of Denmark."

Dismissal, and even frame-ups by politicians, of high officers are also frequent and are said to have "a bad effect on their health."

Similar sources of exasperation and anger are found in the ordinance promulgated by Goering that an officer has acquired no special rights solely on the grounds of rank but may be subordinated to men of junior rank. This happens at all levels in the Luftwaffe. In the Army it appears to be limited to N.C.Os. An Obergefreiter (L/Opl.) who shows courage and leadership may be placed in charge of a section while an incompetent section sergeant serves under him.

The right of appeal or complaining to higher authority exists for all men accused of crimes or infringements of duty. In practice there is a feeling that higher authorities will always back the accusing officer or N.C.O. and that there is no redress. There are therefore grounds for believing that the sense of justice is not infrequently violated in men of lower ranks.

This section can well be concluded with a picture of the endless chain of consequences of the German type of discipline, inter-level relations and punishments, given by a naval lieutenant:

"It was a monstrous affair. The reserve officer cadets went to the training depot as P.Os. but those from the regular Navy as cadets. So first of all the P.Os. took it out of the cadets. Then the cadets became midshipmen and took it out of the P.Os. As they were in the majority there were continual reprimands there; reports were coming in all the time."

(ii) Rewards. The recognition of merit by promotion, decorations and other marks of favour or distinction to individuals or units is an important method by which the paternal authority of an armed force maintains the sense of justice, gives encouragement and fosters zeal. What evidence have we of the policy of the Wehrmacht and how far does it succeed in its purpose?

We know already of the enthusiastic men, chiefly among war-time soldiers, who care little for such things and are content in the idealistic feeling that they are doing their duty. Some indeed go so far that they want to be in the dirtiest jobs as a token of devotion and self-sacrifice. For this a good many statements are on record. The men concerned are mostly enthusiastic Nazis with either no background or else a good job awaiting them (or so they hope) when they return to civil life.

Promotion is different for the regular soldier and for the war-time man. To the former it comes in due time but may be accelerated for merit or through favouritism. That "jumping the seniority list" is not appreciated by their contemporaries or seniors is natural and that it leads to derogatory gossip can also be imagined. Such talk is rife in the group of captured senior officers.

Thus a Major-General of 48: "Our system of command has been completely upset so that seniority has gone by the board. In my opinion, younger men can't do it any better because it is harder for them." Another General, aged 55, agrees that it is ridiculous.

Among junior ranks there is less grousing but frequently a fine attempt at rationalising by various excuses the fact of their own non-promotion.

The war-time man, if intelligent, is frequently rapidly promoted through the ranks. A commission may be given in the field for conspicuous gallantry and dash, but he can never rise high in combatant arms.

In the main there is little significant comment on this point except among detractors of the Nazi Party who see its members being given preference; but the system, obviously liked by most, is not without its critics. A pilot said:

"I wrote in my will begging them not to commission me after my death, if they couldn't do so while I was alive. The Squadron captain knows what he can do with my promotion. He was raving mad when he read it. But it really was a scandal the way promotions were handled."

A new order by the Party has recently been promulgated by which a C.O. is bound to accept a Gauleiter's nominee as an officer candidate, however much he dislikes or disapproves of him as a soldier.

Decorations are dished out wholesale. The Iron Cross, 2nd Class, is awarded in batches of 60 or 70 per division and distributed by regimental C.Os. In the Luftwaffe there is a "points scale" which automatically gets a pilot the I.C. II for so many sorties with engagement and/or shooting down of enemy aircraft. People go in for these like Boy Scouts for their badges. Further, there is the Knights' Cross and beyond that the Oak Leaves, several new decorations in bronze and gold, with swords or without, and a Meritorious Service Cross for administrative officers, all of which are eagerly sought and displayed, usually in full, pinned to the uniform. In addition there are badges, commonly called "Storm" something or other (e.g. Panzersturmbzeichen), for those who have taken part in front line fighting in any arm. Medals for the different theatres of war are also already worn: Africa medal, Eastern Front ribbon etc. "Even the clerks at G.H.Q., who sat in Italy, sport them," said a Major deprecatingly. Various distinctive armbands, e.g. "Afrika Korps", "Hermann Goering Division" and the like add to the bedizened appearance of the old warrior and make him feel very grand.

There are, as usual, a few grumbles about decorations policy.

Two field officers: "The way decorations were handed out was crazy - especially to the fighter pilots."

"Or else you get a decoration to keep your mouth shut."

"No staff officer should get an order for bravery. Why not give him the Meritorious Service Cross? That's quite enough."

"Those Africa emblems that the Luftwaffe wear and all that nonsense - they were worn all over Italy. They never got as far as us."

(Before issue a soldier had to make a solemn declaration that he had served 180 days in Africa, not counting punishments.)

A sergeant, A/T unit: "The award of decorations isn't properly done. It would be better to have none at all."

A Major: "Four officers approached me and said that my predecessor had promised them the Iron Cross. I said: 'My predecessor is still alive; he'll soon write and tell me to put you up if he wants you to have them. What is more, a German officer does not go round asking for decorations.'"

A Colonel (Div. Commander): "Three of my regimental commanders were awarded the Knights' Cross and one the Oak Leaves and I was never asked whether they had earned them or not. If I had kept to the conditions of the award I should not have recommended any of them for them. I was the first man to get the Gold Cross."

Decoration hunting appears to be a serious matter. There are plenty of stories, especially from the fighter pilots, that once they have reached a certain decoration they cease to care, and give themselves airs. Discussion centres on such topics as how many Spitfires shot down are equivalent to a bomber sortie, and that the fellows on the Russian front earn their Crosses too easily. The whole thing has a very adolescent ring.

Extra Pay. Certain arms get danger pay. These are U-boat men, flying crews and paratroops. There are no such privileges for the Infantry or Tanks. A General criticises the system of rewarding with money soldiers who merely perform the duties of their arms; he also feels the Army comes off badly. Men in E-boats have a grievance vis-a-vis U-boat men, regarding their own service as just as hazardous.

In connection with pay, it is expressly laid down that no married man may be penalised by forfeiture of pay or allowances. The attentiveness to preventing home grievances in order to eliminate a source of conflict is clear. In general rates of pay are very generous. Service in the armed forces is quite a paying proposition to a skilled man. Yet one hears that civilian labour is paid very high wages. The Todt organisation is a source of grumbling on this account. "Here are these civilian navvies working cheek by jowl with us and drawing huge pay. It's a shame!" is the general tone of the comment.

Rewards by extra food. There is no evidence that anyone has disliked this method. The matter will be pursued further under the heading of 'Welfare.'

(C) MATERNAL FUNCTIONS

PROTECTION, NURTURE AND WELFARE

Recalling our list of needs to be satisfied, and the human tendency to build up the complex from the simple, it may not be as strange as it sounds that armed forces come to stand for certain maternal values. This is perhaps most easily grasped in relation to ships which even in German are feminine to the sailor. We speak of people being "cradled in the service." The attraction of the Service for the security it offers is shown in many cases of regular members of the Wehrmacht.

1. The Need for Security and Protection

This motive seems to have played an important part especially with naval personnel. Of a number of life histories of such men, that of a C.P.O. telegraphist (Oberfunkmeister) is a good example:

Age 30. His father was a civil engineer who died when the son was only 14. This stopped short the boy's education. He had to become an apprentice electrician after having led a sheltered existence, and disliked the rough life of the workshop. He was then thrown on the labour market at the time of greatest unemployment and joined the Navy. He was a mild, timid man who took to service life because "you know where you are, your duties are prescribed, everything is done for you, and at the end you are sure of safe job as an official." He did not want to go into an independent business as it entailed risks. His was a typical time-server's personality, polite, over-conscientious, afraid to express an opinion. He had not even caught the excitement of the Nazi spirit. His sense of duty and loyalty to his service were high, though he admitted he was never keen on the Navy or the sea.

In this case the man's character was weak; he needed to shelter in an organisation and feared competition. Other cases might be quoted in which the economic motive, concealing a wish for dependence and a lack of enterprise, had caused men to volunteer for long term service with the certainty that the German Government would provide not only present security but also a handsome cash payment and a post in the civil service at the end of engagement. (Incidentally, by filling their civil service with this type of deferential, thoroughly "house-trained" old N.C.Os., they were making sure that the military spirit permeated the railways, power stations and similar state enterprises.) The demand for economic security became especially pronounced in certain sections of the middle and lower middle classes in Germany due to the economic vicissitudes of the Weimar Republic, e.g. inflation in the early thirties. For these people the steadiness of a position in the Wehrmacht satisfies this major need, rendered all the more pressing by the frightful experiences of German society in the twenties. A position in the Forces not only provides a steady flow of income to oneself and one's dependents in the present and for the rest of one's life if one wishes to make it so, but it even provides the prospect of fixed increments and advancements, including officer status since the war.

The wish to surrender responsibility for one's own actions and to avoid the necessity for choosing between alternatives is a powerful one with some people. It has been found by the writer to operate very strongly in a number

of types of regular German soldiers of all arms. It overlaps to some extent with the striving for economic security, but the emphasis is on the weakness of character rather than on the cash aspect of the safe job.

For example, a German bomber pilot, aged 28, married, of working class background, had served for 8 years and had reached the rank of sergeant (Feldwebel). His whole early life had been dogged by economic instability. The parents had "fled" from that part of Upper Silesia which became Polish in 1921. As his father's eldest son he had become conscious of that poor man's employment worries. The father had warned him never to take part in politics and to see that he kept out of the labour market. He was glad to be taken on in Goering's newly formed air force where, as he said, "one doesn't have to worry about politics - one just does one's duty." He had married a year or so before the war but had refused the responsibility of bringing children into the world. He also hoped for a quiet "depot job" when he got over age. He was a pessimist, nervous of his health and pre-occupied and frightened in manner. His chief fear in case of a German defeat was that he would have to find another job.

Even to such men as the two examples quoted, the service offered, besides security, a career which they regarded as far above the "working class life" they would have had to lead and thus a good alibi for their essential lack of courage and enterprise. There is nothing like running for protection under somebody's wing and being told what a fine fellow you are for doing it!

Another urge to escape is provided by the unhappy or broken home, such as is shown, for example in the following cases:

A naval W/T hand volunteered for service because he was shocked that his father, a widower and ex-naval stoker, remarried. The step-mother behaved in the classical fairy tale manner and even turned the father against him. He was very devoted to his father but now felt himself cast out and was looking for the niche in which he would again be regarded as "one of the family". In his father's old service he found what he wanted.

A W/T operator in the Luftwaffe, an Austrian peasant boy, volunteered soon after the Nazi occupation, despite his very mixed feelings about the Germans, for the main reason that his mother was dead and he and five other children had to be farmed out and were brought up in a bad environment. The service had filled an emotional need and had been a parental institution for him.

A naval W/T P.O., aged 26, was the son of an originally well-off merchant who took to drink and started maltreating the mother. The latter could not look after him because she went out to work. He had an adventurous, criminal childhood and, after being in reformatories and monastery schools, drifted into the Navy. An embittered, rebellious fellow, "agin the Government" and without loyalty, he was only out for what he could get.

Such life stories could be multiplied even from within the population of a single P/W camp. They are quoted to illustrate the point that the armed forces can attract for a number of reasons quite apart from heroism, love of soldiering or patriotism, men who want to find a safe refuge from financial or other troubles. They can be said to play a "good parent" part for these people and so focus on themselves a great deal of filial loyalty. The military unit, the warship or the air squadron as a home from home, the centre of one's affections and the kind foster-parent who, moreover, provides many brothers to play with, is a most important idea to remember when considering morale problems, especially in the case of Germans who tend to romanticise their surroundings and who do not bear individual decision, loneliness and isolation well.

To the above mentioned emotional inducements must be added the reasonable calculation of benefits widely advertised in recruiting offices to young technicians and others without special training. The promise of professional experience as fitters, mechanics, drivers, electricians and radio operators, opening better prospects at the end of engagement, with preferential placement

in public utility enterprises, could not fail to persuade large numbers of bright and ambitious young men that here was their best and cheapest training school which, moreover, rewarded you with a good bonus after meritorious service, enough to set you up in a small business or to finance marriage.

But it is not only naval men or homeless waifs who come to regard their service as the steady, abiding protective influence that feeds, clothes, houses and cares for them body and soul. All soldiers have this attitude to some extent. The service is a lady bountiful with inexhaustible larders which one can raid and she automatically replenishes them. The tendency to squander military stores by comparison with private property is a symptom, and so is the grouching at bad conditions.

If the German father expresses his fondness for his son by being hard on him - hence the son's expectancy of hardness as a kind of love - the Teutonic mother tends to be doting and fussy, doll him up on Sundays, take somewhat excessive care over his health, shield him from the father if she dare, educate him to orderliness with occasional treats and indulgences. The Wehrmacht has not failed to incorporate these elements since it is also a product of German mentality. Much thought has been expended on making the recruit feel "at home". That the soldier in Germany behaves towards the civilian as the spoilt favourite child we have already noted.

2. Food

Many prisoners compare their own rations favourably with those received in British camps but admit their civilians would gasp with surprise at this amount of food.

In regard to food, a supreme effort is made to procure the best for the forces, especially for those in U-boats or on other special service. U-boat crews take on board fresh chickens, ducks, meat, eggs, ham, butter, the best tinned vegetables, fruit, both fresh and preserved, sweets, real coffee, and rationing on cruises does not exist. The food rationing in the services is in fact nicely graded to the degree of reliance on it as the principal enjoyment or indulgence.

Food envy exists as between various arms and as between men and their superiors. Food is also "scrunged" very freely by all ranks; this is a more or less open secret, the only commandment being not to be found out.

In all static establishments Sunday is observed by extra good food and no duties. Official functions at which alcohol is issued or bought and consumed jointly are a feature. A General was proud that he had taken great care of a country chateau in an occupied country, but made no bones about lifting the entire stock of wine. "There were 12,000 bottles - well, that's only one for each of my men, and they were entitled to it."

3. Medical Care

The German soldier has also been made vitamin-conscious and often has anxiety about his gums and other symptoms of deficiency. It is perhaps a sign of weakness that men, e.g. on night watch, are given "strengthening pills for the nerves of the eyes", food concentrates and "pervitin" (a benzedrine-like substance increasing alertness and wakefulness), but it shows that the psychological effect of giving them a feeling of being looked after is being sought. Many soldiers scorn "drugs" but it is recorded that a General used "pervitin" in order to force the pace of his advance, against medical advice. Captured airmen carry packages of this substance, usually unbroken.

The medical services are variously spoken of. Both officers and men tend to grumble about the inadequacy of "raw" M.Os. who take no interest in their job. The ideal laid down is that the M.O. should be at all times available to help the men as a doctor. In the lecture on welfare (see B above), the special morale officer, who was obviously a psychiatrist, says:

"It has been stated that if the Commander is the father, the M.O. should be the mother of his men. As he has no disciplinary functions, the men tend to approach him more as human beings in need and with less regard for the fact that he is a superior officer. He must be ready to keep a sharp look-out for anything appertaining to their welfare and spot early symptoms of disability, etc."

It seems that far from this being the case, M.Os. tend to shout at the men and try to be more military than the combatants. Careful observers have put the efficiency even of ordinary hygiene measures in North Africa in such things as fly prevention, food shortage, latrines, etc. below the British level. A group of PsW service doctors personally examined, certainly bears

out the observation that these were collow, poorly trained young Nazis of no mental refinement. In the words of a paratroops lieutenant:

"Those Army doctors I've seen aren't worth much. One could see they had not studied much. Some of them don't even know how to bandage, and anyway they don't care."

While intolerant of any cases of psychological trouble which, as is well known, are frequently morale problems, these German M.Os. seem very gullible where the symptoms have a physical flavour though due to purely nervous causes. A number of such cases have been met and they had always been wrongly diagnosed by their own doctors. A technical officer with a mild nervous affliction of the heart due to conflicts in his mind was given ten years to live by his M.O., with shattering effect on his morale. A gunner had successfully dodged foreign service for several years because of "breathlessness" on parade, though he was a footballer in civil life. This medical blindness is undoubtedly due to Hitler's dictum that "the German soldier has no nerves", therefore if he has then the disease must be physical. In fact, some ten per cent. at least of a random sample of PoW captured in Tunisia were found to be suffering from easily recognisable psycho-neurotic disabilities, such as the well-known "effort syndrome", hysterical fainting attacks and the like. Shortage of man-power alone can account for the fact that not even the worst M.O. could miss, that infantrymen with trigger fingers missing or with several toes lost through frostbite in Russia, ammunition humpers and storemen with uncured ruptures, and other glaring physical defects were found among the same sample in another ten per cent.

No soldier encountered has had the feeling that his M.O. has been the "mother", and the task of educating M.Os. to their morale-sustaining function seems to have been tackled belatedly, alongside the renewed scouring of the "humane" note in discipline, itself an attempt to introduce a maternal inflection into the stern voice of authority.

4. Welfare

Benevolence however, cannot be created by lectures. This is very apparent in the set-up of welfare and entertainment ("ENSA") services.

Excellent insight has been obtained into the spirit and working of these through captured files. Odds and ends of officers of very junior rank are charged with welfare work of large areas (in this case the ground organisation of the Luftwaffe in Tunisia and what remained of Tripolitania). Periodic reports called for by H.Q. of the Air Officer Commanding are dull, devoid of feeling, limited to a return of "amerities". A typical one in the batch is the following, in this case by a medical welfare officer:

"In the unit there are two radio sets, three games of chess, two of ludo; our books are too old. Newspapers from home are arriving regularly. A supply of 21 mouth organs is requested. The following film show was held on (date) and attended by three officers and 92 O.Rs: "Dreamy Eyes". It was much appreciated."

It is assumed that games, books and a flow of home films keep the men happy; great attention is paid to the regular flow especially of local home newspapers and of mail, which raises interest in the highest quarters, and long apologies for delay. It is clear that the authorities are anxious that the sense of touch with the homeland should be preserved and that news should reach the front and the homes quickly.

Another feature is the collaboration between the Nazi Party local officials of a man's home town with the military welfare authorities in arranging for letters from home and for hospitality and entertainment on leave for men who have no family or friendship ties; considerable trouble is taken in this connection. Several lonely, orphaned PoW have spoken warmly of the part played by their former Hitler Youth headquarters in giving them a good time on leave, placing them with families or in cosy hostels. In Russia, as in North Africa, touring cinema units and small vaudeville entertainment troupes have regular circuits and are popular. Special regulations had to be issued governing the proper conduct of troops, including officers, towards visiting actresses who had lodged complaints against importuning.

There appears in the past to have been no routine issue of alcohol to front line troops, but within an hour of the front line cinemas and variety shows were to be had once or twice a week and transport was arranged. Here, canteens would also serve beer. There were also visiting lecturers of the more serious, academic sort. These do not appear to have gone down so well. One such patriotic gentleman, a "professor", lodged a complaint against his cold and indifferent reception by a certain Luftwaffe officers' Mess. This resulted in an urgent instruction to be polite and that officers would in future be expected to attend such lectures to set an example to their men.

5. Political Indoctrination

Another interesting request was from a welfare officer for more official pamphlets of the patriotic, political type (called "haversack leaflets"), suitable to instruct officers in counteracting the effects of enemy propaganda, and "would the senders please remember next time to send them under secret cover as otherwise they lost their point."

The Nazi propaganda machine makes great efforts to teach political uniformity by just this type of appeal to history and nationalist pride, and issues periodical pamphlets, the analogues of A.B.C.A. literature, for the guidance of military lecturers to troops. By them that part of morale is being built up which has to do with belief in a good cause. The soldier must have no doubt that his country is virtuous, is defending its rights and is obeying natural God-given laws, and is therefore justified in employing him as a soldier.

In a publication entitled "Mental Preparedness for War", (1941) issued by the Nazi Party, such propaganda is described as "... not only an instrument of enlightenment for the German fellow-national about the rightfulness of the political acts and measures of the Reich, it wards off not only the opponents' lies, blitz-fashion and summarily, but also inflicts on him defeat after defeat by the laying bare of his weaknesses, shortcomings and faults before the world."

As already mentioned, the stock of ideas about the origins and causes of the war current among German PsW, whether former Nazi Party members or not, show an extraordinary uniformity and resort to clichés familiar to students of Germany in Goebbels's propaganda, and learnt in lectures, pamphlets and addresses given in the Hitler Youth, the Labour Service and in the Armed Forces. Since the Nazi Party boasts openly of being the "spiritual and world-philosophical bearer of the new life-order," it claims that education, "in a state to whom the common weal and security of its individual citizens is the supreme law, cannot be subjected to the caprices of various Party, confessional or scientific movements."

6. Brothels

At U-boat bases in France and elsewhere, a list of officially sanctioned brothels was always kept, subject to medical supervision. A convoy of 200 prostitutes for North Africa was lost by British naval action on the way over. At times, especially after a cruise, the men are ordered to parade for brothel. Queues may be seen outside these establishments. A similar state of affairs prevailed at Naples, with an official list of addresses posted up at the main station. V.D. prevention centres are usually handy and elaborate instructions and appeals are issued to report to them.

Now that the U-boat bases of Lorient and St. Nazaire are razed to the ground and lack these "amenities", some flotilla commanders have taken country houses as rest centres for crews, paid for out of unit funds, where "women and wine" are provided. Otherwise, transport is provided to neighbouring towns for sight-seeing and entertainments.

7. What does the German soldier need most?

There is evidence that alcohol and female company are his main solaces. In occupied countries of Europe there are many girls, both decent and loose, who are willing to form liaisons of all degrees of permanence and intimacy with German troops. The majority of the soldiers, however, rely on the brothel with its hollow promise of love, and a fair number have expressed disgust at these establishments. They have the feeling that their nice natures are being corrupted.

E.g., G.A.F. pilot: "In France our nature is being corrupted."

Stoker, (Navy): "The German soldier's morals are being ruined in France and wherever he goes." (This after a long chat on the brothels of Kiel and Danzig.)

Bomber W/T operator: "I was a decent boy when I joined the Luftwaffe, but they have made a swine of me."

We have already noted the case of the young Signals officer who "could not live without the erotic experience" as he so pompously called it.

In Berlin rich elderly women pick up soldiers and sailors and are pleased, for handsome payment, in their own flats.

Drunkenness is a constant problem. Welfare lecturers are advised to urge the men to moderation. They are to warn them that crimes are committed and V.D. contracted "under the influence", and that the military law does not take alcohol into consideration as a mitigating factor. "The Führer may always be quoted as a shining example of moderation." Such evidence as exists seems to point to most of the drunkenness being of a convivial, joint, jolly nature, except among isolated cases of officers.

As the German regards drink as a "manly" thing the official attitude is lenient and indulgent, as it is towards sexual fun. In fact in Eastern Europe nothing is done to safeguard the female population who are regarded as fair game. These symptoms are, psychologically, an expression of the need for female comfort, rather than solely a need of sexual satisfaction. If their brutal sex adventures are lacking in the tender quality they strike the men as empty and futile and increase their loneliness or homesickness.

German welfare reports show a volume of requests or praise for the following: albums depicting German towns and landscapes and typical German people in national costume; front artistes who sing "homely" dialect songs; prompt home mails and local newspapers. The greed for papers from home is so great that bales are pilfered as they are being sorted at airfields for distribution to units.

A C.O. writes in an urgent tone that his troops are short of comforts such as parlour games and radio sets and requests acceleration of home mails as their lack is having a most disturbing effect on the morale of his troops. Soldiers' programmes, analogous to "Forces' Programme", are transmitted from many broadcasting stations. These emphasise homely dialect, light café music and German humour.

Concerning the men's attitude towards the efforts made to entertain and look after them, an Army lieutenant who had also served in the ranks said that, while they are grateful for games and shows, they do not trust the welfare officer. First, he is not a member of the unit. Secondly, he is not a soldier. Thirdly, he is often a lawyer and, as such, "remote and short-tempered". Where a medical officer fulfils the duties of a welfare officer he is not trusted either for the reasons stated above, i.e. they always assume that a man comes because he wants to dodge something. The feeling in wide circles of soldiers is that nothing ever gets done; the M.O. is always too busy to bother with their worries. So if they have a home worry, legal or financial, they discuss it with their own comrades among whom can nearly always be found a solicitor's clerk or someone with knowledge of the intricacies of the law. This evidence rather fits in with the attitude of the soldiers themselves and follows logically from the type of leadership psychology growing out of the cult of severe paternalism and suppression of the tender element in the officer philosophy, especially in those with little front-line experience.

It remains to deal with a very important figure - "the most important man in the German Army" according to all observers - the Hauptfeldwebel, whose nearest equivalent is the C.S.M. He is universally referred to as the "Spieß". Spießes among themselves lay claims to being "the mother of the company." They know everything, look after rations, pay, prepare company orders, deal with offences etc. They are men who usually "have served too long", i.e. it is the usual summit of a regular soldier's career. "For their limited outlook they have too much power." The O.C. relies on them for his information and personal views on individual men. "Bad men suck up to the Spieß," cliques are formed round him, he is given to having favourites and black sheep. A figure held in dread and veneration, he has even established himself in the new Luftwaffe, while in the Navy he is found in shore establishments. This is the man who is often delegated to have the nice kindly talk with offenders, if officers feel themselves "too distant".

A corporal pilot said: "It was our Spieß who directed our flying. We were all young and inexperienced crews. He told us all what to do and cursed us if we didn't do it properly."

A flight sergeant: "The Spieß runs the squadron, the other N.C.O.'s do the work. He once went to the M.O. and asked him how it was that officers had different food from ours..... He told him off properly."

A comrade: "You can do that with a M.O. but an officer would have said: 'It is not your place to ask such questions.'"

These remarks show that not even officers dare be very rude to Spießes. Other informants make it clear, however, that a Spieß usually does himself pretty well, e.g. another N.C.O.:

"I lived with the old Spieß. They had absolutely everything in the mess... all the captured stuff, chocolate, coffee etc. That sort of thing creates bad feeling."

It seems that the Spieß is after all nearer the conception of Jehovah than the standard idea of a Mummy in the eyes of the men - and even of the officers! The few specimens actually seen seemed typical deferential German N.C.O.'s. No doubt captivity was detrimental to the flowering of their arts.

Despite evidences of the predominantly masculine "Fatherland" notion derived from the strongly patriarchal ancestor-worshipping German culture, we also find some associations of their country with mother values. The figure of Germania was a heavily armoured female Valkyrie, and the narrower homeland, containing the same root as Heim = home, is feminine in gender (*die Heimat*). It links in their minds with the place where they were children, where their mothers or wives live now. Fortress, castle and city are also feminine words in German, places to be defended and kept from the enemy who will come and rape the womenfolk. This thought may well represent a foisting on the enemy of impulses which we know the Germans have gratified in Czecho-Slovakia and Poland especially; the British and particularly the Russians are both credited with this intention:

E.G., a sergeant pilot: "God, to think of it, that they would over-run our homes and rape our women - my sister! - I would sooner shoot them! God, it doesn't bear thinking about. I would sooner fight to the last round!"

The evidences that guilt is the origin of the feeling is strong. A few stories will be quoted:

An airman told of a corporal in the German forces in Poland who raped a fifteen-year old girl and killed the sister and mother and subsequently the father of the child, who tried to intervene. He was condemned to death, but the officer found it amusing that the charge should be of rape and not of murder.

An officer related that he had seen troops seize girls in Czecho-Slovakia in restaurants and rape them - "married women too."

A W/T operator said: "I am told that at the occupation of Prague girls were collected and given to German troops for "mass intercourse".

Another soldier relates how, in the Channel Islands, of two of his comrades one raped a girl while the other held her fiancé down, and how they then changed over.

Not the perpetrators of such acts, but the more morally responsive feel the guilt.

An engine room artificer: "What is done in Poland is bestial

..... such things avenge themselves."

Similarly other prisoners, including Generals, usually blame the S. S.

These statements are quoted to loud point to the assertion that an enemy's entry into the citadel of the homeland is in the last analysis imagined in terms of rape. Among primitive peoples wars or raiding attacks are sometimes fought for the express purpose of stealing women. The notion of defending a "fortress" of which the core is Germany is thus a powerful, because deeply determined, incentive, fed from the mother-sentiment in the German. The official Nazi morale pamphlet, "Spiritual Preparedness for War" (1941), stresses this aspect very clearly. Talking of the meaning of the homeland, it points out:

"Guardianship of family-consciousness is the highest task of the German woman, for in her hand rests the preservation of the race..... This means the guarding and cherishing of that unconscious, as yet unformed but therefore primordial life... of our racial culture which alone makes us creative."

(Alfred Rosenberg)

"It is in defence of these exalted and eternal life-values that the German soldier has taken up arms."

It is very essential to the soldier that he should think of the homeland as strong and not shaken. For this reason German propaganda to the troops emphasises the high spirits of those at home, especially the women. There is a fairly strict censorship of home mail to the front. We now perceive the psychological importance of the insistence on rapid mails and care that the soldier shall not worry about home. The more destructive the Allied air raids, the fiercer do PW protestations of their ineffectiveness become, despite doubt and anxiety about a defeat in the field. "The people at home will not let us down" is a kind of safe anchorage for trust, a talisman of stability, a child's first need.

Thus a Major-General, talking of evacuation: "Where can one send one's family? Besides one goes to the dogs.

If one's family leaves home and goes to strangers one feels hopeless and helpless...."

In quite a number of instances soldiers carry written talismans, so-called "Schutzbriefe" or letters of marque, which are traditional invocations of God, guaranteeing immunity. These are always presents from a mother, aunt or godmother. Despite affecting to make fun of them, the owners carefully preserve these bits of magic reassurance.

Some of the homeless men whose mothers are dead or have remarried have displaced their mother-loyalties entirely to the Wehrmacht in which they have found a safe refuge. This subject has already been discussed.

D. COMRADESHIP - GROUP SOLIDARITY

We now turn to those aspects of the Wehrmacht's inner life which has as its basic pattern the relationship between brothers. It is well-known that such relations are not only friendly, but are apt to be punctuated by quarrels, rivalries and fights. These differences are often based on ideas of unfair favouritism of the parents, or dislike of having to share favours.

The section will be concerned mostly with the ties existing between individuals within a unit: the company or squadron or small ship's company, and between various branches of the theoretically unified Wehrmacht. Strains and rivalries, more likely to be revealed under stress, such as the relationships of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS, and those between the natives of various parts of Germany will be dealt with in Part IV.

Team work, the fun of sharing the same experience with others like oneself, is universal and it is especially congenial to the German adolescent who romanticises the group spirit of uniformity and comradeship, in which he finds a sense of solidarity and worth. Expressions of liking for and emotional satisfaction in mass movement, marching in unison, losing one's personality in a greater 'whole' are very common and date back to school gym classes and to the Hitler Youth: "How I enjoyed marching in step - we were smart little fellows" or "You should see those young boys of the Hitler Youth - heart and soul in it as they swing along in their uniforms." The Labour Service (at 17 to 18 years of age) fosters a similar spirit: discipline, marching and, in the evenings, "high jinks", sing-songs, communal entertainments, getting drunk together and so forth, all of which give a promise of still better things to come in the 'real thing', when one is in the proud Wehrmacht, initiated into the brotherhood-in-arms and company of the elect. Compared with the facilities existing in a time of unemployment, poor wages in civil life and with the relative status of civilian and soldier in German national tradition, military life seemed a young man's paradise.

The American sociologist, E. V. Hartshorne, writes about the Germans:

"Just as adolescents tend to rush blindly into soul-satisfying faith movements, whether they be religious or political, in order to find security, so, it might be argued, the German people as a whole, display characteristics of adolescence, the 'gang-age', the 'age of hero-worship and hope'"

The comradeship spirit of soldiers has been idealised and romanticised in German literature and poetry from the songs of 1813 to "All Quiet on the Western Front". The spontaneous youth movements which sprang up in Germany after the last war as a symptom of faith after defeat were canalised into the Nazi cause as the Hitler Youth and the Labour Service. This is one aspect of the working of the adolescent "brotherhood" tendency which is carried forward into the Wehrmacht.

The soldier has the feeling that here all are brothers, e.g. even an Austrian anti-Nazi officer said: "Well, once you are in the Wehrmacht they only want to know whether you are a good soldier and can do your job. That's how I escaped the concentration camp." Another soldier said: "Nazism only begins 10 miles behind the front line." The feeling of soldierliness can be, and often is, quite distinct from Nazi Party loyalties. To take examples of P/W views of varying shades of emphasis: -

"We are a nation of soldiers, thank God, under our Führer."

"I am no longer a National Socialist at the moment, but a soldier I remain!"

"I am an anti-Nazi, and so is my brother, but we are 100 per cent soldiers."

"The German who is a soldier, whether Nazi or anti-Nazi, remains first and foremost a soldier."

The other aspect is one which goes to the heart of the Nazi Party's foundations. It began in the gangs of ex-soldiers of World War I who had lost their hold in normal civilian life. Chiefly young officer types with ruined educations banded themselves together as "Free Corps" and continued to fight and march wherever there was any fighting to be done. Their sense of comradeship arose from what they called "front experience" - a mysticism of intimate companionship,

sharing danger and hardship, which for them became the noblest ~~2519-33~~ ~~04~~ ~~row~~ ~~93~~
They were further united in their resistance to the new spirit of contempt for the soldier which for a time prevailed in the Republic. They felt themselves a gang of outcasts, despised and rejected by an ungrateful and unmanly bourgeois Fatherland. Hitler and his associates were just of this type and an early striving of their movement was to revive the "front spirit" among Germans and to impart it to the rising generation. Thus the soldier dream and militant, despised youthful idealism fused into one glorious faith.

The repercussions on the minds of Hitler's soldiers of this spirit are very apparent. The great majority of front-line soldiers, flying crews and naval men will harp on the excellence of the comradeship in their service. To let down a comrade, to steal from him, are the greatest crimes. The highest praise for an officer was that he was not only strict but "a good comrade". As mentioned, the normal attitude is one of contrasting themselves with officers. The Wehrmacht, partly from tradition and partly on advice from experts, has left nothing undone to ease the transition to military life and to foster a group spirit. Some of these measures were described in Farago's "German Psychological Warfare" (Q.v. para. 33, 34, 39-41): the new recruits' reception "into just one big family," the solemn oath, the placing together in huts of men with similar regional, educational and religious backgrounds, the very intensive "wooing" of the soldier by having all the fun inside and not allowing him out for the first two months. Their task has been enormously eased by the pre-military organisations so far as the merging of the individual in the group is concerned, however objectionable the more orthodox regular soldiers found some of the qualities of the Hitler Youth enthusiasts in other respects.

Their opinions as to the effect of political indoctrination prior to joining the Wehrmacht are very divided. Some quite senior officers hold the view that the youngsters are wonderful - loyal, proud of their leaders, imbued with burning faith in the ideal of the Führer and Fatherland. Others deprecate this political pre-training and consider the younger generation as arrogant and hard to discipline because as keen Nazis they "know everything better", but that essentially they are faint-hearted and only brag of their prowess. Their immorality and brutality are also criticised. The notion is rife among all ranks that despite the non-political façade of the Wehrmacht, political party influence does play a big part, especially in promotions and postings to good jobs, e.g. "I've been in the service for four years now and am still in the ranks. If I'd been a Nazi I should have been an officer by now." While this is unquestionably true in part, the Wehrmacht has nevertheless retained a separate corporate spirit whose invasion by the Nazi enthusiasts is viewed with different degrees of misgiving according to the speaker's own political opinions. The apprehension is naturally highest among those who have most to lose in status and influence, i.e. general officers.

For reasons already outlined earlier, the German feels weak when he is alone, and develops a sense of power when in a group. It leads to a kind of release which finds its expression in singing, marching and collective aggressiveness. This is very obvious even inside P/W camps where big collections of men show much more defiance, belief in victory and moral courage on the one hand, and where their almost automatic discipline and group reactions can be observed on the other hand, as compared with segregated individuals. A whole barrack square full of men would leap to attention as an officer passed by. In a three-storeyed building with hundreds of prisoners crowding the narrow staircase a mysterious message, recalling the spread of news in jungles, would always precede the officer so that the whole length of stairway was cleared for his passage. Such coherence is a quality presupposing much preparation. Certainly by the time these men reach operational stations they are welded into such close union. The strongest bond, the one that survives capture, is the man-to-man loyalty. Scores of U-boat men have said:

"Our officers let us down, but the spirit of comradeship on board was wonderful - all one big family." "We were all good pals," or "We all shared alike." "Those were happy days in the U-boat." "We fought bravely." "If, in spite of all the ordinary soldier has done, we lose everything will be upside down."

Nazis, especially if suspected of being Gestapo stool-pigeons, are not popular. The front-line soldier feels himself above the petty fanaticism of informers and zealots. There is a line of cleavage between home and front, both as regards the greater meaning for a man of his pals in the unit than his family, and as between "fighting men" and "rear" in which Party bosses are often included. A naval W/T P.O. relates how he went on leave unwillingly and dared not meet the relatives of friends who had been killed.

"They looked at you as if to say: 'What right have you to be still alive?'" He felt almost a traitor to his dead shipmates. In an authoritative review of young German soldiers it is stated that when they come on leave they feel strangers and often spend their entire leave roaming the wards of military hospitals looking for their wounded pals. "They strain to get back to duty cannot make contact with parents or wife; the comradeship of the front is the only society they know." This is obviously the beginning of the same phenomenon as was observed in the last post-war period.

The existence of "death and suicide pacts" between members of air crews has been established.

The only troops so far encountered who have shown a real exclusive élite spirit have been various members of the Luftwaffe. This includes bomber crews, fighter pilots (as usual rather "prima donnas"), paratroops, members of the Hermann Göring division, and anti-tank/anti-aircraft gunners manning the 88 mm guns. The last named have been particularly conscious of having news value for the British press. Flying men are rather proud of their rather smart, if to our eyes somewhat garish uniforms, their bright yellow scarves, and their "chivalry of the air" kinship with the R.A.F. They talk with pity of the crawling foot-sloggers and are mostly keen to outdo one another in boasts of the achievements of their various formations. They are very clannish, gossip about their squadron comrades. The policy is to train and keep crews together, and there is no doubt that such crews develop a great mutual affection and sense of unity, born of common experience and danger. The crew, an officer and several men, themselves frequently future officers or at least of that sort, are very motley.

e.g. (an air gunner): "Christmas day every one of us was drunk, including the lieutenant. Then we were drunk again New Year's day, so they just had to let the drunks fly. It was all very convivial and we were all on the best of terms."

Another ditto: "At Munich all the best hotels were reserved for the Luftwaffe."

Sgt. Major (Paratroops): "The comradeship among us was wonderful; all volunteers. We all tried to out-dare each other."

The number of decorations and "kills" held by members of a squadron is proudly retailed to newcomers without much thought for the "self". It is said that the Junkers aircraft are purposely so designed that the whole crew can see each other. The gain to morale is stated to outweigh the slight technical disadvantages. (Swiss Aeronautical Journal, 1942.) All airmen look to Göring as their leader and are united in their affection to "our Hermann", and are also very proud of their young ace air chiefs like Mölders and Galland. On the other hand they are contemptuous of ground officers.

A Sgt. pilot: "Think how the (ground) officers treated us. We had officers who had never been in action - except with women."

Aircraftsman: "He's got the medal for valour. He actually said to me: 'We shall lose the war'. Just imagine a staff officer talking like that."

PART IV

GERMAN MORALE IN THE BALANCE

We have now reviewed various aspects and components of the Wehrmacht's psychological structure. It remains to examine the working of these relationships in the war, both in success and in adversity. That the evidence is not complete need hardly be stated, but there is enough to permit of certain deductions that might be of value to a number of operational departments. The material adduced in the previous parts will be brought together with such testimony as we have of the feelings and conduct of various members of the Wehrmacht in battle and crisis. The factors of strength and of weakness will be as far as possible pointed out, and some sort of balance struck, constituting a prognosis of the likely future reactions of the German armed forces.

We shall begin by examining the changes in their ideas about the war as a whole.

Certain subjects commonly discussed among them have been found to be of special value in serving as the indices of German soldiers' morale. These broad obvious topics permit conclusions as to the state of:

- (i) their allegiance to their country and regime, i.e. their conviction about the goodness of their cause and the excellence of their leadership
- (ii) their belief in victory, i.e. in their superior power;
- (iii) their attitude towards their enemies, i.e. their feeling of comparative worth, and of ambivalence;
- (iv) their post-war expectations, i.e. their phantasies of reward or retribution.

The composition of samples of officers and men on whom the comparisons were made has remained relatively constant (airmen, naval personnel from U-boats and surface craft, and a few batches of ground troops). Throughout the war their views have undergone remarkable changes.

(i) Attitude to the regime and to Hitler personally. In the early stages of the war arrogant and whole-hearted profession of National Socialist beliefs was the rule and an occasional critic of the regime was a nine days' wonder. Such figures as are available of a census of spontaneous opinions show unquestioning patriotic fervour and love of the Führer as the embodiment of all the German virtues. We were then dealing not only with the cream of the Wehrmacht, carefully selected and trained as well as indoctrinated, but they were also at the height of their successes.

As the war went on, the Russian winter of 1941/42 had resulted in hardship and frustration and England had stood firm, there was a very gradual deterioration. Between the Stalingrad disaster and May 1943 the "complete Nazi" index had dropped to only some 25 per cent. of prisoners, and by November 1943 it stood at 20 per cent. Their origins, education and antecedents were mostly the same as previous samples and they were still largely volunteers and regular soldiers, yet their political opinions had swung away from Nazism. These observations, coupled with the strident exhortation of German radio and press propaganda to their own people, permit the inference on the unstable, fair-weather nature of German group loyalty.

The faith in Hitler personally followed a somewhat different pattern. We must recall that he is not only a revolutionary leader with a new gospel, but to many unpolitically-minded or luke-warm men he is also the head of the State and G.-in-C., to whom they have all taken their solemn oath. They mostly know their recent history; they have seen the good short-term effects of his labour policy on employment and wages, and have been told that all other leaders before him had failed. He is the personification of the "good father", the giver of all things, one who did not want war but only loved national honour (and this to the average German means armed power) better than craven peace, and so he had to resist the attempts of all the malignant enemies at long last. It is not in the nature of most human beings to commit lese majeste or to accuse their own fathers. The authority symbol embodying order and control cannot be questioned or set aside without causing national or personal chaos and conflict unless a new figure stands ready to perform this essential stabilising function. In the case of Germany, Hitler has become the last figure. Few can visualise a new leader. Thus there is a certain "compensatory mechanism" in their minds which forbids the idea that he might fail, make mistakes or disappear. 79 per cent. of PsW still accept the Führer as their leader. Even so, between Stalingrad and Tunisia, the index figure for "unquestioning faith" in Hitler personally dropped a great deal, some 20 per cent. but still remained at some 50 per cent. Lately criticism of Hitler has become much more vocal and his blind worshippers now constitute only 28 per cent. Until recently criticism of Hitler was mainly by the favourite method of shifting the blame to lesser leaders. This is true to pattern, and was prominent in the last war when diarists, such as the above mentioned naval rating (Part I) maintained as late as 1918 their belief that the Kaiser was above reproach but that his politicians and especially the Corps of Officers were letting him down. There has been an increasing volume of criticism and cursing of subordinate military and political leaders, together with a limited search for substitutes. A few uncompromised Generals like Brauchitsch and Halder are sometimes mentioned, but so far those who have not become apathetic or hostile cling to Hitler as the unifying symbol and magician. "You wait, the Führer has something up his sleeve. You'll see when our new tanks (planes, rockets, U-boats etc.) come out." "He is luring the Russians on." These are the sort of remarks which express the need for reassurance in order to prop up the chief morale need - belief in the power of the central authority figure. Conscious doubt was felt by 21 per cent. of the November 1943 sample of prisoners.

(ii) Belief in Victory. This has undergone a catastrophic fall parallel with the multiple reverses since Sicily was invaded and the 1943 Russian summer offensive got under way. Only five per cent. of the latest sample of naval and air force prisoners believed in victory, most of the rest being either outright defeatists or pessimistic doubters who merely hedge by saying: "It looks bad for us but we must not lose hope," or pin their faith in the heroic qualities of the German soldier. Prior to the fall of Italy, the loss of belief in victory had been more gradual.

Previous samples, from all three services, had also shown a tendency to feel defeatist because their ship or squadron or unit had been overwhelmed. They had taken the part for the whole and thought that because the enemy was strong at their particular point he must be strong at all points. The feeling of overwhelming Allied power is rapidly percolating through the Wehrmacht which, until three months ago, rather poo-pooed the Western powers and only took Russia seriously.

(iii) Attitude towards their enemies. This criterion of morale change has shown a growth of admiring friendliness towards Britain and an unwavering dread of Russia, with the U.S.A. occupying an intermediate, nebulous position in their minds.

Britain to the German prisoner is becoming more and more a "leader nation", old and wise, her soldiers fine and brave, almost indistinguishable in looks and martial bearing from the Germans - a brother nation of Nordic race with whom no war should have been allowed - "together we should have won victory". "Hitler never meant to harm Britain which is essential to the world." These are not the honeyed words of cunning flatterers, though such also exist, but the sentiments of simple peasants, miners and workers.

The U.S. are powerful, but "have no business in Europe"; also they are apt to be called the seat of "Jewish conspiracy".

Russia, on the other hand, is the embodiment of all that is bad: they are oriental sub-men, cruel, "no soldiers", unfair; cattle driven to their death by commissars with a pistol behind their backs; they will come into Europe and pillage, rape and kill all the countries, nor will they stop at the Channel. In brief, the Russians are like Golliwog in the nursery: everything bad can be off-loaded on to them, the scapegoat of scapegoats, bearing all the sins. Only a few of the most recent PsW have begun to see virtue in the Russians. As a symptom of the change towards the enemies it may be mentioned that the amount of listening to foreign radio, B.B.C. especially, has gone up among all those who had the opportunity either in their units or at home. This must be regarded as significant in view of the strict prohibitions.

(iv) Post-war expectations. The term "phantasies" was used in this connection because the average German soldier is not capable of visualising the future in historical, rational fashion. A phantasy is an emotional creation of the mind and reflects fears, hopes and day-dreams. A third of all German soldiers see their nation's fate in the gloomiest colours: extermination, castration, splitting into fragments, slavery, permanent weakness. Some - indeed many - do not wish to return to such conditions but prefer to seek a new home in the victorious Anglo-Saxon countries. As the war has proceeded, this type of phantasy has crowded out the cheerful pictures of a great German-controlled Europe, with the worthless Russians, Poles and Czechs as their agricultural serfs, not deserving a better fate; compliant governments in Britain and France and unlimited economic opportunities in all parts of the world for the German to reward him for his cultural supremacy and past deprivations and injustices at the hands of the undeserving "rick" nations. While in those days the German in general thought of himself and his Führer as the heralds of a new age of plenty and of civilising gifts to the less enlightened, naked aggressiveness would keep peeping through this idealistic vision.

"I am thinking of the time when we shall rape Englishwomen just like they raped ours. A little German blood won't do those degenerates and drunks any harm. What a giddy time that will be!" (O/Lt., Luftwaffe, Oct. 41).

"The Poles, Czechs and Russians have no right to an individual existence. They must be ruthlessly expelled behind a certain line so that we shall have room to expand." (Composite sentence to illustrate common sentiments.)

"These peoples (Czechs, Poles) have permitted themselves dirty tricks against us, so they deserve all they get from the S.S." (Another Lt., Luftwaffe, March 43.)

Others, perhaps some 10 per cent., form an intransigent group ~~of 25-30 per cent.~~ ^{25-30 per cent.} not exclusively of ardent Nazis:

"The "Idea" will never die; we shall rise and fight again until we have our just place in the world."

Alternatively:

"If we lose we shall join the Bolsheviks and murder and pillage and go on fighting until we are killed."

"My pals and I have made a death pact: even after the armistice, and if we only have a crate of matchboard and old nails, we shall come and bomb you until we are shot down."

Very few have any constructive vision of a future Germany. In case of defeat they all visualise an authority to run their country for them, if not one of their own then perhaps a British High Commissioner or even King. They wash their hands of responsibility; it will be the job of the victors to arrange their lives. So long as they have their living and can do their work they do not mind. This is the view of some 65 per cent. of them. Exceptional prisoners, depending more on a background of liberal upbringing than on social class or rank, can imagine a federal, brotherly European order on slightly Utopian lines, in which they are prepared to play a "normal" (i.e. neither dominant nor abject) part.

(v) Changes towards occupied peoples. We saw earlier (Part III) how the German soldiers as a whole think of civilians in the countries overrun by them. The more gruesome evidence was in fact not cited so as not to let the reader be too one-sidedly prejudiced. It was thought wiser to tone down the picture and present the point of view rather than its extreme translations into the most brutal and cowardly deeds. This point of view is well presented by a very recent prisoner, a corporal pilot:

"Our methods in Russia were not drastic enough. We should have gone into every single house with machine guns and mowed them down."

This was by way of regret that now that the Germans looked like losing there were too many hostile people left to take vengeance.

A Naval officer of a cultured family and with the sort of critical insight which some educated Germans have, especially in adversity, gave a thumb-nail sketch of the typical Teuton way of handling subject peoples:

"We have not the right type of character to be the Lords of Creation.

We are too unscrupulous. Look at the way we behaved in Greece! To begin with we buttered the people up and then we turned round and looked them up and ill-treated them. As soon as we gained power they were "the good Greeks" all over again."

"There were some twelve Greeks who were pro-Nazi in Salonica ... but do you think they were looked after? Not a bit of it! They weren't given any food and when winter came they died of starvation in the streets...."

"I have grave doubts as to whether, were we to win the war, we should have the moral strength to rule the world. I know that you cannot keep the German people within due limits (of behaviour). That was best seen in Norway. National Socialism had to be instilled into the people by sheer force. But you can't attain everything merely by force....."

A humble Panzer Grenadier, captured in October 43, voiced the feelings of the German soldier of today:

"I was in Lithuania and the partisans there are all against us. People are against us everywhere, in Norway, Holland, Danzig - and now we are getting the same thing in Austria too. Every country is waiting for the British and Americans - the Greeks, the Yugoslavs, all of them."

The recent evidence suggests that, as the Germans begin to feel insecure, they are attempting to ingratiate themselves individually with the civil population. The reports of the bearing of the civil populations of the various occupied countries are inconclusive, though on the whole suggesting that the Germans are meeting with more hostility than friendliness, even if the people's behaviour is correct and in-offensive. They feel unsafe: frequent mention is made of the orders to go out armed and in parties in many towns. They envy uncomprehendingly the British escapees who are helped across France whereas no-one would lift a finger for the poor German soldier. At times they express admiration for the decent people who resist them. The shooting of hostages is approved or resented according to temperament, but mostly excused as a military necessity in an intolerable situation. As far as the evidence goes it appears that the German soldier is grateful for signs of friendliness from the civil population and for any bits of extra food given him by civilians. Recently some prisoners complained that the military governor of Belgium had not reacted with appropriate severity to "provocative" conduct by the civil population. Reliance is placed by them on the magical omnipotence of the S.S. security troops.

Individuals' relations with individual people in occupied countries may be excellent. A family may befriend a decent young soldier who behaves himself and perhaps returns their kindness. The system of billeting has produced a good many such relationships, including engagements and marriages, and it would be a mistake to draw the picture as one of solid, unrelenting hostility involving every German soldier. Many are able to retort to suggestions of this sort that "the girls are not unfriendly - at least not in the evenings." (Evidence from Holland, Norway, France and Denmark). This is an important morale matter. As mentioned, it is precisely this female approbation and company that the exiled soldier desires, quite apart from sexual intercourse. Few things shake the German's self-respect more than boycott by women, whereas the successful rivalry with the local male tends, if anything, to raise their morale, even if it leads to café incidents and acts of vendetta. On the whole, however, the German soldiers' estimate of European occupied peoples' reaction to them is that there is 80 per cent. of hostility. This cannot contribute to their sense of happy relaxation in these western countries where they are often sent to rest and reform units maulled in Russia.

B. PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS

As is so often the case in human affairs, certain virtues contain their opposites. This is especially true of mass phenomena or the characteristics of groups. In the group all emotions are much less stable, their expression more "total", and calm reflection almost absent as compared with the conduct of the individual man. Military training endeavours to exploit these tendencies to its own advantage. The instability is an especially double-edged weapon, for while it makes for enthusiasm, responsiveness to leadership and so forth, it also causes feeling to swing easily the other way towards disaffection and panic. "Total reaction" is undoubtedly an advantage while the men composing a group are swayed by a feeling which is desirable for the military purposes, e.g. aggressiveness, hate of the enemy, zeal for self-sacrifice and so on. Its danger lies not only in swing to the opposite, such as panic, but also in that the individual, after "coming to", may start the process of reflection and perhaps remorse on what he did under the influence of crowd impulse. Here comes in the value of training, discipline and the conviction of a "righteous cause". The absence of reflective thought from the group as such has to be made good by the leader. This imposes a great strain on leaders at all levels during crises. Here the soundness or unsoundness of individual officers' character structure will play a big part.

It is for these reasons that considerable attention has been paid to the study of typical German traits of personality from which we can draw conclusions as to the psychological origins of German "behaviour". From these we will select those qualities which have a special bearing on military morale.

1. Power and Aggressiveness. This tendency is of obvious value to a warrior individually and as "offensive spirit" to a unit. The wish to attack and destroy is among the most deeply rooted features of living things. Yet in common religious and ethical teaching such as even Germans have had for the greater part of two thousand years, the free expression of aggressiveness has been condemned, except as "righteous anger" and as warlike spirit. Its glorification in the latter sense has been a distinctive feature of recent German philosophy based on the cult of manliness. The Nazis especially have linked the older Prussian tradition, in which an element of mediaeval chivalry still lingers, with the doctrine of the blond beast, the splendid ruthless youth with the look of the bird of prey, free from "weakening Christian inhibitions", giving full rein to the glorious freedom to fight, conquer, sweep the world clear of everything that stands in his victorious path.

There is no doubt that this form of sadism is as enjoyable to many Germans as knocking down brick houses is to a small boy. So long as it is carried out within the sanctions of the Wehrmacht and the licence given by the group leader, ethical scruple does not arise. This lends considerable dash and élan to German attack. They can express freely their boyish love of letting off guns and wielding destructive power. In the early stages of the war this element added greatly to their offensive strength and even now examples of reckless daring and enterprise are not wanting. The mental picture of irresistible might sweeping everything before it is a great help. In a military propaganda pamphlet we read:

"The German Panzer storm which swept over European lands last year was the iron "break camp" signal of a young and renewed people."

"The deciding power factor in the world, in the hands of the Führer, to whom he (the soldier) looks up in faith..... the mystery of death-defying deeds."

There is plenty of evidence as to the kick which these young warriors got out

of their fighting. The Luftwaffe crews in 1940/41 were especially interesting in this respect as witness the following: 2519-224-04-96

Air gunner, 1941: "I kept blazing away with my M.G. into the street. After all one can kill people. It was great fun. It was the only time I had a chance of shooting.... I was the only one (of the squadron) who had the chance of firing so neatly down at them."

Fighter Pilot, 1941: "In the squadron they called me the "Professional Sadist". I went for everything - buses, civil trains. I shot up every cyclist we had orders to bomb right inside towns."

Another ditto, 1942: (describing the morning of the start of the offensive against Russia) "We flew into the rising sun, hundreds of us, and below me the limitless space to be conquered - and endless columns of our armoured might marching east. It was the most inspiring moment of my life." (The boy's face glowed with a kind of rapture as he described the scene.)

Another air gunner, 1940: "I had the urge to shoot a man out of hand. I saw a town under me so I just emptied my racks into the traffic. It was fun! I was only sorry for the horses."

To these instances from individuals of the Air Force can be added an impressive mass of reports of sentiments expressed by many other Germans of all arms, to the same effect. Sadism is fun, so long as it is practised "en masse". The worst offenders, from personal observation, have been little blond, blue-eyed, baby-faced boys of obvious immaturity, or else the elegant "pansy" type, in both of whom the need to "play the man" was psychologically determined by the law of compensation.

Quite apart from any ethical or religious considerations, there are however certain psychological disadvantages to the practice of primitive sadism. An individual whose instinct of aggression - in itself a normal component of human nature - has not developed to certain levels of maturity can only interpret the reactions of other people in similar terms to his own. This is the same point made earlier with regard to the effects of harsh upbringing of the Prussian type. National sadism, i.e. the immature, childish form of aggressiveness, is a heritage of this family background and works both ways. The individual thus handicapped has no belief in goodness. This does not worry him so long as he is in the ascendant. The moment the other side begins to show power, fear arises. For he can only see the actions and intentions of the opponent through the lens of his own feelings. In brief, he expects the enemy to behave in the only way known to him, i.e. like himself. This is merely stating the old truth that a bully is also a coward. Removed from the spell of the group, prisoners are thus terribly apprehensive about the fate of their country and can only see the future in terms of acts of sadistic vengeance, such as detailed in the preceding section under "Post-war Expectations".

A long road has been traversed from Hitler's "We would sooner be feared than liked" to the idea repeatedly expressed by various men that:

"We must win, then the other side will be blamed for starting indiscriminate bombing."

"Why do all the nations hate us?"

"If only we had once more - just once more - the strength we had at the beginning, so that we could start a powerful offensive. The enemy have their teeth into us now."

"We began it - we had no idea what the others could do."

"Do unto others as you would have them do unto you..... we have so much blood on our hands."

"The Führer only went into the war because he said no other country was in a position to do so."

This last quotation, from a Major General, is another weak point in the sadist's armour. He needs cheap successes or his manliness wears thin. Many Germans are sighing for the good old days of walk-overs.

"What fun it used to be to shoot up towns with no A.A. there!"

"The occupation of Vichy France was a joy ride, as good as the walk into Austria."

"The war I should enjoy best would be against the Italians. That we could win with our Girls' League."

It would be wrong to assume that such reactions of prisoners occur with the same frequency and full awareness inside the armed forces. Two examples will lend point to this caution:

A Cpl., (W/T): "It's a funny thing, when you are with your unit you never have the slightest inkling that Germany could lose the war."

Yet since I have been in a prison camp I've thought quite differently." A Lt. Col: "There is more time to think about things here than at home. Sometimes I ask myself whether it's treason or merely a healthy human outlook."

It should be the task of our psychological warfare to cause more and more men to pull out of the group sadism and review their situation in these individual reflections. It is clear that what is being awakened is the long dormant sense of guilt and remorse.

The "virtue" of ruthless action, regardless of ethical considerations, is beginning to hit back at its exponents, both as direct guilt and remorse in the more morally developed, and as a phantasy of retaliation in equal measure in the brutal. Men are discovering that war has made them into coarse brutes. Some are finding that after years of arrogant Hitler Youth cynicism, the Army chaplains are a comfort to them.

The real sadists are in the worst plight:

"Only a little while ago I was tickled to death to watch Russian prisoners: the guards lashed them about with their sticks. Now they will vent all their fury on us prisoners of war if we lose."
(Cpl., G.A.F.)

There is much spurious self-justification:

"Poles who show alcoholic tendencies are sterilised so as not to endanger the nobler side of the Polish character." (An officer.)

"We only shoot Jews to get rid of them..... They look like beasts. You see types there (in Russia) whom I could kill without turning a hair..... In the partisan groups they are all Jews!" (Infantryman.)

They sometimes even fear treatment by British Medical officers "because I want to get back home again - thousands of Poles have been poisoned in German hospitals in Poland," or "if Germany loses only prisoners of war will be left and they will be sterilised to prevent their doing any more harm."

Now, it is safe to assume that such speculations also pass through the minds of at least a proportion of men not yet captured. We know, for instance, how interested a certain Grenadier regiment was in the subject of castration if Germany lost. In so far as German soldiers are affected by the sadistic group spirit they are bound by psychological laws to expect the worst; hence their various bogeys: Russians, coloured troops, and (in the last war) Highlanders and Australians - the dread of the "primitive", essentially a projection of this quality in themselves. The practical problem is whether this will make them fight better or worse. Has "Strength through Fear" morale-building value?

Will these men, realising they are ringed round by people who hate them and who they feel are bent on their destruction, close their ranks in greater solidarity or will they rather desert and hope to throw themselves on the mercy of the strong in time?

The answer must be postponed until we have also examined some of the other important components of the German character.

2. Submissiveness. As we saw earlier, in Part I, German submissiveness is an aspect of their primitive aggressive impulses. Also, in Part I it was pointed out that the chief defence against such impulses breaking out within the German family had to be suppression and the assumption of the meek, sternly dutiful and obedient attitude towards authority. Inside Germany the average native does not seek freedom because he has the experience that it leads to fratricidal strife. He submits himself to any power strong enough to unite him in common loyalty, but in the process the non-expressed aggression must find other outlets. Hence a dictatorship in such a nation is bound to lead to outer hostilities, really in order to preserve internal peace. We see that submissiveness, obedience and devotion to the leader principle are at least in part rooted in a fear of the internal "bad self". This makes them powerful but brittle cement of an armed force. The arguments and ideas of the Germans themselves have been previously quoted in sufficient detail to demonstrate the great importance of this factor in discipline, zeal of "service" etc. There is no denying the asset such an attitude is for military commanders, so long as that commander is feared above all else and the turning of aggression upon "outsiders" is successful.

By a strange provision of nature this inversion of sadism, which constitutes the essence of submission, can be felt as enjoyable. This enjoyment is usually not direct but only felt through the process of "idealising" obedience and "romanticising" pain at which the German is so good. We have seen examples of the sticking power and ability to put up with discomforts because of "soldierly duty", "self-sacrifice" and the like. In the course of an enquiry into the effect of various forms of Allied weapons on the German's nerves, it has become quite clear that "being a soldier" is a great strength. Artillery barrage, for example is admittedly unpleasant to him, "but one gets used to it, one is a soldier for that". Wounded men, with toes frozen off through immersion, show great fortitude and resignation. Many men in relatively sheltered jobs have professed their desire to "go through it", share their comrades' sufferings, be spared nothing.

The shadow side of this soldierly virtue of submissiveness becomes apparent when we recall the gradual shift of admiration from waning German to growing Allied strength, mentioned earlier. Mass, weight and rigid formation, as in artillery and bomber actions by the Western allies, and massed Russian tanks, mortar fire and infantry impress him in an awe-producing manner quite apart from any reasonable fear of personal injury. From the morale point of view mass tactics will always impress the German, who himself likes to imagine "gigantic" and "colossal" power concentrated into a solid lump. It is his ideal of might and he is over-powered by its contemplation.

This submissiveness or, to give it its psychological term, masochism (the lust of suffering), has other drawbacks. It leads to evasion of responsibility and the "passing of the buck" to those higher up among the senior leaders, and to lack of initiative among the lesser leaders. Everyone feels "only a little man". These features have already been considered when describing members of the Wehrmacht. It seems that, in theory, reference back is not a rigid demand of the German chain of command which looks for "responsibility and initiative" in action, but in practice their fear of authority and the stultification of initiative achieve this end, except perhaps at the highest levels. Their whole way of life and character-building precludes real independence and freedom of action which is only reserved for the Father-Hero-Leader.

An Infantry lieutenant complains that "as an officer you are supposed to be a leader and then again you are not. You are bound hand and foot...." A Coy. commander tells us that he was fed up with his C.O. "He even interfered in my internal discipline and issued an order that I was to ask him before I punished anyone with more than three days."

Two Generals, discussing the critical attitude of the other senior officers towards the regime, wonder whether they acted according to their principles when in a tight corner or whether they did not just carry out orders and leave the responsibility to those above them.

This point brings us to another aspect of submissiveness which does not work in a crisis. It is the hidden resentment which was always there but kept under while the machine was working smoothly. In an order of society which is based on strict hierarchy and obedience of the junior to the even slightly senior, true team work, especially at staff levels, seems difficult to achieve except in operations previously carefully worked out as to exact dove-tailing of functions. Many such instances of one or other branch (the Air Force appears to be the favoured scapegoat) letting the other down by saying "Not our business" or "We have had no orders about this" appear in reports. These messes would be followed by enquiries and reprimands or even dismissals and degradations.

3. Split Feelings. Rivalry and hidden resentment can only have a positive value to an army's morale when they are kept within the modest bounds of healthy competition in efficiency and a determination to put up a better show than the next man or unit. It may perhaps be natural and within those limits that members of one division or air group speak of the others as a lot of cowards or incompetents. What seems to be a more serious problem for German morale is the evidence of a real bitter spirit of back-biting, mutual undermining and jockeying for position, which can be gleaned from the picture of conditions in higher places presented by senior officers. Political influence appears to play the chief part in this. Duality and split loyalty pervade many levels of apparently zealous yes-men. Highly placed men are secretly hoping for the downfall of the regime. At all levels the hidden hostility comes to the surface when conditions of free speech have become assured in prison camps. It can surely not have been generated merely by the fact of capture. As we have seen, the renegade tendency is very marked. Germans are not only prepared to bite the hand that feeds them but also to eat out of the hand that has dealt them a good hearty smack. In addition to a good many examples of this tendency interspersed through these pages, the following spontaneous remark by a corporal of the Africa Troops is a gem:

"I hate the English and, like the S.S., I would take no prisoners. But if I felt the English were obviously going to win I would serve under them. If I had no relatives in Germany I would not object to settling in Canada or Africa."

Less naively and crudely, the same sentiment has been voiced again and again. It only needs a sharp concentration of our successes before it will be even more widespread. Hand in hand with it come the first evidences of some degree of defiance of authority, such as refusal to go on operational sorties unless proceedings against the crew for a joint crime against property in a Paris café were quashed; refusals to put to sea and the like. The symptoms are only in an early stage.

4. Impressionability. A further disadvantage to an unsuccessful authoritarian organisation is the malleability of opinions of its members who have not been given the right or opportunity to hold individual views. No doubt in times of rising power the leader creates a much more overwhelming impression on vacillating or vacant minds, but once his immediate influence is withdrawn or doubt of his omnipotence crops in, the danger that the more powerful opponent will gain the followers' ear is great. We see this constantly, not only in the already rising familiarity with British radio programmes despite all strictness of prohibition, but also in the rapid change of front of a large proportion of Germans of various initial shades of opinion. The absence of personal conviction or consistent philosophy of life is especially marked in the younger men and least in the sturdy, unthinking peasant who was never much swayed in any case. It is easy to gain decisive moral control over many German soldiers by the mere fact of being the bearer of authority. This is another facet of the characteristic described in section B above, based on the cowering by paternal power which leads to insecurity, lack of self-confidence, indeed loss of personal integrity and "wholeness".

How the change over from the sway of group leadership of the own side to the greater pull of the stronger enemy takes place is illustrated by the reminiscence of a Panzer Grenadier taken at Salerno:

"When the Allies landed our officers had just had a celebration at Battalion H.Q. and the C.O. came back half tight. The message came through that they (the Anglo-Americans) had landed. We bolted into our holes (defence positions). I wasn't worried. The section leader ordered me to take up my machine gun. I said: 'I can't refuse to obey an order but I don't understand it.' I wasn't such a fool. I stuck up my hands and went back. When they came past I went up to a U.S. officer who spoke German and told him everything. I gave everything away."

Another ditto replies: "So did I."

Another man: "People at home really have absurd ideas of what being a FW is like. They think we are being driven and beaten all the time. They only said it so as to prevent people from deserting..... What madness that propaganda was!"

A Cpl., Air Force: "The main point is that it is not everyone who is willing to sacrifice his life today. The lads are not such dare-devils as they used to be."

A N.C.O., Air Force: "After the war I shall never be able to feel ill-disposed towards an Englishman."

Another: "If the Führer could see these great tough English chaps!"

Another: "We can't rule a gigantic Empire with a handful of people like the English..... Sooner or later they will prove too powerful for us - the swine!"

No doubt similar rapid changes in the face of display of superior strength occur in the orbit of our Allies' operations.

This almost "feminine" yielding after a struggle to an opponent's power is hinted at by a high Italian officer who says of the Germans:

"The toughest soldiers in the world, but I noticed a curious trait in the last few days' fighting (in Tunisia): instead of a gradual decline in fighting morale which characterised the Italians, the Germans collapsed from one moment to the next. When the Germans thought resistance useless they immediately threw down their arms."

It is the view of the writer that this is but the "climax" of a logical process of displacement of submission from their own authority to that of the enemy.

5. Group Solidarity. Many references to "group mentality" or collective feeling have been made throughout these pages, mostly emphasising the strength and comfort it gives Germans. To be called by the collective name "soldier" is to put on an armour protecting one against fear and weakness. It must not be assumed that the inability to express their anti-Nazi or anti-war sentiments within the unit is chiefly due to any special Gestapo agents or suspicion of each other. In the group these things do not rise to the surface except as harmless grouses. The bright facets are placed together to form a shining surface layer. The members are sustained by the collective fictions, traditions and symbols of leaders, loyalties and mutual support. We have given ample evidence of the German's inner need for such buttressing of his feelings of worth, solidarity and even affection. The successful working of instinctive group unity is exemplified in an interesting description by a captain of the behaviour of his unit under a British barrage:

"We had amazing luck! The whole unit including myself were lying on our noses, well dug in. But it's a nasty feeling. Splinters whizzed by into the sandbags, but nothing was damaged. When the firing was over we breathed again. There was a roar of laughter - not that there was anything to laugh at, but it was the tension."

Speaking of losses in the Tunisian campaign one man ventures to express fear of their moral effects. Another says: "There will be no moral effect. Surely you have seen how we can take it."

The advantages of such comradeship are obvious. Are there any drawbacks in the German variety of group feeling? It must be admitted that there are. The first is a further contribution to lack of personal initiative, and thus a much greater dependence on quality of leadership. The insistence of the system on group qualities, on the pyramid of authority, has evidently had a discouraging effect on leadership itself. The words of Matthew Arnold are relevant:

"Can it be denied that to live in a society of equals tends in general to make a man's spirits expand and his faculties work easily and actively; while to live in a society of superiors, although it may occasionally be a very good discipline, yet in general tends to tame the spirits and to make the play of faculties less secure and active? Can it be denied that to be heavily overshadowed, to be profoundly insignificant, has on the whole a depressing and numbing effect on the character?"

The tearing from the group has, evidently, a quite catastrophic effect on the German soldier. He does badly in solitariness and longs for "comrades", and he shows conspicuous lack of personal moral courage or convictions, with a few notable exceptions of men with strong religious or other ethical principles. There are instances of men being "abandoned" in forward positions by their officers (whatever the good or bad reason for this), and feeling lost and bewildered.

A junior lieutenant says with bitterness: "Every regimental C.O. has to make out a report on his officers who have been captured. I should very much like to meet him again. I wrote to my parents that during the withdrawal I was left behind. The C.O. drove up, got out, told me to remain with my vehicle, and the others then saw him escape."

A tank captain: "The General fought marvellously. But apart from him, any leadership one saw was done by the men... The whole thing was like a rabbit hunt - a disgraceful show! Everything smashed up! A brigade of 5,000 men! It brings tears to my eyes to think about it.... The brigade was much sinned against.... It seemed to us as if we had been betrayed and forsaken..... No rations..... no W/T communication with Army. We were carrying on the war off our own bat. We didn't know what was happening...."

Cpl., Air Force Ground Troops: "The way R. said 'The air-field must be held to the last round!' That speaks for itself. The old men say: 'You cowardly swine!' They (the Higher Command) don't know what defence is like today. They stay at home while we give our lives out there....."

In defeat or crisis, their thoughts turn naturally to the magician-Führer.

A pilot from Tunisia says: "17 of our Generals captured! Germans falling back without fighting; 180,000 dead and wounded!" (Quotations from local camp gazette.) "I think we are absolutely done for unless Adolf can save us If Adolf says we shall fight to the last man it is true. He ought to say something! He must have something up his sleeve."

Of the Führer alone they expect miracles of faith. A Major said: "I can imagine our people's spirit (on hearing of Stalingrad) when everybody is waiting for him to speak. A man should have sufficient faith in himself to appear before his people. Stalin would not shrink from it. . . . (This speaker was an ardent but cowardly Nazi bully.)"

As the national thought turns to the chief leader on a large scale so the soldiers look to their officer for guidance; it is clear from many stories of the Tunisian campaign that here at least the officers tended to leave their men in exposed positions. Others seem to have "advocated capture". N.C.Os. complain that so many officers lost their heads because the "situation wasn't in the text book", especially if the fire came from an unexpected quarter.

We have little direct evidence of the moral effect of encirclement, beyond such general statements as that it is "unpleasant" but bearable if men are together. Another side of group mentality which could be exploited to our advantage is the absence of reflective, critical capacity. While this enables orders to be carried out with automaton-like precision and obedience to be unquestioning (which the German leader expects in action), it also facilitates the spread of rumour and false news, demoralisation no less than enthusiasm. The groups of prisoners taken in Tunisia in May had a persistent rumour to buck them up, i.e. that Stalingrad, Moscow, Leningrad and Gibraltar had all fallen to the Germans. "It won't be long now." Whether this was done deliberately by their authorities to send them into captivity with good morale, or whether it was a spontaneous consoling wish-thought was not ascertained. They believed in it wholeheartedly.

When these negative factors have been enumerated, the impression which has remained with all observers is of the abiding and very real strength of German "Kameradschaft", of sticking together, pulling together as men in common danger, of trust in the man "with whom you lie in a hole together." Only the other day a recently captured bombardier of the Hermann Göring Division said: "Oh, the war has been fine. Such good fellowship! We were like a sworn band of brothers in our Battery - all trusting and knowing each other completely. This appears to have been especially true of the spirit at the Russian front where they feel much more up against it in a truly hostile, implacable land, with partisans prowling at night and danger all round. This faith and loyalty to comrades which emerge from countless anecdotes of all three services are the main cementing force of the Wehrmacht. The more's the pity that this fine quality can only be induced in Germans in the conditions of military service.

6. Rivalries

Except for grumbles about local insufficiencies of the Air Force, the majority of Army soldiers above a certain level think highly of it and are anxious to transfer to the flying arm or the tanks, partly because they are a "cleaner life" but also because of conditions of pay and especially because they are the prestige services. This exclusiveness is much resented by the higher Army officers. Two generals discussed the great difficulty in getting young men to become infantry officers as they all wanted to fly or drive tanks. A Colonel, among many others, has described the constant friction between the Air arm and the military. "Rommel blamed Kesselring," "Strong representations had been made that the G.A.F. was always taking the most valuable human material and using it for ground staffs. Hermann wangled it so that he retained 400,000 men, lavishly equipped. despite the great needs of the Army. That sort of thing makes you sick." "They don't think so much of the Luftwaffe at home now. . . ." The humble infantryman also has his thoughts: "The men in the Air Force and the Navy and the Panzers get a lot of food, but what happens in the infantry makes one's hair stand on end." Yet the infantry man is supposed to be the hero of the war. Even the Army auxiliary girls can't bear the Air Force girls because the latter get more pay.

As between the U-boats and the G.A.F. honours are easy. Remarks are frequently heard that they compare their relative dangers and each expects the other to win the war for them. While an Army General grumbles that it was the Navy who spoilt the invasion of Britain plans because they thought themselves too proud to act as ferry-men, an Air General from Tunisia had nothing but praise for the Navy's local

co-operation and, in fact, had a batch of Iron Crosses awarded to Naval personnel just before the surrender as a token of his gratitude. In brief, the Army would appear to regard the Air Force as a lot of spoilt upstarts biting off more than they can chew, as when high Air Force officers, thanks to Goering's influence, are given land commands for which their training does not fit them. The Navy and Air Force regard the Army as very much the senior service, the "poor land rats", (Landser), heroes and all that, but prefer their own jobs to "lying about in the mud." Neither of them appear to grumble much at their ground establishment's efficiency in the way that the Army, at least those in Africa, have blamed their rear service for muddle, treason and soft-living. There is, however, some considerable envy of the E-boat men for the U-boat crews. They believe that their job is just as hazardous and unpleasant but they do not get the double and treble rates of pay of the submariners. The latter speak deprecatingly of the "big ship" men, and regard themselves as the only live part of the Navy, who are not forever cleaning ship. Inter-unit and inter-formation rivalry and contempt are also found. A lieutenant of Panzer Grenadiers, for example, makes very deprecating remarks about a division sent to Tunisia: "I don't know what they sent them over here for. XYZ regiment was the worst. All that rabble!"

An Air Force corporal says: "I saw masses of men and officers of the Hermann Goering Division as PsW..... The elite of the Wehrmacht!" (Laughs scornfully.)

Front versus Rear. This type of antagonism is well marked among all three services. The "base wallahs", storemen, ration people etc. are thought of as more or less enemies.

A Flak corporal describes his return to a depot unit after discharge from hospital: "... Corporals' Mess was filthy as a pigsty..... Everyone, from the C.O. down to the lowest private, was against us soldiers from the front. A second man confirms this by saying: "Yes, it's always the same in these convalescent companies; so many chaps there trying to dodge everything." A lieutenant speaks contemptuously of "all those famous base warriors from Tunis - supply officers and that sort of thing, an unpleasant lot."

All U-boat men despise the fellows who man their shore establishments. They are nearly always called the "Defaulters' Company", implying that they consist of bad types. These men are famed for scrounging the U-boat crews' extra rations, to which they themselves are not entitled.

The air crews frequently grumble about the inadequacy of flying instructors at schools.

The most informed and damning evidence of the strain between front and rear services comes from the more vocal among the Generals. We hear expressions describing the administration as "an absolute bloody scandal". "Those in the administration always get away with it. Rations were shocking. No guns - what irresponsibility!" One General advocates the creation of a number of "shock" inspectorates to clean up the disorder prevailing everywhere.

The Flak round Berlin is blamed for retaining too many high-grade men. The staffs were all "badly picked" and did not understand front commanders' requirements. On the contrary, experienced ordnance Generals were suddenly shifted to command brigades or divisions. "Nothing but hitches, and if you go and try to make a row you are greeted by the Chief of Staff sipping his coffee and smoking a cigar, saying 'You are a bit over-excited, aren't you?'" "No fuel, no cars, no vehicles - you had to beg for everything."

The point of these quotations is not whether they represent the truth, but that the feeling of being let down by "Base" exists.

Soldiers versus Party. How far does the Wehrmacht as a whole feel solidarity with the Party institutions with which it has professional contact? It will only be necessary to summarise, as many of the points have emerged in earlier parts of this report.

Rivalry with the S.S. is considerable. It is however necessary to distinguish between the Waffen-S.S. which is now an embodied military force at the disposal of the O.K.W., the general (civilian) S.S. of part-time members, and the Security-S.S., the squads responsible for "cleaning up" occupied countries etc. These latter are at the disposal of the political authorities, and their activities, atrocities etc. are, it must be stated, disapproved of with varying degrees of emphasis by a goodly percentage of German soldiers of all ranks. Other members of the Wehrmacht, though not disapproving of their methods, regard them as a necessary evil but are glad they haven't to undertake the S.S.'s job. The Waffen-S.S., on the other hand, are considered the "cream" of the armed forces, and as such either looked up to as "model troops" or else looked at askance with envy and readiness to pick holes in their prowess and to debunk their pre-eminence. A typical example

of the former attitude is the remark by an Army Obergefreiter who said he had a brother serving in the S.S. "He's got the Iron Cross, Class I. He's been through hard times. An S.S. battalion is coming to North Africa soon..... then things will hum." They are regarded as rather admirable dare-devil fanatics, specially chosen and indoctrinated, which makes them indifferent to death; they are apt to be chosen for all the worst suicide jobs on the Eastern front where they do not take prisoners and never surrender.

The envious, gleeful fault-finding attitude is illustrated by a number of stories of their failures.

"The S.S. is favoured." (Cpl., Armoured Regt.)

"One S.S. regiment completely disappeared and was never again put into action." (L/Cpl., ditto.)

"They are a lot of fanatics, but when it comes to fighting - give me the Army every time." (O/Lt., G.A.F.)

"S.S. Division Germania was a lamentable failure in Poland. The Army had to come to its assistance. The Adolf Hitler Division was incredibly stupidly led; they attacked without rhyme or reason before their heavy arms had arrived." (O/Lt., G.A.F.)

"They should only have been used as military police."
(Another ditto.)

As long ago as 1941 some German officers realised that the S.S. might have special functions. A pilot officer said: "It is always possible that someone might engineer a rebellion. But if there are two armies which don't see eye to eye..... If the S.S. becomes too powerful the Führer can fall back on the Army and vice versa. In my opinion this is part of the plan. We are the people who are really doing the fighting." Another officer, a few days later, stated that in his opinion there would be a fight between the S.S. and the Wehrmacht.

The S.S. men themselves, to judge from the remarks made by the few who have been captured by us, feel themselves a race apart and do not wish, for instance, to be transferred to the Army. There are sometimes heated arguments between them and members of the Wehrmacht as to their military efficiency. They appear to be favoured at least on home stations with the best barrack accommodation and food. A significant fact has emerged. Reserve and training units of the Army no longer have access to more than a nominal amount of ammunition for practice purposes. The dumps are all guarded by S.S. troops. Some of them are quite frank in their aims of putting the Wehrmacht in its place and establishing the complete ascendancy of the Praetorian guard. They seem very devoted to their chief, Himmler.

Regional Attitudes. The Nazi policy has been to try and abolish all regional separatism and feeling, especially in the Wehrmacht. "The inner experience of the soldierly attitude stands in the closest relationship to the concept of 'Prussianism' says the official doctrine ('Spiritual preparedness for War', 1941). The world of Prussia..... is today the world of the entire German people." The policy of regional, territorial recruiting and depot-ing of regiments has been progressively abandoned. There is evidence that this system has been successful up to a point. Even a few Bavarian soldiers have stated that they are German first and do not object to Prussians. On the whole, however, the Bavarians and Austrians do not get on with the Prussians whom they find cold, arrogant and slow. Austrians, Sudetenlanders and, more especially, men of German lineage from Poland and the Baltic etc., have often complained that they have been discriminated against and teased for their accents. Conscripted Poles, Luxembourgers and Alsations have been made very conscious of their inferior status. Such people are usually completely split up among Reich Germans so as to lose their compactness.

In the main, however, the regional factor is not found to play any great part up to the present. There is enough evidence to show that it has possibilities of springing to life among Bavarians and Austrians.

The People at Home. Certain aspects of this topic have been mentioned in other sections, viz. what the soldier expects from the civilian and the kind of phantasy he has of the "Homeland" in the abstract. The soldier's attitude to the Party boss was also indicated and it was pointed out that, rightly or wrongly, those worthies were beginning to play a scapegoat's part in the soldier's mind. On the other hand, the rank and file are rather at one with the common man at home. If they are anti-Nazis or disaffected they grumble at the needless sufferings to which "our people" are being exposed. If they are Nazis they underline the solidarity and unity of "Home and Front".

Occasionally voices are heard blaming shipyard workers and the like for sabotage. With the penetration of air raid news or in men recently back from leave (in the case of airmen and U-boat crews this may be a matter of days only before capture) there is a tendency to ascribe to the blitzed population great stiffening of morale, righteous hate and a determination to fight and work twice as hard. Pity for the sad life at home is beginning to be heard, mixed with occasional indignation that the civilian is losing his erstwhile sub-servience to the soldiers.

From time to time there are echoes - or revivals - of the 1918 feeling on these lines: "I suppose when we get back as men in uniform we shall have to creep along the gutter if we don't want a knife in our backs." An Obergefreiter, voicing the common sentiment of not wishing to return to a beaten homeland, adds that he is completely disillusioned. "I don't want to see the vileness, the dirty tricks and injustices that go on there. When I think of my colleagues having cushy jobs at home while I and my brothers are at the front....." The tendency to project to the outsider things which the German himself feels is also appearing in this connection. A Sergeant Pilot expressed the view that

"Englishmen hate soldiering. If things go wrong they'll raise hell and say they've had enough of it and are not fighting any more. Our men, brought up on National Socialism, have a different spirit."

The mistrust of the rear can also be deduced from the fact that the front line man is beginning to look askance at the poor human material that "home" is sending out: "cowardly swine" and "silly young puppies" are now coming along; "all the best men have gone."

"These are the young soldiers, the ones who have seen the home front and know what is going on behind it."

"That's what we are fighting for - to be robbed right and left when we come home." (On the subject of rising prices in cafes.)

"This time there will be not only profiteers, but the Nazis as well."

The inference is that it is not "the people" but certain vaguely specified, almost imaginary evil-doers at home, partially identifiable as "Party bosses" or shopkeepers, or the O.K.W. authorities, or simply "they" who are wrong, against the fine, heroic, long-suffering "soldiers and common people".

The soldier is showing signs of being fed up also with hollow propaganda, and the front line fighter is very contemptuous of the heroic stuff and nonsense which is reported back by the newspaper men and by the unrealistic treatment of the war in films. An Air Force sergeant tells how in a cinema he saw a newsreel depicting the "Advance of German Gunners in Russia." So he shouted: "Forward, march! Back the way you came!" as he had just returned from the great retreat at the front. On another occasion an assault on a Russian village was shown on the screen when a soldier sitting next to him said: "The whole thing is a swindle; I took part in the making of that film, hundreds of miles behind the front!" They said this for the whole audience to hear and laughed loudly, while the S.S. men were pacing up and down excitedly but were unable to do anything because soldiers in uniform are not within their jurisdiction.

Perhaps the core of the comradeship spirit of the Wehrmacht is expressed in the words of another Air Force sergeant;

"If only we could fight as soldiers against soldiers, without having any civilians or politicians, it would be a jolly fine thing because soldiers understand each other no matter whether they are friends or enemies."

7. Status.

(a) General. Solidarity of a group with a common tradition engenders some sort of pride, or self-regard, which is felt by each member in virtue of his belonging to the group. It constitutes "esprit de corps". The sources of this feeling were examined in considerable detail in Parts I B and III. Here we must try and assess the role it is playing in conditions of battle stress and adversity. This esprit de corps must, of course, be based on "mutual regard and esteem" of its members. But apart from this aspect already covered by comradeship and group feeling, there is a kind of abstract sense of superiority which most closed groups have and which in the case of the Wehrmacht we called "The Finest Army in the World" feeling. This need not necessarily bear any relation to reality. Even the Italian army began the war with plenty of dash and beating of drums. But above this, there are also to be considered the personal re-actions of individuals, especially of the officers, and the change in individual self-feeling as a member of the group. The theory behind this somewhat involved thought is that so long as a man's self-esteem or pride can find a suitable channel through the group, he

will continue to give it his love and loyalty. If he became ashamed or disappointed with it he would "withdraw" the live part of his feelings from it, indeed, he might even start to hate it, the way one is apt to swing into hostility towards past loves, especially if one is a German.

It has already been shown how great a part of initial morale-feeling is contributed to the Wehrmacht by the prestige it enjoys in its own nation and by the consequent boost to self-valuation it supplies to the majority of its members. This feeling has in fact been so swelled by the great and spectacular successes of the German armed forces in the first years of the present war, by constant propaganda of invincibility and of the "building up" of their weapons, that the fund of pride and faith has carried it so far through a number of major defeats without being fatally undermined by the harsh impact of facts. Dittmar, Germany's star military radio commentator, has stated that "consciousness of defeat is the essence of defeat." This consciousness is present among prisoners of war, but even they argue away the implication, i.e. that they are no longer the finest army in the world, by characteristic rationalisations.

Some recent statements on this point may be quoted to show how tenacious is their belief in their superiority and soldierly qualities.

A Sergeant, Tank Regt: "German soldiers fought bravely in Africa."

A L.A.C., Air Arm: "..... no denying we've had a hard knock..... but what is a mere 150,000 men?"

A Cpl., ditto: "After this war we'll make a peace pact of 25 years. During that time we'll get ourselves thoroughly equipped and then we'll start another war and that time we shall finish on top."

A General: "Even if we lose, the German Army is and will remain the best in the world, even as regards leadership."

A Private, Air Infantry: "Europe must first be subjected, then South America. No power in the world can stop us....."

A Sgt. pilot: "Our men who fought at Stalingrad and Tobruk will go down to history, our children will look on them as heroes"

Lt., Army: "I have had more than enough of the 100 per cent Nazis, but I am a soldier and do my duty. If you (British) think you are going to get the better of me you are mistaken."

It is unnecessary to labour the advantages which such an attitude confers on armed forces. Belief in their superior human quality and manhood, in the efficiency of their training and weapons, besides local pride in the smartness and doughty deeds of their units or formations is irreplaceable, once lost. These are the essence of "competence, power and worth", which were listed as the core of morale. It is therefore, very necessary to subject the several aspects of this rather complicated feeling of soldierly pride to further scrutiny. This must be done both from the point of view of individuals and of group sentiments.

(b) Status-reactions of particular service levels.

A considerable gap remains between leaders (especially officers) and followers in the Wehrmacht, despite official and personal attempts to close it. Hence the self-regard of men and officers has to be treated separately. We have already learnt through the statements of a high commanding general that only ten per cent of German soldiers can be considered as active, conscious fighters, while the remainder will follow these "real soldiers", if they exist, in any given group. The reactions of the leader group, therefore, are interesting.

(i) Leaders. There is evidence that the higher an officer's position and the more he knows of the "inside" working of his war machine, the less confidence does he show. This evidence was set out in Part II, Sect. A (1) especially. First there is the general deflation of the status of senior officers by political ascendancy of the Party. The consciousness of their caste having lost the battle of status, proof of lack of moral courage and of unsoundness has entered deeply into these men's souls.

"We have stood too much we have had our backbone broken"

is a fair summary of many P/W Generals' feelings which must be shared by many of their as yet uncaptured peers.

They share, to a high degree, the retrospective sense of guilt aroused by the brutalities of the regime, and are aware of the loathing of the world. A Colonel voices this in a very remarkable way:

25/A-33 / 84 - 101

"The people of Danzig, formerly so happy and well-off and now completely disillusioned. I don't know why it is, we just do not seem able to draw people to us. After all the fundamental principle is to convince the foreigner that he is better off now and under this rule"

A Lt.Col. says:

"I have found that hatred of the Party is much more pronounced in Germany than hatred of the enemy".

Ambition, the wish to excel and be noticed, to receive a high decoration and other honours are frank aims of most high German officers despite affecting to be unmoved by such considerations. The inability to gather further laurels and the prospect of defeat thus have a very depressing effect on men whose vision of themselves is largely of "the greatest leader community in the world", entering cities, disposing of the enemy in sharp, massive, masterful blows planned to the last detail. Their phantasy of power and superiority is pained and hurt by withdrawals and defeats as well as by consciousness of administrative muddle and complacency. This is brought out again and again. The inability to face reality is well summarised by a lieutenant captured in North Africa:

"German soldiers have become visionaries during the war. Instead of doing something about their mistakes, they still imagine everything will be alright. They took up this attitude after their first big successes from N.C.O. to General Staff And now what is going to become of us if anything goes wrong?"

Generals themselves confirm that there was lack of calm and objective appreciation at high levels, and that such decisions as timely withdrawal in Tunisia and perhaps also in Russia were not made, because of the psychological incapacity to face these insults to pride and prestige. As one officer put it: "No German can ever admit he is wrong and climb down." The German dependence on a sense of superiority, helpful in success, leads to childish wishful thought and reliance on the miraculous in adversity. The mystical qualities of German military superiority are the main props of what faith in victory remains. But a Staff officer, asked by a colleague for his appreciation of the military situation about the time of Mussolini's fall, and what his remedy might be, confessed he could only think of one solution: the sudden providential demise of Mr. Churchill!

The self-centred, unrealistic attitude leads not only to over-estimation of self, but also to wrong appraisal of the enemy and blindness to the actual needs and feelings of troops under one's command. The German is given to attribute to his enemy feelings and intentions of his own which he will not acknowledge. This acts both ways. It relieves him of guilt but also increases apprehension. But this Narcissus-like quality of seeing oneself mirrored in others instead of appraising them as they really are has further disadvantages.

Reaction to enemy tactics:

In so far as the German enjoys his war, this is due to the feeling that he is a very chivalrous, fair, "decent" fighter. He therefore also loves his British opponents whom he does the honour of regarding as "almost like Germans", "Nordic kinsmen", "perfect gentlemen" etc. In so far as our British methods of warfare conform to the German model, they are "fair", "honourable" and the obvious expressions of a "Kultur"-nation. It must be stated that the British, while admired as tough, fair, manly and brave, hold no essential terror to the Germans because their methods lack the element of the surprising or unfamiliar which is the essential shock factor to the self-centred. It is true that this also has its slight advantage for us. Thus, officers have repeatedly stated that their troops who fought well in Russia went to pieces in Tunisia precisely because the British seemed so like themselves and were felt to be so honourable that they didn't mind surrendering to such opponents. This means, as already stated, that the British are bearers of the German's "good" self qualities, whereas certain other nations, notably the Jews (politically) and the Russians (militarily) are the symbols of their "bad" selves. But there are also drawbacks for us in this embarrassing affection. They even hope for salvation by the British from the fury of these "bogey".

Not a few soldiers and officers have said that they liked fighting the British because they knew what to expect, could work out the plan behind their artillery patterns, could calculate how much the enemy were likely to stand in the way of punishment etc., i.e. they could put themselves into our place. A general formulated this similarity very precisely when he said he had made a special study of the psychology of weapons and had come to the conclusion that people could only devise weapons in accordance with their national temperaments. Hence German and British weapons policy and design were closely similar, but Italian arms were quite different.

During most of the artillery softening in Tunisia the Germans got to know when the British gunners "stopped for a meal and a smoke", and arranged their own meal hours accordingly. None of these comforting, Portland Club conditions were to be found in Russia where, it is stated, "you can't call it warfare - it's ruthless struggle for your life..... neither side will give any quarter." A Lieutenant of tanks and another of artillery comparing notes made remarks to this effect:

A: "We came here from Russia and were glad to have a decent enemy to fight. When we knocked a tank out I always said: 'Cease fire; enemy prisoners to be well treated!' Of course, there were some who went on firing - that's the old hatred."

B: "Yes, but they can't have been old Afrika Korps men. Between them and the Eighth Army there was a gentlemen's agreement."

Similarly, an airman, as far back as 1940, said:

"The English are of Germanic race..... they were our best opponents in the last war; they know how to defend themselves against our peculiarities."

Russian weapons, such as the "Stalin organ" multiple rocket projector, or their use of partisan troops in the enemy rear, or their disconcerting refusal to give in, but also such things as night attacks by allied coloured troops are feared and resented as an outrage to decent fighting. The German is angered and disconcerted by the use of tactics and devices he had not considered, and which are, therefore, "not honourable".

Reaction to subordinates: Turning now to evidence as to leaders' attitudes towards their troops, it is clear that a good proportion must be satisfactory or their men would not follow them. No generalisations to include so diverse an assortment as "officers" under one hat can be made. It is more profitable to try and compare their strong and weak points. There can be no doubt that the rigid stern type of leadership plus reasonable efficiency and care for the men suits the Germans. To alter it would be a departure from their family pattern. "Fathers" are like that and the sons' devotion is aroused by this very treatment. The trouble is not, therefore, strictness as such, but the change in type of "new officer" and in the character difficulties which the new generation of Nazi-educated officers have to contend with when face to face with a hostile superior force.

The evidence up to date is clearest in the German Navy, among the young U-boat officers. They are not infrequently extremely arrogant and intemperate in their discipline, over confident before action, but badly trained and inexperienced and therefore, not unexpectedly, cowardly and self-centred in action. There have been a number of examples of captured U-boat crews who have been outraged by the fact that the officers have seen only to their own comfort and safety, or have utterly broken down, have abandoned ship themselves but ordered the crew to perform scuttling duties which were theirs to carry out. Older seamen are very contemptuous and frankly disaffected with this generation of officers. These are, it will be remembered, the nominated products of the Nazi Party.

"These pipsqueaks, Hitler Youth leaders with their Hitler Youth manners!"

One of these young gentlemen himself tells how one of his men got four months for stealing a tin of sardines from ship's stores, and adds:

"When you think of all the things we used to send home! But of course we were artful."

It is also fairly clear that nomination and strong political pressure for final selection of these sadist-coward youths for army commissions is now in the Party's hands. Neither C.O.'s nor men have confidence in them.

The evidence from the fighting army is not so conclusive. Many soldiers speak of the good attitude and humaneness of their (junior) officers who are "of their own class." A certain amount of criticism is, however, found.

A Captain (regular) criticises the arrogant, automaton-like young Nazis who become officers and a Lt. Col. (Tanks) says the Hitler Youth leaders always make the worst officers.

Two L/Cpls. of an Infantry unit gave unwitting point to the crucial importance of leadership for morale when one said:

"We had arranged that if we met any British we would give ourselves up"

while the other said of their company officer:

"3,000 rounds into our sector and Lt. X's nerves broke down." (Aug. 42).

Two officers described how, on the eve of Alamein, they were to have had a party; the C.O. and Adjutant were coming.....

"Then we saw shellfire..... I never saw so much moral disruption in a short time....."

Recent impressions from the Mediterranean theatre of war seem to point to an increase in the number of Nazi young officers with corresponding results to the morale of their men. None of a personally examined recent batch of "all sorts" of unselected military and Luftwaffe ground personnel prisoners from Tunisia, Sicily and Italy have shown dissatisfaction with those officers with whom they were immediately concerned. We have, however, already referred to an abstract, general latent hostility towards "officers" as a whole, which is an irrational symptom of split feelings.

"The company commander used to drop into our mess for a chat and a drink - genuinely friendly, without condescension. Young recruits were at first afraid of officers but soon lost that. Higher officers are rarely seen."

(Cpl., Flak)

"One can always go to one's Coy. commander with personal troubles."

(Sgt., Flak)

"Relations with officers were very good. On the Russian front the immediate officers used to come round and chat in a friendly way. They were more like companions."

(L/Cpl., Air Infantry)

"I've never yet met a bad front officer; they are comradely, more like ourselves."

(L/Cpl., Tanks)

"Officers are very decent - strict on duty, of course - but one can have very human relations with them off duty. The old Colonel I drove was very nice, too, and used to talk to me on the trips."

(L/Cpl., Driver, M/T)

A Signals L/Cpl., a late arrival, described three cases of young officers completely losing their nerve at the first shell explosion. All three had been bullies during garrison days.

The O.K.W. is certainly concerned about its officers. A recently captured army pamphlet, a periodical entitled "Notes for the Officers' Corps", dated July 43, contains much material proving that they are anxious to preserve the "new ideal". In little sermons to the officer, they urge him to see that the new type of recruit (i.e. the reservist of older years and some status in life) is not "senselessly insulted from morning till night." Respect for such men is urged, and supervision of N.C.Os lost their inclinations to severity and bullying get the better of them. It is tacitly assumed that without such reminder offensive harshness would prevail.

In an article entitled "Marginal Notes", officers are reminded that they must not listen to foreign radio, that this is punishable by hard labour, "so of course their sense of honour forbids....." We know what good reason the O.K.W. have to issue this coaxing but threatening appeal.

The danger threatening from slackness in political indoctrination of troops, which they admit prevails, is stressed. C.Os. who plead lack of time are stigmatised as disobeying orders. (We learn, unofficially, of a move to replace the highest commanders by politically reliable S.S. Generals.)

Another strange note concerns the action the German Officer must take if he finds his colleagues indulging in fraud and corrupt practices. "Thank God it is only a question of rare exceptions" - but the reader wonders why in that case the honour and patriotism of officers is appealed to in a passionate 2-page article.

An interesting sidelight on the differences in theory and practice is thrown in another of those marginal notes. This urges officers not to threaten their defaulters with front line service. "It is criminal folly to talk like that.

Front line service is and remains the highest honour that can happen to a German man." Similarly the threat to "transfer an incorrigible man to the Infantry"; to this the editor says: "Let the devil take those who say things like that. In nearly every Fuhrer speech during the war it has been emphasised and the nation knows that the Infantry is and remains the queen of all the arms and that to be an infantryman is therefore an incomparable honour."

A single number of this periodical is so full of such insults to both the integrity and good sense of any average officer that it is apparent there must be a lack of trust and respect of the O.K.W. for the new type of officer and that they perceive that the new officer is losing the regard of his men. In older publications this curious wrapped up appeal to the "honour" of the officers' caste not to commit treason, felony and insubordination is not so prominent. It goes some way to show that the conceptions of even purely eternal gentlemanliness, such as at least characterised the Junker sort, are now no longer taken for granted. It is inconceivable that a British journal like *MECA's* "Current Affairs" or "War" should contain a long appeal to officers on the necessity of keeping their ranks clean by spying out their pals who did a bit of trading in Army clothing or petrol. Yet this is evidently what the present German officers are accustomed to be told about. Such literature must in itself be perceptibly lowering to the self-esteem of the Officers' Corps as a whole. But the men, by and large, show as yet no evidence of having lost trust in their junior leaders, although the tendency to grumble at their youth and inefficient training is becoming more marked.

Then bad officers appear to be chiefly in the rear and on home service, though an effort is being made to have only wounded front veterans as instructors in rear training establishments.

ii. The Followers

We must now review the "soldierly pride" factor in the great mass of Germans, again bearing in mind the limitations of using prisoners of war for our purpose. It has already been stated that the need to preserve the sense of superiority is still there. In order to achieve this recourse is nowadays had to various manoeuvres of reality evasion. The opinions of the German press and of *EW* abound with examples.

"The 1940 invasion of England was abandoned because of leakage of information."

"Rommel came up against heavy opposition and was forced to withdraw. That was brought about by an act of treason."

"The Italians let us down in Africa and Sicily. They were also responsible for Stalingrad."

This is none other than the revival of the old "stab in the back" theory by which Germans claimed the last war was lost. The Socialists and Jews were then blamed. Now, despite the expulsion of the Jews, these fears have not abated. They and the Freemasons continue their evil plotting.

"If we lose the war it will be because of the Jews. The Jews abroad will be responsible." (A.G.A.F. pilot, 1943). The idea is that they are stirring up the world against Germany and financing enormous armaments in the Allied countries.

Those unable to use so fantastic an excuse, fall back on blaming mere material superiority of the Allies, with implied contempt for such an unfair method of battling against heroes, forgetting that their own earlier successes were achieved precisely in this way. This preponderance of Allied numbers and weapons is exaggerated into figures like 100 to 1, as a complete excuse for failure.

Another way to escape the realisation that there may be other armies in the world equally brave and well organised is the mysterious and smiling hint that all the withdrawals are nothing but cunning strategic moves by the O.K.W. to lure the clumsy enemy into a trap. "You wait until our counter-move develops." This was heard successively over Libya, Tunisia, Sicily and Salerno, and also throughout the past twelve months of the Russian war. Still less well equipped German soldiers just dig their heels in and foresee victory because the finest soldiers in the world cannot be beaten. Thus a Major, after listening to the pessimistic arguments of a very clear-headed General, burst out: "I am proud of the achievements of our Army - it gives me a hold. I am perhaps weaker than the General; I need such a hold." Anxious attention to evidence of continuing "to matter" is another symptom.

"The British officers are still treating us with respect - we must be still a power."

Two further kinds of reality-evading legends are also current. The first has a factual basis in some experimental work known to be going on: it is our old friend the secret weapon story. The second is the already mentioned manufacture of completely untrue rumours of fantastic German successes "of which the British

The secret weapon myth has a venerable history going back to the last war. It was current in 1917 after the failure of the Kaiser's peace offer. It is frequently encountered at all stages of this war. "There is a weapon which will only be used in the greatest emergency on Hitler's personal orders to decide the war. He refrains on humanitarian grounds....."

"When once we start to use the weapons we have up our sleeves.... that won't be warfare any more.... oh well, we shan't use them against England, only against Russia."

"If we lose, the world is done for but wait till we get our new Tank (the 'Tiger')."

There is as yet little evidence that either sailors, soldiers or airmen belittle their existing weapons or compare them unfavourably with their enemies' except perhaps in regard to Russian mortars and heavy tanks, and British Spitfires and 25 pounder guns. They are positively proud of their Focke-Wulf 190s, their U-boats, their 88 mm A/Tk guns and their heavy machine guns. The Allies' profusion and lavish use of material and the resources which it bespeaks are however having an effect on the German mind.

"I used to say 'We shall win', now I say 'I hope we win'. The British have everything."

The veneer of racial superiority which (as has been maintained throughout these pages) conceals a profound sense of inferiority and self-condemnation, is wearing very thin. One reason, the emerging sense of guilt, has already been discussed. But the quality of the Wehrmacht's personnel itself is not now immune from criticism. An Air Force liaison officer says: "The new drafts lack élan. Good units thus lose their reputation."

A Sgt. Major of the Hermann Goring Division even criticises his own elite formation:

"The band is about all that's good in it. Otherwise it is a complete washout."

A Cpl: "We shall certainly lose the war That's what we are Germans for."

A Sgt. pilot says: "We used to dress up marvellously to fly sorties over here (Britain), but now we don't care"

A Sgt., Infantry: "When I look at these hefty great English chaps"

A St. Major, on leave from Russia, said to a U-boat C.P.O.: "What's the good of all this fighting? One must admit the Russians are valiant men They never let go; they are reckless fighters."

A L.A.C.: "The Allies will never give in before we do - it is no good deceiving ourselves."

Another Sgt. pilot: "Two years ago no-one would have believed that the German Army could suffer such a disgrace. Such a thing could not have happened under Bismarck."

"We have no material and no man power left."

"If our Luftwaffe is in such a bad way it's no good our starting anything else, the prospect is hopeless."

Sgt., Flak: "..... These cowardly swine that come out now officers just the same. All the best men have been killed, wounded or captured and we've just got the scum left let themselves be shot up one shot and they abandon the tank."

L/Cpl: "The fact that there are more prisoners taken than men killed and more guns captured than destroyed shows that German morale is not what it was."

Cpl., Tanks: "Look at the boys - the new blood. They aren't soldiers. All the training in the world doesn't help; they are the weak and unintelligent. Do you remember how 3 Coy ran away from its own armoured cars?"

This is not evidence of breaking morale but merely of a slow loss of pride and of the sense of unconquerable superiority - the early symptom of disaffection. It is closely allied to early clinical depression and its morbid self-criticism and loss of drive, awareness of insufficiency and expectation of disaster and chaos, which can co-exist with a fairly normal external behaviour and performance of duties. The important problem, from a psychological point of view is whether this self-condemnation will quickly grow worse and whether it will prevail over the psychological projection which cures internal tension by the shifting of blame to the opponents. Projection would result in rather a desperate though spuriously "righteous" fervour often found in the persecuted. "They all hate me; I am not guilty, but all means are now justified. I shall fight on, tooth and nail." This would be the ultimate expression of repressed guilt and self-conceit. Of this reaction we also have considerable evidence. First there are those who, while personally dissociating themselves from such attitudes, further project them to the Nazi leaders:

Cpl. Benke: "The Nazis have such a hatred of England that they are near

Two airmen (O.R.'s) at different periods express the view that "Adolf won't give in even if the whole race is destroyed....." ".....he will end by using gas - he doesn't care what he does." And "we shall get to a pitch where we shall be driven to extremities if we want the war decided in our favour." The "death pact", desperate type of soldier, usually an enthusiastic Nazi and thoroughly identified with the regime, is noteworthy. The object of the pact is "never to give in" either to the British or to the Russians after the expected collapse of the people without the "front spirit". These are typical symptoms of adolescent defiance gangs. The same underlying feeling, less tinged by defeat and death, manifests itself as a "beating up" of civilians in restaurant brawls at home and in occupied countries. Beer house provocation by a group of Germans round a table is a well-known sight, even in peace time. Such men account for perhaps ten per cent of the total, but are liable to have great influence as representing the keenest and also the ruling group in the Wehrmacht, likely to be increasingly promoted to leadership position, and ruthless in scenting out disaffection among the timid herd. While, therefore, all Germans are sensitive to ostracism, inferiority and dislike, many react to this treatment by greater aggressiveness and sadism. This is clearly seen in their manner of ruling the occupied countries.

A curious aspect of the German attitude towards aggression is squeamishness, as shown, for instance in the wrapping up of unpleasant truths in high-sounding verbiage, of which "liquidation" is the best-known specimen, and "retreat according to plan" another.

Lastly, on the subject of self-regarding feelings, there must be mentioned a tendency to make war impersonal. This shows itself in the undoubted dislike of German soldiers for close combat, especially with cold steel. This aversion has been repeatedly expressed by men interviewed in order to discover their reactions to various tactics and weapons. The German likes to think of warfare as a clean, long distance affair. It has its origin in the deep-down dread of retaliation for his own sadistic impulses which should be wrapped up as "action", "weapon-effect" etc. No military vocabulary has so many nice camouflage words to express brutality as the German. The "blood and guts" reality is horrible to the German; it is too near the bone for him, too primitive. There is evidence of men going mad when seeing a mass of wounded comrades.

A Lt/Cpl., Tanks, says: "When there was a bayonet charge we left everything, even the vehicles, and ran."

He needs a thick skin of armour, of cover, a sense of having a superior long-range weapon, as also a long distance between the enemy and his threatened homeland. The dread of having his homeland invaded, hurt or damaged is an important extension of this squeamishness for his skin. It is therefore the policy of the O.K.W. to insulate him as much as possible from inside knowledge of air raid effects, as it was to keep the war well away from the German frontiers. The instructions to company commanders to "prepare their men spiritually" for going on leave in the raided areas are a proof of this essential thin-skinnedness, especially while away from the group. The same instruction (contained in the above mentioned "Notes for the Officers' Corps") further betrays German anxiety about prestige by impressing on all officers the necessity to warn these men on their return not to divulge any details about air raid damage to people in the occupied countries "so as not to prolong the war". It is assumed that the German soldier on receiving a heartening talk from his O.C. will be strong-minded and comforted.

(8) Tendencies towards loss of army identification.

It was stated in the introduction that a military unit is mainly held together by feeling bonds which for the time being are diverted from a man's basic emotional life, his private and personal aims and purposes, including even the instincts of self-preservation and of love. The positive, unifying "love" feelings towards the whole organisation, towards superiors and equals have also to be stronger than the hostility directed against these objects. In the dissolution of morale the individual, private emotions and sentiments, notably that of self-preservation, regain the upper hand, while the balance of love and hostility towards the group and its members becomes reversed in a "centrifugal" sense.

In order to attempt an estimate of this factor several types of case must be examined separately. Let us deal first with the two simplest:

(a) Nazi enthusiasts. The essential feature of these men is that they have completely and successfully (from the psychological point of view) merged their private and their military loyalties. These are the "death and glory" boys whose love goes to Hitler and his purposes and teachings with which they are identified to the exclusion of secondary, personal aims. In the Wehrmacht, excluding the Waffen S.S., they represent some ten per cent of all ranks.

(b) Unassimilated men. These include some conscious and avowed anti-Nazis who have no bond with the Wehrmacht beyond naked fear and compulsion and whose morale is therefore non-existent.

In this group would also fall older men whose call-up has come late, who are quite unpolitical and who have never transferred their emotions, beyond rather doubtful patriotism, to the Wehrmacht. They remember in many instances the debacle of 1918. The rear services, transport and supplies, guard and garrison troops, are full of these people. Among those captured and seen are men still wholly absorbed in their business and family troubles who regard the war and their part in it as a calamity, do not care particularly how it ends and are glad they are out of it, "only it is a pity the wife will worry about them being taken prisoner."

E.g. Cpl., Signals: "If it weren't for the fact that I am a prisoner I could feel at home here. Nothing to do, no superior to order you about, and plenty to eat."

Sgt. (Ground Staff, G.A.F.): "80 per cent of us could have got away from the hospital in Tunis. Not one of us had a mind to do so. You are treated decently here; you are not even looked upon as an enemy....."

Their hope is that the war will end soon no matter in whose favour. Since they have much less share in group aggression, they usually also do not expect extermination but a reasonable peace for the "little man". They are essentially passive to politics and events, visualise without much regret or joy the prospect of having to readjust themselves again to some new type of regime which they hope will leave them in peaceful enjoyment of their earnings.

In a random sample of 104 men picked out of some 4,000 Tunisian prisoners, 47 belonged to this group. The total batch had an abnormally high proportion of supply and transport personnel.

(c) Leader types. The duality and split loyalty of the senior officer caste has been sufficiently dealt with. It need only be restated that the evidence points to a very high degree of "ratting" from the sinking ship, though of course their private interests coincide at least with a professional stake in some sort of survival of the Wehrmacht. They are pathetically anxious to exonerate themselves from the suspicion of having given themselves up. One at least, since the publication of the Moscow Conference communique, has begun to explain that he is not really a Prussian but only a Silesian. Another stated that "anyhow he was a diplomated engineer and could always make a living". They have, on the other hand, a rigid sense of duty which enables them up to a point to "insulate" and suppress their misgivings and act professionally as "good soldiers" in conformity with the split in the German character. The present writer considers it less likely for a German Badoglio to come forward than for a landslide of retirements into nervous breakdowns or suicides to occur in this group when the conflict becomes intolerable, though one or two exceptions are possible.

This sense of duty animates the external behaviour of the junior officer and the "good" N.C.O. equally strongly. However slippery and ingratiating in captivity the semi-loyal man, or however sincere in his ethical objections to his present regime the anti-Nazi, the supreme law is soldierly obedience which will continue to exercise its pressure on the average German officer. Painful conflicts of this nature have often been witnessed even where the temptation is greatest and the risk least, i.e. in a prison camp. The self-respect is too bound up with this particular form of loyalty, however unpleasant or inconsistent for the rest of the character it may be.

The practical question arising out of this is the readiness with which such subordinate leaders will give up a fight by retreat or surrender and indeed by subconscious blundering owing to the pull of rival sentiments, and to what extent their conduct, by whole-heartedness or hesitation, will influence their men. In this respect all that has been said on the subject of political attitudes, guilt feelings and pride acquires its importance. It is the writer's opinion that the officer's "ego-ideal" based on tradition, intensive and continual indoctrination and the appeal to the self-admiring tendencies of the German will outweigh the private pull of fear and unconscious disloyalty in a sufficient majority. The stories of "ratting" junior officers are as yet rare.

(d) The rest. To the "average man" in the Wehrmacht also the most important factor of self-regard is the conception of "German honour". In theory, as he thinks of it and experiences it, this is a very comprehensive rule of life comprising the ancient code of the faithful henchman: - fidelity to the leader, obedience, self-sacrifice for one's comrades, courage, magnanimity for the beaten foe, respect for women etc. - in short the generally recognised "soldier's creed". That is "honour", but it is not enough to define it in this way for the Germans also believe that they and certain other people - really only the British - alone

possess this great tradition. In practice we see that the part of German honour which has a real existence and a power to influence conduct is comradeship, god-like devotion to a good leader and, in rarer cases, an active merging of self with the greatness and desperate resistance of the Fatherland. The motive of dread of "rape" of the homeland also imparts real fervour to some. The better men among them feel pained and dishonoured at the various international crimes committed by Nazi Germany, so much so that some do not even care to wear their decorations bestowed by Hitler. One man observed poignantly: "Adolf has frequently broken his word; why should I keep mine?"

Another factor which has tended to decrease individual pride is the consciousness of hasty or insufficient training, and the drafting of unfit men, of which there has been a good deal of talk. It is usually felt by old soldiers as a slight to themselves to have to be associated with such poor human material. The train of thought is somewhat as follows: "Look at these new boys! No wonder we can't succeed. It has all been in vain, therefore why should I bother? I've had enough and it's time to stop this war."

The very young, whose period of political schooling took place between 1938 and say 1942, have a more individualistic outlook than their older comrades, aged 22 to 28. The "Hitler Youth" has become more a matter of routine to them - a kind of compulsory Sunday School - than it was to the 24 to 28 year old men who experienced it during the exciting years of the Nazi rise to power. Not a few among these youths have said that, while they had to enrol in the Hitler Youth, they avoided all its meetings preferring to take their spare time off for sport or to go out with their girls. Of such boys a corporal in the Air arm said: "They are not so enthusiastic as they used to be. They don't know what we stand to lose." That means to say that they are not so ready to transfer their emotional allegiance from their private objectives to the Party of the Wehrmacht. Surfeit of war in any case brings about a weakening of this allegiance through the relatively expanded attractions and idealisations of absent home, wife, best girl etc., which condition may reach the level of homesickness and service apathy. In this respect prisoners are a poor guide. It is to be expected that they themselves would be "fed up" and that they might therefore tend to attribute much of their disaffection to their comrades still serving. Nevertheless we must pay some attention to such stories, especially when they are told to other Germans or are spontaneously expressed statements where the question of pleasing a British officer hardly arises. Some of these statements will be quoted.

Leading Seaman: "We were all Reds in our boat. Nobody in our flotilla believes in victory."

L/Opl.: "How much we have missed! What has life been for us? Direct from school into uniform and then the war came."

L/Opl., G.A.F.: "I've been away from home for three Christmases. To hell with it."

Engine Room P.O.: "Oh this damned war! I'm not interested in politics; all I want is for my work to be appreciated."

Lt. General: "I wonder how many telegrams arrive at the front daily saying: 'House destroyed. Family killed. Come at once.' And things like that."

Many soldiers state that their comrades in regiments, flotillas etc. "have had their fill" and are dreaming of a quiet little house and garden where they can live undisturbed and follow their chosen trade.

A certain amount of realistic anxiety and worry about their people in towns subject to air raids is also responsible for diverting the minds of men from single-minded prosecution of the war. We have already mentioned the measures the C.K.W. takes to prevent precisely this element in morale deterioration. A recently captured Army signaller stated that this topic was preoccupying soldiers' minds more and more. The fact that a gradually increasing number of men are willing, on capture, to offer themselves uninvited for some kind of service to the Allied cause, is further evidence of disintegration of allegiance. To any trained observer the majority are patiently motivated by the desire to fall soft and look after their own interest. This again is chiefly true of the U-boat service. In the other services such instances are also increasing.

(9) Physical self-preservation.

The instinct of self-preservation is at first sight diametrically opposed to all ideals of the soldier. He who thinks first of his skin has not learnt the basic virtue of a disciplined and devoted fighter. Yet in various forms fear, which is the typical feeling associated with the functioning of self-preservation, is an ingredient of military life. We have already mentioned the role it plays in the conception of German discipline. "The soldier must fear his officer more than the enemy."

There is the best possible evidence, that, at least in the theory, the O.K.W., under the stimulus of modern psychological teaching, takes a tolerant view of the appearance of battle fear among its soldiers. Hitler himself, in "Mein Kampf", has described his experiences which ended, needless to say, with his complete mastery over the weakness of his flesh, after a "great conflict between fear and the dictates of duty."

The lecturer in the German psychiatric service, mentioned in Part III, stresses the normality of fear which can be counteracted by good leadership and discipline, comradeship and esprit de corps. Many officers and men of all ranks and services in the Wehrmacht have confessed freely to fear in the face of the enemy and only rather stupid fellows have pooh-pooed it as something "no German feels." The older soldiers have sympathy for the youngsters who show fear and only get angry if this initial "windiness" does not disappear in a given man. It is almost impossible to collect reliable evidence as to the real amount of cowardice in the face of the enemy and the proportion of men shot for this break in morale. But, judged by the practical test of actual conduct of the great majority of German units so far, it does not appear significant. Stories of panic, uncontrolled flight, easy abandonment of ship, or turning tail and jettisoning bombs in the air occur in the course of work with Ps/W. They themselves confess to such episodes. There are nevertheless far more stories of fear experienced but overcome by recollection of "being a soldier" and not letting one's comrades down.

This aspect might be called short-term or transient acute fear. Its incidence so far is not abnormal to the scientific observer. The amount of punishment by shell and bomb many ground troops could take without, individually or as groups, succumbing to panic is very remarkable, and requires careful study before assuming the effectiveness of "softening" by artillery fire. To this "natural fear", inherent in the constitution of all living beings, must be added a long-term fear, i.e. evasion of military or front line service on the part of enlisted or about-to-be conscripted men. A very observant, if critical, Oberleutnant pilot described the growing tendency in Germany of trying to get medical exemption, or of wangling soft jobs in the administrative branches on the part of quite able-bodied men, especially among the sons of Nazi officials. There are also accounts of men practicing self-mutilation or even committing suicide in preference to returning to the front, as well as deserting, usually while on leave. The older U-boat men are known to do all in their power to get transfers out of their service. Again, the proportion and increase of frequency in various forms of dodging is not easy to assess. But it can be stated as a significant fact that, whereas in the past the soldiers on active service used to laugh about or pity these "miserable creatures", they are now talking about them bitterly. This suggests that the conflict in the soldier himself between duty and self-preservation has become a real thing. They also tend to interpret the disappearance from danger of senior officers (who are supposed to be saved to prevent undue wastage) as cowardice and react accordingly.

Thirdly, there is fear literally induced by their own propaganda, which is intended to instil "strength through fear". The enemy - especially the Russians - are going to kill and destroy. The only hope is fighting to the last round and the last man. It is generally the Nazi enthusiasts who hold this view with the greatest conviction because they also have most guilt about their own sadism. The apolitical, stolid peasant type disbelieves it and also has less of any other kind of fear except that of disobedience. Fear in the disciplinary sense is, as far as can be ascertained, on the wane, except perhaps in the Army, where they expect the greatest strictness. In the Navy there are stories of insubordination of the "go and do it yourself" type towards officers, and occasionally worse: of mass pressure on C.Os. who are unduly hard. Thus in a U-boat the crew forced the C.O. to concede smoking in the conning tower. In the Air Force there have been successful organised "sit-down" strikes by crews to force better accommodation and rations, while "the officers slept in the open." One Panzer Grenadier stated that in his company there was a feeling that any officer who did not treat his men well would get a bullet in the back, while an A/Tk sergeant told of this actually happening to a "stuck-up aristocratic officer who continued to fight instead of surrendering." On the Russian front apparently the strength through fear theory is translated into successful practice, i.e. the Germans are mortally afraid of giving themselves up lest worse befall.

"Every man there must fight to the last drop of blood. No quarter is given by either side whether one likes it or not" is the epitome of such views, as expressed by an Air Force sergeant.

"We fight on until we are hit - it's no good being taken prisoner by the Russians," says another N.C.O.

This factor, despite propaganda efforts, appears to fail badly in regard to the Western Powers whose treatment of Ps/W is not feared. But the French, especially

their colonial troops, and the Poles share bogey-value with our Soviet Allies. Here we pass the borderline between the reasonable, normal instinct and the phantastic realm determined by phantasy guilt, already considered under an earlier heading. It is to this side that the Wehrmacht propoganda appeal is always directed. The German is offered the choice between two terrible enemies: the pitiless, castrating Russian or Pole, and the omniscient avenging fury of his own security services. This is evident from the increasingly threatening tone of recent utterances of the Nazi leaders about the "few hundred malcontents and traitors" in their midst.

German military training, like any other, lays stress on the best use of cover and the avoidance of unnecessary exposure to danger. Dare-devilry and unnecessary heroics of young soldiers are severely discouraged by the authorities and condemned by the more experienced warrior. "Cover" is rated the highest boon by all those who have been interviewed on the effect of weapons on their morale. Once under cover, natural or artificial, they are able to stick out, with dulled senses, very long barrages.

It may be significant that those German soldiers who had experienced accidental dive-bombing by their own Stukas regarded this as the most terrifying war experience of their lives. "Those screaming sirens were most demoralising," was their uniform comment. It would seem that a nation devises its morale weapons along the lines of its own worst fears. Perhaps this is why the British have little respect for this side of weapons policy. Pintschovius, a leading Wehrmacht psychologist, stresses the crucial importance of noise in evoking fear. Surprise and speed are also things which disturb them. Concerning the merits of surprise as against long preparation, a German general holds the following views: After criticising Rommel for planning an artillery preparation of six to eight hours he says:

"That is something we never did in all our great offensives.

We always opened with a lightning stroke and pushed on.....

If we have such a long preliminary bombardment the English will know precisely where we are coming and will be able to move their reserves in a place like Tobruk in such a way that we shall encounter defence in depth. Besides we ought to arrange for Stukas to make an attack beforehand....."

A majority of those who gave their impressions on British methods rated surprise - especially at night - as more unnerving than long artillery fire to which they became accustomed. The exception was the barrage preceding our attack at Alamein because it was itself a surprise in this war.

(10) Other indications of changes in Morale

Under this heading we shall briefly allude to various psychological symptoms commonly held to indicate the state of morale - straws showing which way the wind is blowing. In states of anxiety and uncertainty the human mind tends to slip back to absolutely primary needs. Thus in 1940 - 41 British people were unreasonably preoccupied with food topics, there was a tendency to hoard supplies, to buy extras on the side, to talk about it, eat as much as possible at every meal etc. All this despite the absence of any great shortages. As the situation generally improved this wave of food anxiety disappeared. The same is true of certain indulgences, especially tobacco, hot drinks and alcohol, well known solaces for troubled minds. What evidence is there of similar reactions in German soldiers when they are up against it?

In an earlier passage reference has already been made to another soldier's escape: the prostitute, with the frequent sequel of V.D. Is this form of escape on the increase? Further, we should pay attention to the emergence of superstition in various forms, and to rumour.

(a) Superstition. Superstition may be said to denote a lack or loss of faith in one's own strength and a consequent turning to the miraculous for moral support. The superstitious look for signs and portents in prophecy, from the reading of tea-cups to the conjunctions of stars. They also dig up popular beliefs which usually have their origin in primitive taboos. Thus, in certain savage tribes no woman is allowed to see the men go off to war. It is a widespread superstition among U-boat men that no woman must set foot on their ship or they will come to grief. A U-boat wireless hand related that many crews consult women who tell fortunes, by cards or palmistry, and that this has some effect in causing assurance or apprehension, sometimes to the point of trying to dodge a particular cruise.

Among the airmen the superstitions are of a more private nature. Planes with certain lettering are felt to be unlucky. To sleep in the bed of a missing comrade is to invite ill-luck. One man felt safe so long as he had a little bag with pyjamas and all "necessaries" for capture with him, but knew that if he left it behind he would be shot down.

A few men of all the arms have been found to wear talismans (other than R.C. crosses or beads) but mostly because their womenfolk have pressed these on them. Only two or three, all senior officers, have professed long-standing belief in the message of the stars; their oracles are no more accurate than their British conferees.

Taken as a whole, the evidence that the German soldier flees into superstition to buttress his confidence is very slender and it is not increasing. The only possible exception are the U-boat men. A general wishful thought, "a miracle will perhaps save us," and the belief in the impending use of new and mysterious secret weapons are however widespread and, coupled with a still considerable volume of faith in Hitler's uncanny genius, represent the chief avenues along which the superstitious element in the German soldier expresses itself.

(b) Rumour. The difficulty of giving its true value to rumour in this war is the fact that rumour is sometimes artificially started and disseminated by the German propaganda agencies themselves and there is evidence that some of the continental underground resistance movements also spread false stories. The only remaining criterion of the psychological importance of any given rumour is its persistence and acceptance. As instances we have already mentioned the widespread dread of castration at the hands of the Allies as a guilt phenomenon; and the widely current beliefs of overwhelming German victories in Russia at the time of the Tunisian collapse as a "reassurance" symptom. The secret weapon myth is itself such a symptom of maintaining belief in the eventual superiority and invincibility of German genius.

The readiness to assume treason is another, for it also preserves one from admitting straightforward defeat. Other rumours which have been gaining some currency among German Ps/W are those of impending compromise peace with one or other of the opponents who would then become their ally to help finish off the remainder.

A story which is repeated with monotonous regularity is of the small party of a given unit captured by the Russians. On re-entering the village the horribly mutilated corpses of the comrades are found, nearly always "by a man I know and who has no motive for lying." The corpses are always castrated and have had their eyes and tongue cut out. This is then adduced as an excuse for "any stoniness the Germans have had to show" against the inhuman Russians. This particular rumour has all the marks of a purposeful dissemination by the Nazi authorities as a deterrent against desertion or seeking capture, and as inspiration to hatred.

Another rumour, which is a repetition of a similar story in the last war, concerns women: "In Holland (or sometimes in France) women allow themselves to be infected with V.D. without harm to themselves and so that they cannot even become pregnant. Their task is to infect as many men as possible for which they are highly paid (by Germany's enemies). It is difficult to track the infection to its source because when examined by doctors they are not suffering from V.D." This medical impossibility may also be spread by anxious authorities, but it seems to have an appeal to the German with his eternal dread of a "stab in the back" and the superstitious dread of the "foreign woman" defiling his Teutonic manhood. One naval P.O. said: "That is how the French still wage war against us." This story tells us something of the ill-at-ease feeling which the average German has in contact with the more civilised Western nations. He is conscious of their hostility and subtle undermining of his loutish national arrogance and rationalises this as an attack on his virility.

By and large, the subject of rumour as evidence of German demoralization is not very convincing either. Rumour is such a fleeting thing that one would have to live among the Wehrmacht in order to capture the various local legends that spring up, have their day and are forgotten before they can be retained.

(c) V.D. Closely associated with the need of the soldier for relaxation and "comfort", even if it be the tarnished one of the brothel, is the V.D. rate which thus becomes another pulse chart of morale. Here, it seems, the U-boat men again lead the way. It is a crime to conceal V.D. in the German forces and arrangements are very thorough to catch the men for preventive treatment as soon after exposure to infection as possible. There is a tendency in the prisoners' accounts to hint that V.D. is being "caught" on purpose to escape going on cruises and that the reaction of the naval authorities is to treat infection as a crime on a par with cowardice and malingering. In the other services there is less talk of V.D. than there was in the two preceding years, especially 1942 which seems to have been a peak year. For this reason the intelligence that new brothels, officially sponsored and supervised by the Wehrmacht's medical services, are being opened e.g. in Norway has some significance. Coupled with this goes a good deal of "moral suasion" and appeal to the men, and company and equivalent commanders are encouraged to make themselves the men's confidants in this matter. Land troops and airmen in the Mediterranean theatre and Russia appear to be less tempted, and the propaganda about "dirty" women of "inferior race" seems to be effective up to a point. Many prisoners have expressed this disgust and stated they preferred to have nothing to do with Levantine or Russian girls.

A flying officer made an interesting observation that in his squadron it was nearly all the rear gunners who contracted V.D. with devastating effect on the battle-worthiness of the unit. These men would disregard the instructions about immediate disinfection and the proximity of a hospital. This suggests that the people in the most isolated and unpleasant station of a bomber had less moral resistance to permitting themselves this "escape" from flying duties. The proportion of men infected with V.D. at any given time appears on a rough estimate, to be some ten per cent. in the G.A.F. and higher in the U-boat arm.

Of a merchant cruiser's crew, returning from blockade running from Japan, 15 men out of 58 had contracted gonorrhoea at Singapore.

(d) Abuse of Alcohol. Apart from convivial drinking, and the usual soldiers' eagerness to buy or scrounge wines and spirits, there is the well-known tendency to drown depression, fatigue or anxiety in alcohol. It is this latter compulsion to get drunk which constitutes real "escapism", i.e. unhealthy or neurotic drinking. The line is not always easy to draw, for the hail-fellow-well-met type of man, who fears that this over-confident facade may crack under strain, may camouflage his failing adjustment by alcoholic hilarity. The German appears to be easily taken in by this kind of bravado. "Wonderful chap - always tight!" or "He was a marvellous officer - drank like a fish but never let you see it." In fact it is only among Naval officers that evidence can be found of "despair drinking" to an extent that might be called abnormal. An elderly reservist mechanic off a sunk German trawler claimed that his C.O., a young N.O. of 26 to 28, was always drunk and had hazarded his ship in an ill-planned and foolhardy action. In the army also there are recorded a small number of cases of real alcoholism, but in the main this exploration has not yielded any impressive evidence. Spontaneous references to drink as a menace are rare. The welfare services are alert and are urging early examination of morose drinkers. The German medical and welfare services are conducting active propaganda to induce moderation and to frighten the men off excess by pointing out the military penal code, the "emerging brutality of seemingly peaceful men", and the like. Alcohol is, moreover, pretty well withheld from men on active service, except for the pampered Luftwaffe or in special conditions (such as Russian cold). One man explained this fact as follows:

"Hitler doesn't smoke or drink, but Churchill does, so he (the latter) sees to it that his soldiers get enough to drink and smoke."

The majority of Army soldiers examined have a rigorous code: "Drink lowers your efficiency. Russians go into action drunk. We would scorn such a thing. Of course we enjoy a good party when we are resting and have a jolly good evening." There is however, some evidence that remote garrison troops, e.g. in Norway, are having to have their alcohol rations increased to keep them contented. Operational flights whilst "Under the influence" are not infrequently talked about, but this is not a practice, but due to emergencies when the crews had anticipated a night off and made merry. It might signify shortage of men rather than alcoholic deterioration.

This rather meagre information practically exhausts the available evidence.

Hot drinks, analogous to the British reliance on innumerable "brewings up" of tea, seem to play very little part in the gastronomic life of the German soldier.

Tobacco, on the other hand, is a very important commodity in which they appear to be kept rather shorter than British troops. Heavy smokers are common and nicotine staining of the fingers is frequent. Not a few German soldiers have taken to it in the war because of its soothing effect, where previously they had been abstainers usually for reasons of athletic fitness, if not in pious imitation of the Fuhrer.

(e) Food Interests. Almost the first fact that struck the observer about German soldiers was their inordinate preoccupation with food, from which it emerged not only that they were accustomed to much more bulk of nourishment, but that they had also on the whole been well looked after. So anxious and aware are the Wehrmacht authorities on this point that e.g. on U-boats the messing officer has complete freedom to order what he likes and does not need to adhere to a fixed ration scale or keep accounts. Yet even then the men were quick to grumble about any extras they saw in the officer's quarters.

Soldiers are aware of the great disparity between their own rations and those of their civilian relatives. The discrepancy is softened when they go on leave by the issue to every man of the so-called "Fuhrer" parcels containing butter, a sausage, flour, tinned vegetables etc. This is a wise psychological move.

Stress is laid in field training on hardening the men by long stretches without food, by irregular meals etc. (e.g. in a Training Manual for Mobile Troops, Wunsdorf, 1942). This does not appear to have much effect on developing stoical qualities, as witness the following story told by a bombardier:

"We had a ration dump in Sicily always guarded by two fellows with pistols. After two days with nothing to eat we got impatient and simply shot them. Hunger's a painful thing and you don't ask questions."

A Major of artillery related with glee how during a long route march for training purposes in France "We had marvellous food. The people were forced to produce the stuff."

Such flashes make it clear that the German on the march will let little stand in the way of getting his belly filled and is intolerant of deprivation. P/W's reaction to discovery that the British, for example, do not ration vegetables or bread and have real coffee to drink produces a very considerable disturbance. "If our people know what there is still to be had - they would stop the war."

Among the strong instinctive forces behind German expansionist propaganda has been that of acquiring all the food wealth of other lands, especially of the Ukraine. An interesting conversation took place with some prisoners who hated Tunisia but referred to their earlier service in Russia as "wonderful" - "a land of milk and honey literally - yes, and of butter too. There we could cook ourselves something decent and serve it nicely." This conversation, substituting France or Holland or the Balkans, could be multiplied many times from our records. They are very sensitive about food, are both gluttons and afraid of not getting enough. Their pockets, as P/W, are stuffed with bits of stale bread although they have had regular meals served out on the transports. Food topics are discussed a great deal by them. This psychological trait is not unconnected with the harshness of general family culture and the relative deprivation of ordinary love and affection; the "hoggishness" is a means of compensating oneself for this deficiency. Retreat and the loss of food reserves, cutting off from supply bases of a unit or formation, have marked effect on all soldiers, but the effect is likely to be severe on the German with his dream of a future plenty and a dread of starvation which is one of the reasons why he fights so stubbornly.

Talk about food has appreciably diminished among prisoners of war in the last three months (July-Oct. 43). This can be explained by the emergence since that time (the fall of Mussolini and the events on the Russian and Italian fronts) of conscious anxiety about the outcome of the war. Within that curtailed volume the relative frequency of stories of scrounging food or buying and selling on the side and scouring the occupied countries for delicacies has increased. Reference has already been made to the occurrence of this symptom among officers which betokens not only a deterioration of their quality but also more pressure of primitive hunger-fear and war strain within many.

CONCLUSION

It is not easy to assess degrees of rise or fall in morale in a group if one is standing outside it. Yet, without such an attempt, the onus is thrown on the reader who is presumably looking for assistance. The evidence presented in this report can at least help us to dispel the misleading and mischievous impressions current among many people that the Wehrmacht is in a state of rapid disintegration. It has only been possible to point out the elements of strength that have stood the test and the potential factors making for disintegration of which few symptoms are appearing on the surface - but no dissolution.

Conclusions on the quality of German military morale

The reader who is not already familiar with the above described trends of German thought and feeling will have been struck by several qualities. One is the tenseness and earnestness of their loyalty when it exists, the other is its evanescent quality. The man who said: "I am no longer a National Socialist at the moment, but a soldier I remain" perhaps expresses a nice blend of both. He is in a dilemma, his feeling is split. The new German Wehrmacht was founded and developed in order to further the Nazi policy and aims. He remains a soldier - but for what purpose if he renounces the roots of his Army's being? Henceforth his allegiance, had he remained uncaptured, would have been an automatic thing of habit, given to a machine without reference to the purposes of that machine. He and the many like him take refuge in belonging still to a group - the Wehrmacht. This saves them from the pain of isolation and futility. "I must have this hold - I am not strong enough like the General," as the previously quoted major said.

It is also noteworthy that the morale of P/W, as measured by their attitude to regime, victory, accessibility to British influence and propaganda and by their security consciousness, is much higher in large cages where they are formed into the semblance of military units under their own N.C.Os., than in small camps living under much better physical conditions, perhaps two or three in a room. We can only conclude that their type of morale is fostered and nourished in the group, that they need the morale support of the mass and of a leader. This was apparent even in one of the first two P/W generals who were under observation for some time.

His colleague, a great individualist and opposed to the Nazi regime, greatly influenced him in his views and this second one's morale sank to gloom and apathetic agreement with his more intelligent companion's views. The moment a large group of generals and other senior officers arrived, including one senior in rank to himself who naturally assumed leadership of his camp, our general completely changed his tune, professed unswerving loyalty, faith in victory and altogether began to behave in quite an aggressive way towards all who dared to express doubt or despondency. He also had been "no longer a Nazi for the moment." The re-entry into the group gave him back his "hard skin", his moral corset. We conclude that German individual morale is, by and large, a hard brittle outer casing concealing softness, impressionability and lack of personal conviction. The thickness of the shell varies with the individual, but few of them are "all of a piece", and only succeed in remaining steadfast when buttressed by collective standards. A very recently captured Lieutenant-Colonel of the Luftwaffe has given striking confirmation of the motives which keep the soldiers of Germany fighting. These are his words:-

"Of course, morale is good everywhere. In the first place, none of our soldiers are straining to get home. In the last war everyone wanted to get home, but no-one is making any effort to get there now. On the contrary, everyone who is at home is miserable because it is so lousy. Secondly, the soldier is not supposed to think. The efficiency of the army depends on the soldier's not thinking. As soon as a soldier starts thinking, things go to the dogs. When he sees his sector fighting he thinks: "Wonderful! Perfect comradeship, a he-man's life!" and so on. But as soon as a man has a chance to think about things, as we have here, for instance, sitting about doing nothing, then things look pretty black."

We further see that their attitude towards their own authorities and towards the enemy is frequently divided. So long as "father" is a success, they gladly identify themselves with him in his power and sternness. But when he fails, and someone else comes along who is stronger and more successful, the "good parent" qualities are transferred to the newcomer, e.g. to the British. This latent split could have been, and was in fact, predicted on purely theoretical grounds of psychology from the type of father-son relationship which we have seen characterises the German family. The father's power overwhelms the son who accepts his authority meekly, but deep down there is the lurking feeling "You let up on me and I'll show you". Such authoritarian rule does not produce psychological integrity and strong characters, but only fervid devotion so long as the authority is effective or betrayal when that authority flags. The picture reminds one of conditions in the jungle where the old herd leader of many gregarious beasts is set upon and destroyed when his powers fail.

The German feels uneasy when he is slackly treated. For this reason he prefers the more military, brisk atmosphere of a British P/W camp to an American camp where, as many stated, "they handle you too familiarly - like civilians."

This uneasiness arises from the dim awareness of the hidden feeling split. Removal of the 'corset' means danger of the hidden renegade's emergence. But there cannot, must not, be a renegade. There must only be the true, upright, brave German soldier.

What happens to the renegade? He is at present projected to the 'real' enemies - the Jews and especially the Russians. They are the destroyers, the revolutionaries, the Asiatic horse-men who only obey through fear of the whip; the greedy devouring savages who lust after power and world domination. The chivalrous brotherhood of the Wehrmacht is 'Europe's only shield' against this monstrous chaos. This is a faithful reflection of an inner cleavage and conflict in the German's own soul. Only the strong soldierly authority prevents the eruption of a destructive, vengeful rebel. It was this psychological situation which lent emotional force and nation-wide approval to Hitler's sudden attack on Russia - the great shadow threatening from behind like Satan. In this way the German was enabled to rally again behind the Fuhrer and at the same time hoped to justify himself as 'good and civilised' after all so that England might make peace with him. How often do not people with an uneasy conscience suffer from morbid fears of someone following them from behind or lurking behind doorways in order to spring on them? Germany's fear of attack is the same nervous symptom on a national scale. It lends force to the impassioned appeals of some German P/W for Britain to hurry up and by occupation to save them from 'Bolshevik chaos', or else they fear they will themselves 'run amok and murder and pillage.' (e.g. an infantry officer, in peacetime a lawyer.) It indeed presages a possible sudden violent swing of the Germans towards murderous internal anarchy. Thus the

We must consider the question of uneasy conscience further. We saw in Part I, Sect. B, some typical defensive arguments justifying military preparedness. We also know from our knowledge of human nature that mere reasoning is powerless against deep feelings, e.g. how useless it is to argue with a depressed man or a jealous woman. Projection of one's less pleasant qualities to a scapegoat (the greedy Jew or the savage Russian) is one method of lessening the tension. Another and more powerful emotional anodyne against the still small voice of guilt is burying oneself in the membership of a group. A Guy Fawkes night 'rag' at Cambridge, during which lamp-posts are smashed, bonfires made of shopkeepers' furniture and policemen assaulted with violence, illustrates the powerful effect of crowd psychology on individuals, themselves quite harmless, studious and well brought up young men. Guilt on such occasions is minimal. If the crowd, moreover, possesses a leader who takes all the responsibility of decisions and policy upon himself, who gives you absolution and expects 'hardness of Krupp steel', in fact gives expression and patriotic, idealist sanction to all your adolescent aggressiveness - then you can feel virtuous, as fighting in a holy cause. The historian Benedetto Croce has said that "the Germans have brutalised romance and romanticised brutality." The channel of romance is through idealistic exaltation of the group, i.e. via the band of brothers held together by common devotion to the hero-leader, who 'makes everything good' and in 'whose service is perfect freedom' - for the instinct of aggression. The loss of faith in the omnipotence of this leader is therefore beginning to release much guilt feeling among captured Germans, especially once the individual is physically removed from the action of his group. It shows itself in some as a detestation of war, in others as protestations of innocence ("I am only a little man who has done his duty - what influence could I have?"), with apathy and depression, in yet others as disavowals of atrocities, and in the great majority as a fear of retribution. This fear assumes in them a bogey-like quality. A captured Panzer Grenadier mentioned that no topic was more widely discussed in Tunisia than the news item (duly propagated by Goebbels) that a certain American, Kaufman, had advocated castration of all German males. Even the above-mentioned captive general, whose spirit sagged when isolated, believed this threat. Two prisoners were prepared to supply details of method: 20,000 doctors were standing by for the job. They both stressed that it was retaliation for what Germany had done to Poles and Jews and bore no grudge. Another man, in a moment of candour, said (re Russian atrocities): "We began it - we didn't rightly estimate what the others could do." "What is done in Poland is bestial one man who took part had to be sent home because he became depressed such things avenge themselves." (A naval C.P.O., 1941).

Even the extremely brutalised SS security troops are stated, on the authority of the most clear headed of the captured generals, to be frequently subject to: "Blood lust which surges up and then dies down, leaving them incapable of carrying on. And then there are cases where these people break up inside, themselves collapsing mentally." If this is true of men with a fanatical belief in their cause, it is much more likely to be true of soldiers who have lost faith but are still called upon to kill, even if in 'Honourable battles'. No psychological law is more certain in its action than this one. Take away the sanction which resides in belief in the rightness of the cause and the integrity of the leader, and guilt breaks out sooner or later as apathy, depression or violent betrayal of the bad parent who ordered the killing.

Once this has happened the rational justifications appealing to discipline, tradition and history can continue by force of automatic habit only for a short time. The leadership itself, at first local bosses and later higher personalities, will inevitably assume the role of scapegoats in the ever-present phantasy of the common soldier. This prophecy was made, among others, by a U-boat Bosun: "If things go wrong Adolf will have the whole German people after his blood." "If I had a chance to condemn the whole gang I would hang Hitler on a silken cord so that he should die a lingering death. I've lots of scores to settle with people at home, even my own relations." This was said by an infantry private. Such are the feelings as yet only slumbering in many a good soldier's bosom.

A small but significant percentage have clearly felt unhappy and conflicted from the beginning, doing their military duty with distaste and against their better principles. Their plight is pathetic but, being more consistent and individualistic, they are usually the men who can see daylight after the war. There is another equally consistent 20 per cent. group of true Nazis who do not waver and are prepared to suffer for their convictions to the bitter end without distinguishing between Party and Army. These are perhaps Hitler's best soldiers.

As regards the will to war, martial aggressiveness, this appears to have abated considerably from its initial joyous phase. It is replaced evidently by the attitude of grim endurance characteristic of the veteran, but it also shows some features of weakness due to the emergence of fear and guilt, inevitable consequences of brutality during its diminishing success. While this brings about notable diminution in fighting élan, it lends to the more fanatical minority the solidarity of despair and 'last-ditch' courage. It is just this small fraction of the Wehrmacht which is being placed in key positions and is likely to carry with it the doubt-torn and 'better' people who are sick of their useless fight and only want peace. Propaganda encourages resistance by playing on the guilt and dread of sadistic retaliation, so as to counteract the strong German tendency to transfer allegiance to the successful opponent. The best that can be said is that many soldiers inwardly doubt the virtue of their cause and its higher leaders.

Their general esprit de corps, as shown by comradeship and readiness to stick together, has proved to be very strong and represents the most solid asset of the Wehrmacht's structure. While resentment and mistrust of officers is becoming apparent and the officers themselves are deteriorating in quality and training, especially in the U-boats, there yet appear to remain sufficient good officers who can inspire trust in their men.

There is no strong evidence of a recent fall in unit morale from various data such as alcoholic consumption, V.D. and malingering.

At present the German capacity for evading reality makes it possible for the majority to shut off their political doubts and sense of futility and to carry on the war in fulfilment of their highly developed tendency to mass discipline, unquestioning sense of military duty as an end in itself and glorification of soldierly "honour".

These are of great importance to morale. Equally it is clear from all that has been said so far that service in the Wehrmacht is of real psychological value to the average German. It serves both as an escape and as a protection against weakness and mental division; as an artificial "school of life" in which he acquires a standard moral corset, an experience of unity and ordered power which, on his own frequent admission, he lacked both in his individual life and his pre-1933 civic life.

Among older men such as compose many of the rear services, integration into the esprit de corps is very shaky, and private aims predominate, though this is unlikely to cause them to quit openly and "en masse" in face of iron rule and appeals to both pride and duty. They are also much influenced by "strength through fear" propaganda.

The great unknown is the peculiarly German streak of submissiveness and tendency to self-undoing. While on the one hand it leads to stolid if not joyful suffering, to reinforcement of obedience and patient "sticking it", it also represents the chief danger to the Wehrmacht. This is, firstly, inherent in the likelihood of a swing over to submit to the stronger side. Secondly, and even more importantly, submissiveness is the inversion of hate or authority. This hate is, so to speak, turned inside out through introjection and now unconsciously directed towards self-destruction. This gives us some justification for asserting that in the end German "self-sacrifice", especially of the "last-ditch" fanatics, may really turn out to be self-immolation and eventual descent into an abyss of suicides and internal carnage the like of which the world has not seen. The occasion for it will come when all successful external aggression is blocked and the mass of soldiers can no longer evade the conviction that their leadership is unequal to the task of holding off a stronger enemy and has let them down. The O.K.W., through their psychological advisers, are aware of, and have dealt as far as possible with, such troubles in the national character as excessive sternness of commanders, lack of consideration and discrimination for the men, and the understanding of fear, not altogether without success. But their submissive, self-undoing tendencies, representing an essentially suicidal, insane streak due to a chronic repression of their own soft and humaner needs - these they are blind to, and here they are supremely vulnerable. These softer needs then assume compulsive force because they become linked with the hatred of frustrated humanity. As these words are being written information has come to hand that, both in a German newspaper "pep" article and in a cartoon in a humorous German weekly, attention has been drawn to the Siegfried myth and to the weak spot on the hero's skin, left through a leaf sticking between his shoulder blades and so preventing the dragon's blood from covering him entirely. The article hints that the weakness is "pettiness" and carping at their own "great leaders". The cartoon depicts the hero bathing in the dragon's blood, watched from the shadows by John Bull and Uncle Sam who say: "Damn! He has found the London leaf!" The reader is left in doubt as to what Germany is supposed to have discovered.

To us, on the military fronts, Siegfried as yet presents the formidable aspect of the dragon's hide. We cannot do better than to take advantage of the psychological fact of his fatal soft spot in the planning of our operations.

The Material and Methods of this Report

The aim of this report has been to provide as objective a study of German military psychology as is possible. This was felt to be necessary in view of the unrealistic and fanciful picture of "The Enemy" frequently encountered in the minds of officers. This highly-coloured impression is often based on writings of people with strong emotional bias or journalistic sensationalism. That may be good propaganda, but it is bad science, i.e. ascertainment of the truth. It is therefore dangerous and inadequate as background for the making of operational and political decisions. In view of the claim to scientific status made for the report, the reader should be told how it has been compiled.

(A) Theoretical basis

The work has been an attempt to apply methods previously used with success to the study of human relations and groups by various branches of science.

1. Studies of the behaviour of "primitive societies" - e.g. native tribes - have been conducted by anthropologists working among the people to be investigated. Some anthropologists, such as Malinowski and Rohm, have introduced modern psychological concepts into their work, thus taking anthropology from the level of a descriptive science to the level of exploring the dynamic causes of group behaviour.

2. Another approach has been the science of sociology, which has tended more to the investigation of group-life (society) by statistical methods, analysing mass facts of environment, economics etc. and hoping thereby to discover the laws underlying the processes studied. In this branch of science also, attention has been tending in the direction of human motive and needs, previously passed over as "historical" or "economic forces".

3. Modern medical psychology (psychiatry) has shown that man is conditioned not only by his heredity but also by his environment. He is a product of his culture, and in turn contributes to its shaping. The pattern of his culture is ordinarily transmitted through the basic social unit, i.e. the family. This tradition moulds and modifies the expression of his inborn simple drives (such as need for self-preservation, love, aggressiveness and sexuality) in ways that result in reaction types - both within "normal" and "abnormal" limits - for any given society or group.

4. Hitherto psychiatry has been chiefly concerned with the study of individual reaction types, in the fight against mental disorder. It has concentrated on the ways in which a personality has reacted to the group in the light of his inborn endowments and acquired "twists". Social psychiatry - of which the present study attempts to be an example, would reverse the emphasis. It would examine the motives of behaviour of representative "specimen" individuals from a given social group in order to understand the life of the group itself. The object of interest is the factors held in common, not the distinguishing characteristics of individuals.

5. It is accepted that man shows a capacity for forming groups of greater or lesser degree of organisation and permanence; also that as a member of such groups he behaves and feels differently from when he is acting as an individual. While it is not possible to accept the idea of a "mass soul", it is permissible to think of a "herd psychology", if by it we mean that aspect of man's behaviour which is manifested in the group or crowd. It is with the above assumptions which have already gained acceptance and verification in the sciences dealing with man, that the present work was undertaken.

(B) The Material

The chief material has been the German prisoner of war. Over the course of fourteen months' continuous residence at a sorting camp, with periodic extended visits to reception camps for newly captured prisoners, it has been possible to see many hundreds of "specimens" of the group studied, i.e. the Wehrmacht. The scientific need for this sample to be "random" has been met by the accident of capture. There has been no selection as to who fell into Allied hands by the present observer! The responsible authorities have been good enough to permit the freest access.

Further, the products of the German mind have been additional evidence which has been studied and digested. These have comprised (1) Captured German military documents from "Part II Orders" to lectures on welfare; (2) Army pamphlets and other propaganda material; (3) German newspapers, books and technical treatises; (4) Personal documents such as private letters, diaries and jottings. Thiraly, much help has been derived from the reports prepared by, and discussions with many experienced British and Allied military and other official observers and experts, to whom a debt of gratitude is owing.

(C) Methods

The chief method has been that of the prolonged personal interview in their own language. Upwards of three hundred and fifty men have been examined in this way. In the course of the informal talk, lasting one to three hours or more, they were permitted to discuss any topic, with a special interest in their domestic background, military experience, philosophy of life, their hopes, fears and prejudices, the observer maintaining as far as possible a neutral, non-argumentative attitude, only saying enough to stimulate the flow of conversation. An important part of the evidence, for an observer trained in psychiatry, are the unspoken, unrecognized trends and attitudes by which men reveal their minds in interview and writing even when they try and deceive themselves or others. This capacity to penetrate below the surface of human behaviours is an acquired psychological skill which has yielded a rich harvest of new understanding in many domains of science.

Documents studied have been subjected to the same process of psychological assay. As the result of preliminary survey it was decided to adopt the hypothesis that German morale is a function of certain aspects of the German character, the chief and indisputable traits of which emerged quite soon from the study of its living representatives. The frequency-distribution of these traits has been validated statistically, though not by controlled comparison with other nationalities. To that extent the work lacks the ultimate proof, but for practical purposes the findings are internally consistent and accord with the many non-technical descriptions of the German character given by other writers of penetration and experience.

Special tests - e.g. the British Army's General Intelligence test - have been administered when necessary. Otherwise formal test procedures have been avoided, as undue suspicion of a technical examination would have been aroused. The essence of the procedure has been that the subjects have not guessed that they were being subjected to a psychiatric examination.

Unobtrusive observation of the men in the mass, and among themselves has been a further method.

(D) Criticism of the method

Certain objections may reasonably be advanced as to the accuracy of such findings, especially as to two points.

1. Reliability of evidence from PW

It may firstly be objected that prisoners do not feel like their comrades who are still in the Wehrmacht's ranks. That is true and should be admitted.

It is clear that the views of men torn from their milieu, their leaders and friends, and in the power of the enemy, cannot be taken at their face value as representing the morale prevailing in their fighting army. Captured officers have indeed commented on the remarkable change which takes place in their men when they become prisoners, especially that their discipline towards their own officers disappears. A senior officer remarked that the same thing had happened in the last war: "No sooner were they captured than they began running down the Kaiser".

What is, however, legitimate, is (a) the comparison of such opinions drawn from similar samples of prisoners at various stages of the war, and (b) conclusions about the quality and psychological meaning of changes in morale and opinions. From these the trained observer can draw correct inferences about the nature of the bonds and forces which maintained morale prior to capture.

A critical examination under conditions of loosened morale in captivity will enable us the better to understand the nature of the group ties by which the structure is held together. In order to understand normal functions, it is at times necessary to study their diseased state.

The method used does not merely accept what is said by them, but interprets the meaning of which the statements etc. are the symptoms.

Also, much of the subject-matter of the interviews was concerned not with present-day facts or transient attitudes, but with the more permanent memories, sentiments and background features of the individuals, less likely to be altered by the mere fact of capture. It was generally possible to be sure if changes had taken place as the result of capture, and these facts themselves were of interest as part of the "symptoms".

The diagnosis of the incidental from the significant and causal is a daily routine for the psychiatrist, and in this precisely his technical skill is exercised. It is in essence the same technique as when he has to decide whether someone is trembling because he has just been frightened, or whether he had trembled before; whether the trouble is more or less than is reasonable for the degree of fright, or indeed whether the whole thing is a fake.

It must be conceded that short of actual sojourn behind the German lines in the Wehrmacht, the method of long and intimate psychological interview and observation in captivity is the nearest approach to reasonably reliable insight which can be hoped for.

The answer to this criticism has already been to some extent given in Part I, where it was pointed out that the abstraction of "a German character" is a figment for purposes of description, and that the meaning of this abstract entity must be limited to a significantly frequent occurrence of certain traits, when looked for by a method of established reliability.

Further, it is not claimed that these characteristics are exclusively German, but only that their existence in Germans is frequent. For all we know, some other national group may show them even more strongly. The German character has been analysed along certain lines which seemed useful and psychologically obvious, within a certain framework of reference. This analysis has both confirmed and helped to explain some already existing views of good observers. The difference is that the present study is based not only on "hunch" but on the detailed examination of evidence as current in the social sciences.

APPENDIX II

(The following classified questions might prove useful as guides to conversation with P.S.W. when endeavouring to obtain a picture of morale in the Wehrmacht as a whole or in any given arm, formation or unit. It is only necessary to establish enough contact to get the individual chatting freely and imperceptibly guide his conversation. A formal catechism of questions shot at the subject defeats its purpose. It is essential to obtain a representative sample of any group whenever possible and not to be misled by accepting and passing on as objective information the grossly biased or one-sided statements of a fanatic (whether "pro" or "anti"). It should also be remembered that the naive admissions of simple fellows are as valuable as the more caustic fencing remarks of a clever man who may divine the purpose of the conversation. The questions need not be dealt with in any particular order.)

Morale Questionnaire

- (1) What are his views, (2) What do the others in his unit feel, in regard to:-
- A. Health, Strength, and Courage
 1. Age distribution in unit. Recent reinforcements.
 2. Food and welfare.
 3. Sickness rate, including VD.
 - B. Training and Confidence in own Competence.
 1. How much battle experience?
 2. Opinion of enemies' weapons and soldiers' efficiency.
 3. Comparison of man's own weapons and comrades.
 4. Opinion of new drafts and reserves seen at home or in the field.
 5. Views on his own and enemies war production and supply position.
 - C. Conviction about his Cause
 1. Faith in victory of own side. Expectations of how victory will be used. What good reasons for it?
 2. Feeling about patriotism and own authorities. Belief in own news.
 3. Attention to non-German news and propaganda.
 4. Attitude towards enemy nations and their intentions towards him, especially views on capture.
 5. Views on home front. Shirkers, grumbling, effect of air raids.
 - D. Relationship with leaders, equals and subordinates.
 1. Discipline - just or unjust, severe or slack, etc.?
 2. Opinions of officers.
 - (a) junior (in contact with him)
 - (b) intermediate commanders, Regt., Div., etc.
 - (c) in high places
 3. "Comradeship"
 4. Rivalries: inter-service, regional (Prussian-Bavarian), S.S.v Army etc.
 - E. Approval of others.
 1. National inferiority and guilt.
 2. Attitude towards atrocities.
 3. Relations between Wehrmacht and civilians.
 - (a) at home
 - (b) in occupied countries
 4. Dread of retaliation.

Institut für Zeitgeschichte – Archiv

Auf die Aufforderung des "Tagesspiegel" will ich Ihnen gerne "etwas" über meine Teilnahme an der Verschwörung gegen Hitler berichten. Um Ihnen eine vollständige Darstellung zu geben, müsste ich ein Buch schreiben. Damit habe ich übrigens begonnen. Hier kann ich nur den Versuch machen, Ihre Fragen kurz zu beantworten:

Frage 1 :

Für Hitler und seinen Anhang habe ich stets nur Abscheu empfunden. Als der zum Reichspräsidenten verkleidete Feldmarschall von Hindenburg Hitler zum Reichskanzler machte, war mir klar, dass die Untermenschen in Deutschland die Uebermacht gewonnen hatten. Das, was sich im "erwachenden" Deutschland nach der Machtübernahme abspielte, hat diese Auffassung nur bestaetigt. Deshalb war es für mich nie zweifelhaft, dass alles getan werden musste, um das Naziregime zu beseitigen. Was in meinen Kraefte stand, habe ich dazu beigetragen. An den Planungen und Vorbereitungen des Staatsstreichs gegen Hitler habe ich seit dem Jahr 1938 mitgewirkt.

Infolge der "Fritschkrise" kam es im Sommer 1938 zur ersten planmässigen Zusammenarbeit zwischen der militärischen und verschiedenen zivilen Widerstandsgruppen, an deren Spitze Beck, Popitz, Gereke und Gördeler wirkten. Die Initiatoren dieser ersten planmässigen Zusammenarbeit gegen Hitler waren der damalige Oberst ~~XXXX~~ Hans Oster und der Reichsgerichtsrat Hans von Dohnanyi. Beide befanden sich in hohen Schlüsselstellungen. Oster war Chef des Zentralamtes der Abwehr unter Admiral Canaris, Dohnanyi Leiter des Ministerbüros im Reichsjustizministerium. Sie hatten sich während des Verfahrens gegen Fritsch naeher kennen gelernt und nach einer offenen politischen Aussprache die Abrede getroffen, alle zivilen und militärischen Widerstandskräfte zusammen zu führen, um nach den Weisungen von Beck, der damals noch Chef des Generalstabes war, einen Staatsstreich gegen Hitler vorzubereiten. Mir wurde dabei die Aufgabe zuteil, im Bereich der Luftfahrt nach zuverlässigen und entschlossenen Männern zu sondieren. So begannen wir damals an den Fäden zu und zwischen den Männern zu spinnen, die am und nach dem 20. Juli 1944 in Erscheinung getreten sind.

Nach Ausbruch des Krieges kam sehr bald eine Konsolidierung der verschiedenen aktiven Widerstandsgruppen unter dem inzwischen entlassenen Generaloberst Beck und dem ehemaligen Chef der Heeresleitung, Generaloberst a. D. von Hammerstein, zustande. Dabei waren zunächst die Führer der illegalen SPD und der freien Gewerkschaften noch nicht vertreten. Auf Anregung meines Kollegen Klaus Bonhoeffer konnten wir jedoch noch im Herbst 1939 durch die Mitwirkung von Ernst von Harnack, Julius Leber, Jakob Kaiser und Josef Wirmer die Verbindung zu Wilhelm Leuschner und zwischen diesem und Beck herstellen. Damit war bereits vor dem Winter 1939/40 in den Spitzengruppen eine Art Einheitsfront gegen Hitler zustande gebracht worden, der sich auch Prinz Louis Ferdinand als kompromissloser Gegner des Naziregimes zur Verfügung stellte.

Aber die Ausführung eines Staatsstreichs scheiterte an der Haltung in den führenden Kommandostellen des Heeres. Die Generale Von Brauchitsch und Halder weigerten sich, bei einem Staatsstreich gegen Hitler mitzuwirken, obwohl durch unsere Verhandlungen über den Vatikan, die von Dr. Josef Müller geführt wurden, die Voraussetzungen geschaffen waren, um den Krieg durch eine Beseitigung des Hitlerregimes und die Einsetzung einer verhandlungswürdigen anti-Nazi Regierung ohne Schaden für Deutschland zu beenden.

Mit dem Sieg über Frankreich waren uns scheinbar alle Argumente aus der Hand geschlagen. Unsere Aktivität wurde erst wieder wirksam, nachdem Hitler auch Amerika den Krieg erklart ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ und die Wehrmacht im Winter 1941/42 sich in Russland festgerannt hatte. Im Frühjahr 1942 kamen die Vorbereitungen des Staatsstreichs wieder in vollen Gang. Ich wurde beauftragt, in Madrid und Lissabon, die Wiederherstellung der Verbindung zwischen Prinz Louis Ferdinand und Präsident Roosevelt vorzubereiten. Ich kam mit dem damaligen amerikanischen Geschaeffstraeger in Madrid in Verbindung, der mich dann später mit seinem Militaerattachee zusammenbrachte, um die Verbindung aufrecht zu erhalten.

Zum ersten Versuch eines Staatsstreichs kam es aber erst im März 1943. Unter den Auswirkungen der Katastrophe von Stalingrad entschlossen sich in der Erkenntnis der Notwendigkeit zu handeln der damalige Oberst von Tresckow und sein Freund, Leutenant, d. Res. von Schlabrendorff, zu einem Attentat gegen Hitler. Es gelang ihnen eine Zeitbombe in das Flugzeug Hitlers zu bringen, bevor dieser von einem Besuch im Hauptquartier der Heeresgruppe Mitte in Russland nach Deutschland zurückflog. Aber die Zündung der Bombe versagte.

Mit diesem Eingriff der "Vorsehung" sollten aber auch alle unsere weiteren Pläne und Vorbereitungen zum Scheitern verurteilt bleiben. Kurze Zeit später wurden im April 43 durch eine unglückliche Verkettung von Umstaenden Hans von Dohnanyi und Josef Müller mit ihren Frauen ~~XXXXXXXX~~ und Dietrich Bonhoeffer verhaftet. Im Verfolg der Untersuchungen wurde bald danach auch Oster kalt gestellt. Damit war der Verschwörung, die ganz wesentlich auf der Zusammenarbeit Oster-Dohnanyi aufgebaut war, das Rückgrat gebrochen.

Im Oktober 1943 übertrug General Olbricht die Weiterführung der von Tresckow ausgearbeiteten Pläne für die generalstabsmässige Vorbereitung des Staatsstreichs dem damaligen Oberstleutnant Graf Stauffenberg, der als Chef des Stabes bei ihm tätig war. Dies hatte eine Umgruppierung innerhalb der Verschwörung zur Folge, weil es nicht mehr möglich war, die verschiedenen Gruppen - wie vorher durch die gemeinsame Tätigkeit von Oster und Dohnanyi - durch eine planmässige und zentrale Leitung unter Beck zusammenzuhalten. Ausserdem musste Beck sich einer schweren Operation unterziehen und es war zweifelhaft, ob er überleben oder so bei Kräften bleiben würde, um die Verschwörung weiter zu führen. Andererseits wurden unsere Hoffnungen durch die Entschlossenheit und Aktivität Stauffenbergs neu belebt. Im November 43 waren die Vorbereitungen unter Stauffenberg so weit gediehen, dass ein neuer Versuch für den Dezember geplant werden konnte. Ende November suchte ich meine Vertrauensleute in Madrid und Lissabon wieder auf, um sie zu über das neue Vorhaben in Kenntnis zu setzen. Aber dieses und verschiedene andere Unternehmungen, die im Verlaufe des Winters 1943/44 versucht wurden, scheiterten an der Tatsache, dass sich Hitler - wie vom Teufel behütet - allen Möglichkeiten entzog, an ihn heran zu kommen.

Im Frühjahr 1944 verstärkten sich die Gefahren für eine Entdeckung der Verschwörung ganz wesentlich, nachdem durch die Verhaftungen von Kiep, Moltke und Gehre und insbesondere durch die Entlassung von Canaris auch der Deckmantel der militärischen Geheimhaltung zerrissen war, den die Abwehr bis dahin über uns breiten konnte. Es gelang zwar dem Oberst Hansen, als Nachfolger von Canaris einen kleinen Restbestand der Abwehrorganisation für unsere Zwecke unter der Nase von Himmler im Reichssicherheits-Hauptamt aufrecht zu erhalten. Aber wir waren uns klar, dass uns der SD auf der Spur war, und dass keine Zeit mehr zu verlieren war. Aber trotz aller verzweifelten Anstrengungen kamen wir erst dann einen wesentlichen Schritt weiter und näher an Hitler, als Stauffenberg Anfang Juni die Stelle des Chefs des Stabes beim Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres übernahm und dadurch in die Lage versetzt wurde, ins Führerhauptquartier und an Hitler selbst heranzukommen.

Stauffenberg baute auf dieser Möglichkeit, die er ihm wie vom Schicksal dargeboten erschien, seinen letzten Plan auf, der dann am 20. Juli zur Ausführung kam. Ich sollte nach Absprache mit Stauffenberg und Hansen eine Verbindung zu General Eisenhower herstellen, um die Einleitung von Waffenstillstandsverhandlungen vorzubereiten. Kurz nach der Invasion flog ich wieder nach Madrid, um dort auf Hansen zu warten. Statt dessen erhielt ich wenige Tage vor dem 20. Juli von ihm die Nachricht, dass Leber verhaftet worden sei, dass ich sofort nach Berlin kommen sollte und "dass jetzt gehandelt würde".

Am Tag des Attentats wartete ich verabredungsgemäss in meinem Büro auf Instruktionen. Am Spätnachmittag rief mich der Adjutant Stauffenbergs, Oberleutnant von Haefliger, telefonisch in das OKH in die Bendlerstrasse mit den Worten: "Kommen Sie her - wir machen vollziehende Gewalt!" Aus dem, was ich im Kriegsministerium erlebte, insbesondere aus den Telefongesprächen Stauffenbergs, die ich zum Teil mithörte, gewann ich den Eindruck, dass die Wehrmacht jedenfalls gegen die Nazis in Marsch gesetzt worden war. Ich kam garnicht auf den Gedanken, dass sie wieder "Kehrt" machen könnte. Da ich bei der Durchführung des geplanten militärischen Ausnahmezustandes selbst keine Funktionen hatte, beschloss ich Popitz aufzusuchen, um mich mit ihm zu besprechen. So bin ich - wie der reine Tor - gerade noch rechtzeitig aus der Bendlerstrasse entkommen, unmittelbar bevor dort die Gegenrevolte einiger offiziell hitlertreuer Offiziere einsetzte, durch die der Staatsstreich zu Nichtgemacht worden ist. Erst am nächsten Abend kam ich zu der Erkenntnis, dass überhaupt nichts mehr zu retten war, nachdem ich im Hause Popitz durch dessen Tochter erfahren hatte, dass ihr Vater bereits um 5 Uhr morgens verhaftet worden war. Nach einer letzten Absprache und Beratung mit meinen Freunden flog ich am 24. Juli frühmorgens mit einem Flugzeug der Lufthansa nach Madrid. Als der Boden auch in Spanien zu heiss für mich wurde, flog ich nach Portugal. Dort landete ich schliesslich in einem Gefängnis von Lissabon. Daraus wurde ich durch Freunde befreit, die mir Zuflucht in England verschafften.

Frage 2 : Die Verschwörung gegen Hitler ist in ihren verschiedenen Stadien in der Hauptsache, aber nicht nur an dem Verhalten der aktiven Generale gescheitert. Dass sie zu keiner Zeit zu einem Erfolg geführt hat, ist wesentlich in der Einstellung und Haltung begründet, die die überwiegende Mehrheit der Wehrmacht in allen ihren Rängen zu Hitler eingenommen hat. Obwohl das Attentat gegen Hitler misslungen war, hätte der Staatsstreich auch noch am 20. 7. 44 durchgeführt werden können, wenn überhaupt nur in der Wehrmacht eine innere Bereitschaft und Entschlossenheit vorhanden gewesen wäre, mit Hitler und seinem Regime Schluss zu machen. Das war aber leider nie der Fall, wie die Tatsachen bewiesen haben. Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Generale, des Offizierkorps, der Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften hat zu Hitler gestanden und tatsächlich ja auch mit ihm bis zum bitteren Ende gekämpft. Gleichwohl darf man die Ursachen für das Scheitern der Verschwörung in ihren verschiedenen Stadien

nicht allein bei der Wehrmacht suchen. Die Einstellung und Haltung der Zivilbevölkerung in allen ihren Schichten hat ganz wesentlich dazu beigetragen, die Pläne für eine rechtzeitige Beseitigung Hitlers unausführbar zu machen. Dabei möchte ich nicht missverstanden werden. Ich predige nicht über Schuld und Busse, sondern spreche von Ursache und Wirkung. Zusammenfassend kann ich auf Grund meiner Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen nur feststellen, dass alle Versuche, den Krieg durch eine Beseitigung Hitlers zu beenden, letzten Endes daran gescheitert sind, dass wir weder bei der Wehrmacht noch im Volk die Bereitschaft und Gefolgschaft gefunden haben, die erforderlich gewesen wären, um das Schicksal Deutschlands zu wenden, als die Möglichkeit dafür noch gegeben war. Naturgemäss tragen ein besonderes Mass von Verantwortung dafür diejenigen Männer, die in der Wehrmacht und im Volk an führender Stelle gestanden haben. Es steht hier nicht zu Erörterung, ihre "Schuld" abzuwägen.

Frage 3:

Darüber bestanden zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten bei den verschiedenen oppositionellen Spitzengruppen verschiedene Ansichten und Absichten. Diese werde ich ausführlich in meinem Buch darstellen. Ein unvollständiger Bericht hierüber in einem Interview kann nur zu Missverständnissen führen.

Frage 4:

Es bestanden mehrere Verbindungen zu emigrierten deutschen Politikern. Zuletzt habe ich im Frühjahr 1944 noch auf Veranlassung von Jakob Kaiser, Bernhard Letterhaus, Ministerialrat Münz und Josef Wirmer versucht, die Verbindung zu Dr. Brüning herzustellen. Im gleichen Sinne bemühte sich zur gleichen Zeit nach vorheriger Absprache ein Schweizer Freund von Adam von Trott. Die Verbindung mit Dr. Brüning kam jedoch vor dem 20. Juli nicht mehr zustande.

Frage 5:

Über die letzten innerpolitischen Ziele bestand bei den verschiedenen Widerstandsgruppen zeitweilig Uebereinstimmung. Beck verfolgte als letztes innerpolitisches Ziel die Wiederherstellung einer konstitutionellen Monarchie. Damit hatte sich im Winter 1939/40 auch alle massgeblichen Persönlichkeiten der Verschwörung einverstanden erklärt, Leuschner unter der ihm erteilten Zusicherung, dass die politischen Rechte der Arbeiterschaft uneingeschränkt wieder hergestellt würden. Im Herbst 1943 bildete sich jedoch eine innere Umgruppierung innerhalb der Verschwörung vor allem unter den Auswirkungen der Ausschaltung von Dohnanyi und Oster, im Hinblick auf die Möglichkeit eines vorzeitigen Todes von Beck und nicht zuletzt infolge einer politischen Entfremdung zwischen Popitz und Gördeler. Dies alles bewirkte eine fortschreitende Zersplitterung innerhalb der Verschwörung über die letzten innerpolitischen Ziele und die neue Staatsform. Im Frühjahr 1944 war in dieser Hinsicht auch bereits ein Zustand der Verwirrung eingetreten, der zu allem Unglück auch noch dazu führte, dass innerhalb der Verschwörung gegen einander gearbeitet wurde. Zu keinem Zeitpunkt aber war es innerhalb der Verschwörung zweifelhaft, dass Prinz Louis Ferdinand als legitimer Nachfolger des letzten deutschen Kaisers persönlich und insbesondere auch wegen der ihm von Präsident Roosevelt bewiesenen Freundschaft aussenpolitisch-sachlich die erforderlichen Voraussetzungen und Bürgschaften bot, um ihm das höchste Amt anzuvertrauen. In diesem Sinne habe auch ich persönlich als letztes innerpolitisches Ziel die Wiederherstellung einer konstitutionellen Monarchie erstrebt, in der der Monarch als Wahrer der Verfassung und des Rechts fungiert. Dies waren aber Pläne für die fernere Zukunft, über die eine Volksbefragung zu entscheiden haben würde (worauf übrigens Dr. Brüning noch ganz besonders in einer letzten Botschaft hingewiesen hatte, die von Adam von Trott aus Amerika übermittelt worden war). Das vordringlichste innerpolitische Ziel sah ich in der Wiederherstellung eines Rechtsstaats, dessen entgeltliche Form der Entwicklung vorbehalten bleiben musste.

Frage 6:

Ich war durch Jahre hindurch in enger Verbindung mit Dr. Gördeler und Jakob Kaiser tätig. Es ist mir nie zum Bewusstsein gekommen, dass unausgleichbare Gegensätze zwischen beiden bestanden haben. Dagegen weiss ich aus eigenem Erleben, dass gerade die Zusammenarbeit dieser beiden Männer besonders fruchtbar für die Verschwörung und den Kampf gegen Hitler war und ich bin der Ueberzeugung, dass ihre Zusammenarbeit von Dauer gewesen und geblieben wäre.

Frage 7:

Bis zu einem gewissen Zeitpunkt bestanden berechnete und dokumentarisch zu beweisende Hoffnungen, dass ein aus eigener Kraft vom Nationalsozialismus gereinigtes Deutschland ohne materielle Nachteile einen ehrenvollen Frieden bekommen hätte, wenn die Verschwörung sich rechtzeitig durchgesetzt und eine verhandlungswürdige und vertragstreue anti-Nazi Regierung eingesetzt hätte.

Frage 8:

Hierzu verweise ich auf meine Antwort auf Frage 2. Es fehlte in allen Schichten des deutschen Volkes an der erforderlichen Bereitschaft und Entschlossenheit, eine wirkliche Widerstandsbewegung gegen Hitler zu bilden. Der Widerstand gegen Hitler ist in einer Stillhaltebewegung versandet. Die Tat Stauffenbergs war nicht von einer Bewegung getragen. Sie blieb wie alle früheren Versuche zur Beseitigung Hitlers die Angelegenheit einer Minderheit, die zu klein war, um sich durchzusetzen.

Frage 9:

Diese Frage kann nur die "Vorsehung" beantworten. Ich weiss gar, dass es einen Kreis von Männern gab, die seit der Machtübernahme ohne Rücksicht darauf, ob Hitler gerade Erfolge hatte oder nicht, das eine Ziel verfolgten, Hitler zu beseitigen, um den Krieg und die Katastrophe zu verhüten, die nun eingetreten ist. Nachdem alle ihre Bemühungen zu den verschiedensten Zeitpunkten im Frieden und während des Krieges gescheitert sind, ist es mühsig nach dem "günstigsten Zeitpunkt" zu forschen.

Frage 10:

Ja. - Denn die Bildung einer Regierung war im Kreis der Verschwörung ja tatsächlich vorbereitet worden. Beck sollte zunächst an der Spitze des Staates als eine Art Reichsverweser stehen bis die entgeltige Staatsform durch Volksabstimmung entschieden werden konnte. Dr. Gerdeler sollte als Reichskanzler die Bildung einer neuen Regierung übernehmen. Ueber die einzelnen Ministerposten bestand nur teilweise Klarheit und Uebereinstimmung. Ich bin aber überzeugt, dass sehr schnell eine vollständige Regierung aus dem Kreis der Verschwörung zustande gekommen wäre, wenn dieser letzte verzweifelte Versuch, Hitler und sein Regime zu beseitigen, gelungen wäre.

W. Gordeff
Walter Gong
Bad Kissingen
Staffelsberg.

8.5.1947.

Sehr geehrter Herr Doktor John,

Prinz Louis Ferdinand hat Ihnen bereits einige Worte über mich geschrieben und dürfte in seinem Brief, dem ich diese Zeilen beifüge, die Tatsache erwähnen, dass ich ihn für den "Tagesspiegel" über den 20. Juli interviewt habe. Da Sie in diesem Interview als einer der aktivsten Teilnehmer der Widerstandsbewegung genannt werden, möchte ich an Sie die Bitte richten, mir auf die nachstehend aufgeführten Fragen in Form eines weiteren Interviews für den "Tagesspiegel" zu antworten. Obwohl mir Ihre Bedenken über eine vorzeitige Publikation bekannt sind, halte ich es doch für ausserordentlich wichtig, dass Sie sich nunmehr über ein Interview mit der führenden und infolge ihrer korrekten und sachlichen Haltung allgemein anerkannten Tageszeitung der Westzonen in die Debatte einschalten, die bis jetzt aus Mangel an authentischen Informationen an Sachlichkeit und Klarheit gelitten hat. Ich glaube, dass Sie der deutschen Öffentlichkeit, die an den Vorgängen des 20. Juli ein berechtigtes Interesse hat, einen grossen Dienst erweisen, wenn Sie sich zu den Fragen äussern, die ich Ihnen im Auftrage meines Blattes stellen möchte.

Der "Tagesspiegel" hat es sich zur Aufgabe gemacht, im Interesse einer geschichtlichen Klarheit, die der demokratischen Erziehung des deutschen Volkes nur zugute kommen kann, die Vorgänge zu prüfen, die mit der am 20. Juli 1944 endenden Widerstandsbewegung im Zusammenhang stehen. Wir haben bereits eine Reihe von Aufsätzen gebracht, die sich im wesentlichen auf Publikationen im Auslande stützten, jedoch keine wirkliche Klarheit schaffen konnten. Gleichzeitig wird von politisch interessierter deutscher Seite alles getan, um die wirklichen, realpolitischen Zusammenhänge zu verschleiern und zu vernebeln und eine neue Legendenbildung zu fördern, die wir schon allein aus dem Grunde ablehnen, weil wir glauben erkannt zu haben, dass Deutschland immer wieder an seinen politischen Legenden zugrunde gegangen ist. Was die heute in Deutschland lebenden Teilnehmer der Verschwörung der Öffentlichkeit mitgeteilt haben, ist in keiner Weise geeignet, die Öffentlichkeit wirklich aufzuklären. Infolgedessen halten die einen den 20. Juli für den letzten Ausdruck einer allmächtigen Volksbewegung mit durchaus fortschrittlichem Charakter, die anderen für einen kleinen Putsch reaktionärer Elemente. Die dritten - und deren Zahl ist überaus gross - machen sich diese Verschwommenheit der Konturen zunutze, um ihrerseits zu behaupten, sie wären auch in einer Widerstandsbewegung gewesen -, auch wenn sie nicht näher präzisieren können,

118708.
nach 7.11.44
negativ hat
... 10.11.44

worum es sich da gehandelt hat. Auf diese Weise kommen wir nicht weiter. Das einzige Aktivum, das wir aufzuweisen hätten, wird verfälscht und verwässert - und zwar weniger durch den Widerspruch, den die politischen Absichten der Verschwörer (soweit man sie überhaupt auf einen gemeinsamen Nenner bringen kann) heute nachträglich auf den Plan rufen, als gerade durch jene, die in gefühlsduseliger Überschwenglichkeit so tun, als wäre am 20. Juli, als die Bombe platzte, alles schon politisch im besten Lot gewesen und als hätte man sich nur noch an den Regierungstisch setzen müssen, um Deutschland dem Heil entgegenzuführen. Was wir erreichen wollen (und schon zum Teil erreicht haben) - ist eine unerbittliche und kühle, aber gerade dadurch positive und das politische Bewusstsein der Deutschen fördernde Objektivität in der Schilderung jener Vorgänge, von denen auch heute noch die meisten Deutschen nichts Bestimmtes wissen. Ich habe die feste Hoffnung, dass Sie uns in diesem Beginnen unterstützen werden, was für Sie umso leichter sein sollte, als Sie bereits namentlich erwähnt worden sind und von Ihrem Standort im Auslande mit einer grösseren Zurückhaltung und Objektivität urteilen können, als die Politiker, die sich unter den oder jener Vorzeichen in die heutige deutsche Politik eingeschaltet haben und nunmehr das Verdienst der Widerstandsbewegung unter parteipolitischen Gesichtspunkten für sich in Anspruch nehmen. Ich darf vielleicht noch hinzufügen, dass je kritischer und distanzierter Ihre Darstellung sein wird, desto lieber wird sie uns sein, da wir nur auf Sachlichkeit und wirkliche Objektivität Wert legen.

- Meine Fragen:
1. Sie sind im Interview des "Tagesspiegel" mit dem Prinzen Louis Ferdinand von Preussen als einer der aktivsten Teilnehmer der Widerstandsbewegung genannt. Könnten Sie uns etwas über Ihre persönliche Teilnahme an der Verschwörung gegen Hitler berichten und darüber, wie es Ihnen gelungen ist, sich dem Zugriff der Gestapo zu entziehen?
 2. Sind auch Sie der Ansicht, dass die Verschwörung in der Hauptsache am Verhalten der aktiven Generäle gescheitert ist, die sich nicht bereit finden konnten, die Kraftprobe gegen die Nationalsozialisten zu wagen, so lange die militärische Lage einigermaßen günstig schien und die auch noch im letzten Augenblick eine merkwürdige Passivität an den Tag legten?
 3. Glauben Sie, dass die Widerstandsbewegung sich bei militärisch günstigeren Augenblick zu unterzeichnen - oder sind Sie auf Grund Ihrer Erfahrungen der Ansicht, dass Sie unter allen Umständen versucht hätte, tragbare Friedensbedingungen zu erreichen?
 4. Bestand zwischen den Verschwörern und ins Ausland emigrierten Politikern, wie z. B. Brüning, Verbindung?
 5. Welcher Art war das neue deutsche Staatswesen, das Ihnen persönlich und den Ihnen nahe stehenden Teilnehmern der Widerstandsbewegung vorschwebte?
 6. Glauben Sie, dass sich die Gegensätze zwischen Dr. Goerdeler und Jakob Kaiser z. B. in einer Synthese hätten

- 2 -

ausgleichen können? Wie beurteilen Sie diese Gegensätze?

7. Bestand bei den Verschwörern berechnete Hoffnung, dass sich die Alliierten mit einem neuen, aus der Verschwörung hervorgegangenen Deutschland verständigt hätten?

8. Welche Schwächen wies Ihrer Ansicht nach die Konstruktion der Widerstandsbewegung auf, die zu ihrem Zusammenbruch nach dem missglückten Attentat auf Hitler führten?

9. Wann war Ihrer Ansicht nach der günstigste Zeitpunkt zu einem Staatsstreich gegen Hitler - vor 1939, im ersten, "siegreichen" Stadium des Krieges, zwischen 1941 und 1943 oder, wie es versucht worden ist, im letzten Akt des verlorenen Krieges?

10. Hätte sich Ihrer Ansicht nach sofort eine auf der gesamten Plattform des Verschwörerkräftes ruhende Regierung bilden lassen können, wenn das Militär bei der Ausführung des Staatsstreiches nicht versagt hätte? Wie hätte Ihrer Ansicht nach diese Regierung aussehen können?

Ich hoffe, sehr geehrter Herr Doktor John, dass Sie sich der Mühe unterziehen werden, diese Fragen möglichst ausführlich zu beantworten, unter Berücksichtigung des Umstandes, dass die härteste Wahrheit heute in Deutschland immer noch den Vorzug hat, eine Wahrheit zu sein, an der sich das Volk bilden kann. Darüber hinaus möchte ich Sie fragen, ob Sie eventuell bereit wären, zu einem etwas späteren Zeitpunkt eine grössere Aussage in Form eines von Ihnen selbst verfassten Artikels für den "Tagesspiegel" zu machen, der Ihnen jederzeit seine Spalten zu Verfügung stellen wird. Selbst wenn Sie die Absicht haben sollten, ein Buch über den 20. Juli zu verfassen, dürfte eine solche Aussage mit Hilfe der Tagespresse nicht hindernd, sondern fördernd wirken. Für eine recht baldige Antwort wäre ich Ihnen sehr dankbar.

Mit vorzüglicher Hochschätzung

John (Gordon)

20.7.44 *Witzmann*

Aufgrund meiner Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen im Kampf gegen HITLER gebe ich nachstehende Erklärung ab:

Der innerdeutsche Widerstand gegen HITLER im Dritten Reich war nicht von einer Bewegung getragen. Es gab in allen Schichten des deutschen Volkes Männer und Frauen, die auch nach der Machtübernahme ihrer kompromisslosen Einstellung gegen den Nationalsozialismus aus religiösen, moralischen oder politischen Gründen treugeblieben sind, und unbeirrt von innen- und aussenpolitischen "Erfolgen" HITLERS aus innerer Gewissensverpflichtung unter ständiger Gefährdung ihres Lebens ~~den~~ Kampf gegen das nationalsozialistische Regime bis zum Zusammenbruch des Dritten Reiches fortgesetzt haben. Diese stellten aber keine einheitliche geistige, politische oder revolutionäre Bewegung dar. Sie kamen aus fast allen früheren politischen Richtungen der Weimarer Republik, blieben durch Freundschaft oder Gesinnung ~~W~~ verbunden und bildeten allmählich in Kreisen um einzelne Persönlichkeiten verschiedene Widerstandsgruppen. Zwischen diesen gab es bis zum Ausbruch des Krieges zwar viele persönliche und auch amtliche Querverbindungen, aber keine planmässig organisierte und einheitlich geführte politische Zusammenarbeit zur Verwirklichung gemeinsamer Ziele. Sie hatten mangels Einsatzbereitschaft gegen HITLER in den breiteren Schichten des deutschen Volkes auch keine ausreichende Gefolgschaft, um eine wirkliche Widerstands-"Bewegung" zu bilden.

Die wirksamsten politischen Widerstandsgruppen bildeten sich

- a) innerhalb des Heeres in den Kreisen um die Generale von HAMMERSTEIN , BECK und OLBRICHT und Oberst OSTER,
- b) unter den konservativ gerichteten Zivilisten in den Kreisen um Minister POPITZ und Dr. GOERDELER,
- c) aus der ehemaligen Führung der deutschen Arbeiterschaft in den Kreisen um Wilhelm LEUSCHNER, Julius LEBER, Jakob KAISER , Bernhard LETTERHAUS und Max HABERMANN

Der Plan einer Verschwörung gegen HITLER fand seine erste Konzeption während der FRITSCH-Krise im Frühjahr 1938. Die Initiatoren dieses Planes waren der damalige Oberst Hans OSTER und der Reichsgerichtsrat Hans von DOHNANYI. Beide befanden sich in hohen Schlüsselstellungen. OSTER war Chef des Zentralamtes der Abwehr unter Admiral CANARIS, DOHNANYI Leiter des Ministerbüros im Reichsjustizministerium. Sie hatten sich während des Verfahrens gegen FRITSCH näher kennengelernt und nach einer offenen politischen Aussprache die Abrede getroffen, alle zivilen und militärischen Widerstandskräfte zusammenzuführen, um nach den Weisungen von Generaloberst BECK, der damals noch Chef des Generalstabes war, einen Staatsstreich gegen HITLER vorzubereiten. Ihre gemeinsame Tätigkeit führte zunächst zu einer engeren Zusammenarbeit zwischen der militärischen Widerstandsgruppe und den zivilen Kreisen um Minister POBITZ und Dr. GOERDELER. Ein wesentlicher Fortschritt im Sinne ihrer Arbeit trat jedoch erst ein, nachdem der Krieg mit dem Einmarsch in Polen begonnen worden war. DOHNANYI wurde auf Weisung von BECK als Sonderführer in den Stab des ~~xxx~~ Admirals CANARIS in das OKW einberufen, um dort seine Tätigkeit unter dem Deckmantel der Abwehr enger und intensiver mit OSTER fortzusetzen zu können. Damit war die Dienststelle OSTERs - das Zentralamt der Abwehr - zu einer zentralen Exekutive der ~~xxx~~ Verschwörung gegen HITLER geworden, die nach den Weisungen von BECK arbeitete. OSTER bearbeitete die vorwiegend militärische Planung und Vorbereitung des Staatsstreichs, DOHNANYI den vorwiegenden politischen Teil. Auf ihrer Zusammenarbeit beruhte und baute sich die Verschwörung gegen HITLER weiter auf.

Der Ausbruch des Krieges bewirkte eine wesentliche Konsolidierung der verschiedenen zivilen Widerstandsgruppen. Alte parteipolitische Gegensätze wurden angesichts des gemeinsamen Gegners HITLER leicht überbrückt. So konnte auch bereits im Herbst 1939 auf Anregung von Dr. Klaus BONHOEFFER durch ~~xxx~~ DOHNANYI und die Mitwirkung von Ernst von HARNACK, Julius LEBER, Jakob KAISER, MAX HABERMANN und Josef WIRMER die

Verbindung zwischen Wilhelm LEUSCHNER und BECK hergestellt werden. Damit war bereits im Zeitpunkt der Beendigung des Polenfeldzuges in den Spitzen der zivilen Widerstandsgruppen eine innerpolitische Einheitsfront gegen HITLER hergestellt. Die führenden Persönlichkeiten der einzelnen zivilen Widerstandsgruppen befassten sich im wesentlichen mit der Vorbereitung einer innerpolitischen Neuordnung des Reichs, die nach dem Sturz von HITLER ausgeführt werden sollte. Die aussenpolitische Vorbereitung des Staatsstreichs lag in den Händen von Dr. Josef MÜLLER, der im Auftrag von und im Einvernehmen mit Generaloberst BECK handelt und über den Vatikan die Einleitung von Friedensverhandlungen vorbereitete. Die militärische Vorbereitung lag in den Händen von General OLBRICHT, dem Chef des Allgemeinen Heeresamtes beim Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres. Das Ziel der Verschwörung war der gewaltsame Sturz HITLERS, um die Ausweitung seiner Herrschaft zu verhindern und um eine neue deutsche vertrauenswürdige und vertragsfähige Regierung in Deutschland einzusetzen. Generaloberst BECK verfolgte als letztes innenpolitisches Ziel die Wiederherstellung einer konstitutionellen Monarchie und nahm die spätere Einsetzung des Prinzen Louis Ferdinand von Preussen in Aussicht, der durch sein persönliches und politisches Vertrauensverhältnis zu dem verstorbenen Präsidenten ROOSEVELT im Hintergrund der Verschwörung ein bedeutsamer politischer Faktor war.

Während die innerpolitischen Vorbereitungen nach Abschluss des Polenfeldzuges von den verschiedenen zivilen Widerstandsgruppen in gemeinsamer Arbeit durchgeführt wurden, nahm Dr. Josef MÜLLER die Verbindungen mit dem Vatikan unter dem Deckmantel der Abwehr auf. Es wurde ihm über den Vatikan eine durch den Papst verbürgte Zusicherung übermittelt, wonach Deutschland den Krieg durch die Einsetzung einer verhandlungswürdigen und vertragstreuen Anti-Nazi-Regierung ohne Schaden beenden konnte. Trotzdem scheiterte die Ausführung des Staatsstreichs an der Haltung in den führenden Kommandostellen der Wehrmacht, die sich auf die bevorstehende Auseinandersetzung mit den Westmächten, auf die von HITLER gedrängt wurde,

vorbereiteten. Der Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, von BRAUCHITSCH, versagte sich jeder eindeutigen Stellungnahme und argumentierte, dass dieser Krieg ein Kampf zwischen Weltanschauungen sei, der ausgetragen werden müsse. HALDER, der Chef des Generalstabs, weigerte sich weiterhin, gegen HITLER mitzuwirken, weil die militärische Lage Deutschlands, insbesondere aufgrund des Vertrages mit Russland, nicht mehr so sei, dass ein Gewaltakt gegen HITLER daraus gerechtfertigt werden könne. Damit wurden die militärischen sowie die innen- und aussenpolitischen Vorbereitungen des Staatsstreichs gegen HITLER zunichte gemacht.

Mit dem Sieg über Frankreich waren scheinbar alle Argumente gegen HITLER widerlegt und die Mehrheit in Deutschland fügte sich willig den Erfolgen. Im engeren Kreis der Verschwörung wurde aber keiner wankend. Die Aktivität, die im engeren Kreis der Verschwörung fortgesetzt wurde, wurde jedoch erst wirksam, nachdem HITLER auch Amerika den Krieg erklärt und die deutsche Wehrmacht sich vor Moskau festgerannt hatte.

Zum ersten Versuch einer Ausführung des Staatsstreichs kam es erst unter den Auswirkungen der Katastrophe von Stalingrad. Oberst Henning von TRESCKOW und sein Freund Leutnant der Reserve Fabian von SCHLABRENDORFF führten am 13. 3. 1943 im Einvernehmen mit Generaloberst Beck ein^{en} Attentatsversuch auf HITLER durch. Es gelang ihnen, eine Zeitbombe in das Flugzeug HITLERS zu bringen, bevor dieser ~~am~~ von einem Besuch im Hauptquartier der Heeresgruppe Mitte in Russland nach Deutschland zurückflog. Aber die Zündung der Bombe versagte. Dem Mannesmut SCHLABRENDORFFS ist es zu danken, dass das Attentat nie entdenkt wurde.

Nachdem dieser Versuch gescheitert war, sollten neue Vorbereitungen für einen Staatsstreich gegen HITLER getroffen werden. Anfangs April 1943 wurden jedoch Hans von DOHNANYI und Josef MÜLLER mit ihren Frauen verhaftet, weil ein Vertrauensmann der Abwehr seine Geheimstellung für

persönliche geschäftliche Zwecke missbraucht hatte, von der Zollfahndungsstelle in Prag zu Anzeige gebracht worden war zu und zu seiner Verteidigung schwere politische Verdächtigungen und Belastungen gegen DOHNANYI und MÜLLER ausgesprochen hatte. In Verfolg der Untersuchungen wurden bald ~~xxx~~ danach auch Hans OSTER seiner Dienststellung enthoben. Damit war der Verschwörung, die ganz wesentlich auf der Zusammenarbeit OSTER - DOHNANYI - MÜLLER aufgebaut war, das Rückgrat gebrochen.

Nachdem OSTER, DOHNANYI und MÜLLER ausgeschaltet waren, musste die zentrale Exekutive der Verschwörung neu organisiert werden. Im Oktober 1943 übertrug General OLBRICHT im Einvernehmen mit Generaloberst BECK die weitere generalstabsmässige Vorbereitung des Staatsstreichs dem damaligen Oberstleutnant Graf STAUFFENBERG, der als Chef des Stabes bei ihm im Allgemeinen Heeresamt tätig war. STAUFFENBERG übernahm die von TRESSECKOW ausgearbeiteten militärischen Pläne und Vorbereitungen, auch aber nicht auch die zentrale politische Leitung der Verschwörung. Diese zerfiel sehr bald in eine Umgruppierung innerhalb der einzelnen Kreise, weil es nicht mehr möglich war, die verschiedenen Widerstandsgruppen - wie vorher - durch die gemeinsame Tätigkeit von OSTER und DOHNANYI durch eine planmässige und zentrale Leitung unter BECK zusammenzuhalten. Dabei lebten frühere parteipolitische Gegensätze innerhalb der Verschwörung wieder auf, und in der Folgezeit bildete sich unter STAUFFENBERG zwar eine neue militärische Exekutive der Verschwörung, aber eine einheitliche politische Leitung kam nicht wieder zustande.

In ihrer neuen Zusammensetzung ~~kam~~^{brachte} die Verschwörung erst dann einen wesentlichen Schritt weiter und näher an HITLER, als STAUFFENBERG anfangs Juni 1944 die Stelle des Chefs des Stabes beim Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres übernahm und dadurch in die Lage versetzt wurde, ins Führerhauptquartier und an HITLER selbst heranzukommen. STAUFFENBERG baute auf dieser Möglichkeit seinen letzten Plan auf, der am 20. 7. 44 zur Ausführung kam .

Über die Entwicklung der Verschwörung gegen HITLER und ihr Scheitern bis zum Frühjahr 1943 vermag als sachverständiger Zeuge am besten Dr. Josef MÜLLER Auskunft zu geben, der bis zu seiner Verhaftung anfangs April 1943 un ebsten Kreis der Verschwörung und im ständigen Einvernehmen mit Generaloberst BECK tätig gewesen ist.

Allyquinn

Bln: Den 21sten Juli 1944.

Mein lieber Junge,

Soeben habe ich einen Brief an deine liebe Mutter beendet. Es wird wohl der letzte sein. Nun will ich in der Zeit, die mir noch bleibt, das Niederschreiben, was ich dir als Vermachtnis hinterlassen moechte. Wenn das geschehen ist, kann ich getrost meinem Schicksal entgegensehen. Jedenfalls koennt Ihr sicher sein, das ich diesem Himmel nicht lebend in die Haende gefallen bin. Hier bei Tante G. bin ich vorerst sicher. Niemand vom SD kann eine Ahnung haben, dass ich z.Zt in Berlin bin.

Nach den Radio-Meldungen von heute morgen ist der Putsch angeblich zusammengebrochen und alle erschossen. Stauffenberg wurde genannt. Ich sehe nicht durch. Ich bin gestern abend bis gegen 11 Uhr mit Stauffenberg in der Bendlerstr. zusammen gewesen. Seit ich weg bin, habe ich keine Information mehr bekommen. Heute morgen gegen 9 Uhr habe ich verabredungsgemaess bei Stauffenberg angerufen. Die Ziegler war am Apparat und sagte, er sei "verreist". Haeflgen ist angeblich auch verreist! Wahrscheinlich ist sich die SS ihrer Sache doch noch nicht so sicher. Ich habe noch eine kleine Hoffnung dass wenigstens einer im Reich losgeschlagen hat, dass es jetzt von alleine weitertreibt. Onkel K. ist unterwegs und will versuchen Hansen von einer Telefonzelle aus zu erreichen. Ich habe ihm die Geheimnummer gegeben. Die Vermittlung OKW klappte heute morgen noch ausgezeichnet. Trott war hier; ich habe ihm kurz gesprochen. Aber auch er weiss noch nichts naeheres. Er will morgen mittag wiederkommen. Hoffentlich erfahrt im Amt was los ist. - Ich werde abwarten, ob von Hansen eine Nachricht kommt. Ich glaube aber kaum dass er noch auf freiem Fusse ist. [Voellig unerklaerlich bleibt mir, dass er gestern abend nicht in der Bendlerstr. war und Stauffenberg auch keinerlei Nachricht uebermittelt hatte. - Wie dem auch sei. Ich glaube es spielt alles keine Rolle mehr, unsere Sache ist verloren. Das wurde mir klar als ich den Kerl heute nacht sprechen hoerte. Bei der Ankaendigung seiner Rede glaubte ich erst noch, die Burschen wuerden einen Imitator ans Mikrophon stellen. Aber es kann kein Zweifel sein, das er selbst gesprochen hat. Weiss Gott, wie ist das moeglich? Stauffenberg war so sicher, dass er ihn erwischt haette. Natuerlich rief er wieder die Vorsehung an, "die ihn so wunderbar errettet hat". Nun, wer es eben glauben will, dem ist nicht zu helfen. Das Volk wird es ja nun am eignen Leib erfahren, wie er alles restlos zu Grunde richtet. Es ist unsere eigne Schuld. Wir haben zulange gewartet und dem Wahnsinn zugesehen. Nachdem das Attentat in Maerz '43 schief gegangen war haette man keine Ruecksicht auf die Bedenken Kluge's nehmen duerfen. Post Festum hoert sich das weise an. Aber es war immer meine Ansicht, ueber die ich auch keinen Zweifel gelassen habe. Seit Stalingrad habe ich versucht, den Herren klarzumachen, das ein Staatsstreich nur dann zu einer vernuenftigen politischen Loesung fuehren kann, wenn er vor Beginn einer Invasion durchgefuehrt wird - eben kommt Onkel K zurueck und berichtet das er Hansen nicht erreichen konnte, er ist angeblich auch "verreist" und kommt nicht vor 8 Tagen zurueck. Onkel K. ist noch mal durch die Bendlerstr. gegangen und hat keinerlei Veraenderungen, nichts auffaelliges feststellen koennen. In der Stadt ist alles ruhig wie jeden Abend. Kein Mensch weiss was nun tatsaechlich los ist. An die Goebbels-Meldungen glaube ich nicht - eine voellig verrueckte Lage. Mit allem habe ich gerechnet, auch das die Bombe wie damals im Flugzeug nicht losgehen wuerde. Aber das wir nun hier in und um die Stadt herum verstreut sitzen und alle nicht wissen, was sich nach meinem Weggang gestern abend in der Bendlerstr. abgespielt hat, ist grotesk. Ob Goerdeler mehr weiss? Wenn ich gestern abend nicht noch mit eigenen Ohren gehoert haette wie die Wehrkreiskommandeure dem Olbricht und Stauffenberg die Befehle des BdE fuer den Ausnahmezustand bestaetigt haben, dann koennte ich mir diese Goebbels Meldungen erklaren. Ob Fromm eine Schweinerei gemacht hat?? Ueber diesen Gedanken konnte ich nicht hinweg. Hammerstein, der inn jawohl am besten kannte, hat mir mal vor langer Zeit gesagt: "F. ist Fuehrertreu und Nazi, aber im Grunde ein anstaendiger Charakter. Der wird zu Hitler stehen, solange erselbst noch nicht eingesehen hat, dass der Kerl ein Verbrecher ist. Wenn er das erkannt hat, wird er von selbst zu uns kommen. Aber das braucht Zeit". Das war so etwa im Fruehjahr '42. Was gestern zwischen Fromm und Beck gesprochen worden ist, weiss ich nicht. Die beiden waren die meiste Zeit alleine in Fromm's Zimmer. Aber da Stauffenberg mir sagte, der alte Beck zieht die Sache durch, nahm ich an, Fromm habe sich ihm unterstellt. Einmal muss sich das ja aufklaeren. Wie es auch immer ausgehen mag: Ich kann mir nicht vorstellen, dass die wahren Tatsachen wieder durch einen solchen Schwindel wie nach dem 30.6.54 auf die Dauer unterdrueckt werden koennen. Wenn ich morgen keine Aufklaerung bekomme, werde ich sie mir verschaffen. Es ist so sinnlos, hier zu sitzen und zu warten. - Direktor H. war eben da. Onkel K. hat ihm vorenthalten, das ich hier im Hause bin - "zu unser aller Sicherheit"! Er hat erfahren, das Popitz heute frueh um 5 Uhr verhaftet worden ist. Das sieht mir ganz so aus, als ob jetzt alle abgeholt werden, die nur irgendwie verdachtigt sind, mit der Sache im Zusammenhang zu stehen. Damit ist ja wohl alles aus. -

Himmler B&E. Wenn da jetzt nicht einer losgeschlagen und die Lavine ins Rollen gebracht hat - ist es vorbei, und fuer alle Zeiten. Soweit musste es kommen - und dabei waere jetzt noch alles zu retten gewesen. Das muss man sich klarmachen! Endlich waren wir soweit, dass wir alle unter einen Hut passen. Dank Beck's ueberragender Persoenlichkeit. Auch Leuchner und seine Leute haben sich ihm bedingungslos zur Verfuegung gestellt. Es ist nicht auszudenken, das er tot sein soll. Er waere der Retter und der wahre Fuehrer Deutschlands' geworden!

Hier habe ich abgebrochen, wegen dem Abendbrots. Tante G. und Okeel K. sind zu Bett gegangen, nachdem ich ihnen versprechen musste dass ich das Haus heute nacht nicht verlassen werde. Sie haben Angst, das ich mit dem Raß zu Wirmer oder Goerdeler fahre. Die werden aber auch nicht mehr wissen als ich - wahrscheinlich gibt es bald Fliegeralarm. Ich habe mir einen von Grosspapa's altem Burgunder geholt und werde weiterschreiben Du sollst und musst wissen wofuer wir gekaempft haben.

Vor allem: Lasst euch keinen blauen Dunst vormachen! Lasst euch nicht wieder die Koepfex verwirren! Geht den Dingen auf den Grund und bleibt bei der Wahrheit! Endlich muss mal Schluss gemacht werden mit den Luegen und der Legendenbildung.

Wer ist denn dieser Hitler, hinter dem das Volk wie von einer magischen Gewalt gezogen ins eigne Verderben rennt? Gewiss ein ungewoehnlicher, aber kein grosser Mensch. Wer von den Millionen, die ihm verfallen sind, hat ihn je in seiner wahren erbaermlichen menschlichen Gestalt gesehen? Ein heimatloser Vagabund; aus der Schule, dem Elternhaus entlaufen hat er sich rumgetraeben, unfachig einen Beruf zu erlernen, sich durch eigne Arbeit zu ernahren. In den obdachlosen Aaylen war sein Zuhause. Unter dem aermsten der armen unter den ausgestossenen selbst blieb er bar jeder menschlichen Regnung und deshalb einsam - bis ihn der Ausbruch des Weltkrieges erloeste. Da, unter den Leiden der Menschen ist er gewachsen. Abseits von seinen Kameraden, unter den Truemern und gleichen der Schlachtfelder hat er einsam gesessen und vor sich hin gebuetet. So hat man ihn einst gefunden, mit xaxf verzerrem Gesicht ueber den zerfetzten Koerper eines Soldaten gebeugt. Mit luesterner Befriedigung genoss er die Selbsterstoerung der Menschen, an deren Glueck und Freuden er keinen Anteil haben konnte. Dann brachen unsre Fronten zusammen. Mit Millionen zog er zurueck und war wieder heimat- und brotlos. Mit hysterischer Kraft steigerte er sich in eine zeitweilige Blindheit und fand Aufnahme und Pflege im Lazarett. Nach seiner Entlassung fiel er zurueck in den Sumpf der Grossstadt und nahrte den Hass, der ihm zum Spaltpilz der Menschheit machen sollte. Als Spion und S itzel im eignen Volk fand er sein Brot und lernte die Kunst, Menschen verfuehren und missbrauchen. Er pries sich als Trommler und Apostel eines neuen Fuehrers und entdeckte dabei die Macht seiner Rede. Dann war er dem Daemon verfallen. Er gab ihm die Kraft ueber Menschen, die, wie er selbst, im Leben gescheitert oder von den Pruefungen des Schicksals gebrochen, sich dem Hass und der Rache verschworen hatten. So wurde eine neue Lehre geboren, die das geschlagenen Volk verfuehrte. Er gab sich das Ansehen des gerechten Raechers. Er schlug in die Runden und zeigte auf die, denen der Schoepfer, angeblich die Zeichen der Schuld so sichtbar ins Antlitz gepraegt. Er sammelte die gestrandeten, die enttaeuschten und die Verbrecher um sich. Wer je von einem Schicksalsschlag getroffen, vom Leben heimgesucht oder sich verraten fuehlte, der fand bei ihm Trost und Hoffnung. Denn er lehrte die gerechte Ordnung und versprach das Heil allen, die nicht mit sich und der Welt zufrieden waren und ein Bund mit ihm schlossen. So wurde er mit seiner Gefolgschaft bald eine Macht im Staat. Laengst war seine wahre erbaermliche Gestalt nicht mehr sichtbar. Nur wenige kennen noch sein Abbild des Ekels, das er hinter den Kulissen der grossen Massenversammlung bot. In sich zusammengebrochen, in Schweiss gebadet sass er da und stroemte einen widerlichen Gestank aus... "Giftgeist und Pesthauch" hat es... genannt, der einmal davon erbrechen musste. Das wurde der Fuehrer des deutschen Volkes.

Die ihn dazu gemacht haben, sind verantwortlich fuer das Unglueck, das er erst ueber Deutschland, dann ueber die Welt gebracht hat. Sie koennen sich nicht rechtfertigen mit der billigen Phrase, dass sie dies nicht gewollt haben (Papen). Es macht sie allein schuldig, dass sie als verantwortliche Staatsfuehrer in diesem Mann und seiner Partei nicht das erkannt haben, was sie wirklich sind: vom Daemon gefuehrte Verbrecher. Manche haben es erkannt, als es zu spaet war. Aber sie haben wenigstens den Mut besessen, ihre Schuld zu bekennen und haben alle Anstrengungen gemacht, das Unrecht wieder gut zu machen und groesseres Unheil zu verhueten. So z. B. Guertner. Er hat

als Justizminister Hitlers tatsaechlich schwer an der Verantwortung getragen. Aber er ist im Amt geblieben, um zu helfen. Was in seinen Kraeften stand, hat er getan. Das muss anerkannt werden. Aber auch andere koennen es bezeugen, die mit ihm zusammengearbeitet haben. Er hat klar gesehen, dass Deutschland nur durch eine gewaltsame Beseitigung Hitlers und der Partei gerettet werden kann. Und was er selbst dazu tun konnte hat er getan. Nur mit seiner Unterstuetzung haben wir die erste Oppositionsgruppe nach dem Fritsch-Prozess bilden koennen. Die Kirche weiss, was er fuer sie getan hat. Er ist einer der wenigen Verantwortlichen, die wenigstens versucht haben, durch "taetige Reue" wieder gut zu machen. In diesem Sinn koennen aber selbstverstaendlich nicht Leute wie Helldorf entlastet werden. Es gibt ein Mass der Schuld, das keine Entlastung mehr zulaesst

Wenn ich die Entwicklung seit 33 ueberdenke, dann schauderts mich. Das alles haben wir kommen sehen - und doch nichts machen koennen. Weil wir machtlos waren. Wir hatten nichts als unsere Ueberzeugung und ein Gewissen, das uns verpflichtete. Wir konnten unsere Gesinnung bekennen, aber die Tatsachen waren staerker, die Erfolge Hitlers gegen uns - bis die ganze Verdorbenheit des Systems auch denen offenbar wurde, die im guten Glauben fuer eine gerechte Sache zu arbeiten und schliesslich zu kaempfen wachten.

Im Maerz 33 wurde mit dem "Tag von Potsdam" die Wiedererstehung der deutschen Nation gefeiert. Wenige haben damals erkannt, dass damit ganz bewusst nur ein Schauspiel ins Ssene gesetzt wurde, um die besten Gefuehle der Nation zu missbrauchen. Der Appell der neuen Regierung an die Nation, "auf der Grundlage ueberkommener Werte alle Kraefte des Volkes zu einen, um in einer neuen Synthese aus Tradition und Sozialismus den Wiederaufbau zu beginnen", war auch nur ein vorsatzlicher Betrug. Alles und jeder wurde missbraucht, um die Herrschaft der Partei zu begruenden. Kein Wort klingt mehr echt, kein Bekenntnis mehr wahr seit es ein Propaganda-Ministerium gibt. Im Vertrauen auf die Versprechungen Hitlers, im Glauben an die Verwirklichung des "unabaenderlichen Programms" haben sich Millionen deutscher Maenner und Frauen zur Verfuegung gestellt. Ihre ungeheuren Anstrengungen und Opfer galten der Wiederherstellung eines geordneten Wirtschaftslebens, einer sauberen Verwaltung, der Wiederbelebung aller Werte, die einst das Ansehen des deutschen Volkes in der Welt geschaffen hatten. Ihre Leistungen allein haben die aeusseren Erfolge ermoeeglicht, mit denen Hitler und seine Parteifuehrer die Triumphe des Aufstieges zum Grossdeutschen-Reich gefeiert haben. Pflichtbewusstsein und Opferbereitschaft, Arbeitsfreude, Fleiss und Strebsamkeit ~~xxx~~, alle Tugenden des deutschen Volkes sind erst ausgenutzt, dann er-

presst worden. Mit Täuschung und Verrat, mit List und Gewalt hat Hitler seine Gegner beseitigt oder unschädlich gemacht. Unter Eidverletzung und Wortbruch hat er sich nach dem Tod Hindenburgs in den alleinigen Besitz der Staatsgewalt gebracht. Willkür und Rechtlosigkeit wurden zum Prinzip erhoben, die Interessen der Partei und ihrer Führer zum Maßstab aller Dinge. Mit den gleichen Gewalttaten und Verbrechen, die später in den besetzten Gebieten den Hass der ganzen Welt herausgefordert haben, ist der innere Widerstand in Deutschland gebrochen worden - bis die Alleinherrschaft Hitlers gesichert war. Nicht nur die Juden waren nach der Machtübernahme dem Terror der Partei ausgeliefert. Anonymes deutsches Blut und Leiden kennzeichnet den Weg Hitlers zur Macht. -

Mit Besorgnis hatten wir die Machtübernahme erlebt, mit Schrecken sahen wir der Zukunft entgegen. Unter ständiger Gefährdung haben wir erst passiven Widerstand geleistet, dann die Gleichgesinnten gesammelt und organisiert. Oft glaubten wir Hitler am Ende - wenn er das Volk und die Welt wieder durch eine neue Revolution herausforderte. Aber, was er auch immer ersann und vollführte - er hatte Erfolg. Er wurde immer wieder vor sich selbst und dem noch zweifelnden und ängstlichen Volk durch seine Erfolge gerechtfertigt. Diese Erfolge des angeblich so glänzenden "Aufstiegs" zu nationaler Macht und Würde" und die widerspruchslöse Haltung im Ausland schlugen uns die Argumente aus der Hand. Sie blendeten das Volk und lehrten es, an den Führer glauben. Als sich auch bei der Besetzung des Rheinlandes kein Widerstand regte, hatte er scheinbar die Probe bestanden. Fortan hatte "der Führer immer Recht".

Von diesem Zeitpunkt an, konnte eine Änderung nur mit militärischen Mitteln erzwungen werden. Aber viele Offiziere waren wie das Volk durch die Erfolge verdorben und geblendet. Goerdeler war es, der damals allein von seiner Überzeugung und dem Gewissen getrieben, den Mut fand, den Führern der Wehrmacht die Wahrheit zu sagen und sie daran zu erinnern, dass es die Aufgabe der Wehrmacht sei, das deutsche Volk nicht nur vor seinen äußeren, sondern auch vor seinen inneren Feinden zu schützen. Bei manchen fand er Verständnis und die gleiche Gesinnung. Aber fast alle lehnten es ab, "Politik zu machen". Unter denen, die Hitler und seinen Nationalsozialismus gleich richtig erkannt hatten, standen Fritsch und Beck an führender Stelle. Sie waren sich eben so klar darüber und entschlossen, wie Goerdeler, Deutschland vom Nationalsozialismus zu reinigen, um das Volk vor dem endgültigen Verderben zu bewahren. In ihnen hatten wir endlich die Männer gefunden, die über die erforderlichen "Mittel" verfügten und auf die wir rechnen konnten. Hinter ihnen standen

zahlreiche Generale und Offiziere, die wie insbesondere Hammerstein (damals schon a. D.) und Olbricht auf ein baldiges Eingreifen drängten. Fritsch und Beck sahen aber vorerst eine notwendige Massnahme darin, das Offizierkorps und die Truppe frei von jeder Beeinflussung durch die Partei zu stärken und auf einen Staatsstreich vorzubereiten. Sie erkannten klar die Gefahr, dass die Wehrmacht unter dem Oberbefehl Hitlers zum gefährlichsten Werkzeug seiner politischen Machenschaften zu werden drohte. Und doch konnten sie es nicht verhindern -

Wir hatten inzwischen mit, den damals massgeblichen Vertretern der Kirchen und auch mit Leuschner und Mirendorf Fühlung genommen. Nachdem nun auch die Verbindung mit der Opposition in der Wehrmachtführung hergestellt war, konnten wir an die Bildung einer wirksamen Einheitsfront gegen Hitler und die Partei gehen. Dieser Aufgabe habe ich mich seit 37 Jahren in enger Zusammenarbeit mit Goerdeler, Wimmer und Leuschner gewidmet. Dabei kam mir zugute, dass ich selbst frei war von allen früheren parteipolitischen Bindungen. Das Ergebnis unserer jahrelangen Bemühungen war schliesslich die Bildung einer Regierung, der jedenfalls das weitere Schicksal Deutschlands anvertraut werden durfte und die seit dem Herbst 43 bereit stand, unter Beck als Reichsverweser die Geschäfte zu übernehmen. -

Aber Hitler hat wie mit einem sechsten Sinn seine Feinde stets rechtzeitig und richtig erkannt. Fritsch hat er durch eine niederträchtige Verleumdung unschädlich machen lassen. Die Akten darüber sind sichergestellt und befinden sich jetzt bei ... Beck hat er zum offenen Widerspruch herausgefordert und dann entlassen. Er wusste genau, dass Beck sich der Vergewaltigung Oesterreichs widersetzen würde und auf eine unbedingte Gefolgschaft im Heer rechnen konnte - jedenfalls damals noch. Damit war die Führung der Wehrmacht Keitel, d. h. Hitler selbst ausgeliefert. Halder war zu schwach, Brauchitsch zu korrupt und Keitel ausserdem noch zu dumm, um Widerstand zu leisten. Mit allen Mitteln haben wir versucht, auf sie einzuwirken. Schliesslich ging es darum den Krieg zu verhindern. Sie haben - zum Teil trotz besserer Einsicht - nicht gehandelt, sie liessen sich treiben und wurden zum Werkzeug Hitlers. Die Gewalttaten der SS und Partei in Polen haben manchen der Generale nochmal das Gewissen wach gerüttelt und sie den Vorhaltungen Becks zugänglich gemacht. Im entscheidenden Augenblick aber, als der Staatsstreich nach dem Polenfeldzug 39 vorbereitet war, hat Halder seine Durchführung unmöglich gemacht - er hat tatsaechlich in den letzten 5 Minuten einen Rueckzieher gemacht, und zwar telefonisch, indem er Olbricht anrief. -

Dann sahen wir wieder da und versuchten den Leuten klar zu machen, dass der

- 6 -

Krieg ein Weltkrieg sei oder jedenfalls werden würde, dass er nie gewonnen werden könnte. Wir haben die Generale mit wirtschaftlichen und politischen Gutachten traktiert, um ihnen überhaupt erstmal einen Einblick und weiteren Ueberblick ueber die Lage zu geben, in der sich Deutschland tatsaechlich befand. Alle militaerischen Sachvertsaendigen sagten einen langen Stellungskrieg an der Maginot Linie voraus - aber sie waren nicht zu ueberzeugen. Der Fuehrer hatte ihnen naemlich, und zwar jedem persoendlich, "ganz geheim" anvertraut, er habe zuverlaessige Nachrichten aus London, dass die Englaender bald Schluss machen wuerden. Und das haben sie geglaubt. - Im Winter 39/40 haben wir versucht, sie durch die Wiederbelebung des Restaurationsgedanken zu ueberzeugen. Leuschner hat als Beauftragter der Sozialdemokraten und der christlichen und freien Gewerkschaften eine Denkschrift uebergeben, in der diese der Restauration grundsatzlich zustimmten, wenn nur Hitler und die Partei beseitigt wuerden. Allerdings machten sie Vorbehalte gegen eine Wiedereinsetzung des Kronprinzen, erklaeerten sich aber mit Prinz Wilhelm einverstanden, der im Heer bekannt und sehr beliebt war. Wir konnten damals noch hoffen, dass es so dem Einfluss Becks in der Wehrmachtfuehrung gelingen wuerde, den Krieg noch vor der Offensive gegen Frankreich durch eine Beseitigung Hitlers und der Partei zu beenden. Wir waren so zuversichtlich, dass wir uns in Ruhe den Gutachten, Verfassungs- und Gesetzentwuerfen fuer die neue Regierung widmen konnten - und schliesslich befolgten die Generale doch nur die Befehle Hitlers. Sie waren einfach nicht im Stande politisch selbstaendig zu denken oder gar zu handeln. Sie waren nicht einmal in der Lage die Argumentation Becks zu verstehen, den sie alle selbst verehrten und als den ersten Fachmann achteten. Er stand zu hoch ueber ihnen, als dass sie seine Beweggruende ueberhaupt nur ahnen konnten.

22.7.44.

Da habe ich gestern Schluss gemacht. Jetzt weiss ich, was los ist, mein Junge; Es ist aus: Beck ist tot, Stauffenberg, Olbricht, Merz und Haeflten erschossen. Hase ist von Goebbels persoendlich in dessen Dienstzimmer verhaftet worden, nachdem er vorher eine Flasche Wein mit ihm getrunken hat. Ein General laesst sich von Herrn Dr. Goebbels verhaften anstatt den Kerl niederschlagen! Das gehoert ganz in die Geschichte dieser herrlichen Wehrmacht - Und Fromm hat sich natuerlich aus der Affaire gezogen. So sieht es jedenfalls aus. - Ich bin verabredungsgemaess vorgestern Abend um 6 Uhr in die Bendlerstrasse gegangen. Auf der Treppe traf ich Oberst .., dem die Hauskontrolle uebertragen worden war, nachdem nach aussen abgesperrt war.

- 7 -

Dann habe ich Stauffenberg gesehen und bin ueber die Lage informiert worden. Wenn Hitler tatsaechlich nicht tot war, konnten wir doch annehmen, dass er nicht mehr aktionsfaehig war. Beck hatte die vollziehende Gewalt uebernommen. Fromm war damit einverstanden und hat mitgemacht. Zwischen 8 und 10 haben Olbricht und Stauffenberg mit den Wehrkreiscommandeuren telefoniert, um die Befehle ueber den Ausnahmezustand zu bestaetigen. Die Sache war im vollen Gang. Da die ersten Gegenbefehle Hitlers durchkamen, waren wir uns gegen ~~10~~ ¹¹ darueber im Klaren, dass dies nun den Buergerkrieg bedeutete. Aber, es gab kein Zurueck mehr und der alte Beck war eiaern entschlossen durchzuziehen. Das gab mir die berechnete Hoffnung, dass es ~~xxx~~ ^{noch} gelingen wuerde, wenn auch nicht ohne Blutvergiessen - So bin gegen 11 Uhr losgefahren, da ich selbst in der Bendlerstrasse nichts mehr tun konnte und meine Sachen fuer die Besprechung mit Goerdeler vorbereiten wollte.

Als ich weg war, hat sich - wie mir Trott jetzt berichtet hat (er hat den Bericht von einem SD Mann im Amt) folgendes abgespielt: Als bekannt wurde, dass Hitler lebt, sind ein paar von den Offizieren aufsaessig geworden, weil ihnen ploetzlich einfiel, dass sie ja auf den Fuehrer vereidigt seien. Sie drangen unter Fuehrung des Oberst von der Heyde in das grosse Vorzimmer ein und verlangten Stauffenberg. Als er raus kam wurde auch schon auf ihn geschossen und er im Ruecken verletzt. Dann kam Fromm dazu, der die Situation gleich begriff und sich gegen Stauffenberg stellte. Nach einem kurzen Handgemenge wurden Stauffenberg, Olbricht, Mers und Haeften ueberwaeltigt. Danach wurden sie abgefuehrt und im Hof erschossen. Beck war noch im Zimmer Fromm, wo er sich dann in Gegenwart Fromms erschossen haben soll. Das ist aber nicht ganz klar. Eine andere Version, die Trott gehoert hat, ist, Fromm habe Beck erschossen. Sicher ist jedenfalls, denn das habe ich doch mit eigenen Augen gesehen, dass Beck einen Strassenanzug anhatte und ich wuesste nicht, warum er eine Pistole bei sich gehabt haben sollte. Ich bin der Ueberzeugung, dass Fromm Beck die Pistole mindestens hingelegt hat, wenn er nicht sonst noch nachgeholfen hat. Denn er hatte alles Interesse daran, dass Beck als Zeuge gegen ihn verschwindet. Dann habens die anderen natuerlich leicht gehabt und Goebbels hat recht, wenn er sagt: "er Putsch ist im Keim erstickt worden. - Das ist bitter, mein Junge. Das ist ein Ende, das sich keiner von uns vorgestellt hat. Was jetzt kommt, ist der Himmelsterror ohne Maske. Dagegen koennte vielleicht Rommel etwas machen. Aber er ist vor 14 Tagen in Wagen von einer Maschine beschossen worden, dann verunglueckt und sehr schwer verletzt. Es besteht keine Aussicht, dass er wieder aufkommt. - Jeder wird fragen: was soll nun werden? Ich bin hoffnungslos, denn Beck war der Einzige, der uns haette retten koennen

Die meisten, insbesondere der Offiziere, kannten ~~ix~~ ihn nur als den Generalstaeb-
ler. Sie bewunderten ihn alle als den ersten Fachmann, sein ueberlegenes Koennen
und verehrten ihn ^{wegen} seiner vorbildlichen Haltung. Sie achteten ihn als einen Mann
von hohem soldatischem Koennen und als untadeligen Charakter. Aber die wirkliche
Groesse und Tiefe seiner Persoenlichkeit haben sie kaum erfasst. Er war Soldat,
aber darueber hinaus hatte ihm die Erfahrung seines Lebens, insbesondere des Vori-
gen Krieges und der Nachkriegszeit eine Einsicht und Weisheit vermittelt, die ihn
ueber alle erhob. Er hat von Anfang an in Hitler den Daemon gesehen, der das Volk
verfuehrt, um es zu verderben. Er hat sein Amt als Chef des Generalstabes seiner
Zeit uebernommen, damit er von dieser Stelle aus Einfluss gegen die Gewaltpoli-
tik Hitlers nehmen konnte. Dabei war sein Handeln weniger bestimmt durch die Er-
kenntnis, dass diese Gewaltpolitik Hitlers und die Kriegsvorbereitung, die er be-
wusst betrieb, eines Tages zu einem neuen Krieg, d. h. zu einem neuen Weltkrieg und
deshalb zu einer Katastrophe fuehren musste. Bestimmend fuer ihn war vor allem die
Erkenntnis, dass es hoechste Grundsaeetze gibt, die allein den Massstab fuer alles
menschliche Handeln abgeben. Er war ein ueberzeugter und glaeubiger Christ, der die
Kraft und Wirksamkeit seiner Persoenlichkeit allein aus dem Glauben schoepfte.
Nicht ^{erst} /deshalb, weil er erkannte, dass Hitler uns in den Krieg und das Verderben
fuehrt, hat er sich ihm entgegengestellt, sondern weil er sich als Christ und
Deutscher vor seinem Gewissen verpflichtet fuehlte, fuer die Erhaltung der mora-
lischen und rechtlichen ~~Grundlagen~~ Lebensgrundlagen unseres Volkes zu kaempfen,
die ihm wesentlicher waren als Rohstoffe und Erdoel. Auch als Soldat sah zuerst die Pflie
gegen den zu kaempfen, der diese letzten Grundsaeetze nicht nur preisgab, sondern
bewusst zerstoerte, um sie durch eine Irrlehre zu ersetzen, die die primitivsten
Instinkte der Menschen entfacht, um sie eigensuechtig zu missbrauchen. Was huelle
es dem Menschen, wenn er die ganze Welt gewaenne und naehme doch Schaden an seiner
Seele? war seine erste Aeusserung zum Sieg ueber Frankreich. Als er nach der Wieder
besetzung des Rheinlandes erkannt hatte, dass seine Warnungen nicht nur fruchtlos
waren, sondern durch die "Erfolge" scheinbar ad absurdum gefuehrt wurden, hat er vor
der Besetzung Oesterreichs,
der naechsten frivolen Gewalttat Hitlers, gehandelt. Er hat sich bei Hitler melden
lassen und hat ihm auf gut deutsch die Wahrheit gesagt. Er war sich wohl bewusst,
dass er damit aufs ganze ging. Er begann seinen Vortrag mit den Worten: "Mein Fuehr
rer, was ich zu sagen habe, mag bei Ihnen als Hochverrat gelten und mir den Kopf ko-
sten. Den lege ich Ihnen vorweg zu Fuessen. Aber was ich zu sagen habe, bestimmt
mein Gewissen ... Dann hat er gesprochen wie Las Casas vor Carl V. Hitler war sich
damals der Gefolgschaft der Wehrmacht noch nicht sicher und konnte ihn nur ent-

lassen. - Beck haette sich ganz zurueckziehen koennen. Er hatte im Amt getan, was Menschen moeglich ist. Aber er sah das Unglueck ~~kommen~~ dieses Krieges ueber uns kommen und war erfuehlt von der Pflicht, dies zu verhindern. Als ein staendiger Mahner der Generale hat er auf sie einzuwirken versucht, unterstuetzt von Hammerstein und Olbricht. Sein bis dahin unbestrittenes fachliches Ansehen und sein politisches Urteil wurden in Frage gestellt, als Hitler mit dem Sieg ueber Frankreich "mal wieder Recht behalten hatte". Bis im Winter 41/42 der erste Rueckschlag in Russland die ersten Zweifel in "Hitlers Unfehlbarkeit" setzte, und genau das bestaetigte, was Beck und Hammerstein, der Russland besonders kannte, vorausgesehen hatten. Nach Stalingrad waren die siegreichen Feldmarschaele endlich zu der Einsicht gekommen, dass Hitler und dem Krieg ein Ende gemacht werden muesste. Aber die Bombe, die uns befreien sollte, zuendete nicht. Offenbar war uns eine haertere Pruefung bestimmt. Aber das Volk glaubte die Luegen der Propaganda, dass Hitler selbst durch sein Eingreifen die Wehrmacht gerettet und nun ihre Fuehrung uebernommen habe. So konnte der Entschluss zu handeln in der Wehrmachtfuehrung erst dann zur Tat werden, wenn Hitler selbst geschlagen und Volk und Wehrmacht vor Augengefuehrt wurde, dass er uns ins Verderben fuehrt. Deshalb konnte der jetzt gescheiterte Plan, ~~erst~~ ~~ausgefuehrt~~, insbesondere nach der Ansicht Rommels, erst dann zur Ausfuehrung kommen, wenn mit ~~der~~ Invasion im Westen der Ansturm der Feinde aufs Reich zur ^{bis} Tatsache wurde. Gegen den eindringlichen Rat Becks wurde deshalb der Staatsstreich ^{nach} ~~bis~~ ~~der~~ Invasion verzoeigert, da nach der herrschenden Meinung im Generalstab unsere politische Lage nur verbessert werden konnte, wenn es uns gelingen wuerde, die Invasion abzuschlagen. Aber auch trotz Invasion waeren wir ~~immer~~ militaerisch in der Lage gewesen, noch die Voraussetzungen fuer einen Verhandlungsfrieden zu schaffen. Stauffenberg hat mir das ueberzeugend auseinandergesetzt. Aber es gibt ja auch noch andere, die dies einmal nachweisen werden und koennen. Grundlage waere die ~~stark~~ Schaffung einer neuen oestlichen Verteidigungslinie, etwa Riga-Brest/Litowsk-Lemberg-Prut-Galati. Ferner haetten wir mit den besetzten Gebieten als Pfaendern sehr schnell zu einem Frieden im Norden, Sueden und Westen ~~kommen~~ insbesondere mit Frankreich kommen koennen, da de Gaulle von den Englaendern und Amerikanern noch nicht anerkannt worden ~~ist~~ und deshalb auch frei ist, um mit uns einen Frieden zu machen. Wir wissen, dass er darauf einzugehen bereit ist. Aber dies alles gilt natuerlich selbstverstaendlich nur unter der Voraussetzung, dass Deutschland von uns selbst vom Nationalsozialismus gereinigt. Nur so koennen wir das Ansehen des deutschen Volkes vor der Welt wiederherstellen, nur so erwerben wir wieder einen moralischen

und rechtlichen Anspruch auf Gleichberechtigung und werden bundnisfaehig. Wir stellen unsere Feinde klaglos, wenn wir Hitler und den Nationalsozialismus beseitigt haben. Noch in einer seiner letzten Reden hat Churchill zwar die bedingungslose Kapitulation gefordert, aber von "Nazi-Deutschland". Die oeffentliche Meinung in Amerika wird sich hinter und stellen, wenn wir der Welt bewiesen haben, dass es noch ein anderes Deutschland gibt. Die Interessengegensaetze zwischen England und Russland bestehen an vielen Stellen der Welt und die Englaender werden gerne darauf verzichten, diese Gegensaezte in Europa zu vergroessern. Davon duerfen wir zwar nicht eine Spaltung unserer Feinde erwarten solange sie gegen den Nationalsozialismus kaempfen. Denn darin sind sie wirklich einig. Darueber duerfen wir auch garnicht sprechen solange wir keine veraenderten Tatsachen geschaffen haben. Das Propagandageschrei der Nazis ist sinnlos, weil sie unsere Feinde dadurch nur wie eine Familie zusammenschweissen, in der auch das missratene Kind gegen Angriffe von aussen geschuetzt wird.-

Heute noch haben wir es nicht noetig zu kapitulieren, wenn wir der Welt beweisen, das es ein anderes ~~zuerkennbares~~ Deutschland gibt, das sich selbst gereinigt und sein Ansehen vor der Welt wiederhergestellt hat. Aber in 6 Wochen schon werden wir, wie mir Stauffenberg noch sagte, nach der Ansicht Kluges die Front im Westen nicht mehr halten koennen. Deshalb muss das, woran wir gescheitert sind, sofort geschehen - sonst gibt es einen Kampf bis zum bitteren Ende. Hitler hat es ausgesprochen, dass er den Kampf nicht einstellen wird bis ihm die "Vorsehung" die Siegespalme zuerkennt. "Sonst, sagt er, werden wir untergehen. Nichts als Truemer und ~~zuerkennbare~~ rauchende Steinhaufen werden wir hinterlassen. Aber nach in tausend Jahren wird die Menschheit davon sprechen, wie ich mit meinem Volk untergegangen bin".

Leb wohl, mein Junge! Ich versuche nach Bruessel zu kommen. Dort bin ich ~~sicher~~ vielleicht sicher und kann nocheinmal versuchen, ein paar Leute zusammenzubringen. Sonst sehen wir uns nicht wieder. Bleibe aufrecht und wahr und sterbe, wenn es sein muss wie ich im Glauben an unseren Heiland -

Dein Vater.