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INTERVIEW OF MR. GEORG VON SCHNITZLER
by Mr. Oswald A. Sprecher, 19 February
1947, 1030-1230, Room 166, Palace of
Justice, Nuremberg, Germany.

Also present: Mr. Albert E. B. Levy,
Mr. Leon de Chetnik; Miss Rita E. Gaylord,
Court Reporter.

TO THE ATTORNEY BY MR. OSWALD A. SPECHER:

Q Do you have something for me, Mr. von Schnitzler?

A I give you first the certificate of Mr. Devine.

Q This is dated 30 October 1945, a letter from Mr. Neil A. Devine to
whom it may concern, dated October 30, 1945, Frankfurt Main, Germany.

"To Whom it May Concern: Georg von Schnitzler, formerly a member of
the Central Body Committee of I. G. Farbenindustrie, has today, with other I. G.
Farbenindustrie personnel been redetained after a few days interim of so-called
house arrest.

"The undersigned wishes to state that this redetention is not based
upon any past failure on von Schnitzler's part to cooperate with the investi-
gators of I. G. Farbenindustrie. It should be noted as a fact that von Schnitzler's
assistance from an information gathering standpoint has been invaluable. Signed,
Neil A. Devine, Investigator, Acting in Charge, I. G. Farbenindustrie."

Q This is the little scrap of paper Mr. Weissbrodt gave me in case I
needed help. That is his own handwriting. If you want to have it corroborated
in the States --

Q The little memorandum which Mr. von Schnitzler has handed me states
simply: "Mr. I. B. Weissbrodt, Financial Division, Weltmann Building." Now,
was that in Washington, D. C.?

Q It was in Frankfurt. You see, when Mr. Weissbrodt left I felt a little
forlorn because there was a certain relation of confidence, I think so, between

-3-

himself and myself, so I viewed it, and I said, "To whom can I address myself if I need some help?" And it was the last day he was present and he gave me that little scrap of paper.

Q That was his brother?

A Yes, and it was in the Holtzmann Building in Frankfurt; it was the next building to the Reichs Bank.

Q Now, let me summarize. As I understand it, you felt somewhat forlorn when you learned that Mr. Abe Weissbrodt was going to depart from his mission, which had been, among other things, to interrogate you over a long period of time?

A Right.

Q And since you had gone to him a number of times concerning some of your problems, you talked to him about this matter?

A Yes.

Q And it was Mr. Weissbrodt who suggested that in case of any further difficulties or if you had any further problems, you might address his brother at the address we have put into the record, in Frankfurt?

A That is right, sir. You see, he said simply if you show him that --

Q We have it in the record. That will take care of that. Now, you indicated yesterday that at least one of these two gentlemen was exceedingly intelligent. I forget which one you said. Was that Mr. Devine or Mr. Weissbrodt, that was a very intelligent man?

A I think Mr. Weissbrodt was the leading spirit.

Q Did you write up most of your material, such as these signed statements, first in longhand or did you dictate most of them as you described yesterday?

A I think I wrote some of them in longhand when I prepared them and some

-3-

of them I dictated after some little notes I had made before. But these, for instance, were all dictated by Mr. Weissbrodt himself. These where you see Answer, Question, Answer, Question, they were all dictated by Mr. Weissbrodt.

Q Let me see if I understand you correctly. That was an interrogation?

A Yes.

Q And the question was stated by Mr. Weissbrodt and you made the answer?

A That's right.

Q Now, what do you mean the answer also was dictated by Mr. Weissbrodt?

A Yes, the answer was also dictated by Mr. Weissbrodt. He comprised it and he made me sign it afterwards, after having gone over the sense. You see, it is not my wording because it would have taken too much time. It is not my wording. The answers are Mr. Weissbrodt's wording as he understood me.

Q Now, you are referring to certain rather lengthy interrogations concerning the Jasco agreement, is that right?

A Yes.

Q Let me have them in order to identify them for the record. The first document I have here purports to be an interrogation of you on the afternoon of the 23d of July 1945. It comprises five pages. It is signed by you, and on the margin of each page or beside some of the answers, there is the familiar "von Schaitaler" initials indicating some corrections had been made; is that right?

A Yes.

Q This interrogation is principally concerned with the Jasco Agreement. The second one is an interrogation of the 26th of July 1945 which is only one page long and which is signed by you; is that right?

A That is my signature, yes.

Q The third one is another interrogation of the 25th of July 1945 marked

-4-

3:00 to 4:00 p.m. This interrogation is three pages long. It is signed by you. At the end you have indicated you have read over the interrogation transcript and swear to the truth of the matters contained therein; is that right?

A That is right. That is my signature.

Q And those are your corrections throughout it?

A No, those are not corrections. Those are signed pages.

Q Oh, I see.

A To certify the correctness of each page.

Q Yes, that is right. Where it appears in the left-hand margin, the initials indicate a correction. Where it appears on the bottom of the left-hand page, it indicates that you have approved that particular page.

Now, suppose you read these through more fully. Does the name Miss Bignan bring any person to your mind?

A Yes, ^{Regener} Bignan. I think he was sort of a secretary of a so-called German-American Society in Berlin.

Q No, Miss Ellen Bignan (spelling) B-i-g-n-a-n. It is just a passing reference, I believe.

A No, it doesn't say anything to me.

Q She was one of the stenographers in Frankfurt at the time you were there?

A Yes. There is of course--these statements are right, and I couldn't say anything else nowadays. But if this is all entirely correct in fact, that I don't know, because you find it always here that I only speak of my opinion. It was only my opinion, because my knowledge was absolutely restrained on that matter. I said in one of the other domains--you know, I am from the beginning, as you had it yesterday, a dye stuffs man.

Q I am quite familiar with those things. It won't be necessary for you to go into detail. We have many records in the hands of the Americans at the

time you were previously interrogated, and I think that you very clearly understood my objective. You have now read through three documents which have been clearly identified. You have certified to the subscription of those documents. Now I don't wish to hear from you, "This may be generally a matter of my opinion, and therefore I could have been wrong." That is what we call weasel words. You're familiar with the American term. A weasel is a little animal that runs into little ^{holes} and out of little holes.

A Yes, if that is a weasel, yes.

Q Now, we call these "weasel words." Will you point out any statement therein which you now say is false.

A No, there is nothing false. That was as I had the opinion at the time.

Q You read the document over again. If you see anything that you think is false, either as to fact or opinion specifically, then let's hear about it, but it does not help the record or your position to just make a lot of weasel words--a lot of generalities. It's just as if you had not answered at all.

A Sir, you will allow me to say to this first page: That was absolutely my opinion at the time that we wanted Standard Oil only to be interested in the oil field and not entering the chemical field.

Q You're referring to page 1 of the Interrogation of 23 July 1948?

A Yes.

Q That is what you state here.

A That is what I state. That was my opinion at the time.

Q Is there any other opinion which you now have?

A After having talked with Dr. Ter Meer, it seems that my technical colleagues were not entirely of that opinion. They were not of that opinion. They did not share that opinion that Standard Oil should not enter that field. I am not of that opinion any more. That was my opinion. I could do nothing but say my own opinion of the matter that the chemical domain should be reserved to chemical companies and oil domain to oil companies; but if you will hear about that from my technical colleagues: ^{on from} Dr. von Knielien--they will say that it is not absolutely right; that in fact, indeed, the meaning of the people connected with that business with I was not were not of that opinion.

Q Now, Mr. von Schnitzler, let's just see what you're trying to say by a process of formulation. Number one: Did Mr. Ter Meer ^{you and} travel together ^{in 1933 and 1935} accompany you to the United States when you were representing I. G. Farben in dealing with Standard Oil?

A No. Yes.

Q All right. Now, Mr. von Schnitzler, when you went to the United States to deal concerning Standard Oil, you were representing I. G. Farben, is that correct?

A No, sir, I never dealt with Standard Oil. I only dealt with ^{other} duPont and the dye-stuffs companies.

Q Didn't you make some arrangements when you were in Delaware so that you talked to some of the Standard Oil representatives?

A Not I.

Q One of your colleagues did.

A Ter Meer talked with the Standard Oil people; not I.

Q Ter Meer was with you at that time?

A Yes, in America.

Q And at that time you naturally talked, since you were dealing

with duPont, concerning I. G. Farben's position vis-a-vis duPont with respect to production of oil and other such things, did you not?

A Yes.

Q And at that time you certainly discussed with Mr. Ter Meer the question of what his position and I. G. Farben's position was with respect to this basic question, did you not?

A Not in such a clear way.

Q Not in such a clear way? Let's find out about the clear way. Here you're negotiating with respect to who enters a tremendous field of production--important things concerning how your company and duPont and Standard Oil may be committed to the entire future with respect to the production of materials which very few companies make, and you say you didn't have a clear impression as of that time. Do I understand you correctly that you didn't have a clear impression as of that time?

A I was, I think, under the impression that the chemical field should be reserved to the chemical companies and the oil fields to the other companies.

Q That is understandable. It's always understandable that a man having such an opinion as that would be representing I. G. Farben provided that coincided with the general position which would be approved by the Vorstand. But it's also very obvious to any judge of the matter that you would not have stood a chance of leaving Germany either because of what Farben represented or because of what the Nazi Government interests were unless your view with respect to this matter was clearly known to them and unless the official position had been made very clear to you before you went to America. Am I right?

A No, sir, that is not exactly that way. You see, these questions in I. G. at the time were very much separated between the ~~X~~ different domains, and I never worked in the domain I, and I was only with Ter Meer together.

Q When you say domain I, you mean Sparte I?

A Yes, Sparte. Yes, in Sparte I, and when we were together, Ter Meer and I, that was in the year '35 with duPont's, there were many negotiations in which I only partly participated because ~~I never~~ I only participated in dye stuff dealings with DuPont, and I was only from time to time an observer and spectator, or whatever you call it: on general topics. And then I remember--I think there is another statement--I make that clear too, I remember one evening in Langet's house that Ter Meer made the suggestion to duPont to work together in the rubber ^{field,} ~~field.~~

Q That is covered by some further interrogations. We won't have to go into that in order to cover this point. It seems to me that the record can adequately disclose that, and you in due course will have ample protection with respect to this whole question on the basis of this simple matter, you, as head of the Kaufmannische Ausschuss.

A I was not at that time the head of the Kaufmannische Ausschuss. It was created later. When we were in America together, Ter Meer and I--the last time it was in '35--and then there was no Kaufmannische Ausschuss.

Q There was a predecessor of the Kaufmannische Ausschuss.

A There was no organization of that kind. The Kaufmannische Ausschuss was created in '37.

Q Yes, you're certainly correct. What strikes me as singularly strange, and I am trying to get a good view of what is really behind

the Schnitzler facade in order to meet these allegations. I am interested in seeing whom you're interested in protecting, if this comes to a question of what a reasonable conclusion of fact would be on your part.

A On my part?

Q Do you understand what a reasonable conclusion of fact is?

That is a conclusion which a normal man, given the basic underlying and fundamental facts, would be required to draw in the same way he draws them in his every-day existence. Do you understand? Now here you draw a particular fact on the basis of certainly somewhat intimate relations with a gentleman with whom you were traveling in America representing I. G. Farben, and now after you have talked to those gentlemen, and those gentlemen are apparently a little afraid about something, you have suddenly had a reconversion inside your own mind. I am wondering why that is.

A The reconversion is that at the time of that journey together, when we saw the duPont Company together--For Meier and I--he developed his ideas of the team work in America and made that proposition in the rubber field. And then Lemmet answered--that was very late in the night, but I remember it quite well--"We are ready to go with you/ⁱⁿ every domain or in nothing." That was the sense of it. And For Meier then said that we had too many commitments in America to be able to go with one chemical concern or one concern alone; that we had commitments with the Standard Oil on the Jasco Agreement; that we had other commitments in the domain of, I think it was, plastics; also on with the Union Carbide; that we further were interested to keep friendly

relations with the Allied Chemical Industry, which you know.

Q Where are we getting, Mr. von Schaitzler? I understand the objective of cartel arrangements. I am certain that you understand the objective of cartel arrangements. You have been working ^{with them} all your life. Treatises have been written concerning that. On the whole, those treatises won't vary greatly concerning the basic purposes of cartel agreements. I. G. Farben believed in cartel agreements. You not only believed in cartel agreements, but you reduced yourself to writing in official publications which even got published in America concerning cartel agreements. The record is clear concerning that. It will not be necessary to use up a lot of words concerning these basic matters. The question is: What specifically is there here which makes you say that a different position must now be taken concerning the matter? Just what? I mean, say ^{what} this is wrong in the following regard: I have since talked to Ter Meer, who tells me this was the position. Now it isn't half way in between. It isn't tomorrow and it isn't yesterday. It's a specific thing. Now, study it over a little more and see how you can summarize what is false here.

A False? I think that the impression I have had here when giving that statement was still the impression of 1935 when Ter Meer made a suggestion to duPonts to go together in the rubber field, and that his opinion was at the time to make the rubber arrangement, and further what ~~all~~ is regarded as "Kunststoffe" together with duPont and ^{we} wanted to have reserved the oil field to Standard Oil of New Jersey.

Q Now so far I think the record of your conclusions is precisely-- the record you have just now made with respect to your feelings--is precisely in line with what you said. That is why I don't understand why additional words are necessary.

A Yes, but they are necessary in that sense that with Ter Heer's last trip of 1938, of which you see I was not informed in detail, I was not with him in America alone. I think at the time his attitude was changed to a large extent. But you must not forget ^{that} in the meantime there was no talk any more with duPonts to go together in the rubber field, and that is, I think, more important in fact, that what was absolutely right in ¹⁹³⁵ 1938 was not any more the same standpoint. *in later years.*

Q You were in America the same time Ter Heer was in America in 1938?

A No, I was in Europe.

Q So you didn't have the same degree of intimacy with what Ter Heer was doing as you did have in 1935?

A Not as in 1935. You understand that; that is what I wanted to say.

Q You are then making no point about the fact that on the basis of your dealings with Mr. Ter Heer and with duPont and to some extent collaborating with Standard Oil, the statement you make there is correct.

A The statement is correct entirely on the basis of '35, but I didn't assist with the negotiations of Standard Oil.

Q You didn't assist with them even in '38?

A No, even in '35. I only assisted at one social luncheon, but not to any dealings with Standard Oil.

Q When you say you didn't assist, you mean you were not present?

A I was not present.

Q You do not mean to say you didn't know they were going on or

you didn't discuss generally their nature with Mr. Ter Meer?

A No, I didn't say that.

Q Of course; in other words, you discussed these things with Ter Meer. Let me just see how you came ^{out} on this. You were in America with Ter Meer and there were some questions at that time concerning Standard Oil. Did he withdraw into his own shell and pull a curtain down between von Schnitzler and Ter Meer concerning these things or did he talk to you as a business confidante who was travelling with him in America concerning the entire interests of I. G. Farben?

A I think, sir, that we discussed all matters which came up, but after my memory at the time of '35, the problem that Standard Oil could take up synthetic rubber didn't even come to a suggestion. What occupied Ter Meer later, and on which I was informed, that was the application which he talked to me later on of his negotiations with Firestone and other companies for the application of synthetic rubber.

Q It was Good Year too?

A Yes, that is right. At the end of '33, ^(Ter Meer and I) we were shown for the first time that cake of neoprene, *which Dupont had produced,*

Q Mr. von Schnitzler, it's very clear that you were shown the cake of neoprene from the statement, so we won't have to know about that any further. If you weren't shown the cake of neoprene and that statement is false, then you avert to it; otherwise, we can just go along. In other words, what is clearly correct and jibes with both the facts and your present recollection and the documents we have, there will be no question about those matters. If you are certain that those matters of which you have written are all right, no further reference will have to be made to that, but where there is something that is clearly wrong, as you now view it, that is what we would like to have you concern yourself

with and specifically.

A You see, I can only repeat what I said that this is all said under the impression of two journeys I made together with Ter Meer to America in '33 and '35, and this is absolutely right. It was my opinion. That was my opinion I had from him that he wanted to develop the synthetic rubber field with the application companies, and in the production field with duPont, but he said at that meeting--at that dinner with Lamet-- that we have commitments with Standard Oil in New Jersey in that field because it falls under the ^{Tasco} ~~last company~~ agreement and we need Standard Oil's approval. The commitment was clear.

Q Have you covered the rest of those three statements now?

A I say--I should say that is right, but it's only my opinion; yes.

Q Now you have said that, Mr. von Schnitzler--

A If I would have to do it again--if you would question us now again--then I would say that this has all been said under the impression of '33 and '35 and that I was of the opinion when I made that statement that still the same was prevalent.

Q Now between 1935 and 1945, you were on the Vorstand?

A Yes.

Q And Mr. Ter Meer was on the Vorstand?

A Yes.

Q And he never said anything to you between 1935 and 1945 which caused you during that period to vary the opinion you got from your trip to America with him when he was concerned with these matters, is that correct? Is that correct now, yes or no?

A You see, it's perhaps too strictly said. The negotiations with

duPont didn't come to a result. That was perfectly clear to me.

Q Mr. von Schnitzler, perhaps you didn't understand my question. I will ask the stenographer to read it to you.

(Stenographer reads question)

Now, my point is that you have reduced to writing here in the interrogation to which you have sworn your conclusions concerning the matter of who should produce oil and who should make chemical products, and you have discussed it as an I. G. Farben matter which seems eminently reasonable to me in this connection. Now the question is very simple. It doesn't really require, it seems to me and I think whoever reads the record will have a similar feeling, anything more than for you to decide whether or not Mr. Ter Meer or possibly somebody else between 1935 and 1945 gave you further information which should have changed your opinion. Did they give you any further information that would have caused you to change your opinion between 1935 and 1945?

A I was always of the opinion that Ter Meer wanted to develop the rubber field in America, if possibly with the application companies later on.

Q Mr. von Schnitzler, I think we can pass the subject. I think the record is adequately clear.

A But I haven't seen the other records. You were going to show me the other records. I have only seen the first one.

Q You have seen the one with respect to this one of the 25th of July 1935.

A I saw that of the 25th of July, and I said that it was always my opinion on interrogations that Ter Meer did not want to develop the

rubber field with the Standard Oil of New Jersey.

Q The question in effect which you refused to answer is that between 1935 and 1945 you were never given any information which would have led you to vary the opinion you formed in 1935. Now that is clearly the case because you so stated and so signed back in July 1945. All you have to do is say yes, or else I want you to indicate that you have told a falsehood. It's one of the two; there is nothing different.

A That was still my opinion.

Q In 1945, in July, you were still of this opinion?

A In July 1945, I was still of that opinion that we had not the intention to develop another domain. Another matter was that Standard Oil had the right to ask the process under the Jamco Agreement itself, but it was not--

Q Mr. von Schnitzler, what Standard Oil's rights were, I haven't ask^{ed} you, have it?

A Yes.

Q Isn't that right?

A Yes.

Q All I asked you is what you heard between 1935 and 1945 which would change your position so that you were either telling the truth or not telling the truth when you made your conclusion here.

A I was telling the truth as I saw it at that time.

Q In July 1945?

A Yes.

Q Which was after ten years of dealing with Mr. Ter Meer, after you had been with him in America, concerning the matter, correct?

A After ten years.

Q Isn't that correct?

A I know that Ter Meer was in '38 again in America and that he always talked with the application companies, but I never was informed that he himself had dealt again with the Standard Oil about the procedure in American itself. So what could have been my interest to deny it? You see, I can't say more than I know.

Q No one is asking you to say anything more than you know, and I don't think at any time any American investigator has asked you to say anything more than you know or anything that is untrue, is that correct?

A Yes.

Q You have indicated that you had a cordial relationship, and you wouldn't have had a cordial relationship with an interrogator if he were trying to make you say anything more than you know or a falsehood, because if you had a cordial relationship with a man and then/certify to the truth of ^a statement, ^(before him) that would be a very strange situation, wouldn't it?

A Yes.

Q Now these agreements, I had thought that we would pass in two minutes, because it seems to me that basically they state what would be fairly obvious to anybody, and I raised the question that a difference of opinion--a difference in conclusion--should be made because of information you have now received from Ter Meer after July '45.

A Yes, after July '45.

Q Now I have only asked you a simple question. Before July 1945, in the course of your dealings with Ter Meer, ^(there was) a period in which you had little directly to do with oil--is that correct?

A Nothing.

Q Mr. Ter Meer never reported to you or to the Vorstand when

you were present that Farben's policy had changed? He never reported that to you?

A I can't remember it now. I can't remember it now. If you would have asked me for the 25th of July--I was still of the opinion on the 25th of July--that was my opinion at that time.

Q Now let's get it straight. Simple questions and simple answers. On the basis of all your dealings with the I. G. Farben Vorstand, and on the basis of your personal relations with Mr. Ter Meer, nothing ever came to the attention of you which caused you to vary the opinion which you drew in 1938, is that right? Why is it so hard for you to say yes to that?

A Because I knew for the first time again in Berlin when Mr. Howard was present that the question--that was the year 1941--that the question of rubber came again, because in the meantime--

Q Mr. von Schnitzler, apparently you don't want to understand. That is perfectly agreeable to me to have the record show that, because the record is a very telling record at this stage. I asked you about four times a simple question and at least four times I have gotten a very discursive and ambiguous answer. The simple question is: between 1938 and 1945, nothing occurred so that you changed the viewpoint you held in 1938 after visiting America with Ter Meer. Is that right?

A That was so deeply rooted into my brain that whenever I heard something else in the meantime I forgot that and I was always under that impression when I ^{said} that.

Q And so much so that you still stated it in July 1945 after ten years of being on the Farben Vorstand and after ten years of seeing Ter Meer at every Farben Vorstand meeting and ~~at~~ many times in committee meetings?

A I was still always of the opinion that Fer Meer did not want to take up the rubber question with the Standard Oil of New Jersey-- from the production standpoint--I was always of that opinion. And as far as I was informed of his journey of '38, he had no negotiations with Standard Oil about the production of synthetic rubber. He had dealings with the application companies of which I have no recollection what exactly was in them and even now I don't exactly know what he had dealt with them. But that his position was that he, from his side, didn't want to take up the negotiations with Standard Oil. Quite another point was that Standard Oil, from her side, wanted to take it up or not.

Q Well, let the record stand. We come now to another statement of the 23rd of July 1948. We will see how the record will stand on this.

(Witness reads paper)

May I interrupt you, Mr. von Schnitzler? Mr. von Schnitzler, there is something I had ^{wanted} to postpone talking to you about, but perhaps it would be wise to insert it here. You lived through a very difficult period of existence. No one on the earth needs to remind you of that nor do you have to remind anybody of that. Now, when you became a member of the Party, you took an oath to Adolf Hitler?

A I didn't give any oath.

Q Did you make a subscription that you would be loyal?

A No. I had not to do anything of that kind.

Q Why not?

A It was not done. I never did do anything like that.

Q What did you sign in connection with your application for Party membership?

A I couldn't tell you, but I never looked at the form. You

see, that was just--when I became the Betriebsführer in Frankfurt--

Q Mr. von Schnitzler, when you became a Betriebsführer in Frankfurt and when you did a lot of other things, doesn't have a great deal to do with whether the question as to what you signed-- as to whether you signed anything. If you didn't sign anything, just say so.

A No, I signed--

Q A lot of things, didn't you?

A I signed a paper, yes.

Q And copies of these naturally went to the Central Party records, didn't they?

A Yes.

Q Now, I don't have to bother you with what we have or what we don't have, because I am finding out what your ability is with respect to the truth. My point is simple, and I am quite certain that you are not whatsoever misled by my point. My point is this: when you became a party member, you at least had to go through the form of some type of formal approval of the program of Adolf Hitler.

A Yes, that is a form of approval; you are right.

Q And when you became a ^Wirtschaftsführer, you had to sign more papers.

A No, I had not to sign anything.

Q And certain people had to make certain statements concerning your loyalty to Adolf Hitler.

A Yes.

Q In other words, my point is that you have lived constantly in an atmosphere where you had to make subscriptions to one kind of loyalty or another.

A Yes.

Q And it may be very difficult for you to distinguish in your own mind as to when you are attempting to tell the truth and when you are attempting to tell a lie because you have lived in a police state so long that you no longer have the moral basis for distinguishing between truth and falsehood, and that because over so many years you engaged in very clever dealings with Nazis that it's very hard for you now to deal with other people who ^{have not such an} ~~had a different~~ experience for 12 years of their life.

A That I admit that, yes. It's true, we have lived under a terroristic regime. We have had always to make through. It ^{was very} ~~is very~~ difficult.

Q And during this regime, you constantly had to live under a number of pretences, is that correct?

A Window dressing, yes.

Q Window dressing, which in its own nature is to be misleading-- which in its very nature is to be misleading to somebody, is that correct?

A That can be, yes.

Q Now do you think that the habits of 12 years, to say nothing of any other habits which you may have acquired in international negotiations, ^{which} ~~were~~ sometimes necessary ^{to} ~~not~~ to disclose your full hand, ^{have} ~~has~~ permanently affected your character?

A No, I don't think so.

Q Well, I think that we have a very short period in which to find that out because it's not too difficult a question. It is a question of directness, and if the record stays vague and ambiguous, full of pretences, full of vaguaries, full of this type of deviation and that type of deviation, you go back to your cell and ask yourself: "Mr. Von Schnitzler,

where do you come out before God, before people ^{judging} judging you for what you say under oath, before your own people and before the world?"

A Yes, that is right.

Q Perhaps we should let you go back and think about that.

A Thank you, sir, very much. We must go over this whole domain again because it's so involved. But I can only repeat that it was always my endeavor and my only purpose to tell the truth to these American ^{interrogators} ~~attorneys~~ and I think we shall prove that when you go over all the facts that I always said the truth. But what you're going through now, that is indeed a most difficult domain which I have been asked because I am not certain at all in the domain and so many ideas--possibilities--cross my mind and still cross my mind that at the present moment still I am in a certainly difficult position about the final results of that all.

Q Now, I haven't even ^{began} ~~begun~~ to come to what I consider some of the big points here, but I am surprised that concerning such a little point as this one here concerning a policy which you as a Verstand member enunciated in fairly general terms--general but clear--you have been unable to make yourself articulate to me, and instead have filled the air here with long and worried discussions in which you start to talk about everything else. It looks very strange to the person viewing your answers, you see. It's either that you had this opinion in 1945 based upon what you had learned in the normal course of your dealings with the Verstand--with the duPonts, with Mr. Ter Meer--or you didn't. Now you answer to that fairly simply: I take it that was ^{your} ~~my~~ opinion on the basis of the history as ^{you} ~~I~~ knew it in July 1945, is that correct?

A That was as it was rooted in my memory and my brain.

Q Right. It was rooted there after years and years and years.

A Yes.

Q And now since this time, a year and a half or so has passed, during which time you and Ter Meer, being quite aware of what's going on in Germany with respect to the occupational policy concerning war crimes^{and} concerning the treatment of the larger industries--you have something to add there on the basis of what you discussed with Ter Meer.

A Yes.

Q And as I get it, that amounts to two things--and I don't know why you couldn't have told me these things, but very simply--: one, Mr. Ter Meer may have changed some of his views or I. G. Farben may have directed him to change some of his views between 1938 and 1945, and you were not apprised of that between 1938 and 1945, is that correct?

A Yes, that is correct. I was not aware of it. Perhaps it was said once but it had left my memory again.

Q Now the record is clear as to what your position is concerning a fairly basic policy of I. G. Farben's as of July 1945. Can you succinctly and directly tell me what your view would be now, after you have talked to Ter Meer? How would it be different from what you said in July 1945?

A Ter Meer made in the meantime a statement. I have got that statement with me, myself. ^{will} I bring it to you in the afternoon and we can read what he has put on that statement. And there he writes about those negotiations he has had in 1938 and what later happened and if you allow me to get over and revert with it this afternoon, because at the present moment I must tell you it is not entirely present in my mind.

Q In other words, even at the present time you would take the position that no fact brought to your attention by Ter Meer has been so alarming to you that you can remember it?

A No fact has been so alarming to me only in connection ^{in connection} ~~even at~~ consideration of that policy with Standard Oil of New Jersey, that it from the present moment is absolutely clear in my memory.

Q In other words, you have in your own mind at the present time no other facts which would cause you to have a different conclusion concerning the statement you made in July 1945 except that something Mr. Ter Meer has said makes you feel that perhaps you were a little too strong or too weak in making your statement, is that correct?

A Yes. I should have said at the time "I know so very little that please don't ask me anything about that which I can seriously subscribe."

Q Do you ever subscribe to anything without being serious?

A Oh, yes, I was always serious. I never subscribe to anything which is not my opinion.

Q Now let's pass to the next--

A But still can we come back to that after I have brought with me this afternoon this paper?

Q Mr. von Schultze, you can write anything you want, such as you have written about the A. C., and then you can submit it to me, or in later interrogations we can discuss the matter much more fully. For the time being--

A Can we discuss it much more fully because at the present moment my memory is a little troubled now with these matters with which I had no thorough knowledge later.

Q Let's pass on then. If you say that there are no new facts that now come to your attention which would cause you to want to revise any of that, that is adequate. If, after you have refreshed your recollection by reading Ter Meer's statement or by anything else, you are free to

submit to me in future interrogations in writing your conclusions.

A Yes, sir. I refer to it this very afternoon, but can I read these other ones? You see, I again stated ^{what} that to be sure ^{was} what my opinion was at the time that we never gave Buna--yes, there you see, it was always my opinion. (indicating)

Q Mr. von Schnitzler, will you speak so that the stenographer can understand what you're talking about. You're pointing out to me that on page 4 you said something, is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And you now want to say that is true?

A Yes.

Q The record will show that. You don't have to make these comments. I have adverted to this now four or five times. If it states the truth, that is fine. We won't have to have any further language or conversation concerning it. If it does not state the truth, please point that out to me and directly.

A Yes.

Q Now Mr. von Schnitzler, you have just read the five pages representing the results of the interrogation of the 23rd of July 1945, 2:15 p.m. to 4:15 p.m. ^{Are} Is there any untruths that appear from that statement?

A ^{No,} Not for the present moment. I have to read first Ter Meer's statement about it.

Q I think the last one is a one page statement of the 26th of July 1945, 10:00 a.m.

A Yes.

(Witness reads paper)

Q What do you mean by "yes?"

A I have nothing to say to that. I said I don't know more even now.

Q We have taken a great deal of time to cover, I think, a very simple matter.

A For me it's a most difficult matter because I am not an expert on that domain.

Q I next will show you a statement by you dated 21 August 1945 which begins, "When one tries to compare the I. G. with the rest of the chemical industries of Germany." It is two pages long, signed by you. Will you read it clear through, Mr. von Schnitzler before making your comment.

(Witness reads paper)

A That is right except one point. The pharmaceutical industry-- that seems to be a little exaggerated. What I have written there--I could only corroborate later the position of I. G. in the pharmaceutical domain. It's not exactly as strong in fact than it's described here.

Q In other words, the influence of I. G. Farben in the pharmaceutical industry, where the Bayer Firm was the principal I. G. firm, was not quite as strong--

A As I had thought it was when I did make that up without my files.

Q At the time you made the statement in August 1945, you did not have direct access any longer to the Bayer files or to the Farben files?

A To no files whatever.

Q That is correct?

A That I had no access to any files and I think I overrated the pharmaceutical share.

Q In other words, where you said, "in the pharmaceutical field, I. G.'s share was at least one-third," you feel you were exaggerating there?

A No, that is right, but when I write "the other two-thirds are entirely independent," that is incorrect.

Q Oh, yes, I am sorry, I had not read that far. I didn't mean to make a misleading statement, which I will assert to you, ~~that~~^{made} my statement was because I had not read the next bit. Mr. von Schnitzler states, "To summarize, I may give some examples of I. G.'s relative share in the different key domains of chemistry: dye stuffs - 100 per cent; auxiliary products - at least 50 per cent, probably in pharmaceuticals at least one-third, the other two-thirds all depend on the supply of basic organic products through I. G.;" Now, your point is that you were exaggerating when you stated that the other two-thirds of the shares in the chemical industry are actually dependent on I. G. Farben?

A Yes.

Q What approximate figure would you state?

A I am not able to do that, you see.

Q I will ask you a few more questions, since you have raised some I have just refreshed my own recollection. In the cordial relations which you developed with Mr. Weisbrodt and Mr. Devine, you did not hesitate to tell them from time to time your preferences as to how you might develop the materials for them, is that right?

A Yes.

Q I would like to have you feel free to make suggestions to me in the same way.

A Yes.

Q For example, this morning you have indicated that with respect

to the A. C., you would like to see some of the other materials concerning the ^{Husbands} ~~A-Flag~~ ^{Organization} before you further submit material concerning that. I will give that suggestion consideration. Meanwhile, if you choose to spend some time developing that matter similarly to the way in which you developed the matters for Mr. Weisbrodt and Mr. Devine, that will be entirely satisfactory to me, and you will be given full opportunity to submit the matter. Now I am trying to think of a way to hasten this procedure with respect to getting your view of the truth of these things at this stage. Perhaps the interrogation process does not give you as much opportunity to be specific as you could be if you sat down for a while with the document and thought and referred to writing a few of your pointed remarks--references to the document.

A Yes.

Q I don't know. I am certain that I don't make any pretenses of having the answers to everything. Now from time to time we may try that because I note that dealing with Mr. Weisbrodt particularly, you often preferred to go and write things out by yourself and then come back and dictate your conclusions, is that right?

A That is right. I did that, for instance, with that last ^(document) which you gave me to read into the last statement concerning I. C.'s strength and position--general strength and position.

Q And that was dictated after you had written--

A Written my notes.

Q And you had a little room by yourself where you could go and do that?

A I could go and then dictate.

Q Perhaps we will be able to arrange that because I wouldn't want the record to continue to be as discursive. I think you will agree with

me that you don't think it will be too helpful. You can see the number of things that I have pointed out to you have a considerable similarity to this procedure of the little vessel. I will not make my conclusion at the present time whether that is intentional or not. I merely want to find out a very satisfactory basis--preferably a basis that is also satisfactory to you, and I assure you that I hope that when this is over that you have the same feeling concerning me as you emphatically state you have concerning Mr. Weischrodt and Mr. Davine.

A I know I was very ^{up} happy and shocked when you read me yesterday the first sentences that you read to me because some more points I could add. Mr. Edelman said to me verbally, "I know you have been the most cooperative one of all." That was Mr. Edelman.

Q Well, Mr. von Schnitzler, a number of informed people concerning Farben have passed through a number of stages in connection with their dealings with the occupation authorities. Some of the gentlemen whose names you have mentioned recently are at liberty, still developing many materials which are of utility to the occupational authorities and in many cases have a great utility to the German Government or the German economy ^{and to} people who are now administering the German economy. And some of them pass ^{ed} through the stage of withholding information until they found out what the interrogators had and then later on some of them made a different decision, some of them did not; and naturally, that makes a great deal of difference with respect to the total view which the Allied authorities must take concerning them because it is the best way of piercing this facade. I don't think you are making any pretences or that I should make any pretences that this situation is not of your choosing--

A Not of our choosing, no.

Q No, of course, not. This was a war and Germany lost the war and now there is an occupation. I don't ever want you to say to me that you like that situation or that you don't wish it had gone another way because I would know you were falsifying. But we are terribly concerned as to whether or not your loyalties still remain such that it affects your ability to tell the truth. We are also terribly concerned with whether or not the period of pretense ^{had a bad effect on you} during these 12 years of a police state when a lot of people made a lot of pretenses to one another--Nazi between Nazi, non-Nazi to Nazi, non-Nazi even to non-Nazi--because no one knew exactly where the other person stood in his deepest heart. I am certain you even felt that with respect to some of your I. G. Farben Vorstand members, is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q And certainly some of them rather emphatically had views concerning other Vorstand members including yourself. Now some of them are in a position now to fortify their views because they have cooperated so completely, at least with respect to telling the detailed truth, that they can be trusted to go over some of these files, and by the time we have made the determination that they can be so trusted, we usually find that they find that they find in those files things which substantiate fairly well some of the things they have said. I mention that only that it indicates that by the time we are certain in our mind, or relatively certain in our own mind, concerning the ability ^{to tell the truth} and in some cases it isn't a question entirely of intent, it's a question of the ability of the man to discard these protections he has built around his inner most heart.

A I understand you.

Q Now there are a couple of more things I wanted to ask you since

we were discussing some of your relationships. During the period of your interrogations in Frankfurt by Mr. Weisbrodt and Mr. Devine principally, you were ordinarily interrogated along with a number of other Farben people in the ^{Reichsbank} Reichsbank Annex?

A Yes.

Q About ten or a dozen officials were brought into this building in the morning and you ate your lunches there and then you returned in the evening to Freungeshelm?

A Yes.

Q Some of the Farben officials preferred to work directly with the interrogators in some of the larger rooms, but on the whole, you preferred to work by yourself?

A Yes.

Q Do the following names bring back your memory of the people whom I mentioned: Miss Ellen Wiggin. You don't recall her?

A No. Miss Wiggin--was that perhaps Mr. Ritchie's female secretary?

Q She was one of the secretaries.

A Then perhaps I may know her.

Q Miss Anne Friedman?

A Yes, that was a German girl. I think so, yes.

Q Mr. George Landau?

A Yes, Mr. Landau. Yes, I met him many times.

Q Do you remember Mr. Mahoney?

A Yes, but very little.

Q Your wife at that time was allowed to visit you occasionally?

A Yes. That was a great help for me at the time. Excuse me, sir. I remember Miss Friedman very well. She was not a German; she

was an American. I remember her very well. She was one of the secretaries.

Q I'd like to ask you concerning your view of this statement of Mr. Weisbrodt. He states that after a certain stage, "von Schnitzler indicated he favored the method of writing his statements out better than the method of questions and answers."

A Yes. It was at a certain stage once when I proposed it to him because the general survey ^{as} of those two ^{ways} have shown to me could be better made up in sort of a restatement than ^{by} question and answer.

Q Yes. "Following such discussions with us, he would sit alone and put his thoughts into writing."

A Yes.

Q "von Schnitzler wrote out most of his statements in his own hand."

A Yes.

Q Thereafter, I understand, that you usually ^{dictated} dictate them so that it could be read more easily.

A Only for that reason. I only wrote them all in long hand or I made notes, but so ^{full} strict that I could dictate it. My English, of course, is not sufficient to be able to dictate whole sentences without interruption. I think the English still would sound a little dillettantic."

Q Perhaps a little stilted.

A And for that reason, I ^{had} ~~have~~ to write it down, and as Mr. Weisbrodt puts it right: sometimes I wrote it down in long hand so it was readable and sometimes I made it in the form of notes and then I dictated it from my notes.

Q Now, I propose to come to a number of statements concerning I. G.'s activities abroad.

A Yes.

Q The documentation concerning these activities is too truly tremendous.

A Our activity?

Q Yes.

A Yes, we were practically in every country.

Q Yes, and the documentation reflects that. That is my point, you understand, and I prefer that you read over these statements and after you have finished reading them if there is anything wrong--anything false--point that out then. If there are any things which could be amplified, wait until we have gone through all these statements, Mr. von Schnitzler, because at that time you will recall better whether or not some of the other statements cover these matters of amplification.

A Yes, that is right.

Q Is that a sound principle?

A Yes, that is a sound principle.

(Witness reads document)

A Yes, when I said to you yesterday the A. G. question was not entirely covered in that statement--

Q It's not entirely covered in that statement. I show you first a statement which is three pages long and the title of the statement is: "Statement re the activity of I. G. abroad in the years 1932-1938."

A Yes, certainly. (Witness reads document) This is entirely right. Perhaps I can make ^{this} explanation to the last page. That was on the suggestion of Mr. Ritchie or Mr. Wainbrost; I don't know who it was any more--what my thoughts were about the future of those

works which we had to erect on order of the Government. I wanted to make clear that development didn't come from us, you see. That was not voluntarily made by I. G., but the Auflage, as the word was, came from the Government.

Q With that amplification--

A That is an amplification--an explanation--I can give you ^{as a} for the reason because there what is written for the last sentences is for the present moment entirely out of discussion. I never thought at the time I wrote that that it entirely ^(won't) come under Russian influence and that the Russians would apply the policy that we call "the iron curtain."

Q You're not indicating that anything is false here but rather that at that time you were giving your opinion on the basis of--

A On the basis of August '48.

Q And since that time, there's been further developments in the occupation; but as far as the truth of your statement is concerned as of this time, this document is perfectly adequate.

A Yes.

Q The next document is dated 18 August 1948. It consists of four pages, your signature appearing in the usual place at the end. The document begins, "Beginning with the peaceful conquest of Austria."

(Witness reads document)

A On the first page, I am not entirely sure if that was really "high octane" which was produced in Moosbierbaum. I am not sure. It can also be another product. Dr. Bostelisch knows it. May I say to the second page, I made here a reproach against the Goering Werke, and ^{I do not} ^{bring} I want to keep that up. You see, I shouldn't have said that because I don't know sufficiently. I write here, "The way by which the Nazi

Governments and instrumentalities like the Goering Werke and the industrial economy was highly to be blamed as it materialized practically in the looting of private interests." You know, that was an opinion at that time under which I was, but I don't know sufficiently about that whole domain to keep up such a reproach.

Q Have you got information since that time which makes you think?--

A Yes, which makes me think that this opinion of mine was not exact.

Q Do you mean you have information that makes you think that the way the Hermann Goering Werke and the SS acquired their interests--

A The SS probably, yes, there I can't say anything direct; but the Hermann Goering Werke, I don't think that is right.

Q Your recent information would indicate that they acquired their interest without looting?

A I think so. That was, of course, the Government took them in trusteeship and then the Hermann Goering Werke acquired them, and I don't know the details, but I was together in Krensberg with Dr. Voss and Dr. Fleiger.

Q That is Dr. Wilhem Voss and Dr. Paul Fleiger?

A Yes, and ^{they} indicated to me that everything which was in connection with the requirement from their private standpoint was absolutely correct.

Q After talking to Dr. Voss and Dr. Fleiger, were you convinced that they were correct in stating that the Hermann Goering Werke had--

A That they and the Hermann Goering Werke did not do any looting.

Q But as of 1943, it was your opinion.

A That was my personal impression, you know.

Q Continue reading.

A But you say my conscience is burdened, having written that as an opinion of which of course I couldn't have definite ^{Judgement}. It was just an opinion. You understand me?

Q Yes.

A I entirely had forgotten that I put that sentence in that statement. Of course, that will not be an investigation, but I wouldn't like that I would be liable to have caused some detriment to them because I am not able to do that.

Q What you mean to say is that on the basis of the facts and information before you in 1945, you had one opinion. Now that you have talked to Mr. Voss and Mr. Fleiger, you have another opinion.

A Yes, I have another opinion.

Q That will be all.

A Can I explain? Yesterday evening I got an entirely cold meal because it was a little late. Of course, I prefer that it last as long as possible, but isn't it possible that I get some hot food in prison? I had in 1943, so-called jaundice infection, and that was in Germany circulating at the time. I think it was imported from the East, and since then my stomach and my liver and my bile are still a little sensitive.

Q Certainly. We will make every effort to see that it does not occur again, so that you will not be late for your meal.

Rita Margaret Gayler, Court Reporter:

Rita Margaret Gayler

Ernest A. Sprecher, Interrogator:

Georg von Schnitzler, Witness:


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Institut für Zeitgeschichte - Archiv

INTERVIEW OF MR. GROSSER von SCHMITZ
by Mr. Franz A. Sprecher, 19 February
1947, 1400 - 1700, Room 106, Palace of
Justice, Nuremberg, Germany.

Also present: Mr. Hans J. Wolffschlaeger;
Rita M. Gaylord, Court Reporter.



TO THE WITNESS BY MR. SPEECHER:

Q Let's go on from where we were this morning. I notice you have brought in some more statements. Perhaps later in the afternoon we can come to some of them.

A Yes, because we can clear up entirely what we talked over this morning about the Jasse.

Q Yes, we are right in the middle of another statement.

A I can give just as simple an answer as your question was simple.

Q Fine. Let's do that in a little while after we finish this statement.

(Witness reads document)

A Can I make one remark in the first sentence here? I have here: "I. G. was asked by the Government or by Kruech to start in an enormous development in creating, etc." I think it is identical because Kruech did not do his quality as president of I. G.'s supervisory board but as a Government official--as the head of the Amt Vier Wirtschaftliche Ansehen. It's only to avoid any misunderstanding, you know.

Q Yes, may I see that a moment?

A It's on page 3.

Q Now, it wasn't until 1940 that Kruech became chairman of the Aufsichtsrat. You indicate that Kruech and the Government in this contract are one and the same?

A Yes, are one and the same; that is, perhaps the sentence

could be misleading as it is written there. I didn't think of it when I wrote it down.

Q That was the impression I had after reading the sentence there.

A I couldn't say that it was the Government directly, or if it was the Amt Fuer Wirtschaftliche Aushau--I think it is not quite well worded again.

Q Well, you word it again.

A I don't exactly know if it was the Government directly or the Government through the Amt Fuer Wirtschaftliche Aushau, and up to now, I don't know it. I think again the next was with Norway; that has to be more clarified.

Q Yes. On the third page where Mr. von Schultze in a statement was talking about developments in Norway after the invasion of Norway, he wishes to make an amplification.

A The clay necessary for the production of aluminum was of Norwegian origin, just as well, but of course the vaukite had to come over from the continent.

Q That clarifies that satisfactorily, is that correct? Your addition clarifies that satisfactorily?

A Yes, that clarifies that satisfactorily. The next French contribution--that is all what I knew in 1945; that is absolutely correct. In the meantime, of course, one has read so many things where you read that perhaps--but it is not necessary to add anything to that.

Q I am not clear as to whether or not you mean to say that you desire to make a correction or whether you do not.

A No, I do not.

Q You do not desire to make any corrections?

A No.

Q Well, we are in different ways familiar, in different directions perhaps, in respect to what has happened in France since, but that is of no value to our discussion now. But the question is, as of the time the occupation of France was going on, what the relations between the French and the German industry was. You have made a statement there.

A That was my opinion. I still think it is correct. I knew more in the meantime from papers and so on, but at the moment that is correct.

Q You probably want to say that what you have learned from the papers and so on has amplified in your view the contribution of the French industry, or to the contrary? See, I can't quite see if you're trying to say--if you say you're a little erroneous there--

A No, not at all. We can go on. I think I would put it exactly the same way if I had to do it again now--if I had to do it again today. I think I would have to do it exactly the same way. Now, I think the last phrase, that was one of the phrases made under the depression of which I spoke yesterday. It is exaggerated.

Q May I read the last phrase?

A The last sentence.

Q Now would you make quite clear what it is on page 4, which is merely one short paragraph, just what it is that is incorrect?

A You see, my idea is this, if I can speak aloud--only first think aloud, not taking anything for the present moment.

Q We take a record of everything, Mr. von Schnitzler.

A That the Auflagen I. G. get from the Government concerned

as well what had to be done in the old German territory as in the other countries, say in Auschwitz, in Hydebreck, in Norway, and that it was not I. G.'s purpose to use those countries as a tool; you know, it was the Government which made us invest there certain productions by order.

Q Do you have anything further?

A That by order, that is you see, we did not take away property from other persons, but we invested in those countries on order of the Government. That is my idea.

Q Does that finish your comments concerning this paragraph.

(Reporter is asked to read witness' answer)

Q Is that satisfactory?

A I think it seems to be satisfactory.

Q I will read the next to the last sentence to you, Mr. von Schmitzler: "I. G. played an important part in adapting the economy of the conquered countries to the purposes of the German war machine." Just how do you find a conflict between that sentence and what you have just said? I, personally, don't find any conflict. Do you find a conflict?

A One could read, from what I have written there, that that was all deliberately taken on our own initiative, but indeed it was made only on Government order.

Q I will read the last sentence: "Also I. G. acquired companies, increased its participation in other companies, and made important new capital investments in the conquered countries." You have stated nothing that is contradictory to this.

A No, but the impression, you see--the impression you get from that sentence becomes quite different when you add that what I said before.

Q Well, let's take this sentence in little pieces then. I just want to be sure that the record discloses any corrections, if you mean it to be a correction. "I. G. acquired companies." I. G. did acquire companies in the occupied countries, is that right?

A Yes, if you consider Austria and Sudetenland conquered countries, that is right. If you take them apart, Austria and Sudetenland, I don't think we acquired companies.

Q Well, we will come to such things as Wels and Linz and Moruta later on, and to Bruncolor. Let us confine our attention for this next question entirely to Moruta. What was there about the relationship of I. G. Farben to Moruta which would make you say that I. G. Farben would not acquire Moruta.

A Yes, the question of Moruta, of course, is somewhat difficult because Moruta had belonged practically to the Polish State.

Q Yes, Mr. van Schuiteler, regardless to whom it belonged or as to whether it was acquired by the approval of the leader of the Mohammedan Church, or whatever it may be. It was acquired, is that correct?

A Yes, Moruta was acquired.

Q This is what I mean when I said before, this morning: if this statement is clear upon its face and it represents the facts, that is all that is necessary. You do not stand in danger then of having told an untruth; and so far as amplification is concerned, with respect to all these variations concerning that Moruta was previously controlled by the Polish Government through a Polish bank, etc., etc., that we can come to another time. But this statement is not wrong in that it merely says, "I. G. acquired companies." Isn't that right?

A Yes.

Q "It increased its participation in other countries." That is the next sentence. It's true with respect to Francolor; it's also true with the increase of I. G.'s control with respect to Vinnica?

A True.

Q So the only thing that would trouble me concerning the veracity--the truthfulness--of the last statement you made when you said it only applied to Austria and Czechoslovakia is that you were for some reason or other forgetting about such plain matters as Sarata and Vinnica.

A I am thinking the whole matter over, and Francolor, that was a joint creation of a new company.

Q With I. G. Farben acquiring a 51 per cent control of the shares?

A But with a French president all the time.

Q Yes, but that fits in with your statement here that I. G. Farben increased its participations in other companies. There is nothing untrue about that.

A No, that is not an untruth.

Q "And made important new capital investments in the conquered countries." Your report is in respect to Anschultz and Heydebreck. Well, Heydebreck was in the old Reich. With respect to Anschultz, you made important new capital investments. Likewise with Norway, you indicated that certain additional investments were made by I. G. Farben in Norway. Some of these investments did not produce anything because the banks came too soon, but you did make an important new capital investment.

A Yes, we did.

Q I think I understand what you were trying to say.

A What I am trying to say now is correct.

Q Yes, what you said is correct.

A Yes, but she (reporter) can take what I said too about the Government.

Q I am certain she is taking everything.

A Yes, she is taking everything.

Q Fine. The record is clear. If you have any doubts about it, I will be glad to have it read back to you, and besides, you will have an opportunity to see this record. Now you, Mr. von Schnitzler, brought up certain documents which you said would assist us with respect to our discussions this morning concerning Jacco. This morning, concerning Mr. Ter Meer's views and I. G. Farben's views concerning the production in the rubber, oil and chemical field, you made certain statements and you wished a chance to see what Mr. Ter Meer had to say in a memo to you. You now have that memorandum before you?

A Yes, I have that memorandum before me.

Q Will you speak clearly so that the reporter can get your comments.

A (Reading document) Of course, that is made in German. He writes:--

Q May I see the text? If you would like Mr. Wolffsohn to make an exact translation--

A Yes, he can make an exact translation.

Q Beginning from the top of the page. Is that satisfactory?

A Yes, everything, because he writes here about international contracts. It might be useful to have it all.

Q Well, if you like, we can study the entire matter and come back to it tomorrow.

A Only I wanted to state one thing, to have it off my heart.

You asked me, after I had said that all what had happened in '35 was so deeply rooted in my memory that it still was present in '45, and what has happened or nearly--it was the sense of your question--between '35 and '45, and you wondered that the problem had not been discussed or discussed in my presence, and the answer is very simple. The problem did not arise because there was no interest in the United States for the Buna process. There was no interest in the Buna process. And what I said before when Ter Meer was '38 in America, that was only for application questions of Buna with the American tire companies. Of course, he needed the approval of Standard Oil for it. But the question of production of Buna, which was interesting as a future problem in '35, never came to discussion again because there was no American interest in the production, and Ter Meer puts it this way, "The possibility to develop Buna in the United States against the competition of natural rubber was not given on price reasons and reasons of quality, and of the possibility that every natural rubber company could not be at the disposition in sufficient quantities." Apparently, nobody ever thought about it.

Q Let me summarize the meaning, not that I want to use other than your words, but so that we can understand precisely what is in your mind. Your point is this, that Ter Meer states that none of the companies in America with whom he had dealings were interested in the production of Buna.

A Yes.

Q When he visited America in 1938, his purpose in negotiating with the Firestone and Goodyear Rubber Companies was to determine whether or not they desired to obtain Buna from Germany.

A Yes.

Q From the I. G. Farben Buna plants.

A Yes.

Q And the question of application had to do with applying for such Buna and working out all the procedures connected thereto, is that correct?

A Yes, that is correct.

Q Is that sufficiently clear? If it is, then we can pass on.

A Yes, that for the present moment, and the same is said, but only in an interior statement by Dr. Knieriem. That statement was not given officially but made for our own use only. Knieriem made that statement for only our interior purposes.

Q When did he make that?

A He made that in Autumn of 1945.

Q By "interior purposes," what do you mean?

A When we prepared it in Kramsberg between ourselves.

Q When you and Mr. von Knieriem were in Kramsberg, you prepared together some materials?

A Yes, we were all together with more people: Schmitz and Ter Meer and Buestefisch and more people.

Q And other I. G. Farben people? Now, by "interior purposes," you mean for your personal information?

A Yes, for our personal purposes. He said the same thing in saying--perhaps you will be good enough to translate it later on--that the reproach which has been made many times that I. G. had the intention to keep low the American, that is the United States--war material potential and was against giving out the know-how for Buna is also wrong. The Buna know-how in the second half of the thirties stood at the disposition of Standard Oil and also, to duPont on the carbide basis. But it was not asked for, as at that time the United States of America had no interest in

synthetic rubber because of the quality and superiority of the much cheaper and more abundant natural rubber and because of the higher production costs of the synthetic product. When we succeeded in Germany to lower the manufacturing cost through the so-called "thermic Aufbau" below the cost of the natural rubber in the late Autumn - (and I think that must mean 1938), a new approach in the United States with the specific authorization of the German Government offices was decided upon. But it was always application. A board meeting of Standard Oil, in which Fer Meier took part, gave their consent to negotiations to be taken up with the so-called Big Four: the United States Rubber, Goodrich, Goodyear and Firestone, and the General Tire Company. Those negotiations were successful insofar as all five tire firms declared themselves ready to start tests with the important Buna-S and production of special tires with Buna cord, as Buna in the abrid is superior to natural rubber by 30 per cent. Those tests against expectation dragged on till far in the summer of 1939, so that a journey which was planned in the spring of 1939 to the United States had to be postponed until the autumn. Have I been clear?

Q Yes.

A On account of the outbreak of the war it did not materialize any more. With questions of war potential and such questions, those negotiations had nothing to do. Then because in 1938 and 1939, surely no American ever thought of the possibility that the importation of natural rubber to the United States could ever be cut off. And then comes a very important sentence: In Spring 1940, Howard in Basle asked for the know-how for Buna. We were not able any more to give it to him.

Q Now you have just translated almost literally a statement which has been made by--

A This is the interior statement about Buna, and this was an official statement by Ter Meer given to Fiat in Frankfurt-Hoechst. Now the answer of your question is indeed that what I had in my memory from '35 still existed.

Q In 1945?

A In 1945, because the question never had arisen again of the production of Buna in the United States, the application question of course apart, and when Howard in the Spring of '40 asked for it --everything-for procedure and so on, Ter Meer and Knieriem had to refuse.

Q Now why did they have to refuse him in 1940?

A I think on account of the Government; so I think, it's not expressed here. Now I think I have cleared that entirely. When I spoke of a certain different meaning -- you remember that -- I think it can be explained this way. I think, I am not absolutely sure, and I can't make it out of those two statements, but it seems to me I kept it that way in my memory that if, for instance, the United States firm would have asked for the production procedures and so on, under the Jasco agreement in those years, they would have been able to give that.

Q. That is to say, you feel that after the Nazis came to power in 1933, if Standard Oil had asked for the I.G. Farben know-how concerning the production of Buna, I.G. Farben would have been able to give Standard Oil this procedure?

A That is the impression I have of what Ter Meer and Knieriem mention, but it can be wrong. You see, we have not spoken that over in such clear terms, and I, of course, reading again those statements I have made, I was under that impression only theoretically-- because I knew that there had been difficulties in granting to Italy

certain procedures--

Q Yes, well, that still seems to me to be a reasonable basis for drawing the conclusion you drew.

A That was the conclusion I have drawn.

Q Do you have any basis for feeling, even after you have talked to Kauter and Ter Meer about this exact point, that I. G. or the Nazi Government would have had a different relationship concerning the installation of production in the United States than I. G. and the Nazi Government had with respect to Italy?

A I will tell you this. They gave authorization to Italy, but they made certain difficulties during a certain time. They gave it. Italy built two or three different Buna plants on our procedures and our material, but I read at the time that certain difficulties, the details of which I never knew and I wouldn't have collected--but there were certain difficulties--I think you can find it there. And I have drawn from those difficulties, that of course it would have been even more difficult if the United States would have been the partner. But that was a pure conclusion because it was all entirely theoretical, and that has never been asked from the United States.

Q When were the Buna plants installed in Italy?

A I think it was in '38. I think so, but you can have it here because in those points Weischbrodt always helped me and I think that the date was corroborated by Dr. Struss and Loehr.

Q Would you say it was after the Munich Pact that I. G. was permitted to assist in installing the Buna plants in Italy?

A So I say that there?

Q I am asking you now.

A I am not certain of the date.

Q All right.

A I think I have it entirely clear so that I can say with best faith that what I said on the '35 basis was still prevalent, as the case never came up again.

Q You mean was still prevalent in 1945?

A Yes, because nothing had changed in '40 and then in '40 Howard asked, and we had to say, "No."

Q Good. Now let's go back to some of these other statements.

A May I ask one question? Does it make a bad impression that for the first moment this morning I hesitated and was a little troubled by this whole problem--that it was not so entirely clear for the first moment upon me.

Q Now the next statement I will hand you is a statement of one page entitled: "Statement Re Other Private Firms Having Acquired Property in the Conquered States." In the middle of the page it is dated 11 September 1948. After that date, you have additionally made another statement and I presume it's on the same date but it doesn't make any difference.

A (Witness reads document) Yes, that was all I knew. Mr. Weisbrodt once asked me to write down what I knew at the time of these things, you see, from my memory, and I do not know more than I do presently. But I should have to think it over if you make a point of it.

Q Just for the record, Mr. von Schnitzler, when you were reading from the statement of Ter Meer which was submitted to Fiat, you were reading from page--

A From page 14.

Q And 15.

A No, I read only from page 15.

Q Of the statement which is dated 30 of March 1946, and it's entitled: "A statement by Dr. Hermann Schmitz." It was a correction by Hermann Schmitz. And the Schmitz statement was made on the 17th of September 1945, and this statement to Flat by Ter Meer of 30 March 1946 was a correction or amplification.

A We shall have to revert many times to the statement of Ter Meer's.

Q The first page of this is missing so I can't tell what this is.

A Oh, yes, the first page must be fallen out. I hope I kept it.

Q All right, the statement by Knieriem, from which the first page is missing--

A I have got it in my room; I am sure.

Q You were translating from pages--

A On page 7.

Q All right, that will be satisfactory. Now we will go on to two signed interrogations; the first being an interrogation of the 30th of July 1945, an interrogation which is three pages long, and in this interrogation questions were asked both of you and Mr. Ilgner. You're not being asked at this point to either confirm or deny anything which Mr. Ilgner stated except insofar as that affects answers which you made here. You understand that?

A Yes.

Q I will give you this and at the same time the next statement which is a continuation of the same question where only you were interrogated on the 8th of August 1945; the second interrogation being

only one page long. I will let you have them both together so that any questions of amplification can be treated together rather than separately.

(Witness reads document)

A I have nothing to say only one remark coming from me about the Rothschild's part in the Oesterreichische Kredit Anstalt. You see, that is difficult for me. That is a conclusion--my answers, that Weissbrodt made it that way, I shouldn't have. It's not signed by Weissbrodt but it's signed by me.

Q Yes, that seems to be not only your signature but your position written in there. You're referring to the interrogation of the 6th of August 1945.

A The 8th of August.

Q Mr. von Schnitzler, you're telling us that you believe you have made another conclusion and that you now think that there is something wrong with this conclusion.

A With the conclusion.

Q Now indicate specifically where your conclusion is wrong.

A I think it's the Kredit Anstalt wanted to sell the interest in the Skoda-Wetzler even long years before the Anschluss. I should think it was in '31 or '32 even, and I. G. always refrained from it because the interest was not sufficient in that Austrian company, but when--

Q That is to say, the interest of the Kredit Anstalt?

A No, the interest of I. G. was not sufficiently interested in that company. The Kredit Anstalt always wanted to get rid of that participation and even get rid at a relatively cheap price, but I. G. was not interested to acquire because we had generally spoken no interest to acquire such participations of more or less simple chemical works in different states. And this more or less state of abeyance lasted

for years and years notwithstanding our department, Verkaufs Gemeinschaft Chemikalien--Chemical Sales Association--and always entertained friendly relations to Mr. Pollack, the owner of that enterprise.

Q Now let me recapitulate.

A Can I continue?

Q May I recapitulate what you just said as I understand it? The Kredit Anstalt was always interested in selling Skoda-Wetzler for some reason or other. This bank was willing to sell its interest in Skoda-Wetzler at a very low price. I. G. Farben--

A Relatively low price.

Q I. G. Farben was not interested at this time in acquiring simple chemical production companies in the southeast or elsewhere.

A Elsewhere, that is it.

Q Now--

A Now, notwithstanding the Verkaufs Gemeinschaft entertained friendly relations with Mr. Pollack who was the leading spirit.

Q That is to say that throughout this period between 1931 and 1938 and 1938, you had had very friendly relations with the principal leader of Skoda-Wetzler, Mr. Pollack.

A That is right.

Q Not continue.

A Now, Mr. Pollack died of a stroke when the Germans entered Vienna.

Q Which would be on the 12th or 15th of March 1938.

A So I can't give you any more details about his death. He might have committed suicide, but I don't know it, but we always heard that he got a stroke and was dead; so the company was at the time without a leader. It was a small company and it was without a leader,

and then the Kredit Anstalt renewed, as I am informed--it was not my proper business--always renewed their offers, and now the situation for I. G. was entirely changed because the Skoda-Wetzlar became a German firm, economically speaking, and their domain fell into the German economic sphere. And for that reason, from the very first time one could realize that in Austria certain chemical development would take place, I. G.'s standpoint to the acquiring of that company was entirely different than before.

Q Do you have any further amplification?

A Not yet entirely. Therefore, it was a common interest of Kredit Anstalt, independently of their owners and of I. G., that I. G. should acquire the participation of Kredit Anstalt, Skoda-Wetzlar, at a very favorable price as in reality was paid by I. G.

Q Is that all?

A Yes, that is all. Thus, I think I have to correct the conclusion because it was no theft, and if Mr. Rothschild would have been still a president, he would have agreed to that agreement just as well. That is right. Have I made myself quite clear?

Q I think so. If you have anything else to say, say it.

A No, all the facts are clear, but the conclusion is wrong.

Q Now I would take this particular answer in connection with the question which appears above it: "Do you think that the Deutsche Bank and the Reichs Kredit Anstalt Bank then purchased it or acquired it by some way or in some manner from the Nazi Government?" The answer is: "Yes, I think so."

A That is right.

Q Now, there is nothing wrong about that so far?

A No, I still think that it was the way; I think so. It can be

wrong, but of course it can be cleared up at once, but it would have been so.

Q You next say, "From who else could they have gotten it?"

A Yes, that is what I said.

Q "I concluded from this that I. G. acquired the Skoda-Wetzeler Werke from the Deutsche Bank and the Reichs Kredit Anstalt Bank." That is just a repetition of what you said before.

A Yes.

Q And then you say, "The Reichs Kredit Anstalt Bank had acquired the Skoda-Wetzeler Werke by participating with the Nazi Government in a theft of the property." Now you believe that there is an exaggeration here or that the conclusion is wrong that this was a theft, is that correct?

A Yes, the conclusion for the I. G. is wrong because the bank would always have sold the participation regardless of the owner of that bank.

Q Yes. Now, Mr. von Schnitzler, we don't misunderstand one another about this, I am certain, and I am certain that the record will not disclose any particular misunderstanding. The Kredit Anstalt had owned only a certain per cent of the shares of the Skoda-Wetzeler.

A I think it was about 90 per more per cent. It was an absolute control.

Q Now some of the persons who held shares in and interests in the Kredit Anstalt Bank or in Skoda-Wetzeler were Jewish, is that right?

A In Skoda-Wetzeler, I can't tell you if Pollack has had shares himself and what happened with those shares. I am not informed and I don't know what happened of those shares. You must ask Dr. Ilgner who knows the details of that. But, of course, the Kredit Anstalt, as I

mentioned, was partly owned by the Rothschild before the Anschluss.

Q All right. Then came the occupation by military troops of Germany on the 12th of March 1938 and naturally what had been happening to the Jews in Germany before this time began to happen to the Jews of Austria after that time, is that right?

A Yes.

Q And you found yourself, as you began to deal with the Kredit Anstalt Bank, or is it the Deutsche Bank, on your behalf dealing with some different people than those who had been there before?

A That is right.

Q Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q There is absolutely nothing wrong with that.

A No, no, there is nothing wrong.

Q After these changes in the personnel had taken place, after the Deutsche Bank and the German authorities had had certain dealings with the Kredit Anstalt, the whole question of Germany extending its chemical interest into Austria or of Austria's chemical interests becoming a part of the German sphere was entirely plain to everybody?

A Yes, it was entirely plain to everybody.

Q And it was at that point that I. G. became interested where previously it had not been interested.

A That is right.

Q Now when you describe the transactions which had taken place prior to the time that I. G. acquired the Skoda-Wetzlar Werke dealings through the Deutsche Bank--

A Skoda Kredit Anstalt.

Q Your point is that you did not deal with representatives of

the Deutsche Bank at all?

A No, I don't think so.

Q You dealt directly with the Kredit Anstalt?

A Directly with the Kredit Anstalt.

Q Well, my point is that there were dealings between Deutsche Bank and Kredit Anstalt and later there were dealings between I. G. and Farben/ either Kredit Anstalt or also Deutsche Bank.

A No, I don't think so.

Q You don't think there were any dealings with the Deutsche Bank?

A No, always Kredit Anstalt.

Q So when you said here that, "I. G. acquired the Rhoda-Wetzlar Werke from the Deutsche Bank and the Reichs Kredit Anstalt Bank," you now wish to make a correction?

A Yes, I wish to make a correction. I think I didn't realize that it was put that way, you see. And may I say one word? I think it has not been certified by Mr. Devine and Mr. Weisbrodt that it never came to an end--that it was an agreement. My relations with Mr. Devine and Mr. Weisbrodt was such that even if I had signed something I could still revert to it before they had finished it, and my firm impression is, you see, that I would have discussed it again with him. I would have asked Mr. Weisbrodt to take that off because it doesn't represent my opinion. He dictated that answer from me after the impression he got. He put, if I may say so, the conclusion into my mouth, and later on I had no time apparently to discuss it with him again, and I would have done it, I am certainly sure. It's a finished statement and there is no more fault in the beginning, of course, because it must read not "acidic acid," it should be sulphuric acid.

Q The last paragraph above your signature states, "I have read

the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weisbrodt and Mr. Davine are true. G. von Schnitzler." I don't quite get your point as to why at that time you signed this.

A Probably I don't remember the facts entirely as they were. Probably, I took that in having signed it and then having wanted to rediscuss it with the gentlemen.

Q Assume that you were rediscussing it with the gentlemen now, would you add anything more than you have presently added except that you would like to leave off the conclusion that this was a theft of the property?

A All the facts are correct except this fault here, but the conclusion--I can't maintain that conclusion.

Q Now is your point this: You believe that I. G. Farben paid Kredit Anstalt at that time a fair price?

A A fair price and a much higher price than what the Kredit Anstalt formerly was ready to sell it.

Q You paid a higher price than what you would have paid if you had accepted the terms which Kredit Anstalt would have given you when Rothschild was there?

A Yes, that is it. As for my own person, I was not connected with those negotiations at all, but as a member of the Board of I. G., I have of course the great interest that I. G. did not participate in any so-called Aryanization because I. G. was absolutely opposed to any kind of Aryanization. You know that we had till '38, 39 of our supervisory board was Jewish.

Q I will go to this other statement here and just let me read it. Mr. von Schnitzler, on page 8 of the interrogation of 30 July 1945

when both you and Mr. Ilgner were being interrogated, you volunteered a statement here after Mr. Ilgner had failed to disclose exactly what had happened between the Kredit Anstalt and the Rothschild and the Deutsche Bank, and you stated as follows--and your initials and those of Mr. Ilgner are besides this entry. You have missed out some things there and your initials appear. This is what you, Mr. von Schnitzler, said: "As far as I could remember, the Kredit Anstalt Bank was always closely connected with the Rothschild and I always understood that what the Deutsche Bank acquired in the Kredit Anstalt were the shares belonging to the Rothschild interests."

A Yes, that is corresponding.

Q "They were always very closely connected because Louis Rothschild, whom I knew very well socially, was the president of the Kredit Anstalt." That is correct?

A Yes, that is correct.

Q You state there that the Deutsche Bank had acquired certain shares of the Kredit Anstalt, is that right?

A After the Anschluss.

Q Yes, after the Anschluss, of course. And then thereafter, I. G. acquired certain shares of the firm which the Kredit Anstalt also owned, that is in which the Kredit Anstalt held shares, is that right?

A Yes, of course, but the Kredit Anstalt was an enormous enterprise which had many participations.

Q Of course.

A But, sir, if you would not have done any dealing with any firm where just interests had been taken away, then practically you would have been a thief in a great percentage of all your dealings. Even in other enterprises, Jewish shares had been taken away. That was

infamous. I knew that only too well, and I disapproved of it in the highest form, but still if you continue to do business for such firms or make transactions with them, you can't say under those conditions that you're participating in the theft. That is my conclusion. A theft would have been if on account of that Arrangement, we would have taken a special, for instance, profit in the whole matter, but it was only the continuation of long term negotiations in the interest of the firm, the Kredit Anstalt.

Q I come here to another document.

A You will put it that way on the record, Yes? You will take the conclusion that I must take back that conclusion?

Q You know what you have said. You know that the record is being made.

A Yes.

Q This is entitled: "A short statement re acquisition of Aussig-Falkenau," which I take it you had written up first and then dictated. Will you read it through?

(Witness reads document)

A Yes, it's correct. The "F. S." is the most interesting part insofar as the dye stuff's interests were prevalent in the whole arrangement.

Q May I just underline that for the record? Your point is that the main interest of I. G. in the whole question of acquiring Aussig-Falkenau was I. G.'s interest in the dye stuffs question?

A Yes.

Q I. G. could not and would not let the factory of Aussig-Falkenau go over to the control of a third party which would then acquire a strong foothold in the dye stuffs domain?

A In Germany, yes. That was the sense.

Q What do you mean in Germany?

A Abroad, of course, there were many other dye stuffs produced. Our interests in Aussig-Falkenstein only became actual when Aussig became a part of the German economic sphere.

Q In that that plant was within the Sudetenland?

A Yes, the Sudetenland.

Q I. G. Farben then did not want a competitor in the dye stuffs field, is that correct?

A In Germany?

Q Well, in the German economic sphere.

A That is right, in the German economic sphere.

Q Then we don't have to make any qualification?

A No.

Q You say in Germany, but it doesn't mean anything.

A No. I said the same word that you said. No, we are perfectly clear about that.

Q I just want to recapitulate, then if it's correct let's leave it that way rather than confuse the record again. When the Aussig-Falkenstein plant, which is in the Sudetenland within the German economic sphere, by virtue of the Sudetenland becoming a part of Germany, I. G. Farben did not want a third party to have control over the Aussig-Falkenstein plant?

A Dye stuffs plant. You know, you must not forget the Farben-^{nothing} industry was the merger of all dye producing companies. There were two little corrections; one is the man in the industry was called Walert not Muller. When I came to see the manager of the chemical department of

the Reichs Economic Ministry, the name was Mr. Mulert.

Q Mr. Mulert? M-U-L-E-R-T. Mr. von Schnitzler, the stenographer who heard you dictate this previously apparently understood you to say Heubert, is that correct?

A Probably, yes.

Q But now you wish to indicate that that should be Mr. Mulert who was the only man in charge of the chemical department of the R.W.M.

A (Reading) Then another place I say that there is "owing" instead of owning.

Q Yes, on page 2 in the second paragraph from the last, you point out that the stenographer made another question in that she used the word "owing" instead of the word "owning."

A You know, that can happen when one dictates after having made it in the memory. One has his own sentence so firmly in your brain that you can't sometimes see the right spelling.

Q Yes, that happens to all of us. Now this next statement should perhaps be rather long with an interrogation and a second statement. The first is entitled: "Short Statement re Personalities having Handled the Transactions Soruta and Amsig-Falkenau." This statement is dated 14 September 1945. This statement is two pages long. The interrogation is dated 8 August 1945 and is also two pages long. The second statement is entitled: "Statement re Amsig-Falkenau and Soruta," and is dated 11 September 1945. Will you read the three of them together because it will avoid repetition, I am certain.

(Witness reads documents)

A The first one is absolutely correct. There is nothing to add.

Q That is referring to the short statement re personalities having

handled the transactions Boruta and Aussenig-Falkenau, is that correct?

A Yes. Is this right too? Perhaps I can read that first.

Q You want to finish reading the last statement? That is right.

I prefer that you do that.

A Yes, I think so, this is right.

Q Now you're referring, Mr. von Schnitzler, to the interrogation of the 8th of August?

A Yes.

Q And to the statement re Aussenig-Falkenau and Boruta, which is dated the 11th of September 1945, correct?

A It's correct. The statement is correct. There is only one thing I could eventually add. However, I said here--I was asked: "Did I. G. have an interest in this concern?"

"Formerly, no, we bought later a certain amount of shares a little less than two per cent."

Now, I think it is of interest to know from where those two per cent came from.

Q Yes.

A "When did you buy them?"

"We started to buy after that agreement."

"About what date was this?"

"In the year 1939."

Q Now what is your addition?

A Now it is my addition--I am wondering that--I think at the time I, as well as Mr. Weissbrodt, both we have forgotten that of course the way we have acquired those shares was absolutely known. It was the following--but you see, we had that question, answer, question, answer system and perhaps both we omitted it at the time.

Q We are giving you full opportunity now so you don't have to explain why it's not there. For example, make the addition right now.

A When we got the permission of the RWM, that is Heyden and we together, and I. G. together--Heyden and I. G. together--the RWM, apart from different other Auflagen, under which was one of a payment of three million marks in a so-called Ausgleichsfond; we furthermore had to take over the obligation to take over from share holders of Vereinsaktien in the Sudetenland. Their shares in exchange to shares of I. G. and Chemische von Heyden, and that on the basis of a quotation fixed by the RWM, many shareholders of the Sudeten Gau--of the Sudetenland--many shareholders of the Sudetenland made use of that option and mostly have chosen I. G. Farben shares. Only a small fraction was exchanged in von Heyden shares. But as von Heyden had no interest in keeping the few shares, they had to exchange all shares of von Heyden which were acquired by that transaction passed into the hands of I. G.

Q That partly answers the question which I asked and let me put that question to you right now before you go further. After von Heyden and I. G. had acquired Aussig-Falkenau on a 50/50 basis, you have stated that Heyden then leased the dye stuffs factory to I. G. Now, question: Did von Heyden thereafter have any actual control over the Aussig-Falkenau plant?

A Oh, yes. You see, the dye stuffs plant was leased by the new company. We formed the new company: Chemische Werke Aussig-Falkenau, and that new company leased the dye stuffs plant to I. G.

Q And thereafter, I. G. controlled directly this dye stuffs plant?

A Yes, and formed a new company too called Teer Farben Company; of this company, Dr. Kugler was Geschäftsführer, but of course, this

small company was entirely run as part of I. G., as so-called Organisationsgesellschaft. That means not showing a proper profit; but the profit was turned automatically to I. G.

Q Now, Heyden maintained some control over the production facilities of the Aussig-Falkenberg plant apart from dye stuffs.

A And all the rest was made jointly.

Q That is, apart from dye stuffs?

A Apart from dye stuffs, the whole company was run jointly.

Q By I. G.?

A And Heyden; and we appointed the directors and we had the meetings of the so-called Aufsichtsrat and Mr. Jungel and I were joint presidents of the Aufsichtsrat.

Q And thereafter, were you and Mr. Jungel the top supervisors jointly of that operation?

A Jointly of that operation, yes. I have not yet entirely finished with it. It was about the shares. Then I think, apart from those shares we acquired by force, if I can say so: by order of the Government, only quite a small fraction by the Dresdner Bank which had acquired them on the stock exchange. But I am not entirely sure if it is so. It is quite unimportant.

Q Are you talking still about this two per cent now?

A I am talking about the two per cent because it might be of interest to you. The two per cent plainly consists of that exchange transaction of the so-called Sudetenland share holders and some shares probably are comprised in the nearly two per cent which have been bought on the stock exchange by the Dresdner Bank.

Q That is to say, you always purchased some of the shares from the Dresdner Bank?

A I think so. I am not absolutely sure, but I think so; but it can only be a very small fraction, and we considered the Verein as controlled by Sivos and by Solway, and with both of them we were on friendly relations.

Q That is to say, Mr. von Schnitzler, that the Verein was controlled by Sivos Bank and the Solway?

A Yes.

Q The shares you controlled, approximately two per cent, were never used by you to influence or control the Verein?

A No, never.

Q You had very friendly relations with both the Sivos Bank and Solway?

A Yes.

Q That is right?

A That is right.

Q Anything farther concerning these two statements and the interrogation?

A No.

Q We come to another document entitled, "Statement re Prager Verein, Sommer 1938," which is dated 19th August 1945 and is two pages long.

(Witness reads document)

A I have made so often the mistake to say "apart of" when one must say in English "apart from."

Q I sometimes make the same mistake, particularly after studying German. I think we might try to cover in addition to that statement, two more short statements and then stop.

The next one is, "Donau-Chemie A. G." This is a one page statement dated 28 July 1945.

(Witness reads document)

A Yes, to give you even a more explanation to what we were discussing about an hour ago about the price paid to the Kredit Anstalt, in that sentence, the statement is amplification. The statement means an amplification to what was said about the acquisition from Kredit Anstalt.

Q And it's correct?

A It's correct.

Q The last statement for this afternoon is a statement you directed to the attention of Mr. Weisbrodt entitled: "Additional Statement re Aussig and Wola." It's dated the 12th of August 1945. In the first paragraph, I think you merely restate what you had said earlier to us this afternoon, but I want to be certain about that.

(Witness reads document)

A Yes, this is right. Of course, the second paragraph is important as I. G. has never acquired Wola and had never to do anything with the liquidation of Wola--the Komissars.

Q Now, this last statement you have looked at is correct?

A That is correct.

(Reporter indicates correction)

Q Now, Miss Gaylord indicates that she didn't hear you make an affirmative statement concerning the first statement; namely, the statement re Prager Verein. She didn't hear you say, "That is right." I heard you say, "That is right," and she wants that for the record.

A The statement is correct.

Q We are referring to that so as to make the record clear. That

is referring to the statement re Prager Verein, Summer 1938, dated 19th August 1946. That is correct, is that right, Mr. von Schnitzler?

A Yes. I would be very interested to know if really it was in June that the last meeting happened because I said it was my conviction it didn't, but I said in the beginning, my memory is so entirely overshadowed by the negotiations which later take part that events of that summer are not so absolutely clear before my mind, but it has happened just in that period, I mentioned.

Q Yes. Now that covers those adequately then, is that correct?

A Yes, that covers it adequately.

Q This evening we will be going on as you can see from the progression to some of the statements concerning Poland, and if you leave now--it's a little before 8:00 o'clock--I hope you get another warm meal.

A And then he (guard) brings me back?

Q He will bring you back around 8:00 o'clock so you will have three hours to rest and to eat.

Rita M. Gaylord, Court Reporter:

Maxwell A. Sprecher, Interrogator:


Georg von Schnitzler, Witness:

Rita M. Gaylord

25.10.62. 69

mus. v. 2202.47
(engl.)

Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Archiv

Interrogation No.

Interrogation of Georg von SCHNITZLER
by Drexel A. Sprecher, 22 February 1947
10:20 - 12:10 hours, Room 166, Palace of Justice,
Munich, Germany
Also present: H. J. Wolffsohn
Lotte Kluge, Court Reporter

- Q: This is a continuing interrogation. Mr. von Schnitzler has already been sworn. We were referring yesterday when the interrogation closed to some matters in your statement of 8 August 1945, the 11 page statement. You had gotten to page 9 on the slip with your notes. Will you continue now?
- A: I may perhaps first remark to par. 2, because I used the words "a graver and far reaching decision". Now I am doubtful if I explained correctly in English what I really meant. I meant "schwerwiegende". I think the word "graver" doesn't cover what I really mean.
- Q: Well, this seems to me to be a statement of normal business practice: one man is charged with general responsibility and another man is charged with a special field of responsibility. So that means, what you say. Each member of the Vorstand, in case he made an important and far reaching decision, naturally was bound and obliged to report the matter to the general supervisor, the chairman of the entire Vorstand.
- A: That is the sense.
- Q: You could say that in German practice or in American practice the chairman of the Vorstand is in general responsible for all activities conducted by the individual members of the Vorstand. Is that correct?
- A: Yes, that's what I mean.
- Q: The individual members of the Vorstand, also had a responsibility generally, because they were Vorstand members, is that right?
- A: Yes, that's right.
- Q: And they had an individual responsibility in addition for the specific field in which they were responsible?
- A: That 's right. Then you have no objection against the word "graver" in that sense?
- Q: That would be "more important".

- A: I was not entirely sure if I had put the right word.
- Q: You merely use the expression for a question of degree?
- A: That's right.
- Q: "More important" or "more weighty" show a question of degree.
- A: May I speak now to par. 3f
- Q: Dr. von SCHNITZLER is referring to the second full paragraph on page 9 which begins "Independently of Abwehr etc....". Go ahead.
- A: There are other statements about the same item and this just as well as what had been said before about Abwehr and Vermittlungsstelle " is only a sort of a summarizing of things set down in other statements.
- Q: A point was incorrect about this?
- A: Not incorrect. It is only to be repeated, because this seems to me important that this omits that these reports were on matters in the normal business procedure.
- Q: You mean in the normal course of business?
- A: Yes.
- Q: To what do you wish to add the question of the normal course of business?
- A: They only had to report about economic matters in the largest sense and then in the normal course of business.
- Q: Do you mean to say that when I.G. put its personnel at the disposition at the Wehrmacht, they did not enter into typically military espionage?
- A: Yes, never.
- Q: But they did that in the question of intelligence concerning economic matters?
- A: Yes.
- Q: And that they reported on economic matters which they acquired in the normal course of I.G. business during that period?
- A: Yes, that of course applies the whole paragraph for all so-called selling, etc. organizations. The Berlin offices such as VOWI about which many hearings have been held, they have to be dealt with separately.
- Q: You do not mean to indicate by your distinction that any particular department of NW 7 did not comply with any request?

A: No. I wanted only to apply to what was done in the selling organizations.

Q: You wanted "to refer"?

A: Yes, "to refer". You know as far as the VOWI concerned, they were sworn in by the Wehrmacht. I think at the beginning of the war they wanted it. It was even the intention of the Wehrmacht to take over the whole organization for the Wehrmacht itself and then you know just as well that Dr. KRUGER, who was at that time a head of NW 7 in Berlin, was at the same time mobilised as an officer with the Wehrmacht.

Q: Yes. With respect to your selling organization abroad you did agree to certain requirements on personnel?

A: Yes.

Q: You do not deny it?

A: No.

Q: It was decided that no I.G. representative should go abroad unless he was a member of the DAF and had the approval of the Auslandsorganisation?

A: Yes, that is another question again. I think that has nothing to do with that which is taken up in the paragraph mentioned.

Q: Right. Now we go on as to what you meant.

A: This is only what concerns the Wehrmacht. It means to have by NW 7 too small possibilities.

Q: And did you give up material to the Wehrmacht?

A: I think so. It was the national duty. It was known to do that. You see that there were two different problems in this respect and they both are covered by the paragraph, but not so clearly developed as might be necessary. This firstly concerns the organizations as such regarded. That means when they got material of general economic interest in the course of their normal business. That was put to the Wehrmacht's disposition. And apart from that problem, the question of the individual man being engaged by the Wehrmacht for special purposes was an entirely different one and that of course did not concern us at all.

Q: You mean, you did not know?

- A: Or better I would say that we had no influence because the Wehrmacht chose the man on the spot after their own conception of the situation.
- Q: Now, Dr. von SCHNITZLER, can we come to the point of this matter? KRAUCH was quite directly informed that large parts of the NW 7 organizations might be taken over completely by the Wehrmacht. Is that correct?
- A: Yes, that's correct.
- Q: Therefore, I.G., in effect, made some counter proposals to this view, is that correct?
- A: Yes, it is.
- Q: These counter proposals were an arrangement that these people would still stay on the I.G. Farben payroll, is that correct?
- A: Yes, I.G. continued, and it had to fulfil special obligations in the economic field as they were put to them.
- Q: By the Wehrmacht?
- A: Yes.
- Q: And that arrangement was mutually acceptable?
- A: Yes.
- Q: After such an arrangement was established and understood by both sides, Wehrmacht and I.G. Farben, it was quite natural that the Wehrmacht would not have to go to Mr. BOSCH or KRAUCH or SCHMITZ in order to make particular requests upon NW 7 offices?
- A: That's right. The only addition to the matter is that the Wehrmacht used certain men in our services abroad for special informations about which we were not informed at all.
- Q: Whom do you mean by "we"? The Vorstand or KRAUCH?
- A: This was an entirely individual matter between the representative of the Wehrmacht and that individual man who was working for them. And if a man was working or not for the Wehrmacht, did not officially become known to us because that man was sworn in as everybody was when he was on government duty. Of course, in some cases it became evident that the respective man had the duties because cases have happened that we wanted to take a man back or make him free for military service, because following our duties, we could not keep him any longer on the list of the draft-exempted people, and when then came the news

or a general order that we should keep him, of course, it was evident that there were also other motives behind.

Q: Since you have raised this point in connection with this paragraph, I have a further question: You personally reflected or showed some concern on a number of occasions, concerning I.G. employees and representatives working abroad, and might be getting intelligence for a number of other organizations?

A: Yes.

Q: You did not want their activity for I.G. to be destroyed or reduced because they were known to have other responsibilities?

A: Yes. You know I only wanted to mention that the shown paragraph 3 is absolutely correct, but cannot cover the whole problem because the whole statement is a sort of summarizing of other statement. Now the same applies to the next paragraph. If you accept the same remarks, that only covers a much larger field and that field has to be cleared up in another general order of ideas. Then of course it is necessary to come back to it here.

Q: Let us be clear about this question of our purpose here; I do not think you mean to say that there is anything incorrect with any particulars?

A: No.

Q: What you mention could be discussed for a number of pages. All you are doing is making a summary here concerning certain points, where there was a further team-work between I.G. and the Wehrmacht, and that is correct.

A: Yes, that is right. The next paragraph again is correct, but there again, if I would have to do it again, I would add specifically "during the war", because I think one should distinguish more distinctly the war times. Before the war, the Wehrmacht was not in this the deciding factor, this was Dr. ter MEER's statement.

Q: Well, then you raise again a question that seems obvious. It seems that before 1939, before the outbreak of war, there could not possibly have been as intensive a relationship as there was after the war. However, you do not mean to say, as I understand you, that after 1934 the Wehrmacht did not become the principal ministry.

- A: No, that is wrong. It became a very important ministry, but not the principal agency. It became such only after outbreak of the war.
- Q: What was the situation between 1934 and 1939?
- A: The principal ministry was the Reichswirtschaftsministerium.
- Q: Your representatives in both Berlin and Frankfurt had more to do with the Reichswirtschaftsministerium?
- A: Much more.
- Q: Than they had to do with the Wehrmacht?
- A: That's right.
- Q: Now, in the Reichswirtschaftsministerium, are you including the Four Year Plan when you say that?
- A: Yes, that was collateral to the Reichswirtschaftsministerium. I think this word is not too bad.
- Q: No, that's very good. The Four Year Plan had certain supervisory duties over RWM on the one hand, and certain collateral duties on the other hand?
- A: The Four Year Plan was dependent directly from Goering and there always was a lot of friction between the Four Year Plan and the Reichswirtschaftsministerium. Hans KEMMLER had continuously frictions with KRAUCH.
- Q: Then you mean that Hans KEMMLER's activities in the RWM oftentimes came to some friction with KRAUCH's activities in the Four Year Plan?
- A: Yes, that's right.
- Q: Did you have a further note concerning this matter?
- A: Yes, but not on page 9. On page 10, paragraph 2, there is a wrong point. I think, when making that stenogram from my long-hand writing, it has been omitted: "Whilst I.G. was a compliant partner in regard of all demands of the Wehrmacht; it tried to refract with all means from this latter intervention into its relations with its leading as well as the other personal." There must be quite another word. What I meant was the following and this comes again on the last page. There was a great difference against Wehrmacht and against the party and I am speaking here of party measures and not of Wehr-

nacht measures and when you read it further then you see that I here spoke only of party measures.

Q: Let me read it again.

On page 10, the first full paragraph, you have dictated as is written here: "I.G. tried to refract". You meant to say "to refrain". Further, that you have been previously talking about the efforts of certain party leaders to influence I.G.'s activities and you indicate you were not responsible as responsive to the party as to the Wehrmacht and that you tried to refrain from party demands.

A: Yes, "refrain" would be very good. Since signed it, I wanted it to be cleared up. It becomes absolutely clear by the next paragraph: "The party resented that attitude and gave I.G. continuous warnings that I.G. was not fulfilling the obligations incumbent to it and a state of tension always subsisted."

Q: Will you come to the next correction or the next error?

A: The next is with the A.O. and there is an important paragraph regarding our relations with the A.O.

Q: Let's finish that later.

A: I remember that on a little sheet I have noted it. When we are coming back to the whole matter, I think we can refer to the matter.

Q: The question now is: do you have anything to say with regard to the incorrectness the third full paragraph on page 10?

A: No, that's now correct.

Q: If you have anything later, let me know.

A: The part, of course, is summarizing everything which is included in the problem.

Q: This whole statement is a summary to a large extent and if the summary is correct, then we can pass.

A: Now it is correct.

Q: If you have any further points where the statement is incorrect, let me know.

A: After having read page 11 concerning paragraph 1). There is again that error I committed before. In Summer 1945 I was under the impression that the technical development was much more dependent of the Wehrmacht's intentions than in

r reality it was. And this is simply due to my lack of sufficient technical knowledge.

Q: I feel to see that heading 1) under paragraph 3 on page 11 has to do principally with technical matters. I would like to direct your attention to several specific questions. The investment policy of I.G. is a matter that concerns both the commercial people and the technical people. Is that correct?

A: Yes, that's right.

Q: And therefore, I do not understand the nature of your qualification on sub-heading one to par. 3 for any of the reasons you have just stated.

A: That is erroneous and that will be proved by other material, I.G. has prepared. In all those negotiations for the creation of Buna, artificial dye-stuffs, and the different synthetic oil domains, that was all done under the Autarchy Plan of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium and Four Year Plan. And the Wehrmacht did not interfere with these problems at all. With Magnesium, the Wehrmacht had from the very first beginning a direct interest. But with those other domains it only became by and by more interested and of course when war broke out, in an over whelming capacity. But at the beginning, this was not connected with the Wehrmacht. I think that has to be corrected.

Q: I have one point. I would like to ask you about what you state here, that the Wehrmacht "only followed itself in material the line prescribed by the party is well known". The words "in material" -- I think you perhaps meant "in general".

A: I mean with these words: "in der Sache, in der Materie." I better should have put it in German.

Q: Will you state for the record the German which you would prefer to use for the words here: "... only followed itself in material the line prescribed by the party".

A: Die Wehrmacht folgte in der Sache, aber nicht in der Ueberzeugung.

Q: You mean to say that it was generally known that the Wehrmacht followed in the fact but not with conviction?

A: That's right. You translate it now quite correctly. That concludes that point,

but it doesn't conclude the point of the Four Year Plan and the autarchy policy of development.

Q: The Autarchy Plan had been under way for some time even before?

A: But it was a collateral matter.

Q: There was an intermingling of autarchy and rearmament?

A: There was an intermingling. I state it corrected in par. 1, page 2:

"The policy of "autarchy" and "rearmament" was so closely interconnected with one another that it really represents unsurmountable difficulties to distinguish which element of both was the prevalent one."

Q: Say what you mean.

A: 8 There is an error. I mentioned that the Wehrmacht participated from the very first beginning in all that, but then it was principally the Reichswirtschaftsministerium and the Four Year Plan.

Q: And the policy of RWM, the Four Year Plan and the Wehrmacht were certainly not in conflict with one another?

A: Not in conflict, but in the earlier time of the regime the Wehrmacht was not the deciding factor.

Q: When did it become the deciding factor?

A: Only when war broke out. The importance of the Wehrmacht was increasing since 1938.

Q: Well, since the Anschluss or just before the Anschluss, the intensification became tremendous and quite open with respect to the Wehrmacht, is that right?

A: Yes.

Q: You mean that between 1933 or 1934 and 1938 there was not an apparent increase of the Wehrmacht influence?

A: No, the increase was a continuous one throughout. You know, there are errors in the last two clauses.

Q: You are referring to the last two clauses, that is in subheading 4 and subheading 5, the last two subparagraphs of the entire statement. Again I want to ask you this; is it clear when you made that statement in August 1945 that you intended to make a correct conclusion?

A: Yes, it was my intention.

Q: Now, Doctor, what is now upon your conscience concerning this matter?

A: I have written this morning something to give you an idea --

Q: Now I understand, you have written another statement and you feel that you can state your additional remarks more cogently if you read this statement.

A: (The interrogator reads:)

"The last 2 paragraphs were added after a long discussion with Mr. Weissbrodt. I primarily did not want to insert it as they seemed to me unacceptable. Mr. Weissbrodt induced me to do it and at last I subscribed to them understanding them in the following sense: You reverted at the beginning of your interrogations to the fact that I am a religious man of deep-rooted faith and conviction of Jesus Christ. Consequently I accepted the responsibility in the Christian sense as Bishop Wurm of Evangelische Landeskirche had later on determined it in a much more eloquent way than I am able to do it. By this, I mean that I share the responsibility with the entire German people which has participated in that terrible tragedy of the years 1933 - 1945, but no special responsibility is meant with my wording in the legal sense."

Q: Let me see if I understand what you mean by a series of questions. When I get your answer to the first questions, then I will be better able to ask the last questions. On the one hand you mean to say -- following the determination of Bishop Wurm -- that anyone who made a contribution during the Hitler era is responsible in some degree for the tragedy of this era.

A: That's right.

Q: On the other hand, you do not feel that you are responsible in a legal sense for your contribution?

A: That is, what I mean.

Q: You do not mean to deny that you or I.G. contracted a great responsibility in connection with the entire policy of the Hitler era from 1933 to 1945?

A: No, I don't deny it.

Q: And if I understood you correctly, you recognize that by your acts and the acts of I.G. Farben you and I.G. Farben have contracted a great responsibility in that your acts and the acts of I.G. Farben constituted a substantial help to Hitler's foreign policy?

- A: That is the responsibility before God, that is what I meant.
- Q: But not in a legal sense?
- A: No, not in a legal sense.
- Q: It is interesting to get your opinion in the matter for me as a lawyer, that you feel an additional responsibility before God.
- A: It was an underlying motive.
- Q: Now one further point. You have not mentioned it. It is a point in addition. You recognize a responsibility before God, and you do not recognize a responsibility before the law?
- A: Yes.
- Q: Do you recognize a responsibility before mankind in the same sense that you recognize a responsibility before God?
- A: That is the consequence of the responsibility I take before God. We, of course, followed the laws of our country. To the best of my conviction, we never did something unlawful against humanity as far as we were concerned. But having been in this terrible boat, and having participated in the handling of this boat, we have that responsibility before God.
- Q: And in consequence before mankind?
- A: Not directly, but indirectly.
- Q: I cannot understand very clearly the distinction between your responsibility before God and before the mankind on the one side, and before the law on the other side, but I do not quite get the line which you draw with regard to your responsibility before God and before mankind.
- A: May I answer you with the Matthaues Evangelium. There are two duties for a Christian: the love of God and the love for your neighbor. Consequently, in answering your question about mankind, we acted against the love of our neighbors, and that is what I meant when saying "consequently".
- Q: Mr. von SCHNITZER, you have tears in your eyes, do you wish me to discontinue this interrogation?
- A: No, I thank you.
- Q: When you said, we acted against the love of our neighbors, you feel you did this, because you were in this boat, as you put it, during the Nazi regime --

- A: Yes, and if Mr. Weisbrod would be present, he would go to explain this question from a much higher moral point of view than I would be able to do. Regarding the question, I see, I should have done it in a better way than I have done --
- Q: Well, I understand how you add that to the last two paragraphs, by stating that you had no intention to admit any responsibility in the legal sense. But as I conclude from the statements you have made about your moral feelings, omitting any conclusion in the legal sense, that in acting in this way it has done, the I.O. contracted a great responsibility in contributing a substantial, and in the chemical domain a decisive, help to Hitler's foreign policy which led to war and to the ruin of Germany.
- A: That is the simple conclusion and I think I had put it that way from the very first moment. The question of the personal responsibility came into the statement on Mr. Weisbrod's inducement and was understood in the sense I gave it now.
- Q: That is to say that you and Mr. Weisbrod talked over many of these problems for long hours?
- A: Yes, for long hours.
- Q: And after you came to this point, Mr. Weisbrod, in commenting upon what you had previously said, suggested an additional point?
- A: Yes.
- Q: He said, in effect, if you feel a responsibility before your conscience, it would be better from a moral point of view, if you would admit it, but Mr. Weisbrod understood at that time that you did not mean to make it an admission in a legal sense?
- A: Yes, so I understood it. Of course; what he concluded himself, that didn't come into the discussion.
- Q: The whole point is that in consequence of these talks you made a conclusion concerning the moral responsibility.
- A: Yes, regarding the moral responsibility, but not the legal responsibility.
- Q: Regarding the 5th subheading, I think we could stand a little explanation. I want to be sure I have your meaning exactly. I start with the assumption that you are talking about your moral responsibility when you say: "Thus I must

-13-

conclude that I.G. is largely responsible for Hitler's policy". Do you clearly mean this that without the substantial contribution, in general, and the decisive help in the chemical domain, in particular, the Hitler policy could not have come to its utmost conclusion?

A: By the mere fact that without a substantial chemical industry the modern warfare is impossible, it would not have been possible to carry through in the years 1939-1945 without the potential of the chemical industry.

Q: Yes, and since, the output of the chemical industry - and for this purpose I understand you are including synthetic oil, Buna, and light metals - was principally produced by using I.G.'s technical facilities and I.G.'s know-how, you feel a moral responsibility for the fact that the Hitler regime was able to conduct war between 1939 - 1945.

A: Yes, sharing that responsibility with everybody who has worked on a similar basis and made just as necessary implements.

Q: I think that's clear: you don't mean to indicate a graver moral responsibility than that which you feel should be accepted by either persons or concerns who made a comparable contribution.

A: Yes, that's right.

Q: In connection with the implements of warfare?

A: Yes.

Q: Now I would like to have you take back with you the record of the interrogation for the first afternoon, which is the record for the afternoon of the 18th of February 1947. I have noticed some of the usual typographical errors, but I would prefer that you have an opportunity to note on this copy the corrections you would make without benefit of counsel, so to speak. So will you arrange to go through this over the weekend and then make any notes you choose on the margin, and then we will take the original and alter it accordingly. I also give you a copy of the record for the afternoon of the 19th of February. I still do not have the record for the morning of 19th of February, so there will be a gap. But this will give you an opportunity to check the usual typographical

-14-

79

errors which have been misunderstood by the stenographers and then you will give it back on Monday, when we will come back together again.

Lotte Kluge, Stenographer:

Draxel A. Sprecher, Interrogator:

Georg von Schnitzler, Witness:

23.11.47

Autogr. v. 26.2.47
(engl.)

Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Archiv

INTERROGATION

Institut f. Zeitgeschichte München ARCHIV
1948/56

Witness:	Dr. Georg von Schnitzler
Interrogator:	Brexel A. Sprecher
Present:	H.J. Wolffsohn
Reporter:	J.H. Naver
Date:	26 February 1947
Time:	1600 to 1700 hours

- Q. Now Dr. Schnitzler we were discussing this morning the interrogation of the 24th of September 1945. At the time we broke up we had finally finished the first page and I believe we had finally reached the matter ^{point} of stating one specific statement was incorrect. Will you try to be similarly specific in any of your other comments ^{of} this interrogation and I think we can avoid ^{these} similar situations where any incorrectness of the statement is not involved?
- A. Yes. (Witness reads Document) -- No observations.
- Q. I take it by that then with the exception of the comments you made this morning concerning the Vermittlungsstelle & the statements made in the interrogations are correct. Is that correct?
- A. Yes, correct.
- Q. There is one thing I wanted to ask you about. You mentioned in this interrogation the Kriegsspiele at Leuna and Leverkusen. Was the question of any damages to I.G. Farben properties taken up so far as you know after the Kriegsspiele had taken place at Leuna and Leverkusen?
- A. There were no damages, they were purely theoretical.
- Q. It didn't involve any discontinuance of any of I.G. Farben plants for any period of time?
- A. Oh, no.

- Q. In other words it actually did not involve shutting down any part of the plants for any length of time?
- A. I never heard so, I only imagine it was made theoretically. What shall we do if this power plant will be put out of action, etc..
- Q. Were you personally present during any part of the Kriegsspiele?
- A. No, I only much later heard of it.
- Q. Was it conducted secretly?
- A. I am certain it was.
- Q. Who represented I.G. Farben with plans for making preparations?
- A. The man on the spot.
- Q. The plant directors?
- A. The directors on the spot.
- Q. To whom were the reports made concerning the problems brought out of the Kriegsspiele?
- A. I am not informed about that.
- Q. Was it brought up in the Vorstand meetings?
- A. No.
- Q. Was it brought up before the TRA BUERO?
- A. Not in my presence.
- Q. Was it brought up in any other meeting in I.G. Farben to your knowledge?
- A. Not to my knowledge. It was pure team work between the specific plant and the competent military authorities.
- Q. Did you discuss the question of the Kriegsspiele after the Kriegsspiele had taken place with any of the members of the Vorstand?
- A. I, never. No.
- Q. Did you ever talk it over with Karl Krauch?
- A. No.

- Q. I will show you a statement of one page dated 22 August 1945 concerning military preparations (Witness reads Document).
- A. That was my impression at the time.
- Q. You have indicated to a number of people, and to some extent in these discussions we have had, that you were opposed to many parts of the Nazi policy. Is that correct?
- A. Yes, that is right.
- Q. I don't recollect your having stated to me any way in which you demonstrated this opposition with respect to the rearmament. Did you ever take any outward steps to indicate any opposition within I.G. Farben or otherwise with respect to the rearmament?
- A. I think I never did take any open steps, I resented it and I was terribly oppressed by it. I once said to Mr. Weisbrodt, even verbally, if I would have foreseen it all, I would have resigned. When the rearmament became so powerful I understood more or less that my responsibility was to remain at my post, and of course fulfill my duty. A very substantial factor was that I felt a great moral obligation to all my employees and my feeling within my commercial organization was that a captain shouldn't leave his ship.
- Q. Naturally, we are talking only of the period before the invasion of Poland, in the time of preparation. I just want to be sure whether any moral feelings you had at that time took any concrete form. Did you express your concern about the matter to some of your intimate friends and colleagues at I.G. Farben or not?
- A. I think I often mentioned them to my collaborators and to my personal friends, of course, I mentioned it very often. For example Professor Rousselle, he was outside of Farben, and then inside Farben, to my old

friend, Szilvinyi. *Mr. Carl von Weinberg.*

Q. He is now dead?

A. Yes, he is now dead. *I also mentioned it to Richard*
He was Karl von Szilvinyi, related to my son-in-law.
He is now head of the Mainkur Office and perhaps you know that he was 50%.

Q. He was 50%

A. He was 50% Jewish and I camouflaged him as 25% and made him a Prokurist in '42. He was also one of my closest friends.

Q. You knew he was actually 50% Jewish but you camouflaged him as only 25% and ^{were} able to keep him in the Farben organization?

A. Yes.

Q. To whom else, besides him in Farben were you able to express these things?

A. I should think Kugler and Koehler. I very often expressed my concern about that.

Q. What did you generally say to your close collaborators concerning your feelings?

A. That that mad man would bring us to ruin.

Q. Of course you are referring to Hitler and that was the kind of statement which you could not make very openly after 1934?

A. Impossible.

Q. What did you mean by "bring us to ruin"?

A. I was of the opinion that the world in the long run would not tolerate his action and his offensive speeches. You see I feel myself in a similar position to what was once said by a Catholic priest in Oberursel. I was there with my wife. The priest had not been in a concentration camp but thought we might all have had the duty to go to a concentration camp.

Q. How do you view that? What was your opinion of the statement which the Catholic priest expressed to you?

A. That is my own opinion, too.

Q. That is what you feel now or when the Catholic priest said that to you at Oberursel?

A. I remember so well that was the last Sunday when I was free, the 6th of May 1945.

Q. That was after the Americans were occupying the area where you were living but before you were made a prisoner?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you ever adopted that opinion or view before 1945?

A. Oh yes, I always had that feeling.

Q. That is that there was a moral responsibility to oppose the authorities that cooperated with Hitler to the extent that you might land in a concentration camp?

A. That would have been a proof of high moral standing.

Q. Certainly, if it came at an early enough stage. What did you say to yourself and to your conscience, Dr. von Schnitzler, after the Anschluss when you saw the German troops and heard about the German troops marching into the countries like Austria? What did you feel and what were your feelings then?

A. I'll tell you the Anschluss was a little difficult in the manner it was declared to us publically - that the Austrian people wanted this Anschluss and you must not forget that Schuschnigg did not have a very big following behind him and that in Austria practically half of the population was Nazi and then about 30 to 35% Sozialdemokraten. Schuschnigg had only 15% behind him. Thus when the German troops entered Austria they were greeted with flags and although the Austrian people don't want to admit it for the

present moment, they were all in a frenzied spirit.

Q. But we are talking about the feelings you had, the moral judgment you made at the time. The fact was that force was used, German troops had crossed a border. There were pictures of it in the papers, is that correct?

A. That is correct. I didn't approve of the manners.

Q. Well, a movement of troops, Dr. von Schnitzler. Your conscience, I am quite sure even before the ultimate ruin of Germany came about, was such that you didn't regard a movement of troops such as the movement into Austria as a solely question of bad manners?

A. No.

Q. So what was there at that time that injured your sense of morality, your feelings of a morality, apart from the question of bad manners?

A. I thought that every military movement was to be reproved but I must admit that when the news came from Austria, it was partly accelerated by propaganda.

Q. You knew that at the time that it was exaggerated?

A. I must admit I was not absolutely sure.

Q. But you had been living for 5 years with a lot of Nazi propaganda and you thought that the Frankfurter Zeitung had changed its complexion and its news coverage considerably? Is that right?

A. That is absolutely right, Sir, and I may say that I could not be free entirely from that propaganda as it was such a continuous development and pressure and the Frankfurter Zeitung could not be free from it either. And when you speak of the Frankfurter Zeitung it reminds me they were all

close friends of ours, among them being Benno Reiffenberg and Rudolf Kircher.

Q. Did you know Rudolf Kircher?

A. Not as well as other people. Reiffenberg was a special friend of ours and I procured for him, too, a position when he had to leave Frankfurt as a matter of life and I arranged for him through Prof. Hoerlein and Prof. Lautenschlaeger, a job paying 500 marks in the Black Forest where he could quietly work on special scientific matters.

Q. I also knew Rudolf Kircher. He was one of the gentlemen who even after the Nazis came to power, expressed also the same feelings you had stated with respect to the fact that Hitler will bring about the ruin of Germany. Did you ever talk to him about this during the years 1933 to 1939?

A. I was not as intimate with Kircher.

Q. The answer is no then?

A. Yes. I have an affidavit with me, if it is of any interest to you. Most of my affidavits are all with my wife in Frankfurt.

Q. You can bring it along with you the next time. The record stands that you disliked the manner shown by the Nazi Government in moving troops into Austria?

A. Yes.

Q. And that you were against all movements of troops into foreign countries. Are you talking about what your feelings are now or what your feelings were at the time the troops moved?

A. No, at the time the troops moved.

Q. Because you know it is one thing to have the view after defeat and ruin and another thing to have the view at the time the troops moved with great success?

A. You are absolutely correct.

Q. After the occupation of the Sudetenland and after the Munich agreement in March 1939, German troops occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia, what were your feelings then?

A. Sir, I can explain that part by saying that I was simply shocked in the deepest depth of my heart. That happened when we were in Duesseldorf at the German-English conference of industrialists and I had never been in such an awkward position in my international career than being together in my motorcar and driving with Sir Francis Larke from Duesseldorf to a mountain place with him where we had luncheon when he showed us his reaction on this terrible step and I was absolutely unable to answer him by any word because I was just as shocked as he himself and had neither explanation nor excuse. Furthermore, and that I might explain also, ^{along} only with the question of ^{I realized} yesterday how great the sympathies were in the United States for Czechoslovakia at the time of Wilson and Masarik. Czechoslovakia was considered a kind of Godchild of the United States, if I may say so. So I was of the mind the world would not tolerate this practice from the very beginning. If I may say so too, that day with the English, the English acted with extreme loyalty to us German industrialists. Notwithstanding the fact, they signed the agreement we had just made the day before. We were bound the same night to go by sleeping car to Berlin as the British Ambassador had invited us all to a dinner party.

Q. In Berlin?

A. In Berlin. Of course it never materialized, even after having signed that agreement. They did that out of loyalty and kindness primarily to Dr. Poensgen and myself. Ernst Poensgen.

Q. Did you merely listen to the views of Sir Francis Larke or did you trust

him enough so that you could state your own views, which I take it, were pretty much the same as his?

A. Identical to his views. I was entirely of the same opinion.

Q. And thereafter, I suppose you felt free to say at least to your intimate friends, that you thought the Nazi Regime was taking Germany closer to the ruin?

A. That was my firm belief.

Q. Did you stress it at any time to your close friends?

A. To many of them. My wife has other proofs. She has the addresses of the Redakteur of the Frankfurter Generalanzeiger, Dombrowski, who is now directing the paper in Mainz and he said to my wife I recall so well, even before the war, your husband said to me at the Frankfurtergesellschaft that Hitler would drive us to ruin. He is ready to certify it.

Q. How could we get proof of that from Dombrowski. Do you know where he is now?

A. He is in Mainz.

Q. He is now Redakteur?

A. Yes, Redakteur, he is the editor of "Die Gegenwart" in Freiburg.

Q. If there are any more—

A. There are more if you want to have more proof. Where I really took a risk, I must tell you of the acquaintance of a young lady at the beginning of the war called Fraulein ^{Enna} Brunnabend from Frankfurt, Klueberstrasse 12, and I helped her to support her mother when she was in Theresienstadt. I have ^{it is an affidavit of Mrs. Selma} that proof ^(but it is with) and so has my wife in Frankfurt concerning Miss Brunnabend.

Q. It is almost 5. I can appreciate that your views were sharper after the the military occupation of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia. Is that why

you feel you then had a much stronger feeling concerning the military occupation of Czechoslovakia than you then ~~you~~ had previously had with Austria?

A. Oh yes, incomparably stronger.

Q. That is very interesting Dr. von Schnitzler and perhaps we can continue it another time but we don't want to detain you past 5 o'clock. We will return this evening to go over some of the records which have some stenographic errors in order to correct them.

J. N. Maver

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DREXEL A. SPECHER, INTERVIEWER

GEORG VON SCHNITZLER, WITNESS