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Preface

ANDREAS WIRSCHING

Rarely has a concise, eight-page text had a more profound impact than Hans Rothfels's "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe" ("The Task of Contemporary History"), first published in 1953. With his essay, the author pursued a twofold purpose. On the one hand, he was launching a new journal that was to become the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*; on the other, he was reflecting on the scholarly foundations of a postwar German *Zeitgeschichte* that had yet to be established in the shadow of the Nazi dictatorship. By conceptualizing this history as an "epoch of contemporaries and its scholarly treatment," Rothfels had in mind the central experience of the Germans in the interplay of dictatorship and democracy, war and atrocity, East-West conflict, and national division. This experience of crisis and upheaval (which continued with the rupture of 1989/90) endows Rothfels's periodization of contemporary history with enduring value, even though the "epoch of contemporaries" continues to shift forward. Yet, in the specifically German context, *Zeitgeschichte* has also essentially retained its epistemic commitment to the pivotal year 1917. It is true that pragmatic considerations suggest a shift in focus to the period after 1945, for example in the sense of a transnational "European contemporary history." But it remains imperative to systematically include early twentieth-century history in the study of the more recent past in order to understand cultural modernity, the roots of dictatorship, and the forging of democratic societies after 1945.

The Munich-based Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ—Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History) is celebrating its seventy-fifth birthday in 2024. From its very beginning, it has been at the center of research on the Nazi dictatorship and an important participant in the debates that its research has provoked. Starting with the first translation of Rothfels's seminal article into English, the contributions in this volume give valuable insights into the history of research and scholarship at the IfZ, as well as into the development of the subdiscipline of *Zeitgeschichte* more generally.

From the institute's difficult beginnings, the trajectory of the articles extends into the 1980s. It addresses critical topics, such as the somewhat problematic treatment of Jewish historians by the West German academic establishment. The product of the institute's work has been a vast panorama of scholarship spanning several generations. And the institute will continue to tackle important themes in the future. Just in time for the seventy-fifth anniversary of the IfZ, and thanks to the careful supervision and introduction by Thomas Schlemmer, Susanna Schrafstetter, and Alan E. Steinweis, the English-speaking reader has the opportunity, in this volume, to delve into the formation and development of German *Zeitgeschichte* after 1945.

Introduction

Contemporary History and the Responsibility of Scholarship

THOMAS SCHLEMMER, SUSANNA SCHRAFSTETTER,
AND ALAN E. STEINWEIS

In an early essay appearing in the September 1957 issue of the journal *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, Martin Broszat, then a young research fellow at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ—Institute for Contemporary History) in Munich, took stock of research into contemporary history in the young Federal Republic of Germany twelve years after the end of World War II:

> The concept and the practice of research and teaching about contemporary history only became established in Germany after 1945. The impetus for this came from the perplexity and confusion triggered by the collapse of 1945, which created an urgent need to establish markers of orientation after the collapse of previously valid ideals and in the chaos of Germany history, which had been rendered seemingly meaningless. After Germany, Europe, and the world had been fundamentally transformed by the events of a few years, the basic necessity arose to cognitively come to terms with these upheavals. The personal impact of history on contemporaries called for contemporary historical clarification. The singularity and specialness of these events alone, however, as epoch-making as they were, could hardly provide justification for a special discipline of contemporary history. [. . .] Rather, it was necessary in Germany to make up for what had hitherto been neglected, to overcome the largely unjustified and, in its repercussions, frequently damaging reluctance of German historical scholarship to broach modern history. Meanwhile it was unignorable that, elsewhere, this had long become an established practice, for example under the term "*histoire contemporaine*" in France or "contemporary history" in the Anglo-Saxon countries.[1]

At this early point Broszat, who in the 1970s would rise to international renown as a scholar and public intellectual,[2] outlined the self-conception and the conditions for the emergence of contemporary history in Germany. Of course, in light of the Cold War and the division of Germany, his remarks could only claim validity in West Germany, even if he later, as director of the IfZ, quietly brushed this point aside. What he emphasized, however, was the inseparable link between epoch-making events and the necessity of pursuing new avenues of historiography. Historians had been aware of this link for centuries, whether they were concerned, like Thucydides, with the Peloponnesian War, which had just come to a close upon his death in ca. 400 BCE, with the French Revolution of 1789, or with the Great War between 1914 and 1918. Regarding the epoch-making events that marked a new historiographical approach in (West) Germany, Broszat only hinted at the "collapse of 1945." One reason was that his readers knew exactly what he meant—they did not need an explicit reminder of National Socialism and the Third Reich. But it also had to do with the fact that, in the 1950s, the criminal dimensions of the war, such as the murder of the European Jews or the extermination campaign in Eastern and Southern Europe, were usually addressed in a roundabout fashion or between the lines. One could say that the "personal impact" on contemporaries, their "perplexity," and their need "to reacquire markers of orientation" were both a resource and a problem at the same time. On the one hand, these three factors provided the impetus to grapple with the history of the National Socialist (NS) era, despite the painful realizations attending this process.[3] On the other hand, they fulfilled the need for exoneration and moral rehabilitation. This ambivalence stood at the cradle of (West) German contemporary history, even if its presence wasn't always obvious.

The history of research on contemporary history in the Federal Republic and its most important institutions—one cannot necessarily say the same of the German Democratic Republic under the auspices of a state-imposed Marxist-Leninist historical policy[4]—can thus be written as a story of success and modernization. This view is supported by the high international reputation that the IfZ enjoyed around 1960, just ten years after its founding,[5] and by the increasing attention paid to how, after a difficult beginning, the Federal Republic began to deal with its National Socialist past. Or as the journalist and historian Götz Aly has put it: "The world champion of murder has become the world champion of commemoration."[6] And yet, to borrow from Axel Schildt, the same story can be told as a "burdened history."[7] Ultimately the historians' guild must face the question of how, "in view of the pressing material and moral burdens," which could not be persistently denied even

within their own ranks, it was possible for a new subdiscipline of history, politically anchored in a free and democratic constitutional order, to come into being in the first postwar decade despite undeniable continuities in personnel and lacunae in themes and subject matter.

It was by no means the case that "everything that had not been personally experienced or witnessed" was "missing" from the research agenda of the first generation of contemporary historians.[8] Hans Buchheim—a staff historian at the IfZ from 1953 to 1966, to whom this quote can be attributed—must have known better, having himself served in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, where he was seriously wounded. He had thus experienced the consequences of the racial-ideological war of extermination against the Soviet Union firsthand, and yet this central element of Nazi rule was not integral to his research, which also holds true for the IfZ as a whole in its early years—in any case, an early draft of a work plan from the year 1950 lacked any reference to it.[9]

For obvious reasons, the success story of research on contemporary history has been emphasized above all by representatives of its main institutions.[10] Scholars at the turn of the twenty-first century, however, particularly historians such as Sebastian Conrad[11] and Nicolas Berg, have pointed to the "gray zone"[12] between experiences of the Nazi era and the only partially realized claim to objective research practice within a democratic framework. The assessment of these scholars was correspondingly "ambivalent." Indeed, one can identify a series of ambivalent factors which, on the one hand, facilitated the success of the (West) German field of contemporary history, and, on the other hand, led to flawed developments and methodological barriers. The rigorous scientific approach adopted by the first generation of contemporary historians made the results of their research hard to attack in the political and public discourse, yet the much-vaunted emphasis on "sobriety"[13] was also conducive to a lack of empathy. This tendency found particular expression in their cold and uncomprehending treatment of victims of the Nazi regime or of Jewish colleagues in their dual role as historians and subjects of persecution. "Research without memory" was the regrettable consequence of this mixture of academic arrogance and lack of empathy.[14] This, of course, does not mean that firsthand experience per se was spurned as a source for historical inquiry and the production of knowledge—to the contrary. Surviving elites from the administrative, diplomatic, and military sectors of the Nazi regime were sought-after interlocutors, especially in the 1950s, when access to the files of Reich ministries, Nazi party offices, and the Wehrmacht was limited, not least because a large portion of them was still in the hands of the victorious powers of World War II.[15] The basic credibility of these contemporary witnesses was not disputed, unlike that

of (especially Jewish) victims of the Nazi regime, who were thought to cleave to "a mythical form" of "remembrance" that promised no epistemological value, as Martin Broszat wrote as late as 1988.[16] In contrast the first generation of contemporary historians—most of them men—hardly reflected on their own dual role as contemporaries and historians. Their own personal experience and knowledge contained a heuristic potential that should not be underestimated, but their socialization in the National Socialist era or their membership in Nazi organizations could lead to conscious or unconscious defensive reflexes that pushed certain uncomfortable questions into the background.[17]

The postulate of strict scientific rigor in the historical reappraisal of National Socialism favored the primacy of empiricism in research practice, that is, of tapping and evaluating archival sources. This approach led to a rapid increase in factual knowledge, but it concentrated on the modes of operation, power structures, decision-making processes, and leading figures of the Nazi state, while the social history of the Third Reich only came into historiographical focus later on. In its orientation toward official sources and state structures, the young field remained close to late historism, which immunized it for a long time against the modernizing trends that saw history as historical social science. It was not for nothing that Hans-Ulrich Wehler, one of the leading proponents of the latter school, bemoaned the "theoretical deficit of contemporary history," while Norbert Frei contended that Martin Broszat, his teacher, was "much more of an empiricist than a theoretician." Indeed, Frei continued, "in some matters he was downright anti-theoretical, particularly where he should have been forced to reflect on his own positionality."[18]

Even where contemporary history provided methodological impetus and focused on structures instead of reverting to a classical history of events, the results could be ambivalent. For one thing, a totalitarian system of rule did not lend itself to questions of individual responsibility or the ground-level implementation of Nazi policy. A structural history, understood in this way, left little room for research into perpetrators,[19] which only became widespread in the 1990s. Even institutional innovations such as the establishment in 1949 of the German Institute for the History of the National Socialist Era, renamed the Institute for Contemporary History three years later, which gave an undeniably significant boost to the scholarly examination of recent German history, can also be interpreted in a negative light. The creation "of a separate research institute" could very well symbolize "the severing of National Socialism from the historical context of German history."[20] The same applies to the early demand to treat contemporary German history within "an international framework."[21] On the one hand, such a perspective helped to overcome the adverse

effects of a navel-gazing approach to national history. On the other hand, it could arouse the suspicion that, instead of understanding National Socialism as a "product of long-term internal developments," historical scholarship was relativizing it "as the outgrowth of a supposedly 'Western' modernity that came from the outside."[22]

A brief appraisal of the historiography about the field of contemporary history suggests that a fair amount of work remains to be done. This applies in particular to institutions such as the IfZ or the Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt (Military History Research Office),[23] to biographical studies of influential personages,[24] and to the inter- and transnational dimensions of the birth and development of the field.[25] The pre- and early history of the field in (West) Germany, and of its most important institutions in the first postwar decade, has been reasonably well researched.[26] This is due not least to the great interest in the role of historiography under National Socialism and the associated continuities in the years after 1945.[27] Seen in this context, long-forgotten non-university academic institutions such as the Historische Reichskommission (Historical Reich Commission), founded in 1928, or the Zentralstelle für Nachkriegsgeschichte (Central Department for Postwar History), with branches in Breslau and Königsberg, came into view as institutional forerunners of post-1945 contemporary history.[28] In contrast, we know comparatively little about the years after 1955. The current volume, produced in connection with the seventy-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Institute for Contemporary History, thus pays special attention to the 1970s and 1980s (in addition to the first two postwar decades), and therefore intends to serve as an impetus for addressing gaps in the research.[29]

The starting point for an inquiry must be Hans Rothfels. In 1953, in the first essay of the first issue of the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Rothfels took up the challenge of outlining contemporary history as a field of research and a historical subdiscipline, working out its distinctive features, naming caesuras, and sketching a profile of the new journal. Establishing a periodical for a subdiscipline whose institutional footing was shaky, and whose scientific validity was disputed within the guild, seemed a "gamble,"[30] and nobody could have foreseen that contemporary history would develop into the "main axis of national historiography."[31] (One may also say that, beyond national histories, nobody could have foreseen that this concept of contemporary history would also come to inform a great deal of recent historical writing about European integration.[32]) "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe" ("The Task of Contemporary History"), as the Tübingen historian and long-standing editor of the *Vierteljahrshefte* titled his short article, can be considered a timeless classic. Hardly

any student of recent history will graduate from a German university without having encountered Rothfels's definition of contemporary history as the "epoch of contemporaries and its scholarly treatment."[33] The dynamics by which the present is continually turned into history are the unique feature of contemporary history, and these dynamics, together with the specific dialectic of the researching subject being "personally affected" by history, while maintaining a scientific claim to objectivity, are what distinguishes it from all other epochs and historical subdisciplines. Rothfels's understanding of contemporary history has had an astonishing influence on the field and remains valid to this day, despite the occasionally fierce criticism of his national-conservative outlook, and despite the period-specific ambivalence in his historical outlook as a returned emigrant who had been driven out of Germany by the National Socialists because of his Jewish ancestry.[34] This classic text, written by a contemporary historian who was elevated "to the rank of an icon"[35] early on, is framed in this volume by two commentaries, one by Gerhard L. Weinberg, an important voice in transatlantic contemporary history who can speak both as a student of Rothfels and as a contemporary historian, and another by Astrid M. Eckert, a colleague from a younger generation, who describes the long-term impact of Rothfels's concept of contemporary history.[36]

Rothfels's conceptual considerations and the critical appraisal of them are followed by a new look at the founding history of the Institute for Contemporary History, provided by Magnus Brechtken. Based on a broad study of sources, this contribution supersedes the widely read essay of IfZ veteran Hellmuth Auerbach from 1970.[37] Brechtken concludes that, contrary to what is often assumed, the influence of the American military government did not play a significant role in the founding of the IfZ. Instead, Brechtken emphasizes the significance of political motivations among (West) Germans, which were more important and more sustainable than the tenets of a tradition-bound field of scholarship. "The foundation of the Institute for Contemporary History thus was, at its core, a project of politicians and high-level civil servants," according to Brechtken. In the process of its foundation, historians were primarily spectators and attendants of institutionalization, to which they had to constantly adjust. Brechtken comes to the defense of Gerhard Kroll, the first general secretary of the IfZ, who was not a historian, but who helped shape the new democratic beginning in Bavaria and West Germany for the Christian Social Union between 1945 and 1950. It was Kroll's "tenacity" that, "in alliance with people who had shared his motivation for years," secured the "existence" of the IfZ during the precarious founding phase. This conclusion does not reflect at all well on the historians' guild.

Gaëlle Fisher then looks at a central field of activity of the IfZ in the 1950s and 1960s, namely the drafting of expert reports for trials involving Nazi crimes or for reparation proceedings. She focuses on the particularly multifaceted example of Martin Broszat's expert reports concerning compensation for Jewish survivors of the Holocaust from Romania, which were consequential for decision-making between 1955 and 1965. The compensation of hundreds of thousands of Holocaust survivors by the Federal Republic of Germany was an unprecedented, complex, and controversial legal process. The question of responsibility for the persecution and murder of Jews in the Romanian sphere of influence during World War II developed into a major point of contention between survivors, their representatives, and the West German compensation offices. For this reason, experts, including the staff of the IfZ, above all Martin Broszat, played an important role. Based on this case study, Fisher investigates the manifold tensions between historiography and jurisprudence. She pays particular attention to the connections between the historians and the legal representatives who fought for the rights of Jewish victims.

The next article, René Schlott's analysis of a debate triggered by Götz Aly in 2017,[38] also involves expert reports from the IfZ. At a conference held to mark the tenth anniversary of Raul Hilberg's death, Aly, the contentious Berlin journalist and historian, accused the Institute for Contemporary History of having twice torpedoed a German translation of Hilberg's standard work, *The Destruction of the European Jews*.[39] With the discovery of additional documents presented in this article, Schlott adds a new facet to the discussion. When *Darmstädter Blätter* considered publishing a German translation in 1979, Ino Arndt, a research fellow at the IfZ, expressed skepticism, citing the high translation costs. Furthermore, despite requests from the *Darmstädter Blätter*'s publisher, Günther Schwarz, Arndt was unable to name a qualified reviewer. Yet shortly thereafter, she herself wrote a negative assessment of the book for a different publishing house, C.H.Beck, which contributed significantly to Beck's decision to hold off on a German translation. Other documents, however, show that the IfZ helped bring appreciation and recognition to Hilberg's work.[40] The relationship between Hilberg and the Munich institute was, therefore, complex and ambivalent. Alan E. Steinweis, an associate editor of the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* and Professor of History and Raul Hilberg Distinguished Professor of Holocaust Studies at the University of Vermont in Burlington, where Hilberg taught and wrote between 1955 and 1991, comments on this documentation and places the controversial discussion surrounding the 2023 edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews* in its wider context.

In their contribution, Moritz Fischer and Thomas Schlemmer shift the focus to the Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt (ZFI—Contemporary History Research Center Ingolstadt). This institution is largely forgotten today, but must be regarded as an important trendsetter in the field of apologetic historical revisionism, especially in the 1980s and early 1990s. Founded in 1981 under the leadership of the Ingolstadt secondary-school teacher Alfred Schickel and the Erlangen history professor Hellmut Diwald, the ZFI saw itself as a counterweight to the IfZ in Munich, which was seen as the bastion of a politically motivated historiography standing in the way of liberating German identity from the shadow of the Nazi past. Exactly such a liberation was the goal of the ZFI. Based on newly discovered sources, the authors provide insights into the ZFI's workings. They trace its conflicts with established institutions such as the IfZ and the Federal Archives, and they explain why the ZFI was able to evolve into a publicly recognized pillar of the "spectrum bridging conservatism and right-wing extremism" in the Federal Republic.[41]

In this volume's concluding contribution, Maximilian Kutzner focuses his attention on an event that kept the world in suspense in April 1983 and prompted heated discussions among historians in Germany and beyond: the publication of the alleged Hitler diaries. Could these diaries really be authentic? And what would this mean for our understanding of history? Even before the first excerpts from the diary were published in *Stern* magazine, the IfZ was in contact with key players in the ensuing scandal. In the phase between the announcement of the diaries' "discovery" and their exposure as a forgery, multilayered processes of self-positioning took place in the institute's administration, then directed by Martin Broszat. The documents from the IfZ archives presented here show that the forged diaries were also a touchstone for the public role of contemporary history and its key representatives.

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With Volume 8 of the *German Yearbook of Contemporary History*, the Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History and the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* continue their successful collaboration with the University of Nebraska Press, which began in 2020. We thank Joyce Gettman, Manjit Kaur, and Shannyn McEntee once again for their advice and active support. We would also like to thank our team of translators—Sinéad Crowe, Melanie Newton, Catherine Venner, and Charlie Zaharoff—for their first-class work. Our thanks also go to Kathleen Luft, Melanie Newton, and Charlie Zaharoff for editing the translations, as well as to Merle Read, who copyedited this volume, and to Tizian

Bartling, who supervised the technical editing. We are most indebted, however, to Julia Menzel as Editorial Coordinator at the Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History. Without her support, this volume would not have come into existence—or at least not on time.

Burlington and Munich, June 2024

Notes

Translation by Charlie Zaharoff

1. Martin Broszat, "Aufgaben und Probleme zeitgeschichtlichen Unterrichts (Am Beispiel der nationalsozialistischen Zeit)," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 8, no. 9 (September 1957): 529–50, here 529.

2. A biography of Broszat that combines both scientific and institutional history would be worthwhile. Important information can be found in Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Claudio Natoli, eds., *Mit dem Pathos der Nüchternheit: Martin Broszat, das Institut für Zeitgeschichte und die Erforschung des Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 1991), and Norbert Frei, ed., *Martin Broszat, der "Staat Hitlers" und die Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007).

3. On this, see the exemplary work of Eberhard Jäckel, "Vom Kampf des Urteils gegen das Vorurteil: Andreas Hillgruber zu Ehren," in *Deutschland in Europa: Kontinuität und Bruch; Gedenkschrift für Andreas Hillgruber*, ed. Jost Dülffer, Bernd Martin, and Günter Wollstein (Frankfurt a. M.: Propyläen, 1990), 11–19.

4. On this, see the pioneering study by Jürgen Danyel, *Die geteilte Vergangenheit: Zum Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand in beiden deutschen Staaten* (Berlin: Akademie, 1995).

5. See Mathew Turner, Tony Joel, and David Lowe, "'Between Politics and Scholarship': The First Decade of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 1949–1958," *European History Quarterly* 49, no. 2 (April 2019): 250–71, here 264.

6. Quoted in Ulrike Köppchen, "Deutsche Geschichte: Der Bewältigungsweltmeister," September 1, 2014, https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/deutsche-geschichte-der-bewaeltigungsweltmeister-100.html.

7. Axel Schildt, "Fünf Möglichkeiten, die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik zu erzählen," in *Mehr als* eine *Erzählung: Zeitgeschichtliche Perspektiven auf die Bundesrepublik*, ed. Frank Bajohr et al. (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016), 15–26, here 21; also the source of the following quotation.

8. Hans Buchheim and Hermann Graml, "Die fünfziger Jahre: Zwei Erfahrungsberichte," in *50 Jahre Institut für Zeitgeschichte: Eine Bilanz*, ed. Horst Möller and Udo Wengst (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 69–83, here 70.

9. In a draft of a work plan submitted in 1951, the subject area "Occupation policy and national resistance in the Balkans" was at least included. See Nicolas Berg, *Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker: Erforschung und Erinnerung* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), 283–84; the quote can be found on 284.

10. See Horst Möller, "Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1949–2009," in *60 Jahre Insti-*

tut für Zeitgeschichte München-Berlin: Geschichte, Veröffentlichungen, Personalien, ed. Horst Möller and Udo Wengst (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009), 9–100.

11. Sebastian Conrad, *Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Nation: Geschichtsschreibung in Westdeutschland und Japan, 1945–1960* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999).

12. Berg, *Holocaust*, 283; the following quote can be found on 318.

13. Klaus-Dietmar Henke, "Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte unter der Ägide von Martin Broszat 1972–1989," in Henke and Natoli, *Mit dem Pathos der Nüchternheit*, 39–57, here 53 and 56.

14. Berg, *Holocaust*, 319; on disputes between staff members of the IfZ and survivors as historians of the Holocaust such as H. G. Adler and Joseph Wulf, see ibid., 304–11 and 594–615.

15. See Astrid M. Eckert, *The Struggle for the Files: The Western Allies and the Return of German Archives after the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

16. Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer, "Um die 'Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus': Ein Briefwechsel," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 36, no. 2 (April 1988): 339–72, here 343.

17. See Conrad, *Suche*, 239–46.

18. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Intentionalisten, Strukturalisten und das Theoriedefizit der Zeitgeschichte," and Norbert Frei, "Nach Broszat," both in Frei, *Martin Broszat*, 71–75, here 71, and 7–16, here 13, respectively. Frei was alluding to the fact that Broszat had belonged to the Hitler Youth and was accepted into the NSDAP in April 1944.

19. See Conrad, *Suche*, 255–82, and—exaggerating on the case of Broszat—Berg, *Holocaust*, 568–613.

20. See Conrad, *Suche*, 231.

21. Hans Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1, no. 1 (January 1953): 1–8, here 7.

22. See Conrad, *Suche*, 232.

23. The Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, which played a central role in the establishment of critical military history in the Federal Republic, has hardly been researched yet; see Martin Rink, *50 Jahre Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt: Eine Chronik* (Berlin: be.bra wissenschaft, 2007), and Markus Pöhlmann, "'Geringe Produktivität auf teilweise recht uninteressanten Randgebieten'? Die Anfänge des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes und die Entscheidung für ein amtliches Reihenwerk zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, 1957–1972," *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift* 82, no. 1 (2023): 59–95.

24. See the exemplary work of Jan Eckel, *Hans Rothfels: Eine intellektuelle Biografie im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005), here in particular 357–84.

25. See Kristina Spohr, "Contemporary History in Europe: From Mastering National Pasts to the Future of Writing the World," *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 3 (July 2011): 506–30, and Astrid M. Eckert, "The Transnational Beginnings of West German Zeitgeschichte in the 1950s," *Central European History* 40, no. 1 (March 2007): 63–87.

26. On this, see the pioneering study of Winfried Schulze, *Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989). Even the contact between early staff mem-

bers of the IfZ and the "Organisation Gehlen," forerunner to the Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service), only came to light comparatively recently; see Klaus-Dietmar Henke, *Geheime Dienste: Die politische Inlandsspionage der Organisation Gehlen 1946–1953* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2018), here in particular 555–77. However, with the internal consolidation and scientific establishment of the IfZ under the leadership of Hermann Mau (1951–52) and Paul Kluke (1952–59), this connection quickly lost its significance.

27. See the much-discussed volume by Winfried Schulze and Otto Gerhard Oexle, eds., *Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1999).

28. See Mathias Beer, "Hans Rothfels und die deutsche Zeitgeschichte: Eine Skizze," in *Hans Rothfels und die deutsche Zeitgeschichte*, ed. Johannes Hürter and Hans Woller (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 172–78. Paul Kluke and Helmut Krausnick, two later directors of the IfZ, counted among the staff of the Zentralstelle für Nachkriegsgeschichte before 1945.

29. See Frank Bajohr and Magnus Brechtken, eds., *Zeitzeugen, Zeitgenossen, Zeitgeschichte: Die frühe NS-Forschung am Institut für Zeitgeschichte* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2024).

30. Hans Maier, "Die Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte," in Möller and Wengst, *50 Jahre Institut für Zeitgeschichte*, 169–76, here 169.

31. Lutz Raphael, *Geschichtswissenschaft im Zeitalter der Extreme: Theorien, Methoden, Tendenzen von 1900 bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Beck, 2003), 248.

32. See Constantin Goschler and Rüdiger Graf, *Europäische Zeitgeschichte seit 1945* (Berlin: Akademie, 2010).

33. Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," 2; also the source of the following quotation.

34. See Andreas Wirsching, "'Epoche der Mitlebenden'—Kritik der Epoche," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 8, no. 1 (2011): 150–55.

35. Beer, "Hans Rothfels," 161.

36. On this, see the publication based on the podium organized by Thomas Schlemmer and Andreas Wirsching titled "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe im 21. Jahrhundert: Themen, Konzepte, Perspektiven," in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 72, no. 2 (April 2024): 289–361, with contributions by Julia Angster, Kiran Klaus Patel, Eckart Conze, Martin Rempe, and Frank Bösch.

37. See Hellmuth Auerbach, "Die Gründung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 18, no. 4 (October 1970): 529–54.

38. See Götz Aly, "Raul Hilberg and the Angst about the 'Whole Truth': A Case Study on the Work of German Zeitgeschichte," *Yad Vashem Studies* 46, no. 1 (2018): 141–71.

39. See Raul Hilberg, *Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden* (Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fischer-Verlag, 2023); this expanded new edition was published by S. Fischer-Verlag and contains a foreword by René Schlott.

40. Additional comments and materials compiled by René Schlott can be found here (accessed April 7, 2024): https://www.ifz-muenchen.de/vierteljahrshefte/zusatzangebote/beilagen. See the critical commentary of Horst Möller, "Bemerkung zur Dokumentation von René Schlott, Ablehnung und Anerkennung: Raul Hilberg und das Institut für Zeitgeschichte, im Januar-Heft der VfZ," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 69, no. 3 (July 2021): 547–48.

41. Armin Pfahl-Traughber, "Brücken zwischen Rechtsextremismus und Konservativismus: Zur Erosion der Abgrenzung auf publizistischer Ebene in den achtziger und neunziger Jahren," in *Rechtsextremismus: Einführung und Forschungsbilanz*, ed. Wolfgang Kowalsky and Wolfgang Schroeder (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994), 160–82, here 160.

The Task of Contemporary History

HANS ROTHFELS

In the first essay of the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, which appeared in 1953, Hans Rothfels took up the challenge of outlining contemporary history as a field of research. His short article, titled "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe" can be considered a timeless classic, and just about any student of recent history at a German university will have encountered Rothfels's definition of contemporary history as the "epoch of contemporaries and its scholarly treatment." The dynamics by which the present is continually turned into history were, for Rothfels, the unique feature of contemporary history. His understanding of the field had a profound influence on future scholarship and remains valid to this day, despite the occasionally fierce criticism of his national-conservative political outlook, and despite the period-specific ambivalence in the historical thought of a returned emigrant who had once been driven out of Germany by the National Socialists because of his Jewish ancestry.

1

Sometimes we are forced to use a term that is logically and philologically unsatisfactory, simply because it already exists and gives the general sense of something important. Indeed, this observation applies to the German word *Geschichte* with its well-known double meaning, referring both to past events as well to the intellectual visualization of past events. And it certainly applies to a number of its compounds. In the introduction to his *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, Jakob Burckhardt complains that *Geschichtsphilosophie* is a "centaur"—yet he goes on to philosophize at considerable length about history. While Burckhardt criticizes the contradiction between the two component words—and thus within the thing they name—as "contradictio in adjecto," Benedetto Croce calls the combination a "tautology." All history, Croce declares, is philosophy, although this belief did not inhibit him from rooting his reflections, as befits a historian, in a very concrete description of events. Some-

times language itself appears to know, better than the contemplative mind, what is needed.

The comparison is perhaps overstretched, and I do not intend to extrapolate it further here. The word *Zeitgeschichte* [literally "time-history"] directs us to a simpler and, at first glance, very unphilosophical realm. The term is open to similar and indeed better-founded objections, both in the sense that it is logically contradictory (or lacks clear differentiation of its two components) and in the sense that it connects two words that belong to the same category. Surely history always has to do with time? One might be tempted to clarify by replacing "Zeit" with "Gegenwart" [the present]. But that only draws us deeper into difficulties. It is generally understood that the historian is interested in "the past," which is "no longer the present."[1] The title of the well-known reference work *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* [Religion in History and the Present] exemplifies the distinction. And if one objects that the historian is, justifiably, particularly interested in the present in history, and in the historical in the present, this only makes the problems with the substitute term clearer. What is "our" present?[2] Certainly not the latest simply for the sake of the new, "a ripple in the river of time." The English language has coined the accidentally apposite term "current history" or "current events" for this passage from past to future. The task of accompanying that passage with a "running" commentary based on an awareness of historical context should certainly not be dismissed, but it is not what we are talking about here—nor is it the purpose that the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* is intended to serve. The term "Neueste Geschichte" [the most recent history] would therefore be equally misleading, or at least point in the wrong direction.

One might be more easily tempted to follow the example of another well-established term borrowed from a foreign language, namely "contemporary history" or "histoire contemporaine." In German the term would be "zeitgenössische Geschichte" [the history of current times] or "Geschichte unserer Zeit" [the history of our time]. If only the word "Zeitgenosse" [a current-day person] were not so misused, and if only the term "unserer Zeit" [of our time] did not, aside from its imprecision, suffer the embarrassing undertone of claiming that we "own" the age or have reason to look with special pride at "our" achievements. If we are to understand *Zeitgeschichte* as the epoch of contemporaries and its scholarly treatment, we should do so in the sense that, for us, this is about an age of crisis-ridden shocks and the universal constellation essentially determined by it.

If we take that as the determinant—a point to which we will return—it makes sense that the word *Zeitgeschichte* exists, and that it is no accident that

it appeared when it did. It is not as old as its foreign alternatives.[3] It was originally used only as a formal term for chronologically narrated history, and the meaning we know today only appeared properly in the 1790s. It is unambiguously connected with the revolutionary events in France, and thus with a specific moment of being affected by history. This reference to the origin of the word may serve as a legitimation, and also as an indication of the general thrust of what we understand as the task of *Zeitgeschichte*.

2

Before we follow up on the question of our own affectedness, we should circumscribe the practical significance of the task, its organizational side, and thus the immediate purpose of this journal. We see the obvious need to catch up in a field where much greater progress has been achieved elsewhere. There are certainly reasons to wonder whether things have perhaps been overdone here and there, for instance where more than half of the 1,300 PhD dissertations currently in preparation in the United States are dedicated to questions of the twentieth century.[4] The American discussion rightly identifies the dangers and misunderstandings involved in "presentism." I should not need to point out that the founding of this journal should in no way be understood as encouraging a "short-windedness" of historical interest, and still less a neglect of deeper historical roots. But it would be equally wrong to overlook the relative shift in the center of gravity, which corresponds to the practically undeniable needs of school and university teaching, civics, etc., and probably also springs from the momentum of epochal change and a real need for self-understanding.

In any case, the outcome is certainly a diversity and convolution of research, amid which, in Germany, the tasks of stocktaking, catching up, and clarifying future orientation are the most obvious and most urgent, if unnecessary repetition and wasted effort are to be avoided. The often-scattered German contributions to international discussion in the field of contemporary history also need a technical collecting point of the kind that only a specialized journal can offer. To promote the effort of stocktaking, its scope should encompass, in particular, systematic bibliographical compilations and periodic research reports.

The publication of source materials is subject to the same fragmentation as the field of research itself. Except for the major published document collections, original source documents and collections tend to be located in very remote and random places. Postwar conditions have made many documents homeless, in particular German historical documents of the very recent past. Nevertheless, Germany does possess very considerable stocks of official and

private materials, which can be significantly enriched through interviews. Systematically pursuing such augmentation while the eyewitnesses of important decisions and events are still alive is another urgent task for contemporary historical research. That undertaking will require cooperative efforts of the kind already underway in multiple quarters.[5] The journal will have a special responsibility to report on such "secondary" archival materials and their associated problems, as well as on published document collections. At the same time, the journal can itself serve as a repository for documents of manageable length, meaning that at least a significant proportion of the individual sources that become available in Germany will be so in one place.

The question of sources is associated with another task for the *Vierteljahrshefte*, and for *Zeitgeschichte* as a whole. *Zeitgeschichte* must scrutinize the very foundations upon which its academic treatment rests. More than in any other modern epoch, *Zeitgeschichte*, and in particular its study of politics, is vulnerable to the often-misleading character of official material, the fallacy that "Quod non est in actis non est in mundo" [What is not in the records is not in the world]. The techniques of record management require careful investigation, especially when dealing with a totalitarian state, where formal responsibility is fragmented but actual responsibility is concentrated. The influence of modern news media, propaganda, and mass communication must be diligently examined. Similarly, methodological principles for using specific types of sources such as interviews, questionnaires, and court files need to be developed, and technical means need to be provided for exploiting them. However much we might wish to resist further division of labor, which we know must be counterbalanced, it is undeniable that "the task of contemporary history" will necessarily involve a considerable degree of specialization. That requirement alone is justification for a specialized journal.

3

Given that the above touches on questions of organization as well as labor, two objections are to be expected. The first would be that history is a whole: each of its parts is subject to the same epistemological preconditions, and thus there can be only one historical method. This is certainly correct in principle. One of the essential duties of the historian is to subject the sources to rigorous examination of authenticity and trustworthiness, the principles of which have been fully developed during the last 150 years. Neither these methods nor the striving for objectivity that is inherent to them permits any kind of relativism. But that does not mean we are not dealing with very specific applications and

very specific difficulties, adapting and at the same time preserving inherited principles under conditions that are simply unprecedented.

This is where the second, more general, objection comes in, which is essentially that *Zeitgeschichte* is simply not "ripe" for consideration as history because it lacks the necessary documentation and the necessary distance—all the more so that it now operates in a global framework, where some of its sources have grown to immeasurability while others are largely lost or withheld, and where it is so deeply riven by fundamental contradictions. One could counter the general objection with a plaintive assertion that the challenge is unavoidable, while citing great examples of historical scholarship. And indeed, outstanding examples of scholarship on contemporary history have emerged in particularly tumultuous times, sometimes precisely because of an awareness of the crisis. It suffices to recall Thucydides and his objectification of the Peloponnesian War. But we should not hide behind general axioms and great men. And the dilemma of limited insight will doubtlessly remain, with the proviso that it applies to all history and not only to particularly recent or insufficiently illuminated periods.

This is not the place to get into the epistemological weeds. While such questions certainly lie within the remit of a contemporary historiography that is conscious of its responsibility, they fall outside the scope of these introductory remarks. There certainly is no place for naive realism, as if history in the sense of intellectual visualization, ever represents history in the sense of "what happened." We know that, alongside other contingencies, there is a subjective aspect to all historical insight. But we also know that this is not simply a symptom of the limitations of our abilities, but rather reflects the essential fact that history itself is by no means value-free. It has meaning for people; it represents an encounter with their past and their future. The worthiness of such scholarly efforts resides in the possibility of such interaction between people and history. Objectivity in this field therefore means a disciplined search for truth, setting prejudices aside wherever possible, but not remaining neutral in questions that are essential to us. It is always about truth in the sense of both "correct" and "valuable."[6]

In those terms the task of *Zeitgeschichte* is not a special case. It faces special difficulties, but also benefits from special impetus. It shares with all forms of historical consideration the risk of error, indeed, it shares with human life itself the characteristic proportional relationship between risk and reward. The closer we are to events, the easier it is for us to overlook their essence and be led astray by preconceived opinions. But we are all the more likely to possess possibilities of correction and of access to the hinge points.

This question of proportionality also applies, to a certain extent, to the question of "lacking documents." Scholars will certainly encounter enormous gaps in the record and will often have to accept not knowing. But it could also be argued that, for some areas at least, a hitherto unprecedented wealth of material is available, to which *Zeitgeschichte* possesses a unique "divining rod." The danger will lie, often enough, in the suffocating mass of documentation. Dealing with that will require innovative technical resources, but above all an intensity of questioning that echoes the methods historians have developed specifically for sparsely documented epochs. Contemporary history has at its disposal, as one may well say, methods of unusual effectiveness for approaching this problem correctly, i.e. not arbitrarily, but rather according to the substance and structure of the situation.[7]

The objection of "lack of distance" is thus two-faced. Nobody would deny the danger of proximity or hasty updating. Evidence of these is plentiful. But it can also be demonstrated, for example, that the task of historical understanding, in the sense of feeling oneself into the position of the doers or the victims, can be considerably facilitated by personal experience. That position must be embraced with mental discipline if it is to manifest its objectifying effect in the context of war, whether between or within nations.

In other respects, too, proximity may offer a curious leverage. And this is where "Betroffensein" [being affected]—which is associated with the very origin of the word *Zeitgeschichte* and lends it a specific meaning—comes into its own. We need to think our way into the spirit of the epoch not from a distance and principally by way of historical intuition. That spirit has beleaguered us sufficiently to make us aware of the inner coherence and the novelty of a universal constellation, which followed a short and very unusual century of national differentiation that knew neither world war nor global revolution.

4

The concept of *Zeitgeschichte*, in the sense to which the *Vierteljahrshefte* is dedicated, is thus based on the view that a new epoch of world history began to emerge roughly in 1917/18. Its roots lie in the fundamental tendencies of imperialist policy and industrial society, which should not be excluded from discussion in these pages by any mechanical timeframe. But even the First World War, for all its attendant revolutionary collapse and shattering of feelings of security, can be said with good reason to have been simply a conflict between nation-states that expanded out into the world. Not until the peculiar simultaneity of the entry of the United States into the war and the outbreak of the

Russian Revolution did the constellation become truly universal, and at the same time the conflict between peoples and states became both permeated and crisscrossed by deeper societal contradictions. Essentially, the Washington-Moscow antithesis was already very real by 1918. In the following decades the three ideologies of democracy, fascism, and communism coexisted in a "triangle," until the bipolar division began to reemerge after 1945. What is new and universal here is that ideological and societal movements operate across national borders to a degree unknown in the age of nation-states. Vertical fronts have been succeeded by horizontal fronts, which were foreshadowed by the age of the French Revolution but resemble even more closely the "confessional age" of European history. This shift has created the possibility of a global civil war.

As this brief outline shows,[8] the task of *Zeitgeschichte* must be handled in an international framework. This applies, for one thing, at the technical level. As set forth above, the *Vierteljahrshefte* will strive to catch up with research conducted abroad. By the same token, the editors would heartily welcome the participation of non-German historians who are attempting to clarify the central structures and processes of our epoch. But this desire for collaboration is about more than formal interaction, and also about more than the so-called "global situation," although the latter already lends *Zeitgeschichte* a universal orientation. There have also been internal shifts, which have manifested themselves in the disruption of familiar relationships, in the challenge to political sovereignty, in the emergence of new international movements (e.g. among agrarian workers), and in existential crises. One may say that humans are no longer as anchored in the realm of the national as they were at the time of Ranke's *Weltgeschichte*. Resistance and integration movements are thus central issues for *Zeitgeschichte*.

Just as it transcends national borders and must confront new loyalties and solidarities, *Zeitgeschichte* should also work to overcome the "sectoral divisions" of the political, the socioeconomic, and the intellectual. This goal would create a counterweight to the increasing specialization demanded by the task itself. Less than ever is it possible to distinguish between internal and external, state and society, interests and ideologies, human nature and nature itself. By making such integration an objective, *Zeitgeschichte* could both provide a methodological service to historical scholarship and also position itself to capture the structure and essence of an epoch that is in many respects totalitarian. With its modest means the *Vierteljahrshefte* wishes to contribute to this holistic perspective.

Of course that will remain an ideal toward which to strive. However much the wish for universal breadth and thematic diversity must remain

points of orientation, as a practical matter political and socioeconomic history, in particular from the realm of German history, will form the backbone. That is another task of *Zeitgeschichte* that must not be underestimated, and indeed in some respects is a priority. There is still a great deal to be done for the period of the Weimar Republic, which was long a stepchild of academic scholarship, and it is an absolute duty, especially for German academics, to engage the National Socialist years with all available energy.[9] To date this has happened only sporadically—and already we are hearing from those who would prefer to wrap themselves in the cloak of concealment, the cloud of forgetting. We must respond with all due clarity that "the task of contemporary history"—conducted in a spirit of openness—must not be afraid of the "hot potatoes" (whether national or international) and leaves no hiding place for myths to lurk.

When discussing matters German, we must absolutely set aside any inclination to self-humiliation and apologetics. Only sober and candid exploration of the most emotionally charged questions can clear the air in Germany and abroad. The goal here, as elsewhere, must be maximum objectivity in recording the facts, but certainly not neutrality toward the traditions and principles of European civilization.

The unequivocal political value of *Zeitgeschichte* becomes apparent here. It will have to prove that proximity and profound involvement are compatible with distancing from the passions of the day, without leading to relativistic skepticism; that, to the contrary, it is an intellectual discipline that, as an accessory to understanding and self-education, ventures into the sphere of moral decisions, as the epoch so urgently demands. By serving scholarship, the *Vierteljahrshefte* also hopes to help clarify questions of values and intentions, which, while interesting but not necessarily sensational, concern a broader public.

It is a happy coincidence that both editors are faculty members of the University of Tübingen. May the endeavor of introducing "the task of contemporary history" into academic and political life be true to the motto of this university's founder:

"Attempto!"

Notes

Translation by Melanie Newton

1. Peter Rassow, *Der Historiker und seine Gegenwart* (Munich: Rinn, 1948), 10.

2. See the brilliant and profound observations by Hermann Heimpel, "Der Mensch in

seiner Gegenwart," *Die Sammlung: Zeitschrift für Kultur und Erziehung* 6, no. 9 (September 1951): 489–511.

3. See Paul E. Geiger, "Das Wort 'Geschichte' und seine Zusammensetzungen" (PhD diss., Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, 1908), 9, 88 ff.—I am indebted to Reinhard Wittram for sources on the etymology. See also his inspiring essay, "Das Interesse an der Geschichte," *Die Welt als Geschichte* 12, no. 1 (1952): 1–16.

4. See Howard R. Lamar, "The New York Meeting, 1951," *American Historical Review* 57, no. 3 (April 1952): 795–822, here 799. Also the same source (798–99) for the discussion of "presentism."

5. In Germany, with no claim to exhaustiveness: the Institut für Zeitgeschichte München; the J.-G.-Herder-Institut in Marburg (for Eastern Europe); the Kommission für die Dokumentation der Vertreibungen. Recent historical documents ("Zeitdokumentation") will also be a focus of the newly founded Bundesarchiv.

6. See Johannes Kühn, *Die Wahrheit der Geschichte und die Gestalt der wahren Geschichte* (Oberursel: Kompass, 1947).

7. Although not always still relevant to the present situation, see the remarks by Justus Hashagen, "Beurteilungsmaßstäbe der Zeitgeschichte," *Historische Vierteljahrsschrift* 21 (1922/23): 444–49. In his lecture "Contemporary History—Its Validity," E. L. Woodward also underlines the contemporary historian's opportunity "to understand basic matters that leave no record." Lamar, "The New York Meeting, 1951," 802.

8. For the two interwar decades, see the present author's *Gesellschaftsform und Auswärtige Politik* (Laupheim: Steiner, 1951).

9. These two phases account for most of the work of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte München.

Hans Rothfels and Contemporary History

GERHARD L. WEINBERG

The major role that Dr. Hans Rothfels played in the establishment of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ—Institute for Contemporary History) in Munich and its journal is surely to some extent the result of events in his life and its surroundings. When these are significant enough, they allow a divergence of a historian's general focus of attention from the distant past and events preceding the historian's birth. The article in the first number of the journal outlines the rules and procedures that the self-defined historian should follow if he makes such a change, but it may be worth paying some attention to the dramatic events that had an impact on the author-historian's life.

Rothfels served in the German army on the Western Front and there, to the best of my knowledge in November 1914, suffered an injury that cost him a leg. After the war he studied at Heidelberg University and received his degree in 1920. From 1924 to 1926 he taught at the University of Berlin, and from 1926 to 1934 at the University of Königsberg. He had converted to Christianity from his Jewish family background when young, but in the eyes of the Nazi government was racially Jewish and hence fired from his university position.[1]

When I was a graduate student at the University of Chicago in 1948–51, Rothfels was my main professor. I became his graduate assistant, and once was invited to his Chicago residence. On that occasion his wife told me of the extraordinary event in their lives in November 1938. Two policemen came to arrest him, no doubt on the basis of a list of Jews in the immediate area. His wife explained to them that he was in bed because the prosthesis for the leg he had lost in the war was being repaired. They told her that they would be back with a stretcher.

The policemen came back after a while and carried Rothfels out to their vehicle. They drove to the local police station and carried him to the room in which those arrested were being collected for dispatch in a truck or bus to a concentration camp (the standard practice all over Germany at that time). It turned out that the police officer in charge of the room had been in the

same company in the German army as Rothfels in 1914, recognized him after twenty-four years, and told the policemen carrying the stretcher to take him home. They did so. It was soon after this event that Rothfels left Germany and went to England, where he taught at St. John's College, Oxford, in 1939.

Some months after the Second World War started, Rothfels was interned on the Isle of Man (as my father was), and it was thereafter that he moved to the United States. He taught substantial numbers of students at Brown University and then at the University of Chicago, but after 1946 started to make periodic visits to Germany, and thereby made things somewhat complicated for his students. It needs to be noted that by the time he returned to Germany for visits in the late 1940s and permanently in 1951, the main site of his earlier academic career, the University of Königsberg, was no longer in Germany. For a person who was a German nationalist, the transfer of half of the former East Prussia to Poland and the other half to the Soviet Union certainly was of great significance.[2]

It seems to me that these very dramatic events justified in Rothfels's thinking a willingness, even an eagerness, to focus attention on more recent events than those generally the subject explored by those who consider themselves to be professional historians. It is at least possible that one very important aspect of his own past may have had a further influence on his scholarly focus. The decision of the officer in charge of the collection room in the police station very likely saved his life. How could a person expect to live in a concentration camp with one leg and nothing to replace the lost leg? The decision to send the arrested individual home was undoubtedly against the rules. The officer had made this decision because he was sure it was the proper one, whatever the rules and regulations may say. Could this experience of being saved by a person in the official hierarchy breaking the rules have influenced the early focus of Rothfels's scholarship on the German resistance against the Nazi regime? He worked on this topic while still in the United States and published his first book on the subject in English in 1948.[3]

It certainly is very likely that the whole range of his experiences in Germany and his having to leave the country he loved contributed to Rothfels's willingness to be one of the very few German historians who in the early years of the postwar German republic would include a focus on what we call the Holocaust in historical research and publication.[4] It is fair to suggest that this attitude of his contributed indirectly but substantially to the evolution of Holocaust research and publication in the Federal Republic of Germany in subsequent decades into the present time.

If those who considered themselves to be historians and who shifted from

the traditional focus on earlier events to the recent past, to *Zeitgeschichte*, were to teach and publish properly, they needed guidance that they were unlikely to have received during their university education. It is surely very likely that Rothfels designed the article—the first in the first issue of the new journal that he edited and published—as an appropriate remedy for this deficiency. He always thought of himself as a teacher in addition to being a professional historian who researched, wrote, and published works of history for what he hoped would be a substantial audience.

Notes

1. For a critical biography of Rothfels, see Jan Eckel, *Hans Rothfels: Eine intellektuelle Biographie im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005). See also Johannes Hürter and Hans Woller, eds., *Hans Rothfels und die deutsche Zeitgeschichte* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005).

2. See, for example, Hans Rothfels, *700 Jahre Königsberg: Rede bei der Gedenkfeier der Patenstadt Duisburg am 28. Mai 1955* (Munich: Gräfe und Unzer, 1955).

3. Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler: An Appraisal* (Hinsdale: Regnery, 1948). The German edition was published as *Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler: Eine Würdigung* (Krefeld: Scherpe, 1949); a second edition was published by Fischer in 1958. The conservative resistance against Hitler remained one of Rothfels's central areas of research. See, for example, Hans Rothfels, "Adam von Trott und das State Department," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 7, no. 3 (July 1959): 318–32; Hans Rothfels, "Trott und die Außenpolitik des Widerstandes," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 12, no. 3 (July 1964): 300–323; Ulrich von Hassell, *Vom andern Deutschland: Aus den nachgelassenen Tagebüchern 1938-1944*, with a preface by Hans Rothfels (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Bücherei, 1964); Hans Rothfels, "Zur 25. Wiederkehr des 20. Juli 1944," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 17, no. 3 (July 1969): 237–53.

4. Evidence for this can be seen in the publication of the Gerstein report in the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* in 1953. Hans Rothfels, "Augenzeugenbericht zu den Massenvergasungen," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1, no. 2 (April 1953): 177–94; Hans Rothfels, "Zur 'Umsiedlung' der Juden im Generalgouvernement," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 7, no. 3 (July 1959): 333–36. For an English translation of Rothfels's essay from 1953, see Hans Rothfels, "Kurt Gerstein's Eyewitness Report on Mass Gassings," *German Yearbook of Contemporary History* 1 (2016): 63–83; for an accompanying commentary, see Valerie Hébert, "Hans Rothfels, Kurt Gerstein and the Report: A Retrospective," *German Yearbook of Contemporary History* 1 (2016): 85–105.

Hans Rothfels and the Duty of Contemporary History

ASTRID M. ECKERT

Introduction

In German historiography it is well nigh impossible to address the field of contemporary history without citing Hans Rothfels's short essay "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," a title that translates alternatively as "contemporary history as a duty" or as "the task of contemporary history."[1] The article appeared in 1953 as an editorial in the inaugural issue of a new quarterly, the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, published by the equally new Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ—Institute for Contemporary History) in Munich. Together with Theodor Eschenburg, Rothfels served as the journal's first editor-in-chief. His article aimed to launch an academic history journal: to introduce its scope, tasks, and rationale. The journal was part of a push to establish contemporary history as a legitimate subdiscipline in the West German historical profession.

As many scholars have noted—and as Rothfels himself conceded, too—neither the term nor the concept of contemporary history was a novelty at the time. The theoretician of conceptual history Reinhart Koselleck is not alone in tracing it back to the eighteenth century and even all the way back to antiquity. Whenever historians felt moved to profess a need for contemporary history, Koselleck notes, it was usually when they felt that current events had surged and reached a particular apex ("Ereignisschübe"). On such occasions, instead of remaining disinterested observers, historians acknowledged their own involvement and role as witnesses in these upheavals, a role that lent authenticity and immediacy to their accounts.[2] Rothfels was a case in point when he referred to the recent past as the "age of crisis-ridden shocks."[3] We ourselves have just lived through a global surge of events and are experiencing emergence from a crisis, as evidenced in an emerging cluster of literature giving historians' perspectives on the COVID-19 pandemic.[4]

Hans Rothfels's biography mirrors the crisis-ridden shocks of the era.[5] He volunteered to serve in World War I and was seriously wounded in 1914. He spent the remainder of the war working on his dissertation on Carl von Clausewitz, which he submitted to Hermann Oncken in Heidelberg in 1918.

Ideologically he was deeply embedded in the national-conservative milieu that radicalized significantly in response to the Treaty of Versailles. After writing a second dissertation, the so-called habilitation, on Bismarck's diplomacy, Rothfels assumed a professorship in Königsberg in East Prussia in 1926. Although his right-wing politics showed considerable overlap with the rising Nazi movement, his career was cut short after 1933. The fact that he had converted to Protestantism in 1910 did not protect him: antisemitic laws turned him from a German history professor into a *Jewish* history professor. He lost his appointment in Königsberg in 1934/35, despite his best efforts to retain his citizenship rights. His status as a decorated war veteran and the support of his network in the historical profession kept him afloat for a while. After the November pogrom in 1938, however, he finally started to make arrangements to dispatch his children to Britain and followed with his wife, Hildegard, in 1939. A teaching position at Brown University allowed the family to move on to the United States in 1940. Rothfels became an American citizen in 1946 and took up a job at the University of Chicago that same year.

Rothfels attracted significant attention during the late 1990s and early 2000s, culminating in Jan Eckel's critical biography published in 2005.[6] Something of a 'Rothfels controversy' had erupted that centered on the extent of Rothfels's ideological overlap with Nazism around 1930 and his contributions to an unrepentant and apologetic postwar German historiography.[7] One of his American graduate students at the University of Chicago, Georg Iggers, pegged Rothfels as deeply "conservative and German-national" in his outlook, and wondered why someone with such views had had to flee Germany in the first place. Only later did Iggers learn that Rothfels had been marked as Jewish by antisemitic Nazi legislation.[8]

After the war Rothfels became the only re-émigré to reassume a permanent professorship in German history.[9] The favorable reception of his recent work, especially his book on the military resistance against Hitler, assured him that he would fit in again.[10] The unbroken national-conservative consensus within the profession contributed to this assessment. In 1951 Rothfels moved to the University of Tübingen. He soon became a key figure among postwar German historians, not least through his editorship of the *Vierteljahrshefte*. He was the perfect "bridge builder," as Friedrich Meinecke called him. Here was a Jewish historian with American credentials who was still politically conservative enough not to stir the pot, and who did not offend the sensibilities of his colleagues with questions about their possible involvement with the National Socialist regime. Rothfels thus had major "exculpatory utility" for German historians.[11] This utility notwithstanding, he displayed a keen sense of his sur-

roundings. Shortly after his return to Tübingen, he advised the émigré archivist Ernst Posner against accepting the position as director of the new West German Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv). Posner would find himself "surrounded by injured ambitions and offended egos, not to speak of other resentments." The backlash, Rothfels continued, "is stronger than you can imagine based on the impressions of two years ago."[12] We may safely assume that these "other resentments" were antisemitic ones. Rothfels was both insider and outsider at the same time.

A Contemporary Journal

Writing the lead essay in the first issue of the *Vierteljahrshefte* journal gave Rothfels the chance to put his stamp on the field of contemporary history. He defined it as the "epoch of contemporaries and its scholarly treatment."[13] This succinct definition bundled the temporal scope of contemporary history, its perspective, method, and—hinging on the temporal scope—also its content. The temporal definition, especially, was remarkably flexible and functioned like a moving wall. By referring to the "epoch of contemporaries," each new generation would define contemporary history's latest reach. By taking the historian's present as the point of departure, contemporary history would continuously rejuvenate its purview based on the life horizon of its practitioners.[14]

Tellingly, Rothfels did not take his own life horizon as a yardstick to define the field's temporal focus. Born in 1891, he excluded the first twenty-six years of his life from the purview of the new discipline—a quarter of a century no less. Instead, he declared contemporary history's starting point as coinciding with the dawning of a "new universal-historical epoch" in 1917/18, when the United States entered World War I and the Russian Revolution took place. This move centered the "Washington-Moscow antithesis," Rothfels's term for what we would call the Cold War, and dated its roots back to 1918.[15] It also shaved off the history of Imperial Germany, including the contentious "war guilt" debate that had agitated (and implicated) German historians during the 1920s.[16] The timeframe of contemporary history that Rothfels defined in 1953 thus reached from 1917 to 1945.

What exactly needed attention during this timeframe was not as obvious in Rothfels's essay as one might think. He emphasized political and socioeconomic history ("Ereignisgeschichte [. . .] politischer und wirtschaftlich-sozialer Art") as the "backbone" of the new discipline without, however, sparing a word on the specific content these approaches were supposed to tackle. Instead, he continued to express himself in temporal terms, maintain-

ing that much work still needed to be done on the "period of the Weimar Republic" that had been a "stepchild" of historical research for too long. Above all, however, German scholars in particular had an obligation to address "the National Socialist years with all available energy."[17] It was the task of contemporary history, Rothfels insisted, not to avoid any "hot potatoes" on the subject, since such shirking would allow legends and lies to fester.

As historian Andreas Wirsching points out, Rothfels delivered the first "hot potato" in the second issue of the journal when he printed excerpts from the Gerstein Report, a retrospective account written in spring 1945 about the gassing operations in Bełżec.[18] The fact remains, however, that the inaugural essay "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe" was surprisingly mum and non-explicit on content. If the study of "the National Socialist years" was an obligation specifically for German historians, what was it that they needed to address and explain about it? Inferring from later issues of the journal and focusing on what the *Vierteljahrshefte* eventually became is not the same as stating its purpose with clarity at the outset.

To understand that the new journal was indeed intended to become the prime venue for research on the history of National Socialism, we need to turn away from Rothfels's essay and consider the context. The institute in Munich that hosted the journal had been founded in September 1950 under the initial name of German Institute for the History of the National Socialist Era. Renamed in May 1952 as the Institute for Contemporary History, its original name remained programmatic. The institute's founding was accompanied by much political wrangling and burdened with high expectations. As one board member put it, "the founding of the Institute [. . .] is one of those duties of the state, which, if not fulfilled, would call into question the purpose of the entire state apparatus."[19] The purpose of the new West German state was, of course, to become the opposite of the preceding dictatorship and radically depart from the Nazi past. This could only succeed if an unfettered, evidence-based analysis of the most recent past was undertaken that would lay bare why the Weimar democracy had failed, paving the way for the National Socialists to establish their dictatorial power structures. This knowledge, it was hoped, would fortify the nascent democracy against its enemies and ensure that it would survive beyond the period of Allied tutelage. This seemed all the more important since a veritable cottage industry of sensationalist publications and exculpatory memoirs about the Nazi years began to flourish in the Federal Republic shortly after the Western Allies ceased tight media control. The study of the Nazi era, then, was to play a central role in the process of democratization, a role that was assigned to the Munich institute.[20] Quite fittingly,

Gabriele Metzler called early contemporary history a "stabilization science" ("Stabilisierungswissenschaft").[21]

Rothfels's failure to take a more explicit position on content opened him up to later criticism. Despite his own experience of antisemitic discrimination and forced emigration, his essay did not even mention the persecution and murder of Europe's Jews. These themes did not feature in his private correspondence with colleagues either.[22] Rothfels, to be sure, remained very much within the mainstream of what German historians were willing to say about the history of National Socialism during the 1950s and 1960s. Research on National Socialism remained curiously anemic: the regime seemed to have no roots in German society, and crimes were perpetrated by a surprisingly small group of people. The Holocaust did not become a research topic in its own right until the 1980s, and the Institute for Contemporary History played a sad role in sabotaging earlier efforts.[23] Rothfels scholars have pointed to this evident dissonance between his own life and his research agenda, and have sought to explain why he did not use his notable cultural, social, and political capital to set the postwar research agenda in German contemporary history differently. One of his sharpest critics, Karl-Heinz Roth, contends that Rothfels delayed a critical engagement with Nazi society "by decades."[24] It is hard to dispute an argument that cannot be disproven, but the dissonance between Rothfels's biography and the short essay is quite real. Just as he did not take his own life horizon as a yardstick to define contemporary history's temporal focus, he was not guided by his own life experiences in defining its content either.

Instead, the essay has a rather defensive ring to it because it expended *half of its space* on preempting anticipated criticisms of contemporary history as such. The emerging field was not necessarily welcome among specialists in the more established branches of the profession. In a disarmingly pragmatic move, Rothfels justified the project of a new "specialized journal" ("Spezialzeitschrift") with the remark that contemporary history required specialized skills. He pitched the need for such a journal as a necessary "division of labor" ("Arbeitsteilung") within the historical profession, and described its function as a "technical collecting point" that brought together the widely scattered German contributions to contemporary history.[25] However, as Rothfels clearly knew, the objections to such an endeavor reached much deeper and touched upon the methodological and epistemological scaffolding of historical scholarship.

The main charge against the pursuit of contemporary history during the 1950s was that of "presentism," an allegedly exaggerated focus on recent events that was said to come with an attendant lack of distance from the object of

study.[26] Historians dealing with chronologically more remote periods called contemporary history a contradiction in terms: "history" could not be "contemporary" because "history" was "past."[27] Rothfels had heard a good number of these objections at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in New York in 1951. At that conference a historian of early modern Iberian history had only half-jokingly asked whether the past still had a place in history. Surveying the conference program, this speaker bemoaned the "high percentage of the sessions [. . .] devoted to 'historical' matters well within the living memory of any middle-aged person." To his dismay, it was those sessions "that draw the crowds."[28] Critics of contemporary history reminded their colleagues that the ideal of objectivity was supposed to unite the profession, an ideal that could not be upheld when writing about one's own times. The charge of presentism thus had a strong epistemological component: the recent past had not yet become history; it was too intertwined with the historian's own lifetime, and thus posed the problem of transcending personal memories and experiences.

Rothfels acknowledged the claim that contemporary history was not yet "ripe" to be considered history ("geschichtsreif").[29] He sought to deflect this alleged "lack of distance" by flipping the (partial) convergence of the life span of scholars with their objects of study from a handicap into an advantage. Proximity to their period of study, he pointed out, gave contemporary historians "curious leverage" ("eigentümliche Hebelkraft") because they found natural access to the "spirit of the epoch" and its inner workings. It was much easier for contemporaries to put themselves in the shoes of those who had acted and those who had suffered than it was for historians who approached their research topic "from a distance" and through "historical intuition." Being a witness, *ein Mitlebender*, opened up new avenues of historical inquiry and ultimately yielded fresh insights. It allowed for a historicist feeling-oneself-into the past ("Sich-Hineinversetzen"). In Rothfels's reasoning, being affected by the recent past ("Betroffensein") was not a limiting but an enabling factor.[30]

In this context, Rothfels cited the national-conservative historian Justus Hashagen, who had issued a similar call to address contemporary history after World War I. Hashagen practiced what he preached and hired himself out to the German Foreign Office's "War Guilt Department," a government office that generated propaganda publications to rail against Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, the so-called war guilt clause. Their national pride offended, a significant number of German historians embraced this effort to refute the charge that Germany was to blame for the war, a charge that the peace treaty used to justify German reparation payments, loss of territory, and disarma-

ment of the German military. In citing Hashagen, Rothfels shot a tiny arrow to remind German historians that they themselves had plunged headfirst into an engagement with contemporary history only three decades previously in ways far from neutral, let alone objective.[31]

To ensure that the focus on the very recent past did not rattle the cage of established historical disciplines more than necessary, Rothfels tied the new discipline to the traditional methodology of the profession. He urged its practitioners not to deviate from established historical methods and to strive for objectivity. Their proximity to the events under study could be neutralized by exercising a strict "mental discipline," a historicist, objectifying frame of mind that needed to be coupled with an approach that maintained a "rigorous examination of authenticity and trustworthiness [of source materials], the principles of which have been fully developed during the last 150 years."[32] Although he thus wedded contemporary history to the time-honored methods of the profession, Rothfels wanted it to be understood that "objectivity" was not "neutrality." History, after all, was not neutral ground either.[33]

Reflecting a strong focus on the state as the primary historical agent, these historical methods had long relied on the analysis of official documents.[34] To enter the ambit of serious historical scholarship, research had to be based on primary sources, an expectation that usually referred to government records. If such records were not yet available for any particular time period, that period could obviously not be the subject of historical scholarship. In 1960 historian Peter Rassow of the University of Cologne still maintained that "historical eras in the scholarly sense are those for which the historian has unhindered access to unpublished sources as well."[35] Given the centrality of records as the benchmark for what constituted "real" history, access to official sources became of crucial importance for the nascent discipline of contemporary history.

Rothfels's essay therefore touched upon a profoundly bizarre situation that confronted practitioners of contemporary history during the 1950s: the pertinent German governmental records—documents relating to the Nazi Party, foreign relations, military affairs, and much more—had been confiscated in 1945 by the advancing Allied armies. They had since been kept under American and British control.[36] If these materials were to become available, contemporary historians would be in a position to employ the time-honored methods their colleagues espoused. Access to the paper trail of the defunct Nazi regime would then allow them to refute the charge that this recent era was not yet "ripe" for historical analysis. Over the course of the 1950s, the Munich Institute for Contemporary History thus entered the fray over access to the captured German records.[37] At the time of Rothfels's writing, however, access to

the "withheld" sources still appeared inconceivable any time soon. He therefore emphasized the abundance of material that had *remained* in Germany, advocated alternative methods such as interviewing key personalities, drew attention to the material that Allied war crimes trials had brought to light, and, out of sheer necessity, argued against a fetishization of government files, especially those created under a totalitarian regime.[38]

Rothfels's emphasis on the historian as witness was riddled with ambivalences, however, and was soon utilized to determine who could authoritatively speak about the recent German past. If the epistemological prerequisites for historical understanding were tied to personal experience, then only those who had lived through those times were in a position to analyze them. No medievalist or early modernist could afford to argue this way, but contemporary historians like Paul Kluke of the Institute for Contemporary History averred that the ability to truly *understand* "is perhaps granted only to those people who have had the dubious honor of personally living and suffering through the events, because a true understanding can only be purchased with the gravity of fate."[39] In the context of the 1950s, such comments were directed at German émigré and foreign historians who were thereby epistemologically and discursively excluded from the pursuit of German contemporary history.[40] Kluke addressed Americans and their wartime guests in particular, since they had lived "in the completely different circumstances of a free people." Their situation made them inherently unable to grasp "the utterly different preconditions of all decisions in National Socialist Germany."[41] Kluke actually shifted Rothfels's argument. Whereas Rothfels had argued for the benefits of temporal proximity, Kluke demanded that temporal proximity coincide with geographical presence. By policing the "club" of legitimate voices in German contemporary history in this way, non-German and émigré historians were left *ante portas*.

Ante portas was not a bad place to be. Just as the German people as a whole stood irreparably compromised in the eyes of the world, the German historical profession emerged from the Nazi era morally corrupted. It was not until the late 1990s that a debate about their intellectual and practical involvement in the Nazi dictatorship took place, a debate that interrogated the German historical profession's relationship to the nation-state, its role in the agitation against the Treaty of Versailles, and the anti-Slavic *Volkstumspolitik* of the Weimar era, as well as the racist, ableist, and antisemitic policies of the Nazi regime.[42] It is no coincidence that in his 1953 essay Rothfels emphasized the need for German historians to "catch up" with international research trends.[43] They had not simply fallen behind because of exogenous circumstances; they had maneuvered *themselves* into isolation. As the émigré historian Fritz Stern put it some fifty

years later, "when [. . .] Germany turned into a monstrous tyranny, we became the guardians of German history; from 1933 to 1945, German history was being written here [in the United States] and in England or not at all."[44] For nationally minded German historians, it was a profoundly alienating experience that they were no longer "alone" with their national history after the war. Their self-conception as the legitimate interpreters of German history now had to reckon with competing interpretations by historians from abroad who soon discussed German history with an authority derived from the use of the "currency" so valued by the historical profession at the time: the original source material. After teaching at American universities for eleven years, Rothfels himself embraced the idea that German contemporary history needed to be pursued in an "international framework."[45] The de facto internationalization of German historiography that got underway after 1945, however, unfolded not out of conviction but because the German historical profession had no choice.

The Art of Inaugurating

The *Vierteljahrshefte* were unusual in printing an inaugural manifesto. The *Journal of Contemporary History*, launched in London in 1966 by the German-Jewish émigré historians Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse, granted itself a mere three-page "editorial note" that was not even signed by its authors. Writing thirteen years after Rothfels, they found themselves in an altered landscape. Justifying the pursuit of contemporary history was no longer necessary: source material was available in abundance, and the chimera of objectivity was no longer used to disqualify the endeavor. Indeed, "the ideal of absolute objective truth in historical writing has been gradually abandoned in this century." Having thus discarded previous reservations against the field, Mosse and Laqueur defined the main purpose of their new journal as providing a venue for the study of twentieth-century Europe, since the field, they contended, had been marginalized by "current fashions" in the historical profession, namely the study of non-European world regions. It was thus not the temporal focus that needed justification in this journal, but the geographical position of "Europe [as] a legitimate subject of study and debate."[46]

The first issue of the *Journal of Contemporary History* nonetheless contained a lengthy reflection on contemporary history, penned not by the editors themselves but by the Oxford don E. Llewellyn Woodward, a historian of diplomatic relations.[47] To the sensibilities of readers in the present day, his piece stands out for its colonial arrogance and classist condescension. Woodward considered contemporary history well established by the mid-1960s. If

anything, there was already too much of it, especially in the United States, where scholars had become likely to neglect "the development of western civilization for a superficial study of the past of Africa and Asia." Woodward castigated this trend by deploring that "Timbuktu is assumed to be as significant as Athens in the history of human societies and a study of primitive tribal custom as valuable for the education of the young as Plato's *Republic*."[48] In terms of thematic focus, Woodward conceived of contemporary history as a study of wartime diplomacy and its top-level representatives, with Churchill at the center. The real innovation of the journal's first issue lay less in theorizing the field of contemporary history than in providing a platform for the new field of comparative fascism, the study of which became a signature strength of the *Journal of Contemporary History*.[49]

Around 1990, Mosse and Laqueur's periodical experienced not only an editorial succession crisis, but also a disorientation as to future direction of contemporary history after the fall of state socialism in Eastern Europe.[50] In 2004 the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung (ZZF—Center for Contemporary History) in Potsdam, by contrast, took the end of the Cold War as the very reason to begin a new journal, the *Studies in Contemporary History* (*Zeithistorische Forschungen*). If the *Vierteljahrshefte*, with its focus on National Socialism and the Federal Republic, hosted contemporary history 1.0, *Zeithistorische Forschungen* aimed to establish contemporary history 2.0, namely the history of the German Democratic Republic, the "asymmetrically entangled parallel history" (Christoph Kleßmann, the ZZF's founding director) of both German states, and forays into international contemporary history. *Zeithistorische Forschungen* thus pushed into a void that the *Vierteljahrshefte* failed to address. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the latter journal stayed close to its traditional profile and showed no rush to diversify its focus.[51]

The first issue of *Zeithistorische Forschungen* published no fewer than four articles reflecting on the practice of contemporary history.[52] Although none of them was elevated to the status of editorial, Konrad H. Jarausch's article comes closest to the scholarly profile the ZZF is associated with: the effort to integrate the postwar histories of East and West Germany.[53] The article followed on the heels of the race to historicize the "second German dictatorship" that had dominated the 1990s. Jarausch criticized the continued parallelism of West and East German history in which the history of the Federal Republic was presented as a success narrative, whereas the history of the GDR was framed as a predetermined failure.[54] To break out of this impasse, Jarausch advocated Christoph Kleßmann's focus on entanglements between East and West, an approach the ZZF has since developed into something of a trademark.[55]

Contemporary History, Continuously Rejuvenating

Rothfels's definition of contemporary history as the "epoch of contemporaries and its scholarly treatment" has proven enduring, most likely *because* it was never fully fleshed out with regard to content. The term *Zeitgeschichte* continues to enjoy wide currency in German scholarship, and, as intended, its timeframe continuously rejuvenates itself and moves forward with each new generation of scholars. The challenge of temporal proximity to the events under study is no longer a point of contention. Instead of engaging in historicist mental exercises intended to create an objectifying frame of analysis, the current generation of historians is more likely to constructively reflect on their positionality: how their own cultural, racial, gender, and political identities shape their questions, resources, assumptions, and relationship to the communities they study.[56] It is a reflection that had no currency yet at the time of the Friedländer-Broszat debate about the historicization of National Socialism in 1987.[57]

I offer a few concluding thoughts about current scholarship in contemporary history that are necessarily brief, highly selective, and inevitably subjective.

The history of the Nazi era remains a core competence at the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich, despite the fact that it has branched out into other fields and activities as well. The institute's book series and its flagship journal are still the go-to venues for new scholarship on Nazi society and the Holocaust.[58] From a critical edition of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* to a sixteen-volume source anthology on the persecution and murder of the European Jews, the institute also has the requisite funding to pursue basic research (*Grundlagenforschung*).[59] Through their publications and expertise the institute's scholars continue to provide academically validated knowledge for policy makers, the media, and civil society, and thereby make an important contribution to civic (memory) culture—at least to those who value it. The integration of East and West in German postwar history has also made great strides and moved beyond the clumsy beginnings when Jarausch was writing. Indeed, it has become an integral part of postwar history to a degree that recent works use it as an analytical frame as a matter of course and to great effect, as for instance in the legal histories by Sebastian Gehrig and Alexandria N. Ruble.[60]

Approaching contemporary history by topic, I would like to highlight three thematic fields that are currently going strong: environmental history, migration and mobility history, and the history of sexuality.

The field of environmental contemporary history (*Umweltzeitgeschichte*) began to take shape almost twenty years ago.[61] In the history of the GDR, it has made significant contributions to the protracted debate on how state and

societal actors negotiated environmental problems under the socialist dictatorship. These works also reframe the church-centered perspective on the East German opposition movement and thereby provide a fresh understanding of the revolution of 1989.[62] Since nature and pollutants obviously know no boundaries, environmental history also lends itself to perspectives on inter-German relations during the Cold War as yet another instance of inextricable entanglement between West and East.[63] Finally, energy history is booming and provides a strong link between contemporary history and pressing political concerns, a link that the discipline has always sought to forge.[64] It is to be expected that, going forward, energy historians will delve more deeply into the history of climate politics and diplomacy, a focus that is currently still underserved.[65]

Like environmental history, the field of migration and mobility history has gained significant traction over the past two decades and has further honed its conceptual tools for the analysis of migration regimes.[66] The historical reality of Germany as an immigration country may have eluded conservative politics well into the 1990s and beyond; however, no such denial hampered historians in exploring the lived experience of migrants in Germany, both workers and asylum seekers. These studies tend to focus on the *illiberal* side of liberal democracy[67] and deconstruct the patina of socialist brotherhood;[68] Anglophone scholarship in particular uses race as a category of analysis.[69] I highlight two books that throw this trend into relief: Lauren Stokes's *Fear of the Family* analyzes West German efforts to prevent immigration from southern Europe and Turkey after the recruitment ban of 1973, when labor migration progressed to the arrival of family members. Stokes examines the West German moral panic about the migrant family, the various bureaucratic schemes to prevent integration and access to the welfare state, and the responses of the migrants themselves to the efforts that sought to govern their family life.[70] Michelle Lynn Kahn's *Foreign in Two Homelands* adds a much-needed window onto Turkish discourses about labor migration to West Germany in the Turkish press and among those who stayed behind. The transnational lives that the migrants charted for themselves were keenly observed and constantly judged, turning private decisions into matters of national import. Those who lived in Germany and adapted to local culture were soon derided as *Almancı*: they were no longer "true" Turks. The second part of Kahn's book focuses on the anti-Turkish racism of the 1980s and the efforts of the Kohl government to incentivize Turkish migrants to return to Turkey.[71]

One of the currently most vibrant thematic fields in postwar German history is the history of sexuality. In a veritable explosion of productivity, schol-

ars have centered queer lives in both German states. Their works explore the continued legal discrimination and pathologization of homosexuality after the war.[72] They chart the ambivalences and contradictions of the legal, social, and cultural emancipation of queer men and women in ways that restore contingency to these processes.[73] Relying on the toolkit of the history of emotions, Benno Gammerl, for instance, explores the changing spaces and conditions of same-sex love in West Germany, and explains that ending state sanctions and gaining equal rights under the law did not necessarily translate into feelings of "freedom" and personal security as long as prejudice and social discrimination persisted.[74] Emancipation came with its own challenges as established subcultures vanished, and increased visibility exerted pressures and expectations on how to live a gay life. In keeping with analytical frameworks for postwar German history, these works also address the peculiar quality of queer lives in a divided country where the presence of another German state could provide leverage for gay activists through cross-border networks. They also show the AIDS epidemic as a *shared* experience.[75] Another body of work has queried the role of race and racism in queer and trans political movements.[76] Collectively, these studies do not fit into a postwar "progress" or "success" paradigm. Like the histories of migration, these new books place another question mark on the liberalization thesis of the early 2000s.[77]

The field of contemporary history is certainly still going strong, so much so that every now and then concerns resurface that contemporary themes dominate modern German history to the detriment of earlier periods.[78] Whether the field today is a contemporary history that Hans Rothfels would recognize and appreciate is indeterminable. Not only has the democratization of the discipline allowed to incorporate previously neglected themes and perspectives, it has also enabled it to approach the recent past in all its complexity. It is to be hoped that the field will continue on this trajectory of pluralization.

"Attemptamus"

Notes

1. Hans Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1, no. 1 (January 1953): 1–8. An English translation of Rothfels's article titled "The Task of Contemporary History" forms part of this volume.

2. Reinhart Koselleck, "Stetigkeit und Wandel aller Zeitgeschichten: Begriffsgeschichtliche Anmerkungen," in *Zeitschichten: Studien zur Historik*, ed. Reinhart Koselleck (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 2000), 246–64, here 251–52.

3. Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," 2 (page 14 in the English translation provided in this volume).

4. Christian Goeschel, Dominique K. Reill, and Lucy Riall, "Central European History in the Age of COVID-19," *Central European History* 54, no. 4 (December 2021): 670–95; Mary Lindemann, "The Historian and the Virus: A Time Capsule from Mid-March," *Perspectives on History* 58, no. 5 (May 2020); Peter Alagona et al., "Reflections: Environmental History in the Era of COVID-19," *Environmental History* 25, no. 4 (October 2020): 595–686.

5. Biographical data based on Jan Eckel, *Hans Rothfels: Eine intellektuelle Biographie im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005).

6. Ibid.

7. Part of the debate was conducted between Heinrich August Winkler and Ingo Haar in the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* in 2001 and 2002. The debate was continued in a forum, "Hans Rothfels und die Zeitgeschichte," hosted by the online venue HSozKult in 2003 (https://www.hsozkult.de/debate/id/fddebate-132041) and a conference marking the fiftieth anniversary of the *Vierteljahrshefte* in 2003. See Johannes Hürter and Hans Woller, eds., *Hans Rothfels und die deutsche Zeitgeschichte* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005).

8. Iggers, cited in Nicolas Berg, *The Holocaust and the West German Historians: Historical Interpretation and Autobiographical Memory*, trans. Joel Golb (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015), 91.

9. In 1955 Dietrich Gerhard (1896–1985) accepted a chair in American history at Cologne while retaining his teaching position in St. Louis.

10. Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler: An Appraisal* (Hinsdale, IL: H. Regnery, 1948).

11. Berg, *Holocaust and the West German Historians*, 82.

12. "Sie [würden] umringt sein von verletzten Ehrgeizen und beleidigten Leberwürsten, von anderen Ressentiments ganz zu schweigen. Der come back ist stärker als Sie sich auf Grund der Eindrücke vor 2 Jahren denken können." Hans Rothfels to Ernst Posner, November 20, 1951, box 2, Posner Papers, Record Group 200, National Archives and Records Administration. On resentments against emigrants, see also Eckel, *Rothfels*, 232–33.

13. Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," 2: "Epoche der Mitlebenden und ihre wissenschaftliche Behandlung." (The quote is on page 14 of the English translation provided in this volume).

14. See also Koselleck, "Stetigkeit und Wandel," 246: the concept "can always be replenished in terms of content, always depending on what is experienced and defined as contemporary history" at any given time.

15. Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," 6–7 (page 19 in the English translation provided in this volume).

16. There is a similar observation in Andreas Wirsching, "'Epoche der Mitlebenden'—Kritik der Epoche," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 8, no. 1 (2011): 150–55, here 151. On German historians after 1918, see Bernd Faulenbach, "Nach der Niederlage: Zeitgeschichtliche Fragen und apologetische Tendenzen in der Historiographie der Weimarer Zeit," in *Geschichtsschreibung als Legitimationswissenschaft 1918–1945*, ed. Peter Schöttler (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1997), 31–51; Holger H. Herwig, "Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War," in *Forging the Collective Memory: Government and International Historians through Two World Wars*, ed. Keith Wilson (New York:

Berghahn Books, 1996), 87–127. For context, Annika Mombauer, "Guilt or Responsibility? The Hundred-Year Debate on the Origins of World War I," *Central European History* 48, no. 4 (December 2015): 541–64.

17. Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," 8 (page 20 in the English translation provided in this volume).

18. Wirsching, "'Epoche der Mitlebenden,'" 153. On the complexities of the Gerstein Report as such and Rothfels's edition of it, see Valerie Hébert, "Hans Rothfels, Kurt Gerstein and the Report: A Retrospective," in "Holocaust and Memory in Europe," *German Yearbook of Contemporary History* 1 (2016): 85–105.

19. Hermann L. Brill, head of the State Chancellery of Hesse, July 7, 1948, cited in Astrid M. Eckert, *The Struggle for the Files: The Western Allies and the Return of German Archives after the Second World War*, trans. Dona Geyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 334.

20. On the protracted and highly political founding of the institute, see Magnus Brechtken, "Die Gründungswege des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte—eine Aktualisierung," in *Aufarbeitung des Nationalsozialismus: Ein Kompendium*, ed. Magnus Brechtken (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2021), 61–101, an English translation of Brechtken's article appears in this volume titled "Muddled Roads to Establishing the Institute for Contemporary History: An Update"; Sebastian Conrad, *Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Nation: Geschichtsschreibung in Westdeutschland und Japan 1945–1960* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 228–32, 237–38; Christoph Cornelißen, *Gerhard Ritter: Geschichtswissenschaft und Politik im 20. Jahrhundert* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2001), 533–45; Eckert, *Struggle for the Files*, 334–43.

21. Gabriele Metzler, *Der Staat der Historiker: Staatsvorstellungen deutscher Historiker seit 1945* (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2018), 120.

22. Eckel, *Rothfels*, 227.

23. Frank Bajohr, "Holocaustforschung—Entwicklungslinien in Deutschland seit 1945," in Brechtken, *Aufarbeitung des Nationalsozialismus*, 122–42; Berg, *Holocaust and the West German Historians*, 189–230; René Schlott, "Ablehnung und Anerkennung: Raul Hilberg und das Institut für Zeitgeschichte," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 69, no. 1 (2021): 85–119, (see the English translation in this volume titled "Rejection and Recognition: Raul Hilberg and the Institute for Contemporary History"); Klaus Kempter, *Joseph Wulf: Ein Historikerschicksal in Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 192–95, 259–67, 352–55.

24. Roth, cited in Berg, *Holocaust and the West German Historians*, 77. See also Karl-Heinz Roth, "'Richtung halten': Hans Rothfels und die neo-konservative Geschichtsschreibung diesseits und jenseits des Atlantik," *Sozial.Geschichte* 18, no. 1 (2003): 41–71.

25. Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," 3, 4 (pages 15, 16 in the English translation provided in this volume).

26. I have addressed the objections to contemporary history during the 1950s in previous publications. The following paragraphs reference Eckert, *Struggle for the Files*, 332–34 and passim, and Eckert, "The Transnational Beginnings of West German *Zeitgeschichte* in the 1950s," *Central European History* 40, no. 1 (March 2007): 63–87.

27. Koselleck, "Stetigkeit und Wandel," 249, dismisses this objection and concludes: "Every history is contemporary history, and every history was, is, and will be: history of

the present." For arguments against contemporary history, see Conrad, *Verlorene Nation*, 220–21.

28. "Historical News: The New York Meeting, 1951," *American Historical Review* 57, no. 3 (1952): 795–850, here 799. Rothfels cited this meeting twice in his short essay.

29. Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," 4 (page 17 in the English translation provided in this volume).

30. Ibid., 6 (page 18 in the English translation provided in this volume). See also Paul Kluke, "Aufgaben und Methoden zeitgeschichtlicher Forschung," *Europa-Archiv* 10 (1955): 7429–38, here 7432: "The reliving becomes even more intense, vivid, [and] convincing the closer we are to the era we want to portray."

31. On Hashagen, see Klaus Große Kracht, "Kriegsschuldfrage und zeithistorische Forschung in Deutschland: Historiographische Nachwirkungen des Ersten Weltkriegs," *Zeitgeschichte-online* (May 2004), https://zeitgeschichte-online.de/themen/kriegsschuldfrage-und-zeithistorische-forschung-deutschland. The similarities between Hashagen's appeal for contemporary history and Rothfels's short essay are striking.

32. Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," 4, 5 (pages 16, 18 in the English translation provided in this volume).

33. Ibid., 5: "Geschichte [ist] eben kein wertfreies Gegenüber." (In the English translation the quote can be found on page 17.)

34. On the Hegelian understanding of, and focus on, the state among German historians, see Metzler, *Der Staat der Historiker*, 16–28.

35. Rassow, cited in Conrad, *Verlorene Nation*, 227.

36. Eckert, *Struggle for the Files*.

37. Ibid., 334–57.

38. Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," 3–4, term "withheld" on p. 5 (pages 15–17 in the English translation provided in this volume).

39. Kluke, "Aufgaben und Methoden," 7437. Similarly, Fritz Ernst, "Blick auf Deutschland: Ausländische Stimmen zur neuesten deutschen Geschichte," *Die Welt als Geschichte* 10 (1955): 192–212, here 193, 207. Paul Kluke (1908–90) served as the director of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte from 1953 until 1959 and became the founding director of the German Historical Institute in London in 1975. For a short biography of Kluke, see Astrid M. Eckert, *Kampf um die Akten. Die Westalliierten und die Rückgabe von deutschem Archivgut nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2003), 404–5.

40. Berg, *Holocaust and the West German Historians*, 83–84; Conrad, *Verlorene Nation*, 238–41; Anna Corsten, *Unbequeme Erinnerer: Emigrierte Historiker in der westdeutschen und US-amerikanischen NS- und Holocaust-Forschung 1945–1998* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2023), 111–13.

41. Kluke, "Aufgaben und Methoden," 7437.

42. The literature on this debate is vast, and research on individual historians, archivists, and other academics in the humanities during National Socialism has grown immensely. Focusing on the 1998 debate at the biannual meeting of the German Historical Association, a place to start is Winfried Schulze and Otto Gerhard Oexle, eds., *Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1999); Peter Schöttler, ed., *Geschichtsschreibung als Legitimationswissenschaft 1918–1945* (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1999); Rüdiger

Hohls and Konrad H. Jarausch, eds., *Versäumte Fragen: Deutsche Historiker im Schatten des Nationalsozialismus* (Stuttgart: DVA, 2000); Ingo Haar and Michael Fahlbusch, *German Scholars and Ethnic Cleansing, 1920–1945* (New York: Berghahn, 2004).

43. Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," 3, 7 (pages 15, 19 in the English translation provided in this volume).

44. Fritz Stern, "German History in America, 1884–1984," *Central European History* 19, no. 2 (June 1986): 131–163, here 132.

45. Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," 7 (page 19 in the English translation provided in this volume). On the occasion of the journal's twenty-fifth anniversary, an editorial reminded readers of Rothfels's call to catch up with international research trends and praised it(self) for having done so successfully. See Karl Dietrich Bracher and Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Zur Einführung," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 26, no. 1 (January 1978): 1–8, here 1.

46. "Editorial Note," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, no. 1 (1966): iii–vi. For a history of the journal, see Richard J. Evans, "The *Journal of Contemporary History* and Its Editors," *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 4 (October 2015): 710–37.

47. Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," 6, note 7, had quoted Woodward to make the point that the contemporary historian as a witness of the times was in a better position to "understand basic matters that leave no record." (The quote is on page 21 of the English translation provided in this volume).

48. E. Llewellyn Woodward, "The Study of Contemporary History," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, no. 1 (1966): 1–13, here 3.

49. Evans, "*Journal of Contemporary History*," 715–16.

50. Ibid., 722.

51. Ulrich Herbert, "70 Jahre *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*: Laudatio auf der VfZ-Festveranstaltung am 12. Januar 2023 in München," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 71, no. 3 (July 2023): 641–52, here 645–47.

52. *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 1, no. 1 (2004), https://zeithistorische-forschungen.de/1-2004.

53. Konrad H. Jarausch, "'Die Teile als Ganzes erkennen': Zur Integration der beiden deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichten," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 1, no. 1 (2004): 10–30.

54. Ibid., 13.

55. Frank Bösch, ed., *A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s*, trans. Jennifer Walcoff Neuheiser (New York: Berghahn, 2018).

56. Christoph Kalter, "Wie bestimmt die Distanz zum Untersuchungsgegenstand den Forschungsprozess?," *Zeitgeschichte-online* (April 2023), https://zeitgeschichte-online.de/themen/christoph-kalter-teil-6-wie-bestimmt-die-distanz-zum-untersuchungsgegenstand-den.

57. Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer, "Um die 'Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus.' Ein Briefwechsel," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 36, no. 2 (1988): 339–72.

58. See, for instance, the research cluster on private lives during National Socialism on the institute's website (accessed June 17, 2024, https://www.ifz-muenchen.de/aktuelles/aus-dem-institut/artikel/das-private-im-nationalsozialismus) and Elizabeth Harvey et al., eds., *Private Life and Privacy in Nazi Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

59. Christian Hartmann et al., eds., *Hitler, Mein Kampf: Eine kritische Edition*, 2 vols.

(Munich: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 2016); Susanne Heim et al., eds., *The Persecution and Murder of the European Jews by Nazi Germany, 1933–1945*, 16 vols. (Munich: Walter de Gruyter, 2019–23), https://pmj-documents.org/.

60. Sebastian Gehrig, *Legal Entanglements: Law, Rights and the Battle for Legitimacy in Divided Germany, 1945–1989* (New York: Berghahn, 2021); Alexandria N. Ruble, *Entangled Emancipation: Women's Rights in Cold War Germany* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2023). For a recent overview of "entangled" histories, see Frank Wolff, "In der Teilung vereint: Neue Literatur zur deutsch-deutschen Teilungsgeschichte," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 58 (2018): 353–91, here 367–77.

61. Jens Ivo Engels, "Umweltgeschichte als Zeitgeschichte," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 13 (2006): 32–38; Melanie Arndt, "Umweltgeschichte, Version 3.0," *Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte*, last modified November 10, 2015, http://docupedia.de/zg/Arndt_umweltgeschichte_v3_de_2015.

62. Julia E. Ault, *Saving Nature under Socialism: Transnational Environmentalism in East Germany, 1968–1990* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021); Thomas Fleischman, *Communist Pigs: An Animal History of East Germany's Rise and Fall* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2020); Tobias Huff, *Natur und Industrie im Sozialismus: Eine Umweltgeschichte der DDR* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015); Christian Möller, *Umwelt und Herrschaft in der DDR: Politik, Protest und die Grenzen der Partizipation in der Diktatur* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019); Martin Stief, *"Stellt die Bürger ruhig:" Staatsicherheit und Umweltzerstörung im Chemierevier Halle-Bitterfeld* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019).

63. Astrid M. Eckert, *West Germany and the Iron Curtain: Environment, Economy, and Culture in the Borderlands* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019); Sophie Lange, *Deutsch-deutsche Umweltpolitik 1970–1990: Eine Verflechtungsgeschichte im internationalen und gesellschaftlichen Kontext des Kalten Krieges* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2023); Frank Uekötter, "Entangled Ecologies: Outlines of a Green History of Two or More Germanys," in Bösch, *History Shared and Divided*, 147–90.

64. Dolores L. Augustine, *Taking on Technocracy: Nuclear Power in Germany, 1945 to the Present* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2018); Sophie Gerber, *Küche, Kühlschrank, Kilowatt: Zur Geschichte des privaten Energiekonsums in Deutschland, 1945–1990* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2015); Rüdiger Graf, *Oil and Sovereignty: Petro-Knowledge and Energy Policy in the United States and Western Europe in the 1970s*, trans. Alex Skinner (New York: Berghahn, 2018); Jonas Kreienbaum, *Das Öl und der Kampf um eine Neue Weltwirtschaftsordnung: Die Bedeutung der Ölkrisen der 1970er Jahre für die Nord-Süd-Beziehungen* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2022); Felix Lieb, *Arbeit und Umwelt? Die Umwelt- und Energiepolitik der SPD zwischen Ökologie und Ökonomie 1969–1998* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2022); Eva Oberloskamp, *Energie, Ökologie, Markt: Bundesdeutsche und britische Neuansätze in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, forthcoming 2025); Henning Türk, *Treibstoff der Systeme: Kohle, Erdöl und Atomkraft im geteilten Deutschland* (Berlin: Bebra, 2021). For an overview, see Rüdiger Graf, "Energy History and Histories of Energy: Version 1.0," *Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte*, last modified August 29, 2023, https://docupedia.de/zg/graf_energy_history_v1_en_2023.

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67. Quinn Slobodian, "The Borders of the *Rechtsstaat* in the Arab Autumn: Deportation and Law in West Germany, 1972/73," *German History* 31, no. 2 (2013): 204–24; Patrice G. Poutrous, *Umkämpftes Asyl: Vom Nachkriegsdeutschland bis in die Gegenwart* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2019).

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71. Michelle Lynn Kahn, *Foreign in Two Homelands: Racism, Return Migration, and Turkish German History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2024).

72. Nadine Drönner, *Das Homosexuellen-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts aus rechtshistorischer Perspektive* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2020); Steff Kunz and Karen Nolte, "Lesbische* Frauen* in einer westdeutschen Psychiatrie in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren," *Zeitgeschichte-online* (June 2023), https://zeitgeschichte-online.de/themen/lesbische-frauen-einer-westdeutschen-psychiatrie-den-ersten-nachkriegsjahren.

73. Jennifer V. Evans, *The Queer Art of History: Queer Kinship after Fascism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2023); Craig Griffiths, *The Ambivalence of Gay Liberation: Male Homosexual Politics in 1970s West Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021); Samuel Clowes Huneke, *States of Liberation: Gay Men between Dictatorship and Democracy in Cold War Germany* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2022); W. Jake Newsome, *Pink Triangle Legacies: Coming Out in the Shadow of the Holocaust* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2022); Michael Mayer and Michael Schwartz, eds., *Verfolgung—Diskriminierung—Emanzipation: Homosexualität(en) in Deutschland und Europa 1945 bis 2000* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2023).

74. Benno Gammerl, *anders fühlen: Schwules und lesbisches Leben in der Bundesrepublik; Eine Emotionsgeschichte* (Munich: Hanser, 2021).

75. Huneke, *States of Liberation*; Andrea Rottmann, *Queer Lives across the Wall: Desire and Danger in Divided Berlin, 1945–1970* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2023); Teresa Tammer, *"Warme Brüder" im Kalten Krieg: Die DDR-Schwulenbewegung und das geteilte Deutschland in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2023); Johanna Folland, "'Not Even the Highest Wall Can Stop AIDS': Expertise and Viral Politics at the German-German Border," *Central European History* 56, no. 2 (June 2023): 255–69.

76. Laurie Marhoefer, "Was the Homosexual Made White? Race, Empire, and Analogy in Gay and Trans Thought in Twentieth-Century Germany," *Gender & History* 31, no. 1 (March 2019): 91–114; Laurie Marhoefer, *Racism and the Making of Gay Rights: A Sexologist, His Student, and the Empire of Queer Love* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2022); Christopher B. Ewing, *The Color of Desire: Untangling Race and Sex in German Queer Politics since 1970* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023).

77. Ulrich Herbert, "Liberalisierung als Lernprozeß: Die Bundesrepublik in der deutschen Geschichte—eine Skizze," in *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland: Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945–1980*, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), 7–49. On the role of the success paradigm, see Frank Biess and Astrid M. Eckert, "Introduction: Why Do We Need New Narratives for the History of the Federal Republic?," *Central European History* 52, no. 1 (March 2019): 1–18; Claudia C. Gatzka, "Berlin ist nicht Bonn ist nicht Weimar: Die deutschen Republiken im politischen Deutungskampf," in *Erinnerungskämpfe: Neues deutsches Geschichtsbewusstsein*, ed. Jürgen Zimmerer (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2023), 414–31, here 425–29.

78. David Blackbourn, "Honey, I Shrunk German History," *German Studies Association Newsletter* 38, no. 2 (2013): 44–53; Karen Hagemann and Simone Lässig, "Introduction: The Shifting Space of the Nineteenth Century in European History," *Central European History* 51, no. 4 (December 2018): 611–17.

Muddled Roads to Establishing the Institute for Contemporary History

An Update

MAGNUS BRECHTKEN

The motives behind, and decisive steps leading to, the founding of the Institute for Contemporary History must be reevaluated in light of a broader and deeper analysis of the relevant sources. The institute came into being as the result of the desire for enlightenment and a coming to terms with the past on the part of politicians and politically engaged civil servants. They were convinced of the necessity of creating a research institution that was as independent as possible from the feudalism of university-based history departments and the ideological influence of existing historical institutions. The founding of the new institute thus inevitably generated disagreement over its mission and personnel. The question of funding was also a source of controversy for many years and was finally resolved through an act of political will.

The founding of the Institute for Research on the History of National Socialism is one of those duties of the state, which, if not fulfilled, would call into question the purpose of the entire state apparatus.
(Hermann Brill, August 7, 1948)[1]

Funding is the project's sticking point. It always has been and always will be.
(*Der Spiegel*, April 23, 1949)[2]

Introduction

To date, there has not been a full academic account of the history of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ—Institute for Contemporary History). It is a desideratum that has been pointed out repeatedly.[3] Overviews have been published over the decades, providing useful findings and up-to-date information. Presentations made by the institute's directors in the 1950s and 1960s to introduce the institute to the public are another source of this kind and have been barely

studied. If one reads them today, several things are striking: they present the institute's evolving understanding of itself; they reflect the parameters of the historiographical Zeitgeist; and they evince a growing confidence in the validity of the institute's role in the research landscape.[4] Anglo-American historians likewise observed the delicate seedling of a new type of establishment in the young Federal Republic of Germany.[5] John Gimbel's "outsider's" perspective on the institute's origins from 1945 to 1949[6] provides several reliable summaries of the arguments of the time based on the minutes of sessions of the Länderrat (Council of the Federal States) and other important meetings. However, his perspective lacks focus and barely touches on the range of sources available at the time.[7]

When Hellmuth Auerbach wrote his still impressive 1970 overview of the period leading up to the signing of the institute's founding deeds in September 1950, he had access to a large portion of the information and documents that dominated how these years were viewed over the two decades following the institute's inception.[8] His description can still serve as an important guide, even if certain persons and opinions were later evaluated differently, as will be shown. Further aspects of the institute's founding history, including some new source references, can be found in Winfried Schulze's synopsis of recent German history, published under the title *Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945* in 1989.[9] Finally, the most extensive recent overview of the institute's history is to be found in the publication marking its fiftieth anniversary in 1999 by its then director, Horst Möller, who updated it ten years later for the institute's sixtieth anniversary.[10] Using Auerbach's account as a basis, Möller sketches the initial years primarily in terms of the prevailing atmosphere, supplemented by succinct résumés of the most important protagonists. He also includes some important new sources on contemporary historiography. However, the associative leaps in the presentation distract from a review of the motives, arguments, and interests that were of central importance for the decision-making process from 1945/47 to 1952, as well as from the debates about the institute's orientation during this phase. As will be shown, motives have always been entangled with the sometimes tentative, sometimes rapid developments in the political history of the Federal Republic of Germany and should therefore be viewed in relation to it.

It seems remarkable how historiographical interest in the institute specifically has continued to play a minor role in the larger interpretative discourse on German contemporary history. In the discussions of the 1990s concerning the role of historiography in National Socialism—most memorably at the Frankfurt Historians' Conference in September 1998—the Institute for Con-

temporary History was barely mentioned.[11] The discussion about Hans Rothfels represented an exception because it was actively taken up by the institute.[12] Yet in the past two decades, interest in the institute has barely increased. Two important exceptions are worth mentioning: Nicolas Berg's broad study of the Holocaust and West German historians,[13] and Klaus Kempter's biography of Joseph Wulf.[14] However, when they discuss the institute, they focus primarily on the phase after the actual process of foundation. More recently, the Institute for Contemporary History has featured as a prominent secondary topic in several research projects with other focuses.[15] An open discussion of the institute took place in fall 2017 when it co-organized an event to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the death of Raul Hilberg. On that occasion the historian Götz Aly focused on two expert reports written at the institute in 1963/64 and 1980, both of which spoke out against a German translation of Hilberg's most important work, *The Destruction of the European Jews*. The first report had already been known to researchers, while Aly unearthed the second, with the aid of institute employees, among the papers of Ino Arndt.[16] What all the texts, including the most recent English-language overview of the years 1949 to 1958,[17] have in common is that they present snapshots, to which they, in some cases, attach an exaggerated significance. The same can also be said of the early links between the institute's employees and the so-called Gehlen Organization, an intelligence agency established in Germany in 1946 by the US occupation authorities.[18] The duration and impact of these relationships has been studied superficially at best. Integrating such understandably sharply focused studies into the broader research literature in a way that allows for a fair assessment of the institute's history is a task that has yet to be undertaken.

These brief comments establish why the reasons for the foundation of the institute need to be reinterpreted and, in many cases, evaluated differently. Furthermore, the documented conflicts between historians, on the one hand, and politicians and high-level civil servants (politische Beamte), on the other, provide insights that enhance our general understanding of the founding history of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The following analysis focuses on the immediate postwar period until the beginning of the 1950s. It arranges the available documents and more recent analyses into a synopsis, which deliberately allows the voices of the time to speak clearly so that their influence becomes more visible. It ends before the conflicts of the year 1951, which arose following the change in leadership from Gerhard Kroll to Hermann Mau and the scandal caused by Gerhard Ritter concerning Hitler's so-called "table talk." At this point the institute's formal foundation gave way to a discussion about its internal mission.[19]

Political Realism vs. an Uncritical Harking Back to Tradition

It should be stated from the outset that the Institute for Contemporary History was not founded by historians. It arose from the conviction among some politicians and high-level civil servants that before 1945 the majority of German historians had functioned neither as self-reflecting and independent intellectuals nor as representatives of a democratic research culture, but rather as mandarins of German nationalism. It is a known fact that leading historians of the 1920s regarded their professional ethos and their academic responsibility as helping their nation-state to establish new authority, political greatness, and historical purity.[20] A consensus therefore formed around a rejection of the Treaty of Versailles. Major academic endeavors, such as the document collection *Die große Politik der europäischen Kabinette* (The High Politics of the European Cabinets) and publications on the issue of war guilt were primarily intended to prove the innocence of the Reich, contrary to the terms of the treaty's Article 231, and to justify calls to revise its geographic, economic, financial, and cultural consequences. After 1933, moreover, hardly a single historian spoke out independently against National Socialism. Many of them served the regime as researchers within the framework of the new Zeitgeist and as hangers-on and supporters.

After 1945 this situation fueled the ambitions of political decision-makers interested in history to urgently find alternatives to this kind of legitimizing scholarship. Leading postwar politicians' distrust of traditional historiography was, therefore, rooted in beliefs that had an enduring influence on the foundation history of the Institute for Contemporary History.

The motives for, and purposes behind, founding such an institute appeared thoroughly clear to the stakeholders who were instrumental between 1947 and 1951. However, the preferred form of the institute remained vague for a long time. The proposals at the time can be roughly categorized into three options: (1) a documentation center, (2) an institute for historical and political information and educational publications, or (3) a research institute endowed with independence over selection of academic topics (whereby the question whether the academic management should be internal or external was controversial). The assumed duration of the mission also remained contentious. A time limitation stipulating dissolution after ten years was seriously considered. Although it was the third model, that of an institute with an academic focus and internal self-management, that eventually became established, this was by no means clear from the outset; nor indeed was the institute's status as a permanent institution. Rather, this was the result of contentious processes lasting

several years, during which the issues of internal direction and the selection of research topics were always closely linked to the question of funding.

The politicians and high-level civil servants who campaigned between 1946 and 1951 for the creation of the institute (for example, Hermann Brill, Theodor Heuss, Rudolf Holzhausen, Gerhard Kroll, Anton Pfeiffer, Dieter Sattler, and Walter Strauß) were united in the belief that the Nazi period needed to be treated differently than previous eras of German history. Openly or implicitly, a skeptical regard for many of their contemporaries frequently resonated in their reasoning. They knew that the crimes of the Nazi regime were much more widely known than people wanted to keep in their communicative memory after 1945. As Konrad Adenauer remarked soberly on February 23, 1946, in a letter to his friend, Pastor Bernhard Custodis: "The German people" allowed themselves to be co-opted (*gleichgeschaltet*) "almost without resistance, even with enthusiasm in some cases [. . .]. That is where their guilt lies." He added that although people did not know all the details of the concentration camps, it was clear to everyone

> that personal freedom and all legal principles had been stomped on, that terrible atrocities had been committed in the concentration camps, that the Gestapo, our SS, and some of our troops in Poland and Russia had committed unprecedented atrocities against the civilian population. The anti-Jewish pogroms of 1933 and 1938 took place in full public view. The hostage murders in France were officially announced by us. So people really cannot claim the public did not know that the National Socialist government and the military leadership were constantly infringing natural law, the Hague Convention, and the simplest laws of humanity as a matter of principle.[21]

This was a fundamentally different position to the one being circulated by leading German historians, which will be addressed in detail below. Gerhard Ritter was the leading figure to exemplify this attitude. He saw National Socialism in Germany as a "phenomenon" that had amazed the country by its elevation to power. "The Germans themselves were more surprised than anyone else by the rapid rise of the National Socialist Party to a position in which overall power in the state was at its disposal."[22] It was as if the Third Reich had appeared like an unforeseen accident. Adenauer, by contrast, in a speech given at the University of Cologne on March 24, 1946, argued that "National Socialism would not have been able to rise to power if it had not found soil prepared for its poisonous seed in large segments of the population. I emphasize, in large segments of the population."[23] In a literary vein, Hermann Hesse

boiled the problem down to the weaknesses of political understanding in the "German" character: "A great, an important people, the Germans, who can deny it? Salt of the earth perhaps. But as a political nation—impossible."[24]

The desire to understand history had already formed the basis for analyses of the causes and consequences of National Socialism formulated during the war and shortly afterward by observers and visitors from abroad.[25] "The Germans have clearly still not learned anything," Inge Deutschkron complained on November 11, 1945 to her father, who had fled to England. Looking back, she described her perception that

> at that time, the majority of Germans did not want to hear the truth about the dreadful crimes. They took little notice of the war crimes trials, about which all the newspapers were publishing in-depth reports. According to surveys, they believed that as a result of the bombings, forced displacement, and hunger, they had suffered as much as the victims of the concentration camps. In conversations the impression was given that the NSDAP had been the largest underground movement in Germany. [. . .] "Any Jewish person still living here and many of our friends have a single goal, and that is to turn their backs on Germany as soon as possible," so I wrote to my father. My mother added that in her opinion the Germans would never learn. "Political maturity is still in the very distant future, insofar as you can speak of goodwill at all."[26]

In a lecture at the Hamburg Press Club in September 1946, Axel Springer stated that "Nazism [. . .] has not been swept away by an intellectual uprising [. . .] but by the airplanes and tanks of the Allies."[27] And, he went on, "The vanquished party is not convinced without further ado." Rather, he said, it was the task of the press, radio, and political parties "to use education to convince the masses of why Germany ended up running into this defeat and what consequences would naturally result from it."[28]

The same sense of a radical challenge, which these examples illustrate, was also found in the political circles that drove the foundation of the institute in the years that followed. Baed on the perception that most Germans were seeking actively to avoid addressing the criminal aspects of their own past, the wish grew for an office that would confront repression and silence with research-based education. The minister-president of Hesse, Christian Stock, made it clear that scholars had "done Germany a political disservice,"[29] and his state secretary, Hermann Brill, said at the first Advisory Board meeting that through the institute "German academia should be given the opportunity

to rehabilitate itself on the international stage in order to regain the world's respect."[30]

There is a remarkable overlap between the people who helped draft the German Basic Law and those who had an instrumental influence on the foundation and securing of the institute. Hermann Brill was a member of the Constitutional Convention on Herrenchiemsee, while Ludwig Bergsträsser, Theodor Heuss, Gerhard Kroll, Anton Pfeiffer, and Walter Strauß were members of the Parliamentary Council.[31] Brill and Pfeiffer as state secretaries in Hesse and Bavaria, respectively, took on key roles in the formation of the institute, Kroll was appointed as its first general secretary, and Bergsträsser and Heuss were active as members of the Academic Advisory Board. As federal president, Heuss was instrumental in campaigning for the participation of the federal government. Walter Strauß, as state secretary in Hesse and then in the Justice Ministry in Bonn, was an influential observer on the institute's boards for over a decade.

Foundation Proposals, Lessons from History, and the Importance of Individuals

There are two distinct periods of the foundation process of the Institute for Contemporary History. The first phase runs from the end of 1945, when vague proposals were circulating, through the specific negotiations starting in 1947, to the creation of the "Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics" with a founding deed dated October 7, 1947. The signatories were the minister-presidents of Bavaria, Hesse, and Württemberg-Baden and the president of the Bremen Senate.[32] Dieter Sattler and Anton Pfeiffer from Bavaria, as well as Hermann Brill and later Walter Strauß from Hesse, were central actors during this phase.[33] By the end of 1945, Sattler had already suggested to the Bavarian State Chancellery that it "make the party files (including the central register of the National Socialist Party) stored in the American 'collecting point' for seized Nazi cultural artifacts the basis for establishing an institute for research on National Socialism."[34]

The actual governing body of the new institute was initially an advisory board that met on October 17 and November 25, 1947 in the Bavarian State Ministry under the leadership of Anton Pfeiffer. At the second meeting it discussed nine members of an "Academic Advisory Board" who were to be appointed from 1948.[35] Pfeiffer expressed the hope that the institute would be funded in such a way that "after the currency reform it will be able to survive

without state grants." Hermann Brill, state secretary of the Hesse SPD, was skeptical.[36] For 1948 a sum between 180,000 and 200,000 Reichsmarks had been agreed upon. Württemberg-Baden, Bavaria, and Hesse were each to pay 64,000 Reichsmarks, and Bremen would pay the rest.[37] Theodor Eschenburg was considered for the position of executive chairman.[38] It was above all the financial insecurity that made 1948 a time of uncertainty and that reopened the question of actually establishing the institute.[39] In April 1948 a draft budget plan was submitted; however, the currency reform in the three Western occupation zones on June 20, 1948 meant the end of this budget and a general turning point.

It was against this background that Hermann Brill wrote in an urgent tone on August 7, 1948 to his CSU colleague Pfeiffer, saying that, at its last meeting, the Advisory Board had "considered constituting the Academic Advisory Board and electing the academic director at the start of 1948." But he wrote that these goals had not yet been implemented. Brill continued:

> I completely understand in terms of psychology that there are people who honor the notion that in order to secure the currency and finance, all other non-essential governmental tasks must be shelved. But in my experience essential tasks are primarily understood to be the preservation of the apparatus, rather than forward-looking tasks related to the present. The founding of the Institute for Research on the History of National Socialism is a government task that, if not fulfilled, would call into question the purpose of the whole state apparatus. To claim under these circumstances that there are not even the resources to pay the travel costs for a meeting of the Academic Advisory Board means that the establishment of a democratic state in Germany is in extreme danger.[40]

Brill urged Pfeiffer, as the chairman of the Advisory Board, to act:

> In my opinion it is necessary to discuss the existence of the institute again at Länderrat level as soon as possible in order to create a new financial basis. Furthermore, it appears advisable to me to review who could be appointed as academic director; and finally, I believe that the Advisory Board should have the courage to entrust a suitable public official to provisionally assume the duties of the academic director, even without the Academic Advisory Board. I do not believe it is either advisable or useful to transfer the whole matter to the bizonal administration or to wait until the new state order in West Germany has been established, which would undoubtedly have to incorporate the large amount

of preliminary work that has been carried out in the American occupation zone.[41]

In order to understand what the search for a "suitable public official" meant, this article will focus on Rudolf Holzhausen, who has hitherto remained largely unnoticed, despite numerous references to him in the sources. When Brill wrote to Pfeiffer, Holzhausen had already repeatedly drafted his thoughts on a historiography of National Socialism, which were discussed in the context of the institute's foundation.[42]

Rudolf Holzhausen

The surviving documents reveal an astounding historiographical failure to notice Holzhausen.[43] Born in 1889, Holzhausen, a lawyer, served in World War I as a Prussian regular officer. He joined the Foreign Office in 1919 and was pensioned off by the National Socialist state in 1934.[44] On October 14, 1945, he was appointed senior government official (*Oberregierungsrat*) in the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior and quickly climbed the career ladder as a politically unobjectionable public official. On July 19, 1945, he wrote to an unnamed editor-in-chief[45] about the political situation and drafted a program for the reconstitution of German society. There he advocated "a re-education of the people" designed to develop a "political sense of responsibility and an awareness of reality." "Initially our nation must gaze into the mirror of its past, must see it in the cold light of day, must see the errors that were made."[46] People distrust anything that comes from the victorious powers, he went on, and that is why the "demystification of history must come from the Germans themselves." For this reason

> it is appropriate to establish a *German research and education committee*, which should examine the impact of Nazism in an objective manner, starting from World War I, and show the nation just what kind of leadership it elected and the fatal errors it made.

The findings were to be disseminated "in books, presentations, radio, and films. Special educational work was to be carried out in schools and universities, among civil servants, and in political parties." "Special caution" should be exercised "in the selection of historians," he said.[47]

By the time he repeated these proposals on October 7, 1946, Holzhausen had risen to become a senior ministerial councilor and representative of the Bavarian Ministry of the Economy at the Allied Control Council in Berlin. In

an exposé entitled "Proposal for the Foundation of a 'Research and Education Office for the History of the National Socialist Period,'" he reiterated his view of the political consciousness of "the Germans" outlined above:

> Weak political judgement is a characteristic of the German people. [. . .] Unfortunately, this weakness is also heavily represented among our nation's intellectual leaders. [. . .] A large proportion of Germans would much prefer to submit to a leadership and to follow it, trusting in its authority.[48]

Holzhausen's characterizations reflect the discussion about a "special German consciousness," which was already manifest in the self-image of the political, military, and intellectual leadership under the Kaiser and became established in such well-known notions as the "ideas of 1914" and the image of "introspection protected by power." With good reason, researchers repeatedly emphasized that there could be

> no doubt that the notion of a special historical path for Germany and of the unique nature of German politics and German institutions compared with the institutions and fundamental political stance of other nations had been an essential feature of German national identity before 1945.[49]

Accordingly, Holzhausen complained that after World War I, a chance had been missed to explore "the causes of the catastrophe." "At the time, each individual German should have been taught where the natural boundaries of our national power lie," that "each individual German must think independently and soberly, and that every individual bears political responsibility." The "opportunity for such a profound democratic re-education" had been wasted, he said. "Nobody, either in the state or in the political parties, seriously addressed the consequences of the lost war. Instead, large swathes of the population clouded their judgment with the creation of legends."[50] At the same time, Holzhausen regarded the ability of German society to undertake critical self-reflection with a degree of skepticism:

> People still turned a blind eye to the catalog of Nazi crimes, to the criminal nature of the leadership, and to the mistakes they themselves made in their uncritical support or tolerance of the Nazi regime. Instead, National Socialist ideas are not only still alive today, but in places they are continuing to gain ground, even though the most active Nazis have been taken into custody and deactivated by the occupation forces.[51]

He concluded:

> Therefore the authorities need to initiate a systemic investigation of the Nazi era [. . .]. If it is to be effective, this research and educational work must be carried out by a *German* institution, whose judgment is respected by the nation.[52]

That is why he proposed "the foundation of a 'German research and education office for the history of the National Socialist period'":

> The office would have the task of compiling a factual account of the Nazi era based on written and printed material and on interviews with the people involved, and of publishing a series of writings on the subject. These writings would serve as a foundational and guiding resource for teaching and information material to be circulated in schools, universities, and libraries, in government agencies, and in all political, academic, economic, and cultural organizations. The matter is urgent because Nazi literature and newspapers need to be seized for academic study while they are still available, and professionals from the Nazi era (diplomats, politicians, allies, secretaries, etc.) who would be hard to trace later must be interviewed.[53]

On August 17, 1948, Holzhausen presented a further draft regarding "preparations for the historiography of the 'Third Reich.'" He imagined the establishment of a "registration office for materials concerning the history of National Socialism."[54] In October 1948, when the establishment of the institute was still in limbo owing to the question of funding after the currency reform, Holzhausen was responsible on behalf of the Bavarian state government for the "preparatory work for the foundation of the institute."[55]

Holzhausen had thus already been long engaged in "preliminary work for the registration of documents that are to serve as the basis for research"[56] when Anton Pfeiffer and Hermann Brill tried to inject new momentum into the movement to establish the institute. On December 8, 1948, Holzhausen accompanied Pfeiffer to Bonn for a meeting of the representatives of the four state chancelleries of the American zone.[57] Other participants were State Secretary Eberhard for Württemberg-Baden and State Secretary Wilhelm Haas for Bremen, with Ludwig Bergsträsser and Rudolf Vogel from "Friedensbüro Stuttgart" (Peace Bureau Stuttgart) as guests.[58] Holzhausen took the minutes of the meeting, which recorded the state of progress and plans in detail.[59] In view of the scarce financial resources, he suggested starting "initially with the establishment of a collection office for historical material on a small scale," for

which he budgeted 120,000 DM.[60] By then Bavaria had provided a floor of a building on Reitmorstraße, comprising seven rooms, in order to establish "at least a material collection office for the time being," with Holzhausen "in charge."[61] And on February 28, 1949, when the Academic Advisory Board met, it was Holzhausen who gave a presentation on the status of the archive.[62] At this point Gerhard Kroll became director of the provisional institute.[63]

It should be noted that in his persistent initiatives, his conceptual drafts, his practical work, and in the function of a ministerial official close to power, Holzhausen always presented himself as a conscious democrat who did not harbor any illusions about the basic characteristics of the German tradition of political culture. He bemoaned the ignorance of those who considered politics a dirty business and political parties as evil, as well as their frequently enthusiastic idealization of an imaginary Volk community over the merits of a responsible, independent individual with natural rights and rights of liberty. He saw a direct connection between a non-political way of thinking that espoused an authoritarian state and the desire of many Germans to avoid political rivalry and the civilized contest for ideas and majorities.[64] Holzhausen's influence on day-to-day ministerial life is a tangible reflection of these sober analyses. For several years as a ministerial official he advanced the work of the institute in practical ways, especially together with Hermann Brill and Anton Pfeiffer, during a period when the project seemed doomed to failure on several occasions.[65]

The Election of Kroll and the Permanent Conflict over Funding

With the meeting of the state secretaries in Bonn on December 8, 1948, Hermann Brill and Anton Pfeiffer had at least provisionally re-secured the project. At this point it was particularly important that the institute had a prospect of being established beyond the American zone on a "trizonal basis," as was the preparation of a budget plan of the four donor Länder at the next Advisory Board meeting. The incipient Cold War also played into this situation, with explicit reference made to "similar institutions and efforts in the eastern zone," to which a response was needed.[66] However, the notion "of establishing the institute as a federal institution in the emerging West German state" was rejected.[67] It was clear that if the institute were to become a reality, it had to be financed by the Länder, because the ideas floated about using other assets, for instance from the sale of state property or income from the press, remained pure fantasy.[68]

The third meeting of the Advisory Board was scheduled for Carnival Sunday, February 27, 1949, in Munich.[69] Hermann Brill chaired the meeting and

Anton Pfeiffer nominated Gerhard Kroll as the executive chairman, who was to draft an institute budget. Brill complained that almost two years had "elapsed fruitlessly." "An effective education of the nation has not taken place. The indifference and aversion to this education is extraordinary," he said.[70] The Academic Advisory Board meeting was scheduled for the following Shrove Monday in the meeting room of the Bavarian State Ministry.[71] At the meeting, Brill took up the matter of imposing a time limit on the institute's existence and emphasized that it "will not be disbanded in the next ten years."[72]

The core problem remained funding. In this regard a new front emerged. The finance ministers of the Länder and their ministerial officials persistently boycotted even the minister-presidents' requests. The biggest blow was when "the inclusion of the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics with its office in Munich in the funding for the Länder as a whole [was] rejected" at the meeting of the culture and finance ministers of the Länder in the western zone on March 15, 1949, in Königstein.[73] Carl Wagenhöfer, the Bavarian representative, was recorded as saying: "The remaining Länder have indicated that some research in this field is being undertaken at their university institutes and that the time to establish their own institute is still too short." That is why, he continued, it "has been decided to await a possible merger of the establishments in the individual Länder into one institute."[74] His explanation illustrated how little awareness the ministerial bureaucracy possessed of the realities of German historical scholarship—and how much the initiators of the institute stood out from the "mainstream."

The reactions to the Königstein debacle thus once again underlined the importance of the determination and perseverance of a few important stakeholders to keep the project alive, namely the high-level civil servants who had been leading it for years. They were indignant. Hermann Brill wrote to Gerhard Kroll, who had been in office as executive chairman at the beginning of March, that he would seek out the persons responsible for this wretched situation. He emphasized that he would "continue to make relentless efforts to finally achieve a secure basis for the funding of the institute from now on."[75] The Stuttgart Culture Ministry urged "at least the four founding Länder—Bavaria, Hesse, Württemberg-Baden, and Bremen—to assure funding for this institute in the meantime."[76]

Brill followed this up with a detailed "Memorandum regarding the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics."[77] His five-page report provides an initial "historical" summary of the history of the institute's founding. His authorship was double-edged. The most important advantage was that Brill's role as a central actor made him an immediate witness to the history. On

the other hand, it was a disadvantage that, when he wrote it, he was unaware of material from the other ministries, in particular the history of the Bavarian initiative and the processes in Munich. Brill vividly summarized the past differences in opinion among the four founding Länder. Hesse, for instance, initially had in mind an institution to track down, collect, and publish documents. Hesse State Secretary Walter Strauß "did not want the institute to be part of a university under any circumstances," but instead for it to be organized and controlled closely by the state. By contrast the Bavarian representatives, Dieter Sattler and Friedrich Glum,[78] opposed state control. They feared for its reputation for independence and spoke in favor of "recognized academics and publicists."[79]

At the internal meeting of the Länderrat of the American occupation zone on April 26, 1946, the minister-presidents voted in favor of budgeting for the institute in principle, despite opposition from the finance ministries.[80] Nevertheless, Munich had still not received any money when Gerhard Kroll "with the help of two employees and a part-time typist" began his work in Reitmorstraße in May.[81] Therefore, Kroll intensified his efforts with a political and public relations offensive, "in order to convince the public of the importance and urgency of objective academic historical research on the National Socialist period in general."[82]

Since the ministerial bureaucracy did not react, Kroll wrote to Minster-President Hans Ehard, whom he then met in person. Ministerial Director Richard Ringelmann from the Finance Ministry was also invited to the meeting.[83] It is notable that Kroll spoke of a "limited duration" of ten years. Ringelmann wanted an even shorter period.[84] He would block further funds, he said, and asked for "consideration of the possibility of merging the institute into the Max Planck Society."[85] As an alternative, he suggested affiliation to a university or transfer to the Academy of Sciences.[86]

In general, there appeared to be a clear confrontation between the ministries of finance, namely in Bavaria and Württemberg-Baden, on one side, and leading officials in the culture ministries, on the other. The civil servants in the finance ministries showed little understanding of the requirements of an independent institution, while the political stakeholders, such as Brill and Pfeiffer, and also Ehard, emphasized the historical dimension of an independent research institute. Against the naysayers Brill pointed to "the tremendous political responsibility the whole matter involves."[87] Brill emphasized that the decision should be made by the Conference of the Minister-Presidents without giving finance ministers or their apparatus the chance to flog the matter to

death.[88] The Council of Länder agreed that all four Länder would make their contribution.[89]

On May 13, 1949, the Conference of the Minister-Presidents finally decided in favor of the institute, once again thanks to the efforts of Brill. A week after the proclamation of the German Basic Law, which counted the leading stakeholders in the institute's establishment among its contributors, Brill invited the Advisory Board to Munich on May 30 to discuss the draft of a new state treaty and an organizational overview. He said it was "the most important meeting since its founding"; Kroll emphasized that "the institute's academic reputation needs to be safeguarded against overhasty, superficial, and sensational publications"—a warning whose prophetic nature he was unaware of at the time.[90] The cooperation between Brill and Kroll was instrumental in drafting the structural documents (in particular the organization plan, work plan, and the budget), not to mention their party-spanning consensus that historians should not be involved in this project and certainly should not be able to make decisions.

Kroll informed the members of the Academic Advisory Board to this effect in mid-June 1949. In a memorandum he declared that for organizational matters "the Advisory Board alone is competent according to the charter," which is why the Academic Advisory Board was not consulted.[91] The Advisory Board had discussed and approved the budget, and the Academic Advisory Board should only reconvene once the institute had been constituted. Furthermore, Kroll pointed out that according to the envisaged charter both a representative of the Advisory Board and the director were to participate in the meetings of the Academic Advisory Board.[92]

Once again objections from Hessian finance minister Werner Hilpert caused irritation when he sought to prevent the institute from being funded with money from the State of Hesse. In a letter to Brill, who was both chairman of the Advisory Board and a member of the Hessian government in Wiesbaden, Hilpert signaled "grave concerns" regarding Hesse's obligations. Hilpert wanted to go back on the minister-presidents' decision and invoked the earlier rejection of joint funding. If Hesse co-financed this institute located in another federal state, then it could equally easily ask other states to cofinance the "Römisch-Germanische Kommission" (the Roman-Germanic Commission) in Frankfurt, the "Freies Deutsches Hochstift" (Free German Bishopric), or the "Chinainstitut" (China Institute).[93] Quite apart from the minister-presidents' decision, it appears characteristic of Hilpert's historical (un)awareness that he would use such a far-fetched comparison to torpedo an

institute that was intended to investigate the causes and consequences of National Socialist rule, which were visible everywhere. It was particularly notable given that Hilpert himself had been imprisoned in a concentration camp for over five years and counted Eugen Kogon among his friends. Kroll promptly accused Hilpert of possibly "emboldening all new fascist tendencies."[94] Kroll also warned his minister-president that a failure to (re)establish the institute would "lead to an immense emboldening of all neo-fascist tendencies" and be "completely intolerable for a democratic Germany."[95] The obstacles remained, even in Bavaria. Although on July 28, 1949, in a conversation with Kroll and finance minister Hans Kraus, Minister-President Ehard emphatically supported further funding. In order to obtain the money Kroll had to threaten the immediate closure of the institute because it was "impossible to pay the regular salaries."[96]

At their conference in Wiesbaden on August 5, 1949, the minister-presidents finally and unanimously decided that the institute should be (re)"created" and recommended that the eleven Länder and Berlin become party to the corresponding state treaty.[97] All of them were to declare their participation by September 21. But only Berlin sent its assent, meaning that Bavaria as the state hosting the institute's headquarters once again secured its financial existence for the following months until the Federal Ministry of the Interior finally stepped in.[98] Once again Brill was the biggest influence. He championed the institute vis-à-vis both his minister-president and the federal minister of the interior, Gustav Heinemann.[99]

On the Non-Influence of the US Military Government

During the almost four years that the institute's fate hung in the balance, from 1947 to 1950, repeated references were made to alleged initiatives by, and the influence of, the US military government on the foundation of the institute. However, in 1970 Hellmuth Auerbach concluded that the US occupation authorities "didn't just not participate but strictly held back regarding the development of the institute [. . .] although they warmly welcomed its creation."[100] This conclusion is historically correct and has been confirmed by the sources. Nevertheless, the theory of the Allies' initiative continued to make the rounds, and is still asserted in the most recent English-language Wikipedia article about the institute.[101]

A review of the documents reveals just as little evidence of a US initiative as of influence by any of the other occupation forces. Certain practical sugges-

tions or even specific promises were no doubt discussed. However, no proof of such discussions has emerged in the documentary record.[102] Instead, the correspondence is dominated by signals from the military government that the Germans should act independently. The Bavarian state government remained cautious in this regard and placed importance on agreement, but surviving records are patchy. It is not known when the US military government was first informed of the plans to establish the institute. In the context of the state treaty dated October 7, 1947, there were once again rumors about US intentions of support, which were expressed in the summaries by the ministerial bureaucracy and over time developed a life of their own through copying and repetition, without the military government ever actually becoming an active player. At the Advisory Board meeting on November 25, 1947, Friedrich Glum reported that he had held talks "with American offices" in Berlin and "met with understanding." "They could have as much money, i.e., Papiermark, as they wanted." Glum named neither persons nor institutions, so it is not clear who made such promises to him. In practice they meant nothing because money was not forthcoming. Glum also mentioned that "the outcome of the journey [made him] very skeptical [. . .] with regard to the practical implementation of the institute plans." He emphasized that the Council of Länder should approach General Lucius Clay, which implied that such a connection did not yet exist.[103] Nine months later, on August 23, 1948, Anton Pfeiffer declared in a letter to the archive of the former Reich Finance Ministry that the Länder in the US occupation zone had "with the consent of the US military government decided to establish an institute for the history of National Socialism."[104] Pfeiffer does not mention any American initiative or sponsorship. We should assume that he would have done so if that had been the case. Around six weeks later, on October 7, Ministerial Councillor Fritz Baer from the State Chancellery in Munich mentioned in a letter to the document Collecting Point, in which he described the plans to establish the institute and to request the surrender of files, that "the US military government [. . .] has approved the plans to establish this institute."[105] Although this letter implies that the US government had communicated its approval, the Office of the Minister-President inquired again and asked the military government for confirmation. This is evident from the US reply dated November 30, 1948, which clarified:

> It is not necessary for your institute to have a license or even approval from Military Government. As far as this division [Office of Military Government for Bavaria, Education and Cultural Relations Division, MB] is concerned there is no objection to the institute undertaking an

> objective and systematic study of German History during the period of the National Socialistic [!] Reich.[106]

There was also a clear message regarding the Collecting Point's request for documents:

> In view of the fact that Military Government has no objection to your study, you should find no difficulty in gaining access to such material as may now be under the control of Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Section, Restitution Branch.[107]

These were clear indications of US non-interference combined with signals for German independence.

So where did the persistent rumors, which grew into narratives, originate? From what can be traced in documents, the fable of US start-up assistance was popularized by a report in the news magazine *Der Spiegel* dated April 23, 1949. Starting with the typical *Spiegel* style of personalizing stories, it began with a portrait of Gerhard Kroll as "a well-padded man in his late thirties."[108] Kroll, officially appointed in March, had wanted to start work right away, but "the eight rooms on the 4th floor of Reitmorstraße 29 were completely empty on April 1 [1949]. The institute didn't even own a chair."[109] Since no money was forthcoming, Kroll was paying "the auxiliary staff out of his own allowance from Bonn."[110] The *Spiegel* reference to an endowment capital of 80,000 Reichsmarks, "borne equally by the states of Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden, Hesse, and Bremen," was correct. But the magazine then went on to assert that "the Americans generously promised to pay the ongoing expenses out of the income from the *Neue Zeitung* (NZ) newspaper. At the time the NZ was drowning in floods of Reichsmarks thanks to continual print runs."[111] This assertion was picked up in a memorandum by the Bavarian Finance Ministry, which was drafted at approximately the same time as the *Spiegel* article in April 1949. But to this day, no document expressing such American intentions has materialized.

This misunderstanding was clearly reinforced when in July 1949—after all the minister-presidents and ministerial officials in the culture ministries had already reached agreement—the establishment of the institute was once again questioned by Hessian finance minister Hilpert. He made reference to the "American military government, whose wish" was reflected in the establishment of the institute. That government should also provide the required funds, he argued. A further document, a note dated September 1950 in Walter Strauß's papers, summarizes the preliminary history of the foundation of the

institute. It states for the turn of the year 1948/49, "Attempts [to find] funding options through the press, through a German-American collecting society for war material [...] are failing."[112] Evidently, this note was also based on earlier assumptions and rumors.

The plethora of documents that have survived shows that in the discussions between the key stakeholders of the years 1947 to 1949, namely Anton Pfeiffer, Hermann Brill, and later Walter Strauß, as well as the minister-presidents and culture ministers in the Länder in the US zone, there is no mention of any *actual* US options for funding. While there was no shortage of suggestions for seeking such funding,[113] in practice the US stance, though benevolent, was deliberately distanced. The Americans sought to avoid the impression that the institute was a creation of the Allies,[114] and the leading German stakeholders were well aware of this.[115] But the rumors of an active American role nevertheless made their way into the memoranda, which must be read as a mixture of actual knowledge and hearsay. Unfortunately, later historians never bothered to check the sources.

Symbols: Kroll vs. Ritter

The incidental role of historians was never defining in any phase of the institute's creation. This can be illustrated by the aspirations of Freiburg professor Gerhard Ritter, who was a leading historian and academic functionary at the time. His ambition and striving for influence are very well documented.[116] Ritter's potential involvement with the institute was controversial, and he was excluded when the Advisory Board discussed a list of candidates for the Academic Advisory Board at its first meeting on October 17, 1947.[117]

The stakeholders were aware of Ritter's view of history. At its core it had become apparent that Ritter, who always championed "objectivity," "a sobriety devoid of illusions," "an honest and courageous sense of truth,"[118] and "unbiased research and presentation,"[119] used a pre-set model for his view on German history, which he defended dogmatically. Yet his personal qualities, above all his capacity for hard work combined with his sense of mission, enabled him to exert considerable influence on the foundation process. Among his fellow historians, Ritter enjoyed the aura of an established professor and a productive academic, who could rely on influential allies.[120] His persistence and organizational talent led him to aspire to influential positions, such as the chair of the Verband der Historiker und Historikerinnen Deutschland (VHD—German Historical Association). His links to resistance circles in the Third Reich furthered his reputation. He refused to acknowledge that several of the traditions

that shaped conservative resistance circles had also been responsible for National Socialism coming to power.[121] In 1949 and 1950 he fought in vain to establish and shape the institute according to his vision and to gain control of its academic work and direction.

Ritter's view of National Socialism has been described many times, so that a few key points will suffice here. Instead of analyzing specific reasons and motives in German politics, culture, and society, he pointed to the "uprising of the masses" and the "breakdown of all historical authority."[122] Hence, according to him National Socialism was a consequence of "the general cultural decay, the lack of religious faith, and moral nihilism."[123] At the same time, he vehemently rejected the importance of Prussian-German political concepts from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for enabling the Third Reich. He avoided specific terms, such as faith in authority, the authoritarian state, militarism, and national exceptionalism, or else disputed their meaning. Instead, he spoke of the "hysterical bluster" and "counterpropaganda" that had taken the place of National Socialist propaganda.[124]

Ritter combined his view "that the problems of German political life can be better clarified and understood in their historical context by German than by foreign experts"[125] with the assertion that traditional German historical scholarship (which was embodied by leading functionaries like himself) was capable of reviewing and reappraising it. Ritter's emphasis on past "achievements" shows how his desire corresponded to the historiographical tradition of national legitimation:

> After the collapse in 1918, in the course of just five years, German historiography brought to light no fewer that 54 large volumes of carefully arranged and meticulously annotated political documents from World War I. This feat, which stunned the world, together with nascent research into so-called war guilt, which has been able to uphold its fundamental theses in all the civilized countries, has proven that German historical research need not necessarily be plodding in order to be thorough and diligent.[126]

For Brill the failure of German historiography was manifest precisely in this "shocking example of documents being published by the Foreign Office," which must "not be repeated."[127] From the very beginning, Brill had been concerned about Ritter's appointment to the Academic Advisory Board, even though for pragmatic reasons he was initially accommodating.[128]

It is notable that in the first few months of 1949 there was (still) clearly an amicable working relationship between Kroll and Ritter. Kroll even visited

Ritter in Freiburg. That is where the latter first suggested "Institut für Zeitgeschichte" (Institute for Contemporary History) as the new name for the institute—"a name," Kroll wrote, "that appears very fitting to me."[129] Clearly motivated by this perceived understanding, on April 18, 1949 Ritter presented a two-page draft "on the necessity of accelerating the establishment of a central institute for recent history."[130] He repeated that only German authors "of undeniable academic and political authority" could correctly analyze German history. No foreigner could "understand German things from the inside, as we do ourselves." In one regard, his arguments initially appear to be aligned with those of Kroll, namely, that a single university institute would "be just as poor at performing [the tasks] as an association of several institutes in various Länder." "A central office staffed with people working for it full-time" was needed. The university institutes were "dispersed over all the German Länder" and could not undertake this research, he argued. "German historical scholarship" had been waiting "impatiently for a long time for the implementation" of these plans. With the turning point of the currency reform imminent, Ritter appealed for the cooperation of the Länder governments to ensure that the process of establishing the institute did not fail for financial reasons.[131]

Ritter continued on this course in May 1949 with a text entitled "Zur Organisation des 'Instituts zur Erforschung der nationalsozialistischen Politik'" ("On the Organization of the 'Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics'").[132] In addition to a change of name,[133] Ritter was above all interested in a new structure. He took it as a given that it would not be possible to find a leading historian to work full-time as head of the institute. Between the lines the insinuation was that anyone who could secure a professorial chair would not be satisfied heading up the institute, and thus by implication anyone who would be satisfied with this post could not be an important and distinguished historian. That is why an Academic Advisory Board was needed, which Ritter evidently thought would gather the crème de la crème of the profession. Its chairman could have "some kind of overall management of the institute," he asserted.[134] It doesn't take much imagination to picture whom he had in mind for this position.

Ritter was thinking not only about control over the staff. He also wanted to see the institute "essentially [. . .] limited to the acquisition and provision of material," while the actual research work should continue to be done at the universities. His indication that the institute should act similarly "to the way the matter of 'war guilt' occupied all younger scholars of recent history for years after 1919" could almost be taken as a threat.[135] Accordingly, he proposed "three of my students" for assistant positions at the institute.[136]

In light of these imperial ambitions, the relationship with Kroll ended before it had even begun. Kroll had been in politics long enough to immediately identify his own interests with those of the institute. He showed Chairman Brill of the Advisory Board his correspondence with Ritter. Brill firmly rejected Ritter's influence and stated, "In my opinion Mr. Ritter has already shown at the joint meeting of the Advisory Board and the Academic Advisory Board [on February 28, 1949] that he does not have the personal qualities that would enable him to work with the institute."[137] Brill proved to be very well informed about historiography when he emphasized:

> If the opportunity arises, someone should read back to Mr. Ritter his preface to the 1st edition of *Utopie und Machtstaat* [Utopia and Power Politics].[138] The memory of his Lesser-German-Frederician understanding of history, which he presented in his great Stein biography, his compilation *Deutschland und Europa* [Germany and Europe], which he published last year, and many other things will no longer burden my mind at the joint meetings with the Academic Advisory Board when I no longer have to see the petty-spirited, pinched face of Mr. Ritter in front of me.[139]

Brill also informed Kroll that, after the establishment of the institute, they could "painlessly" get rid of Ritter in the process of reconstituting the Academic Advisory Board.

But Ritter was not the kind of person who would forfeit his ambitions when the potential prize—control of an institute with all its possibilities—was so attractive. In the summer of 1949, when the Advisory Board went ahead without reference to his proposals, Ritter tried to establish his influence through the Baden state government. State President Leo Wohleb wrote to his fellow minister-presidents on September 11, 1949, saying that the state government intended "to distance itself from the recommended declaration of participation in the state treaty [for the institute] for the time being."

Wohleb's letter exemplifies the absurdity of the situation, the most important arguments of which were as follows. "In principle," Wohleb explained,

> the Baden state government believes that the idea upon which the planned establishment of the institute is based is essentially right and that for reasons of national politics, it is imperative to meticulously record the facts of National Socialist rule and politics and to communicate them to the public.

Then there is

> no doubt that many events of this period are not known to their full extent to large sections of the population, that large sections refuse to address these things, and that there is a danger that the crimes of National Socialism may be forgotten. It is said all too often that one should let the past be past and not open up old wounds. This view is immoral and politically dangerous. For insight into the inner nature of National Socialism is only possible if the crimes and atrocities resulting from the nature of National Socialism are known. Only from this knowledge and insight can an inner transformation of the German nation take place. For large sections of the population there are at least serious indications that this inner transformation has not yet happened.[140]

That was accurate and conclusive. Yet the proposal was rejected nonetheless. Wohleb gave two reasons: First, since the Federal Republic of Germany now existed, the federal government should step in. Second, Wohleb cited Gerhard Ritter's "very significant reservations" about the planned organization. Yet if Ritter, whose reputation was once again referred to, were to stay away for that reason, it would be "detrimental."[141]

Wohleb sent the letter with a new draft for the state treaty that had clearly been inspired by Ritter. On the role of the Academic Advisory Board it read: "The president of the board instructs the general secretary and staff" and "represents (together with the respective chairman of the Advisory Board) the institute externally."[142] It continued, "the close connection with other academic institutes in Germany" was particularly important. The "reputation of the institute at home and abroad" depended "very substantially on the overall management of the institute being held by a politically independent person with academic rank, who is equally well known at home and abroad and who enjoys the public's trust." Thus, the general secretary was merely to receive orders and only had the authority to employ and supervise non-academic staff.[143] In short, the institute would be the extended workbench of the president of the Academic Advisory Board, who at the same time could assume a central position in German and international historical scholarship.

The fact that the state government of Baden made such proposals to serve Ritter[144] was tantamount to a declaration of war against all the leading minds that, until then, had driven the foundation of the institute; against the incumbent General Secretary Gerhard Kroll and against the decisive stakeholders of previous years, from Anton Pfeiffer and Hermann Brill to Dieter Sattler. Kroll

drafted a sharp reply, in which he strongly attacked the Baden government and held it responsible for the delays of the past. And, in any case, he did not think Ritter's leaving would do any damage.[145]

Ritter tried to establish two further fronts through the Historikerverband (German Historical Association) and the Historical Commission in Munich. The first postwar German Historians' Conference, held in Munich from September 12 to 15, 1949, was attended by 231 participants, including 40 East German historians.[146] Here Ritter was truly in his element, brimming over with self-confidence and a sense of mission. In his opening lecture, "Die gegenwärtige Lage und Zukunftsaufgaben deutscher Geschichtswissenschaft" (The Current Situation and Future Tasks of German Historical Scholarship), he ignored the institute and acted as though one still needed to be created.[147] His attacks against those who had been in charge until then were likewise unmistakable, when, for example, he announced, "If the scholars want to be silent, then the unbidden will speak—they have already been speaking for a long time, without any shame or discretion." He went on:

> But how carefully, how well-thought-out must the organization of such an institute be if it is not to become a political center of defamation! Without the guiding hand of an experienced historian, who discerns the important issues from the secondary ones, who understands how to channel all efforts toward the main problems, and who is supported by a team of experts, it will not work. What the governments of the Länder have previously undertaken to ensure the foundation of such a research institute (unfortunately without the involvement of any historians) remains financially uncertain. So, in that regard, a completely new beginning is needed, and all German historians stand behind this aspiration.[148]

Not only did Ritter neglect to mention his months-long practical "involvement," but in making his claim to speak for "all German historians," he made it abundantly obvious to all just whom he meant when he called for "the guiding hand of an experienced historian." Accordingly, the "resolution of the German Historians' Conference" called for the "speedy establishment of a well-equipped German institute for the central organization of contemporary historical research." This was combined with a threat: "We initially intend to address a formal application to the newly formed West German federal government to create such an institute associated with the still-to-be-established Federal Archives."[149] Had the federal government established a new institute

assigned to the Federal Archives, it would have stifled the already existing institute.

The signals from the Historians' Conference confirmed the reservations already held by the founding group of institute sponsors. Bavarian state secretary Dieter Sattler promptly complained about Ritter's behavior to Federal President Theodor Heuss. Sattler also opposed "changing the character of the institute, which would turn it into a more or less dead, purely archival affair." He also accused Ritter of trying "to silence or defame all politically active historians." Sattler asked for Heuss's support in protecting the institute against these attacks.[150]

Another attack came in the form of a three-page position paper initiated by Walter Goetz, president of the Historical Commission at the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities. Goetz had been clearly instrumentalized by Ritter when he criticized several decisions in which both he and Ritter had been personally involved. Goetz acted as if he had learned all of this from the press. With a personal attack on Kroll, he tried to veto the institute. "It must be evident from all these facts that German historical scholarship can have no association with the endeavor in *this* form if it does not want to risk its good reputation."[151]

Kroll and his supporters were appalled. He spoke of "an ambush"[152] and in response formulated a statement of which numerous drafts with a multitude of alternative formulations have survived.[153] The statement ridiculed the countless factual errors in Goetz's text, which above all served to illustrate that the author had only secondhand knowledge of the actual developments and the perils of the discussions about the institute between 1947 and 1949.[154] That Goetz, just like Ritter, sought to make his own role and knowledge opaque appeared outlandish. Kroll accused Goetz of propagating "a boycott of research on National Socialism" by criticizing the size of the institute's budget and attempting to keep it small. Not immune to the polemical style of a political attack, he wrote that Goetz's objections were more to be expected "from the ranks of the National Socialists and neofascists."[155] But essentially Kroll's arguments were correct, and they were understood by everyone involved in the ministries and the bureaucracy, given their own memory of recent events as well as the discussion of the events as recorded in the files. The controversy made it clear that Ritter had enormous influence among historians, an influence he extended all the way to the ministerial bureaucracy in Baden, but he was met with firm opposition from those who were actually in charge.

With corresponding self-assuredness and a sense of urgency, Kroll sent the

statement from Goetz along with his answer to the federal president a few days later.[156] He asked Heuss to persuade the Länder to finally join the state treaty, even if the federal government was also expected to come on board in the medium term. Otherwise, he would have to close the institute at the end of October.[157] Kroll then traveled to Bonn on September 27, 1949, to speak directly with Heuss.[158]

Sattler and Kroll's appeal to the federal president, which was backed by Brill, culminated in the final, decisive turning point. Heuss championed the institute's cause vis-à-vis Interior Minister Heinemann, and he negotiated a permanent regulation of the institute's funding. To Minister-President Ehard, Heinemann praised the stability of Bavaria's financial support and at the same time emphasized that the institute was working on "an all-German issue," so that the federal government felt responsible.[159] With this signal, the interior minister stabilized the existing structures and indicated that the government and the Länder would find joint funding. Provisionally, this involved federal Finance Minister Schäffer, to whom both Kroll and Heuss had appealed on September 27, who pledged funding via the Länder.[160]

But despite the pledge from the federal government, the Länder continued to be hesitant,[161] meaning that Kroll spent the following weeks advocating a funding agreement that was acceptable to all parties.[162] In early November he traveled once again to Bonn to lobby the federal government. He met Ministerial Director Ritter von Lex from the Federal Ministry of the Interior, as well as Finance Minister Schäffer and Ludwig Bergsträsser, who as a member of the Bundestag and member of the Academic Advisory Board had a particular interest in the institute. Heuss also received him again and promised to appeal to Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to secure the funding of the institute. "All parties involved declared very emphatically that the closure of the institute must be prevented by all means, not least for the well-known foreign policy reasons."[163] In mid-November, via Anton Pfeiffer, who worked as a minister of state for the Bundesrat (Federal Assembly), Kroll secured the interim funding in a meeting with Schäffer, Bavarian Culture Minister Hundhammer, and Ritter von Lex.[164] The solution was that the Bundesrat's finance committee requested Bavaria "to draft a brief memorandum substantiating the need for it to be included in the budget of the Federal Ministry of the Interior."[165] Consequently, on December 7, 1949, Interior Minister Heinemann gave the Bavarian minister-president the assurance that the federal government was prepared in principle "to adopt the German Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics and provide a grant to settle the institute's necessary expenses for the budgetary year 1950/51."[166]

Although it still took nine months until Heinemann signed the deed, politically the matter had been decided. This success was thanks to the political will of a few stakeholders who, although from different party-political tendencies, shared the same conviction: not to leave the study of National Socialism to history professors at universities.

On March 1, 1950, a further meeting was held at the Federal Ministry of the Interior in Bonn about the future structure and funding.[167] Despite Heinemann's promise, in practice the majority of the funding was left to Bavaria to provide. Regarding future orientation, Kroll emphasized that there were "profound differences" with Gerhard Ritter about "the purpose and objectives of the institute."[168] He described the work of the past ten months, the purchase of books, and the precarious financial situation. For example, when they interviewed witnesses to historical events, they were "in strong competition with journals, such as 'Spiegel,' which apparently had tremendous amounts of money at their disposal."[169] The meeting turned into a direct showdown between Ritter's well-known ambitions for an extended workbench of professorial chairs and the supporters of an independent, unaffiliated, open institute. Hermann Brill, once again, did not mince his words with respect to historiography, saying that "the failure of academic research in 1933" had been "partly responsible for Nazism." He added that despite an endless abundance of banal publications of recent times, there was "still not a single scholarly account of the Nazi period." Furthermore, the system was in competition with that of the GDR, where "all of the so-called scholarship" was "designed to glorify German communists." "There the German view of history is being poisoned at the source." Brill stated that foreign historians had "taken huge steps ahead" of German scholarship.[170]

Heinemann summarized the outcome as a compromise. With regard to research in the sense intended by Kroll and Brill, he wrote that an effort should be made to obtain the German files held abroad, and that the institute should be designated as the information office for archive material, albeit not as the "major archive" as envisaged by Ritter. There should be three main responsibilities: archives, research, and publications. However, it remained an open question of how much research the institute itself would do and to what extent research would be "organized" only by it.[171] A new legal and financial entity would emerge. Bavarian State Secretary Dieter Sattler assumed leadership in getting the transition off the ground.[172]

Just how much the decision-makers in the ministries distanced themselves from Ritter is also expressed in their further proposals for the Academic Advisory Board. On April 5, 1950, when Sattler sent his colleague Erich Wende at

the Federal Ministry of the Interior a budget plan and a list of proposals, Ritter was no longer envisaged as a member, which Sattler, clearly together with Wende, had intended.[173]

Kroll's contacts with the Gehlen Organization also occurred during this final phase of development and conflict in spring 1950. The people with whom he corresponded and met for discussions formed a network cultivated by both institutions in these years. For example, Kroll spoke to former General Hans Speidel about several people who might be suitable for researching military history. These included Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg and Wolfgang Langkau. The latter was considered by both Kroll and Speidel as a candidate for the "war history department," but he went to work instead for the Gehlen Organization. In correspondence with Kroll, Speidel referred to "our mutual friend G.," which clearly meant Gehlen.[174] Their contact was close during these months. On February 8, 1950, Gehlen and Kroll discussed the general political situation. In his detailed analysis of the early history of the Gehlen Organization, Klaus-Dietmar Henke describes this discussion as a lecture by Kroll "abounding with self-confidence."[175] That may have been Kroll's personal self-perception, but it did not reflect his real position.[176] He already sensed that he would not be permanently in charge of the institute. That was not only down to Ritter's opposition. In the ministerial bureaucracy, too, the conviction was growing that new leadership was required that was closer to the discipline than Kroll, as a politician and economist, could offer. Kroll's search for staff during these months, which is what linked him to Speidel and Gehlen, was above all characterized by the quest for an independent path beyond the influence of Ritter and his allies. If in retrospect the contact between General Secretary Kroll, the secret service man Gehlen, and former General Speidel appears strange for an academic institute, this derives from a misunderstanding of the context. The institute was still barely operational. In practice it was Kroll and his personal connections that drove it and guaranteed its very existence during these months. Thus, the exchange hardly appeared strange to the stakeholders, who viewed it as a pragmatic concordance among similarly minded people.

Looking Ahead

With the meeting on March 1, 1950, and the subsequent organization by Sattler, the institute was prepared for its reconstitution. The details shall not be elaborated upon here because, in contrast to the three previous years, there

were no further surprises. On August 29 the Bavarian minister-president declared "his agreement with the enactment of the [institute's] charter by the Federal Ministry of the Interior."[177] Bavaria undertook to pay

> a partial contribution of one-fifth to the one-off and ongoing costs of the institute, up to a maximum of 60,000 DM annually. The federal government was to pay the remaining four-fifths. Upon the accession of other Länder, the shares borne by the donors until that point were to be reduced proportionally.[178]

The federal minister of the interior, Heinemann, brought this regulation into force with his signature on September 8, 1950. The institute was now legally and financially established, but, in essence, only as a structure. The conflicts over its mission, leadership, staff, oversight, and daily functioning persisted for several years.

The foundation of the Institute for Contemporary History thus was, at its core, a project of politicians and high-level civil servants. Historians were largely spectators to the founding of the institute and observers of its organizational development, to which they had to continually adapt. Given the obstacles (lack of funding, resistance in the financial bureaucracy, and attempts by historian-functionaries to dominate the process), the outcome could by no means be taken for granted. Until the end of 1949, the institute's foundation process could have come to a halt at any point, and the meager structures—seven rooms in Reitmorstraße with a few auxiliary staff—could have been disbanded. The tenacity of Gerhard Kroll, a politician serving as general secretary, in alliance with people who shared his motivation for years, was initially the decisive factor that secured its existence. Only then could productive work begin.

In this phase, which started at the end of 1950, qualities other than those possessed by Kroll, with his political and organizational temperament, were required. The recently highlighted influence of the Federal Ministry of the Interior[179] has to be regarded in the context of chronology and personal connections, like all other central aspects of the foundation process. The Federal Ministry of the Interior became active in the process after the fundamental debates had been largely fought out. The conflicts now moved to a new level, namely that of staffing, corporate image, and direction. Meanwhile, the conflict over the interpretation of German history represented by Gerhard Ritter continued.[180] As before, the civil servants remained influential. In the view of people like Erich Wende and Walter Strauß, strict state supervision was still

required. The disputes of the following years confirmed to them (or so they believed) how urgently the newly founded institute required oversight that was both politically and academically informed, so that the young, precarious institute and its staff would not be pulverized by the pursuit of dominance among competing actors. These were tough beginnings, and for years the academics at the Institute had to cautiously find their way forward in historiographically uncharted and controversial territory.

Notes

Translation by Catherine Venner

1. IfZ-Archiv, ED 1/1, Hermann Brill to Anton Pfeiffer, August 7, 1948.

2. "Alles Papier zum Thema NS: Hitler auf dem Seziertisch," *Der Spiegel*, April 23, 1949.

3. Yet the belief that a history of the institute must be independently and "externally" compiled is dominant. I would like to emphasize that I have been researching the institute's history for over two decades, in other words, since long before I became an institute employee. In this article I deliberately focus only on the history of the institute's founding, with the aim of presenting a new reading of the material and the insights provided by recent scholarship and recently discovered sources.

4. For example, those by general secretaries Paul Kluke (1953–59) and Helmut Krausnick (1959–72). See Paul Kluke, "Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte in München," *Schweizer Beiträge zur Allgemeinen Geschichte* 12 (1954): 241–42. They include Krausnick's typewritten self-presentation dated March 1962 and his article "Zur Arbeit des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 19 (1968): 90–96.

5. Robert Koehl, "Zeitgeschichte and the New German Conservatism," *Journal of Modern European Affairs* 20, no. 2 (1960): 131–57. In many cases exiled German historians and their students shaped Anglo-American research on Germany after 1945. These include (in chronological order): Peter Alter, "Learned Outsiders," *Times Higher Education*, January 9, 1998, https://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/learned-outsiders/105366.article; Peter Alter, *Out of the Third Reich: Refugee Historians in Post-War Britain* (London: Tauris, 1998); *Friedrich Meinecke: Akademischer Lehrer und emigrierte Schüler, Briefe und Aufzeichnungen 1910–1977*, ed. Gerhard A. Ritter (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006); Richard J. Evans, *Cosmopolitan Islanders: British Historians and the European Continent* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Andreas W. Daum, "The Second Generation: German Émigré Historians in the Transatlantic World, 1945 to the Present," conference report, accessed November 28, 2023, https://web.archive.org/web/20150330081252/http:/ghi-dc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1281&Itemid=1105. Owing to their orthodox Marxist perspective, articles written in 1950s East Germany on the institute's history can be read as historical documents of the "competing systems." See, for example, Günter Paulus, "Wissenschaftliche Zeitgeschichte oder Apologie des deutschen Imperialismus?," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 3, no. 1 (1955): 3–28; Joachim Höppner, "Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte in München und seine Arbeit im Dienste

der militärisch-klerikalen Herrschaft des westdeutschen Imperialismus," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 7, no. 2 (1959): 346–67.

6. John Gimbel, "The Origins of the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte*: Scholarship, Politics, and the American Occupation, 1945–1949," *American Historical Review* 70, no. 3 (April 1965): 714–31.

7. It is still unclear why Gimbel does not address some striking aspects. In general he shows no understanding of the political and historiographical dimensions of the conflicts that played out during the founding phase.

8. Hellmuth Auerbach, "Die Gründung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 18, no. 4 (October 1970): 529–54. Further articles of a similar type include Institut für Zeitgeschichte, *Selbstverständnis, Aufgaben und Methoden der Zeitgeschichte* (Munich: self-pub., 1972; 2nd ed., 1973; 3rd ed., 1979); Anton Hoch, "Das Archiv des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," *Der Archivar: Mitteilungsblatt für deutsches Archivwesen* 26 (1973): cols. 295–308.

9. Winfried Schulze, *Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989; Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1993). Citations refer to the Deutscher Taschenbuch edition.

10. Horst Möller, "Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte und die Entwicklung der Zeitgeschichtsschreibung in Deutschland," in *50 Jahre Institut für Zeitgeschichte: Eine Bilanz*, ed. Horst Möller and Udo Wengst (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 1–68; Horst Möller, "Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1949–2009," in *60 Jahre Institut für Zeitgeschichte München–Berlin: Geschichte, Veröffentlichung, Personalien*, ed. Horst Möller and Udo Wengst (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009), 9–100. Now also: Udo Wengst, "Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte: Ein Beispiel für die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Nationalsozialismus in der Frühgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Geschichte jenseits der Universität: Netzwerke und Organisationen in der frühen Bundesrepublik*, ed. Jürgen Elvert (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2016), 41–52.

11. Otto Gerhard Oexle and Winfried Schulze, eds., in collaboration with Gerd Helm and Thomas Ott, *Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus*, 4th ed. (1999; Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer-Taschenbuchverlag, 2000).

12. In July 2003 the Institute for Contemporary History hosted a colloquium on "Hans Rothfels and German Contemporary History," which aside from the then-current controversy, also marked the fiftieth anniversary of the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*. In his position as its first editor, Rothfels was just as influential as he was when he was the long-term chairman of the Academic Advisory Board (until 1974). On this, see Johannes Hürter and Hans Woller, eds., *Hans Rothfels und die deutsche Zeitgeschichte* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005).

13. Nicolas Berg, *Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker: Erforschung und Erinnerung*, 3rd rev. ed. (2003; Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004), esp. 318–21.

14. Klaus Kempter, *Joseph Wulf: Ein Historikerschicksal in Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013).

15. Dietfrid Krause-Vilmar, "Hermann Brill und die Gründung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," *Newsletter zur Geschichte und Wirkung des Holocaust* 15, no. 29 (2006): 19–23; Dietfrid Krause-Vilmar, "Hermann Brill und die Gründung des Instituts für

Zeitgeschichte," in *Hermann Louis Brill: 1895–1959, Widerstandskämpfer und unbeugsamer Demokrat*, ed. Renate Knigge-Tesche (Wiesbaden: Thrun, 2011), 173–200; Dieter Krüger, *Hans Speidel und Ernst Jünger*: *Freundschaft und Geschichtspolitik im Zeichen der Weltkriege* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016), in particular 185–212; Klaus-Dietmar Henke, *Geheime Dienste: Die politische Inlandsspionage der Organisation Gehlen 1946–1953* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2018), esp. 533–77; Stefanie Palm, "Auf der Suche nach dem starken Staat: Die Kultur-, Medien- und Wissenschaftspolitik," in *Hüter der Ordnung: Die Innenministerien in Bonn und Ost-Berlin nach dem Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Frank Bösch and Andreas Wirsching, 2nd ed. (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2018), 614–23; Rick Tazelaar, "Hüter des Freistaats: Die Bayerische Staatskanzlei zwischen Nationalsozialismus und Nachkriegsdemokratie" (PhD diss., Ludwig Maximilian University Munich, 2020).

16. See René Schlott, "Ablehnung und Anerkennung: Raul Hilberg und das Institut für Zeitgeschichte," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 69, no. 1 (January 2021): 85–119, in which he differentiates and summarizes the current state of knowledge. An English translation of Schlott's article appears in this volume as "Rejection and Recognition: Raul Hilberg and the Institute for Contemporary History." The first report from 1963/64, incomplete and without the author's name or the date, is located in the papers of Helmut Krausnick. It is doubtful whether Krausnick wrote it. Frank Bajohr and Andrea Löw referred to it for the first time in 2015: Frank Bajohr and Andrea Löw, "Tendenzen und Probleme der neueren Holocaust-Forschung: Eine Einführung," in *Der Holocaust: Ergebnisse und neue Fragen der Forschung*, ed. Frank Bajohr and Andrea Löw (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 2015), 9–30, here 9, 28n2. This author analyzed the report on April 18, 2016, in the public annual Raul Hilberg Memorial Lecture on the topic of "Raul Hilberg and the Beginnings of Holocaust Scholarship" at the Center for Holocaust Studies at the University of Vermont in Burlington. Regarding the further publication history of the report by Aly, see Schlott, "Rejection and Recognition," 158n5 and Schlott, "Ablehnung und Anerkennung," 86n5.

17. Mathew Turner, Tony Joel, and David Lowe, "'Between Politics and Scholarship': The First Decade of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 1949–1958," *European History Quarterly* 49, no. 2 (April 2019): 250–71.

18. Willi Winkler, "Institut für Zeitgeschichte: Alte Kameraden," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, April 2, 2018, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/institut-fuer-zeitgeschichte-alte-kameraden-1.3926474-0.

19. The scandal surrounding the so-called table talk, with which Ritter plunged the young institute into a serious existential crisis in 1951, illustrates the academic-political, historiographical, and societal upheavals of that era surrounding Germany's attempts to come to terms with its past that go beyond the history of the institute itself. The main reason was Ritter's inadequacy as a historian. It is strange enough that this finding, which is clearly revealed by the documentation, has been repeatedly obscured by references to Ritter's "importance." An analysis and presentation of this matter would go beyond the scope of this article. I shall deal with the period of Mau and Ritter in detail in an article to be published in a volume dedicated to the occasion of the Institute's 75th anniversary in autumn 2024. For the overall context: Mikael Nilsson, *Hitler Redux: The Incredible History of Hitler's So-Called Table Talks* (London: Routledge, 2021).

20. See Magnus Brechtken, "Geschichtswissenschaften im Nationalsozialismus—Einflüsse, Personen, Folgen," *Archivalische Zeitschrift* 96 (2019): 255–76.

21. *Adenauer: Briefe 1945–1947*, ed. Hans Peter Mensing (Berlin: Schöningh, 1983), 172–73.

22. Gerhard Ritter, "The Historical Foundations of the Rise of National-Socialism," in *The Third Reich: A Study Published under the Auspices of the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies with the Assistance of UNESCO* (New York: Praeger, 1955), 381–416, here 381. Ritter presented the text on May 10, 1951, in Aarhus and completed it in June; for more details, see Christoph Cornelißen, *Gerhard Ritter: Geschichtswissenschaft und Politik im 20. Jahrhundert* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2001), 525n13; manuscript in Federal Archives Koblenz, N 1166/252. See also Gerhard Ritter, *Europa und die deutsche Frage* (Munich: Münchner Verlag, 1948), 194.

23. Konrad Adenauer, "Grundsatzrede des 1. Vorsitzenden der Christlich-Demokratischen Union für die Britische Zone in der Aula der Kölner Universität," March 24, 1946, in *Reden 1917–1967: Eine Auswahl*, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1975), 82–106, here 84–85.

24. Hesse, quoted from Thomas Mann, open letter to Walter von Molo, September 7, 1945, in *Briefe*, vol. 2, *1937–1947*, ed. Erika Mann (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1963), 441.

25. Examples of the historiographical interpretations available at the time include Henry Wickham Steed, "From Frederick the Great to Hitler: The Consistency of German Aims," *International Affairs* 17, no. 5 (September/October 1938): 655–81; Rohan d'Olier Butler, *The Roots of National Socialism: 1783–1933* (London: Faber and Faber, 1941); A. J. P. Taylor, *The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany since 1815* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1945). Writings by emigrants and visitors at the time include Saul K. Padover, *Experiment in Germany: The Story of an American Intelligence Officer* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946); John Dos Passos, *Das Land des Fragebogens*, trans. Michael Kleeberg (1946; Frankfurt a. M.: Neue Kritik, 1997); Carl Zuckmayer, *Deutschlandbericht für das Kriegsministerium der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika*, ed. Gunther Nickel, Johanna Schröder, and Hans Wagener (1946–48; Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004).

26. Inge Deutschkron, *Mein Leben nach dem Überleben*, 3rd ed. (1995; Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2001), 16–17.

27. Axel Springer, speech at the Hamburg Press Club, September 25, 1946, quoted from Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Axel Springer: Die Biographie* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2008), 122–23.

28. Ibid.

29. Quoted from Auerbach, "Die Gründung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," 533.

30. IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fols. 1–8, here fol. 3, Meeting concerning an "Institut zur Erforschung der Geschichte der Nationalsozialistischen Politik," October 16–17, 1947.

31. Brill and Pfeiffer had come to an understanding at the Herrenchiemsee Convention about an urgent need for such an institute: IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fol. 22, Minutes of the meeting of members of the Advisory Board of the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, December 8, 1948.

32. Hans Ehard (Bavaria), Christian Stock (Hesse), Reinhold Maier (Württemberg-Baden), and Wilhelm Kaisen (Bremen).

33. After the end of the war, Dieter Sattler was initially the second chairman of the "preliminary arts committee of the state capital of Munich." From 1947 to 1951 he was state secretary at the Bavarian Ministry of Education and Culture. From 1949 to 1952 he was a member of the Advisory Board (since 1962 Board of Trustees) of the Institute for Contemporary History: Ulrike Stoll, *Kulturpolitik als Beruf: Dieter Sattler (1906–1968) in München, Bonn und Rom* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005). In this very detailed biography, Sattler's role in and his influence on the foundation of the Institute for Contemporary History, which holds Sattler's papers, is not analyzed.

Anton Pfeiffer had founded the American Institute in Munich in 1926 and established an extensive international network. Some of his acquaintances came to Germany after 1945 as representatives of the military government. Pfeiffer had been connected with the influential diplomat Robert D. Murphy since the 1920s: Tazelaar, "Hüter des Freistaats," 65. In July 1946 Bavarian Minister-President Hoegner named Pfeiffer "special minister for denazification," but he left this position in December of the same year: Christiane Reuter-Boysen, "Anton Pfeiffer (1888–1957)," in *Zeitgeschichte in Lebensbildern*, vol. 11, *Aus dem deutschen Katholizismus des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Jürgen Aretz, Rudolf Morsey, and Anton Rauscher (Münster: Aschendorff, 2004), 124–41, here 135; Christiane Reuter, *"Graue Eminenz der bayerischen Politik": Eine politische Biographie Anton Pfeiffers (1888–1957)* (Munich: self-pub., 1987).

Between 1946 and 1949 Hermann Brill was state secretary and head of the state chancellery of the Hesse State Ministry; from 1949 to 1950, a member of the Advisory Board; and from 1950 to 1959, a member of the Academic Advisory Board of the Institute for Contemporary History: Renate Knigge-Tesche and Peter Reif-Spirek, eds., *Hermann Louis Brill (1895–1959): Widerstandskämpfer und unbeugsamer Demokrat* (Wiesbaden: Thrun, 2011).

From 1945 to 1948 Walter Strauß was state secretary at the Hesse State Ministry; in 1948/49, head of the legal department for the two-zone administration and member of the Parliamentary Council; and then from 1949 to 1963, state secretary at the Federal Ministry of Justice. From 1960 to 1962 he was the executive chairman of the institute's Advisory Board, and in 1961 he played an important role in history policy with the publication of the Lösener report in the context of the discussion about Hans Globke and the Nuremberg Laws. Friedemann Utz, *Preußе, Protestant, Pragmatiker: Der Staatssekretär Walter Strauß und sein Staat* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003); Markus Apostolow, *Der "immerwährende Staatssekretär": Walter Strauß und die Personalpolitik im Bundesministerium der Justiz 1949–1963* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019).

34. Auerbach, "Die Gründung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," 529–30. It has been mentioned more recently that at the start of 1947 Ernst Steinback, head of the Landesstelle für Heimatsdienst in Württemberg-Baden, suggested to Erich Roßmann, the general secretary of the Southern German Länderrat, that the National Socialist files could be used as documentation for political education. At the 23rd meeting of the directorate of the Länderrat on February 13, 1947, Roßmann made an application to establish an "office for political documentation" and presented a draft constitution for it.

35. Prof. Dr. Ludwig Bergsträsser; Prof. Dr. Walter Goetz; Prof. Dr. Theodor Heuss; Prof. Dr. Erich Kaufmann; Dr. Eugen Kogon; Prof. Dr. Gerhard Ritter; Prof. Dr. Franz Schnabel; Prof. Dr. Anna Siemsen; Dr. Hans Speidel; Prof. Dr. Max Spindler.

36. IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fol. 13, Minutes of the Advisory Board on the meeting of the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, November 25, 1947.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid. Eschenburg laid down conditions, and the Advisory Board did not yet want to negotiate. To set it up, a task force comprising "around 25 people" and "30–35 rooms" was planned: IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fol. 8, Meeting concerning the "Institut zur Erforschung der Geschichte der Nationalsozialistischen Politik," October 16–17, 1947. In addition to the donor Länder, the assets of the "German Academy in Munich" were to be used to fund the institute; they were said to amount to 1.6 million Reichsmarks. A special fund was to be formed. In this regard, the funding plans are extremely unclear. In addition to the aforementioned assets, there was also talk of a "total expenditure" of 500,000 to 600,000 Reichsmarks, but its composition remains unclear, as does the issue of whether it was intended as seed capital or for the annual budget as of the end of 1947. Income from media companies, which was also discussed, was disregarded because of its private character. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 60–61, Hermann Brill, Memorandum concerning the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, April 12, 1949.

39. Hesse had transferred its contribution of 20,000 Reichsmarks before the currency reform in June 1948. The contributions from the other three Länder were still outstanding. Bremen and Württemberg did not plan their contributions, now 20,000 DM, in their budget until spring 1949. Bavaria made the money available in 1948 via its Ministry of Culture, but it was not paid out because the institute did not retrieve it. For 1949 Bavaria once again earmarked 20,000 DM plus a further 20,000 DM, as a carryover from 1948, as it were, and as a voluntary operating grant. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 68, Memorandum from the Bavarian State Ministry of Finance concerning the "Institut zur Erforschung der Politik des Nationalsozialismus," n.d. [April 1949].

40. IfZ-Archiv, ED 1/1, Hermann Brill to Anton Pfeiffer, August 7, 1948.

41. Ibid.

42. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 13–16, Rudolf Holzhausen, Preparations for the historiography of the "Third Reich," August 17, 1948.

43. Neither Gimbel nor Auerbach nor Möller analyzed Holzhausen's role. Auerbach's remarks about Holzhausen indicate that he was not aware of his active role, which lasted several years. The authors of all subsequent texts appear to have followed Auerbach's disinterest without looking further at the sources. Turner, Joel, and Lowe, "Between Politics and Scholarship," 255, at least briefly mentioned Holzhausen in the context of the founding history, albeit without looking more closely at his background or his role and position from summer 1945 into the 1950s.

44. Holzhausen's résumé in *Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen Auswärtigen Dienstes*, vol. 2, ed. Gerhard Keiper and Martin Kröger (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005), 366–67.

45. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 3, Rudolf Holzhausen to an "editor-in-chief," July 19, 1945. To date, it is not clear from the context of the document which "editor-in-chief" was the addressee. The *Neue Zeitung* with its editor-in-chief Hans Habe (born János Békessy) as the most important entity established in the American zone only started publishing three months later, on October 18, 1945. Regarding Habe's predecessors, among whom Holzhausen's addressee at best could be conjectured, as well as the continuation of the story, see

Bernhard von Zech-Kleber, "Die Neue Zeitung," Historisches Lexikon Bayerns, last modified November 2, 2020, http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/Lexikon/Die_Neue_Zeitung.

46. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 3, Rudolf Holzhausen to an unnamed "editor-in-chief," July 19, 1945.

47. Ibid. Emphasis in indented quote in the original.

48. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 3, Rudolf Holzhausen, Suggestion for the establishment of a "Forschungs- und Aufklärungsstelle für die Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Zeit," October 7, 1946. On August 8, 1947, the organization committee of the Länderrat included Holzhausen on the list of proposed members of the Academic Advisory Board of the still to be established institute. IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fol. 2, Meeting concerning the "Institut zur Erforschung der Geschichte der Nationalsozialistischen Politik," October 16–17, 1947.

49. Kurt Sontheimer, "Ein deutscher Sonderweg?," in *Die Identität der Deutschen*, ed. Werner Weidenfeld (Munich: Hanser, 1983), 324–35, here 325–26. The following are illustrative of intellectual history: Barbara Beßlich, *Wege in den "Kulturkrieg": Zivilisationskritik in Deutschland 1890–1914* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000); Wolfgang Mommsen, ed., *Kultur und Krieg: Die Rolle der Intellektuellen, Künstler und Schriftsteller im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996); Wolfgang Mommsen, *Der große Krieg und die Historiker: Neue Wege der Geschichtsschreibung über den Ersten Weltkrieg* (Essen: Klartext, 2002). For more details on the political, diplomatic, and military aspects of this consciousness in German leadership, see Magnus Brechtken, *Scharnierzeit 1895–1907: Persönlichkeitsnetze und internationale Politik in den deutsch-britisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2006).

50. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 3, Rudolf Holzhausen, Suggestion for the establishment of a "Forschungs- und Aufklärungsstelle für die Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Zeit," October 7, 1946.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid. Italics in the original.

53. Ibid.

54. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 13–16, Rudolf Holzhausen, Preparations for the historiography of the "Third Reich," August 17, 1948.

55. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 20–21, Ministerial Councillor Rudolf Holzhausen to Senior Government Councillor Dr. Göttel, October 6, 1948.

56. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 31, Ministerial Councillor Fritz Baer to the Ministry of Culture in Stuttgart, December 1, 1948. Holzhausen's draft on "Preparations for the historiography of the 'Third Reich,'" dated August 17, was enclosed "confidentially for information."

57. As a member of the Parliamentary Council, Pfeiffer was present; the most important meetings about securing the institute were held in Bonn in the following twenty months. Here Holzhausen was officially established as the successor to Friedrich Glum, who had been in charge of institute matters at the Bavarian State Ministry. IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fol. 23, Minutes of a meeting of members of the Advisory Board of the Institute for Researching National Socialist Politics, December 8, 1948.

58. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 34–35, Record of the meeting of the representatives of the

four state ministries in the American occupation zone concerning the establishment of the "Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics" in Bonn on Wednesday, December 8, 1948.

59. Further minutes by Hermann Brill have survived: IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fols. 21–28, Minutes of a meeting of members of the Advisory Board [of the Institute] for Research on National Socialist Politics, December 8, 1948.

60. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 34–35, Record of the meeting of the representatives of the four state ministries in the American occupation zone concerning the establishment of the "Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics" in Bonn on Wednesday, December 8, 1948. Holzhausen's presentation is summarized in IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fols. 24–27, Minutes of a meeting of members of the Advisory Board [of the Institute] for Research on National Socialist Politics, December 8, 1948.

61. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 32–40, Minutes of a meeting of members of the Advisory Board of the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics in the building of the Parliamentary Council in Bonn, December 8, 1948. Until then the location of the institute had been disputed. The Bavarian government favored Munich, while others wanted a more central location in Germany (they spoke of "Northern Bavaria" but probably meant Franconia). But since premises had been provided in Munich this automatically became the location. It had also become clear that Theodor Eschenburg would not be available to be executive chairman: IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fol. 22, Minutes of a meeting of members of the Advisory Board of the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, December 8, 1948; IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 61, Hermann Brill, Memorandum regarding the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, April 12, 1949.

62. Auerbach, "Die Gründung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," 537; IfZ-Archiv, ED 105/2, fols. 53–60, Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Advisory Board and the Academic Advisory Board in the Bavarian State Ministry on February 28, 1949.

63. On February 1, 1949, Holzhausen had been sent to Frankfurt to serve in the administration of the Unified Economic Area (Bizonia), where he worked in the "organizational department for economic representations abroad," but he nevertheless participated as a representative of the Bavarian State Ministry in the Advisory Board meeting on February 28; afterward his role became obsolete because of Kroll, who had a higher ranking. After a brief spell in the Office of the Federal Chancellor in 1950, Holzhausen returned to the Foreign Office and became consul general and ambassador to South Africa: *Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen Auswärtigen Dienstes*, 2:367. Nevertheless, several months later Gerhard Ritter, who had met him on February 28, 1949, at the Advisory Board meeting, put his name forward for head of archives at the institute: IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 101, Gerhard Ritter, "Zur Organisation des 'Instituts zur Erforschung der nationalsozialistischen Politik,'" May 12, 1949. Ritter indicated that Holzhausen had expressed his interest in the position to him, which currently cannot be verified but, like many of Ritter's accounts, should be read with skepticism in the absence of any documented evidence.

64. On the discussion and broadening of this interpretation now, see Sonja Levsen, *Autorität und Demokratie: Eine Kulturgeschichte des Erziehungswandels in Westdeutschland und Frankreich 1945–1975* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2019).

65. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 34, Rudolf Holzhausen's record of the meeting of representatives of the four state ministries in the American occupation zone concerning the establishment of the "Institut zur Erforschung der nationalsozialistischen Politik" in Bonn on Wednesday, December 8, 1948.

66. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 61, Hermann Brill, Memorandum regarding the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, April 12, 1949. Back in 1947 Sattler had referred to the "Gesellschaft für die Dokumentation des Zeitgeschehens" (Society for the Documentation of Contemporary Events), which had been launched in Hamburg, as well as "an enterprise started by the Russians" in Berlin as competition: IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fol. 15, Minutes of the Advisory Board on the meeting of the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, November 25, 1947.

67. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 32–36, Record of the meeting of the four state ministries in the American occupation zone, December 8, 1948.

68. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 61, Hermann Brill, Memorandum regarding the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, April 12, 1949. The section about the influence of the US occupation force below provides more detail.

69. Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Stk 12997, Bavarian State Ministry, Dr. Schwarzmann, February 25, 1949.

70. IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fols. 29–38, Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the Advisory Board of the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, February 2, 1949.

71. Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Stk 12997, Bavarian State Ministry, Dr. Schwarzmann, February 25, 1949.

72. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 62, Hermann Brill, Memorandum regarding the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, April 12, 1949.

73. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 48, Correspondence from the Culture Ministry in Stuttgart to the Finance Ministry, March 23, 1949, with a detailed description of the background. The so-called Königstein Agreement was then finalized on March 24 at a meeting of the finance and culture ministers and came into force on April 1: IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 49–55, with the text of the state treaty and the budget for all Länder and institutions involved. Specifically, Carl Wagenhöfer, the representative of the Bavarian State Ministry of Finance, "suggested [including] the institute [in the treaty] with an annual subsidy of 120,000 DM."

74. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 68, Memorandum Carl Wagenhöfer, Bavarian State Ministry of Finance concerning the "Institut zur Erforschung der Politik des Nationalsozialismus," n.d. [April 1949]. For Wagenhöfer's biography see Historische Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed., *Das Kabinett Schäffer: 28. Mai bis 28. September 1945* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), 337n346.

75. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 57, Hermann Brill to Gerhard Kroll (with copy to Anton Pfeiffer), April 9, 1949. All members of the Advisory Board received a copy. Brill's anger can still be clearly read in the minutes of the Advisory Board meeting of May 30. These recorded how the decision regarding the institute had to be amended after the formation of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, which is why Hesse only participated in the Königstein Treaty for two years: IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fol. 40, Minutes of the 4th meeting of the Advisory Board of the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, May 30, 1949.

76. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 48, Culture Ministry in Stuttgart to the Finance Ministry, March 23, 1949.

77. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 58–62, Hermann Brill, Memorandum regarding the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, April 12, 1949.

78. From 1946 to 1948 Friedrich Glum was head of section in the Bavarian State Ministry.

79. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 59, Hermann Brill, Memorandum regarding the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, April 12, 1949.

80. The Minister-Presidents' Conference was held in Bad Godesberg on May 13, 1949: IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 106, Hermann Brill to Anton Pfeiffer, May 16, 1949.

81. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/3, fol. 5, Progress report (Alexander Schönwiese), n.d. [Spring 1950].

82. Ibid. The most influential outcome was a detailed *Spiegel* report that presented Kroll at the center of an energetic campaign: "Alles Papier zum Thema NS."

83. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 82, Richard Ringelmann, according to the minutes of the internal meeting on April 26, 1949.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 83, Hermann Brill, according to the minutes of the internal meeting on April 26, 1949.

88. Ibid.

89. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 83–84, Minutes of the internal meeting on April 26, 1949.

90. IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fols. 39–48, Minutes of the 4th meeting of the Advisory Board of the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, May 30, 1949. The publication of *Hitlers Tischgespräche* (Hitler's table talk) a year later was this "worst-case scenario."

91. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 122, Gerhard Kroll to the members of the Academic Advisory Board, June 21, 1949. A draft of the state treaty, an organizational chart, a budget plan for the year 1949/50, and a work plan are enclosed; furthermore, there is a chronological overview of the development of the institute, although it is not certain whether this was also sent: IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 123–41.

92. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 123–41.

93. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 158, Werner Hilpert (finance minister of Hesse) to Hermann Brill, July 9, 1949.

94. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 166–67, Gerhard Kroll to Werner Hilpert, July 28, 1949.

95. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 161–65, Gerhard Kroll to Minister-President Hans Ehard, July 26, 1949.

96. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 170–71, Gerhard Kroll to Eugen Mayer (Culture Ministry), July 28, 1949.

97. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 174, telegram from Hermann Brill to Gerhard Kroll, August 5, 1949; Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Wiesbaden, 502/3978, Office of the Minister-Presidents to the state ministries of the Länder, August 8, 1949.

98. The files record that the Federal Ministry of the Interior declared to the Bavarian minister-president in a letter of September 28, 1949, that the institute was "a matter for all of Germany." This is according to State Secretary Dieter Sattler in a meeting with Federal

Minister of the Interior Heinemann on March 1, 1950: IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/3, fol. 52, March 1, 1950.

99. This is summarized in Krause-Vilmar, "Hermann Brill und die Gründung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," 19–23.

100. Auerbach, "Die Gründung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," 534.

101. "Founded by the German government and the State of Bavaria *at the suggestion of the Allied Forces*, it was established in 1949 and renamed in 1952": "Institute of Contemporary History (Munich)," Wikipedia, accessed June 18, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institute_of_Contemporary_History_(Munich); my italics.

102. The connections between the institute and US institutions *after* its foundation, namely the consequences of Hermann Mau's journey to the United States, are a different topic, which should be analyzed separately from the history of the institute's foundation.

103. IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fol. 12, Minutes of a meeting of the Advisory Board of the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, November 25, 1947.

104. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 17, Anton Pfeiffer to Dr. Siegert, August 23, 1948 (draft). Pfeiffer also explicitly refers to the work of Rudolf Holzhausen here.

105. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 22, Fritz Baer to the Collecting Point agency, October 7, 1948.

106. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 29–30, Charles D. Winning, division director to Fritz Baer, ministerial councillor, Office of the Minister-President, Bavaria, November 30, 1948 (with a German translation).

107. Ibid.

108. "Alles Papier zum Thema NS."

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. IfZ-Archiv, ED 94/339, fol. 65, Memorandum: German Institute for the History of the National Socialist Period; Tasks and Foundation, dated by hand, September 14, 1950.

113. At the meeting on December 8, 1948, Brill requested a review of whether an allowance could be received "from the funds resulting from the operational profit of American licensed newspapers"—a further indication that real connections had still not been made: IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fol. 22, Minutes of a meeting of members of the Advisory Board of the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, December 8, 1948.

114. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 68, Memorandum from the Bavarian State Ministry of Finance concerning the "Institut zur Erforschung der Politik des Nationalsozialismus," n.d. [April 1949]. The memorandum stating that the establishment of the institute reflected the wish of the US military government was clearly written around the time of the *Spiegel* article and follows its narrative. Bavarian Culture Minister Alois Hundhammer, for his part, reported to Kroll that he had been in contact with Dorn, a relevant adviser to Lucius Clay, whom he also recommended to Kroll: IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 75, Alois Hundhammer to Gerhard Kroll, April 19, 1949.

115. The documents include the draft of a letter from the institute to OMGUS (Office of Military Government for Germany) dated May 1949, in which US financial support was to be requested. The reason for the draft was a letter to Bavarian Culture Minister Hundham-

mer dated May 3, 1949, in which the institute was favorably mentioned. At the meeting of the Advisory Board on May 30, Kroll said, "OMGUS Berlin has declared that it is prepared to support the institute in regard to the acquisition of material, however, not financially in order not to awaken any suspicion of influence": IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fol. 40, Minutes of the 4th meeting of the Advisory Board of the Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics, May 30, 1949.

116. Cornelißen, *Gerhard Ritter*; Klaus Schwabe and Rolf Reichardt, eds., *Gerhard Ritter: Ein politischer Historiker in seinen Briefen* (Boppard: H. Boldt, 1984); Schulze, *Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945*, 159–82; Matthias Berg, "Institutionelle Erbschaften? Zur Wiedergründung des Deutschen Historikerverbandes nach 1945," in Elvert, *Geschichte jenseits der Universität*, 53–72; Matthias Berg et al., *Die versammelte Zunft: Historikerverband und Historikertage in Deutschland 1893–2000*, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2018), 308–58.

117. On August 8, 1947, the organization committee of the Länderrat had drafted a list of proposed candidates that included Ritter; however, "doubts" about him (as well as about Theodor Heuss) were voiced and the Advisory Board did not include him in the list of candidates for the Academic Advisory Board: IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fol. 8, Meeting concerning the "Institut zur Erforschung der Geschichte der Nationalsozialistischen Politik," October 16–17, 1947.

118. These few examples are taken from Gerhard Ritter, "Gegenwärtige Lage und Zukunftsaufgaben deutscher Geschichtswissenschaft: Eröffnungsvortrag des 20. Deutschen Historikertages in München am 12. September 1949," *Historische Zeitschrift* 170, no. 1 (1950): 1–22, here 6, 7, 18.

119. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 38–42, Memorandum regarding the systematic reorganization of academic studies on contemporary history by Professor Gerhard Ritter, 1st Chairman of the Deutscher Historikerverband [German Historical Association], n.d. [March (?) 1949]; the date of Spring 1949 is evident from the other files.

120. In particular, Hermann Aubin and Hermann Heimpel, who were elected together with Ritter to the leadership of the Deutscher Historikerverband: "20. Versammlung deutscher Historiker in München: 12.–15. Sept. 1949," *Historische Zeitschrift* 169, no. 1 (1949): 668–70, here 669.

121. See, for example, his closing comments in Ritter, *Europa und die deutsche Frage*, 193–200.

122. Ibid., 193–94.

123. Ibid., 199.

124. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 38–42, Memorandum regarding the systematic reorganization of academic studies on contemporary history by Professor Gerhard Ritter, n.d. [1949].

125. Ibid. For example, Ritter's naivety is clear in the following assertion: "German research centers probably also have better chances of discovering the true facts from those involved than a foreigner would. Eyewitnesses still alive today and Third Reich functionaries will (if at all) be more prepared *to tell the truth* to German historians, who are interviewing them purely for research purposes (and with the most exacting expertise!) than foreign judicial officials who act as criminal investigators. The importance of such memoir material as a supplement to written documentation can hardly be overestimated, especially in recent history" (fol. 40; my italics).

126. Ibid., fols. 38–42.

127. IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fol. 8, Meeting concerning the "Institut zur Erforschung der Geschichte der Nationalsozialistischen Politik," October 16–17, 1947.

128. IfZ-Archiv, ID 3/1, fol. 18, Minutes of the Advisory Board, November 25, 1947. At the first discussion of the Academic Advisory Board, Brill "withdrew his objections" because the Bavarian representative, Friedrich Glum, spoke up for Ritter.

129. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 65–67, Gerhard Kroll to Minister-President Hans Ehard, April 16, 1948. The name change was to be effected by the minister-presidents in the founding deed. In April 1949 *Der Spiegel* also reported from the internal discussions that it was "to be renamed 'Institute for Contemporary History' as soon as possible. One doesn't want to erect a memorial to National Socialism through the name": "Alles Papier zum Thema NS." Most likely Kroll himself had shared these considerations in his conversations with the *Spiegel* journalists.

130. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 69–74, Gerhard Ritter, On the necessity of accelerating the establishment of a central institute of recent history, April 18, 1949. Furthermore, Ritter provided an outline of the organizational and research tasks. He envisaged four departments: first, general organization and administration plus economic history; second, a "historical evaluation and journalism" department; third, a "collection of documents and memoirs"; and fourth, a library. Regarding the areas of work, the omissions are particularly conspicuous: it is only in a subitem about "background" since the nineteenth century that the development of racial ideology in Germany is referred to at all, and in this connection Ritter mentions the terms "Wagnerism" and antisemitism as topics to be treated as "special tasks outside the institute." For the Nazi era, the persecution of the Jews is listed only as one of twenty subitems and classed as domestic policy; other groups of victims are not mentioned at all. There is not a word or topic proposal regarding the extermination policy during the war, let alone the Holocaust.

131. Ibid., fols. 69–70.

132. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fols. 101–2, Gerhard Ritter, "Zur Organisation des 'Instituts zur Erforschung der nationalsozialistischen Politik,'" May 12, 1949.

133. Ritter suggested "Institute (or research office) for recent German history" as the new name. "The current name is extremely cumbersome and furthermore gives the impression that it is a political undertaking to record new horror stories": ibid. The question of the name change continued to occupy the institute for many months. While Ritter, Kroll, Bergsträsser, and Speidel wanted to see the term "National Socialism" disappear, Theodor Heuss was in favor of keeping it: IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 142, Theodor Heuss to Gerhard Kroll, June 24, 1949.

134. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 101, Gerhard Ritter, "Zur Organisation des 'Instituts zur Erforschung der nationalsozialistischen Politik,'" May 12, 1949.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid. Ritter nominated Heinrich von zur Mühlen, Dierk Oncken, and Jochen Dittrich. Furthermore, he proposed General Waldemar Erfurth and Colonel General Heinrici as military history staff. In addition, he said the institute should have some kind of "honorary president" with special contacts with the United States in order to use these connections to get archive materials returned. For this position, Ritter suggested the former Reich chancellor Hans Luther ("a personal acquaintance of mine").

137. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 160, Hermann Brill to Gerhard Kroll, July 13, 1949.

138. Gerhard Ritter, *Machtstaat und Utopie: Vom Streit um die Dämonie der Macht seit Machiavelli und Morus* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1940). In it Ritter had styled himself as a desk warrior, raved about "witnessing immensely exciting historical events," that is, the war against France, and added, "It is no coincidence that this text was written in the middle of the war and just behind the front on our Siegfried Line": preface, 4. See Cornelißen, *Gerhard Ritter*, 316–26.

139. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/1, fol. 160, Hermann Brill to Gerhard Kroll, July 13, 1949. Cornelißen, *Gerhard Ritter*, 536, quotes from several letters that Ritter wrote to colleagues in summer 1949. Their recurring polemic, in particular against Kroll but also against the ministerial bureaucracy, is primarily a reflection of the powerless nature of the organizational and decision-making processes in practice. They highlight the fact that the historians were primarily objects of an institutionalization to which they adapted, instead of creatively shaping it themselves.

140. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fols. 6–7, Leo Wohleb (state president of Baden) to the Office of the Minister-Presidents, September 11, 1949.

141. Ibid.

142. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fols. 8–11, Amendment proposal for the state treaty concerning the research institute "for Researching National Socialism" (with handwritten note from "Prof. Ritter"), September 1949.

143. Ibid., fol. 11.

144. The head of the State Ministry in Baden, Clemens von Brentano, had already informed Kroll of Ritter's influence at the opening of the Bundestag: IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fol. 77, Gerhard Kroll to Theodor Heuss, September 23, 1949. Together with Brill and Kroll, Brentano was one of Ritter's opponents.

145. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fols. 13–16, undated draft of a statement, evidently by Gerhard Kroll, n.d. [September 1949].

146. Petra Weber, *Getrennt und doch vereint: Deutsch-deutsche Geschichte 1945–1989/90* (Berlin: Metropol, 2020), 432.

147. Ritter, "Gegenwärtige Lage und Zukunftsaufgaben," 19.

148. Ibid.

149. "20. Versammlung deutscher Historiker in München," 670.

150. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fols. 1–3, Dieter Sattler to Theodor Heuss, draft, n.d. [immediately after the German Historians' Conference in September 1949].

151. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fols. 65–67, Denkschrift über die Gründung eines Instituts zur Erforschung des Nationalsozialismus, n.d.; italics in the original. From Kroll's answer it appears that it was made public after the Historians' Conference. It can also be found in Goetz's papers: no. 49, n.d., Walter Goetz Papers, Federal Archives Koblenz, N 1215.

152. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fol. 78, Kroll to Anton Pfeiffer, September 23, 1949.

153. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fols. 29–53, 68–75, Statement of the German Institute for Research on National Socialist Politics on a position paper by Privy Councilor, Professor Dr. Goetz; the version signed by Kroll dated September 20, 1949.

154. When the Historical Commission met in September 1947, it addressed the topic of establishing an institute. Gerhard Ritter attended as a representative for research into National

Socialism. However, the commission does not really play a role in regard to the practical establishment of the institute in October nor in its founding history, which is examined in this article. In this regard see also Schulze, *Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945*, 231–32; Lothar Gall, "Die Historische Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und die Gründung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," in *Geschichtswissenschaft und Zeiterkenntnis: Von der Aufklärung bis zur Gegenwart; Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Horst Möller*, ed. Klaus Hildebrand, Udo Wengst, and Andreas Wirsching (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), 559–67. Gall writes that after the meeting of the organization committee for the foundation of the institute on August 6, 1947, in Stuttgart, "the Bavarian side approached the Historical Commission, i.e., its president Walter Goetz," and "asked it to advise and support the project from an academic point of view, and at the same time to take it under its wing in one form or another." Gall, "Die Historische Kommission," 559. In reality, no evidence of "advice and support" or other practical influence can be found thereafter.

155. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fol. 74, Gerhard Kroll's statement, September 20, 1949.

156. IfZ-Archiv, ID 2/1, fols. 76–77, Gerhard Kroll to Theodor Heuss, September 23, 1949.

157. Ibid. A copy with a personal accompanying letter was sent to the new federal minister of justice, Thomas Dehler, with whom Kroll was friends. Dehler observed the development and concluded that Kroll's discussion with Heuss "has already positively resolved the matter of your institute": IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fol. 108, Thomas Dehler to Gerhard Kroll, October 11, 1949. During these days, Kroll made use of numerous other personal contacts in order to put "pressure" on the Länder so that they would declare their participation in the state treaty. From Berlin, which was the only federal state that had already approved the state treaty, he requested the speedy transfer of 10,000 DM: IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fol. 86, Gerhard Kroll to Ernst Reuter, September 23, 1949. In the meantime Reuter had discovered that Baden had rejected joining, and he wanted to know what the position of the other Länder was, of which he was clearly unaware. He said he would need to bring up the matter with the Berlin magistrate once again: IfZ-Archiv, ID 2/1, fol. 106, Ernst Reuter to Gerhard Kroll, September 29, 1949.

158. Not only did he receive no support from Dieter Sattler and Hermann Brill, but Ministerial Director Karl Heinrich Knappstein from Frankfurt likewise took a position clearly opposing Ritter. "I believe it is time to reject the rather arrogant and furthermore antiquated notions of some academics that a politician, or rather a political person, would be a priori academically inferior and unobjective." Instead, Knappstein feared that "turning over responsibility for researching National Socialism entirely to so-called pure historical scholarship would be tantamount to burying the purpose of the institute desired by the minister-presidents": IfZ-Archiv, ID 2/1, fols. 88–89, Karl Heinrich Knappstein to Gerhard Kroll, September 28, 1949; in a similar vein, Member of the Bundestag Robert Philipp Nöll von der Nahmer to Gerhard Kroll, in ID 1/2, fol. 109, October 12, 1949.

159. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fols. 90–91, Interior Minister Gustav Heinemann to Minister-President Hans Ehard, September 29, 1949.

160. Kroll had initially hoped for interim funding of 150,000 DM from the federal government. Schäffer organized funding of 212,000 DM from October 10, 1949, to June 1, 1950:

IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fols. 98–103, Gerhard Kroll to Fritz Schäffer, October 4, 1949, and Wilhelm Laforet to Gerhard Kroll, October 4, 1949.

161. By the end of October, only Berlin and Württemberg-Hohenzollern had declared their participation. Lower Saxony, Hamburg, Hesse, and Württemberg-Baden declared they wanted to wait until the participation of the federal government had been clarified: IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fols. 126–27, Minister-President Hans Ehard to Federal Minister of the Interior Gustav Heinemann, October 28, 1949.

162. Using his contacts, Kroll clearly also managed to place several articles in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, which argued in favor of the institute: "500.000 DM gesucht," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 14, 1949; "Streiflicht," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 15/16, 1949, in which it stated: "At the moment, the institute is simply some office furniture in silently waiting premises. What an argument for the anti-German forces lurking out there! [. . .] In the USA, there have already been loud voices asking the Rockefeller Institute for help for this major project. However, the latter must first be convinced by a German initiative that we do want to know the full unbiased truth about our past; that we don't want to 'repress' it or are minded to continue carrying it in ourselves as a secret emotional poison. We cannot yet pursue a foreign policy in its literal sense. However, the creation of the institute would prove that we have recognized how many options nevertheless remain open to us to do this."

163. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fol. 131, Gerhard Kroll, Memorandum on various consultations in Bonn concerning putting the German Institute for Research on National Socialism under the auspices of the federal government, November 7, 1949.

164. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fol. 134, Anton Pfeiffer, telegram to Gerhard Kroll, November 13, 1949.

165. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fol. 137, Bavarian Finance Ministry to Bavarian Ministry of Culture, December 6, 1949.

166. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fol. 140, Interior Minister Gustav Heinemann to Minister-President Hans Ehard, December 7, 1949; the monthly grant was only 6,000 DM. A letter saying Bavaria was prepared "to pay a monthly grant of 60,000 DM provided that the headquarters of the institute remained in Munich, that Bavaria was granted a seat and vote on the Advisory Board, and that the presented charter and the size of the budget were not changed substantially" was clearly not issued: IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/2, fols. 143–46.

167. The participants were: Federal Minister of the Interior Gustav Heinemann; State Secretary Erich Wende, head of Department III (cultural matters of the federal government); Gerhard Ritter (for the Verband der Historiker Deutschlands (Association of German historians); Erich Kaufmann (University of Munich); Wolfgang Abendroth (Hochschule für Arbeit, Politik und Wirtschaft—University for Labor, Politics and Economics—Wilhelmshaven); Dieter Sattler (as state secretary in Munich's Culture Ministry); Bernhard Vollmer (as chairman of the Deutsche Archivausschuss—German Archive Committee); Ludwig Bergsträsser (as member of the Bundestag and member of the Advisory Board); Phillip Auerbach (as president of the Bayerische Landesentschädigungsamt—Bavarian Office for Restitution—Munich); Gerhard Kroll for the institute; Hermann Brill (as state secretary and chairman of the Advisory Board); Wilhelm Winkler (as general director of the Bavarian State Archives); Hans-

Georg Nullmeyer for the Interior Ministry of Lower Saxony in Hanover; and Ellinor von Puttkamer for the Federal Ministry of Justice.

168. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/3, fol. 66, Gerhard Kroll in the transcript of the meeting regarding a "Deutsches Institut zur Erforschung der nationalsozialistischen Zeit," March 1, 1950.

169. Ibid.

170. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/3, fols. 67–68, Hermann Brill in the transcript of the meeting regarding a "Deutsches Institut zur Erforschung der nationalsozialistischen Zeit," March 1, 1950.

171. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/3, fols. 55–70, Gustav Heinemann in the transcript of the meeting regarding a "Deutsches Institut zur Erforschung der nationalsozialistischen Zeit," March 1, 1950.

172. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/3, fols. 64–72, Transcript of the meeting regarding a "Deutsches Institut zur Erforschung der nationalsozialistischen Zeit," March 1, 1950. Afterward there were still misunderstandings about the division between the federal government and the Länder, which Sattler clarified. A compromise was also reached on the eternal question of funding, according to which, as of April 1, 1950, the federal government and Bavaria were each to pay 6,000 DM per month, "as an advance payment for the envisaged annual payment" until the federal budget was passed for 1950/51: IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/3, fol. 82, Dieter Sattler to Federal Minister of the Interior Gustav Heinemann, March 11, 1950.

173. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/3, fol. 94, Dieter Sattler to Erich Wende, list of proposed members for the Academic Advisory Board, April 5, 1950. Theodor Heuss was intended as honorary president. The other members suggested were Philipp Auerbach, Ludwig Bergsträsser, Constantin von Dietze, Ernst von Hippel, Erich Kaufmann, Eugen Kogon, Franz Schnabel, Hans Speidel, Wilhelm Winkler, and Emil Dovifat. Sattler wrote that the composition of the board was of "extraordinary importance," and he wanted to clarify "pertinent matters in conversation with you [. . .] in particular with regard to Professor Ritter": ibid., fol. 93.

174. IfZ-Archiv, ID 1/3, fol. 86, Hans Speidel to Gerhard Kroll, March 17, 1950.

175. Henke, *Geheime Dienste*, 547.

176. BND-Archiv, 122733, fols. 1554–56, Wolfgang Langkau (30d), Memorandum on the discussion between Gehlen (30) with Kroll (J-1835) dated February 8, 1950. For more detail see Henke, *Geheime Dienste*, 543–50.

177. IfZ-Archiv, ED 94/339, fol. 66, Note: German Institute for the History of the National Socialist Period; Tasks and Foundation, dated by hand, September 14, 1950.

178. Ibid.

179. Palm, "Auf der Suche nach dem starken Staat," 614–19.

180. At its core was the scandal of the so-called table talk. On this with many new details and, specifically, on the scandal's impact, see Nilsson, *Hitler Redux*; as mentioned I shall deal with the period of Mau and Ritter in detail in an article to be published in a volume dedicated to the occasion of the Institute's 75th anniversary in autumn 2024.

Research in the Service of the Law

Martin Broszat and the Compensation of Jewish Holocaust Survivors from Romania, 1955–65

GAËLLE FISHER

The compensation of hundreds of thousands of survivors of the Holocaust by the Federal Republic of Germany was an unprecedented, complex, and controversial legal process. In the early 1950s, the question of who should be held responsible for the persecution of the Jews in the territory under Romanian control during the war developed into a major area of dispute among survivors, their representatives, and West German compensation authorities. In this context, historical experts, including historians from the Institute for Contemporary History—first and foremost Martin Broszat—came to play an instrumental role in decisions about compensation claims. While focusing on the case of Romania, Gaëlle Fisher's article explores a wider set of tensions between the writing of history and the application of law.

Exploring "Uncharted Territory"

In January 1957 Martin Broszat submitted a more than one-hundred-page expert report (*Gutachten*) titled "The Third Reich and Romanian Policy toward the Jews."[1] Since joining the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ—Institute for Contemporary History) in Munich two years earlier, he had already written several such reports. The institute was in great demand at the time, with numerous institutions and public authorities requesting its expertise. And, as a rule, it was the younger staff members who were tasked with preparing the written opinions. Still, among the many generally very short reports, what came to be known as Broszat's "Romania Gutachten" stands out, not only on account of its length but also because of its complex subject matter and grave implications. Broszat was asked to grapple with the question "whether and to what extent the measures taken by the Romanian state to deprive Jews of their liberty can be regarded as having been instigated by the German Reich."[2] His expert report

thus addressed "the degree of Romanian dependence on Germany in foreign and domestic policy," a controversial issue among historians at the time.[3] But in addition, it dealt with the still barely researched issue of the German Reich's role in the sequence of events that we call the Holocaust in Romania—a series of crimes to which between 280,000 and 380,000 people fell victim between 1940 and 1944.[4] And the significance of these questions was not merely historiographical, but juridical and political as well. Indeed, this report contributed to a debate of major concern to the West German compensation authorities at the time, and Broszat's answers were to largely determine whether the Federal Republic of Germany was liable to compensate tens of thousands of Jewish Holocaust survivors from Romania.[5]

Broszat's "Romania Gutachten" soon became a central document for legal practice in West Germany. Compensation authorities used it for several decades, with jurists, legal counsel, and public prosecutors referring to it frequently, and it ultimately helped many victims obtain compensation. In the report, the young historian provided a detailed and nuanced account of events in the various territories under Romanian control during the war. However, his conclusion and his answer to whether Germany was responsible for what happened in Romania were unequivocal. He stated: "It is undeniable and clear from the documents cited as evidence that Romanian antisemitism and Romanian compliance contributed to the anti-Jewish legislation and persecution of Jews in Romania." However, in his view, the "decisive historical cause" should be sought "in the Jewish policies of the Third Reich." As the "superior power," the German Reich had "assumed the leadership when it came to policies toward Jews in the entire territory under its control"; it had "consciously made antisemitism the aim of its foreign policy too and one of the guiding principles for the creation of a 'new order' in Europe."[6]

Published in a collection of *Gutachten* from the IfZ in 1958, Broszat's report also made an important contribution to historiography. To be sure, the text reflects the state of knowledge in the 1950s, and the reliance on primarily German-language literature and sources limits its significance.[7] But it is still cited in relevant studies today,[8] and at the time it was written Broszat was unquestionably venturing into "uncharted territory."[9] As Sybille Steinbacher has asserted, the commissioning of such reports enabled him to investigate underresearched areas such as the persecution and mass murder of the European Jews and the history of southeastern Europe. In addition, Broszat, who was later to become the director of the IfZ, pursued early on the goal of placing contemporary history on a par with other branches of the discipline. The questions and issues that arose in connection with authoring such reports of-

fered him an opportunity to make a name for himself and for his field.[10] Later on, too, these reports continued to be regarded at the IfZ as "pioneering work" and as "comprehensive accounts." The rigorous pursuit of the facts and the rational and "sober" approach were seen as having contributed in crucial ways to making contemporary history a respected academic specialization in Germany.[11]

But can the historiographical contribution of such opinions be so neatly separated from their legal purpose? In other words, are the goals, methods, and functions of historical research and the administration of justice really so readily compatible? This is highly doubtful. Indeed, were it not for the unsettled issue of compensation, Broszat would probably never have turned his attention to the subject of Romania; after all, he was not even at liberty to formulate the main research question. Moreover, the relationship between the law and history is a notoriously uneasy one.[12] Whereas historical scholarship endeavors to challenge certainties through revision, reevaluation, and the raising of objections and to sift through various plausible and even coexisting scenarios, the law seeks to establish the truth and hence strives for unambiguous, straightforward, and normative explanations. This pairing thus even poses the danger of a "collision" between legal and historiographical lines of argumentation.[13] Last but not least, for all their scholarly value, such expert reports were undoubtedly subject to the influence of the sociopolitical climate of the time, in addition to the juridical context. Here the broader complex of *Wiedergutmachung* and its politics, namely various policies of reparation, restitution, and redress for the victims of the National Socialist crimes and their perception, deserves special mention.[14] Expert reports were part of a wider attempt to reckon with the Nazi past. Thus, whether they liked it or not, anyone involved in writing such reports automatically joined the ranks of those actors in the young Federal Republic who were concerned with, and involved in, the politics of memory, or what Norbert Frei has called the "politics of the past."[15] In this regard, the authors of such opinions were breaking new ground, not just historiographically but also societally, and not only in terms of content but also in terms of history's methodology and purpose.

Taking Martin Broszat's 1957 "Romania Gutachten" and the compensation of Jewish Holocaust survivors from Romania as a starting point, this article addresses the following questions: Why did reparations in the young Federal Republic of Germany require expert reports? What approach did the historians compiling these texts adopt? How did they arrive at their conclusions? And what practical relevance did this expertise have? Further, what was the historians' attitude toward the scholarly, political, and ethical demands placed

on them, and how could they manage to do equal justice to all of them? Finally, how did this type of historical research in the service of the law, and the participation of historians in compensation in general, affect the development of contemporary history research?[16]

In the following sections, I first turn to the state of research before considering the concurent development of compensation law and growing need for historical expertise. Using the example of Romania, I then examine how Broszat obtained his information and how he became an expert in this field. Finally, I look at his efforts to influence compensation practice, as well as the alliances and frictions that arose in the course of his research on Romania. This article thus casts light on the role of West German historians in the first two decades after the war and on an early and specific form of Holocaust research.

Expert Reports as a Subject of Research

For many years the expert reports prepared by historians went largely unnoticed. Even the more than 9,000 such opinions produced by the IfZ over the course of several decades received limited attention for many years, with only a few prominent exceptions.[17] Particularly in the 1960s, when such activity reached a peak at around 600 reports each year, they were largely viewed by those tasked with writing them as a burdensome duty that the IfZ, as a publicly financed institution, was obliged to fulfill.[18] For this reason the opinions and the process of preparing them played only a minor role in the institute's history, or pertained rather to the individual level, when academics took stock of their work at the end of a long career.[19]

Only rarely have contemporary history researchers reflected publicly on this activity. The first and probably the only time that Martin Broszat wrote about his role "in court" was in the mid-1970s.[20] At that time he stated that he had perceived the task "rather like [that of] the medical or psychological expert," in that he did not set out "to prove guilt or innocence." The historian, by virtue of his profession, was able to "assist the court in its legal deliberations" but could not "relieve it of this task or preempt its conclusions." Ultimately, Broszat wrote, "history can best serve the search for truth [. . .] if it sticks to its own historical notions and does not bow to the schematic nature of legal conceptualization." As a historian he had sought to clarify the historical background to the best of his knowledge, even if it was impossible to present complete evidence. In his opinion, it was not his job to define legal concepts, let alone to establish personal responsibility or legal entitlement for the courts. By viewing his task in this light, Broszat believed he could remain faithful to the

principles and standards of historical research, and he did not regard these as having been compromised or constrained by the limits of the law—quite the opposite.

In an obituary in 1990, Ludolf Herbst wrote that Broszat had considered the writing of such expert reports to be "the high art of contemporary history research." It had led him "into the various areas of the [study of the] Third Reich, honed his linguistic and methodological precision, and forced him to actively engage with the issues." "Anyone who wanted to write expert reports at that time," the deputy director of the IfZ went on, "had to leave the narrow confines of the subject-specific ivory tower" and be prepared to reach a compromise between academic purism and sociopolitical responsibility," which Broszat had, throughout his life, regarded as "the genuine task of the contemporary historian."[21]

In both formal and functional terms, these expert reports were in tune with an understanding of research in contemporary history as both a "sociopolitical task" and scientifically objective "critical educational work," an understanding that prevailed at the IfZ in its early years.[22] As Annette Weinke has emphasized, the IfZ saw its primary mission as facilitating the Germans' "reappropriation of their own history."[23] In that sense, efforts were made to approach the past in a way that departed from the punitive tone of the victorious powers' "Nuremberg historiography." The writing of expert reports favored the empirical, source-led approach that would later become characteristic of West German contemporary history research in general and was guided by a concern with causality and the question of how Nazi institutions had operated.[24] At the same time the research for expert reports in particular involved a high degree of forensic investigation, thus constraining historical research in a framework of legal norms. Moreover, given the often difficult task of obtaining sources, the compilers of such opinions often had no choice but to draw on the wider context of Nazi rule in order to form judgments.[25] In the end, then, there was a fundamental and inevitable tension between the yearning for objectivity and the necessity of adopting clear positions.

Only recently has this dilemma become the focus of more sustained attention, with both the reports and the task of producing expert reports itself now being the object of historical research. No one to date has specifically examined opinions with respect to compensation claims, despite their making up most of the reports written by the IfZ. But those that were prepared for use in the major trials of persons charged with committing Nazi crimes have elicited a great deal of interest.[26] A survey of the research literature on this subject yields two main claims: The first is that "an 'expert's history' [. . .] designed

to influence a legal outcome" and "shaped by the needs of the requestor" has major limitations.[27] By nature the jurist's search for legal certainty is at odds with the historian's quest for knowledge, which seeks to arrive at understanding through interpretation. While historical and juridical investigations may concern themselves with the same subjects and sets of questions, therefore, they inevitably reach divergent and sometimes irreconcilable conclusions.[28] The second claim is that the drafting of expert reports itself may be understood as an opportunity or a learning process.[29] In her essay focusing on the practice of preparing expert reports, Steinbacher proposed that the work done by young historians not only offered them a chance to gain expertise in little-investigated fields of research but also taught them to write concise and precisely formulated scholarly texts.[30] Nicolas Berg likewise emphasized that, in preparing such opinions, Broszat and others were already required to answer important historical questions "even before they had produced their own research findings."[31] Berg even suggested that this approach, later known as functionalism, might ultimately be traced back to the spirit in which the historians at the IfZ had perceived their role.[32]

In the 1980s the scholarly examination of the legal, political, and diplomatic aspects of West German reparations slowly got underway.[33] Since then, much research in this area has been inspired by interdisciplinary, comparative, and transnational studies and approaches, which have broadened the perspective on how "material justice" might be achieved[34] Historians have, for example, examined how diverse the views of compensation payments often are, as well as the divergent expectations and roles that the various parties involved might have.[35] Sociologists, on the other hand, have contributed research into later compensation advocacy and emphasized the tendency, in Germany and elsewhere, to be in favor of reparations as well as the importance of the nexus between compensation, transitional justice, and reconciliation.[36] Nowadays, research on the legal, administrative, and political aspects of *Wiedergutmachung* is increasingly being superseded by work on the moral and symbolic dimensions.[37] But even if the issue of what constitutes "just" and "commensurate" compensation is the focus of most studies, the role of the expert historian in this process remains largely unclear.

This aspect is of particular significance here, and it raises some intriguing issues. For example, although a thorough reconstruction of events is imperative, there is always the danger of importing the categories, principles, and perfidious logic employed in the context of a crime into legal decisions or judgments, and thus of perpetuating the injustices committed in the past or even giving rise to new injustices.[38] This problem is what made it necessary to resort to expert re-

ports when seeking to pass judgment in the first place. Still, that solution in turn confronted those preparing such reports with particular challenges. In addition, as numerous studies of West German postwar history have shown, the politics of *Wiedergutmachung* were constantly changing. In the early years of the Federal Republic, compensation payments were regarded as unavoidable foreign policy obligations and hence tended to be viewed as a means of offsetting guilt through monetary means rather than acknowledging it.[39] Only in the late 1950s did a long and slow process begin that ultimately culminated in a radically different attitude toward the victims and hence also to the question of compensation.[40] These attitudes, which naturally include those of expert historians, must therefore be examined against the backdrop of changing historical settings, including the evolution of compensation policy and law.

Compensation Law and the Need for Expert Reports

Even before the war ended, the Allies had begun discussing how victims of the Nazi regime should be compensated and their stolen property restored to them. Because there was no precedent for such a complex task, those charged with carrying it out were forced to experiment, and they took years to arrive at a functioning procedure.[41] The first steps were immediate measures that the Allies took in their respective zones of occupation.[42] In 1952 Chancellor Konrad Adenauer signed the Luxembourg Agreement, in which the Federal Republic of Germany committed to make reparations payments to the State of Israel. However, this was an international agreement, which did not cover the individual claims of those persecuted by the Nazi regime or of Holocaust survivors, whether they lived in Israel, the United States, or West Germany.

In response to demands, particularly by German citizens, the Bundestag in September 1953 passed the *Bundesergänzungsgesetz zur Entschädigung der Opfer nationalsozialistischer Verfolgung* (Supplementary Federal Law for the Compensation of the Victims of National Socialist Persecution—*BErgG*). As the law had been hastily prepared at the end of the first legislative period and was beset with shortcomings right from the start, a Reparations Committee was formed to revise the *BErgG* following the federal elections. The work of this committee culminated in the passage in 1956 of the *Bundesentschädigungsgesetz* (Federal Compensation Law—*BEG*), which came into force retroactively on October 1, 1953.[43] Although the *BEG* likewise met with fierce criticism and consequently was regularly commented on and interpreted, it was revised only once—and conclusively—in 1965 in the so-called *BEG-Schlussgesetz* (*BEG* Final Law), which forms the basis for recognizing compensation claims to this day.

From the outset one of the biggest challenges of compensation law was the question of entitlement. According to the *BEG*, persons were entitled to compensation if "for reasons of political opposition to National Socialism or reasons of race, faith, or worldview they had been persecuted by the National Socialist regime."[44] At first glance this definition may appear rather broad, but in fact the law excluded a whole series of victim groups, such as forced laborers, foreign workers, certain categories of concentration camp prisoners, and prisoners of war. According to the provisions of the *BEG*, these groups were not victims of targeted Nazi persecution but had suffered damage as a result of the war, something that was classified under "general consequences of war."[45] Moreover, most foreigners were excluded from individual compensation because the *BEG* was tailored to domestic policy and was primarily intended for Germans persecuted by the regime—and not, for example, specifically for Jewish victims of the Holocaust. The law did not expressly mention citizenship but instead required "a territorial connection,"[46] and for the specific case of expelled persecutees (*vertriebene Verfolgte*), the requirement of belonging to the German linguistic and cultural circle (*deutscher Sprach- und Kulturkreis*) was added. Essentially, the territorial requirement meant that only persons (1) who had been living within the 1937 borders of the German Reich at the time they were persecuted or (2) who were living in West Germany after 1945 (the cut-off point was December 31, 1952) were entitled to compensation. Under the provisions of the *BEG*, claimants residing abroad could for the most part press their claims only if they had been detained in a German concentration camp, including so-called foreign detention (*Auslandshaft*)—an improvement over the *BErgG*.

This starting point raised several problems. First of all, most of the victims of the Nazi regime had not been German, and many Nazi crimes had been committed outside the borders of the Reich. Around half of the 1.2 million applications for compensation submitted by 1955 came from abroad.[47] Yet not even 10 percent of payments were made abroad.[48] Second, there were glaring inconsistencies. Whereas displaced persons living in West Germany after the war were expressly included in the scheme, Jewish survivors living in Eastern Europe in 1953 were automatically excluded. Finally, the concept of the "German linguistic and cultural circle" absurdly forced many survivors to prove their cultural affiliation with their oppressors and led to awkward debates about identity.[49]

In general the legal provisions produced a whole series of contested cases, encouraged the rejection of claims, and favored inconsistent, inefficient, and unfair compensation procedures. The major discrepancy between the narrow legal parameters and the scope of Nazi persecution[50] resulted in an equal-

ly wide gulf between the political and moral goals of compensation and its practical effects. Over time the legislation was modified so that persons who had emigrated from Eastern Europe after 1953 became eligible, thanks to an amendment of the *BEG-Schlussgesetz* dating from 1965. The implementation of the obligation to prove one's affinity with the German language and German culture also became less strict over time.[51] But this by no means solved all the problems. On the contrary, the widening of the terms of eligibility engendered an increasing number of controversial cases.

Altogether some five million applications for compensation were submitted. Damage suffered was divided into seven different categories: loss of life; bodily damage or damage to health; deprivation of liberty (detention); loss of property; loss of assets; damage incurred through the imposition of special levies and the like; and damage to employment prospects or professional advancement. Each of these categories was the object of various forms of compensation—whether lump sums or continuous pension payments––so that those with multiple eligibilities had to submit a separate application for each offense committed against them. Multiple applications were received from many foreigners who were unaware or had not understood that "deprivation of liberty" was the sole form of damage for which they could press claims. In addition, following the change in the law in 1965, some victims resubmitted their claims for compensation.[52] Regula Ludi summed up the situation thus: "It cannot be denied that German reparations were the result of permanent negotiations between representatives of the victims and of the perpetrator society. But it was always those who paid who set the terms of trade."[53] Such unequal power relationships were evident on all levels, starting from the forms that applicants had to complete all the way to the criteria that they had to fulfill, which gave the victims the feeling that they were "beggars at the Germans' door."[54]

To add to this, implementing the *BEG* was a highly complex administrative process that involved a vast bureaucracy organized at the level of the federal states, in keeping with West Germany's federal structure.[55] As a result, there was scarcely any communication between the compensation offices in the different states, and the confusing organizational structures and procedures made it hard for the victims of the Nazi regime to submit their applications in the correct form and by the deadlines stipulated. The courts and compensation offices, in turn, quickly became unable to cope, not only because of the number of applications received, but for various other reasons as well. The Bavarian compensation office, for example, employed around 700 people in the 1960s, but at least some of them were unqualified for the job.[56] Processing the applications required a thorough knowledge of the legal provisions, of court procedures, and of the his-

torical circumstances, if it was to be done properly. Added to this were the daily bureaucratic obstacles that further slowed the workings of the compensation bureaucracy.[57] Last but not least—particularly in the early years—there was a tendency to suspect "compensation fraud" around every corner.

The victims responded to this situation by founding their interest groups, which supplied the necessary expertise in various areas. The largest group, the Jewish survivors, was also one of the first to organize. In 1948 the United Restitution Organization (URO) came into being, an Anglo-American legal aid association designed to help Jewish survivors all over the world to submit and press compensation claims vis-à-vis West Germany.[58] During the first ten years of its existence, the URO grew rapidly. At the height of its activities, it employed 1,000 people, including 200 lawyers, and had offices in nineteen countries, as well as a central office in Frankfurt am Main. It has been estimated that the URO provided legal assistance to some 250,000 people, of whom many would have been unable to afford any other legal representation.[59] The organization was involved in more than half a million applications—120,000 had been submitted by 1955 alone.[60] Legal assistance, however, does not adequately describe the URO's work, as it also assembled documents and written evidence from foreign archives, and thus collected material on questions on which there had previously been scant information and passed on this documentation to the German authorities.

Understandably the main goal of the victims' associations was to get as many applicants as possible recognized as having been persecuted by the Nazis and to help them obtain compensation payments. In some instances they tailored their historical interpretations quite clearly to this goal.[61] The compensation authorities and their lawyers therefore also drew on expert reports and information from other quarters. These included former diplomats and administrative officials, as well as members of expellees' associations. Above and beyond this, scholarly institutions had a special role to play as it was hoped they could provide unbiased information and solid evidence. This was how the writing of expert reports gradually became one of the main tasks of the Munich Institute for Contemporary History.

Doing Research and Taking a Position: Martin Broszat's "Romania Gutachten"

When Martin Broszat began to concern himself with the history of the persecution of the Jews in and from Romania, relatively little was known about the events and the circumstances surrounding these events. The subject was ex-

traordinarily complex, and virtually no primary sources were available in West Germany. This lack of source material was particularly problematic because—quite apart from the language barrier––given the Cold War, the People's Republic of Romania could not be expected to cooperate.[62]

When it came to compensation, as foreigners most applicants from Romania could only assert deprivation of liberty as a criterion for eligibility. But it proved extremely difficult to furnish evidence of this. The persecution of Jews in Romania differed sharply in circumstances and chronology from the experience of Jews in other parts of Europe. Romania had remained an independent state throughout the war, and most of its Jews had been imprisoned not in German concentration camps but in Romanian ones.[63] Under the legal provisions at the time, any claim for compensation could be rejected if the applicant had not been persecuted by the German state. West Germany was obliged to provide compensation solely for crimes committed by Germans or on German orders. For the West German authorities, therefore, the key point was not what kind of damage an applicant had suffered, but rather whether and to what extent the state of Romania could be considered to have been sovereign during the war.

Answering this question was not easy. What was clear was that General—later Marshal—Ion Antonescu, supported by the fascist Iron Guard, had seized power in Romania in September 1940 and formed an alliance with the Axis powers in the fall of that year. At that point, however, the country had already lost a considerable portion of its territory. When Romania participated in the German invasion of the Soviet Union in summer 1941, it did so partly in the hope of reversing at least some of these territorial losses.[64] Generally speaking, Romania's gradual rapprochement with the German Reich from the late 1930s onward had been ideologically motivated and was a symptom of political instability and economic weakness. Although Romania was part of the fascist military alliance, its role never went beyond that of a junior partner. In addition the German military mission sent to Romania in October 1940 operated as an ally, rather than an occupying force, in a country whose reserves of oil and other raw materials gave it special value to the German war economy. With the launching of Operation Barbarossa, Romania rose to become the German Reich's closest military ally on the Eastern Front. Until August 1944 some 500,000 Romanians fought on the side of the Wehrmacht and waged their own war of expansion and extermination.[65] The cooperation between the two states was reflected in the close relations that Ion and Mihai Antonescu maintained with Hitler and in the accommodating behavior of the Romanian leadership toward the German ambassador, Manfred von Killinger. The fact

that Gustav Richter, a so-called adviser on Jewish issues who was subordinated to the Reich Security Main Office, had been present in Bucharest since spring 1941 was equally significant.[66]

The political independence of Romania was a complex question, but so was Germany's influence on the position and treatment of Romanian Jews. Antisemitism was widespread in Romania, and even before the war the government had introduced radical anti-Jewish measures.[67] The pogroms that took place in Dorohoi (July 1940), in Bucharest (January 1941), and in Iași (June/July 1941) had no or very little German involvement. The crimes committed after the invasion of the Soviet Union and the reconquest of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia were carried out by Germans and Romanians in close complicity.[68] In fall 1941 the Jews of Bukovina and Bessarabia were expelled to Transnistria, an area between the Dniester and Bug rivers carved out to be administered by Romania during World War II. The decision to do this was Ion Antonescu's alone.[69] However, German death squads and troop units also murdered many Jews there, regardless of whether they were local or deportees from Romania.[70] The German and Romanian policies of persecution and murder diverged in certain respects, but where they converged they were fatal.[71] In no other unoccupied European state did so many Jews fall victim to the Holocaust.

Yet, while Romania's "Jewish policy" followed the German example, it had its own logic and characteristics. For example, those Jews who lived in the "Romanian Old Kingdom" were certainly discriminated against, persecuted, and used as forced labor.[72] Still, for the most part they were not deported to Transnistria, and no Romanian Jews were ever deported from Romania to German extermination camps, despite Berlin's pressing demands. Thus more than 300,000 Romanian Jews managed to survive the Holocaust in Romania. Almost all the Jews who were murdered in the Romanian sphere of control between 1941 and 1944 were from the regained or occupied territories, Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria.[73]

When the IfZ received the first inquiries about Germany's role in the persecution of Jews in Romania, there was no question about the institute's position. In April 1955, for instance, Berlin's labor and social affairs senator asked the IfZ to provide him with information about anti-Jewish measures in Romania and Greece. On the basis of documents from the Nuremberg trials and the conclusions reached by Andreas Hillgruber in his study on the subject,[74] the author of the letter of reply wrote that the government of Romania had implemented its own anti-Jewish measures: "Direct German influence or the participation of German agencies can thus be determined only in the case of

the deportation of Romanian Jews living in Germany and in some cases of the deportation of Jews [from Western Romania]." Although he could not be certain, he assumed that a "marking of Jews by a Jewish star or similar [. . .] did not take place in Romania."[75]

A virtually identical formulation was used on various occasions in the following months.[76] In October 1955 Martin Broszat, answering an inquiry about the obligation of Jews in Romania to wear the yellow star, used these very same words. He explained that because there was insufficient evidence, it was impossible to say with any certainty whether wearing the yellow star had been compulsory throughout Romania. What was certain, however, was that "a German military administration could not have issued a regulation to this effect, as Romania in theory and within certain boundaries in practice as well was a sovereign state where there was no German military administration."[77] In other words, the Germans could not be held responsible for anything that had happened there.

Yet by the time Broszat wrote his "Romania Gutachten" a year later, he had adopted a completely different position. In the foreword to the published report, he mentioned two rulings of the Munich Higher Regional Court from 1955 and 1956 that had prompted him to examine the material more closely.[78] A look at Broszat's personal correspondence from this period suggests a different influence, however. His exchanges with Kurt May from the URO appear to have persuaded him to change his views. Born in Meiningen in 1896, May had worked as a lawyer in Jena after World War I before immigrating to Palestine in 1934. After the war ended he returned to Europe and worked for the URO from its inception. In 1955 he became head of the Frankfurt office and later rose to become director general of the organization.[79] Shortly after his first encounter with Martin Broszat in December 1955, May wrote him a letter describing in detail Romania's economic dependence on the German Reich—a point that, he felt, legal experts often overlooked.[80] To reinforce his point he sent Broszat excerpts from Matatias Carp's *Black Book*, a collection of documents relating to the persecution of Jews in Romania.[81] A few months later May asserted again in a second letter that it was doubtful whether it was correct to speak of sovereignty with respect to Transnistria, even if Romania had sought to keep up diplomatic appearances to this effect. From a juridical point of view, May called for a broadening of the legal framework through the introduction of a new concept of joint complicity (*Mittäterschaft*), in accordance with which "both states could be jointly held accountable."[82]

In his capacity as a lawyer and a victims' representative, May judged compensation law not only in its historical context but also with respect to the

consequences for those affected. This approach may explain why he shared his thoughts on the case of Romania with Broszat at this time, for such considerations were all the more important in this moment. Because the Reparations Committee charged with revising the *BErgG* was still in session, there was room for new interpretations of compensation law. The question of whether the law should also include detention abroad (*Auslandshaft*) among the categories of damage suffered—an addition that would significantly enlarge the number of candidates eligible for compensation—was likewise discussed. May outlined this question in one of his letters to Broszat and declared that he would welcome such an amendment. Broszat, who in the meantime had come round to the view that Germany bore at least partial responsibility for the persecution of Jews in Romania,[83] endorsed May's position.[84] In his reply, we can also discern a different, certainly more pragmatic view of the situation. He wrote that it would be "a blessing" if the amendment to the compensation law "with its more generous interpretation of German responsibility for persecution abroad were soon to become law," for, he explained, "the courts and the compensation authorities would then no longer be able to cling stubbornly to the dubious concept of sovereignty and we would be relieved of many a tedious task with respect to inquiries and expert reports."

It was certainly the case that Broszat sometimes found the workload involved in writing expert reports excessive.[85] This reaction encouraged him to adopt a perspective that characterized not only his view of the work of writing opinions, but also his attitude toward contemporary history research in general. In his opinion, once a historian had explored a topic in detail, it could be laid to rest. In preparing his reports, Broszat's primary concern was to cross off items in the long list of blank spots in the history of National Socialism, one by one, and thus bring many debates to a close. However, on another occasion May had already pointed out to Broszat that if the compensation law should change in this respect, the next controversial question would soon arise: Did the German Reich instigate the detention of Jews in countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania?[86]

That is exactly what happened. In 1956 foreign detention became enshrined in the *BEG* as grounds for compensation; however, claimants had to prove that "the National Socialist German government had prompted the government of the foreign state to deprive them of their liberty."[87] The key point, then, was that claims vis-à-vis West Germany were valid only "if the persecution measure in question had occurred because the German government had provably instigated the adoption of this measure by the foreign government."[88] This clause applied to all states that Nazi Germany had not occupied for the

entire period—or indeed not occupied at all—and where the Jewish population had nevertheless been persecuted, imprisoned, and deported. Along with a handful of states in southeastern Europe, this group included France and Italy. In the following years the interpretation of "instigation" became one of the main points of contention between claimants and the courts. The amendment of the compensation law therefore did not, as Broszat had hoped, make the job of the expert report writers any easier—quite the opposite.

What constituted instigation remained vague and hence a matter of interpretation. There was some disagreement over this point, even within the IfZ. Much to May's dismay, Hans Buchheim, for example, had used a very narrow interpretation of the concept in an expert report on France that he wrote in December 1956. May had therefore asked Broszat to tell his colleague Buchheim that, even in the view of the parliamentary Compensation Committee, "neither coercion, nor incitement, nor endorsement" was required to determine instigation; a finding of "conducive influence" and "joint responsibility" was already considered sufficient.[89]

In his "Romania Gutachten" Broszat tried to circumvent this problem by focusing on the macro level of power relationships and dynamics. He contended that structural considerations played a more decisive role than the intentions of individuals or *who* the author of a particular deed was. Thus, he was able to use the term "instigation" almost in passing, without either defining it or indeed expressly determining whether the Germans could be shown to have instigated a measure in every specific instance. As he wrote, "the Nazi regime not only legalized any kind of crime committed against the Jews, but even used it as a measure of special loyalty to the alliance." He went on to argue: "The tempting effect thereof and [German] responsibility go well beyond the measures that Germans can be proven to have initiated, condoned, instigated, or themselves taken against Jews of other countries at the bidding of the Nazi leadership."[90] Broszat thus treated the question whether Germans had initiated, incited, or endorsed such measures in individual cases as secondary to a comprehensive, theoretically broader, and more abstract concept of German responsibility. He ascribed greater significance to the overarching context, which he regarded in historical terms as more important than individual decisions or events, ensuring that instigation did not have to be reexamined in every new legal dispute.

The system of providing expert reports required their authors to take up a clear position. It is therefore hardly surprising that experts were divided on the case of Romania. Hellmuth Hecker, a lawyer specializing in international law at the Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und ausländisches Recht at the

University of Hamburg, for example, published his own expert report on Romania in 1958.[91] Neither Broszat nor Hecker knew what the other was working on as they prepared their respective opinions, and they came to opposite conclusions. Although Hecker drew on recently discovered source material, he arrived at the same opinion as a colleague had done several years previously: that Romania must be considered to have been a sovereign state throughout the war years.[92] According to him, antisemitism was historically deeply rooted in Romania and displayed specifically Romanian features. Therefore, the persecution of the Jews in that country should be viewed more as an adaptation to German policy than a policy carried out at the Nazis' behest. For that matter, anti-Jewish measures had been implemented in Romania before the Germans began to exert influence via diplomatic channels; moreover, they ceased at a time when, technically speaking, the two countries were still allied. Hecker regarded this as proof that Romania had acted autonomously. According to him, the Germans had exerted key influence on events only in a few instances, which he listed with meticulous precision.[93] Thus not only did Hecker ultimately assess the situation differently from Broszat; both his report and his argument were more straightforward and therefore easier for the courts to make use of, and his approach led to many claims being rejected.

Hecker and others, including the historian Eberhard Jäckel, attributed these divergent opinions to the difference between the legal and the historical perspective.[94] Broszat was of a different opinion and emphasized that the job of the expert was not to interpret the *BEG* but rather to deliver factual information about events as they had happened. In this sense, he said, the lawyer Hecker was also doing history and should therefore be judged by the scholarly standards of that discipline. Broszat also expressed his dissent on this question to Hecker directly:

> You will surely concede that the expert reports produced by your research institute are also primarily *historical* opinions in the above sense and are intended as such. Therefore the question arises whether certain differences of judgment that emerged in the past in the opinions of our two institutes can be ascribed primarily to the fact that in one case it is the international law expert who is speaking, in the other, the historian, or whether different standards for using and interpreting sources also contributed to this outcome.[95]

These "differences" may also stem from divergent views of power and range of authority, since in this context there was talk of Broszat's "rejection of personal explanations."[96] But this episode also reveals something both about his

understanding of the task of preparing expert reports and about his attitude to research on contemporary history in general. In fact, Broszat was not that bothered that he and Hecker had judged the validity of compensation claims differently. Rather, he was concerned with defending the independence of the expert historian against the requirements of the legal system.

Yet Broszat's view of the case of Romania did not simply attract opponents. One important, if scarcely intended, consequence of his "Romania Gutachten" was the rapprochement between him and the URO.[97] Kurt May had been expected to welcome Broszat's conclusions, but now Broszat's work also came to the attention of Bruno Fischer from the Tel Aviv office of the URO. Fischer, a Romanian-Israeli lawyer originally from Czernowitz, was entrusted by the URO with all Romania-related questions. In the mid-1950s he was busy compiling several extensive volumes of sources about the persecution of Jews in Romania. He collected mainly German documents and pursued the goal of incontrovertibly demonstrating German responsibility for the events in Romania to the compensation authorities.[98] In the course of his research, Fischer had come across Broszat's Gutachten and had been highly impressed. He therefore contacted its author to request a copy and added a letter containing several brief points and some supplementary material. Broszat seems to have seized on both gratefully, for a number of Fischer's suggested corrections can be found in the galley proofs of the revised "Romania Gutachten," published in early 1958.[99] When Fischer came to Munich in October 1958, he asked to meet with Broszat, who gave him a friendly reception.[100] This marked the beginning of a cooperation between Fischer and the IfZ that was to last for decades.[101] Broszat and Fischer exchanged documents, reports, and opinions and met up from time to time. This cooperation continued even after Broszat believed that he was done with the subject and gradually began handing it over to another historian at the IfZ, Ino Arndt.

Contemporary History Research and Its Application to the Law: Broszat's "Romania Gutachten" and Reparations Practice

Broszat's "Romania Gutachten" was not the only expert report on this subject, and his assessment did not meet with universal approval. What is more, despite its scope, his opinion could by no means clarify all the contested points on which the compensation claims rested. So writing such reference works was just the beginning, and in practice more questions arose with respect to compensation claims, for which further historical expertise was required.

There were various reasons for this. First of all, in gathering evidence the

authorities did not rely solely on expert reports, but also on witness statements and legal precedents. In practice this resulted in arbitrary decisions that did not necessarily stand up to the evidence. For example, directly after the *BEG* came into force in 1956, applications for compensation by survivors from Romania were generally approved. However, after an application for compensation in Stuttgart was rejected on the grounds that Romania had been a sovereign state at the time in question, a whole series of negative decisions followed.[102] In these cases the courts did not use the IfZ expert reports as a basis for their decisions, but relied instead on the witness statements by former representatives of the German Reich in Romania, which led to bitter controversies.[103]

Second, in order to press a claim for compensation even in cases where German responsibility was recognized, many other kinds of proof about the events themselves often had to be furnished. In order to calculate an appropriate compensation payment, the compensation authorities required applicants to provide precise details of the place and date of the events in question—for example, the length of detention—which were then carefully checked. For this purpose the authorities turned regularly to historians. Many such inquiries concerned the exact dates of deportations from Bucharest to Transnistria, which, despite Broszat's Gutachten, continued to cause controversy with respect to the issue of instigation.[104] Precise information and supporting documentation about these events was hard to come by, especially given that not all deportations had been officially recorded. For this reason, the expert reports repeatedly referred to Germany's overall responsibility and to the limits of their authors' own knowledge. However, not every court was satisfied with this argument, and it was not unusual for the courts to rule differently in similar compensation cases. This in turn gave rise to requests for further expert reports in order to obtain legal clarity.

Survivors' organizations, including the URO, criticized this "inconsistent jurisprudence"[105] by saying that judgments should not simply be based on historical facts but should also take account of moral principles. They said those responsible for resolving this "political-ethical problem"[106] should listen to both their "heads" and their "hearts."[107] The German authorities were even accused of deliberately delaying the proceedings in the hope that the problem would resolve itself if those potentially eligible for compensation died before a decision was reached.[108] After 1960 the compensation officers of the federal states reached an agreement to generally recognize in principle that German instigation had indeed occurred in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria.[109] But in practice these questions continued to play a role, and for the rest of Romania they remained unresolved.

The URO therefore campaigned tirelessly for an enlargement of the so-called instigation area.[110] In so doing, it took a two-pronged approach: On the one hand, it urged that court rulings should take into account the situation in Romania as a whole, as well as the fact that the events there had been part of a much broader German plan for a "European solution to the Jewish question." The organization presented many documents in support of this global view.[111] If this thesis could be corroborated, it argued, then the reports of the sufferings of the victims could no longer be cast aside as isolated incidents and dismissed on the grounds of the sovereignty of the country of origin or the lack of German instigation.[112] On the other hand, the URO sought information and evidence that was as localized and precise as possible, because it knew that the authorities based their decisions on specific criteria, and that applications had a better chance of being approved if these criteria were fulfilled.[113] Some of the arguments advanced in this context, such as that there had been "no racial antisemitism in Romania" or that "the two Antonescus had not been antisemites," may sound surprising and certainly took great license with the truth.[114] But they also show to what desperate lengths the applicants and their supporters thought they had to go after years of struggling in vain for compensation.

Martin Broszat and other experts concerned with Romania became increasingly exasperated with the questions and expectations of the compensation authorities too. Broszat pointed out on more than one occasion that as a historian he could only advise, and that it was ultimately not his task, but that of the courts to rule on what constituted instigation.[115] He also made it clear that certain things were impossible to find out. Over time IfZ historians stopped merely affirming or disaffirming the historical facts put forward and began instead to evaluate the credibility and plausibility of statements made in the applications on a more general level. Their aim now was to provide an overall picture of the circumstances under which the event in question had occurred.[116] The many expert reports compiled by Broszat and others suggest in addition that they became increasingly lenient toward the often imprecise and contradictory statements made in the applications. When it came to questions of detail submitted by the authorities that could not be verified with absolute certainty—when exactly the Jewish population in a particular place had been obliged to wear a yellow star, for instance—their expert reports treated the specific circumstance in question as secondary to the overall context of persecution. Broszat had already elaborated this broad context in his "Romania Gutachten," and he seldom tired of citing it. But often the wider context was described in detail all over again in order to play down the relevance of the specific problem the authorities had actually asked about. This was especially

common with respect to the Romanian forced labor camps, which had been temporary, or the situation in Transnistria, about which little was known.[117] Such a line of argumentation made it more difficult for the authorities to reject an application for lack of evidence.

Sometimes applicants' statements were even reworded in order to adapt them to the requirements and the terminology expected by the authorities. Usually this was done in the interests of the victim, to set out unambiguously for what reason he or she was claiming compensation; the term "forced labor," for instance, was substituted with "deprivation of liberty." In some cases the statements made in the applications were not evaluated in the original wording, but paraphrased and explained. Thus Martin Broszat told the Düsseldorf Regional Court in September 1960 that, in the case of a Jewish applicant who claimed to have been interned by the Germans in the Transylvanian city of Cluj (Klausenburg):

> In view of the circumstances at the time, we must regard the assertion of the plaintiff that he was sent "by the Germans" to the Klausenburg labor camp in 1941 as improbable. If, however, he meant that his detention in the labor camp was instigated by the Germans, then this certainly seems plausible.[118]

In another notable trend over time, experts from the IfZ, including Broszat, referred the authorities in their opinions on Romania to an increasingly large range of additional sources and literature, mostly of Jewish origin. These sources included the extensive six-volume documentation by the URO, but also material from Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, the Wiener Holocaust Library in London, the Centre de documentation juive contemporaine in Paris, and the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research in New York. The experts also cited Gerald Reitlinger's and Raul Hilberg's English-language standard works on the Holocaust, even though these contributed little information on the case of Romania as such.[119] Like the experts at the URO, those at the IfZ increasingly tried to persuade the authorities not to concentrate excessively on the particular circumstances of the individual cases before them, but instead to take into account the wider context and to view the events in Romania as part of what was taking place all over Europe at the time. After all, because the goal of the Nazi regime had been to murder all Jews, it was necessary with hindsight to grasp the overall picture in order to understand how endangered each individual marked as Jewish had been during the Holocaust, regardless of the exact circumstances and experiences in any particular location.[120]

Discrepancies between History, Justice, and the Law: Martin Broszat and the Case of Bukovina

These remarks are not, however, meant to suggest that Broszat agreed out of principle with the goals and approach of the victims or of the URO, as can be demonstrated by looking at his position on the compensation of Jews from Bukovina. From the early 1960s onward, an increasing number of Jewish claimants from this formerly Habsburg region[121]—most of them residing in Israel by then—sought compensation. For members of this group, there were two routes to compensation payments. As people with a German linguistic and cultural background, they could press claims for certain forms of damage (deprivation of liberty through foreign detention) based on the *BEG*. Because of the territorial principle, however, they were barred from any other kind of compensation, for example, for loss of property. Here, however, a loophole in the law offered an alternative option. Because Bukovina had had a German-speaking Christian minority who had been resettled in 1940, the region was classified as an "area of expulsion" (*Vertreibungsgebiet*) under the "Federal Law on Expellees and Refugees," commonly referred to as the Federal Expellee Law (*Bundesvertriebenengesetz—BVFG*). Thus Bukovinian Jews, most of whom had embraced the German language and German culture, were able, in theory, to cite their status as expellees under the *BVFG* and to receive additional compensation via the *Lastenausgleichsgesetz* (Law on the Equalization of Burdens—*LAG*).[122]

In practice, however, this option was complicated—and it was controversial. Unlike the *BEG*, which required applicants to prove that both before and during their persecution they had belonged exclusively to the circle of those who had embraced the German language and German culture, the *LAG* required proof of German ethnicity. This in turn was defined in Paragraph 6 of the *BVFG*, which stipulated: "Under this law, a person is an ethnic German if he or she has professed allegiance to German *Volkstum* in his or her homeland, as long as certain characteristics [. . .] confirm this allegiance."[123] Here the phrase "professed allegiance" is important, for it was intended to express more than linguistic competence and cultural affinity. It tacitly implied that belonging to some other *Volk* was actually a criterion for exclusion. However, many applicants were either unaware of this distinction or did not comprehend it. Therefore, many survivors who had already successfully applied for compensation under the *BEG* decided to try their luck once again by applying under the *LAG*. Usually, however, the authorities considered these declarations insufficient. They rejected most of the applications, as they implicitly assumed

that those eligible under the *LAG* must be non-Jewish German expellees. The question of the ethnicity of Bukovinian Jews thus became a central bone of contention between Jewish survivors and the West German authorities in charge of compensation and equalization of burdens, and historical expertise was soon required.

In his 1963 Gutachten, Broszat explained that only 60 percent of Bukovina's Jews had belonged to the German linguistic and cultural circle as defined by the *BEG*, and only 5 percent of them could be considered ethnic Germans under the *BVFG* and *LAG*.[124] This conservative estimate was based on the Romanian census of 1930, in which most Bukovinian Jews named Yiddish as their native language. It also assumed that being fluent in German or attending a German school—so-called objective characteristics—was insufficient for them to claim German ethnicity. Rather, a subjective and active showing of allegiance was necessary, such as a mixed marriage or membership in a Christian-German cultural association. Broszat, by basing his arguments on the customary legal definition, also underpinned the historical validity of "German ethnicity" and the "German linguistic and cultural circle" as legal categories. The clear distinction he drew between a subjective profession of allegiance to German *Volkstum* and an objective affiliation with the German linguistic and cultural circle, as well as his assumption that German culture had not played a major role for a considerable minority of Bukovina's Jews, contributed to the subsequent rejection of many applications made under the *LAG*. At the same time, he was convinced of the historiographical value of his expert report and published it two years later, essentially unchanged, in the *Historische Zeitschrift*.[125]

Bruno Fischer wrote to Broszat at the end of 1969 that he "did not entirely share his opinion" on this matter and suggested: "Perhaps we can discuss these points when we get a chance." Broszat—who had noted in the margin of this letter "I'm not surprised!"—seems not to have taken Fischer up on his offer.[126] In reaction to Broszat's expert report, the URO for its part published a fifteen-page report in which the author—probably Fischer—vehemently disputed Broszat's assertions. He argued that Bukovina's Jews had given Yiddish as their mother tongue for purely strategic reasons, so as to secure their own representation as a minority in Romania and to distinguish themselves from the Germans of Christian faith. This was apparent, he said, merely from the fact that many Bukovinian Jews, by then living in Israel, continued to feel a strong affinity with German culture; therefore the Romanian census of 1930 did not constitute convincing supporting evidence. However the entire foundation of Broszat's arguments likewise came in for criticism. The URO report

argued that, under the provisions of the *BEG*, whether Bukovina's Jews were Germans was irrelevant; what mattered was solely whether the Nazi regime had persecuted them. And with respect to the provisions of the *BVFG* and *LAG*, it was utterly absurd to expect Jews after 1933 to have considered themselves part of the "German community," from which they would in any event have been excluded.[127] The subject continued to preoccupy Fischer for a long time afterward. In 1980 he even prepared his own expert report of the Romanian census of 1930, in which he offered a detailed analysis of its modalities and the circumstances under which it had been carried out. Using the only recently discovered Romanian guidelines for the census, he was able to prove that it did not constitute an objective source of data.[128]

This episode is interesting for a number of reasons. First of all, it points to Broszat's legendary lack of fear of controversy, in combination with his strong self-confidence.[129] Although he had worked for many years with Fischer, who as a German-speaking Jew from Bukovina himself had lived in the region until 1943, this was not sufficient to make Broszat doubt his own research findings. In addition, the dispute illustrates his typical understanding of empirical inquiry into contemporary history, where he favored written sources over reports by Jewish contemporary witnesses.[130] Broszat conducted contemporary history research in what he described as a spirit of "sacred sober-mindedness"—a term he himself coined. He was therefore fundamentally skeptical of the scholarly use of contemporary witness testimony, as those who gave it could not in his view be wholly objective.[131] Finally, this example shows how Broszat regarded his job. He sought to provide the courts with convincing and usable historical explanations that nonetheless met his own professional standards. However, he did not feel called upon to make legal judgments or to influence the outcome of trials. As a result, while Broszat certainly made an occasional effort through his expert reports to help individual claimants obtain justice, he did not seek to contradict prevailing legal doxa or even to supply the system with arguments to correct itself. In other words, he did not, as some other historians later did, contribute to adapting juridical paradigms to historical conditions or help to develop them further.[132] This is why the results of his work sometimes worked to the advantage, sometimes to the disadvantage, of those who had been persecuted.

At first glance, Broszat's stance on compensating Holocaust survivors might seem to accord with the ideal of empirical historical research free of value judgments, a standard to which the first generation of contemporary historians in West Germany aspired. A closer look, however, reveals a clear and powerful interdependence between historical research, jurisprudence, and compen-

sation practice. From a legal perspective, the intentions of the perpetrators, rather than the experiences of the victims, carried the greatest weight.[133] In addition, the preoccupation with questions of compensation and the frequently results-oriented statements of the claimants may have encouraged a skeptical attitude vis-à-vis the victims. In this sense the attempt to maintain a balance between the law and historical research was not possible, nor were there no consequences. The spirit of "sacred sober-mindedness" turned historical interpretations into the kind of evidence that could be used in court. But it did not free even historians like Martin Broszat from the risk of being influenced by the intentions and interpretative models inherent in the documents.[134] At the same time, the focus on scholarly objectivity stood in the way of the political and moral goal of compensation as a project of symbolic rehabilitation and reparation—and ultimately even in the way of advancing historical knowledge. The historians failed to see, for instance, that compensation cases were often the victims' first and sometimes only opportunity to speak about the suffering and injustice inflicted upon them. In many cases they were also the only witnesses. In conclusion, one might therefore venture a new conjecture: despite his genuine interest in the history of antisemitism, history from "below," and the European dimension of the Holocaust, Broszat seems not to have been entirely aware of either the historiographical potential or the pitfalls of the territory that he had entered with his expert reports.

Expert Reports and Contemporary History: Opportunities and Limitations

When Martin Broszat submitted his "Romania Gutachten" in early 1957, the expert report activity of the IfZ had yet to reach its peak. In those years, it was not an easy task to assemble the relevant documents, find the required information, and supply the probative evidence that was essential for this unprecedented attempt to compensate the victims of a mass crime such as the Holocaust. The difficulties that the surviving Jews from Romania encountered illustrate the complexity of this undertaking. But it presented a major challenge to all those involved, including public authorities, historians, and West German society as a whole. At the same time this project, which at least initially resembled a kind of juridical-bureaucratic experiment, offered the writers of expert reports an opportunity to survey little-known fields of history, to gain new information, and build networks with people, institutions, and organizations in Germany and beyond.

As the staff of the IfZ began to concern themselves with the case of Romania, historians were still using mainly German sources and the statements of German contemporary witnesses. From the mid-1950s on, however, Martin Broszat also began working with legal experts from the URO. It was largely thanks to these contacts that, over time, researchers at the IfZ started to contextualize the statements they obtained from the applications more broadly and to interpret them more favorably. Experts thus played no small part in the reparations process. They functioned as intermediaries between applicants and compensation authorities. They were able to use this position to dissuade those working in compensation offices from their financial misgivings or even prejudices, and to help them better address a fundamental structural problem: the large gulf between the victims' perspective, which tended to encompass all spheres of life, and the narrow view of the bureaucracy, where empathy had no place.[135]

Broszat published the findings of his expert reports in historical journals and viewed them as genuine contributions to contemporary history research. He disputed that their association with legal practice and legal use could in any way constrain his arguments or their value. However, historians engaged in preparing expert reports were forced to make certain compromises: they were required to use predetermined terminology, to prefer some sources over others, and to answer detailed questions in which the overall picture or historically more significant dimensions could not be adequately taken into account, or were even ignored. The fact that the research findings supplied by these experts had both a social and a legal-political impact meant that researchers inevitably insisted all the more stubbornly on their neutrality and objectivity, and on the kind of empirical research that could stand up as evidence. Ultimately, however, their approach sometimes led them to put other critical sources aside. The victims' witness statements, for example, were dismissed for being regarded as colored by subjectivity and therefore of only limited validity.

Later historians' assessment of this approach has varied greatly. Whereas for Nicolas Berg this was the result of a conscious approach,[136] Sybille Steinbacher emphasized the need to view these historians' work in its historical context.[137] Indeed, one can scarcely overlook the fact that Martin Broszat and the first generation of West German contemporary history scholars were children of their time, however much they may have liked to believe that their method was immune to passing fashions and personal experience. They were both the subjects and the objects of West German debates about the past.[138] This point is demonstrated both by the particular way in which Broszat and others

discussed and framed the persecution of the Jews as a research topic and by the way in which they perceived of their own role as experts in compensation proceedings.

It is also worth considering further the extent to which the work of preparing expert reports—a task described as tedious and boring—and the concomitant involvement in the practice of compensation codetermined historians' methods and horizons of interest, and what influence this had on their understanding of contemporary history research more generally. For if we look closer, we find that the "functionalist" approach prominently espoused by Broszat might in some sense be regarded not only as the result of his work on expert reports, but also as the source of his efforts to take responsibility without having to delve too deeply into the debate about German guilt. And indeed, it is quite possible that the effort to walk this particular tightrope was a decisive obstacle to a more open and self-reflexive view of his own role and scientific position.

This reading then allows us to substantiate and qualify the widespread argument that legal proceedings were the "vectors of memory," or at least driving forces behind historical research.[139] Fundamentally, the experts involved in preparing opinions for compensation cases were carrying out Holocaust research and were collecting empirical material long before the persecution and murder of European Jews had gained the status of an independent field of research. In addition, this historical expertise undoubtedly contributed to increasing public awareness of the topic. For, as Regula Ludi has argued, the "new sensitivity to the unprecedented and singular nature of the Jewish catastrophe" was a result of attempts at reparation, not what occasioned them.[140] Nevertheless, the historical reappraisal of the past through expert reports remained within the confines of its primarily juridical purpose, and this in turn contributed to the dualistic and—to echo Saul Friedländer[141]—insufficiently integrated picture that early German contemporary historians formed of the past, whether they were engaged in preparing expert reports or not.

Notes

Translation by Melanie Newton

1. Martin Broszat, "Das Dritte Reich und die rumänische Judenpolitik: Gutachten des Institut für Zeitgeschichte," unpublished manuscript (Munich, January 1957); later published in *Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte* (Munich: self-pub., 1958), 102–83. The two versions differ from one another in the preface—where Broszat briefly outlined the context, epistemological interest, and purpose of his report—and in corrections made in the

editing process. The quotations here are generally from the unpublished manuscript, which was the version submitted to the courts. I want to thank the staff of the archive of the Institute for Contemporary History (IfZ-Archiv) for their help in accessing the documents, as well as Rachel O'Sullivan, Maren Röger, and Christian Schmittwilken, who read and commented on earlier drafts of this article.

2. Broszat, "Rumänische Judenpolitik" (1958), 102.

3. Broszat, "Rumänische Judenpolitik" (1957), 1. When Broszat compiled his report, two monographs had already been written about German-Romanian relations—Ion Gheorghe, *Rumäniens Weg zum Satellitenstaat* (Heidelberg: Vowinckel, 1952); Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu: Die deutsch-rumänischen Beziehungen 1938–1944* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1954)—and they reached quite different conclusions. More recent publications show the continuing relevance of this topic: Sebastian Balta, *Rumänien und die Großmächte in der Ära Antonescu (1940–1944)* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005); Herwig Baum, *Varianten des Terrors: Ein Vergleich zwischen der deutschen und rumänischen Besatzungsverwaltung in der Sowjetunion 1941–1944* (Berlin: Metropol, 2011); Hildrun Glass, *Deutschland und die Verfolgung der Juden im rumänischen Machtbereich 1940–1944* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014); Constantin Iordachi and Ottmar Traşcă, "Ideological Transfers and Bureaucratic Entanglements: Nazi 'Experts' on the 'Jewish Question' and Romanian-German Relations, 1940–1944," *Fascism* 4, no. 1 (April 2015): 48–100.

4. Hillgruber, for example (*Hitler*, 236–46), treated the "Jewish question" as marginalia in the appendix, drawing on what was then contemporary literature, especially Hans Schuster, *Die Judenfrage in Rumänien* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1939). In that sense Broszat's work broke new ground. See also Martin Broszat, "Die Eiserne Garde und das Dritte Reich: Zum Problem des Faschismus in Ostmitteleuropa," *Politische Studien* 9 (1958): 628–36. For the numbers, see Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, and Mihail E. Ionescu, eds., *Final Report: International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2004), 179.

5. Historians assume that more than 300,000 Jews survived the Holocaust in Romania. Although only those whose place of residence was west of the Iron Curtain were able to assert such claims, the number of eligible people and compensation claims still ran into the tens of thousands. See United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "Jewish Losses during the Holocaust: By Country," accessed July 12, 2021, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/jewish-losses-during-the-holocaust-by-country.

6. Broszat, "Rumänische Judenpolitik" (1957), 98.

7. Some of Broszat's conclusions are, of course, outdated. He had no knowledge of Romanian, and it was in any case difficult to access Romanian sources during the Cold War. The generally held view today is that the Antonescu regime bore a considerable degree of responsibility for the murder of Jews in the territories under Romanian control. Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940–1944* (Chicago: Dee, 2000); Friling, Ioanid, and Ionescu, *Final Report*; Heinen, *Rumänien*; Brigitte Mihok and Wolfgang Benz, eds., *Holocaust an der Peripherie: Judenpolitik und Judenmord in Rumänien und Transnistrien 1940–1944* (Berlin: Metropol, 2009); Jean Ancel, *The History of the Holocaust in Romania* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011).

8. See, for example, Armin Heinen, *Rumänien, der Holocaust und die Logik der Gewalt* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007); Glass, *Deutschland und die Verfolgung der Juden*; Baum, *Varianten des Terrors*.

9. For this expression, see Christian Meier, "Nachruf auf Martin Broszat," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 38, no. 1 (January 1990): 23–42, here 25. See also Klaus-Dietmar Henke, "Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte unter der Ägide von Martin Broszat 1972–1989," in *Mit dem Pathos der Nüchternheit: Martin Broszat, das Institut für Zeitgeschichte und die Erforschung des Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Claudio Natoli (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 1991), 39–57. Concerning the novelty of the text, see note 4 above.

10. Sybille Steinbacher, "Martin Broszat und die Erforschung der nationalsozialistischen Judenpolitik," in *Martin Broszat, der "Staat Hitlers" und die Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Norbert Frei (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007), 130–45, here 141, 137.

11. Horst Möller, "Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1949–2000," in *60 Jahre Institut für Zeitgeschichte München—Berlin: Geschichte, Veröffentlichungen, Personalien*, ed. Horst Möller and Udo Wengst (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009), 9–100, here 11–12.

12. See, for example, Norbert Frei, Dirk van Laak, and Michael Stolleis, eds., *Geschichte vor Gericht: Historiker, Richter und die Suche nach Gerechtigkeit* (Munich: Beck, 2000), here especially Michael Wildt, "Differierende Wahrheiten: Historiker und Staatsanwälte als Ermittler von NS-Verbrechen," 46–59, and Henry Rousso, "Justiz, Geschichte und Erinnerung in Frankreich: Überlegungen zum Papon-Prozeß," 141–63. See also Erich Haberer, "History and Justice: Paradigms of the Prosecution of Nazi Crimes," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 19, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 487–519; Jürgen Finger, Sven Keller, and Andreas Wirsching, eds., *Vom Recht zur Geschichte: Akten aus NS-Prozessen als Quellen der Zeitgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009); David Bankier and Dan Michman, eds., *Holocaust and Justice: Representation and Historiography of the Holocaust in Post-war Trials* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2010).

13. I have borrowed this expression from Mathew Turner, *Historians at the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial: Their Role as Expert Witnesses* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2018), 11.

14. Although controversial, the term *Wiedergutmachung* (literally: making good again) became established in postwar Germany as an umbrella term for various forms of restitution and compensation for those persecuted by the Nazi regime. In this essay I use it to refer to the broad political process surrounding the material compensation of victims, while my primary concern is the compensation of individuals. See Hans Günter Hockerts, "Wiedergutmachung: Ein umstrittener Begriff und ein weites Feld," in *Nach der Verfolgung: Wiedergutmachung nationalsozialistischen Unrechts in Deutschland?*, ed. Hans Günter Hockerts and Christiane Kuller (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), 7–34.

15. See Norbert Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS Vergangenheit* (Munich: C.H.Beck, 1996). See also: Frank Stern, *The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge: Antisemitism and Philosemitism in Postwar Germany* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1992), esp. 337; Constantin Goschler, *Wiedergutmachung: Westdeutschland und die Verfolgten des Nationalsozialismus (1945–1954)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1992), 18; and José Brunner, Norbert Frei, and Constantin Goschler, "Komplizierte Lernprozesse: Zur Geschichte und Aktualität der Wiedergutmachung," in *Die Praxis der Wiedergutmachung:*

Geschichte, Erfahrung und Wirkung in Deutschland und Israel, ed. Norbert Frei, José Brunner, and Constantin Goschler (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2009), 9–47.

16. Along with relevant texts by Broszat, other expert reports and documents (especially correspondence) from the IfZ-Archiv offer answers to these questions. Around 150 expert reports concerning Romania, dating from the early 1950s and early 1970s and held in the archive (ID 60 and ID 61), were examined, as were the papers of Martin Broszat (ID 144) and Ino Arndt (ID 131), which in the IfZ were concerned mainly with Romania. By way of comparison, I have also surveyed several pieces of work by Helmut Krausnick (ID 103).

17. Together with the two volumes of expert reports by the IfZ from the years 1958 and 1966, the following publication should also be mentioned: Hans Buchheim et al., *Anatomie des SS-Staates*, 8th ed. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005). This book, which first appeared in December 1967, brings together five expert reports compiled by the IfZ for the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial in 1964. Its influence on contemporary historical research can scarcely be overestimated, and to date it has sold 50,000 copies. Dieter Pohl, "Prosecutors and Historians: Holocaust Investigations and Historiography in the Federal Republic 1955–1975," in Bankier and Michman, *Holocaust and Justice*, 117–29, here 123. However, at the time of publication the juridical context in which the reports were compiled was not the subject of any detailed inquiry, nor was it seen as problematic; that happened many years later.

18. Helmut Krausnick, "Vorwort," *Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966), 9–10, here 9. Here the main task was sifting through documents and literature, as well as providing active support for the major postwar trials. Scholarly consultancy is still part of the institute's work to this day: "Gutachten," accessed December 2, 2021, https://www.ifz-muenchen.de/das-institut/gutachten/.

19. See, for example, Henke and Natoli, *Pathos*, in which the opinions are barely mentioned, or Möller, "Institut für Zeitgeschichte," 10–12.

20. Martin Broszat, "Juristische und zeitgeschichtliche Bewältigung der Vergangenheit," in *Nach Hitler: Der schwierige Umgang mit unserer Geschichte; Beiträge von Martin Broszat*, ed. Hermann Graml and Klaus-Dietmar Henke (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986), 42–49, here 46; the following quotations are likewise to be found here: 47, 48–49.

21. Ludolf Herbst, "Nachruf auf Martin Broszat," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 38, no. 1 (January 1990): 18–23, here 19.

22. Hans Mommsen, "Zeitgeschichte als 'kritische Aufklärungsarbeit': Zur Erinnerung an Martin Broszat (1926–1989)," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 17, no. 2 (1991): 141–57, here 142, and Hans Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1, no. 1 (January 1953): 1–8, esp. 8. An English translation of Rothfels's article titled "The Task of Contemporary History" forms part of this volume. The purpose of founding the IfZ has sometimes been described as "educating the people": Winfried Schulze, *Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989), 229. See also Hellmuth Auerbach, "Die Gründung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 18, no. 4 (October 1970): 529–54; Sebastian Conrad, *Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Nation: Geschichtsschreibung in Westdeutschland und Japan, 1945–1960* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), here esp. 219–82; and Sybille Steinbacher, "Die Anfänge der Zeitgeschichtsforschung in Wien und das Institut für Zeitgeschichte

München," in *50 Jahre Institut für Zeitgeschichte der Universität Wien 1966–2016*, ed. Bertrand Perz and Ina Markova (Vienna: new academic press, 2017), 39–61.

23. Annette Weinke, *Gewalt, Geschichte, Gerechtigkeit: Transnationale Debatten über deutsche Staatsverbrechen im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016), 196; the following quotation is from the same source, 199.

24. Nicolas Berg, *Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker: Erforschung und Erinnerung* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), 275.

25. Mathew Turner, Tony Joel, and David Lowe, "Between Politics and Scholarship: The First Decade of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 1949–1958," *European History Quarterly* 49, no. 2 (April 2019): 250–71, here 264.

26. Turner, *Historians*; Devin Pendas, "The Historiography of Horror: The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial and the German Historical Imagination," in *Lessons and Legacies*, vol. 6, *New Currents in Holocaust Research*, ed. Jeffry M. Diefendorf (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2004), 209–230; Malte Beeker, "'Führerbefehl' und 'suspendiertes Unrechtsbewusstsein'? Das zeitgeschichtliche Gutachten Hans Buchheims im Auschwitz-Prozess und seine strafrechtswissenschaftliche Rezeption," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 64, no. 5 (May 2016): 464–83; and Weinke, *Gewalt, Geschichte, Gerechtigkeit*, 193–211. A recent article by Daniel Siemens discusses expert reports written by experts from the URO: "Lawyers Writing History: The Politics of the Past of the United Restitution Organisation (URO) from 1948 to the 1980s," *Journal of Modern European History* 21, no. 3 (August 2023): 343–60.

27. Turner, *Historians*, 4.

28. Ibid., 1–13.

29. Turner, Joel, and Lowe, "Politics and Scholarship," 260–64.

30. Steinbacher, "Martin Broszat," 137.

31. Nicolas Berg, *The Invention of "Functionalism": Josef Wulf, Martin Broszat, and the Institute for Contemporary History (Munich) in the 1960s* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2003), 11.

32. Ibid., 38, and Berg, *Holocaust*, esp. 505–661.

33. See, for example, Christian Pross, *Wiedergutmachung: Der Kleinkrieg gegen die Opfer* (Frankfurt a. M.: Athenäum, 1988); Ludolf Herbst and Constantin Goschler, eds., *Wiedergutmachung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989); and Cornelius Pawlita, *"Wiedergutmachung" als Rechtsfrage? Die politische und juristische Auseinandersetzung um Entschädigung für die Opfer nationalsozialistischer Verfolgung (1945 bis 1990)* (Frankfurt a. M.: Lang, 1993). Previous studies were written mainly by participants and tended to focus on the formal aspects. For example, Georg Blessin, *Wiedergutmachung* (Bad Godesberg: Hohwacht, 1960), and Otto Küster, *Erfahrungen in der deutschen Wiedergutmachung* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1967).

34. Norbert Frei, "Einleitung," in Frei, van Laak, and Stolleis, *Geschichte vor Gericht*, 7–28, here 7.

35. For example, Tobias Winstel, *Verhandelte Gerechtigkeit: Rückerstattung und Entschädigung für jüdische NS-Opfer in Bayern und Westdeutschland* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006); Hans Günter Hockerts, Claudia Moisel, and Tobias Winstel, eds., *Grenzen der Wiedergutmachung: Die Entschädigung für NS-Verfolgte in West- und Osteuropa 1945–2000* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006); Regula Ludi, *Reparations for Nazi Victims in Postwar*

Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); and Dan Diner, *Rituelle Distanz: Israels deutsche Frage* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2015).

36. The sociologist John Torpey coined the term "reparations policy," which reflects the discussion of "efforts to redress gross violations of human rights" and thus indicates "the significant changes in the way we think about human social life." John Torpey, "The Political Field of Reparations," in *Historical Justice and Memory*, ed. Klaus Neumann and Janna Thompson (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015), 63–73, here 63. Also John Torpey, ed., *Politics and the Past: On Repairing Historical Injustices* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); John Torpey, *Making Whole What Has Been Smashed: On Reparations Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

37. For example, José Brunner, Constantin Goschler, and Norbert Frei, eds., *Die Globalisierung der Wiedergutmachung: Politik, Moral, Moralpolitik* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2013).

38. For example, Elazar Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices* (New York: Norton, 2000), and Constantin Goschler, *Schuld und Schulden: Die Politik der Wiedergutmachung für NS-Verfolgte seit 1945* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005), 8.

39. Stern, *Whitewashing*, 349; Barkan, *Guilt of Nations*, 15; and Goschler, *Schuld und Schulden*, 215.

40. Annette Weinke, "West Germany: A Case of Transitional Justice *avant la lettre*?," in *Transitional Justice and Memory in Europe (1945–2013)*, ed. Nico Wouters (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014), 25–61, here 41.

41. Hans Günter Hockerts offered an incisive and comprehensive overview in "Wiedergutmachung in Deutschland: Eine historische Bilanz 1945–2000," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 49, no. 2 (April 2001): 167–214.

42. Goschler, *Schuld und Schulden*, 90–110.

43. Hockerts, "Wiedergutmachung in Deutschland," 182, and Winstel, *Gerechtigkeit*, 47.

44. *Bundesgesetzblatt* (hereafter *BGBl.*), part 1, June 29, 1956, 562–96, here 563: *Bundesgesetz zur Entschädigung für Opfer der nationalsozialistischen Verfolgung* (*Bundesentschädigungsgesetz*).

45. Weinke, "West Germany," 43.

46. Katharina van Bebber, *Wiedergutgemacht? Die Entschädigung der Opfer der nationalsozialistischen Verfolgung nach dem Bundesergänzungsgesetz durch die Entschädigungsgerichte im OLG-Bezirk Hamm* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 42.

47. Ibid., 115. Winstel (*Gerechtigkeit*, 44–45) cited similar figures for Bavaria.

48. Ludolf Herbst, "Einleitung," in Herbst and Goschler, *Wiedergutmachung in der Bundesrepublik*, 7–31, here 30.

49. Hans Günter Hockerts, "Die Entschädigung für NS-Verfolgte in West- und Osteuropa: Eine einführende Skizze," in Hockerts, Moisel, and Winstel, *Grenzen der Wiedergutmachung*, 7–58, here 7, and José Brunner and Iris Nachum, "'Vor dem Gesetz steht ein Türhüter': Wie und warum israelische Antragsteller ihre Zugehörigkeit zum deutschen Sprach- und Kulturkreis beweisen mussten," in Frei, Brunner, and Goschler, *Praxis*, 387–424, here 423–24.

50. Winstel, *Gerechtigkeit*, 62.

51. Hermann-Josef Brodesser et al., *Wiedergutmachung und Kriegsfolgenliquidation: Geschichte—Regelungen—Zahlungen* (Munich: Beck, 2000), 106.

52. Winstel, *Gerechtigkeit*, 59.

53. Ludi, *Reparations*, 77.

54. Meier Teich, *Für eine Revision der Luxembourger Verträge und der Wiedergutmachungs-Gesetze* (Tel Aviv: self-pub., 1961), 3.

55. Karl Heßdörfer, "Die Entschädigungspraxis im Spannungsfeld von Gesetz, Justiz und NS-Opfern," in Herbst and Goschler, *Wiedergutmachung in der Bundesrepublik*, 231–48, here 234. On centralization plans, see Winstel, *Gerechtigkeit*, 51–53.

56. Winstel, *Gerechtigkeit*, 126–27.

57. Ludi, *Reparations*, 116; the following quotation is likewise from this source, 109.

58. On the history of the URO, see Hans Günter Hockerts, "Anwälte der Verfolgten: Die United Restitution Organization," in Herbst and Goschler, *Wiedergutmachung in der Bundesrepublik*, 249–71. There were many other organizations, large and small, like the URO; some were short-lived, such as the World Council for Compensation Claims of Roumanian Jews and the Israelischer Verband ehemaliger Nazizwangsarbeiter, led by Dr. Polgar.

59. Norman Bentwich, *The United Restitution Organization, 1948–1968: The Work of Restitution and Compensation for Victims of Nazi Oppression* (London: Vallentine-Mitchell, n.d.), 27. Bentwich was the first chair of the URO.

60. Ludi, *Reparations*, 116, and Winstel, *Gerechtigkeit*, 55–56.

61. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/18, fols. 204–8, correspondence between Martin Broszat and Dr. Polgar from the Israelischer Verband ehemaliger Nazizwangsarbeiter.

62. In Hamburg, for example, wartime copies of the official Romanian gazette *Monitorul Oficial* were available that contained information about the legislative situation at the time, but there was no German translation of them.

63. On the particular features of the persecution of Jews in Romania, see Heinen, *Rumänien*. On the camps, see Ioanid, *Holocaust in Romania*, esp. 195–224. There is a brief overview in the introduction to Mariana Hausleitner, Souzana Hazan, and Barbara Hutzelmann, eds., *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933–1945*, vol. 13, *Slowakei, Rumänien und Bulgarien* (Berlin: Oldenbourg, 2018), 59–74.

64. Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina had fallen to the Soviet Union under the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (despite Bukovina not being named explicitly), while Romania had had to cede Northern Transylvania to Hungary under the Second Vienna Award.

65. Baum, *Varianten des Terrors*, and Vladimir Solonari, *A Satellite Empire: Romanian Rule in Southwestern Ukraine, 1941–1944* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019).

66. For more details, see Glass, *Deutschland und die Verfolgung der Juden*, esp. 60–85.

67. Antisemitic laws had already been adopted in 1937/38, and they continued from 1938 to 1940 under the autocratic regime of King Carol. On this and the following, see Friling, Ioanid, and Ionescu, *Final Report*; Ioanid, *Holocaust in Romania*; Vladimir Solonari, *Purifying the Nation: Population Exchange and Ethnic Cleansing in Nazi-Allied Romania* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010); and Diana Dumitru, *The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Borderlands of Romania and the Soviet Union* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

68. Andrej Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord: Die Einsatzgruppe D in der südlichen Sowjetunion 1941–1943* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003), and Jean Ancel, *Prelude to Mass Murder: The Pogrom in Iaşi, Romania, June 29, 1941 and Thereafter* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2013).

69. On the administration of Transnistria, see Solonari, *Satellite Empire*. On the Holocaust in Transnistria, see Jean Ancel, *Transnistria, 1941–1942: The Romanian Mass Murder Campaigns*, 3 vols. (Tel Aviv: Goldstein Goren Diaspora Research Center, 2003).

70. Eric C. Steinhart, *The Holocaust and the Germanization of Ukraine* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

71. Klaus-Michael Mallmann et al., eds., *Die "Ereignismeldungen" UdSSR 1941: Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion*, vol. 1 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011), esp. 211, 220, 242–43, 378–79.

72. Ştefan Cristian Ionescu, *Jewish Resistance to "Romanianization," 1940–44* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

73. For more details, see Friling, Ioanid, and Ionescu, *Final Report*, 175–79.

74. Hillgruber, *Hitler*, esp. 232.

75. IfZ-Archiv, ID 60/277, fol. 5, letter to the Senator for Labor and Social Affairs, Berlin, June 21, 1955. The name of the author is illegible; the initials are "Gr," which may stand for Hermann Graml.

76. For example, IfZ-Archiv, ID 60/292, fols. 1–4, IfZ to the lawyer Heinz Roth, July 25, 1955, and ID 60/358, fol. 1, IfZ to the Berlin Higher Administrative Court, November 11, 1955.

77. IfZ-Archiv, ID 60/358, fol. 2, Martin Broszat to the Berlin Higher Administrative Court, November 11, 1955.

78. Broszat, "Rumänische Judenpolitik" (1958), 102.

79. Bentwich, *United Restitution Organisation*, 36. See also Miriam Gross, *An Almost English Life* (London: Short Books, 2012).

80. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/37, fols. 207–9, Kurt May to Martin Broszat, December 29, 1955.

81. Matatias Carp, *Cartea Neagră: Suferinţele evreilor din România; 1940–1944*, 3 vols. (Bucharest: Socec, 1946; Bucharest: Dacia Traiana, 1947–48).

82. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/37, fol. 196, Kurt May to Martin Broszat, April 11, 1956; the following is based on this letter.

83. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/16, fols. 136–37, Martin Broszat to Andreas Hillgruber, February 6, 1958, and ID 104/12, fol. 2, Martin Broszat to Wilhelm Fabricius, April 5, 1956. In 1940 Fabricius was serving as German ambassador in Romania.

84. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/37, fol. 194, Martin Broszat to Kurt May, May 8, 1956; the following quotations are also from this source.

85. In a letter to May dated January 17, 1957, Broszat wrote: "Although we take our work as expert report writers very seriously, sometimes it becomes too much." IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/37, fol. 169.

86. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/37, fols. 192–93, Kurt May to Martin Broszat, May 16, 1956.

87. *BGBl.*, part 1, June 29, 1956, 569: *Bundesentschädigungsgesetz* (§ 43).

88. Quoted from Max Münz, "Wiedergutmachungsrecht, " *Juristenzeitung* 14 (1959): 477–82, here 477.

89. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/37, fols. 184–85, Kurt May to Martin Broszat, December 3, 1956.

90. Broszat, "Rumänische Judenpolitik" (1957), 98; on the following, see ibid.

91. Hellmuth Hecker, "Die Entwicklung der Judenverfolgungen in Rumänien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung eines deutschen Einflusses hierauf," in *Praktische Fragen des Entschädigungsrechts: Judenverfolgung im Ausland*, ed. Hellmuth Hecker (Hamburg, 1958), 201–64.

92. Heinz Doerner, "Über Verfolgungsmaßnahmen gegen Angehörige der jüdischen Rasse in Jugoslawien (mit Bulgarien), Ungarn und Rumänien während des II. Weltkrieges und zur Frage ihrer Veranlassung bzw. Billigung durch deutsche Dienststellen," in Hecker, *Fragen des Entschädigungsrechts*, 1–68, here 51–68.

93. Hecker, "Entwicklung der Judenverfolgungen," 264.

94. See Eberhard Jäckel's review in *Jahrbuch für internationales Recht* 8 (1958): 358–60.

95. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/12, fol. 88, Martin Broszat to Hellmuth Hecker, July 9, 1959.

96. Chris Lorenz, "Has the Third Reich Become History? Martin Broszat as Historian and Pedagogue," *Bulletin of the Arnold and Leona Finkler Institute of Holocaust Research* 8 (1998): 27–44, here 32. It is revealing that Broszat disagreed not only with Hecker but also with Andreas Hillgruber. Broszat largely followed the views of Max Münz, an Israeli lawyer, who had completed a relevant dissertation in the Faculty of Law at the University of Frankfurt in the academic year 1957/58. Münz later worked temporarily for the URO. Max Münz, "Die Verantwortlichkeit für die Judenverfolgungen im Ausland während der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft: Ein Beitrag zur Klärung des Begriffes der 'Veranlassung' i. S. des §43 BEG, seines Verhältnisses zur Staatssouveränität und seiner Anwendung auf die Einwirkung des nationalsozialistischen Deutschlands auf nicht-deutsche Staaten in der Zeit vom 30. Januar 1933 bis 8. Mai 1945 hinsichtlich der Rechtsstellung und Behandlung der Juden, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Judenverfolgungen in Bulgarien, Rumänien und Ungarn" (PhD diss., Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, 1958). In 1958 Broszat had only a working manuscript of the study, which some people regarded as a "diatribe," but which largely won the sympathy of the examiners. Münz's conclusion received proper appreciation, however, only when it was taken into account in the course of revising the BEG in 1965. Daniel Siemens, "Juristische Zeitgeschichte *avant la lettre*: Die Frankfurter Dissertation von Max Münz zur 'Verantwortlichkeit für die Judenverfolgungen im Ausland' (1958)," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 15, no. 1 (2018): 184–92.

97. The contact between May and other members of the IfZ seems to have been much less close and cordial. IfZ-Archiv, ID 103/210, memorandum on a conversation with the lawyer Dr. May from the URO, Frankfurt am Main, March 8, 1961.

98. Hectograph copies of the URO's collection of documents were published in four volumes in 1959/60; IfZ-Archiv, MS 414/1–4.

99. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/12, fols. 83–84, Bruno Fischer to Martin Broszat, August 26, 1957.

100. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/37, fol. 80, Bruno Fischer to Martin Broszat, October 30, 1958, and fols. 82–83, Kurt May to Martin Broszat, November 14, 1958.

101. This is shown by the correspondence in the IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/12.

102. Yad Vashem Archives (hereafter YVA), P 13 (Benjamin Sagalowitz Archive), 22: Documentation regarding the persecution of Romanian Jews and reparations to Roma-

nian and Austrian Jews, 1941–1961, fols. 175–80, German reparations to Romanian Jews; "Entschädigung für Juden aus Rumänien vorläufig gestoppt," *Aufbau*, July 19, 1957.

103. Münz, "Wiedergutmachungsrecht," 477.

104. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/35, fols. 6–7, lawyer K. R. Schmanns to Ino Arndt, January 27, 1972; fols. 60–62, Werner Wilmanns to Ino Arndt, May 2, 1971; fols. 95–96, Otto Knoll to Ino Arndt, January 3, 1971.

105. Kurt May in his foreword dated October 1959 to the third volume of URO documentation on the persecution of Jews in Romania: IfZ-Archiv, MS 414/3, fol. 7.

106. YVA, P 13/22, fol. 118, German reparations to Romanian Jews (draft).

107. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/18, fols. 264–70, Dr. Polgar to the State Reparations Office in Mainz, February 17, 1957.

108. See, for example, Meier Teich, "Die Vertriebeneneigenschaft im Sinne der 11. DV zum Lastenausgleichsgesetz," *Die Stimme* 26, no. 250 (1970): 5–6, here 6.

109. YVA, P 13/22, fol. 67, memorandum 565/60 of the URO Main Office, June 28, 1960.

110. As May asserted in his foreword to the third volume of URO documentation of the persecution of Jews in Romania: IfZ-Archiv, MS 414/3, fols. 7–9; the following quotation is from the same source, fol. 8.

111. Especially IfZ-Archiv, MS 414/6, United Restitution Organization, "Dokumente über Methoden der Judenverfolgung im Ausland," (Frankfurt a. M., 1960).

112. YVA, P 13/22, fols. 84–89, here fol. 84, URO memorandum, 1960.

113. In the mid-1960s Bruno Fischer described the precise events in Romania in a ten-page text in which he listed all the names of camps and cities that might be of interest to the compensation authorities. This text was passed to the IfZ (IfZ-Archiv, ID 60/3641, fols. 5–15), and Ino Arndt evaluated it positively (ID 60/3641, fols. 2–3, Ino Arndt to the Interior Minister of North-Rhine-Westphalia, September 13, 1965).

114. YVA, P 13/22, fols. 84–89, here fol. 85, URO memorandum, 1960. It is remarkable that Broszat ("Rumänische Judenpolitik" (1957), 42) embraced a similar argument.

115. For example, IfZ-Archiv, ID 60/1070, fol. 2, Martin Broszat to the Cologne Higher Regional Court, April 16, 1959.

116. For example, IfZ-Archiv, ID 60/2490, n.p., Erwin Fauck to the Darmstadt Regional Court, January 30, 1962.

117. This is suggested by an analysis of a large number of Gutachten concerning Romania; for example: IfZ-Archiv, ID 60/2874, n.p., Ino Arndt to the Cologne Regional Court, November 25, 1963.

118. IfZ-Archiv, ID 60/1809, n.p., Martin Broszat to the Düsseldorf Regional Court, September 30, 1960.

119. Gerald Reitlinger, *The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 1939–1945* (London: Vallentine-Mitchell, 1953), 394-411, and Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (London: Allen, 1961), 485–509.

120. For example, IfZ-Archiv, ID 60/4558, fols. 2–3, Dietmar Petzina to the Koblenz Higher Regional Court, November 25, 1969.

121. Bukovina had belonged to Austria-Hungary until 1918. It became part of Romania after World War I, and was later divided between Romania and the Soviet Union.

122. Under the *LAG* and *BVFG*, ethnic Germans who had been expelled from this region as a result of the war could claim compensation for material losses. The legislation had not envisaged that someone could be both Jewish and an expellee, because many expellees had not held German citizenship either before the war or at the point when they fled or were expelled. Under the *BVFG* and the *LAG*, it was German ethnicity, not citizenship, that was required in order to be recognized as an expellee. For obvious reasons, postwar West Germany had avoided determining who was German solely according to ethnic criteria. Therefore—although this was not the intention of the lawmakers—so-called Jewish ethnic Germans or Jewish fictive expellees could apply for compensation via the LAG. Brunner and Nachum, "Gesetz," 423–24; Jannis Panagiotidis, "The Oberkreisdirektor Decides Who Is a German: Jewish Immigration, German Bureaucracy, and the Negotiation of National Belonging, 1953–1990," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 38, no. 3 (September 2012): 503–33; Iris Nachum, "Reconstructing Life after the Holocaust: The *Lastenausgleichsgesetz* and the Jewish Struggle for Compensation," *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 58 (2013): 53–67. On the Jews from Bukovina, see in particular Gaëlle Fisher, *Resettlers and Survivors: Bukovina and the Politics of Belonging in West Germany and Israel, 1945–1989* (New York: Berghahn, 2020), esp. 176–90.

123. *BGBl*., part 1, May 22, 1953, 201–21, here 204: *Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge*.

124. IfZ-Archiv, ID 60/3101, fols. 2–53, Martin Broszat, "Die Juden in der Bukowina: Nationalkulturelle und nationalpolitische Eigenart und Entwicklung vor 1933," October 1963; the expert report was prepared for the Cologne Regional Court.

125. Martin Broszat, "Von der Kulturnation zur Volksgruppe: Die nationale Stellung der Juden in der Bukowina im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," *Historische Zeitschrift* 200, no. 1 (1965): 572–605.

126. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/37, fol. 30, Bruno Fischer to Martin Broszat, December 19, 1969; Martin Broszat's reply dated January 19, 1970, is found in the same file, fol. 29.

127. Wiener Library Archive, 579, 1963–1968, The Wiener Library Documents Sections, Jews of Bukovina: Papers re compensation of German Jewish nationals, fols. 1–15, Comment of the URO, Frankfurt a. M., on Martin Broszat's Gutachten (October 1963), unsigned, undated.

128. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/44, fols. 111–19, Expert's comment (March 18, 1980) on the ethnicity of the Jews of Bukovina in light of the Romanian census of December 29, 1930.

129. See, for example, Christian Meier, "Der Historiker Martin Broszat," in Henke and Natoli, *Pathos*, 11–38.

130. Berg, *Invention of "Functionalism"*; Berg, *Holocaust*; and Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer, "A Controversy about the Historicization of National Socialism," *New German Critique*, no. 44 (Spring–Summer 1988): 85–126.

131. Mathias Beer, "Martin Broszat und die Erfahrung der Dokumentation der Vertreibung," in Frei, *Martin Broszat*, 43–59, here 53–54; the quotation can be found on p. 54.

132. On this, see Lawrence Douglas, "The Historian's Trial: John Demjanjuk and the Prosecution of Atrocity," in *The Palgrave Handbook of State-Sponsored History after 1945*, ed. Berber Bevernage and Nico Wouters (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 535–49, and Lawrence Douglas, *The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the*

Holocaust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). This was probably the most important difference between Broszat and the subsequent generation of "expert historians." Lawrence Douglas argues that it had simply been "too early" in the 1950s and 1960s to undertake a commensurate evaluation of these historical sources. Douglas, "The Historian's Trial," 545. In this context it is notable that Ino Arndt, who replaced Broszat as a Romania specialist at the IfZ in the early 1960s, took a different position on the question of Jews from Bukovina and followed Fischer's lead.

133. Van Bebber, *Wiedergutgemacht*, 358.

134. Nicolas Berg criticized the use of mainly German sources from state institutions in the historiography on National Socialism and the persecution of the Jews (*Invention of "Functionalism,"* 13–14) as a precarious extension of "perpetrator-centered interpretation models" and as the "real proximity of historians after 1945 to the perpetrators." See also Devin O. Pendas, *The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963–1965: Genocide, History and the Limits of the Law* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 147, and Christoph Cornelißen, "Zeitgeschichte im Übergang von der NS-Diktatur zur Demokratie: Gerhard Ritter und die Institutionalisierung der Zeitgeschichte in Westdeutschland," in *Historische Institute im internationalen Vergleich*, ed. Matthias Middell, Gabriele Lingelbach, and Frank Hadler (Leipzig: Akademische Verlags-Anstalt, 2001), 339–61, here 342.

135. Constantin Goschler, "German Compensation to Jewish Nazi Victims," in Diefendorf, *Lessons and Legacies*, 6, 373–412, here 394–95, and Heßdörfer, "Entschädigungspraxis," 238.

136. Berg, *Holocaust*, 319.

137. Steinbacher, "Martin Broszat," 141.

138. Steinbacher, "Anfänge der Zeitgeschichtsforschung," 41.

139. Weinke, "West Germany," 30, 41. Turner emphasized, with reference to the published expert reports prepared for the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, that "limited by its judicial purpose, the *Gutachten* that formed the post-trial book proved less decisive in court than they did in charting the course of historical scholarship" (*Historians*, 17).

140. Ludi, *Reparations*, 3.

141. On this, see Saul Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews*, vol. 1: *The Years of Persecution 1933–1939* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997) and vol. 2: *The Years of Extermination 1940–1945* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007).

Rejection and Recognition

Raul Hilberg and the Institute for Contemporary History

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In 2017, the publication history of Raul Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews* provoked controversy. Two expert reports emerged in which historians at the Institute for Contemporary History (IfZ) had advised against translating the work into German. Important questions left unanswered by the debate in 2017 are addressed in the present documentation on the basis of new archival finds from the archives of the publishing houses C.H.Beck and Droemer Knaur. This documentation also includes previously unknown correspondence from the papers of IfZ staff member Ino Arndt. The author of a previously disclosed expert report about Hilberg's work from 1980, Arndt wrote to the publishing house Darmstädter Blätter about a possible translation of Hilberg's book, pointing to the costs connected with such a project. Thus, there are now three known recommendations from the IfZ against publishing a German translation of Hilberg. At the same time, other sources show that Hilberg's work enjoyed appreciation and recognition among the staff of the IfZ. The relationship between Hilberg and the Munich Institute must, therefore, be regarded as ambivalent.

Debate and Unanswered Questions

The publication history of Raul Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews*, which first appeared in the US in 1961, became the subject of controversy a few years ago following the discovery and publication of two expert reports written by employees of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ—Institute for Contemporary History), both of which advised against translating the book into German. Hilberg's book was the first to describe the murder of the Jews as a complex, bureaucratic process based on a division of labor, a process in which all of German society was involved, from Protestant parsonages to private companies, the Wehrmacht, and the ministries in Berlin. Although some of the book's details have been criticized, *The Destruction of the European Jews* remains one

of the undisputed "milestones" of Holocaust research[1] and indeed one of the "classics of contemporary history."[2]

Written almost two decades apart—the first in the early 1960s and the second in 1980—the IfZ's reports praised Hilberg's work but concluded, respectively, that "for certain general reasons, we believe that a German translation is not to be recommended"[3] and that the "question whether *today* [1980] a German translation of the original English edition of *1961* is to be recommend ought [. . .] to be answered with 'no.'"[4]

A conference entitled "Raul Hilberg and Holocaust Historiography," which took place in Berlin in October 2017, sparked a debate about both the IfZ's first expert report, of which only fragments have survived, and the second one, which had been commissioned by the publishing house C.H.Beck. This led to a flurry of media reports and scholarly publications, but none of these revealed new details.[5] Neither the complete first expert report nor the commission agreement with the publishing house Droemer Knaur has been tracked down.

Questions concerning the details of this publication history have thus remained unanswered. This article investigates these questions in the light of new archival discoveries, which include documents found in the archives of C.H.Beck and Droemer Knaur. In addition, the release of papers from the estate of Ino Arndt, the author of the 1980 expert report, has brought important correspondence to light. In a letter written in late 1979, Arndt declined to provide the publisher Darmstädter Blätter with an expert report of her own, but nevertheless warned against translating Hilberg's book. This correspondence is published for the first time in the appendix below. In publishing these letters along with the two expert reports and other correspondence, this article aims to give researchers and the public a preliminary overview of the highly ambivalent history of the relationship between Raul Hilberg and the IfZ—a history of both rejection and recognition that is supplemented in several respects by the archival discoveries contextualized below.

Recently Discovered Correspondence

On October 31, 1979, Günther Schwarz, head of Darmstädter Blätter, wrote to Ino Arndt of the IfZ. After thanking Arndt for the advice she had given prior to the publication of a book by Ludwig Rosenthal,[6] Schwarz continued: "I would like to ask you to recommend a reviewer for Raul Hilberg's book."[7]

It is evident that Schwarz and Arndt had discussed Hilberg before, since

Schwarz thanked Arndt at the end of the letter for the "eighty pages of translation you kindly promised us."[8] He also reported that Hilberg had agreed to have his book published by Darmstädter Blätter.[9] Nevertheless, Schwarz wanted to wait for the verdict of the IfZ experts on the Nazi period before translating the work (which in the letter already has its later German title, *Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden*[10]). Schwarz was expecting "small sales of a German edition" in any case, even though Heinz Höhne, in a discussion of the "Holocaust" series,[11] had complained a few weeks earlier in *Der Spiegel* about the lack of a German translation.[12]

Schwarz therefore planned to ask the publisher of *Der Spiegel*, Rudolf Augstein, to co-fund a German edition, thereby supposedly following a historical precedent. Unfortunately, neither Schwarz's request nor Augstein's reply has been found among the latter's papers.[13] Schwarz may not have actually made the request, since he had obviously been misinformed. Contrary to his belief, the *New York Times* did not help fund the publication of Hilberg's original work. Rather, it was the exile Frank Petschek who facilitated the publication of the first edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews*[14] by guaranteeing in advance that he would purchase 100 copies and then later donate them to libraries.[15]

"Unfortunately, I have not yet managed to find an expert for Hilberg's book," Arndt wrote to Schwarz on December 3, 1979,[16] although just a few weeks later she herself submitted a report on Hilberg's work to the publisher C.H.Beck on behalf of the IfZ.[17] In the same letter she asked whether Schwarz had already heard back from Augstein and whether "the financing of the German edition" and therefore also the "remuneration of the requested expert report [had been] secured."

In his letter Schwarz had argued for the urgency of a German translation partly on the grounds that English was "an insurmountable barrier to study for many history teachers."[18] A few weeks later Arndt rejected this argument when advising the publisher C.H.Beck against a translation of Hilberg's work, claiming that "the majority of potential readers in fact have sufficient knowledge of English."[19]

Schwarz first contacted Arndt about the Hilberg book on September 11, 1979, mistakenly assuming that Arndt was a man and addressing his letter to "Herr Dr. Arndt."[20] In this letter he explained his motive for requesting an expert report from the IfZ. Before beginning the expensive task of having Hilberg's tome translated, he wrote, he wanted a firm commitment from the Bundes- und Landeszentralen für politische Bildung (Federal and State Agencies for Civic Education) to purchase a specified quantity of books, thereby

guaranteeing that production costs would be covered. An expert report from the renowned IfZ recommending the German translation "would likely prove decisive" for these agencies. Schwarz enclosed the letter to the agencies he had sent a few days earlier, in which he announced, "in the light of the Holocaust film screenings and the unsatisfactory follow-up expert discussions each night," the forthcoming publication of a German edition of Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews.* Of the many projects the publisher had undertaken in this subject area, the Hilberg translation was the "most difficult and extensive [. . .] but certainly also the most important," Schwarz wrote.[21]

As she was on vacation, it took Arndt a good four weeks to reply. Echoing Schwarz's words, she wrote that she, too, considered the translation an "important project." She offered "a little help": "several years ago I studied this book very intensively and made a rough translation of some sections (about eighty typewritten pages). If you are interested in it, please let me know."[22] It was not until a later letter, dated October 25, 1979, that Arndt responded to Schwarz's request for an expert report and offered to help find a reviewer, but added two caveats: First, the author of the report would have to be remunerated; in other words, this would involve costs for Schwarz. And second, the translation costs for the entire work would be considerable. Arndt doubted whether the expense was justified, pointing out "that contemporary history scholarship has managed without a German translation for eighteen years now (the book was published in 1961)."[23] This terse sentence was tantamount to a rejection of the project.

Today, it is no longer possible to ascertain whether the abandonment of the translation project was directly due to Arndt's assessment, especially since Schwarz asked her in a follow-up letter to recommend an expert nonetheless.[24] The correspondence between the IfZ and Darmstädter Blätter about Hilberg's book ended with a letter dated December 3, 1979, in which Arndt regretted that she was unable to suggest an expert.[25] No further letters on the matter were exchanged, or if they were, they have not survived or yet been discovered. In his memoir, Hilberg himself mentions publication plans only briefly: "In 1979 a much smaller company, the Verlag Darmstädter Blätter, inquired about the book but then decided it could not manage publication financially."[26] The argument that a translation would "undoubtedly entail high costs" cited in Arndt's letter thus reappears here.[27]

Little is known about the publishing house Darmstädter Blätter and its founder Günther Schwarz. The former has ceased operations, and it has no archives. In March 1996 a short obituary of Schwarz, who had died two months earlier, appeared in the *Börsenblatt für den deutschen Buchhandel*, a

German book-trade magazine.[28] According to this obituary and a 1985 portrait in the same magazine,[29] Schwarz, the son of a factory owner, was born in Berlin-Lichterfelde on July 14, 1905. He studied economics and Russian at the University of Cambridge and in 1934 went to Darmstadt, where he joined the Friedrich May engine manufacturer as an assistant, and later took over its management. In 1935 he married Helma May, the factory owner's daughter. A file at the Berlin Document Center shows that Schwarz became a member of the Nazi Party in Saarbrücken on October 1, 1933, by which time he was working as a corporate attorney.[30] After the war, Schwarz worked as a commercial agent while, on the side, attending lectures at the University of Darmstadt, including lectures by Eugen Kogon. Encouraged by Kogon, Schwarz founded the magazine *Darmstädter Blätter—wir lesen für Sie* in 1956, for which he was responsible from 1967 at the publishing house of the same name. In addition to the magazine, which contained articles from around the world committed to promoting international understanding, Darmstädter Blätter soon began publishing books, including titles on language, conflict research, economics, and philosophy, as well as its own "Judaica" series, which mainly comprised memoirs by Holocaust survivors. Schwarz ran the publishing house for forty years until his death on January 19, 1996. Four years previously, the German president, Richard von Weizsäcker, had awarded him the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany.[31] In Schwarz's obituary, his son Günter announced that he would continue the publishing business. But according to the 2007/8 address book for the German-language book trade, publishing operations ceased in 2006.[32]

Schwarz's contact at the IfZ, Ino (short for Ingrid Nora) Arndt (1930–86), was the daughter of Hans Arndt. Born in 1886, Hans Arndt was a Reich archivist and Ministerialrat in the Luftwaffe's Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung (Military Science Division). According to a "personal certificate" issued on February 4, 1939, "He stands up for the National Socialist state wholeheartedly at all times. His off-duty conduct is impeccable; he is a well-known personality in Berlin social life."[33] After serving as a career officer between 1905 and 1920, Hans Arndt moved to the Reich Archives in Potsdam, where he worked mainly on the project *Der große Krieg 1914/18* (The Great War 1914–18). As a former member of the Luftstreitkräfte (the Imperial German Air Service) and an expert on the history of aerial warfare, in 1933 he was seconded to the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (Reich Ministry of Aviation), where he rose to head the Military History subdivision. He died in a British prisoner-of-war camp in 1945.

It might be said that Ino Arndt followed in her father's footsteps, insofar

as she decided to become a historian. Born in Potsdam in 1930, she lived with her family for a few months in 1944 in Karlsbad in the annexed Sudetenland, where her father's division had been transferred in August 1943. At the end of the war Ino Arndt and her mother fled to Tyrol before moving on to Munich, where Arndt graduated from high school in 1948. After working for a time in the bookstore of a publishing house and spending two years in England, she started university in Munich, where she studied history, English, German, and philosophy. In 1953 she completed a second stay abroad at Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio, before moving to the University of Tübingen.[34] In 1960 she received her doctorate there with a thesis entitled "The Jewish Question in the Light of the Protestant Sunday Papers of 1918–1933," which was supervised by Theodor Eschenburg and Hans Rothfels.

On January 1, 1963, Ino Arndt took up her position at the IfZ, where she worked for over two decades until her untimely death on June 3, 1986.[35] In his letter accompanying her expert report for C.H.Beck, Horst Möller, deputy director of the institute between 1979 and 1982, described her as "our staff member specializing in the problem of the National Socialist persecution of the Jews."[36] An obituary published in *Hefte für den Freundeskreis der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing*, a booklet published by the Protestant Academy of Tutzing, paid tribute to Arndt as a "committed woman [. . .] who never drew attention to herself because of a personal need for recognition."[37] Accordingly, she was regarded at the IfZ as a quiet and diligent worker in the background who was entrusted with writing scholarly reports of all kinds and was involved in various book projects.

The Expert Report for C.H.Beck in 1980

Ino Arndt, who published little herself, became better known when Götz Aly, at the Hilberg Conference in Berlin in 2017 and in the press, revealed the expert report of January 31, 1980, in which Arndt had advised C.H.Beck against having Hilberg's magnum opus translated into German.[38] It remained unclear, however, whether the publisher abandoned the project solely on the basis of Arndt's report, whether it sought out other expert reports, or whether entirely different considerations, such as financial ones, ultimately led to the decision not to publish a German translation.[39]

These questions can now be answered, thanks to a document that has been discovered among Arndt's papers and in the C.H.Beck archives.[40] A response from the chief editor of C.H.Beck, Ernst-Peter Wieckenberg, was written on February 13, 1980. This letter was addressed directly to Ino Arndt and not to

Horst Möller, who had written the letter accompanying the expert report.[41] Wieckenberg thanked Arndt for the expert report, from which the publishing house drew two conclusions. First, as Wieckenberg succinctly put it, "Your verdict has led us to forgo a translation of the work." Wieckenberg then went into much more detail about "thoughts" to which Arndt's report had "given rise." Invoking Eberhard Schmitt's *Einführung in die Geschichte der französischen Revolution* (Introduction to the History of the French Revolution, 1976),[42] Wieckenberg proposed a new publication, referring explicitly to the rejected work: "After all that you write in your expert report on Hilberg's book, it seems to us not inappropriate to plan a similar book on the history of the persecution of Jews in the Third Reich."

Wieckenberg's "thoughts" were already quite concrete, as demonstrated by the figures he provided with respect to the number of pages ("120 printed pages"), the print run ("between 3,000 and 4,000 copies"), and remuneration ("10% per copy"). According to a handwritten note attached to the copy of the letter in her papers, Arndt subsequently telephoned Wieckenberg to thank him for the offer and ask for his patience. Two months later, however, she turned the offer down altogether because of time constraints.[43] Wieckenberg then suggested that Arndt write the book with other colleagues in order to divide up the work and thus to be able to complete the project after all.[44]

Apparently, Arndt did not take Wieckenberg up on this suggestion. In October 1981 the C.H.Beck editor asked Horst Möller again about the "plan[s] of your institute to produce a work about the extermination of the Jews."[45] He referred to a "detailed conversation" between Möller and Wolfgang Beck, one of the owners of the publishing house, during which, as Möller recalled, the idea was proposed to comprehensively document the murder of Europe's Jews by publishing key sources and to provide an account of the Holocaust in an accompanying monograph. In the same letter Wieckenberg asked the deputy director of the IfZ to review two books by Martin Gilbert, including the *Atlas of the Holocaust*, writing that he wanted to assess whether these books could be published by C.H.Beck and assuring Möller that a fee would be paid for the report. According to handwritten notes attached to this letter, Möller agreed only to a report on *Atlas* and once again assigned this task to Arndt. Even before receiving the report, however, Wieckenberg acknowledged that "these two works are [not] even remotely capable of what you have in mind with the work planned by your institute." Arndt's report, which has not survived, must again have been negative, because a year later Rowohlt Verlag, and not C.H. Beck, published a German edition of Gilbert's *Atlas*.[46]

In 1983 C.H.Beck published a volume edited by Martin Broszat and Horst

Möller entitled *Das Dritte Reich: Herrschaftsstruktur und Geschichte* (The Third Reich: Power Structure and History). It contained lectures by IfZ staff members, including a contribution by Ino Arndt on pages 209 to 230 entitled "Antisemitismus und Judenverfolgung" (Antisemitism and the Persecution of the Jews). The IfZ did not publish any other books on the persecution of the Jews with C.H.Beck, and it can be assumed that it was precisely the IfZ's publication plans that contributed to Arndt's rejection of the proposed German translation of Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews*. The IfZ did not want its own project to face competition from Hilberg's extensive study. The same motive had probably played a role in the IfZ's initial rejection of a translation of Hilberg's book back in the 1960s.

The Expert Report in the 1960s

There was good reason to believe that the Munich publisher Droemer Knaur asked the IfZ, which was also located in Munich, for a report and that the publication project was abandoned as a result of a negative assessment from the IfZ. Until recently, however, there was a lack of evidence and correspondence proving these direct connections. In a history of Droemer Knaur published in 2017, there is a detailed section on the "Hilberg Case"—even though this was a book that the publisher had *not* published.[47] While the author of this history assumed that there was no record in the Droemer Knaur archives of what had transpired, the publishing contract and the termination agreement between the Munich publishing house and Hilberg's US publisher, Quadrangle Books, have since been found. In addition, there are four contracts with the translators commissioned for the translation into German.[48]

The original English and German copies of the publishing contract, which is dated July 17, 1963, have survived.[49] It is noteworthy that Droemer Knaur agreed that the translation would be published within two years of the contract being signed. This was quite an ambitious undertaking for a complex work of 800 double-columned printed pages, so there can be little doubt that the publisher approached several people for the task of translating the work.

One of the translators considered by Droemer Knaur must have been the German-Jewish journalist Hans Lamm (1913–85). Lamm, a sociologist and returned emigrant, had received his doctorate under the supervision of Hans-Joachim Schoeps with a thesis entitled "On the Internal and External Development of German Jewry in the Third Reich." At the time Droemer Knaur was considering having Hilberg's book translated, Lamm was a head of department at the Munich Volkshochschule (an adult education center).

Later, between 1970 and 1985, Lamm would serve as president of the Israelitische Kultusgemeinde, or Jewish Community, of Munich and Upper Bavaria. On August 26, 1963, Lamm wrote to the Wiener Library in London asking for British reviews of Hilberg's book. His request had a specific reason: "I am supposed to translate the book by Raul HILBERG 'The Destruction of European Jewry [*sic*]' but I have some reservations, since I know of several critical American Jewish voices about it."[50] Indeed, Hilberg's book had drawn sharp criticism and repudiation from the Jewish community in the US for its comments on Jewish resistance and the role of the *Judenräte* (Jewish councils).[51] Holocaust historian and survivor Joseph Wulf (1912–74) was one of these critics: "Raul Hilberg is a talented young historian who treats with scholarly accuracy the 'Final Solution to the Jewish Question' and all its machinery *in* the Third Reich. But in putting forward theses about ghettos, Judenräte, etc., without using *Jewish sources*, he ventures into terrain that is completely closed off to him."[52]

According to the reply dated September 9, Lamm received five reviews from the Wiener Library, but the reply does not list them, so we do not know the tenor of these reviews.[53] In any case Lamm seems to have decided not to take on the translation. Records show that in November 1963 and January 1964, Droemer Knaur signed contracts with four other translators for the translation into German: two professional translators, Günter Eichel and Liselotte Julius, plus two members of the IfZ, Ino Arndt and Hermann Weiß (1932–2015).[54] However, only Arndt's and Weiß's private addresses are provided in the contracts.

The long-serving deputy head of the IfZ archives Hermann Weiß, who worked at the IfZ from 1961 to 1997, was commissioned by the publisher to prepare "a complete translation and documentation of the quotations" in Hilberg's work, while the running text was divided between Eichel (chapters 1 to 5, 7, and 9), Julius (chapter 8), and Arndt (chapters 6 and 10 to 12).[55] The German manuscript was scheduled for completion in mid-May 1964. There are no records relating to the progress of the translation or whether it was completed on time. At any rate, in a letter dated July 26, 1965, Droemer Knaur terminated the publishing contract with Quadrangle Books, citing as a reason the expiration of the two-year period originally agreed upon for publication.[56]

Strikingly, though, the editor in charge of the planned German edition, Fritz Bolle (1908–82), had already informed Hilberg that the project was being abandoned in a letter dated June 11, 1965, citing Hilberg's "thesis of Jewish 'collaboration'" as the reason for terminating the contract.[57] "In view of the special situation in Germany," Bolle wrote, this thesis could encourage peo-

ple to draw "antisemitic conclusions," thereby "poisoning a considerable share of public opinion."[58] Hilberg himself, however, suspected that it was rather the "concerns about former perpetrators" that had stymied a German edition of his book.[59] Meanwhile, Götz Aly believes that the Nazi past of Hilberg's editor, Bolle, played an indirect role: Bolle had been assistant director of an underground arms factory built by prisoners of the Laura concentration subcamp.[60] In contrast, Hans Mommsen (1930–2015) suspected that "an intervention from the Jewish side" was behind the negative IfZ report. Mommsen, who worked at the IfZ from April 1961 until the end of 1962, also assumed "that the missing parts of the institute directors' records had been deliberately destroyed in order to conceal the fact that the institute had opposed the publication of Hilberg's book."[61]

But despite its rejection of a German translation, Hilberg's book was one of the reference works used at the IfZ. In October 1964, for example, Ino Arndt mentioned Hilberg's original English edition in a letter to the archives of the Wiedergutmachungskammern (restitution chambers) of the Berlin Regional Court. This letter shows that Arndt, as one of the translators, knew the work very well and had familiarized herself with the sources cited in the footnotes.[62] In her letter she said she would send a copy of "the report mentioned on page 382, note 179 in Raul Hilberg's book" on "the administration and use of Jewish assets in Luxembourg."

Having studied English and spent two periods, each of several years' duration, living in Britain and the US, Arndt, a historian, had the requisite English-language skills to read a work of almost 800 densely printed pages and to translate part of it. In addition, she had already dealt indirectly with the prehistory of the Nazi persecution of the Jews in her doctoral thesis and was thus also familiar with the subject matter. It is likely that Bolle had asked the IfZ to suggest translators who might be suitable, and that this is what led to the collaboration with Weiß and Arndt. Further evidence comes in the form of a letter of thanks to Bolle from Thilo Vogelsang, head of the IfZ library at the time, for providing Arndt with a copy of *The Destruction of the European Jews* in July 1964.[63] Bolle and Arndt must have worked together in the following years as well, because among Arndt's papers is a rather informal three-page handwritten letter from Bolle, dated April 23, 1970,[64] which is signed with the editor's "Little Bolle Man," a cartoon he used as a signature.[65]

But the contracts recently discovered in the Droemer Knaur archives raise new questions. Why would the IfZ assign a historian and an archivist to translate a book that it had previously advised not to be translated? After all, although Weiß and Arndt are named as private individuals in the contracts, they

would have had to draw on the institute's resources, such as the library and archive holdings, to complete the translation. And the new archival discoveries do not prove beyond doubt that Droemer Knaur had first commissioned the expert report, as was previously assumed. It may have been a completely different publishing house that requested a report from the institute. Of course, it is also possible that Droemer Knaur decided to translate the book despite the IfZ's negative report. Furthermore, the author of the report remains unidentified. It seems reasonable to assume that the IfZ director at the time, Helmut Krausnick,[66] was the author, since the document comes from his papers. However, all these theories are provisional in nature, as of course more documents on the matter might be found in the IfZ archives and other archives.

As far as the lack of a date for the IfZ report is concerned, the planned or existing publications mentioned in it give important and more concrete clues as to when the report was written. On the second page, for example, a brochure published by Wolfgang Scheffler in 1960 is mentioned. This brochure was to be followed by a longer book, but the latter was never published.[67] Also noteworthy is the reference to "a popular account of the persecution of the Jews in Germany," which was to be produced jointly by the IfZ and the Wiener Library and "completed by the end of this year" under the editorship of the Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst (Federal Agency for Homeland Services).

A large number of documents relating to this ultimately abortive joint project have been preserved in the Wiener Library's correspondence, access to which was opened a few years ago.[68] The background to the project was apparently a planned publication campaign in the early 1950s on the politics of the past. On the initiative of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst, it was decided at a workshop in the spring of 1954 to produce several publications dealing with the Nazi period, as well as "problems of antisemitism and how to combat it." One of these planned book projects was a "work of documentation on the persecution of the Jews in the Third Reich," later briefly referred to in the files as a "document work." It seems that the plan was to compile a volume of primary sources with explanatory texts. Alfred Wiener urged that the persecution itself not be the focus; instead, the assistance provided to persecuted Jews by Germans was to be presented and reference was to be made to the possibilities of "reconciliation" between Germans and German Jews. The conceptual character of the whole project was thus thoroughly in tune with the Zeitgeist.

From the outset the "document work" was conceived as a collaborative project between the IfZ and the Wiener Library, with the director of the IfZ, Helmut Krausnick, and Alfred Wiener acting as coeditors. In addition, indi-

vidual experts were to edit chapters or subchapters. In terms of content, the project was initially structured as follows: 1. The facts; 2. Commentary on the facts; 2(a) The failure of the many; 2(b) The courage of the few; 2(c) The admission of guilt; 2(d) The voice of reconciliation. Later, this structure was slightly modified, and in around 1960 it took on the following outline: 1. The persecution of the Jews (Helmut Krausnick); 2. The failure of the many (IfZ and Wiener Library); 3. The courage of the few (IfZ and Wiener Library); 4. The German Jew (Alfred Wiener); 5. Closing comments (external). Initial preparatory work began as early as 1954, and official contracts were signed the following year.

Work on the project soon stalled, however, because of conflicting deadlines and, more critically, ongoing internal squabbles both within and between the two organizations. New deadlines were repeatedly set for the completion of the project. In 1962 there was increased pressure to finish it by the end of the year.[69] But correspondence between Alfred Wiener and an employee of the Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst indicates that in the summer of 1963, after nine years, the entire project (still unfinished) was abandoned.[70] This allows for a more precise dating of the fragmentary Hilberg report. For if work on the document project was halted in the summer of 1963, but the report mentions that the project "will be completed by the end of this year," then the report dates not to 1964[71] but rather to 1962, when the project was still scheduled for completion at the end of the year. This dating is also supported by the reference made in the report to a dissertation by Helmut Genschel, which he defended in Göttingen on July 18, 1962.[72] A glance at the IfZ library's acquisition history of *The Destruction of the European Jews* also supports a dating to 1962, because for an expert report to be written in the first place, a copy of the English original had to be available, and the IfZ library acquired the book in March 1962. Today, the library holds three copies of the original edition, each of which has its own history.

The Three Copies of *The Destruction of the European Jews* (1961) in the IfZ Library

The first copy was acquired on March 30, 1962 (today's call number: N 375, formerly 62/43780), and used to be held in the library's reading room (under call number n 90 Hil). One or two individuals have left traces of extensive reading in this copy.[73] There are neutral annotations in pencil throughout, but in five or six passages there are also annotations in ballpoint pen. The most striking comment—"Lie!"—is on page 623 and refers to the rumor of soap being made

from the bones of murdered Jews. In October 1962, just a few months after acquiring the first copy, the IfZ acquired another one (current call number: N 375a, formerly 62/45037). This copy was probably the most widely used; at least three or four people seem to have worked intensively with it, and there are annotations and comments virtually everywhere. Information in the footnotes has been crossed out and corrected particularly frequently, and cross-references to other works have been noted. This has been done very meticulously—often with exclamation marks—almost throughout the book.

Interestingly, the third copy of Hilberg's book (today's call number: N 375b, formerly 79/83167) was registered in the library on October 15, 1979, that is, around the time of the expert report for C.H.Beck and the report request from Günther Schwarz. Parts of this copy seem to have been intentionally reviewed with translation and further editing in mind.[74] In the table of contents the reviewed parts have been clearly marked with arrows: "Introduction" (chapters 1, 2, 3); "The Destruction Process I" (chapters 4, 5); "The Destruction Process II" (chapters 7, 9). Apart from these chapters, there are no annotations or underlining of any kind in the book, which appears not to have been used much. A fine red marker has been used to write dashes separating footnotes from the rest of the text, and quotations in English have been crossed out or, if they had been translated from a German source, marked with penciled squiggles in the margins. Similarly, English terms have been crossed out if the original German terms appeared after them. These markings were possibly made because it would be necessary to track down the original German sources for quotations, a laborious task. Very rarely was translation indicated for the more complex terms. Presumably this was the copy Arndt used for her translation, which she said she had completed long before 1979 ("several years ago"[75]). It is possible she kept the copy in her office and only handed it over to the library in 1979. But given that the quotations are especially heavily marked, this could just as well have been the copy used by Hermann Weiß, who, as mentioned above, was commissioned by Droemer Knaur specifically to research the original German sources.

Hilberg in the IfZ's Publications and Correspondence

As early as 1953, Hilberg's doctoral dissertation was listed under its later title, along with the name of the university at which it was completed, in the IfZ's journal, *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (*VfZ*), in a section entitled "Dissertations in Progress, 1952–1953, on Contemporary Germany History."[76] Despite the negative expert report, the IfZ repeatedly made positive comments about

Hilberg's magnum opus. In 1976 Ino Arndt coauthored with the Berlin historian Wolfgang Scheffler an essay summarizing current research on the extermination camps.[77] The essay, which was published in the *VfZ*, cites Hilberg's work three times, and at one point Arndt and Scheffler refer explicitly to the "major accounts by Reitlinger and Hilberg." A letter bearing the subject line "Re: Killing of people by gas in extermination camps and concentration camps under National Socialist rule" states that the German edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews*, which was eventually published in 1982 by the Berlin publishing house Olle & Wolter,[78] was an "academically respected standard work."[79]

In March 1989, Martin Broszat, director of the IfZ since 1972, personally invited Hilberg to an international conference scheduled for September 1, 1989, to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of World War II.[80] However, it is clear from the conference proceedings, which were published later, that Hilberg did not accept the invitation. The reasons for this cannot be deduced from Hilberg's papers.[81]

In September 1982 Hilberg wrote a letter of recommendation for Uwe Dietrich Adam, who had asked Hilberg to support his (ultimately unsuccessful) application for the position of deputy director of the IfZ. Adam had asked Hilberg to provide detailed praise of the former's dissertation "Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich" (Jewish Policy in the Third Reich), which he had completed at the University of Tübingen and which was published in Düsseldorf in 1972.[82] Hilberg began this letter by briefly outlining his relationship with the IfZ: he had long been a reader of the *VfZ* and other IfZ publications, he wrote; furthermore, he had visited the IfZ in person[83] and met with two of its directors.

Seven years previously Hilberg had approached the IfZ with a request for information about both the Central Office of the State Justice Administrations for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes in Ludwigsburg and the Central Office in the State of North Rhine-Westphalia for the Processing of National Socialist Mass Crimes.[84] A few months earlier he had written to Hermann Weiß of the IfZ archives and, in connection with the English edition of Adam Czerniakow's diary,[85] asked for information about Heinz Auerswald, German commissioner of the Warsaw ghetto in 1941–42, requesting that his queries be forwarded to Auerswald if possible. "I am not quite sure whether Auerswald would agree to answer any of our questions, but I am wondering if he would be more cooperative with you," Hilberg wrote.[86] Weiß promised to try to locate Auerswald during an upcoming trip to Düsseldorf.[87]

The ambivalent character of the relationship between the IfZ and Hilberg is also evident in the fact that it was two institute employees who in 1989 as-

sisted, almost at the last minute, in bringing to fruition the paperback edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews*. Published by S. Fischer Verlag, this paperback helped Hilberg achieve his breakthrough in Germany.[88] Juliane Wetzel, a research assistant at the IfZ between 1988 and 1991, and Angelika Schardt (who later took the married name Königseder), a student assistant to Wolfgang Benz, performed critical editorial work on the manuscript. This involved preparing the index, as well as updating parts of the text as requested by Hilberg. Such updates included providing German translations of new sections from the French edition, which had just been published, and making extensive additions to the footnotes, a task at which other editors commissioned by S. Fischer Verlag had failed or else refused to do, owing to its complex and time-consuming nature.[89]

Conclusion

IfZ staff members advised against a German translation of Raul Hilberg's main work three times. This rejection from an institute founded for the express purpose of examining National Socialist crimes seems as unfathomable to us today as the institute's treatment of the Jewish scholars Joseph Wulf,[90] H. G. Adler,[91] and Saul Friedländer,[92] as well as the reactions to early studies of the history of the Holocaust such as Gerald Reitlinger's book *Final Solution* (1953).[93] But Hilberg's work met with resistance beyond the IfZ as well, encountering difficulties not only in Germany—where, in addition to Droemer Knaur and C.H.Beck, prestigious publishers such as Suhrkamp, Rowohlt, and S. Fischer declined to publish him—but also in the US[94] and Israel.[95] For his autobiography *The Politics of Memory: The Journey of a Holocaust Historian* (1996), which to a large extent is a history of the publication and reception of *The Destruction of the European Jews*, Hilberg researched the background to some of this resistance, including the role played by Hannah Arendt in Princeton University Press's 1959 refusal to publish the work.[96]

But what were the motives behind the three negative reports by the IfZ? Was it "fear of the whole truth,"[97] genuine concern that Hilberg's theses might be misused to promote antisemitic ressentiment, or just fear of the competition?[98] Did it have more to do with personal agendas, national snobbery, or, as Götz Aly suspected, a conviction that only German historians could accurately interpret the past?[99] To be sure, these motives overlapped; each seems more or less plausible, and the sources currently available do not point to a single one.

For now, what is important to emphasize is the documented three rejec-

tions by IfZ staff members of a translation of Hilberg's key work. The rejections must be investigated further, partly in order to ascertain whether they were indicative of a pattern in the treatment of Jewish scholars at the time. The thesis that such a pattern existed might be thrown into doubt, however, by the fact that IfZ staff members twice assisted in preparing for publication a German translation of *The Destruction of the European Jews*, in 1963 and 1989 respectively. Certainly, the role of the IfZ in the translation of Hilberg's work cannot be reduced to the word "rejection." It was far more complex and ambivalent than hitherto assumed and should be considered in a more nuanced manner in the future.

A letter written by Hilberg in October 2003 indicates that, by then, he had made his peace with the IfZ. In the letter he took the publication of Nicolas Berg's dissertation[100] ("which I have not read yet") as an opportunity to recall two encounters. The first was with the longtime director of the institute, Martin Broszat:[101] "I knew Broszat personally. If someone had told me then: 'That man was a party member and had to know that he was,' it would have changed nothing in my own attitude toward him. Broszat did valuable work after the war."[102] The second encounter was with Broszat's predecessor, Helmut Krausnick:

> I also met Krausnick, when I came to his institute, unannounced, to do some research in 1968. His secretary immediately ushered me into his office. There he said to me that he wanted to write to me but had not done so. When I asked him why he had not written, he said that he did not think that I would answer him. When I asked: Why not? he said: "I made political mistakes in my youth." [Ich habe in meiner Jugend politische Fehler gemacht.] I did not ask what kind of mistakes these were. Much later, at a conference in Paris [1982],[103] I joined Krausnick and Jäckel[104] for lunch. The urbane Jäckel suggested a restaurant and Krausnick pointed out another. "Mister Krausnick," I said, "you know your way around here." [Sie kennen sich hier aus.] Yes, he said, he had served there in the Abetz embassy.[105]

Hilberg never knew about the IfZ's expert reports and their significance for the translation of his book into German, partly because the IfZ's sources on the matter were not accessible during his lifetime. But in 1988, in a conversation with Alfons Söllner, Hilberg pointed out a contradiction. Since the early 1950s, the IfZ had been initiating its own research and "producing numerous expert reports for Nazi trials and compensation proceedings," raising "the question all the more of why my book was not translated at least in the course

of the 1960s."[106] How might "Sisyphus Hilberg,"[107] who persevered with his book and kept working despite facing mostly ignorance and rejection in the first few decades of his academic career, have reacted to the IfZ's reports? Probably laconically[108] and with little surprise: "I have had my experiences with you" (Ich habe meine Erfahrungen mit Euch gemacht).[109]

Appendix

DOCUMENT 1A[110]

Raul Hilberg: The Destruction of the European Jews, London 1961[111]
Hilberg's book is well founded in terms of sources, generally reliable in its details, and remarkably objective. In these respects, it replaces Reitlinger's account,[112] which was full of errors, and, more importantly, it provides for the first time a comprehensive insight into the individual steps and stages of the entire National Socialist persecution of the Jews in Europe. The focus of the account is on the Final Solution, here again the description of the technical-organizational problems, the responsibilities, and the effects, in terms of figures, of the extermination measures. Hilberg's book has already proved valuable for the Institut für Zeitgeschichte's work in providing expert reports, since in some respects it contains new findings, in particular new details.

However, Hilberg has used only some of the source material. His account is based on a careful evaluation of the abundant documentary material of the Nuremberg trials and the currently existing secondary literature. The files available now, which are accessible at least on microfilm, have not been used. This is possibly because Hilberg limited himself to describing the technical-organizational side of the extermination of the Jews, but not the connection between it and the overall policy of the National Socialist regime. Therefore, the beginnings of the National Socialist persecution of the Jews and, more notably, its intellectual preconditions are only briefly sketched, and the question of how the project of the Final Solution became established is addressed only in passing. But now that the most essential, if not all, facts about the Final Solution are, or may be, familiar to the German public, the connection between the persecution of the Jews and the structure of the National Socialist system of rule is at the forefront of current research. The question whether a German translation of Hilberg's work is desirable can only be answered with reservations. It can be answered in the affirmative insofar as the work has proven to be reliable and informative. Nevertheless, for certain general reasons, we believe that a German translation is not to be recommended. The following factors are critical here:

1. Some German publications on the question of the persecution of the Jews are to be expected soon, the publication of which is desirable if only because it counters the occasionally voiced and quite frequently silently harbored criticism that German contemporary history scholarship has avoided this topic, a criticism that, as publications to date attest, is not entirely inaccure.

The Federal Agency[113] intends to publish a popular account of the persecution of the Jews in Germany, written by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in collaboration with the Wiener Library, which is to be completed by the end of this year.[114] Helmut Genschel's dissertation on the economic exclusion of the Jews in Germany will also be recommended for publication in one form or another.[115] The author of a well-known short documentary account of the persecution of Jews in the Third Reich, Dr. Wolfgang Scheffler, will also present a major work on this subject in the foreseeable future.[116] Although none of these works will be as comprehensive as Hilberg's, they are likely to be superior thanks to a more modern perspective that emphasizes the political aspects of the persecution of the Jews.

2. The much-needed investigation into the persecution of the Jews under National Socialism, in the form attempted and conducted in Germany to date, has largely petered out, since it worked more toward deterrence and mere documentary description, rather than attempting to historically ver-[117]

DOCUMENT 1B[118]

Editorial Office

DROEMERSCHE VERLAGSANSTALT
TH. KNAUR NACHF.
8 Munich 27 Rauchstraße 9 11.6.1965—Bo/As

Professor Raul Hilberg
The University of Vermont
Dep. of Political Science
Old Mill Building
Burlington, Vermont, USA

Dear Professor,
Thank you very much for your letter.[119] The reason you have not heard from us for such a long time is that we have been preoccupied with the difficulties surrounding a German edition of your work. We see these difficulties not in your documentary account of the Nazi extermination apparatus, but in your thesis of Jewish "collaboration."[120] After long deliberations and detailed discussions, we have come to the conclusion that a German edition of your book, despite the horrific details about the extermination of the Jews, could have quite dangerous consequences if malicious people, especially those masquerading as

"honest men," refer to your book to pose questions such as: "Why did the Jews collaborate?" and "Why didn't they resist?" and then draw antisemitic conclusions from such questions. You know that these malicious people exist. We know that they could become very dangerous. A neo-Nazi newspaper like *Die deutsche Nationalzeitung*[121] could do a great deal of damage here, poisoning a considerable share of public opinion.

For these reasons, we have decided to cease work on the translation of your book and not to include the work in our list. We hope, dear professor, that you will understand our decision in view of the special situation in Germany.
With best wishes for your future work,
DROEMERSCHE VERLAGSANSTALT
TH. KNAUR NACHF.
Editorial Office
(Fritz Bolle)[122]

DOCUMENT 2A[123]

Darmstädter Blätter Haubachweg 5, D-6100 Darmstadt
Institut für Zeitgeschichte
Leonrodstrasse 46b
8000 Munich 19

Verlag Darmstädter Blätter
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Telephone (06151) 4 81 96

Post office giro account
344 63–604 Frankfurt/Main

Your reference	Your letter of	Our reference	Date
		Dr Sz/S	September 11, '79

Re: Ludwig Rosenthal, *"Endlösung der Judenfrage": Massenmord oder "Gaskammerlüge"?* approx. 140 pages, ISBN 3-87139-057-7

Dear Mister [*sic*] Dr. Arndt,
Thank you very much for your advice, which has turned out to be correct: I am referring to the forty-two-volume American edition of the first War Crimes Trial in Nuremberg. We are currently preparing the book for print and wish to share with you the table of contents and the preface. The author,[124] who arrived in Munich today and is staying at the Bayerischer Hof until September 19, will visit the institute. Perhaps you could clarify whether the document titles in the American edition are identical to the document titles in the German edition,

which is presumably the case. If not, the American and German document titles will have to be listed opposite each other in an appendix so that the reader can look them up in the German edition of the trial records. We request your opinion on whether this book is necessary.

Re: a German edition of Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*

The author, Prof. Hilberg, is willing to provide me with the original German texts of the many sources he quotes in his book for a German edition in our publishing house. The American paperback edition is now available from Harper & Row, New York, ISBN 0-06-090660-X, 1979,[125] and the cloth-bound edition from Octagon.[126] Would you regard a German translation as nonetheless desirable? Prof. Hilberg has since corrected the errors and omissions in the American edition and added new information about ghettos, transports, and death camps, which means that the German edition would be the first revised edition. This would remain the case for the next four years, because during this time the American editions will remain unchanged. It seems to me that the main benefit of a German edition would be that history teachers and students who cannot read English texts as easily as German ones would be able to work better with a German edition. I would like to ask you for an expert report commenting on the desirability of a German edition. Without firm purchase commitments from the Federal and States Agencies for Civic Education, we will be unable to afford the enormous translation work and the high production costs. Your report would likely prove decisive for these agencies. We wrote to the agencies on September 6 (see enclosure). We are very grateful for your support.

Your sincerely,

Dr. Günther Schwarz[127] Encl.[128]

DOCUMENT 2B[129]

Darmstädter Blätter Haubachweg 5, D-6100 Darmstadt

To all Landeszentralen
f. pol. Bildung in the Federal Republic.[130]

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344 63–604 Frankfurt/Main

Your reference	Your letter of	Our reference	Date
		Dr Sz/S	September 7, 1979

Re: Purchase of *Judaica* to facilitate its publication

Dear Sirs,

In the light of the Holocaust film screenings[131] and the unsatisfactory follow-up expert discussions each night,[132] we have commenced the publication of several *Judaica*. These are listed on the enclosed page.[133]

The most difficult and extensive of these projects, but certainly also the most important, is, however, the German edition of Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, a translation of the American edition published by Harper, 1979, ISBN 0-06-090660-X, 790 pages. The author, Prof. Hilberg, informs us that he is currently busy correcting errors and omissions in this American edition as well as adding new information about ghettos, transports, and death camps. What is most important, however, is that we are being provided with the original German texts, which in the American editions were only available and quoted in English translation. This will provide accurate documentation for the scholarly treatment of the subject. Above all, German students preparing to become history teachers, sociologists, and political scientists would be able to read the work in German. Most students do not have sufficient English skills to read the American original. According to the author, the length of the book will increase by about 10% and the German edition will be 900–1,000 pages.

But we can only publish the book if the institutes for civic education purchase enough copies to cover the costs of the print run. We therefore ask you whether you would be prepared to purchase a considerable number of copies of this work for the universities, colleges, and public libraries in your state. We can provide you with the expert reports we have requested as soon as we receive them.

Please check whether you would be able to purchase copies of the book (approx. 200 pages) "Endlösung": Massenmord oder "Gaskammerlüge"? Eine

Auswertung der Beweisaufnahme im "Prozeß vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg 14. November 1945–1. Oktober 1946["] by Dr. Ludwig Rosenthal, Guatemala. (See enclosed page for contents.)[134] We would be pleased to provide you with the preface and the contents page, as well as photocopies of individual chapters.

We would be grateful for a swift response.

Yours faithfully,
Verlag Darmstädter Blätter
Dr. Günther Schwarz

Enclosures

DOCUMENT 2C[135]

–Dr. Ino Arndt–

October 10, 1979
Ar/Hü[136]

Dr. Günther Schwarz
Darmstädter Blätter
Haubachweg 5
6100 Darmstadt

Dear Dr. Schwarz,

Thank you for your letter of September 11, which I found here on my return from vacation. In the meantime, Mr. Rosenthal has visited the institute and submitted his manuscript. I have only had a brief opportunity to look at it so far and cannot yet answer your question about whether publication is necessary. Presumably, though, you do not want to hear my personal opinion, but the opinion of the institute, and therefore I would recommend that you make a formal request to the institute for an expert report. The same applies to the—in my view—very important project of translating Raul Hilberg's book.

But since, as you have written, you are already in the process of preparing Mr. Rosenthal's manuscript for print, may I personally advise you to have the manuscript carefully proofread. On page 59, for example, Mr. Rosenthal identifies Wolzek as an extermination camp. No such camp is mentioned in any scholarly account of the persecution and extermination of the Jews that I know of. This may be a mishearing—probably due to Höß's statement in Nuremberg—or, as Adalbert Rückerl writes in his book *NS-Vernichtungslager im Spiegel deutscher Strafprozesse* (p. 38, note 5), which was published by Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, a mistake, i.e., by Wolzek Höß meant the So-

bibor extermination camp.[137] I also wish to direct your attention to page 97 of the manuscript, where Rosenthal quotes from Goebbels's weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* but in fact means the newspaper *Das Reich*. At the bottom of page 22, "execute" and "executions" should in my opinion definitely be replaced by "kill" or "murder."

Finally, I would highly recommend using the German edition of the Blue Series for the reproduction of the documents from the trial in order to provide readers with the original statement or text.[138] I am sure that you can also consult a German edition of the Blue Series in Darmstadt.

As you suspect, the document numbers are identical in the English and German editions.

I can offer you a little help with your planned translation of Hilberg's book: several years ago I studied this book very intensively and made a rough translation of some sections (about eighty typewritten pages). If you are interested in it, please let me know.
Yours sincerely,

DOCUMENT 2D[139]

October 25, 1979
Ar/Hü

Verlag Darmstädter Blätter
FAO Dr. Günther Schwarz
Haubachweg 5
6100 Darmstadt

Dear Dr. Schwarz,
Unfortunately, we did not receive your express letter of October 11 until October 16, and so we were unable to reply by that Tuesday, October 16.[140] In any case, the deadline you asked us to meet was very tight.

After careful consideration of your request, we cannot help you in this matter either. Taking on editing work for external publishers is beyond the institute's remit, as its research staff is fully occupied with ongoing research and editing projects, etc. Furthermore, we would ask you to bear in mind that we can hardly refuse something to one publisher that we have already granted to another.

In the case of Dr. Rosenthal's manuscript, we would have been pleased to look for a reviewer who could have taken on this proofreading work privately.

But even this would not have been possible in the short time available. When you can, please let us know to which address we should return Dr. Rosenthal's manuscript.

In principle, we are prepared to assist you in finding an expert to review Raul Hilberg's book, but we wish to take the precaution of pointing out that such a report must be remunerated. Before deciding to undertake the translation, which will undoubtedly entail high costs, it should be borne in mind that contemporary history scholarship has managed without a German translation for eighteen years now (the book was published in 1961). In other words, although in principle a German edition would be welcome, it can be assumed that a large number of contemporary history researchers know enough English to use the book effectively in the original language.

Yours sincerely,
Dr. I. Arndt

pp
(V. Hübner, Secr.[)][141]

DOCUMENT 2E[142]

Darmstädter Blätter Haubachweg 5, D-6100 Darmstadt

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Leonrodstr. 46b
8000 München 19

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Your reference	Your letter of	Our reference	Date
Ar/Hü	October 10 & 25, 1979	Dr Sz/S	October 31, 1979

Dear Dr. Arndt,
Thank you very much for your important suggestions, which I was able to take on board when printing Dr. Ludwig Rosenthal's book.

The book, which was published today, is enclosed here.

I would like to ask you to recommend a reviewer for Raul Hilberg's book. It is very important to the author that the German edition is published by our house, which has also published books by Bertrand Russell, Paul Goodman, Jerome D. Frank, Anatol Rapoport, and John Somerville,[143] among others. He probably no longer expects any of the large German book factories to have any interest in the projected small sales of a German edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews*.

Since Heinz Höhne in the SPIEGEL [*sic*] pointed out the importance of a German edition of this work[144] and Prof. Bergmann, a sociologist at our Technical University,[145] told me again yesterday that the English language is an insurmountable barrier to study for many history teachers—unlike contemporary history researchers—I have asked Mr. Augstein whether he would like to finance the German edition—like the NEW YORK TIMES [*sic*] did at the time. So, if we receive this assistance, we will also be able to pay for the expert report and the proofreading of the translation. The eighty pages of translation you kindly promised us would then help us.
Your sincerely,
Verlag Darmstädter Blätter
Schwarz & Co

1 book

Dr. Günther Schwarz[146]
PS If you send us Dr. Rosenthal's manuscript, we would be pleased to receive it.

DOCUMENT 2F[147]

–Dr. Ino Arndt–

December 3, 1979
Ar/mm

Dr. Günther Schwarz
Verlag Darmstädter Blätter
Haubachweg 5
6100 Darmstadt

Dear Dr. Schwarz,
Thank you very much for your letter of October 31 and for kindly providing me with a copy of Mr. Rosenthal's book. Please excuse this delayed confirmation.

Mr. Rosenthal's manuscript will be sent back to you separately, as agreed. I also thank you for the copy of the book, received today, which you sent to my colleagues and me on behalf of Mr. Rosenthal; I will pass this copy on to our library and write to Mr. Rosenthal.

Unfortunately, I have not yet managed to find an expert for Hilberg's book. The relevant colleagues are all very busy. However, I will gladly continue my efforts. Perhaps you have since received an answer from Mr. Augstein and can confirm whether the financing of the German edition and thus remuneration of the requested expert report has been secured. I would be grateful for a re-

sponse in this regard, in order to be able to provide concrete answers to the pertinent questions.
Yours sincerely,[148]

DOCUMENT 3A

Opinion on the question of a German translation of Hilberg[149]

In the 1960s *The Destruction of the European Jews* (Chicago, 1961) filled a gap in the scholarly literature on the extermination of the Jews; its publication was welcomed by contemporary historians working in this field. In comparison to what was then probably the best-known book on the subject, Gerald Reitlinger's *Die Endlösung* (Berlin, 1956, originally published in English as *The Final Solution*, London, 1953), Hilberg offered important additional documentary material, especially from the archives of the YIVO[150] in New York and from the Federal Records Center in Alexandria, VA (see Appendix IV, p. 768); his account took 1933 as its starting point (unlike Reitlinger, who begins in 1939) and provided an informative introduction to the overall subject (Precedents and Antecedents). *The Destruction* was at that time—at least for English-speaking scholars of contemporary history—the standard work on the subject of Nazi persecution of the Jews.

One criticism might be that Hilberg failed to take into account H. G. Adler's fundamental works on Theresienstadt, which had been published in 1955 and 1958 (*Theresienstadt. 1941–1945. Das Antlitz einer Zwangsgemeinschaft* and *Die verheimlichte Wahrheit. Theresienstädter Dokumente*, published by J.C.B. Mohr in Tübingen); furthermore, the description of the fate of *Mischlinge* and *Mischehepartner* (pp. 273–277) is somewhat in need of correction.

Nevertheless, a translation of *The Destruction* . . . soon after the publication of the original English edition would undoubtedly have been useful and—in terms of political education—helpful. The fact that a translation, though planned (I was commissioned with translating part of the book[151]), never appeared at the time was probably due to the fear that a German edition of this book would provoke unfavorable, possibly antisemitic reactions from the German public,[152] as it develops the very controversial thesis put forward by Hannah Arendt[153] after the Eichmann trial of, to put it in simplistic terms, "collaboration" between perpetrators and victims.[154] This thesis, though certainly understandable at the time, has not held water since the publication of Isaiah Trunk's seminal work *Judenrat* (New York 1972).[155]

The question whether *today* a German translation of the original En-

glish edition of *1961*[156] is recommendable ought, in my opinion—despite *Holocaust*—to be answered with "no." If a revised new English edition were available that took into account the Eichmann trial documents, the NSG[157] trials of the last twenty years (see the collection of German criminal judgments on Nazi murders between 1945 and 1966, for instance, which has now grown to nineteen volumes and which has been published since 1968 by the University Press Amsterdam under the title *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, edited by A. L. Rüter-Ehlermann, H. H. Fuchs, and C. F. Rüter), and the numerous volumes of specialist literature, for example, this question could be answered in the affirmative.

—As a precautionary measure, the following difficulty should be pointed out: in order to meet scholarly standards, quotations from documents would (in the majority of cases) have to be from the German originals, which is relatively easy in the case of the Nuremberg documents (the institute has an almost complete set of copies). In the case of the documents that have since been returned to the Federal Archives by the US, it will only be possible to determine their present location with the aid of a concordance.—

Even if a revised version were already available or in sight (it would not be possible to accomplish the latter in a short time or without the use of relevant archives, however), the following would still have to be borne in mind:

1. the most recently published work on the persecution of the Jews, the very extensive book by Lucy S. Dawidowicz: *The War against the Jews, 1933–1945* (New York, 1975), has recently been published in German translation by Kindler (Munich, 1979),[158]
2. the basic question—as valid now as it was then—is whether the majority of potential readers in fact have sufficient knowledge of English to use the Hilberg book as it is, in the original language.

January 31, 1980[159]

DOCUMENT 3B[160]

C.H.Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung München
Institut für Zeitgeschichte — February 13, 1980 wg/vO
FAO Dr. Ino Arndt
Leonrodstraße 46b
8000 München 19

Dear Dr. Arndt,
Thank you very much for the expert report on the book *The Destruction of the European Jews* by Hilberg. Your verdict has led us to forgo a translation of the work. However, it has also given rise to the following thoughts; I have already outlined them to you on the telephone. You told me that the project emerging from them seemed to you to be not uninteresting. You wish to discuss it with your colleagues at one of your next meetings and then tell me whether it would be conceivable for you either alone or together with colleagues from the institute to write the book for us.

Some time ago we published an introduction to the history of the French Revolution by Eberhard Schmitt. I will send you a copy of this work separately. The publishing house has signed a number of contracts for similar works; at least one will probably appear next year. The aim of these volumes is not so much to familiarize a large readership directly with the history of an era as to make that history accessible. The volumes introduce theories of the period or phenomena in question, provide an overview of the research and research problems, acquaint the reader with the most important research institutions and tools, and so on. It has been agreed that in some volumes there will be small appendixes of documents. We envision that the books will serve as an introduction for people beginning their undergraduate studies and provide quick orientation for teachers, while also being used as a resource by laypeople interested in history.[161]

After all that you write in your expert report on Hilberg's book, it seems to us not inappropriate to plan a similar book on the history of the persecution of Jews in the Third Reich. It should not be too long. 120 printed pages ought to suffice if the appendix does not include too many documents.

I think it would be pointless to give you suggestions for the layout of such a book. If you look at the Eberhard Schmitt volume, it will be easy for you to devise a similar volume for this new subject. I would be delighted if my suggestions met with willingness in principle on your and your colleagues' part to realize this project.
Yours sincerely,
(Dr. Ernst-Peter Wieckenberg)[162]
C.H.BECK'SCHE VERLAGSBUCHHANDLUNG
Editorial Office
PS We would consider an initial print run of between 3,000 and 4,000 copies and could pay royalties of 10% per copy.

Notes

Translation by Sinéad Crowe

1. Dan Michman, *Die Historiographie der Shoah aus jüdischer Sicht: Konzeptualisierungen, Terminologie, Anschauungen, Grundfragen* (Hamburg: Dölling und Galitz, 2002), 20.

I wish to thank Isabel Pantenburg from the IfZ archives, Alexandra Marohn from the IfZ library, and Elena Ratner from the archives of the publishing house Droemer Knaur. I am especially grateful to Viktor-Emanuel zu Sachsen from the Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History for his assistance in the archival research for this article, as well as my former colleague Christian Mentel for important information on Ino Arndt and her papers.

2. Nicolas Berg, "'Phantasie der Bürokratie': Raul Hilbergs Pionierstudie zur Vernichtung der europäischen Juden," in *50 Klassiker der Zeitgeschichte*, ed. Jürgen Danyel, Jan-Holger Kirsch, and Martin Sabrow (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 71–75.

3. Document 1a in the appendix.

4. Document 3a in the appendix (emphasis in the original).

5. Frank Bajohr and Andrea Löw initially made the existence and tenor of the first expert report public, albeit very briefly, after Walter Pehle, whom I had informed about the report, contacted Bajohr with questions about it; see Frank Bajohr and Andrea Löw, "Tendenzen und Probleme der neueren Holocaust-Forschung: Eine Einführung," in *Der Holocaust: Ergebnisse und neue Fragen der Forschung*, ed. Frank Bajohr and Andrea Löw (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch, 2015), 9–30, here 9 and 28n2. Götz Aly ultimately published the two opinions in Aly, "Nur mit Genehmigung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," *Perlentaucher*, October 18, 2017, https://www.perlentaucher.de/essay/goetz-aly-das-institut-fuer-zeitgeschichte-und-die-verzoegerte-deutsche-ausgabe-von-raul-hilberg.html. See also Aly's article "Angst vor der ganzen Wahrheit," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 17, 2017, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/zeitgeschichte-angst-vor-der-wahrheit-1.3712182. In a longer version: Götz Aly, "Raul Hilberg and the Angst about the 'Whole Truth': A Case Study on the Work of German Zeitgeschichte," *Yad Vashem Studies* 46, no. 1 (2018): 141–71. A list of all the media coverage of the debate that followed the publication of the reports and the Hilberg conference can be found at https://zzf-potsdam.de/sites/default/files/medienspiegel_hilberg-konferenz_2017_12_23_rsch.pdf (accessed January 25, 2020).

6. See Ludwig Rosenthal, *"Endlösung der Judenfrage": Massenmord oder "Gaskammerlüge?" Eine Auswertung der Beweisaufnahme im Prozess gegen Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg vom 14. November 1945 bis 1. Oktober 1946* (Darmstadt: Darmstädter Blätter, 1979).

7. Document 2e in the appendix; for the following quote, see ibid.

8. At the time of writing (October 2020), Ino Arndt's translation had not been found in the IfZ archives.

9. There is no correspondence with Günther Schwarz among Hilberg's papers in the library of the University of Vermont. Neither Günther Schwarz's papers nor the publisher's archive has survived (according to an email from the University Archives of the Technical University of Darmstadt sent on January 21, 2020).

10. See Raul Hilberg, *Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden: Die Gesamtgeschichte des Holocaust* (Berlin: Olle & Wolter, 1982).

11. See Frank Bösch, *Zeitenwende 1979: Als die Welt von heute begann* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2019), here in particular 363–95.

12. See "Selten Skrupel," *Der Spiegel*, October 8, 1979.

13. Email from the Rudolf Augstein Foundation (estate administrator), which refers to research of *Der Spiegel* documents conducted on August 8, 2019.

14. See Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews: A Documented Narrative History* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961).

15. See René Schlott, "Der lange Weg zum Buch: Zur Publikationsgeschichte von Raul Hilbergs 'The Destruction of the European Jews,'" *ZeitRäume: Potsdamer Almanach des Zentrums für Zeithistorische Forschung* (2015): 143–52. A sticker with the words "Donation Frank and Janina Petschek Foundation" was applied to the copies funded by Frank Petschek. In addition, the imprint page of the book states "A publication sponsored by the Frank and Janina Petschek Foundation."

16. Document 2f in the appendix; for the following quotes, see ibid.

17. See Document 3a in the appendix.

18. Document 2e in the appendix.

19. Document 3a in the appendix.

20. Document 2a in the appendix; for the following quote, see ibid.

21. Document 2b in the appendix.

22. Document 2c in the appendix.

23. Document 2d in the appendix.

24. See Document 2e in the appendix.

25. See Document 2f in the appendix.

26. Raul Hilberg, *The Politics of Memory: The Journey of a Holocaust Historian* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 171.

27. Document 2d in the appendix.

28. See *Börsenblatt für den Deutschen Buchhandel* 163 (1996): 2769. A brief résumé is also available (in German) in *Stadtlexikon Darmstadt*, the encyclopedia of the City of Darmstadt, accessed September 30, 2020, https://www.darmstadt-stadtlexikon.de/sch/schwarz-guenther.html.

29. See W. Christian Schmitt, "Aufklärer in des Wortes bester Bedeutung," *Börsenblatt für den Deutschen Buchhandel* 41 (1985): 2583–84.

30. Bundesarchiv (Federal Archives) Berlin, Berlin Document Center, R 9361-II/918898, Günther Schwarz file. In early 1937, following Schwarz's move from Saarbrücken to Darmstadt, lengthy correspondence concerning the validity of his party membership ensued. This correspondence is held in the Federal Archives.

31. See "'Nie wieder Krieg': Bundesverdienstkreuz am Bande für Dr. Günther Schwarz," *Darmstädter Echo*, December 3, 1992.

32. See *Adressbuch für den deutschsprachigen Buchhandel 2007/08*, vol. 1 (Frankfurt a. M.: Marketing- und Verlagsservice des Buchhandels, 2007), 590.

33. On this and the following details on Hans Arndt's career, see Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (Federal Military Archives), PERS 6/137506, Hans Arndt personnel file. In 1977 Ino Arndt turned parts of Hans Arndt's papers over to the Federal Military Archives, as is evident from a letter from the director of the archives, Friedrich-Christian Stahl: IfZ-

Archiv, ID 131/14, fol. 72, Stahl to Arndt, November 23, 1977. However, Hans Arndt's papers can no longer be found in the archives.

34. All the details provided here are taken from the 1960 résumé attached to Arndt's dissertation, three typewritten copies of which are kept in the Tübingen University Library (UM 8681:1–3).

35. See the "Personalienverzeichnisse" (staff directory) of "Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter und Mitarbeiterinnen" (staff historians) in *50 Jahre Institut für Zeitgeschichte: Eine Bilanz*, ed. Horst Möller and Udo Wengst (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1999), 545.

36. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/74, fol. 45, Möller to Dr. Günther Schiwy (Verlag C.H.Beck), February 1, 1980.

37. Edgar Höricht, "Abschied von Ino Arndt," *Hefte für den Freundeskreis* 60 (1986): 114.

38. See Document 3a in the appendix.

39. Hilberg mentioned financial concerns, quoting a Swiss literary agent who had been corresponding with C.H.Beck: "You won't be able to sell more than 600 to 800 copies." Raul Hilberg, *Unerbetene Erinnerung: Der Weg eines Holocaust-Forschers* (Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fischer, 1994), 148.

40. See Document 3b in the appendix; for the following quotes, see ibid. On the discovery of this document, see also n. 160.

41. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/74, fol. 45, Möller to Dr. Günther Schiwy (Verlag C.H.Beck), February 1, 1980.

42. See Eberhard Schmitt, *Einführung in die Geschichte der Französischen Revolution* (Munich: C.H.Beck, 1976).

43. C.H.Beck archives, Arndt to Wieckenberg, April 2, 1980.

44. C.H.Beck archives, Wieckenberg to Arndt, April 14, 1980.

45. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/74, fol. 31, Wieckenberg to Möller, October 7, 1981. This letter is also the source of the following quotes.

46. See Martin Gilbert, *Endlösung: Die Vertreibung und Vernichtung der Juden; Ein Atlas* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1982).

47. See Günther Fetzer, *Droemer Knaur: Die Verlagsgeschichte 1846–2017* (Munich: Droemer, 2017), 345–47.

48. The archives are to be reorganized in the coming years, so it is possible that more documents on the "Hilberg case" may be discovered in the editors' files.

49. Droemer Knaur archives, Munich, "Raul Hilberg_The Destruction of the European Jews_1963_Vertrag Deutsch, Raul Hilberg_The Destruction of the European Jews_1963_Vertrag Deutsch_Anhang, Raul Hilberg_The Destruction of the European Jews_1963_Agreement Englisch, Raul Hilberg_The Destruction of the European Jews_1963_Agreement Englisch_Rider."

50. Wiener Library London archives (hereafter WHL), Hans Lamm correspondence, 3000/9/1/825, Lamm to Ilse R. Wolff, August 26, 1963 (emphasis in the original).

51. See Maurice Rosenthal, "The Murdered Are Not Guilty!," *Jewish Spectator* 27, no. 3 (1962): 24–27.

52. Joseph Wulf, unpublished *Spiegel* review of the German translation of Hannah Arendt's book *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, fall 1964; quoted in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 29, 2020 (emphasis in the original).

53. WHL, Hans Lamm correspondence, 3000/9/1/825, Ilse R. Wolff to Lamm, September 9, 1963.

54. See the IfZ's obituary: "Im Gedenken," October 15, 2015, accessed October 10, 2020, https://www.ifz-muenchen.de/aktuelles/artikel/im-gedenken.

55. Droemer Knaur archives, "Raul Hilberg_The Destruction of the European Jews_1963_Übersetzerin_Arndt, Raul Hilberg_The Destruction of the European Jews_1964_Übersetzer_Weiß, Raul Hilberg_The Destruction of the European Jews_1964_Übersetzer_Eichel, Raul Hilberg_The Destruction of the European Jews_1964_Übersetzerin_Julius."

56. Droemer Knaur archives, Maria Hönigschmied (Droemer Knaur) to Kurt Hellmer (Quadrangle's representative), July 26, 1965.

57. Document 1b in the appendix; for the following quotes, see ibid.

58. In her expert report for Beck in 1980, Ino Arndt also expressed the suspicion that the thesis of "'collaboration' between perpetrators and victims" was the reason why a planned translation was never brought to fruition in the 1960s. She made explicit reference in this regard to Hannah Arendt's much-discussed book *Eichmann in Jerusalem*; see Document 3a in the appendix.

59. Hilberg, *Erinnerung*, 141.

60. Aly, "Raul Hilberg and the Angst," 143–45.

61. In a typed letter to the author dated July 25, 2014.

62. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/1, fols. 60–61, here fol. 61, Arndt to Regional Court Director Schlecht, October 20, 1964.

63. "For the kind provision of a copy of *Hilberg*, Raul: The destruction [*sic*] of the European Jews. London 1961. To the Institute for the attention of Fräulein Dr. Arndt, I would like to thank you most sincerely." IfZ-Archiv, ID 50/181, fol. 152, Thilo Vogelsang to Bolle, July 21, 1964 (emphasis in the original). First published in Aly, "Raul Hilberg and the Angst," 153, though Aly interprets the letter differently.

64. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/1, fols. 90–91, Bolle to Arndt, April 23, 1970.

65. Fetzer, *Droemer Knaur*, 321.

66. Helmut Krausnick (1905–90), secretary-general/director of the IfZ from 1959 until 1972.

67. See Wolfgang Scheffler, *Die nationalsozialistische Judenpolitik: Unterlagen für den Unterricht in Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (Berlin: Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit Berlin, 1960). Published a year later, Scheffler's 245-page *Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich 1933 bis 1945* examines "National Socialist policies on Jews." This latter work, which included a new appendix of documents comprising more than 100 pages, was published as a licensed edition by Büchergilde Gutenberg.

68. WHL, General, Pre-1963 Correspondence, Correspondence regarding Dokumentenwerk, 3000/9/1/2 to 3000/9/1/24. The following section on the IfZ and Wiener Library's project is based for the most part on information and files found by Torsten Jugl (Wiener Library), to whom I am most grateful.

69. WHL, General, Pre-1963 Correspondence, Correspondence regarding Dokumentenwerk, with Institut für Zeitgeschichte—Krausnick, Helmut, 3000/9/1/21/86–2, "Betr.: Manuskript 'Judenverfolgungen'" (minutes of an editors' meeting that took

place from October 2 to 5, 1962, at the Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst headquarters in Bonn).

70. WHL, General, Pre-1963 Correspondence, Correspondence regarding Dokumentenwerk—Groneweg, Barbara, 3000/9/1/11/14, Wiener to Groneweg (Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst), June 20, 1963.

71. This was the dating suggested by Aly: "the content allows us to date it to 1964"; Aly, "Nur mit Genehmigung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte."

72. The typewritten copy of the dissertation in the University of Göttingen's library is dated 1962. The dissertation was published four years later: Helmut Genschel, *Die Verdrängung der Juden aus der Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1966).

73. Aly suspects that it is Krausnick's handwriting; see Aly, "Nur mit Genehmigung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte."

74. See Aly, "Raul Hilberg and the Angst," 154.

75. Document 2c in the appendix.

76. John L. Snell, "Dissertationen zur deutschen Zeitgeschichte an amerikanischen Universitäten 1933–1953," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1, no. 3 (July 1953): 289–96, here 296.

77. See Ino Arndt and Wolfgang Scheffler, "Organisierter Massenmord an Juden in nationalsozialistischen Vernichtungslagern: Ein Beitrag zur Richtigstellung apologetischer Literatur," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 24, no. 2 (April 1976): 105–35.

78. See n. 10.

79. IfZ-Archiv, ID 51/274, fols. 10–14, here fol. 13, Hellmuth Auerbach to G. Hickmann, December 9, 1985.

80. IfZ-Archiv, ID 51/274, fols. 57–58, Broszat to Hilberg, March 14, 1989.

81. See Norbert Frei and Hermann Kling, eds., *Der nationalsozialistische Krieg* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 1990).

82. IfZ-Archiv, ID 51/274, fol. 59, Hilberg to the IfZ, September 23, 1982.

83. In 1968 Hilberg returned to Germany for the second time since leaving the country as a US soldier in 1945. During these later visits he consulted various archives, including the Federal Archives in Koblenz and the IfZ archives (Hilberg, *Erinnerung*, 144). His archival discoveries in the IfZ were later included in *Documents of Destruction: Germany and Jewry, 1933–1945* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), a collection of source material, including a list of deportation trains from January 1943 (106–11), which he edited and annotated.

84. IfZ-Archiv, ID 51/274, fol. 61, Hilberg to the IfZ, November 12, 1975. His letter was not answered until two months later: University of Vermont, Special Collections, Raul Hilberg Papers (hereafter RHP), box 5, fol. 26, Karla Götz to Hilberg, January 26, 1976.

85. See *The Warsaw Diary of Adam Czerniakow: Prelude to Doom*, ed. Raul Hilberg, Stanislaw Staron, and Josef Kermisz (New York: Stein & Day, 1979).

86. IfZ-Archiv, ID 51/274, fols. 63–64, Hilberg to Weiß, June 23, 1975.

87. IfZ-Archiv, ID 51/274, fol. 62, Weiß to Hilberg, July 10, 1975.

88. See Raul Hilberg, *Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden*, 3 vols. (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1990).

89. See the correspondence in the S. Fischer archives, S. Fischer, folder: Hilberg, Raul,

Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden, and my private email correspondence with Juliane Wetzel and with Angelika Königseder on August 20, 2020.

90. See Klaus Kempter, *Joseph Wulf: Ein Historikerschicksal in Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), here 259–67.

91. In the late 1950s the IfZ commissioned Adler to write a study, but the contract was terminated in the mid-1960s following delays and because the relationship had soured. Adler's manuscript was rejected partly for being too subjective, and instead of being published as a volume in an IfZ series, the commissioned work was ultimately published by Mohr Siebeck (Tübingen) in 1974 under the title *Der verwaltete Mensch: Studien zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland*. See Nicolas Berg, *Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker: Erforschung und Erinnerung*, 3rd ed. (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004), 304–11, and Peter Filkins's recent biography of Adler, *H. G. Adler: A Life in Many Worlds* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

92. In 1987 Friedländer, a Holocaust survivor, corresponded with Broszat, the IfZ director at the time, "regarding an adequate historiographical examination of the Nazi past 40 years after the end of the war"; quoted in Torben Fischer and Matthias N. Lorenz, eds., *Lexikon der "Vergangenheitsbewältigung" in Deutschland: Debatten- und Diskursgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus nach 1945*, 3rd ed. (Bielefeld: transcript, 2015), 256–59, here 256. Over the course of this correspondence, Broszat referred to "Jewish people who insist on a mythical form of this remembering"; Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer, "Um die 'Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus': Ein Briefwechsel," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 36, no. 2 (April 1988): 339–72, here 343.

93. Despite being rejected by the IfZ, a German translation of the work was eventually published; see Gerald Reitlinger, *Die Endlösung: Hitlers Versuch der Ausrottung der Juden Europas 1939–1945* (Berlin: Colloquium, 1956). On the background, see Nicolas Berg, "Lesarten des Judenmords," in *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland: Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945–1980*, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), 91–139, here 107–9.

94. It took six years for Hilberg to find an American publisher for his dissertation, which he had completed in 1955 but did not manage to have published until 1961; see Schlott, "Weg," 143.

95. In 1958 Yad Vashem declined to publish the work. A Hebrew translation was not published until 2012.

96. See Anna Corsten, "'Immer wieder, wie ein Gespenst kommt sie zurück': Überlegungen zur Konfliktgeschichte von Hannah Arendt und Raul Hilberg," in *Raul Hilberg und die Holocaust-Historiographie*, ed. René Schlott (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2019), 115–29.

97. This was the title of Urs Müller-Plantenberg's review of the German edition of Hilberg's work; Urs Müller-Plantenberg, "Immer noch Angst vor der ganzen Wahrheit," *taz*, November 26, 1982.

98. Berg, "Lesarten," 111. However, Berg points out the extremely questionable nature of the related view that "ressentiment is not the cause but rather the consequence of elucidation."

99. Alan Posener, interview, *Die Welt*, October 26, 2017.

100. See Berg, *Holocaust*.

101. Martin Broszat (1926–89), IfZ director from 1972 to 1989. In 2003 it emerged that Broszat had been a member of the Nazi Party from 1944. The question whether Broszat knew about this and whether he deliberately concealed his membership for the rest of his life subsequently became the subject of debate.

102. RHP, box 7, folder 17, Hilberg to Astrid Eckert, October 13, 2003.

103. See Magnus Brechtken, "Raul Hilberg, der Begriff Holocaust und die Konferenzen von San José bis Stuttgart," in Schlott, *Hilberg*, 47–70.

104. Eberhard Jäckel (1929–2017), Professor of Modern History at the University of Stuttgart from 1967 to 1997.

105. RHP, box 7, folder 17, Hilberg to Astrid Eckert, October 13, 2003; emphasis in the original. In his role as an employee of the Zentralstelle für Nachkriegsgeschichte (Central Office for Postwar History) in Paris, Krausnick, who had been a Nazi Party member since 1932, was sent to the Archive Commission of the Foreign Office, where he examined the files of the French Foreign Ministry. See the biographical details provided in Wolfgang Benz, "Vorrede: Zugleich ein Versuch über Helmut Krausnick," in *Miscellanea. Festschrift für Helmut Krausnick zum 75. Geburtstag*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1980), 7–14, here 9. Ino Arndt's contribution to this Festschrift, "Machtübernahme und Judenboykott in der Sicht evangelischer Sonntagsblätter," in ibid., 15–31, draws on her unpublished dissertation of 1960.

106. Raul Hilberg and Alfons Söllner, "Das Schweigen zum Sprechen bringen: Über Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der Holocaustforschung," *Merkur* 42, no. 7 (July 1988): 535–51, here 540.

107. Doris L. Bergen, "'Vieles bleibt ungesagt': Frauen in Leben und Werk Raul Hilbergs," in Schlott, *Hilberg*, 143–59, here 151.

108. See Nicolas Berg, "Das Innere der Dokumente: Zur Lakonie von Raul Hilberg," in Schlott, *Hilberg*, 161–82.

109. Raul Hilberg, "Auf der Suche nach den Sonderzügen," in Raul Hilberg, *Anatomie des Holocaust: Essays und Erinnerungen*, ed. Walter H. Pehle and René Schlott (Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fischer, 2016), 241–64, here 259.

110. IfZ-Archiv, ED 419/1, fols. 112–13; the document, only parts of which have survived, is in the papers of Helmut Krausnick and is neither dated nor signed.

111. In the copy of the expert report published by Götz Aly, there is a stamp here: "Circulation or reproduction only with the permission of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte"; see "Nur mit Genehmigung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte." According to information provided by the IfZ archives, before the introduction of a watermark, this stamp was used to indicate the origin of documents. All papers that left the archive as copies had to be stamped in order to prevent archival documents from being passed on without an indication of origin. The original does not bear this stamp; see the collection of original documents at https://www.ifz-muenchen.de/vierteljahrshefte/zusatzangebote/beilagen/ (accessed September 4, 2023).

112. See n. 93.

113. This refers to the Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst (Federal Agency for Homeland Services), which was founded in 1952 to provide civic education to broad sections of the

population. Since 1963 it has been called the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Federal Agency for Civic Education).

114. See pages 138–39 of this volume.

115. See pages 139, 161n72 of this volume.

116. See pages 138, 160n67 of this volume.

117. The surviving part of the expert report ends here.

118. This document is a reproduction of a copy of the letter in the S. Fischer archives; folder: Hilberg, Raul/Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden. Raul Hilberg sent the letter to S. Fischer in February 2002 at Walter Pehle's request, together with a number of other documents relating to the publication history of his work. The background to this was research conducted by Nicolas Berg for his essay "Lesarten," which quoted from the letter for the first time. Hilberg himself mentioned the letter in his autobiography: Hilberg, *Erinnerung*, 139–40.

119. Raul Hilberg's letter is not among his papers.

120. This refers to Hilberg's view of the role played by Judenräte and other Jewish functionaries as "collaborators" with their German persecutors. See Hilberg, *Destruction*, ed. 1961, 666: "The fifth reaction was automatic compliance. Much has been said and much has been written about the *Judenräte*, the informers, the Jewish police, the *Kapos*—in short, all those persons who deliberately and as a matter of policy co-operated with the Germans. But these collaborators do not interest us so much as the masses of Jews who reacted to every German order by complying with it automatically."

121. A far-right weekly newspaper published in Munich under various titles from 1950/51 to 2019.

122. The original document bears Fritz Bolle's signature.

123. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/13, fol. 47. The original bears the stamp "Copy made" as well as a stamp of receipt with the date September 14, 1979, and the letters "Ar." for Arndt.

124. Ludwig Rosenthal (1896–1988), born in Frankfurt a. M.; studied law, history, and German language and literature in Frankfurt a. M. and Munich; obtained his doctorate in Würzburg in 1918; served as a judge at the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt a. M.; lived in exile Amsterdam from 1933; emigrated in 1939 to Guatemala, his wife's birthplace, and worked there as a merchant; from the 1960s, published numerous essays and monographs on the history of Judaism, Heinrich Heine, and the history of Rosenthal's own Jewish family.

125. See Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews: With a new postscript by the author* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979).

126. See Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews. With a new postscript by the author* (New York: Octagon Books, 1978).

127. Signed by Günther Schwarz.

128. Document 2b.

129. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/13, fol. 48.

130. Handwritten note. "Landeszentralen für politische Bildung" refers to the State Agencies for Civic Education.

131. See Susanne Brandt, "'Wenig Anschauung?' Die Ausstrahlung des Films 'Holocaust' im westdeutschen Fernsehen (1978/79)," in *Erinnerungskulturen: Deutschland, Italien und*

Japan seit 1945, ed. Christoph Cornelißen, Lutz Klinkhammer, and Wolfgang Schwentker (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch, 2004), 257–68.

132. On the debates broadcast live after the series aired on January 22, 23, 26, and 27 respectively, see Peter Märthesheimer and Ivo Frenzel, eds., *Im Kreuzfeuer: Der Fernsehfilm "Holocaust." Eine Nation ist betroffen* (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1979).

133. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/13, fol. 49. The list includes planned titles by Nahum Goldmann, Hans Lamm, and Julius Schloss.

134. Ibid.

135. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/13, fol. 44.

136. "Hü" is the abbreviation used by the secretary V. Hübner.

137. See Adalbert Rückerl, *Nationalsozialistische Vernichtungslager im Spiegel deutscher Strafprozesse: Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, Chelmno* (Munich: dtv, 1977).

138. This refers to the forty-two volumes of trial transcripts and documents published in German between 1947 and 1949 under the title *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof* (The Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal). These volumes are called the "Blue Series" after the color of their covers. This name distinguishes them from other editions of the trial records (such as the Green or Red Series).

139. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/13, fols. 41–42.

140. In the letter mentioned here (IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/13, fol. 43), Schwarz had asked Arndt for immediate assistance in correcting Ludwig Rosenthal's book (n. 6), which was about to go to press.

141. The original is signed "V. Hü."

142. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/13, fol. 40, bears the stamp "Copy made" as well as a stamp of receipt with the date November 3, 1979, and the letters "Ar." for Arndt.

143. Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), philosopher und mathematician: *Bertrand Russell sagt seine Meinung: Eine Stimme moderner Aufklärung* (Darmstadt: Darmstädter Blätter, 1976); Paul Goodman (1911–72), writer: *Aufwachsen im Widerspruch: Über die Entfremdung der Jugend in der verwalteten Welt* (Darmstadt: Darmstädter Blätter, 1971); Jerome D. Frank (1909–2005), psychologist: *Muss Krieg sein? Psychologische Aspekte von Krieg und Frieden* (Darmstadt: Darmstädter Blätter, 1969); Anatol Rapoport (1911–2007), mathematician and biologist: *Bedeutungslehre: Eine semantische Kritik* (Darmstadt: Darmstädter Blätter, 1972); John Somerville (1905–94), sociologist and political scientist: *Durchbruch zum Frieden: Eine amerikanische Gesellschaftskritik* (Darmstadt: Darmstädter Blätter, 1973).

144. See n. 12.

145. Joachim Bergmann (1933–2019), professor at the Institute of Sociology, Technical University of Darmstadt, from 1972 to 1995.

146. The original is signed by Günther Schwarz.

147. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/13, fol. 38, Arndt to Schwarz, December 3, 1979.

148. Here the original contains the handwritten abbreviation "Ar." for Ino Arndt.

149. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/14, fols. 46–47.

150. The YIVO Institute for Jewish Research (YIVO stands for "Yidisher visnshaftlekher institute"). YIVO, a research institute focusing on the history and culture of East-

ern European Jews, was founded in Vilnius in 1925 and has been based in New York City since 1940.

151. Arndt refers directly here to the aborted plans for the Droemer Knaur edition and her involvement in the project as a translator; see pages 135–36 of this volume. However, she does not mention the first IfZ expert report, possibly because she did not know about it.

152. At the bottom of the original page is the following handwritten note: "→Spiegel 1962/20." This very probably refers to an article in the Hamburg-based news magazine about antisemitic prejudices in West Germany: "Frag mich was," *Der Spiegel*, May 16, 1962. (I am grateful to Klaus A. Lankheit for drawing my attention to this.) The note seems to have been added later in the IfZ, as it is not present in the copy held in the C.H.Beck archives.

153. An asterisk in the original refers to the following handwritten note at the bottom of the page: "drawing mainly on Hilberg."

154. In her book *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Viking, 1963), a trial report first published in *The New Yorker*, Hannah Arendt wrote: "To a Jew this role of the Jewish leaders in the destruction of their own people is undoubtedly the darkest chapter of the whole dark story. It had been known about before, but it has now been exposed for the first time in all its pathetic and sordid detail by Raul Hilberg, whose standard work *The Destruction of the European Jews* I mentioned before" (104).

155. See Isaiah Trunk, *Judenrat: The Jewish Councils in the Eastern Europe under Nazi Occupation* (New York: Macmillan Company/Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1972). Trunk concluded that there was no collaboration on the part of the *Judenräte* (Jewish Councils), because the Jews would have been murdered even if the *Judenräte* had resisted.

156. Emphasis in the original.

157. NSG stands for Nationalsozialistische Gewaltverbrechen (Nazi Violent Crimes), the legal term for the criminal trials commonly referred to as "Nazi trials" for the crimes committed under National Socialism.

158. See Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *Der Krieg gegen die Juden: 1933–1945* (Munich: Kindler, 1979). To Hilberg's annoyance, this book was quite successful in the US and enjoyed multiple print runs: Hilberg, *Erinnerung*, 124–26. Hilberg criticized the fact that having based her study on secondary literature rather than primary sources, Dawidowicz failed to offer new insights.

159. Here the original contains the handwritten abbreviation "Ar" for Ino Arndt.

160. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/14, fols. 43–44, Wieckenberg to Arndt, February 13, 1980. The original bears the stamp "Copy made" as well as a stamp of receipt with the date February 14, 1980, and the letters "Ar." for Arndt. I am grateful to Ilse Denningmann from C.H.Beck for sending me copies of this letter and of the copy of Arndt's report of January 31, 1980, held in the publishing house's archives. The report contains the handwritten note "Dr. Ino Arndt, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, commissioned by Dr. Möller."

161. In the original, the first page ends here. At the bottom of this page there is a handwritten note by Arndt: "thanked tel. 2.15.—[illegible] patience [illegible]."

162. In the original, the handwritten signature of Ernst-Peter Wieckenberg appears here.

Recognition and Frustration

Raul Hilberg and the German Edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews*

ALAN E. STEINWEIS

Raul Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews* is arguably the most important book ever published on the Holocaust. Originally brought out in English in 1961, the text laid the foundation for an enormous body of subsequent research by countless scholars. The role of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ—Institute for Contemporary History) in evaluating the book for possible publication in German translation, which is the subject of René Schlott's document essay in this volume, constitutes but one chapter in a long and complex publication history of Hilberg's work. By now it is well known that Hilberg experienced great difficulty in finding a publisher for his revised Columbia University doctoral dissertation.[1] Having overcome this early obstacle, Hilberg won widespread praise for his study, and then published revised and expanded English-language editions of the work in 1985 and 2003. He also undertook revisions each time the book was translated into a different language, resulting in a rather unusual situation in which the most recent translation represented the definitive version of the study at any given time.

A controversy over the German edition of *Destruction* lies at the center of Schlott's essay and the accompanying documents. At a conference dedicated to Hilberg's life and work, which Schlott convened in Berlin in 2017, the influential and often provocative historian-journalist Götz Aly accused the IfZ of having hindered the appearance of a German translation of *Destruction* from the 1960s into the early 1980s. Aly based his claim on documents he had found in the institute's own archive. Following up on his lecture at the Hilberg conference, Aly published a more detailed version of his critique of the institute's handling of Hilberg.[2] According to Aly, historians at the institute had repeatedly advised German publishers against pursuing a German-language edition of *Destruction*. Although institute staff cited objections to Hilberg's method-

ology, the main reason for the institute's "blockade," Aly maintained, was to keep Hilberg off the German book market so that one of its own historians could publish the book that would shape understanding of the subject for German readers. It was about the institute protecting its institutional "sovereignty in matters of interpretation" (*Deutungshoheit*).

Aly's accusation resonated through parts of the German media. It stung not least because the institute had served as a cosponsor of the conference. (Full disclosure: the University of Vermont, where I teach, was a cosponsor as well.) Aly's assertion was not the first time that the IfZ had been accused of obstructionism toward Jewish scholars of the Holocaust. Nicolas Berg, in a widely discussed book published in 2003, detailed how the institute, in its early days, had avoided Josef Wulf, a Holocaust survivor who in the 1950s and 1960s compiled document collections about the Nazi years.[3] Historians also remembered the controversy surrounding Martin Broszat, the institute's longtime director, in the late 1980s. Broszat had published a plea for the "historicization" of the Nazi past, which some Jewish historians interpreted as insensitive to Jewish perspectives on the Holocaust.[4]

The controversy unleashed by Aly prompted Schlott, who has established himself in recent years as the foremost expert on Hilberg's biography, to inspect the relevant materials in the IfZ's archive and other collections. The result was the essay published in the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* in 2021 and offered in English translation in this volume. In addition to having conducted a more thorough examination of the documents than Aly had done, Schlott avoids sensationalism, seeking instead to arrive at a nuanced understanding of the institute's actions and motives. Schlott sees validity in Aly's claim that the institute acted to protect its *Deutungshoheit* but believes that other factors were also at work. One of these was "fear of the entire truth" regarding the extent of German society's involvement in the Holocaust, which is the central point and most damning conclusion of *Destruction*. Another factor was the fear that a German edition of Hilberg's work could be exploited by antisemites. *Destruction* downplayed acts of Jewish resistance to the Holocaust, and its portrayal of the Jewish councils was unflattering. Schlott credits as plausible the fear of a German publisher in 1965 that a German edition of *Destruction* could fuel antisemitic narratives about Jewish collaboration in the Holocaust. Schlott also provides evidence that the actions of the institute were not as one-sided as Aly presents them. On at least two occasions, institute staff supported the translation of Hilberg into German. The role of the institute vis-à-vis Hilberg, Schlott concludes, was both "more complex and more ambivalent" than had been alleged.

I would like now to shift the focus of this essay to an account of a more recent chapter in the publication history of *The Destruction of the European Jews*. In late 2008 I arrived in Burlington, Vermont, as the newly appointed director of the University of Vermont's Miller Center for Holocaust Studies. Built on the intellectual foundation laid by Raul Hilberg, who had taught at the university from 1956 to 1991, the center was given the mission of promoting "scholarship, education, and public awareness of the events that brought about, constituted, and continue to issue from the Holocaust." Among my unofficial duties as director was to check in occasionally with Gwen Hilberg, the widow of the great scholar, who had died in 2007. Mrs. Hilberg often mentioned her late husband's admiration for the scholarship of a generation of young German historians of the Holocaust. He praised the empirical, archivally based research of the young German historians, contrasting it with the theoretical and literary approaches to the Holocaust that were becoming more common in American academia, about which he was far less enthusiastic. He saw his younger German colleagues as the heirs to his own intellectual mantel. He was gratified that much of his work had been translated into German, thanks in large part to his friend and German editor, Walter Pehle of S. Fischer-Verlag.

But it had also been a great disappointment to Hilberg on his deathbed that the 2003 Yale University Press edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews* had not appeared in German translation. Such a translation had been prepared for Fischer, but Hilberg found it severely lacking in precision and, shortly before his death, declined to give his permission for it to be published. According to Mrs. Hilberg, one of her husband's dying wishes was that Fischer would commission a new translation, and she asked me to approach the publisher on behalf of Hilberg's literary estate to discuss such a possibility. With the support of Walter Pehle, who had since retired from his influential role at Fischer, I visited Frankfurt in 2010 to discuss the project with his successor. The publishing house regarded the costs of a new translation as prohibitive, given that it had already absorbed the expense of the translation that Hilberg had rejected. This publisher's calculation was also based on the success of the German edition of Saul Friedländer's history of the Holocaust, *Das Dritte Reich und die Juden*, which had recently appeared and been decorated with Germany's most prestigious book prize, the *Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels*. Believing Friedländer's work to be more marketable to a general readership than Hilberg's, Fischer concluded that a new translation of Hilberg would not sell well. Even after Gwen Hilberg offered to forfeit royalties, Fischer saw the project as a losing proposition and declined to pursue it. A representative of the publisher acknowledged to me the continuing scholarly importance of the

2003 edition of *Destruction* but observed that German-speaking historians and students possessed English-language skills sufficient for consulting it.

Fischer partially filled the lacuna in 2023 with a hybrid German edition of *Destruction* in 2023.[5] This volume features very useful essays by René Schlott and Christian Seeger, the latter of whom prepared the 1982 German translation of *Destruction* (and who should not be confused with the translator whose product Hilberg rejected in 2007). The edition contains translations of sections of the concluding chapter that Hilberg wrote for the 2003 edition, but it consists primarily of the text of the 1982 German translation, which was itself based largely on the original 1961 edition of *Destruction*. Most of the new edition, therefore, is fairly identical to what Hilberg first published sixty-two years earlier. I would certainly have preferred to see Fischer publish a full-fledged translation of the 2003 edition, but the republication of the old text does constitute a tribute to the rigor, thoroughness, and continuing value of Hilberg's scholarship.

Notes

1. René Schlott, "Der lange Weg zum Buch: Zur Publikationsgeschichte von Raul Hilbergs 'The Destruction of the European Jews,'" in *ZeitRäume: Potsdamer Almanach des Zentrums für Zeithistorische Forschung* (2015): 143–52. See also Hilberg's own memoir *The Politics of Memory: The Journal of a Holocaust Historian* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 91–119.

2. Götz Aly, "Nur mit Genehmigung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," *Perlentaucher*, October 18, 2017, accessed May 4, 2024, https://www.perlentaucher.de/essay/goetz-aly-das-institut-fuer-zeitgeschichte-und-die-verzoegerte-deutsche-ausgabe-von-raul-hilberg.html.

3. Nicolas Berg, *Der Holocaust und die Westdeutschen Historiker: Erforschung und Erinnerung* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003). For the debate over the book, see Astrid M. Eckert and Vera Ziegeldorf, eds., *Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker: Eine Debatte*, *Historisches Forum*, no. 2 (2004), accessed May 4, 2024, https://edoc.hu-berlin.de/bitstream/handle/18452/18461/HistFor_2-2004.pdf.

4. Peter Baldwin, ed., *Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust and the Historians' Debate* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990).

5. Raul Hilberg, *Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden*, trans. Christian Seeger et al. (Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fischer, 2023).

Scholarship versus Apologia

The Institute for Contemporary History and the Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt

MORITZ FISCHER AND THOMAS SCHLEMMER

The Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt (ZFI—Contemporary History Research Center Ingolstadt) has been mostly forgotten, even though it continues to serve as an important trendsetter in the field of apologetic historical revisionism. Founded in 1981 on the initiative of Alfred Schickel and Hellmut Diwald, the ZFI understood itself as the counter-project to the Institute for Contemporary History (IfZ), which as a bastion of an allegedly politically motivated historiography, stood in the way of a German identity unencumbered by the shadow of the Nazi past. Based on sources analyzed for the first time, Moritz Fischer and Thomas Schlemmer provide insights into the inner workings of the ZFI, trace its conflicts with established institutions such as the IfZ and the Bundesarchiv (Federal Archives), and explain why the ZFI was able to become an important element in the "spectrum bridging conservatism and right-wing extremism" (Armin Pfahl-Traughber) during the 1980s.

A Slap in the Face for the Domestic Intelligence Services

In July 2020 some startling news made the rounds in the German media: the Bayerische Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Bavarian State Office for the Protection of the Constitution—the Bavarian branch of Germany's domestic intelligence agency) was having to "pulp" its report for 2019, which it had officially presented in April.[1] What had happened? The Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt e.V. (ZFI—Contemporary History Research Center Ingolstadt), which had been founded in 1981, had been mentioned for the first time in the intelligence agency's report under the heading of "other right-wing extremist organizations." The report stated that the ZFI was publishing speeches that conveyed "antisemitic content and glorified the Nazi period" and that "ZFI events" were attended by "individual speakers who expressed extreme right-wing sentiments or who had already appeared at events staged by other

extreme right-wing organizations." Furthermore, statements in the same vein by leading members of the ZFI had come to light.[2] According to its charter, the ZFI, an association based in Ingolstadt in Upper Bavaria, pursues the objectives of strengthening personal development (Bildung), education, "tolerance," and international understanding "by supporting academic work on contemporary history."[3] Needless to say, the ZFI was not prepared to let these accusations stand. It therefore sued the Free State of Bavaria for an injunction before the administrative court in Munich—and won. The court left no doubt that the ZFI "had knowingly made appearances in far-right extremist historical revisionist spheres pertinent to the protection of the constitution." And although it conceded that the assessment of the Bayerische Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz was "not per se objectionable," no "concrete indications of ambitions" running counter to the liberal democratic basic order of the Federal Republic of Germany could be proven, and thus the ZFI's infringement of basic rights mentioned in the Verfassungsschutz's report could not be justified.[4]

This judgment was music to the ears of the ZFI, which attempted to reinterpret it as a kind of democratic clean bill of health (known in German as a *Persilschein*)[5] and pompously announced that "on the basis of the judgment, the institute will now endeavor to resolutely continue its lecturing and publication work in a way consistent with its objectives."[6] While the "defeat for the Bavarian Verfassungsschutz"[7] was also construed as a "flop for the CSU spooks"[8] and smugly received by certain commentators with gratification and blatant schadenfreude, others, such as Bayerische Rundfunk (BR—Bavarian TV and radio), rubbed their eyes in disbelief. After all, BR commented, it had been known for a long time that the ZFI was one of the "leading stooges of German revisionist history."[9] The ZFI had not enjoyed so much attention in a long time, and journalists who looked a little closer found a surprising link. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (*FAZ*) newspaper wrote, for example, that "the Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt" had been established long ago "as a counterproject to the highly esteemed Institute for Contemporary History in Munich, which has been investigating the history of the National Socialist period since 1949."[10]

How a history association with a niche existence in (New) Right echo chambers came to be connected with an internationally recognized non-university research institute certainly requires some explanation. One attempt to shed some light on this takes us back to the decade from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s when contemporary history was not as firmly established as a separate discipline as it is today, neither in academia nor in the political and public domains,[11] and the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ—Institute for Con-

temporary History) had yet to undergo some important stages in its academic and organizational development. At the same time, the question of a (West) German identity and the place of National Socialism in the country's history were still being fiercely debated; in the process the Holocaust was also increasingly coming into political and societal focus as a constituent element of German history, resulting in a new culture of remembrance[12]—or historical culture (Geschichtskultur), as it was starting to be known.[13]

The ZFI was an offshoot of this robust mainstream academic and non-academic interest in history, which for several years enjoyed an astonishing degree of publicity. In addition to providing a subject for discussion at the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich, it also induced the Federal Archives, an organizationally more established institution, to undertake noteworthy action. Admittedly, the temporary success of the ZFI in the early 1980s had less to do with the research work being done there than with the revisionist unease (firmly anchored in certain segments of West German society) surrounding twentieth-century German history, which repeatedly erupted into heated debates[14] (not by chance usually triggered by references to the National Socialist period). In addition to marginalized right-wing extremist milieus,[15] it primarily involved associations (known as *Landsmannschaften*) of Germans who had been expelled from former German or German-speaking territories after World War II; nationalist-conservative forces, which were also represented in the conservative Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU)/Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU) political parties; and influential representatives of the generation who had personally experienced the Nazi era and, prior to 1945, had worn the uniforms of the Wehrmacht or the Waffen SS. The ZFI likewise took root in this heterogeneous soil, which comprised extremist and conservative-democratic elements in equal measure. Furthermore, it benefited from a longing, widespread in the final decade of the Bonn Republic, to regain a "lost normality."[16]

The ZFI's significance did not originate with the organization as such, but rather stemmed from its being part of a still under-researched informal network of institutions, organizations, short-lived associations, and publications that grew significantly in the late 1970s and early 1980s and posed a far-right challenge to the liberal basic order of the Federal Republic of Germany, as indeed it did to the CDU and the CSU, the mainstream parties of the center right.[17] Examples include the Studienzentrum Weikersheim, established in 1979;[18] the Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung in Munich, headed by Armin Mohler; the political party Die Republikaner, led by Franz Schönhuber; and the short-lived "Deutschlandrat" (Council of Germany), all of which attempt-

ed to permanently shift the axis of West German conservatism to the right.[19] Key figures such as Mohler, Schönhuber, Hellmut Diwald, and Hans Filbinger functioned as human "nodes" or interfaces in this network, and the contemporary history narrative played a central role for the majority of stakeholders. Therefore, the ZFI was no less than a revisionist-apologist stooge in the guise of a history association committed to academic principles and a pier of the "bridge between conservatism and right-wing extremism."[20]

This essay will focus on the three-way relationship between the Institute for Contemporary History, the German Federal Archives, and the ZFI against the backdrop of the "return of history"[21] in the 1970s and 1980s. Although the ZFI clearly differentiated itself from such established institutions, it is no coincidence that it shares the same initials as the IfZ in the reverse order. The kind of anti-establishment sentiments (however "the establishment" is defined) often found on the far right were also a central motive of the ZFI's founders.[22] The question, then, is what conditions allowed a history association founded by outsiders in the Bavarian provinces to boost its own status, at least for a period of time, to become established as a double interface between academia and politics and between national conservatism and right-wing extremism? And how did the historical profession react to the revisionist challenges from this murky undergrowth of civil society? The documents from the collections of the Institute for Contemporary History and the Federal Archives presented in this essay hold the answers. At the same time, these documents offer a first glimpse behind the scenes of an astonishingly long-lived history association that repeatedly produced politically explosive material,[23] an initiative that in a certain sense also typifies the "age of fracture,"[24] characterized by a loss of, and search for, meaning.

Alfred Schickel, Hellmut Diwald, and the ZFI

The ZFI was launched in 1981. There is no consensus about the exact date; we are dealing with a phase of uncertain latency, about which little was known until now.[25] The ZFI itself alleges that it was founded on November 21[26]—not without reason, as will be shown—while the Verfassungsschutz dates its inception to July 1.[27] However, correspondence bearing a May date and the letterhead "Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt" has also been found.[28] In fact, the founding phase of the ZFI lasted nearly a year and only concluded when the Ingolstadt District Court entered it in the register of associations in May/June 1982.[29]

It can be assumed that the founding group met to begin organizational

preparations in early summer 1981. At the end of August, Alfred Schickel drew attention to the ZFI with a letter campaign in which he appealed to recipients to support this new "academic institution of school and university historians," either as "active staff members or as sponsors," and outlined the following agenda arising from the "need for an unconditional illumination of contemporary German history."[30] The ZFI, he wrote, had "espoused the goal" of collecting archival material and statements from contemporary witnesses and of preparing a program of lectures, seminars, and publications, in order to ensure the "provision of unbiased and factual information for all interested parties" and to contribute to the "clarification of controversial issues of contemporary history."

Leading members of the ZFI never grew tired of emphasizing that the first maxim of the history association was "the obligation to serve only the academic illumination of the most recent history and to exclude any biased partisanship or interpretation." According to a voice from later years, it was a matter of "shedding light on the past," and this "whether or not the findings suit the traditional view of history of prevailing opinion leaders."[31] In the early 1980s this methodologically simplistic understanding of history, informed by an ostensibly naive historism, had few advocates among scholars. Furthermore, a look at both the selection of topics, which was often motivated by the members' own biographies, and the ZFI's disregard for academic standards in its work shows that the association's purpose was primarily political rather than scholarly. A characteristic approach of the ZFI was to examine historical events about which its members were in ideologically induced denial, and which cast dark shadows over the German nation and German identity. The questions Schickel included in the invitation to support the ZFI can barely be read any other way. For example: "How many Gypsies died under Hitler? How many people do the Poles mourn on account of the Germans?"[32] The skeptical and relativizing subtext is hard to ignore.

Schickel's appeal, launched on August 27, was followed by the first ZFI "conference" on November 20 and 21, 1981, at the Ingolstadt Bavaria hotel. Approximately sixty participants attended the conference, which culminated in the formative members meeting.[33] The key players were Alfred Schickel and Hellmut Diwald, both historians with the dubious reputation of propagating a nationalistic-revisionist view of history. The former was elected as chair with thirty-three votes and one abstention; the latter as deputy chair with the same result. They were assisted by Ludwig Blanck-Conrady as second deputy chair, Hans Joachim Kloeppel as treasurer, and Wolfgang Tandetzke as secretary, the last of whom would later also become managing director of the ZFI.[34] Among

the leading co-founders of the institute, the name of the well-known CSU politician Alfred Seidl often crops up.[35] Seidl had defended the major war criminals Rudolf Heß and Hans Frank at the Nuremberg trials, and until his death in 1993 stayed in secret contact with Gerhard Frey, who, as the owner of the *National-Zeitung* newspaper and chair of the Deutsche Volksunion party, was a key right-wing extremist figure in the Federal Republic of Germany. Indeed, it was Seidl who gave the opening lecture at the first ZFI "conference," in which he enthusiastically shared his memories as a "defense lawyer in Nuremberg 1945/46." However, the CSU politician was more of a figurehead than an activist; he held no office and it is doubtful whether he ever joined the ZFI as a member, even though he published in one of its series.[36]

Both Schickel's and Diwald's lifelong obsession was their lost homeland: the Sudetenland.[37] Diwald was born in Schattau in 1924, although his family moved to Nuremberg before World War II. In 1952, in the neighboring town of Erlangen, he submitted his dissertation about nineteenth-century historical realism; his supervisor was Hans-Joachim Schoeps.[38] Six years later, Diwald qualified as a professor at the Friedrich Alexander University with a paper on Wilhelm Dilthey, and from 1965 onward he taught there as an adjunct professor of medieval and modern history.[39] He gained a certain degree of prominence, above all through his 1969 biography of Wallenstein[40] and through numerous TV appearances in the 1970s.

Unlike Diwald, Schickel had experienced the expulsion from the Sudetenland first-hand, a trauma that he sought to process throughout his life, including in his publications.[41] His parents had owned a farm in Slabisch, near Aussig an der Elbe, where Schickel was born in 1933 as the second of four sons. Already dispossessed in October 1945, his family had to perform forced labor before they were deported to Bavaria in July 1946. Eventually the Schickels found accommodation close to Eichstätt, where Alfred went to school. He then gained a scholarship to the Jesuit St. Blasien college in the Black Forest, which he attended until 1954. Upon finishing school, he studied history and philosophy at Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich. Subsequently he worked as a prefect at the Catholic Canisius seminary and, despite having no teaching qualifications, as a teacher of history and social studies at a Catholic girls' school in Ingolstadt. At the same time, he worked on a dissertation in ancient history, with which he would earn a doctorate under Siegfried Lauffer in 1966.[42]

Admittedly Schickel's passion was not antiquity but contemporary history, and he indulged this passion alongside his day job at the school by publishing essays, reviews, and newspaper articles, publications that primarily dealt with

the prehistory and history of the Nazi regime and the history of World War II. Yet he certainly did not "predominantly" serve right-wing extreme media from the very beginning;[43] rather, he published in journals such as *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* or *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*. From 1968 he also regularly wrote for the *FAZ* newspaper, where he reviewed political books, including weighty titles such as *Hitlers Weltanschauung* by Eberhard Jäckel or Ludwig Volk's two-volume edition of *Akten Kardinal Faulhabers*.[44] Occasionally he also published articles in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* newspaper[45] and produced contributions for Bavarian and Hessian Radio.[46] By contrast, the editors of the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (*VfZ*) rejected his manuscripts more than once.[47]

Schickel joined the CSU and in 1959/60 was chair of the Bavarian section of the conservative student association Ring Christlich-Demokratischer Studenten. It is not surprising, therefore, that he wrote regular contributions for the *Bayernkurier* newspaper and the *Politische Studien* journal, published by the CSU-affiliated Hanns Seidel Foundation.[48] Yet genuinely political or party-political statements were rare; indeed, one would not have imagined that he would take a rather critical attitude to the *Radikalenerlass* (radicals decree), which was primarily aimed against left-wing activists.[49] On the one hand, Schickel was an outsider—as the child of an expellee family at a time when a "welcoming culture" was a foreign concept,[50] as a teacher without pedagogical training, and as an academic with a PhD in ancient history among colleagues whose profession was contemporary history. On the other hand, he succeeded in putting down roots and establishing himself, in particular in the Catholic milieu in Ingolstadt, which adopted and supported him until the final years of his life. Here his marriage in 1968 to the niece of the bishop of Eichstätt, Joseph Schröffer, who later became curial cardinal, may have been an advantage.[51] This also applied to academic journalism, where Schickel was able to make a certain name for himself, and not just at the (right-wing) conservative end of the spectrum of opinion.

However, in the 1970s a process of alienation and radicalization began, which could also be observed in the case of Hellmut Diwald. The reason was not least the new *Ostpolitik* of the social-liberal coalition, which left many of the expelled Germans and their political representatives voiceless. The coordinates of the politics of memory were also redefined, so that expellee *Landsmannschaften* were increasingly sidelined or even found themselves confronted with previously barely uttered questions about the responsibility of their own ethnic group for Nazi rule and the war of extermination.[52] In the sometimes heated public debates, Schickel and Diwald spoke out. The pair jointly led the

ZFI until Diwald's death in 1993, even though Diwald was unable to devote much time to it after his wife became seriously ill.[53] While Diwald gave vent to his feelings of anger, frustration, and grief in his *Bericht zur Klage der Nation* (Report on the Nation's Lament),[54] Schickel undertook a detailed examination of the Munich Agreement. In 1971 his assessment of the latter was still rather restrained,[55] but later he openly defended it as lawful in order to lend weight to the Sudeten Germans' claims to their homeland and property.[56] By then he already counted himself among the "revisionist outsiders" who "had to endure a pluralistic liberal society" and were liable to be suppressed "through censorship or by being blacklisted."[57] From this position as a (self-proclaimed) fearless fighter against the establishment, the decision to set up an institution like the ZFI was no longer a major step. Later, Schickel repeatedly framed this initiative as an act of resistance against an unscholarly and biased, even distorted, portrayal of recent German history. In his opinion, the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich stood *pars pro toto* for a contemporary historiography in tune with a zeitgeist that served Germany's desire to come to terms with its past.[58]

Historians at a Crossroads

Diwald and Schickel shared a deep unease regarding the shift in German historiography, which in the 1970s was increasingly interpreting the history of the nation(-state) as problematic.[59] They, on the other hand, were convinced that only a brand of historiography that conferred a German national identity could save the "epoch of contemporaries" from chaos,[60] and they shared the distrust of many conservatives toward the increasing individualism of West German society.[61] Their way of writing and interpreting history was not without consequence. At the German Historians' Conference in Mannheim in 1976, Diwald called for a uniform, cohesive, and clearly contoured view of history in order to hinder the "disintegration" of West German society.[62]

Despite harsh criticism, Diwald was not to be deterred, and two years later he upped the ante with his *Geschichte der Deutschen* (History of the Germans) published by Propyläen. Here he chose an "anti-chronological approach,"[63] starting his account with the era of the two world wars and then going back to the early Middle Ages. The year 1945 thus assumed central importance in the book, which can be seen as a milestone in Diwald's journey to the margins of scholarship. He believed that the "historical continuity of the Germans" had been severed, that history was no longer "accepted as an ingenious process," and that historiography had degenerated into a "coming to terms with

the past." Diwald saw the reason for this in a kind of "inner rewiring of the German nation by the victors of World War II," who had "put into practice" a "radical clean sweep" of German history. The "main function in the complete moral vilification of the Germans" had been assigned to Auschwitz, "the German stigma" of the twentieth century. The conclusions resulting from a rejection of these assertions were obvious: the Germans were to be liberated from the shadow of reeducation, their history reclaimed, and the fragmentation of the German nation thus overcome.

With this narrative, which could not be called anything but apologetic, Diwald left the realm of serious scholarship. Back in 1980, the assessment of Hermann Graml, the managing editor of the *VfZ*, had been that Diwald had "essentially [presented] a political pamphlet disguised as a portrayal of history in order to propagate an extreme form of nationalism."[64] And years later his colleague Jürgen Zarusky added that, with his theories, Diwald had formed a revisionist "bridgehead in the camp of academic historiography."[65] And indeed acclaim was not long in coming, both from the New Right[66] and from the Sudeten German *Landsmannschaft*, which awarded Diwald the Kulturpreis Wissenschaft in 1979. The laudatory speech was delivered by none other than Alfred Schickel, who emphasized that Diwald had been "the first historian of note to have undertaken to view German history not as a predominantly criminalized past" and had dared "to place question marks where the literature of the victors had passed blanket judgments and other German contemporary historians had timidly remained silent."[67]

This attack on the contemporary history establishment was followed by a second in January 1980 in the *FAZ*,[68] in which Schickel wrote of "blocked access, prejudices, profiteers, and political interests." He saw academic German "contemporary history at a crossroads," which he *cum grano salis* accused of making itself the lackey of Allied propaganda, thus hindering the ascertainment of the truth. Schickel did not provide evidence for these accusations, but instead was unsparing in his attacks on the Institute for Contemporary History. He claimed that the "Munich institute in question" was a "monopoly enterprise" that tolerated no contradiction to its dubious interpretation of National Socialism, which engaged in "impudent withholding of information," and which displayed an exclusionary "manner of dealing with dissenters."[69]

The article, which Schickel had hawked around the media[70] and which had a long, very personal backstory, caused something of a stir, especially as it appeared prominently in West Germany's leading liberal-conservative newspaper. The Institute for Contemporary History took note of this article "with its primitive insinuations" but refrained from offering a public riposte, citing its

"remarkably poor content."[71] However, the exponents of the New Right saw their chance and could barely believe their luck. As they saw it, the "revisionists [. . .] had broken out of their ghetto" and were now "officially recognized as dialogue partners."[72]

And that was not the end of the matter. Gerhard Frey's *National-Zeitung*, the journalistic flagship of German right-wing extremism, called Schickel to the witness box as an allegedly neutral source vouching for the falsification of history.[73] The *Klüter Blätter*, another right-wing extremist mouthpiece, put him on a par with the famous Holocaust denier David Irving.[74] It is hard to say how close Schickel was to the extreme right or to what extent he shared its convictions. However, he did not resist its attempts to co-opt him, showed no fear of being associated with it, made good use of the journalistic platforms of the organized right, and clearly enjoyed the goodwill shown toward him by these platforms. The encouragement from the far right boosted Schickel's self-confidence as well as his non-academic assumptions and political convictions, which predetermined his selection of topics, lines of argumentation, and findings. However, he did not burn his bridges but instead sought more or less successfully to keep the different worlds in which he moved apart from one another.[75] He therefore continued to cultivate his roots in the Catholic milieu—he only retired from the chairmanship of the Katholisches Bildungswerk Ingolstadt (Catholic Education Center Ingolstadt) in July 1990 after sixteen years[76]—moved in the network of traditional associations and reservist comradeships closely connected to the Bundeswehr,[77] and maintained contact with the Ingolstadt CSU, in particular with Horst Seehofer and the city's mayors Peter Schnell and Alfred Lehmann, who for their part saw no reason to distance themselves from Schickel. On the occasion of its twenty-fifth anniversary in November 2006, Seehofer, at the time federal minister of agriculture, wished the ZFI "a prosperous future,"[78] and on the same occasion Lehmann honored the history association—and its chairs—with a welcome address, albeit one that brought him harsh criticism.[79] However, Schickel's balancing act was only partly successful, and its limits had been reached by the late 1990's at the latest, when in several reports the Verfassungsschutz categorized him, as chair of the ZFI, as a revisionist.[80]

The ZFI—A Pier in the "Bridge Spectrum"

But let us return to the founding period of the ZFI. In the years 1980/81, Schickel had every reason to be satisfied. He had found an audience and had been able to place his views in serious print media with a long reach. In this re-

gard, the *FAZ* was of particular importance, giving space to this history teacher from the Bavarian provinces[81] surprisingly often during these months as a reviewer in the "political books" section, as the author of articles on history in the political section, and as a contributor to the features section.[82] Schickel's journalistic success fired his ambitions to play in what might be termed the premier league of contemporary history research, although ultimately he was not up to the challenge. Nevertheless, it seemed to be an opportune moment to create his own independent platform in association with high-profile figures, such as Diwald and Seidl, in order to proactively contribute to shaping the debates over contemporary history and the politics of history at the interface of democratic conservatism, the New Right, and völkisch nationalism. There was major public interest in historical topics, the social-liberal reform policy had lost much of its shine, and the "intellectual-moral turn" was looming.[83] In short, the time appeared to be ripe to give the "silent majority"[84] a voice and to permanently change the political culture of the Federal Republic of Germany. Schickel's quest was to initiate "an unbiased discussion of our past" in order to overcome the burden of the "Hitler syndrome," which, according to him, was blocking "the way to an impartial reflection on the most recent German and international history."[85]

Schickel and his colleagues were not prepared to settle for anything less when they created the ZFI. The Institute for Contemporary History served them both as a role model and as a target for their negative projections. Schickel had started by courting the institute, but after a vitriolic correspondence with Ino Arndt, Martin Broszat, and Hermann Graml, his association with it became one of profound aversion.[86] This association was reflected both in the ZFI's semiofficial name and its letterhead, which likewise bore a striking resemblance to that of the Institute for Contemporary History. In organizational terms, too, the ZFI founders borrowed ideas from the Institute for Contemporary History, deciding in November 1981 to form an "academic board" similar to the latter's academic advisory board.[87]

The board was actually formed in 1982, and it is worth taking a brief look at its four members, none of whom were leading representatives of West German historical scholarship.[88] It is presumably no coincidence, but rather a result of the weak institutional role of the ZFI, that the two younger members, lawyer and legal historian Wilhelm Brauneder[89] and historian Wolfdieter Biehl, were lecturers at the University of Vienna, which suggests that no suitable professors could be found at a West German university. The remaining two members were Gerhart Binder, professor of science policy at the School of Education Weingarten and author of fairly successful overviews of recent history,[90] and

Erich Schwinge, who from the winter semester 1946/47 until his retirement was on the law faculty at the University of Marburg. The presence of two lawyers on the board is presumably not least a reflection of the ZFI's research program, in which questions such as war guilt, war crimes, and international law played an important role. Admittedly, Schwinge was not just any lawyer. Rather he was considered "one of the leading military law experts" of the Third Reich and a "politically motivated criminal" who had been involved in passing down numerous death sentences without even having been a fanatical Nazi.[91] His book *Bilanz der Kriegsgeneration* (Taking Stock of the War Generation), which appeared in 1978, would have been very much to Schickel's taste, representing as they did the views of an apologist who sought to settle scores and endeavored to endow Germany with a national identity.[92] Nevertheless, this board, which sat until November 2000 (with the exception of Schwinge, who died in 1994),[93] provided little impetus for the work of the ZFI; nor was it suitable as a figurehead, since its members were not famous enough.

In the late 1970s/early 1980s, initiatives like the foundation of the ZFI were not unusual. Another example was the Institut für Demokratieforschung (Institute for Democracy Research) in Würzburg, which was established by the CSU-affiliated sociologist Lothar Bossle and had already published some of Schickel's work.[94] The contemporary history working group of the Katholisches Bildungswerk Ingolstadt,[95] which Schickel had led since 1974, provided a certain organizational basis for the new project, as well as a small team of activists. Furthermore, the initiators could count on a core audience with an interest in history who had barely any alternatives in a city lacking academic historical scholarship. Initially the ZFI became visible by staging regular events, including autumn and spring meetings, which were to grow into small conferences. One of the first events in this format was held on November 12/13, 1982 in the conference room of the municipal theater. A welcoming speech by Mayor Schnell was followed by three presentations on World War II, occupation policy, and expulsion. The first was given by former federal minister Theodor Oberländer, who had been repeatedly harshly criticized on account of his Nazi past.[96] The annual program for 1985/86 included an autumn event on "German-Soviet relations, 1939–1969" and a spring conference on "Germany and her neighbors on the eve of World War II"; in addition, there were several individual presentations and a "symposium" in February 1986 on "contemporary history and television: experiences and opportunities."[97]

Furthermore, Schickel and his ZFI secured the publication of essays, papers, presentations, and smaller studies, which they either placed in obscure venues

or published privately. In 1985, an opportunity apparently arose for the ZFI to publish its own series with Ullstein, or rather Herbig. The person behind this project, which caused "open rebellion" among Ullstein employees and was also anxiously followed by the Institute for Contemporary History, was the publisher Herbert Fleissner.[98] The latter was connected to Schickel through the Sudeten German *Landsmannschaft*. Since the ZFI did not see itself as capable of regularly publishing "Materialien zur Zeitgeschichte" (Materials on Contemporary History), this series was neither successful nor long-lived. The volume of source material *Aus den Archiven* (From the Archives), an unannotated and poorly introduced collection of documents of US origin from the years 1939 to 1945 published by Herbig, with which the ZFI wanted to present itself as an "unbiased institute of historical scholarship," was likewise a flash in the pan.[99]

Although a friend of the institute bragged that the ZFI was well on the way to "growing into a serious rival" to the contemporary history establishment,[100] the reality was different. At its core the ZFI was a one-man operation without an infrastructure. For years its registered office was located in a building next to Schickel's home and it had no further facilities, so it had to rely on event venues owned by the municipality or the Catholic Church. The ZFI's "research associates," of whom there were at least twenty-two, according to an overview from 1985, could hardly reckon with any remuneration for their work, which in any case was generally limited to individual projects. Nevertheless, it is worth taking a brief look at this list.[101] A noticeable concentration on the military and diplomatic history of World War II (with contributions by Dietrich Aigner, Hans Heinrich Düsel, Heinz Magenheimer, Timothy P. Mulligan, and Hans Roschmann) comes as no surprise in light of the importance the ZFI attached to these topics. Neither does the inclusion of the history of displacement and expulsion represented by Heinz Nawratil, who would later join the executive board of the ZFI. In contrast, one would not necessarily expect to find Fritz Tobias, the militant publicist on matters concerning the Reichstag fire, among the supporters of the ZFI.[102] Like Schickel, Tobias was an intractable outsider. The ZFI also attracted ethnonationalist German activists such as Andreas Wesserle from Milwaukee,[103] as well as former Nazis such as Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service, SD) employee and SS-Hauptsturmführer Helmut J. Fischer[104] and medical doctor and chemist Ernst-Günther Schenck. To put it bluntly, Schenck was a Nazi perpetrator. He had worked as a food inspector in the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office and as an inspector for troop catering and nutrition in the armed forces high command. He had also participated in experiments on humans in concentration camps. As a Soviet

prisoner of war, he was initially given the death sentence and then condemned to twenty-five years in a labor camp. He only returned to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955.[105] However, it was no secret to the responsible parties in the ZFI with whom they were dealing, as Schenck pursued an intensive publication program and justified his past publicly, and indeed in a manner that was entirely in keeping with the ZFI's line.[106]

Until now little was known about how many members the ZFI had,[107] but if the sources are to be believed, in the 1980s and 1990s the history association and its leaders exerted an appeal that should not be underestimated. Thirty-four people participated in the founding meeting in November 1981.[108] Just under a year later the membership had grown to a still modest forty-nine men and women.[109] Yet by December 1987, Schickel was already hoping that the following year he would be able to welcome the 200th member,[110] and by the time the ZFI celebrated its tenth anniversary, in May 1991, the chair announced that its membership "had exceeded 500."[111] It continued to grow markedly until the end of the decade. The report for the years 1997 to 1999 recorded "approx. 750 members."[112] These can be roughly classified into three groups. The first was recruited from Schickel's network in the Ingolstadt region and was rooted in the Catholic-conservative milieu in which the historian was well known, not least as head of the Katholisches Bildungswerk Ingolstadt. This group not only comprised Schickel's reliable local followers, but also constituted something akin to the respectable face of the ZFI. The second group came from the ranks of the expellees and their associations, while the third was formed by activists and supporters from all over West Germany, who in particular shared the ZFI's apologetic-revisionist stance, sympathized with the New Right, or even subscribed to right-wing extremist ideology. This structure was not accidental. Schickel was eager to cultivate his "fellow sufferers,"[113] and during the ZFI's founding phase he was already corresponding with the lawyer and long-term member of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany) Wilhelm Stäglich, who is considered to be "one of the first Holocaust deniers" in the Federal Republic of Germany, and who had already been forced into early retirement in 1975 from his position as a judge at the fiscal court of Hamburg.[114]

Organized as a charitable registered association,[115] the ZFI relied on membership fees and donations. Heretofore it has not been possible to arrive at a reliable estimate of this income, but the financial reports for the years 1981 to 1992,[116] which are evaluated for the first time in this article, shed some light on this. According to these reports, the ZFI's income ranged between approximately 43,900 DM in 1982, the first full year of business, and approximately

125,750 DM in 1991. But it fluctuated wildly, making planning and projects difficult. The expenses ranged correspondingly between 33,300 DM in 1982 and 115,100 DM in 1991, whereby it is striking that the costs of administration, office supplies, academic literature, advertisements, paperwork, and business trips were considerably higher than the expenses for speakers or educational grants. In 1984, of a total expenditure of 53,000 DM, the ZFI spent only 3,900 DM on these items. Even considering that the majority of ZFI writings were self-published, which had an impact on the expense and cost structure that should not be underestimated, it is clear that the rudimentary setup in Ingolstadt consumed so much money that there was comparatively little left to support academic work, such as scholarships or project grants, or to stage events.

Initially the annual membership fee was 60 DM, later 80 DM,[117] but even in 1991, its best year, when the income from membership fees was 26,000 DM, these fees accounted for no more than 21 percent of the ZFI's total income. Where did the remaining money come from? Since the token fees for its publications generated barely over 10,000 DM, the remaining income must have been provided by donations, and these flowed abundantly from the very beginning. For 1982, the financial report recorded donations of 40,395 DM, which represented 92 percent of the ZFI's total income. In 1991, the peak year, the ZFI received donations of nearly 90,000 DM, and even in lean years, such as 1989, it never received less than 26,000 DM. To answer the question of where the donations came from, we are reliant on guesswork. However, one trail leads to Günther Kissel, a building contractor from Solingen and ZFI member from the very beginning.[118] Kissel was not just wealthy but was also considered a "right-wing extremist string-puller" who had contacts with David Irving. He was also a donor to right-wing extremist parties and revisionist history projects. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Kissel was similarly generous to the ZFI.[119]

Apart from an annual grant of 2,000 DM received from the city of Ingolstadt until the 1990s,[120] the ZFI received no public money. However, this 2,000 DM was not just a welcome boost to the association's bank account, it also had highly symbolic value for the ZFI and lent credibility to its respectable conservative facade. Gerda Büttner, a Social Democratic councillor in Ingolstadt, put it in a nutshell: "As far as I can tell, the ZFI with its 600 members and no doubt powerful supporters doesn't need our money. Our grant serves solely as a respectable-democratic alibi that it can use for external promotion."[121]

Therefore, the ZFI, while more than just a Potemkin village, was still far from a viable academic institution. However, Schickel knew how to gloss over this fact. He made waves in the journalistic community, got the ZFI attention

in the national press,[122] argued with prominent opponents (revealing an arrogant and aggressive self-assurance), cited employees who in practice only existed on paper, and did not shy away from making political threats that had varying degrees of impact.[123]

The "findings" of Schickel and his ZFI have already been critically assessed in other places.[124] They can be summarized as follows. Although his manifest efforts to reinterpret recent German history and to construct a "counternarrative"[125] went far, at times even very far, they nearly always maintained links to established historiography. In the 1980s, the speakers and authors at the ZFI tested the limits of what could be said, for example when they attempted to question the authenticity of the Wannsee Protocol[126] or to underestimate the number of murdered Jews.[127] However, they never openly denied the Holocaust and avoided the danger of "such a rampage against reality."[128] Therefore, Schickel never made use of texts like the Leuchter Report by the American Holocaust denier Fred A. Leuchter. The ZFI was thus a hybrid, which remained compatible with both the New Right and the extreme right, without drifting all the way in the direction of the latter. For a long time that is where its significance lay.

Of the publications by the ZFI, only one was of historiographical value. Wolfgang Hänel's critical investigation of the sources, published in 1984, revealed Hermann Rauschning's *Gespräche mit Hitler* (Conversations with Hitler) to be a fake. This assertion had been presented to the public one year earlier at the invitation of the ZFI.[129] Despite this success, the ZFI never broke free of its image as a pariah among professional historians, eyed critically by the academic community and occasionally drawing political opposition, but not taken seriously academically.[130] Yet Schickel desired nothing more fervently than recognition, to be treated on equal terms, and to receive applause.[131] Since, however, his colleagues from the historical establishment denied him all of this, his need for admiration tended to be expressed in the form of combative and bitter rhetoric. At the same time, he was growing more susceptible to flattering advances from the revisionist right, to which he repeatedly proffered himself as an ally. In 1981/82, when the famous BR journalist Franz Schönhuber came in for increasingly harsh criticism on account of his autobiographical book *Ich war dabei* (I Was There), in which he described his time as a soldier in the Waffen SS far too defiantly and uncritically,[132] Schickel wrote a letter to BR's director Reinhold Vöth in which he expressed his concern over the "intensifying smear campaign" against Schönhuber. Schickel, on the other hand, as a "historian of contemporary German history," considered the book to be "one of the most revealing contemporary testimonies from that time."[133]

Schönhuber returned the favor by allowing Schickel to speak at length on Bavarian television, where he sought to drum up support for his work.[134] The tone of the seven-minute interview between the BR journalist and his guest was decidedly respectable-conservative, avoided the kind of vociferous or even polemical statements that they had both been known to make in other contexts, and clearly addressed the mainstream audience of the series *Land und Leute*. It is striking that Schickel did not mention the ZFI in a single word and instead presented himself as a modest but eager worker in Clio's vineyard, pointing the way to new topics and sources for his somewhat lethargic and self-satisfied colleagues. Only at two points in the interview might critical viewers have pricked up their ears. The first was when Schickel, quoting an eyewitness, praised how well Polish officers had been treated while being held as POWs by the Germans, thus furthering the cliché of the "clean" Wehrmacht. The second was at the end of the interview, when he spoke of his fate as an expellee. Neither of these topics was controversial for a large part of the audience. On the contrary, Schickel could count on precisely these two points being received with sympathetic interest by the viewers.

Although Schönhuber and Schickel largely shared a common approach to contemporary history, Schickel did not align himself politically with Schönhuber, who in 1983 was one of the most prominent founders of the far-right Republikaner party. Schickel remained rooted in the CSU milieu in Ingolstadt and, unlike his colleague Diwald, did not become involved in the New Right's "Deutschlandrat" (Council of Germany) or in any party-political organization to the right of the right-wing fringe of the CSU. Not that this prevented Schickel's books from being advertised in the Republikaner party newspaper or his being co-opted as an ally for a cultural struggle under right-wing auspices.[135] Throughout his life, Schickel insisted (even to himself) that the ZFI and his own speeches and writings served only the noble goal of scholarship, refusing to admit that, in their genetic matrix, historiography and an apologetic-revisionist politics of history were inextricably interwoven. This propensity to engage in self-deception sometimes even led him to deny reality, for example, when he declared that he had never written for right-wing extremist journals.[136] This was plainly untrue. Since the mid-1980s, he had, in fact, published his essays almost exclusively in New Right and extreme right-wing periodicals, such as *Criticón*, *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, *MUT*, and *Junge Freiheit*, or else in books published by the infamous Hohenrain publishing house.[137] This development was, if nothing else, a consequence of the fact that Schickel's publication options had markedly decreased following his full-blown attacks on the historical establishment and following

the foundation of the ZFI. Even the *Bayernkurier*, which was notorious for its crude views on the politics of history, now rejected his articles, as did political education media, in which as a history teacher he previously always had been able to publish.[138] Moreover, the *Donau-Kurier*, the newspaper published in his hometown, likewise ceased to provide a publication platform after the political shift of the late 1980s/early 1990s.[139] The most painful blow, however, came when newspapers such as the *FAZ* and the *Rheinische Merkur/Christ und Welt* began to give him the cold shoulder, having previously offered him a broad audience, renown, and self-confidence in equal measure. Yet it did not come out of nowhere that Schickel was largely finished by 1983. Institutions, historians, and archivists whom he had attacked, or whose reputations he had damaged, were now defending themselves both openly and behind the scenes, and this was what brought about his decline.

A Form of Love-Hate Relationship: Schickel and the Institute for Contemporary History from 1968 to 1981

Schickel's complicated relationship with the Institute for Contemporary History began shortly after he had completed his doctorate and gone into teaching. Within ten years, his hopes had given way to a deep-seated aversion, which was restoked many times by his bitterness at being ignored by his colleagues in Munich. It all began with a manuscript for the *VfZ* about the "Comintern and Germany" that Schickel offered the journal, at the same time implying that he could also provide other contributions, for example on the role of treason in World War II or on the relationship between the Wehrmacht and the SS in the Nazi state.[140] When the editors told him the essay did not satisfy the academic standards of the journal, Schickel refused to be discouraged.[141] Instead, he used the opportunity to initiate contact with Helmut Krausnick, who had become director of the Institute for Contemporary History in 1959,[142] and through this channel attempted to place an essay about the Munich Agreement in the *VfZ*, which was likewise rejected.[143]

A pattern was already becoming clear, one that was repeated regularly in the correspondence over the following years. Regardless of whom Schickel was dealing with at the Institute for Contemporary History, he used an inappropriately familiar tone, took it for granted that he was on a par with his interlocutor, contacted the institute's employees in writing to solicit one-on-one conversations, and sought to shine by name-dropping or providing minor tidbits of information. He frequently enclosed offprints of his writings, copies of his newspaper articles, or positive reviews of institute publications, seeking

to present himself in a favorable light even when communications with the institute had clearly deteriorated.[144] However, more than anything, he asked questions—questions which those to whom they were addressed often found odd or embarrassing because of the naive ignorance they revealed. His questions were generally very broadly formulated, concerned complex matters, or sought clear answers to specific problems that researchers had yet to clarify. Answering them thus required a great deal of time and effort. What is more, Schickel's questions about history were increasingly politically loaded, for example, when he sought to enter into an exchange with Hermann Graml about the number of Jewish victims of National Socialism. Graml replied that he did not want to sink to the depths of "the artistry of subtraction."[145] Regarding the number of Polish victims of World War II, Martin Broszat had already cautioned against making the "mistake of apologetic number reduction, at almost any price."[146]

Schickel had hoped for considerably more from his repeated advances than a casual correspondence that failed to advance beyond polite, businesslike answers and more or less detailed factual information, especially as he is unlikely to have missed the tone of mild condescension that could frequently be read between the lines. However, the break did not come until 1978/79. The starting point was a correspondence between Schickel and Wolfgang Jacobmeyer that discussed, among other things, the treatment of Polish prisoners of war in German custody. Jacobmeyer warned Schickel against using individual, inadequately documented cases as counterarguments to disprove or to relativize the Nazi policies of Germanization and extermination in occupied Poland.[147] Yet Schickel did exactly that after finding the biography of former marine officer and electrical engineer Jerzy Lubelfeld. How could it be, Schickel asked, that Lubelfeld had taught at a "camp university" when it was otherwise always maintained that "the Polish intelligentsia had been persecuted and liquidated?"[148] From then on Schickel used the ploy of hyping actual or alleged contradictions, or triumphantly insisting that the opposing side had got its facts wrong, in order to cast doubt on research findings regarding the military and extermination policy of the Nazi regime and to discredit the Institute for Contemporary History, which he "no longer [regarded as] an infallible authority."[149]

In the late 1970s, the world of contemporary history research was still small, so Schickel's attempts to play off institutions and colleagues against each other quickly became known.[150] Therefore, Ino Arndt, a research associate at the Institute for Contemporary History, took the first opportunity to tell him that the institute "would not have time [to answer] his queries in the future,"

no matter whether Schickel asked them in a private capacity, via the Catholic education center, or through his contemporary history working group.[151] She enclosed a leaflet advising him that the Institute for Contemporary History reserved the right to answer queries of a particular character only partially or simply by pointing to the pertinent research literature; in certain circumstances it could also fully refrain from "answering queries."[152] Schickel was not prepared to accept this brusque rejection, which became the subject of a heated correspondence with the director of the institute, Martin Broszat.[153]

Nevertheless, despite all his accusations, invectives, and threats, Schickel always tried to keep his options open, hoping that he might still receive the accolade of collegial acceptance. However, his aggressive language and both publicly and privately voiced accusations against the "Institute for Contemporary History" (which he had been writing in quotation marks since 1978) meant that his attempts to restore communication with Martin Broszat[154] and Hermann Graml were doomed to fail from the start. It was Graml, the managing editor of the *VfZ* at the time, who finally drew the line in October 1980, when he confronted Schickel with his publications in right-wing extremist periodicals and asked him bluntly to comment on them before a further exchange of opinions would be possible.[155] This unmasking prompted Schickel, who had long since become aligned with Hellmut Diwald's revisionist positions, to launch an even more furious campaign against the Institute for Contemporary History, which Schickel regarded as a bastion of a politically motivated historiography beholden to the victors of World War II. From this campaign it was then just a small step to the foundation of the ZFI. Schickel's attacks, which could be read in the *FAZ*, for instance, remained without a public riposte. Those in charge at the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich thought the best strategy to put Schickel, the high school teacher from Ingolstadt, in his place was to ignore him and not to give his crude theories (which were certainly deemed dangerous) any more publicity than absolutely necessary.[156]

Interventions from the Federal Archives

The Institute for Contemporary History was not Schickel's only port of call[157] and not the only institution with which he acquainted himself using a mixture of courtship and aggressive communication. It was no coincidence that he contacted the Federal Archives (alongside the Military Archive), but simply a logical step. The document repositories in Koblenz and Freiburg, containing the historical memory of the Federal Republic, and as the institutions where

official documents of the National Socialist era and World War II were housed, exercised an almost irresistible allure over Schickel. The Federal Archives and the Institute for Contemporary History had been linked for a long time, not only through joint projects but also institutionally through the Federal Archives president's membership on the Academic Advisory Board of the institute. In addition, the heads of both establishments—Martin Broszat and Hans Booms—had both completed their PhDs under Theodor Schieder and had a close personal relationship.[158] However, to the uninitiated, including Schickel, this network of collegial contacts and friendly connections was usually not evident, at least at first glance.

Schickel initially sought contact with the Federal Archives at a time when his conflict with the Institute for Contemporary History was heading toward its first climax. Even a brief examination of the Federal Archives' correspondence with and about Schickel reflects Schickel's familiar methods of argumentation and patterns of behavior, but also differences in the dynamics of the communication, owing not least to the missions of the Federal Archives and the Institute for Contemporary History. While the institute could not permanently avoid a dispute with Schickel over substantive issues, the Federal Archives had the option of withdrawing from such a dispute with the excuse that the "interpretation" of the "archival materials" held there was "a matter for the user and not for the archivists at the Federal Archives."[159] In fact, the tone between Schickel—who could initially have been mistaken for just one, rather quirky, user among many—and his interlocutors remained businesslike or even friendly for a long time. However, it did not alter the fact that here, too, Schickel was also trying to take a mile when given an inch, and that he was clearly seeking material to support his apologetic-revisionist theories. He even managed to arrange a meeting with President Booms and Josef Henke, the department head responsible for written and printed Nazi Party material. This meeting took place in Koblenz on July 18, 1980.

It was only then that the wind started to change direction, for a number of reasons. First, Schickel's behavior was found to be presumptuous and overbearing, and his writings were now being followed increasingly critically.[160] Moreover, his attempts to portray colleagues from the Institute for Contemporary History, such as Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, in a bad light backfired. Second, Schickel did not make any friends with his emphatic reports from the US National Archives in Washington that explicitly or implicitly portrayed contemporary historians and archivists in the Federal Republic as ignorant or at least unprofessional.[161] And third, requests from Schickel (and after May 1981 from the ZFI) to the Federal Archives for information, research, and copies of

files became increasingly detailed, complex, and demanding in tone. By October 1981 the point had been reached when the Federal Archives not only referred Schickel to the rules set out in the user regulations, which applied to both him and the ZFI, but also explained that "elaborate searches" could "not be performed as part of the [Archives'] normal service" but would have to be "carried out by your employees or you yourself."[162]

This response was clearly such an affront to Schickel that he did what until then he had only threatened to do: he played the political card and got Horst Seehofer to intervene. In 1980, Seehofer (a future Minister-President of the State of Bavaria) had been elected to the Bundestag for the first time as a CSU candidate for the Ingolstadt constituency, and Schickel nonchalantly declared him to be an "employee of our research center."[163] However, Booms, the top archivist in the Federal Republic, did not allow himself to be intimidated by an inexperienced member of the Bundestag. It was with clear pleasure that Booms gave him a lesson in archival practice, and even after Seehofer tried several times, both in person and in writing, to intercede on behalf of his party colleague from his home town, the archivist refused to budge from his decision not to grant Schickel and the ZFI preferential treatment.[164] Ultimately, Schickel achieved the opposite of what he had set out to accomplish: he turned the person whom he had wanted to instrumentalize for his own purposes against him. Although his queries were still processed in Koblenz and Freiburg, he could no longer count on active support, and the motto was "he should kindly perform his own searches."[165]

Furthermore, publications by and about Schickel were now watched with closer attention, and his connection with periodicals on the right of the spectrum of opinion was now becoming increasingly noticed.[166] His articles about contemporary history in leading newspapers, such as the *FAZ*, were a particular thorn in the side of the Federal Archives' directors. When in a letter to the editor the young historian Rainer A. Blasius harshly criticized Schickel's *FAZ* article on how the Roosevelt administration had dealt with the secret additional protocol to the Hitler-Stalin Pact and accused the author of ignorance regarding the state of research, of obvious methodological deficits, and of a not particularly subtle tendency to relativize the responsibility of the Nazi regime for unleashing World War II,[167] it was decided in Koblenz that the time had come to take action. Josef Henke noted on a newspaper cutting that the *FAZ* would have to "consider the question" of when it would "finally" stop "granting the at best fourth-rate Mr. Schickel valuable space in its so renowned paper." And he added, "Marcel Reich-Ranicki on literature, Mr. Schickel on contemporary history . . . a greater discrepancy could not be imagined."[168]

One of Hans Booms's closest colleagues, archive director Klaus Oldenhage, thereupon put pen to paper and not only intimated what those at the Federal Archives thought of Schickel but also quietly informed Günter Gillessen at the *FAZ* of how American colleagues saw the history teacher from Ingolstadt, who repeatedly referred to them in his criticism of contemporary history research and archival practice in the Federal Republic of Germany.[169] When Gillessen thanked Oldenhage for his efforts on December 15, 1982, it was already known in Koblenz that Schickel's days as a writer for the *FAZ* were numbered. Andreas Hillgruber, a professor from Cologne, had intervened with the editorial committee of the *FAZ*, and written a "frank" letter to Joachim Fest, an editor of the newspaper, of which Hillgruber informed Henke, who also received a copy of Fest's answer from Frankfurt. The content of Fest's response was met with satisfaction in Koblenz. In the meantime, Fest explained, it had been possible to "adopt a formal publisher's resolution that in the future, articles by Alfred Schickel would not be published in any part of the newspaper." As a result, "this matter, which was both annoying and tiresome for the newspaper," was hopefully "finally over and done with."[170]

A few months later, the Federal Archives enjoyed another success that followed a similar pattern. This time it was occasioned by a review by Schickel in the weekly *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt* of the 1982 book *Vertreibungs-Verbrechen an Deutschen* (Expulsion Crimes Against Germans) by the lawyer, publisher, and ZFI activist Heinz Nawratil.[171] Schickel presented the familiar mélange of distorted facts, exaggerated claims, half-truths, victim narratives, and interpretations that could be read as apologetic-revisionist. This discussion caught the attention of Josef Henke, who ridiculed the fact that Schickel had accused the Federal Archives of keeping documents under wraps, and who also saw a need for action. President Booms was likewise of this opinion and directly approached *Rheinischer Merkur* editor-in-chief Alois Rummel with the objective of undermining Schickel in this case as well. In fact Rummel was contrite and declared that Schickel's assignment to review this book had been "a one-off."[172] And with that another door closed for Schickel and his ZFI, further limiting their sphere of action, visibility, and reach. It was only a few months later that Schickel learned what had gone on behind the scenes. He complained bitterly to the *FAZ* that the newspaper had dropped him and hushed up the work of the ZFI. In a more threatening tone, he announced that the paper would "in a few years regret" its change of course "toward fossilized contemporary history." Needless to say, Schickel's angry protest remained without consequence.[173]

The Institute for Contemporary History and the Overrated History Association from the Provinces, 1981 to 1989

While the Federal Archives' victory over Schickel, and therefore also over the ZFI, was a source of satisfaction in Koblenz, at the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich worries and misgivings were growing. This was not even necessarily because Alfred Schickel had let the whole world know how little he thought of the work of the "monopoly establishment" in Munich,[174] or because he was making life hard for its staff with his polemical letters. The reactions of the IfZ's employees differed depending on their temperament and degree of responsibility for the institution as a whole. The combative Ino Arndt, for example, repaid Schickel in kind with a good deal of irony.[175] Hermann Graml no longer deemed Schickel worth a response, which made the latter so angry that he once again threatened to pass "the whole correspondence to a member of the Bundestag" if the managing editor of the *VfZ* continued to remain silent.[176] Hermann Weiß, the deputy director of the IfZ archive, defended himself in his own way. He countered Schickel's attempts to play German and American archivists off against each other with a long letter to Robert Wolfe, the head of the Modern Military Branch of the US National Archives, whom Schickel was trying to co-opt for his own purposes. In his letter, Weiß condemned Schickel's "denunciation-like method" of inflating the importance of individual sources in order to fundamentally question research findings on Nazi military and extermination policy, and to create the impression that studies by "German contemporary historians had been drawn from a completely inadequate source base and were therefore probably even wrong."[177]

On behalf of the institute's management, Martin Broszat exercised patience for a long time and above all refrained from publicly countering Schickel's accusations, even though he was sometimes active behind the scenes.[178] But by May 1982, the point had been reached where Broszat not only began to defend himself brusquely against the shrill talk from Ingolstadt, but openly reproached Schickel for his publications in disreputable periodicals, as Graml had done two years prior. Broszat thus made it unmistakably clear that a dialogue of any kind was impossible.[179] Schickel and his ZFI had now been consigned to the ranks of right-wing extremist hardliners and revisionist history stooges. This was a subject of intense discussion at the Institute for Contemporary History in the early 1980s, as reflected, not least, in an attempt to establish a department at the institute devoted to studying right-wing extremism.[180]

Once this line had been drawn, the two parties spoke less with each other than about each other. Nevertheless, for a period of time in the first half of

the 1980s, Schickel and his ZFI progressed from revisionist nuisances to apparent giants in the politics of history, giving rise to what at first glance was a surprising degree of uncertainty at the Institute for Contemporary History. If one looks more closely, however, this temporary uncertainty becomes more understandable, and is attributable to three main factors. The first was the general sociocultural climate during this period of transition, when the new federal chancellor Helmut Kohl launched an offensive in the field of the politics of history that appeared to shift West Germany's contemporary history coordinates toward the national-conservative end of the spectrum.[181] Were there not forces at work here that, when push came to shove, would have placed the construction of a German identity above considerations of academic integrity? Did this not benefit revisionist upstarts à la Schickel, who under different auspices, and at the cost of established research institutions like the Institute for Contemporary History, could count on political support, financing, and public attention? The nascent alliance between Schickel's ZFI and Herbert Fleissner's publishing empire, which ultimately failed, appeared to confirm such fears in early 1985.[182]

Second, there was also the perceived party-political congruence among the most important financiers of the foundation that supported the Institute for Contemporary History. A Christian Democrat-Liberal coalition government was in power at the federal level, while in Bavaria the CSU ruled with an uncontested absolute majority. In particular, the "CSU state"[183] under Franz Josef Strauß, with his "modern combat unit of aggressive national conservatism" behind it,[184] was considered to be capable of getting away with pretty much anything. This sentiment was felt not just at the Institute for Contemporary History, but also among civil servants in the Bavarian Ministry of Culture, who dealt with the institute and were well disposed toward it. The fact that Schickel used every opportunity to show off his political contacts, and that Alfred Seidl, a former top politician in the Bavarian CSU, was clearly a supporter of the ZFI only served to increase these fears. In March 1983, Ministerial Councilor Helmut Kreutzer made it plain to Martin Broszat that "something [must] happen" in the "Schickel case," especially given that, as a history teacher, Schickel was relentlessly urging school textbooks to be rewritten according to his beliefs.[185] However, since the Ministry of Culture did not have any leverage (Schickel was not working for the state), the Institute for Contemporary History was urged to "take the initiative" and publicly "shred to pieces" Schickel's theories from an academic point of view, and Broszat was urged to intervene with the Ministry of Culture. At the same time, the CSU "needed to

be brought to the realization that it would be backing the wrong horse" were it to award money to Schickel and the ZFI.

In fact nothing came of this offensive, not only because Broszat remained true to his strategy of keeping "the competing establishment in Ingolstadt" small by ignoring it,[186] but also because the Institute for Contemporary History felt exposed, vulnerable, and structurally weak, which is the third factor that might explain its insecurity. This feeling of vulnerability helps explain Broszat's repeated campaigns during the early years of the Kohl era against the "forced enthusiasm for history in the conservative camp of the Federal Republic of Germany," which he saw as having a whitewashing and exonerating function with regard to the Nazi period.[187] For Broszat, the spokesman "for the 'liberal' faction of German historians," the fear of strong political headwinds did not appear unfounded, since it might have had an impact not only on him personally but also on the institute.[188] This went hand in hand with a feeling of structural weakness. The IfZ had grown vastly since the 1970s, but it had not yet completed its "second formative phase."[189] The necessary "goodwill from the supervisory committees" regarding decisions on budget and staff could not be taken for granted. Furthermore, in a time of funding shortages, there was growing competition from universities, which one by one were establishing chairs for contemporary history.

Klaus-Dietmar Henke has described the Institute for Contemporary History of those years as a "family business," also referring to the flat hierarchies and the relatively undifferentiated structure of the institute's management level. For example, public relations work, which was of particular significance in the dispute with Schickel and the ZFI, was dealt with on the side, so to speak. By contrast, the Federal Archives as a government authority had formed a different self-understanding and a different organizational culture, which also allowed a more decisive reaction to the challenge from Ingolstadt.

However, by a certain point Broszat had also had enough. This point was reached in summer 1987, when there were rumors that Schickel was to receive the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany. Initially Broszat rejected a request from the government of Upper Bavaria to provide an opinion regarding this possibility, citing his own partiality.[190] However, he did answer a second request from the Bavarian Ministry of Science and Arts, and this time his evaluation was more than clear. He stated it was downright "irresponsible" to honor a man who espoused "clearly apologetic tendencies bordering on far-right extremism."[191] However, these warnings went unheeded, especially as the Ministry of Science did not offer any institutional leverage for an intervention, and the initiative for the award had not originated there. On April 13,

1989, at the suggestion of Bavarian minister-president Max Streibl, Schickel did, in fact, receive the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany for his alleged services to research in contemporary history and to political education.[192] The laudatory speech was delivered by the Bavarian minister for labor, family, and social order, whose ministry was traditionally particularly closely connected with the concerns of expellees and had therefore suggested the award. That a doctor of history, Gebhard Glück,[193] should have honored Schickel for his contribution "to seeking historical truth" and highlighted Schickel's attempts "to counter ignorance, prejudice, and disinformation"[194] is, in retrospect, hard to bear.

At the time the Order of Merit was awarded, in the final year of the Bonn Republic, the momentum that Schickel and his ZFI had attempted to use (ultimately in vain) was now almost gone. "Schimanski's decade"[195] (as the 1980s were known with reference to the most famous police inspector in the cult German crime series *Tatort*) had begun with a "wave of nostalgia," which was considered the "source of [this] political conservatism."[196] This type of nostalgia proved to be "politically explosive when it was directed toward the National Socialist period," as was shown, for example, in the politically charged debate around the meaning of the sudden growth of interest in Adolf Hitler.[197] This applied to the so-called New History movement, which was closely linked to alternative milieus and touched a sore spot in the superficially healed wounds of German historical memory. However, it also applied to Alfred Schickel and his ZFI, who, in the interest of national identity, wanted to avoid touching these wounds, particularly when it came to the Nazi war of extermination and genocide, and instead advocated "disposing of the German past."[198]

Admittedly these voices were finding fewer and fewer listeners, although even in 1989 Hermann Graml pessimistically noted that it was "unmistakable" that the "susceptibility of the Germans to apologetics" had increased "the more time having elapsed since the Third Reich."[199] Yet even then there were indications pointing in a different direction. A nascent generational change was responsible for this, as was the scandal about the fake Hitler diaries, the debate about the historical importance of May 8, 1945, and even the so-called *Historikerstreit* (historians' debate), which was not so much academically productive as it was "of considerable importance for public historical consciousness in the latter years of the Bonn Republic."[200] Research in contemporary history thereby successfully insisted "on its public competence over interpretation and production of meaning."[201] It did so at the expense of members of the generation who lived through Nazism and World War II who had their own opinions about history, representatives of the media, or ideological historians,

such as Alfred Schickel, who found himself more and more on the far right of the discourse about contemporary history. In addition, remembering the Holocaust was increasingly becoming a matter of transnational importance,[202] with research and debates that influenced and changed the (West) German viewpoint in a sustained way. The hopes and fears that had been generated by Helmut Kohl's alleged "turn in the politics of the past" at the start of the 1980s "ultimately did not prove justified."[203] However, a point had been reached where established institutions, such as the Institute for Contemporary History and the Federal Archives, could draw a line under the history of the ZFI. Whatever direction the history association from Ingolstadt might have taken subsequently is another story that does not need to be told here.

Notes

Translation by Catherine Venner

1. "Verfassungsschutz muss Bericht für 2019 einstampfen," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, July 23, 2020.

2. See Bavarian State Ministry for Internal Affairs, Sport, and Integration, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2019* (Munich: self-pub., 2020), 180–82; the quotations are on p. 180.

3. According to para. 2 of the ZFI charter, accessed on August 2, 2023, https://www.zfi-ingolstadt.de/downloads/satzung-zfi.pdf.

4. BeckRS 2020, 36397: judgment of the Munich Administrative Court (M 30 K 19.5902) from July 17, 2020. The written statement of grounds for the judgment on December 15, 2020, can be found on the ZFI website, accessed on August 2, 2023, https://www.zfi-ingolstadt.de/downloads/rechtliche-klarstellungen-und-urteil-vg-muench.pdf.

5. See the press release issued by the ZFI executive board dated July 23, 2020, https://www.zfi-ingolstadt.de/downloads/presseerklaerung-zfi-2020-07-23.pdf.

6. "Die Gesinnung ist frei. Urteil: Das Verwaltungsgericht München setzt Bayerns Verfassungsschutz Grenzen," *Junge Freiheit*, January 8, 2021; quotation from Gernot Facius, ZFI chair from 2016 to 2021.

7. "Verwaltungsgericht stoppt bayerischen Verfassungsschutz," *Junge Freiheit*, July 23, 2020, https://jungefreiheit.de/politik/deutschland/2020/verwaltungsgericht-stoppt-bayerischen-verfassungsschutz/.

8. According to the title of an online report by the Staats- und Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft (Hamburg) dated January 21, 2021, https://www.swg-mobil.de/2021/01/21/schlappe-fuer-csu-schlapphuete/.

9. "Gericht stoppt bayerischen Verfassungsschutzbericht," *BR 24 (Bayern)*, July 22, 2020; copy in the author's possession. Robert Andreasch, an expert on right-wing extremism, is quoted.

10. "Bayerns Verfassungsschutzbericht darf nicht mehr verbreitet werden," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 22, 2020.

11. See Thomas Lindenberger and Martin Sabrow, eds., *German Zeitgeschichte: Konturen eines Forschungsfeldes* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016); Maximilian Kutzner, "Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte und die Affäre um die gefälschten Hitler-Tagebücher 1982/83," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 71, no. 3 (July 2023): 599–631, here 603–16.

12. For a general account of German history policy in this period, see Edgar Wolfrum, *Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Der Weg zur bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung 1948–1990* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1999). On how German historians addressed the Nazi era, antisemitism, and the Holocaust, see Nicolas Berg, *Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker: Erforschung und Erinnerung* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), and the overview in Peter Longerich, *Antisemitismus: Eine deutsche Geschichte; Von der Aufklärung bis heute* (Munich: Siedler, 2021), 384–401.

13. See, for example, Wolfgang Hardtwig, *Geschichtskultur und Wissenschaft* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1990).

14. See Martin Sabrow, Ralph Jessen, and Klaus Große Kracht, eds., *Zeitgeschichte als Streitgeschichte: Große Kontroversen nach 1945* (Munich: Beck, 2003).

15. Gideon Botsch provides an overview in *Die extreme Rechte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis heute* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2012).

16. Matthias Horx, *Die wilden Achtziger: Eine Zeitgeist-Reise durch die Bundesrepublik* (Munich: Hanser, 1987), 17.

17. See Frank Bösch, "Die CDU und der rechte Rand: Zeithistorische Perspektiven," *ZeitRäume* (2018): 33–42.

18. See Josefine Preißler, "Das Studienzentrum Weikersheim 1979–1989: Ein konservativer Think Tank?" (master's thesis, Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, 2022).

19. See Moritz Fischer, "Die Neue Rechte im letzten Jahrzehnt der Bonner Republik: Armin Mohler, Franz Schönhuber, Hellmut Diwald und die Gründung des 'Deutschlandrats' 1983," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 71, no. 1 (January 2023): 111–53.

20. Armin Pfahl-Traughber, "Brücken zwischen Rechtsextremismus und Konservativismus: Zur Erosion der Abgrenzung auf publizistischer Ebene in den achtziger und neunziger Jahren," in *Rechtsextremismus: Einführung und Forschungsbilanz*, ed. Wolfgang Kowalsky and Wolfgang Schroeder (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994), 160–82, here 160.

21. Andreas Wirsching, *Abschied vom Provisorium 1982–1990: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2006), 470; an overview of "the Germans and their history" in the early Kohl years can be found at 466–91.

22. See Karin Priester, "Die Alternative für Deutschland," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 67, no. 3 (July 2019): 443–53, here 444.

23. Since the 1990s the ZFI has repeatedly been the subject of parliamentary questions; see, for example, Bundestags-Drucksache (hereafter BT-Drs.) 12/2148 dated February 21, 1992: parliamentary question from Ulla Jelpke and the PDS/Linke parliamentary group; BT-Drs. 12/4026 dated December 12, 1992: parliamentary question from Ulla Jelpke and the PDS/Linke parliamentary group; BT-Drs. 13/6067 dated November 6, 1996: parliamentary question from Ulla Jelpke and the PDS parliamentary group; BT-Drs. 14/3234 dated April 4, 2000: parliamentary question from Ulla Jelpke and the PDS parliamentary group; Landtags-Drucksache 15/7335: written question from Florian Ritter (SPD) dated December 12, 2006, and answer from the Bavarian Interior Ministry dated January 1, 2007.

24. Daniel T. Rodgers, *Age of Fracture* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2011).

25. This probably explains the multiple mistakes in Dominik Rigoll, "*Public History* von links nach rechts: Zur De:Nationalisierung des Zeithistorischen in Besatzungszeit und Bundesrepublik," in *Public Historians: Zeithistorische Interventionen nach 1945*, ed. Frank Bösch et al. (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2021), 88–105, here 100, according to which Schickel played no role; instead Franz Schönhuber was counted among the co-founders of the ZFI.

26. See "Der historischen Forschung dürfen keine Fesseln angelegt werden," *Die Aula*, July 2017.

27. See Bavarian State Ministry for Internal Affairs, Sport, and Integration, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2019*, 180.

28. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BArchK), B 198/4086, Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt, the director (signed Alfred Schickel) to the Federal Archives, May 13, 1981.

29. Excerpt from the register of associations at the Ingolstadt District Court (dated September 9, 2021), VR 566, fol. 1; according to this, the first charter was dated May 15, and the entry in the register of associations was dated June 30, 1982.

30. Matthias Schickel's private archive (hereafter PA-MS), Alfred Schickel Papers (hereafter Schickel Papers), ZFI newsletter, signed by Alfred Schickel, August 27, 1981; the following quotations are found ibidem. We would like to thank Matthias Schickel for granting us access to his father's remaining papers.

31. As per Gernot Facius in his foreword to *ZFI-Report: Dokumentation zur ZFI-Frühjahrstagung vom 3./4. Juni 2016*, Kleine Reihe, vol. 1 (Ingolstadt: self-pub., n.d.), 4–6, here 4.

32. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, ZFI newsletter, signed by Alfred Schickel, August 27, 1981.

33. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Program of the "conference" of the ZFI on November 20/21, 1981, in Ingolstadt; a list of those who attended the public event and the members' meeting is also found here.

34. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, "Minutes of the continued founding meeting" of the ZFI on November 21, 1981, and (on Tandetzke as CEO) "News from the institute," n.d. [1989].

35. Dr. Alfred Seidl (1911–93), lawyer; joined the NSDAP (the Nazi Party) in 1937; member of the Bavarian parliament (CSU), 1958–86; state secretary in the Bavarian Justice Ministry, 1974–77; Bavarian interior minister, 1977–78.

36. See Alfred Seidl, *Der verweigerte Friede: Deutschlands Parlamentär Rudolf Hess muß schweigen* (Frankfurt a. M.: Ullstein, 1986); the book appeared in the series Herbig-Materialien zur Zeitgeschichte published by the ZFI.

37. Biographical information found in Munzinger Online/Personen—Internationales Biographisches Archiv, accessed August 3, 2023, https://www.munzinger.de/document/00000015483; Roland Gehrke, "Nationalkonservative Historiographie im geteilten Deutschland: Das Wallensteinbild bei Hellmut Diwald," in *Wallensteinbilder im Widerstreit: Eine historische Symbolfigur in Geschichtsschreibung und Literatur vom 17. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Joachim Bahlcke and Christoph Kampmann (Cologne: Böhlau, 2011), 331–48; Günther R. Mittler, *Geschichte im Schatten der Mauer: Die bundesdeutsche Geschichtswissenschaft und die deutsche Frage 1961–1989* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2012), 168–69, 185–87.

38. See Hellmut Diwald, *Das historische Erkennen: Untersuchungen zum Geschichtsrealismus im 19. Jahrhundert* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1955).

39. See Hellmut Diwald, *Wilhelm Dilthey: Erkenntnistheorie und Philosophie der Geschichte* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1963).

40. See Hellmut Diwald, *Wallenstein: Eine Biographie* (Munich: Bechtle, 1969).

41. Biographical information found in PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Obituary for Alfred Schickel (Nadira Hurnaus, *Sudetendeutsche Zeitung*); Konrad Löw, "Dr. Alfred Schickel—Historiker und Patriot: Würdigung des verstorbenen ZFI-Gründers," *ZFI-Report* 1: 7–16; Munzinger Online/Personen—Internationales Biographisches Archiv, accessed August 3, 2023, https://www.munzinger.de/document/00000016796. See also Susanne Greiter, *Flucht und Vertreibung im Familiengedächtnis: Geschichte und Narrativ* (Munich: Herbert Utz Verlag, 2014), 96–104, 226–30; Alfred Schickel can be easily recognized as the interviewee behind the pseudonym Siegfried Tautermann.

42. See Alfred Schickel, "Die Repetundensummen in Ciceros Verrinen" (PhD diss., Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, 1966).

43. Wolfgang Wippermann, "Verdiente Revisionisten: Alfred Schickel und die 'Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt (ZFI)'," in *Die selbstbewußte Nation und ihr Geschichtsbild: Geschichtslegenden der Neuen Rechten—Faschismus/Holocaust/Wehrmacht*, ed. Johannes Klotz and Ulrich Schneider (Cologne: PapyRossa, 1997), 78–95, here 81.

44. See "Adolf Hitler als Ideologe," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 12, 1971, and "Ein halbes Jahrhundert deutscher Katholizismus," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 10, 1979.

45. See, for example, "Verurteilt mit Julius Leber," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, November 30/December 1, 1974, and "Nachrichtenhelferin mit Freundin," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 4, 1976.

46. The first of ten manuscripts for BR on June 6, 1970, dealt with the "Komintern und Deutschland" (Comintern and Germany); his last, on August 13, 1985, bore the title "Anmerkungen zum 'Haus der Deutschen Geschichte'" (Notes on the 'house of German history'). We would like to thank Sandra Leibner from BR's historical archive for her friendly communications on June 23 and 25, 2021.

47. For example, the archive of the Institute for Contemporary History (hereafter IfZ-Archiv), ID 103/169, fol. 97, Helmut Krausnick to Alfred Schickel, August 3, 1971.

48. See, for example, Alfred Schickel, "Völkerbund—Friedenshoffnung der Väter: Zur Gründung des Völkerbundes vor 50 Jahren," *Politische Studien* 20 (1969): 693–99.

49. See "Umsturz auf Staatskosten?," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 17, 1977.

50. On the framework conditions, see Andreas Kossert, *Kalte Heimat: Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945* (Bonn: Siedler, 2015), 71–86, and Thomas Schlemmer, *Industriemoderne in der Provinz: Die Region Ingolstadt zwischen Neubeginn, Boom und Krise 1945 bis 1975* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009).

51. See, for example, Wolfgang Wippermann, "Der Neffe des Kardinals," *Der Freitag*, November 18, 2012.

52. See Volker Zimmermann, "Geschichtsbilder sudetendeutscher Vertriebenenorganisationen und 'Gesinnungsgemeinschaften,'" *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 53, no. 10 (October 2005): 912–24, and Kossert, *Kalte Heimat*, 176–85.

53. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Hellmut Diwald to Alfred Schickel, November 16, 1988, and his letter of reply, November 18, 1988.

54. See Hellmut Diwald, *Die Anerkennung: Bericht zur Klage der Nation* (Munich: Bechtle, 1970).

55. See Alfred Schickel, "Das Münchner Abkommen: Vorgeschichte, Inhalt und Problematik," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 26 (1971): 3–30.

56. See Alfred Schickel, "Das Münchener Abkommen im Lichte amerikanischer Geheimdokumente: Beweise zur Rechtmäßigkeit des Anschlusses des Sudetenlandes," *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart* 32, no. 3 (1984): 6–9.

57. Alfred Schickel, *Zeitgeschichte am Scheidewege: Anspruch und Mängel westdeutscher Zeitgeschichte* (Würzburg: Naumann, 1981), 34.

58. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, 1981–2006, 25 Jahre Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt: Eine Erinnerung im Zwiegespräch. See also "Keine Angst vor der 'Revisionismus-Keule': Aula Gespräch mit dem ZFI-Mitbegründer Dr. Alfred Schickel zum 80. Geburtstag," *Die Aula*, June 2013; in a similar vein, Schickel's successor Gernot Facius in "Der historischen Forschung dürfen keine Fesseln angelegt werden," *Die Aula*, July 2017.

59. See Lutz Raphael, *Geschichtswissenschaft im Zeitalter der Extreme: Theorien, Methoden, Tendenzen von 1900 bis zur Gegenwart*, 2nd rev. ed. (Munich: Beck, 2010), 247–51; Gabriele Metzler, *Der Staat der Historiker: Staatsvorstellungen deutscher Historiker seit 1945* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2018), 162–97; Thomas Welskopp, "Identität ex negativo: Der 'deutsche Sonderweg' als Metaerzählung in der bundesdeutschen Geschichtswissenschaft der siebziger und achtziger Jahre," in *Die historische Meistererzählung: Deutungslinien der deutschen Nationalgeschichte nach 1945*, ed. Konrad H. Jarausch and Martin Sabrow (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002), 109–39.

60. Hans Rothfels, "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1, no. 1 (January 1953): 1–8, here 2. See the English translation in this volume.

61. See Andreas Wirsching, "Konsum statt Arbeit? Zum Wandel von Individualität in der modernen Massengesellschaft," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 57, no. 2 (April 2009): 171–99, here esp. 175–79.

62. Hellmut Diwald, "Geschichtsbild und Geschichtsbewußtsein im gegenwärtigen Deutschland," *Saeculum* 28, no. 1 (January 1977): 22–30, here 23. See also Wolfrum, *Geschichtspolitik*, 307–8.

63. Hellmut Diwald, *Geschichte der Deutschen* (Frankfurt a. M.: Propyläen Verlag, 1978), 18; the following quotations are found at 15, 164–65. In later editions, the section "Die Endlösung" (The Final Solution) was reworked and shortened. The fact that Propyläen Verlag took the first edition out of circulation and had it reworked was evaluated as follows by Schickel after Diwald's death: "The recall of the unsold copies and their pulping by the publisher appeared to mark the first 'shot' in the witch hunt against the author, which was soon followed by his professional 'coup de grâce.' The grinding and pulping mechanisms between which the several-hundred-page-long 'Geschichte der Deutschen' was destroyed reminded reflective contemporaries of the street fires of May 10, 1933." PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Alfred Schickel, "Hellmut Diwald und die deutsche Geschichtsschreibung," n.d. [1993].

64. Hermann Graml, "Alte und neue Apologeten Hitlers," in *Rechtsradikalismus: Rand-*

erscheinung oder Renaissance?, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1980), 98–126, here 124.

65. Jürgen Zarusky, "Die Leugnung des Völkermords: 'Revisionismus' als ideologische Strategie," in *Auf dem Weg zum Bürgerkrieg? Rechtsextremismus und Gewalt gegen Fremde in Deutschland*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 2001), 63–86, here 70.

66. See Armin Mohler, "Die Deutschen in der Mühle: Zum Stand der Vergangenheitsbewältigung nach 'Holocaust' und der Anti-Diwald-Kampagne," *Criticón*, no. 52 (1979): 55–59.

67. Alfred Schickel, "In honorem Hellmut Diwald," *Sudetenland* 21 (1979): 114–15, here 115.

68. In this regard and on the following, "Zeitgeschichte am Scheideweg," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 16, 1980; the article had previously appeared in the *Donau-Kurier* on September 25, 1979 ("Wissenschaft am Scheideweg") and as two installments in the *Bayernkurier* on November 10 and 17, 1979.

69. The last two quotations are taken from the extended version, which was published one year after the *FAZ* article; Schickel, *Zeitgeschichte am Scheidewege*, 8.

70. BArchK, B 198/4046, Alfred Schickel to the Federal Archives, February 2, 1980; Alfred Schickel to Hans Booms, April 11, 1980.

71. IfZ-Archiv, ID 5/4, fols. 73–74, Minutes of the 22nd meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Institute for Contemporary History, April 18, 1980.

72. "Konservativer Kalender," *Criticón*, no. 57 (1980): 37–39, here 38; the article is anonymous but presumably by Caspar von Schrenck-Notzing.

73. See "Wie deutsche Greuel erfunden wurden," *National-Zeitung*, December 21, 1979.

74. See Heinrich Härtle, "Lichtblicke in der Zeitgeschichte: Eine Zwischenbilanz von Dr. Alfred Schickel," *Klüter Blätter* 32, no. 9 (1981): 30–33; however, it cannot be ascertained whether Schickel and Irving had contact with each other.

75. See, for example, "Der Historiker Schickel und die Wahrheit: Entgegen seinen Angaben schrieb der Ingolstädter VHS-Dozent regelmäßig in rechtsgerichteten Zeitschriften," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, March 28, 1995.

76. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Bishop Karl Braun to Alfred Schickel, July 5, 1990.

77. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Program for the celebration to mark the 25th anniversary of the Kameradschaft Regiment 63 (II./20) Ingolstadt/Neuburg e.V. on November 21, 1981; Schickel held the commemorative address on the subject of "We Germans and our Vaterland" following the founding meeting of the ZFI.

78. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Horst Seehofer to Alfred Schickel, October 30, 2006. It reads: "Please allow me to heartily congratulate you and the whole association on this proud anniversary. I am very impressed by the work you have done and am time and again amazed at what connections and occurrences have been brought to light here."

79. See "Ein Grußwort bringt OB Lehmann in die Kritik," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 30/31, 2006–January 1, 2007; "Applaus von der falschen Seite," *Donau-Kurier*, January 4, 2007.

80. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Bavarian Interior Ministry, signed by Ministerial Councillor Dr. Weber, to Alfred Schickel, August 17, 1998.

81. Peter Hoeres alludes to the "conservative outsider" Alfred Schickel as a *FAZ* reviewer in the circle of such famous university lecturers as Andreas Hillgruber, Kurt Sontheimer, and Michael Stürmer in *Zeitung für Deutschland: Die Geschichte der FAZ*, 2nd ed. (Munich: Benevento, 2019), 219.

82. In addition to the *FAZ* articles already cited, see also (with no claim to completeness): "War Preußen nur eine Armee? Deutsche Geschichte in amerikanischen Schulbüchern" (January 11, 1980); "Von befangenen Deutschen" (March 15, 1980); "Vorlesungen hielt auch der Oberleutnant Rapacki: Gefangene Polen in deutschen Offizierslagern—ein übersehenes Kapitel der Zeitgeschichte" (November 15, 1980); " 'Über die Gräber der Toten finden wir uns': Versöhnung zwischen Deutschen und Polen" (May 23, 1981); "Ein fast vergessener Primas: Kardinal August Hlond" (July 1, 1981); "Wie eine Presseerklärung zum Dokument wird: Vierzig Jahre Atlantik-Charta" (August 14, 1981); "Preußische Kirchenpolitik in Polen" (September 9, 1981); "Die Bundesrepublik und Polen: Eine Bilanz" (September 15, 1981); "Leiden auch nach dem Ende des Krieges: Das Schicksal der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen—Schikanen und Zwangsarbeit auch im Westen" (November 9, 1981).

83. See Peter Hoeres, "Von der 'Tendenzwende' zur 'geistig-moralischen Wende': Konstruktion und Kritik konservativer Signaturen in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 61, no. 1 (January 2013): 93–119.

84. On this topos, see Anna von der Goltz and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson, eds., *Inventing the Silent Majority in Western Europe and the United States: Conservatism in the 1960s and 1970s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

85. Schickel, *Zeitgeschichte am Scheidewege*, 34, 36.

86. For example, the collections of material in the IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/226 and ID 131/63.

87. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, "Minutes of the continued founding meeting" of the ZFI on November 21, 1981.

88. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Overview of the academic board, executive board, and membership of the ZFI, October 1, 1982.

89. Brauneder later joined the right-wing populist Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party), which he also represented in the Austrian parliament between 1994 and 1999. See "Wilhelm Brauneder: Ein Ex-FPÖ-Politiker als Leiter der blauen Kommission," *Die Presse*, February 13, 2018, https://www.diepresse.com/5371039/wilhelm-brauneder-ein-ex-fpoe-politiker-als-leiter-der-blauen-kommission.

90. See Gerhart Binder, *Epoche der Entscheidungen: Eine Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts mit Dokumenten in Text und Bild; Sonderausgabe*, 7th ed. (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1963). Binder's concept of a fact-oriented historiography that used a kind of collage of sources was very close to Schickel's approach.

91. Detlef Garbe, "Prof. Dr. Erich Schwinge: Der ehemalige Kommentator und Vollstrecker nationalsozialistischen Kriegsrechts als Apologet der Wehrmachtjustiz nach 1945," in *Mit reinem Gewissen: Wehrmachtrichter in der Bundesrepublik und ihre Opfer*, ed. Joachim Perels and Wolfram Wette (Berlin: Aufbau, 2011), 144–55; the quotations are at 140 and 143.

92. See Erich Schwinge, *Bilanz der Kriegsgeneration: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte unserer Zeit* (Marburg: Elwert, 1978).

93. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Progress report of the ZFI for 1997 to 1999, November 25, 2000.

94. See Alfred Schickel, *Geschichte ohne Zukunft: Geschichtslosigkeit—das Schicksal der kommenden Generation?* (Würzburg: Naumann, 1979). Schickel's *Zeitgeschichte am Scheidewege* was also accepted there.

95. This working group came into existence at the latest in early 1978: IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/124, Katholisches Bildungswerk Ingolstadt, working group for contemporary history, to the Institute for Contemporary History, February 3, 1978.

96. BArchK, B 198/4086, Invitation to and program of the ZFI's "Autumn conference" on November 12/13, 1982. Oberländer was scheduled to give a presentation on "NS-Volksgruppenpolitik und Abwehr II 1933–1945" (Nazi ethnic groups policy and Abwehr II, 1933–1945).

97. BArchK, B 162/31785, ZFI program for 1985/86; further programs and invitations to events can be found in PA-MS, Schickel Papers.

98. Hans Sarkowicz, "Publizistik in der Grauzone," in *Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik: Voraussetzungen, Zusammenhänge, Wirkungen*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1989), 93–107, here 105; also in this regard, IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/266, note by Norbert Frei for Martin Broszat, February 8, 1985.

99. See Alfred Schickel, ed., *Aus den Archiven: Funde der Zeitgeschichtlichen Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt 1981 bis 1992* (Munich: Herbig, 1993); the quotation from Schickel's short introduction is at 9.

100. Löw, "Schickel," 10.

101. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Overview of the academic board, executive board, and research associates of the ZFI, September 10, 1985.

102. Only after Tobias's death in 2011 were the accusations loudly voiced that he had been "mixed up in right-wing extremist circles." See Anton Maegerle, "Zweifelhafter Reichstagsbrandforscher Tobias verstorben," January 28, 2011, accessed August 24, 2023, https://web.archive.org/web/20120930045720/http://npd-blog.info/2011/01/28/zweifelhafter-reichstagsbrandforscher-tobias-verstorben.

103. See Andreas R. Wesserle, "Kulturträger oder Kulturdünger? Vier Jahrhunderte Deutschtum in Nordamerika," 3 parts, *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart* 32, no. 3 (1984): 28–32; no. 4 (1984): 23–26; 33, no. 1 (1985): 27–29.

104. See Helmut Joachim Fischer, *Erinnerungen*, 2 vols. (Ingolstadt: self-pub., Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt, 1984–85). Fischer's memoirs, in which he clearly shows his sympathies for Hitler and National Socialism, appeared as vol. 3 and vol. 6 of the ZFI's series "Quellenstudien."

105. See Gine Elsner, *Heilkräuter, "Volksernährung", Menschenversuche: Ernst Günther Schenck (1904–1998); Eine deutsche Ärztekarriere* (Hamburg: VSA, 2010).

106. See the publications by Ernst-Günther Schenck: *Ich sah Berlin sterben: Als Arzt in der Reichskanzlei* (Herford: Nicolai, 1970) and *1945: Als Arzt in Hitlers Reichskanzlei* (Stockach: Bavarian Connection, 1986).

107. Wippermann, "Revisionisten," 78–79, and Jens Mecklenburg, ed., *Handbuch deutscher Rechtsextremismus* (Berlin: Elefanten Press, 1996), 211, stated that the ZFI had between 600 and 700 members.

108. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, "Minutes of the continued founding meeting" of the ZFI on November 21, 1981.

109. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Overview of the academic board, executive board, and membership of the ZFI, October 1, 1982.

110. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Newsletter from Alfred Schickel dated December 1987.

111. See "Forschungsstelle zehn Jahre alt: 'Geschichtserhellung' aus Ingolstadt," *Donau-Kurier*, May 15, 1991.

112. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Progress report of the ZFI for 1997 to 1999, November 25, 2000.

113. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Newsletter from Alfred Schickel, "Dear fellow sufferers," n.d.

114. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Wilhelm Stäglich to Alfred Schickel, November 1, 1981. See also Christian Mentel, "Stäglich, Wilhelm," in *Handbuch des Antisemitismus: Judenfeindschaft in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, vol. 2/2: *Personen L–Z*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Munich: Saur, 2009), 786–87 (the quotation is also found here).

115. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Newsletter by Alfred Schickel, December 3, 1982.

116. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Financial reports of the ZFI for 1981–83, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991, and 1992.

117. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, "Minutes of the Continued Founding Meeting" of the ZFI on November 21, 1981, and ZFI Progress report for 1997 to 1999, November 25, 2000.

118. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Overview of the academic board, executive board, and membership of the ZFI, October 1, 1982.

119. See Andrea Röpke and Andreas Speit, eds., *Neonazis in Nadelstreifen: Die NPD auf dem Weg in die Mitte der Gesellschaft* (Berlin: Aufbau, 2008), 106–7; the quotation is at 106.

120. See "'Kriegspreisträger' leitet Kurs über NS-Zeit," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, February 9, 1995. This grant was fiercely debated time and again: see "In Sachen Dr. Schickel: Zuschuß bleibt fraglich," *Donau-Kurier*, May 9, 1985.

121. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Gerda Büttner, "Follow-up to the Meeting of the Culture Committee" on February 22, 1995.

122. See, for example, "Die Frühjahrstagung der Zeitgeschichtlichen Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt: Im Visier; Nachkriegsverluste," *Die Welt*, June 18, 1987.

123. For example BArchK, B 198/4086, Horst Seehofer to the Federal Archives, October 20, 1981; Hans Booms to Horst Seehofer, October 30, 1981; Alfred Schickel to Hans Booms, November 6, 1981; and a handwritten note regarding a telephone conversation between Horst Seehofer and the Federal Archives, head of department II, December 10, 1981; also, IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/193, Alfred Schickel to Martin Broszat, April 7, 1982.

124. See notably Wippermann, "Revisionisten."

125. Gideon Botsch, "Die historisch-fiktionale Gegenerzählung des radikalen Nationalismus: Über den rechtsextremen Zugriff auf die deutsche Geschichte," *Jahrbuch für Politik und Geschichte* 2 (2011): 27–40.

126. See Hans Wahls, *Zur Authentizität des "Wannsee-Protokolls": Eine Untersuchung* (Ingolstadt: self-pub., Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt, 1987). Documents in this regard can be found in BArchK, B 162/31785.

127. See Alfred Schickel, "Die umstrittenste Zahl der Zeitgeschichte: Das ungeklärte

Ausmaß der jüdischen Opfer," *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart* 28, no. 1 (1980): 9–11.

128. Martin Broszat, "Zur Kritik der Publizistik des antisemitischen Rechtsextremismus: Vorbemerkung zu der Untersuchung von Ino Arndt und Wolfgang Scheffler," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 19 (1976): 3–7, here 4. Maria Munzert argues differently, but without convincing evidence: "Revisionismus/Leugnung des Holocaust," in *Lexikon der "Vergangenheitsbewältigung" in Deutschland: Debatten- und Diskursgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus nach 1945*, ed. Torben Fischer and Matthias N. Lorenz, 3rd. rev. and expanded ed. (Bielefeld: transcript, 2015), 93–97, here 96.

129. See Wolfgang Hänel, *Hermann Rauschnings "Gespräche mit Hitler": Eine Geschichtsfälschung* (Ingolstadt: self-pub., Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt, 1984).

130. For example, this was shown in the podium discussion between Alfred Schickel and Wolfgang Wippermann on July 24, 1995, which prompted a markedly conservative echo. On April 25, 1995, Wippermann had already given a lecture at the Volkshochschule Ingolstadt with the title: "Geschichtsrevisionismus in Ingolstadt: Was forscht die Forschungsstelle?" (Revisionist history in Ingolstadt: what is the research center researching?). Material on this is found in PA-MS, Schickel Papers.

131. In this way Schickel asked for information about the ZFI's membership in the Arbeitsgemeinschaft historischer Forschungseinrichtungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Working group of historical research institutes in the Federal Republic of Germany): Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (hereafter BayHStA), AHF 394, Alfred Schickel to Rudolf Morsey, September 2, 1982, and Georg Kalmer to Alfred Schickel, September 24, 1982.

132. See Franz Schönhuber, *Ich war dabei* (Munich: Langen Müller, 1981); for his part, journalist Schönhuber referred in his book (p. 184) to the "famous historian Dr. Schickel."

133. BayHStA, Schönhuber Papers 53, Alfred Schickel to Reinhold Vöth, April 28, 1982. A short expert report by Schickel (BayHStA, Schönhuber Papers 64) was used by Schönhuber's lawyers as evidence in the censorship proceedings that various authorities had brought against *Ich war dabei*.

134. Archiv des Bayerischen Rundfunks, Margot Waltenberger, Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle in Ingolstadt, Land und Leute, video production, BR-1-regional, March 9, 1982. We are very grateful for the assistance provided for our research.

135. See, for example, Harald Neubauer, "Was lesen Republikaner?," *Republikanischer Anzeiger*, May 1985; "Bücher, die wir empfehlen," *Der Republikaner*, no. 6 (1986); Günter Poser, "Wider die Gehirn- und Charakterwäsche," *Der Republikaner*, no. 8 (1987).

136. See his letter to the editor in the Bavaria section of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* on March 16, 1995: "Vorwürfe durch klare Fundstellen belegen."

137. See, for example, Alfred Schickel, "Zur 'Sinti'-Frage: Merkwürdige Übertreibungen in der deutschen Zeitgeschichte," *Criticón*, no. 63 (1981): 36–38. The first contribution was published in the first year of the journal: Alfred Schickel, "Sozialkunde—das schwierigste Fach der Schule," *Criticón*, no. 7 (1970–71): 152–53. See also Alfred Schickel, "Die Komintern: Ziele und Geschichte der Kommunistischen Internationale mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rolle Deutschlands," *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart* 28, no. 4 (1980): 15–20; Alfred Schickel, "Schwierigkeiten mit der Zeitgeschichte: Zur Lage der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft," in *Handbuch zur Deutschen Nation*, vol. 1,

Geistiger Bestand und politische Lage, ed. Bernard Willms (Tübingen: Hohenrain, 1986), 223–62; Alfred Schickel, "Hellmut Diwald und die deutsche Geschichtsschreibung," in *Hellmut Diwald: Sein Vermächtnis für Deutschland; Sein Mut zur Geschichte*, ed. Rolf-Josef Eibicht (Tübingen: Hohenrain, 1994), 38–56. See also Katja Eddel, *Die Zeitschrift MUT—ein demokratisches Meinungsforum? Analyse und Einordnung einer politisch gewandelten Zeitschrift* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011); Anton Maegerle, "Politischer und publizistischer Werdegang von Autoren der 'Jungen Freiheit,'" in *Die Wochenzeitung "Junge Freiheit": Kritische Analysen zu Programmatik, Inhalten, Autoren und Kunden*, ed. Stephan Braun and Ute Vogt (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 193–215, here 206–7.

138. See also "Vertreibung: Noch unbewältigte Vergangenheit: Gesperrte Dokumente endlich freigeben," *Bayernkurier*, February 19, 1983, and "Die Vergangenheitsbewältigung entläßt ihre Kinder," *Bayernkurier*, May 7, 1983. On the fortieth anniversary of the end of the war: "Die Deutschen und der 8. Mai," *Der Staatsbürger/BLZ-Report*, May 1985.

139. See also "Der verspätete Anschluß: Vor 50 Jahren kam die Republik Österreich zum Deutschen Reich," *Donau-Kurier*, March 12–13, 1988; "Die Amerikaner und die Oder-Neiße-Linie: Wie sich Washington die deutsch-polnische Grenze vorstellte," *Donau-Kurier*, July 18, 1989; "Historiker und Geschichtsrevisionismus: Schlagwort oder wissenschaftliche Pflicht?," *Donau-Kurier*, August 20, 1989; "Von langer Hand geplant: Der Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkriegs," *Donau-Kurier*, September 2–3, 1989; and "Friedensfühler nach dem Polen-Feldzug der Deutschen," *Donau-Kurier*, September 21, 1989. On the split between Schickel and his local newspaper, PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Alfred Schickel to Elin Reissmüller, March 27, 2007.

140. IfZ-Archiv, ID 90/47, Alfred Schickel to VfZ, March 21 and September 9, 1968.

141. IfZ-Archiv, ID 90/47, Hellmuth Auerbach to Alfred Schickel, September 18, 1968.

142. IfZ-Archiv, ID 103/149, fol. 37, Alfred Schickel to Helmut Krausnick, October 18, 1968, and ID 103/149, fol. 36, Helmut Krausnick to Alfred Schickel, November 8, 1968.

143. IfZ-Archiv, ID 90/79, fol. 25, Alfred Schickel to Helmut Krausnick, June 5, 1971; ID 103/169, fol. 97, Helmut Krausnick to Alfred Schickel, August 3, 1971.

144. For example, IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/124, Alfred Schickel to Martin Broszat, June 16, 1978. On March 10, 1978, Schickel had promised the Board of Trustees (IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/124) a "book donation" worth 100 DM to the Institute for Contemporary History in return for "information about factual issues."

145. IfZ-Archiv, ID 90/79, fol. 21, Alfred Schickel to Hermann Graml, January 13, 1979. The starting point was the article "Wie hoch ist die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer?" (How high was the number of Jewish victims?) in the *Basler Nachrichten* on June 13, 1946, which Schickel had enclosed with his letter.

146. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/124, Martin Broszat to Alfred Schickel, May 10, 1978.

147. IfZ-Archiv, ID 60-K 60/5857, Wolfgang Jacobmeyer to Alfred Schickel, September 16, 1977, and ID 131/11, Memorandum from Wolfgang Jacobmeyer on the "correspondence with Dr. Schickel, Ingolstadt," February 2, 1978.

148. IfZ-Archiv, ID 60-K 60/5857, Alfred Schickel to the Institute for Contemporary History, September 12, 1977. An interview with Jerzy Lubelfeld, who also recounts his experiences as a prisoner of war, can be found on the website of the United States Holocaust

Memorial Museum, accessed August 5, 2023, https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn510478.

149. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/11, Alfred Schickel to Horst Pötzsch (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung—Federal Agency for Civic Education), January 19, 1978.

150. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/11, Helmut Kistler to Ino Arndt, January 27, 1978.

151. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/124, Ino Arndt to Alfred Schickel, February 24, 1978.

152. The pamphlet, held in IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/62, shows corrections by hand and is dated September 1977; drafts can be found in IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/52.

153. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/124, Alfred Schickel to Martin Broszat, March 9, 1978; Martin Broszat to Alfred Schickel, April 4, 1978; Alfred Schickel to Martin Broszat, April 11, 1978; Martin Broszat to Alfred Schickel, May 10, 1978, and Alfred Schickel to Martin Broszat, May 12, 1978.

154. IfZ-Archiv, ED 104/193, Alfred Schickel to Martin Broszat, February 22, 1980.

155. IfZ-Archiv, ED 104/63, Hermann Graml to Alfred Schickel, October 28, 1980. Schickel's evasive answer on October 30, 1980, is found in IfZ-Archiv, ED 104/193. In public he protested against such "unobjective counter questions": Schickel, *Zeitgeschichte am Scheidewege*, 7–8.

156. IfZ-Archiv, ID 5/5, Minutes of the 26th meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Institute for Contemporary History on April 23, 1982.

157. Schickel's "impertinences" were also reported by the former director of the Dachau Memorial Site, Barbara Distel, "Diffamierung als Methode: Erfahrungen an der Gedenkstätte des ehemaligen Konzentrationslagers Dachau," in Benz, *Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik*, 189–201, here 193–95; the quotation is at 193.

158. See Udo Wengst, "Kooperation des Bundesarchivs mit außeruniversitären Forschungseinrichtungen am Beispiel des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," *Mitteilungen aus dem Bundesarchiv*, no. 1 (2013), 80–88.

159. BArchK, B 198/4086, Note by Josef Henke about Alfred Schickel's visit to the Federal Archives, July 18, 1980; this document includes a summary of the conversation that is referred to in the following.

160. For example, the note in the margin of Schickel's *EAZ* article "Vorlesungen hielt auch der Oberleutnant Rapacki" of November 11, 1980 (BArchK, B 198/4086), which reads "Always the same tendency with Mr. Sch!"

161. See Schickel's article in the *Kieler Nachrichten* of December 23, 1980: "Eine Fundgrube für Historiker." A note by Josef Henke dated January 23, 1981 (BArchK, B 198/4086), added that this article "says a lot about its author, Dr. Alfred Schickel."

162. BArchK, B 198/4086, Federal Archives, signed by Dr. Werner, to Alfred Schickel, October 16, 1981.

163. BArchK, B 198/4086, Alfred Schickel to Hans Booms, November 6, 1981.

164. BArchK, B 198/4086, Horst Seehofer to the Federal Archives—military records, October 20, 1981; note by Dr. Werner, December 10, 1981, and also Federal Archives, signed by Heinz Boberach, to Horst Seehofer, March 8, 1982.

165. According to the margin note of a multipart query from Ingolstadt: BArchK, B 198/4086, ZFI, signed by Alfred Schickel, to the Federal Archives, October 25, 1982.

166. BArchK, B 198/4086, Annotated cutting from *Deutschland in Geschichte und Ge-*

genwart 29, no. 3 (1981) (review of Alfred Schickel's opusculum *Zeitgeschichte am Scheidewege*); the file also contains Alfred Schickel, "Fragen der Vergangenheitsbewältigung: Ein offener Blick in die westdeutsche Zeitgeschichte," *MUT*, no. 183 (1982): 45–56.

167. See Alfred Schickel, "Roosevelt wußte schon 1939 Bescheid: Das 'Geheime Zusatzprotokoll' zum Hitler-Stalin-Pakt war Washington von Anfang an bekannt," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 10, 1982. Blasius's reply was published on November 27, 1982; the newspaper cutting held in the file (BArchK, B 198/4086) bears the handwritten note: "We can only be glad of Schickel's humiliation. He will now also meet with deaf ears at the *FAZ*?!" Schickel answered this and other letters in the *FAZ* on December 12, 1982; however, the same day Blasius wrote to the publisher of the *FAZ* (BArchK, B 198/4086), stating that Schickel "idealized and downplayed [. . .] Hitler's foreign policy—whether consciously or unconsciously, that is the question!"

168. BArchK, B 198/4086, Note by Josef Henke, November/December 1982 (the date is hard to decipher).

169. BArchK, B 198/4086, Robert Wolfe to Alfred Schickel, March 29, 1982, and Klaus Oldenhage to Günter Gillessen, December 8, 1982.

170. BArchK, B 198/4086, Joachim Fest to Andreas Hillgruber, November 26, 1982; this source also contains the note by Josef Henke dated December 8, 1982, from which Hillgruber's quotation has been taken.

171. See "Quälende Stimmen der Vergangenheit: Neues Licht ins Halbdunkel eines Tabu-Themas," *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt*, September 9, 1983. In ZFI circles Heinz Nawratil was considered as one of the "members of the first hour"; see Löw, "Schickel," 10.

172. BArchK, B 198/4086, Alois Rummel to Hans Booms, December 16, 1983; in this regard also from the same file, handwritten file note by Josef Henke, October 21, 1983, and Hans Booms to Alois Rummel, December 5, 1983.

173. PA-MS, Schickel Papers, Alfred Schickel to Klaus Natorp, October 9, 1984.

174. See, for example, the particularly prominent article "Zeitgeschichte am Scheideweg," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 16, 1980.

175. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/18, Ino Arndt to Alfred Schickel, January 21, 1981, and Alfred Schickel to Ino Arndt, January 23, 1981.

176. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/193, Alfred Schickel to Martin Broszat, April 7, 1982.

177. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/63, Hermann Weiß to Robert Wolfe, April 7, 1981.

178. After Schickel's harsh criticism of the work published in the Institute for Contemporary History series "Studien zur Zeitgeschichte" by Christian Streit—*Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941–1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978)—which was published on January 26, 1980, in the *Bayernkurier*, Broszat asked his colleague Ino Arndt to send Streit a copy of "the most recent concoction by Dr. Alfred Schickel" and to encourage him to reply (IfZ-Archiv, ID 163/63, Ino Arndt to Christian Streit, January 25, 1980), which was then likewise published in the *Bayernkurier* on August 9, 1980.

179. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/193, Martin Broszat to Alfred Schickel, May 7, 1982.

180. IfZ-Archiv, ID 5/5, Minutes of the 26th meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Institute for Contemporary History on April 23, 1982. Material on how the institute was to deal with requests from the far-right milieu in these years can also be found in IfZ-Archiv,

ID 131/62. The topic of the Institute for Contemporary History and right-wing extremism would be worth a separate article.

181. See Sabine Moller, *Die Entkonkretisierung der NS-Herrschaft in der Ära Kohl: Die Neue Wache, das Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas, das Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Hanover: Offizin, 1998), and Christian Wicke, *Helmut Kohl's Quest for Normality: His Representation of the German Nation and Himself* (New York: Berghahn, 2015).

182. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/266, Note by Norbert Frei for Martin Broszat, February 8, 1985.

183. Rolf Seeliger, ed., *Bayern—ein totaler CSU-Staat oder ein Staat der Bürger? Sozialdemokraten in der Auseinandersetzung mit der CSU und ihrer Politik im Freistaat* (Munich: Seeliger, 1982).

184. Lutz Niethammer, "Nach dem Dritten Reich ein neuer Faschismus? Zum Wandel der rechtsextremen Szene in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik," in *Die verkannte Gefahr: Rechtsradikalismus in der Bundesrepublik*, ed. Paul Lersch (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1981), 105–27, here 114. On the importance of Niethammer for historical research on right-wing extremism, see Yves Müller, "'Faschistische Grundstruktur': Lutz Niethammers Analyse der extremen Rechten (1969)," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 16, no. 1 (2019): 197–205.

185. IfZ-Archiv, ID 131/63, Note by Ino Arndt for Martin Broszat, March 25, 1983; the following quotations are also found here.

186. Broszat made an exception in summer 1983, when he publicly accused Schickel and others from the "right-wing nationalist corner" of instrumentalizing the term "crimes of expulsion" with the clear "intention of offsetting [these against Nazi crimes]": IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/233, Press office of the IfZ, no. 38, August 30, 1983.

187. Martin Broszat, "Die Ambivalenz der Forderung nach mehr Geschichtsbewußtsein," in *Nach Hitler: Der schwierige Umgang mit unserer Geschichte*, ed. Martin Broszat (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988), 282–96, here 284.

188. Longerich, *Antisemitismus*, 398.

189. Klaus-Dietmar Henke, "Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte unter der Ägide von Martin Broszat 1972–1989," in *Mit dem Pathos der Nüchternheit: Martin Broszat, das Institut für Zeitgeschichte und die Erforschung des Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Claudio Natoli (Frankfurt a. M.: Aufbau, 1991), 39–57, here 57; the following quotations are at 55 and 39. On the general development of the institute, see Horst Möller, "Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte und die Entwicklung der Zeitgeschichtsschreibung in Deutschland," in *50 Jahre Institut für Zeitgeschichte: Eine Bilanz*, ed. Horst Möller and Udo Wengst (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 1–68.

190. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/226, Martin Broszat to Michaela Hemmaier, Government of Upper Bavaria, July 7, 1987.

191. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/226, Martin Broszat to Karl Weininger, November 24, 1987; a collection of material that supports Broszat's argumentation is found in the same file.

192. Proposal list no. 1868 for the award of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany, signed Max Streibl, January 16, 1989, 22. We would like to thank Barbara Groß from the Federal Archives in Koblenz for a copy of this document that is found in B 122 (Office of the Federal President). A request to the state ministry was unsuccessful for reasons of data protection.

193. See Gebhard Glück, "Die britische Mitteleuropapolitik nach dem 1. Weltkrieg: Von der Unterzeichnung des Waffenstillstands bis zum Ende des Jahres 1920" (PhD diss., University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, 1962).

194. Quotation from the highly critical note "Bundesverdienstkreuz für einen revisionistischen Historiker," *1999*, no. 3 (1993): 125–28, here 126.

195. Dietmar Süß and Meik Woyke, "Schimanskis Jahrzehnt? Die 1980er Jahre in historischer Perspektive," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 52 (2012): 3–20.

196. Tobias Becker, "Rückkehr der Geschichte? Die 'Nostalgie-Welle' in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren," in *Zeitenwandel: Transformationen geschichtlicher Zeitlichkeit nach dem Boom*, ed. Fernando Esposito (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017), 93–117, here 103.

197. See Tobias Becker, "Er war nie weg: 'Hitler-Welle' und 'Nazi-Nostalgie' in der Bundesrepublik der 1970er-Jahre," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 18 (2021): 44–72, here in particular 61–69.

198. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Entsorgung der deutschen Vergangenheit? Ein polemischer Essay zum "Historikerstreit"* (Munich: Beck, 1988).

199. Graml, "Alte und neue Apologeten Hitlers," 87. The volume was published for the first time in 1980 and was reissued until 1994 with four updated and expanded editions, whereby the title also changed. In 1980 and 1984, this phrase was not yet included.

200. Klaus Große Kracht, *Die zankende Zunft: Historische Kontroversen in Deutschland nach 1945* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 114.

201. Dietmar Süß, "'Hochkonjunktur für Scheinheilige': Der Skandal um die 'Hitler-Tagebücher' und der Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit in den 1980er Jahren," in *Demokratisierung der Deutschen: Errungenschaften und Anfechtungen eines Projekts*, ed. Frank Bösch et al. (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2020), 220–37, here 222.

202. See, for example, Jacob S. Eder, *Holocaust Angst: The Federal Republic of Germany and American Holocaust Memory since the 1970s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

203. Longerich, *Antisemitismus*, 398.

The Institute for Contemporary History and the Fake Hitler Diaries Affair, 1982–83

MAXIMILIAN KUTZNER

The publication of the fake Hitler diaries in April 1983 resulted in intense discussions among historians in West Germany and abroad, with many asking whether the diaries could actually be genuine. Even before publication, the Institute for Contemporary History (IfZ) had been in contact with the main protagonists of the eventual scandal. In the period between the announcement of the supposed discovery and the uncovering of the forgery, complex processes of self-positioning occurred within the IfZ's leadership. Documents from the IfZ archives reveal that the forged diaries also became a touchstone for the societal role of contemporary history and its leading representatives.

In the Light of Fiction—in the Shadow of Scholarship

The story of the fake Hitler diaries has been told many times. Between 1978 and 1983 the forger Konrad Kujau copied Adolf Hitler's handwriting to create sixty-two notebooks supposedly containing Hitler's diary entries. The reporter Gerd Heidemann then purchased these on behalf of *Stern* magazine for 9.3 million deutsche marks. Thanks in part to Helmut Dietl's 1992 feature film *Schtonk!*, even Germans with little interest in history have a vivid image of this episode.[1] To date, however, there has been no comprehensive account that meets historiographical standards and is based on a broad range of sources. The 1986 study by the British journalist Robert Harris is regarded as germane,[2] but history scholars have been slow to examine the affair and have taken up some aspects only recently.[3]

Yet the historians and institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany, one of them the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ—Institute for Contemporary History), were among the protagonists of the Hitler diaries affair.[4] The documents from the IfZ archives presented in the appendix below shed light on the institute's role, which was largely bound up with the IfZ's contacts with

collectors of Nazi memorabilia and with journalists. The IfZ and its staff had been aware for some time of the existence of forged documents, many of them related to Nazi leaders and even Hitler himself, but its involvement in events surrounding the fake diaries came relatively late. The documents show that in the early 1980s the IfZ was an important, if not the central, point of contact for historians (Eberhard Jäckel) as well as authors already regarded as dubious even at the time (David Irving), archivists (Josef Henke), collectors (August Priesack), and German and foreign journalists (Evgueni Silianoff, indirectly also Gerd Heidemann) who worked with real or fake documents supposedly deriving from the inner circles of high Nazi functionaries. After the diaries were published and before they were exposed as forgeries, the IfZ's director, Martin Broszat, ensured that his institute played a prominent role in scrutinizing this sensational find, thereby highlighting the IfZ's importance for research on contemporary history in the Federal Republic. In the end, though, it was the Federal Archives that uncovered the forgery.

The insights that a history of the fake Hitler diaries might yield lie less in the diaries themselves than in the conditions and contexts that led to their creation. Why were the diaries produced and published in this specific period of West German history? The late 1970s and early 1980s were a time of increased media interest in the past, in particular the Nazi era.[5] Thanks to a wave of "nostalgia," the past was being viewed more positively and there were emerging tendencies toward an ex post idealization.[6] At the same time the memory of National Socialism was shifting, with the victims of persecution and the process that led to the Holocaust moving to the forefront of public consciousness.[7] In the political sphere, meanwhile, disputes about *Geschichtspolitik* (the politics of history), largely centering on the relationship between history and identity, were starting to simmer. Finally, history scholars were being confronted in these years with the question of how to appropriately historicize National Socialism. Intradisciplinary conflicts that would later erupt in the *Historikerstreit* (historians' debate) were already on the horizon.[8] The fake Hitler diaries affair thus occurred at a time when the relationship between history, the public, and scholarship was undergoing profound changes.

Studies in art history, in particular, have shown that research into the genesis and impact of forgeries yields benefits for numerous disciplines.[9] Forged historical material is still being produced, sold, and instrumentalized today, and so research into the conditions under which historical fakes were created has contemporary relevance.[10] Viewed from this perspective, the fake Hitler diaries affair is more than just a grotesque farce. It can also be seen as a phe-

nomenon typical of its time, as a probe with which to investigate questions of media, political, social, and scholarly history.

The Protagonists

The key players in the affair are emblematic of the developments shaping the time. Throughout his working life the reporter Gerd Heidemann was known for his aptitude for fostering relationships with people and organizations that preferred to remain out of the public eye. A photographer by profession, Heidemann had been recruited by the GDR's Ministry for State Security (MfS) in 1953, when he was still freelancing for *Stern*. As a result, he was able to take pictures of the 1953 World Youth Games in Bucharest and sell them in the West. The file kept on Heidemann by the MfS was maintained until 1986 and thus included his time investigating the Hitler diaries.[11] In 1965 Heidemann won the World Press Photo Award for a picture he took of the war in Congo, where he tracked down the German mercenary Siegfried Müller and helped the latter achieve dubious fame as "Congo Müller."[12] Later in his career, too, Heidemann had few qualms about consorting with military officers, terrorists, and people with a shady past. In 1979 Wilhelm Höttl—who prior to 1945 had worked for the Nazi Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service, SD) and the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office, RSHA), as well as serving as Ernst Kaltenbrunner's adjutant—put Heidemann on the trail of fugitive Nazi functionaries in South America. There, while searching for Josef Mengele and Martin Bormann, Heidemann met and interviewed Klaus Barbie. Heidemann was very well connected with prominent former Nazis. Karl Wolff, Heinrich Himmler's chief of staff, was best man at Heidemann's wedding, for example. But Heidemann was more than a journalist. From at least 1973 he was also a passionate collector of Nazi memorabilia and militaria. He became involved with the collecting scene when he purchased *Carin II*, a yacht that had been commissioned by Hermann Göring in 1936 and was briefly owned by the British crown after 1945, before being purchased by a German businessman.[13] It was in his role as reporter that Heidemann first met Konrad Kujau, however; when he initially contacted Kujau, it was primarily to research the story of the Hitler diaries for *Stern*.

Kujau was well known on the collecting scene, generally under the alias Dr. Fischer, as a dealer of Nazi memorabilia of varying value. He had fled the GDR in 1957 to dodge an impending conviction for theft and dealing in stolen goods. A short time later he arrived in southwest Germany via Berlin. After several

failed attempts to establish himself as an employee and entrepreneur, he opened an antique store in Stuttgart's Aspergerstrasse in 1974. He soon became known to police as a petty criminal in West Germany too; he was arrested on multiple occasions and convicted of embezzlement, fraud, and using false identities. Nevertheless, by the time Kujau met Heidemann in 1981, his antique business was well established. He had made a name for himself by pretending to smuggle valuable pieces from East Germany into West Germany.[14] These pieces were in fact forgeries, which Kujau, who was a talented painter and draftsman, sold to his customers for large sums. To this day, the close relationship that quickly developed between Heidemann and Kujau raises the question of whether the reporter was an accomplice who knew that the diaries were forgeries. Although the friendship is well documented, this question remains open.[15]

History as a Field of Cooperation and Conflict

Most accounts of the fake Hitler diaries affair concentrate on the relationship between Heidemann and Kujau,[16] a focus that is reductive and simplistic. As mentioned above, these events took place at a time when the public's engagement with history, in particular National Socialism, was undergoing a variety of developments in both Western Europe and the US. It is therefore important to examine public awareness of history in the 1970s and early 1980s from multiple perspectives, thereby putting a spotlight on groups that have been little discussed to date. Collectors of Nazi memorabilia, in particular, have been largely ignored by historians.[17] Yet an exploration of this group of protagonists, who interacted intensively with journalists and historians in those two decades, promises valuable insights.

"After the boom,"[18] trade and interest in antiques and historical objects and documents of all kinds surged. Collecting became a popular hobby—and for some even a profession. For people who felt that they were living in a time of eroding social certainties, antiques represented a seemingly simpler past.[19] Lurking in the shadows of this trend was a rapidly growing number of Nazi memorabilia collectors. Such collectors had been around long before the 1970s; in fact, the hunt for relics of the "Thousand-Year Reich" began in the final days of the war.[20] Allied soldiers, in particular, sent uniforms, medals, and guns home as trophies. Wealthy collectors in the US and Israel were—and continue to be—major players on the market.[21] In 1974, when the Free State of Bavaria first auctioned off items from Hermann Göring's private collection, many of them ended up in the hands of rich collectors,[22] arousing the interest of unscrupulous but talented forgers like Kujau. It was probably in 1976 that

Kujau first sold forgeries in the US via his agent Wolfgang Schulz.[23] Major collectors in the Federal Republic often had Nazi pasts themselves or shared National Socialist ideology. They collected less because they were fascinated by evil than because of nostalgia and an old sense of affinity.

One of these collectors was August Priesack. Born in 1908, Priesack worked until 1939 in the Nazi Party's main archives, where he was tasked by the party to track down real and forged Hitler documents and, even more importantly, pictures of Hitler. His job was to destroy the forgeries and take the originals out of circulation.[24] After the war Priesack became a high-school teacher, holding the title of "Gymnasium professor." He was known to the police in Munich as an unreconstructed Nazi who made no secret of his political outlook.[25] He never completely abandoned his former occupation, continuing to collect all manner of official documents from the Nazi period along with countless inconsequential newspaper articles and copies of documents. In building up a substantial archive, he gained a reputation as an authority on Nazi documents and Hitler's handwriting. In 1973, in the history journal *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, he detailed the reading errors that the historian and nonfiction author Werner Maser had made in his edition of Hitler's manuscripts.[26] As an arbiter of the authenticity of documents, Priesack was regularly mentioned in the catalogs of the well-known Munich auction house Graf Klenau.

Other collectors thus became aware of Priesack's expertise, as did historians such as Eberhard Jäckel, a Stuttgart-based scholar of contemporary history.[27] While working on his edition of Hitler's manuscripts from 1905 to 1924, Jäckel enlisted Priesack to help him transcribe the texts.[28] In 1978 Fritz Stiefel, a Swabian businessman, hired Priesack to provide an expert report on his collection of Nazi documents and artifacts. Stiefel had purchased most of these items from Kujau in Stuttgart. But instead of exposing the forgeries, Priesack regarded them as genuine, thus giving them the nimbus of authenticity and providing a decisive incentive for Kujau to forge the Hitler diaries. Long before Heidemann became aware of the diary notebooks, a first volume, which Priesack believed to be genuine (a half-year volume for 1935), was circulating among collectors.[29]

Priesack belonged to the generation of Germans who were teenagers or young adults during the Nazi era and were now looking for mementos and memorabilia from that period. In many cases their occupations between 1933 and 1945 made them sought-after postwar experts on the authenticity of such items. Heidemann was in contact with many such individuals.[30] But his interest in Nazi memorabilia and his connections with the scene do not fully explain how the forged Hitler diaries affair came about.

Heidemann and his magazine were not the only ones interested in Hitler and National Socialism. In the 1970s the leading protagonists of the Nazi period became an increasingly prominent subject in the mass media. The publication of Joachim Fest's biography of Hitler marked the start of an international "Hitler wave."[31] The topic of National Socialism was popularized by feature films, magazines, and television documentaries, and the interest in history generated by the media in turn prompted publishing houses to come up with new offerings for a growing audience. *Stern* published excerpts from Fest's biography of Hitler in 1973[32] and established a contemporary history desk five years later. Between 1966 and 1967 Heinz Höhne published a twenty-one-part series on the history of the SS in *Der Spiegel*.[33] Much of the coverage of the Nazi past was characterized by a sensationalistic presentation and highly trivializing tone. Sources offering supposedly spectacular revelations about the Third Reich were continually being discovered. Even marginal and improbable aspects, such as Hitler's alleged paternity,[34] became the subject of intense discussion, not only in the Federal Republic, but also internationally. This was reflected in the 1974 appointment of the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper as editor of *The Times*. Trevor-Roper, who in 1947 had published a widely acclaimed book on Hitler's last days, wrote about history in his newspaper,[35] which until 1980 devoted an increasing number of column inches to the German dictator.[36] This trend continued after Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation took over the newspaper in 1981. Hitler and National Socialism were also on the agenda of the print media in France (in *Paris Match* and *L'Express*) and in the US (in *Newsweek*).[37]

Television played an important role too.[38] Shows about National Socialism could trigger heated public debates, as demonstrated by the series *Holocaust*, which was broadcast in the Federal Republic in 1979.[39] Nazi themes were guaranteed to garner a great deal of attention and became a major selling point.[40] The international mass media's interest in the "Führer" and his entourage over the preceding years ensured that the forged Hitler diaries affair became a huge scandal. When Heidemann set out on the trail of the diaries in 1980, there was a strong commercial interest in them on the part of the publishing house Gruner+Jahr, which was counting on immense public interest. International publishers and broadcasters bought rights on the assumption that the diary story would be highly marketable.

Meanwhile in the political sphere, attempts were being made to co-opt history. Questions about *Geschichtspolitik*—in particular how the Third Reich and its place in German history should be dealt with—became the subject of sometimes fierce debate. The conflicts in this debate mostly ran along party

lines. After the social-liberal coalition was replaced in October 1982 by an alliance of the CDU/CSU and the FDP under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, there was a growing insistence that German history not be reduced to the Third Reich. Instead, it was argued, the focus should be shifted to themes such as Prussia or the 1848 Revolution in order to create lines of tradition that would help foster identity in the Federal Republic.[41] This was an attempt to replace the Federal Republic's admission of guilt for war and genocide with a positive founding narrative that, during the years of entrenched dual statehood, would exonerate the provisional West German state.

Such initiatives met with fierce criticism.[42] The chief objection was simply that they were revisionist, their purpose being to deny responsibility for the Shoah and to draw a line under that particular aspect of the German past. These debates were of considerable political significance, as demonstrated in German-American relations of the time, which were repeatedly burdened by the question of how to deal appropriately with the Nazi era.[43] When they erupted into interpretive battles in the early 1980s, the Hitler diaries seemed to open the possibility of renegotiating central developments and events such as the outbreak of World War II and the murder of Europe's Jews. In his forgeries Kujau painted a picture that largely absolved Hitler of responsibility, leading readers to believe that he had been coerced into war by his generals and had known nothing about the extermination camps. In Kujau's reimagining the dictator had even sent Rudolf Hess to Britain on a secret peace mission.[44] Placing most of the blame at the doors of Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich, the forged source thus provided arguments for exonerating Hitler and downplaying his responsibility for war and genocide.

Within their own discipline, contemporary historians generally opposed this political co-opting of the past. Martin Broszat, who had been director of the IfZ since 1972, also expressed skepticism, warning that such a shift in the culture of remembrance ran the risk of trivializing Nazi crimes.[45] But the question of how scholars should interpret the Nazi past was hotly disputed in the 1970s and 1980s. The disagreement between intentionalists and functionalists or structuralists, both in scholarly publications and among the general public, was particularly bitter. Whereas Broszat and Hans Mommsen emphasized the radicalizing effect of the Nazi state's polycratic power structures, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Saul Friedländer, and Eberhard Jäckel saw an intentional line of continuity stretching from Hitler's political beginnings to the extermination policy of the years 1938 to 1945.[46] Adherents of this latter view were often particularly keen to find sources from Hitler or his inner circle supporting the thesis that the dictator himself had given the order to murder Europe's Jews. Many of

the archives were on the other side of the Iron Curtain and therefore impossible to access, which made it all the more important for these historians to sift through and secure all available holdings, even if this involved sitting down with dubious collectors and Nazi nostalgists.

When it was first founded, one of the chief responsibilities of the Deutsches Institut für Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Zeit (German Institute for the History of the National Socialist Era), as the IfZ was called until 1952, was to identify sources from the Nazi era and make these accessible to researchers.[47] Thus, the institute was in regular contact with witnesses of all kinds, with former Nazi functionaries, and with collectors of Nazi-related written material.[48] The latter offered the IfZ "Table Talk from the Führer's Headquarters";[49] the Federal Archives repeatedly received offers of this nature too.[50] Some historians, wishing to speed things up, aggressively pursued contact with collectors and witnesses. In 1973 Jäckel even placed a notice in the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* and advertisements in newspapers appealing for sources on Nazi history that were in private possession.[51] He began work that year on his volume of Hitler's early manuscripts, a project that would eventually lead him to Kujau and Priesack. Since sources tended to be scarce, historians and archivists tried their luck with texts of dubious origin, thereby opening up opportunities for forgers. The demand for rare personal documents from Nazi leaders was particularly high, and the hope of gaining spectacular new insights led some to neglect principles of academic rigor when evaluating their sources. Hitler and National Socialism offered historians in the media-saturated society of the 1970s and 1980s the opportunity to become well known beyond the confines of academia. In 1980, in advance of the publication of Jäckel's volume, *Stern* published excerpts containing not only falsely attributed texts but also forgeries penned by Kujau.[52] Well-known authors such as Joachim Fest and Sebastian Haffner also played a role in maintaining media interest in contemporary German history, while new television formats were reaching an increasing number of people.

It was no coincidence that, in late 1982, rumors first began spreading at the IfZ that Hitler's diaries were circulating in collector circles. In the ten years that had passed since Broszat became director, the institute had grown not only in prominence, but also in staff numbers and financial resources. This growth was accompanied by a change in profile. Until the mid-1960s the IfZ had focused entirely on its remit as an authority on questions relating to Nazi rule. This led to the production of lengthy expert reports such as that presented by Broszat at the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, which opened in 1963.[53] In the years that followed, as demand for expert reports in criminal trials and repara-

tions proceedings declined, the IfZ concentrated more on compiling large volumes of primary sources and conducting research projects such as "Resistance and Persecution in Bavaria, 1933–1945"; the latter resulted in six volumes published between 1977 and 1983 under the series title "Bavaria in the Nazi Era," which attracted attention beyond academia.[54] Nevertheless, the IfZ did not have the internal and external significance it has today; notably, it had comparatively little media exposure. A simple term-frequency analysis of "Institut* für Zeitgeschichte" in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* shows that the IfZ was referred to with declining frequency over the course of the 1970s, a decline that may have been related to the conclusion of the major Nazi trials.[55] In the 1980s the term increased in frequency again, reflecting the growing prominence of contemporary history in the media from the turn of the decade.

Although Broszat had long striven to raise public awareness and the prominence of his institute, it was only from the mid-1980s that he achieved real success in this regard. The forged Hitler diaries affair, coinciding as it did with a period of increasing public interest in contemporary history, offered him an opportunity to boost the IfZ's profile.

The IfZ and the Forged Hitler Diaries

The IfZ archives were also adapting to the new challenges. In the early days the institute's few staff members had focused on archiving and indexing Nazi-era documents that had been provided by the US occupation authorities. These comprised state documents, files of the Nazi Party and its branches, and documents from the Nuremberg war crimes trials. *Zeugenschriftum* (witness testimonies) and private papers came later, occupying a growing place in the archives in the 1970s and 1980s. The personal papers of Nazi functionaries and Wehrmacht generals were of particular interest, and as a result it became increasingly important to build links with collectors as well as with former representatives of the regime and the armed forces.[56] Such contacts enabled IfZ staff to track down previously undiscovered documents and establish close working relationships that could bear fruit when material was donated or estates bequeathed. Thus, the IfZ archives quickly built up an international reputation as an excellent point of contact for researchers, journalists, and laypeople, but also for some Nazi nostalgists.

The IfZ had encountered forgeries from collectors before the Hitler diaries. In the late 1970s Anton Hoch, head of the IfZ archives from their beginnings until 1978, had identified some forged Hitler documents by comparing handwriting. He alerted Eberhard Jäckel,[57] yet the latter, for reasons that re-

main unclear, nonetheless included them in his volume. Subsequently, Jäckel had to announce in the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* that seventy-five of the documents were forgeries.[58] These, too, had been penned by Kujau. Hermann Weiß, deputy head of the IfZ archives, was aware that Jäckel knew the collector Fritz Stiefel, who was said to be in possession of the Hitler diaries.[59] Heidemann's name also became known at the IfZ in late 1982/early 1983. In an indirect way, the IfZ had heard of Kujau too, because Weiß had learned from David Irving, the bestselling author and Holocaust denier,[60] that a certain Mr. Fischer had been involved in procuring the diaries—and, as mentioned above, "Fischer" was one of Kujau's aliases.

By the end of 1982, rumors about the discovery of Hitler's diaries had reached the top level of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The IfZ's academic advisory board became aware of the rumors in February 1983, thanks to letters to the editor written by Irving to several German daily newspapers.[61] In these letters Irving claimed that twenty-seven half-year volumes of the dictator's diaries had survived.[62] The Federal Ministry of the Interior asked the Federal Archives to comment on Irving's claims. This task fell to Josef Henke, head of the department responsible for the Nazi Party's written and printed material, which was located in Koblenz. But Henke and his colleague Klaus Oldenhage were also the Federal Archives contacts for Heidemann and *Stern*'s head of contemporary history, Thomas Walde. Since 1981 Heidemann and Walde had been giving pages from the Hitler diaries to the Federal Archives for examination, but never an entire diary, in order to prevent the sensational find from being revealed prematurely.[63] As a result Henke and Oldenhage were unable to ascertain exactly what they were dealing with, and up until shortly before the diaries were published, examinations by the Federal Archives and others indicated that the material was authentic.[64]

At any rate, Henke did not connect the pages he had received from Heidemann and Walde with the inquiry he received from the Federal Ministry of the Interior about the Hitler diaries rumors. He therefore asked the IfZ what it knew and received an answer from Hermann Weiß.[65] Even for Henke, an established expert on sources on Nazi history, the IfZ—whose deputy director for archives was regarded as possibly the best authority on the subject—was the first port of call. To Weiß it was clear that the diaries had to be forgeries. He confirmed that rumors were going around, but given that they were being peddled by Irving and Priesack, he believed them to have little foundation.[66] At one meeting at the IfZ in late 1982, Priesack had told Weiß about the alleged existence of the diaries.[67] Heidemann's colleague Michael Hepp had visited Weiß back in May 1981 to research background information on the

alleged diaries and other matters related to Nazi history—but of course Hepp was careful to keep his cards close to his chest at that point.[68]

Thus, many strands of the Hitler diaries affair came together at the IfZ at an early stage, and when *Stern* finally went public with its sensational alleged find, Broszat emerged as a key opponent of the Hamburg-based magazine.[69] Combining his position as IfZ director with his reputation as a historian, he assertively demanded that historical scholarship have the final say in the emerging debate about the authenticity and value of the diaries. In an open letter addressed to Henri Nannen, the publisher of *Stern*, one day after the magazine's official press conference of April 25, 1983, Broszat called for the establishment of an international commission of experts to examine the authenticity of the diaries. The reviews carried out by *Stern* had been inadequate, Broszat wrote; therefore—and here he implicitly brought the expertise of the IfZ into play—further examinations would have to follow. After all, it was not only the public that had a right to "the fastest possible and most comprehensive clarification," but also and "most importantly" professional historians.[70] Broszat was in fact outraged by the downplaying of Hitler and his crimes in *Stern*'s coverage, but he did not mention this in his letter.[71]

Nannen countered with a robust response, asserting that "everything that can be done to verify the diaries has been done." Further examinations were thus unnecessary, he insisted;[72] after all, no historian (or "pseudo-historian") would be able to find out anything more than a shrewd journalist. Moreover, a lengthy inspection of all the documents would run counter to *Stern*'s interests, since the "exclusivity" of the material "would no longer be assured."[73] Only after it became undeniable that the Hitler diaries were forgeries did Nannen admit that it had been a mistake to forgo a comprehensive examination. And he gave due credit to Broszat: "Respect to the head of Munich's Institute for Contemporary History, Professor Martin Broszat."[74]

While Nannen and *Stern* rebuffed the expertise of the IfZ, others were keen to avail themselves of it. *Paris Match* had bought some of the French publishing rights to the diaries from Gruner+Jahr. With all kinds of rumors already circulating, the reporter Evgueni Silianoff was tasked with verifying the authenticity of the diaries.[75] Broszat and Hellmuth Auerbach, a longtime staff historian at the IfZ, shared their skepticism with Silianoff. In return, the IfZ received detailed information on the licensing negotiations between *Stern* and *Paris Match*.

Broszat, for his part, was working on winning over the president of the Federal Archives to his position. The Federal Archives had been commissioned by *Stern* to conduct another examination of the Hitler diaries, but this time of

some complete notebooks rather than just individual pages. Broszat registered his dissatisfaction about this with Hans Booms, who headed the Federal Archives and was related to Broszat by marriage. Broszat reiterated the demand he had already made to Nannen for an international commission of experts. Examining just a few selected volumes would not suffice, Broszat insisted, especially under such time pressure. He feared that it would serve primarily to "provide *Stern* with a most welcome alibi."[76] Broszat's concern proved unnecessary, because just a day after his letter to Booms, the president of the Federal Archives announced that the diaries were a "clumsy [. . .] forgery."[77]

This meant that the IfZ would no longer be involved in verification processes. Nevertheless, it had played a significant role in the Hitler diaries affair. The institute and its archives served as a major port of call for collectors, historians, journalists, and other archivists when it came to questions about the authenticity and historical significance of Nazi documents. This was because over the years the IfZ had built up an excellent reputation as a research institution, and its staff had become known, both nationally and internationally, as leading experts on Nazi documents. The institute's strong links with collectors and memorabilia hunters meant that its researchers and archivists were aware at an early stage of the Hitler diary rumors. Right from the start, they were extremely skeptical. Broszat expressed this skepticism publicly and insisted on the primacy of scholarship—and he was proven right.

The originals of the documents presented below are stored in the ID (Internal Documents) 104 record group of the IfZ archives.[78] In some cases newspaper cuttings or book excerpts that are relevant to the content were attached to the documents; these cuttings and excerpts are described in my analysis and commentary in the footnotes. The presentation of the sources here—with the exception of some careful standardizations and corrections—follows the originals as far as possible; only obvious errors in spelling and punctuation have been corrected without comment. The document headers have been altered to omit information such as addresses and file numbers.

Appendix

DOCUMENT 1

[Hermann Weiß[79] to Josef Henke,[80] December 30, 1982]

Dear Mr. Henke,
Before embarking on a short vacation, I wish to briefly share the information you requested[81] on what I know about the "Hitler diaries" matter.

In the summer of 1982, Mr. Priesack, whom of course you know personally, alerted me to the fact that alleged Hitler diaries were in the possession of a Stuttgart collector (twenty-seven half-year volumes).[82] Neither the nature nor the content of Priesack's story convinced me that I could, in the light of my experience, deem it credible that such diaries existed. In November 1982 David Irving told me the same story, adding a few tidbits about the diaries' provenance. According to him, an officer from Hitler's inner circle named Arndt[83] flew the diaries and other Hitler documents out of Berlin in an airplane in April 1945, was shot down over the territory of what is now the GDR, and was buried in the village cemetery there (I was unable to find an officer of this name and function in the literature).[84] Irving claimed that the Hitler diaries were then sold to the West via a major general of the People's Army, supposedly a brother/cousin of the writer Erwin Fischer (Flurweg 7, 8959 Trauchgau), who is linked to the discovery of the Goebbels diaries.[85]

During his last visit to the IfZ about two weeks ago, Mr. Priesack was already lowering his sights, especially as he had returned from a visit to Irving. Irving, who had managed to track down the Stuttgart collector—whose name, by the way, is supposedly known to Professor Jäckel, Stuttgart—had not seen a single page of the original either there or at Mr. Priesack's place. Mr. Priesack did, however, possess some documents (a letter from Rudolf Hess[86] to Hitler about concealing the motives for the flight to England[87] and a transcript or manuscript of Hitler's speech of July 20, 1944,[88] in his own handwriting!), which, according to Irving, even Mr. Priesack did not, in retrospect, describe as entirely genuine.

Although the Stuttgart collector supposedly told Mr. Irving that he possessed the originals, so far no original proof has been made available and is thus verifiable by any of the people who provided the information (Priesack, Irving). Mr. Irving himself has not yet seen an original. Since Mr. Irving told me somewhat different stories on his two visits,[89] I suspect that he initiated his

letter campaign to more than twenty German newspapers (according to him) based on a mere hunch, because both times he characterized his claims as absolutely reliable, while my critical objections did not elicit from him a recognizably more skeptical attitude toward Priesack's stories.

Basically, there is no reason to react to the reports of the existence of Hitler's diaries with any less skepticism now than in the summer. But to make sure I have not missed something, I intend to visit Priesack in January 1983 and to take a closer look at his sources. Should anything sensational emerge, I will notify you.

Best wishes and a Happy New Year,

Hermann Weiß

pp Karin Popp[90]

IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/228, fols. 33–34.

DOCUMENT 2

[Hermann Weiß: Memorandum on Hitler's alleged diaries and similar Nazi sources, January 21, 1983]

Everything reported below I know only from hearsay. I myself have not seen originals or copies of any of the documents mentioned. The informants were, in chronological order: Dr. August Priesack, David Irving, Gitta Sereny,[91] and Werner Meyer[92] (*Abendzeitung*).

As I recall, Mr. Priesack was already talking about the Hitler diaries at the IfZ a year ago; among the people he spoke to about them was Mr. Möller.[93] Last summer he brought to me in the archives a correction to Jäckel's Hitler collection[94] and told me about "his" volume of Hitler's paintings and drawings,[95] which he said was soon to be published in the US, and casually mentioned the familiar story about the originals of Hitler's diaries, in twenty-seven magnificently bound half-year volumes, being in the possession of a collector from Stuttgart, where he had had the opportunity to view them. The collector was also known to Mr. Jäckel, but the latter said he had promised not to disclose the collector's name. Mr. Priesack did not seem very credible, was unable to say anything about the provenance of the documents, and did not offer to let me see any of them.

In November 1982 Mr. Irving told me an expanded version of the Priesack story. According to Irving, Hitler's diaries had been flown out of Berlin by plane in April 1945 by an Ob[er]stl[eutnan]t Arndt, a member of Hitler's

inner circle. However, the plane was shot down over the territory of today's GDR and crashed near a village, and the Oberstleutnant was buried there (a gravestone exists). Today some individuals from the village are still in possession of items from the airplane, Irving claims. A major general of the People's Army and the head of a military archive in Thuringia—who was, incidentally, a brother, according to Irving (in a later version: a cousin), of Erwin Fischer, known to us through the Goebbels diaries transaction—had used the diaries as a source of hard currency and sold them to the West, seven volumes (numbers vary) of them to the US. In connection with the US, the name Mr. Price, who had already been mentioned to me as a benefactor of Priesack's, also cropped up. In addition, Irving spoke of a letter from Rudolf Hess to Hitler that clearly proved that Hess had flown to England with Hitler's full knowledge.

The only thing I really found interesting about Mr. Irving's story was the GDR connection.[96] I therefore informed the director when I had the chance, but he was rather skeptical of the story.

I managed to speak to Mr. Irving twice about the Hitler diaries during his visit to the IfZ in mid-December. On the first occasion Irving was still very optimistic, claiming that there were more Nazi documents, including a transcript in Hitler's own handwriting of the speech he gave immediately after the July assassination attempt. I pointed out the utter improbability of Hitler writing such a manuscript or transcript himself and in particular the paralysis of Hitler's right arm as a result of the assassination attempt, which seemed to give Irving pause for thought. He subsequently visited Mr. Priesack to inspect his "archives" and to take a look at the documents in question. When I spoke to Irving again the next day, he told me that at least some of the documents (all of them only copies) in Priesack's "archives" seemed to him to be forgeries, and Irving claimed that when he said this to Priesack's face, the latter admitted to having known this; Irving now also mentioned, among other things, that the Hess letter had been called a forgery by Hess's son, Rüdiger.[97]

During his December visit, Irving also reported that he had tracked down the collector (Fritz Stiefel), whom we had not heard of before. According to Stiefel and his wife, the Hitler diaries had looked very unremarkable, i.e. they did not have striking or showy binding. Stiefel, however, no longer owned the originals, only copies; Irving did not know what had happened to the originals.[98]

During the same visit in December, Irving gave varying accounts of the sale of the Hitler diaries: Mr. Fischer was now no longer involved. He also joked about the reactions to his letter to the editor (see Enclosure 1),[99] which he

claimed to have sent to more than twenty German newspapers, but I do not know whether this was before or after his visit to Stiefel. All in all, my impression was that Irving had become much more skeptical about the Hitler diary matter, although he had not completely ruled out the possibility of its existence.

Around the time of Mr. Irving's December visit, Ms. Sereny emerged as a new source in the rumor mill. She provided no substantial new information about the Hitler diaries, but she did have tips about Himmler's wartime diaries, which were allegedly in the possession of the *Stern* reporter Gerd Heidemann (according to claims he had made to her). In my last telephone conversation with Ms. Sereny one to two weeks ago, she said that these diaries were not being held by Heidemann, but by the Federal Archives. (For some time, the FA has had a film of Himmler's diaries from 1914 to 1924, the originals of which are in the Hoover Institution and have also been examined by Smith.)[100] Last summer we followed up reports that Yad Vashem had SS documents with Himmler's personal papers, but our results were inconclusive (see Enclosure 2).[101]

Last Thursday I received an unexpected phone call from Werner Meyer, editor-in-chief of the Munich *Abendzeitung*, who has been searching for years for Wagner autographs owned by Hitler (Meyer comes from Bayreuth). In the course of our conversation, it emerged that Meyer also knew of Hitler diaries that a West German researcher was allegedly working on and struggling to decipher; he suspected these did not contain anything particularly exciting and probably dated to the very early years, presumably before 1933.[102] (I shared with him in two sentences our information on the Hitler diaries.) Mr. Meyer, who had also heard about the attempt to fly the Hitler documents out of Berlin at the end of the war, had apparently already done some investigating, for he reported that, in response to this story, Flight Captain Baur[103] had told him how distressed Hitler had been after Baur notified him that the plane had been shot down. Mr. Meyer promised to inform me immediately of any news on the matter. He planned to meet on Friday (January 21, 1983) with Mr. Price (presumably the Billy Price in Irving's letter to Dr. Priesack of December 30, 1982) or Price's "advance guard"; Price was the publisher of Hitler's paintings, Mr. Meyer said, which had recently appeared in Italy (our library has no information on this). As mentioned above, Dr. August Priesack is behind this volume.

A visit to Mr. Priesack, which I planned and which I have already been invited to make via Mr. Henke/FA (see Enclosure 3),[104] has not yet taken place because of time constraints. I am under no illusions about the results to be ex-

pected. Dr. Hoch,[105] with whom Mr. Priesack also wanted to place some Hitler documents, was always very cautious about his documents, especially after handwriting comparisons. This was probably why he had warned Mr. Jäckel against the Hitler poems.[106]
Weiß[107]
For the attention of the Director
cc Mr. Röder[108]
IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/228, fols. 29–31

DOCUMENT 3

[Martin Broszat[109] to Henri Nannen,[110] April 26, 1983]

Dear Mr. Nannen,
The question of the authenticity or forgery of the Hitler diaries, which *Stern* began publishing on April 25, 1983, is of concern not only to the public, but most importantly to contemporary historians. Given the importance of the subject matter, the public and scholars have a right to the fastest possible and most comprehensive clarification of this question. The form of the open letter therefore seems appropriate to me.

Historians fully appreciate journalists' obligation to maintain confidentiality and the commercial interests of the publishing house. But now that all the essential agreements regarding press utilization have apparently been made at home and abroad, in the interest of scholarly clarification it behooves *Stern* to make the material available in full.

The appointment of an international commission of experts, as also called for by Professor Alan Bullock[111] (London), seems to me to be the right course of action. The partial examination carried out so far by selected individual experts does not suffice to resolve the question of authenticity, which is surely important to *Stern* too. This cannot be postponed until after the press has finished with the material and it has been handed over to the Federal Archives on an unspecified date, as announced by *Stern*.[112] The proposed examination by a group of experts can easily be reconciled with the publisher's confidentiality obligations.

I appeal to you to clear the way for this as soon as possible.
Yours sincerely,
[Broszat][113]
IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/228, fols. 22–23

DOCUMENT 4

[Henri Nannen to Martin Broszat, April 28, 1983]

Dear Professor Broszat,
I cannot ignore the arguments in your letter of April 26, and you can be assured that the chief editors of *Stern* also gave all of these arguments careful consideration before commencing publication.

Everything that can be done to verify the diaries has been done. Scientific investigations have confirmed when the diaries were created, and handwriting examinations by three independent experts, whose reputation cannot be disputed by anyone, have shown that it is Adolf Hitler's hand.[114]

The editors in charge of the publication, Dr. Thomas Walde[115] and Leo Pesch,[116] are valuable and experienced staff members with an education in contemporary history. In addition, two renowned historians were consulted (Trevor-Roper[117] and Weinberg[118]). Although one of them now downplays his initially unequivocal verification of authenticity, he has by no means retracted it.[119]

Now you are calling for all the material to be submitted to an international panel of historians for review. A proposal that seems reasonable at first glance. But am I saying anything new when I point out that there are some parallels between historians and physicians as well as one critical difference? Physicians and historians often diverge in their diagnoses, and in both disciplines subjective theories not infrequently interfere with scientific accuracy. Moreover, there are historians and pseudo-historians, just as there are physicians and quacks. I say this because so far it is mainly the pseudo-historians who have spoken out.

What are we to make of it when one historian claims that Hitler's Parkinson's disease meant he was incapable of writing in the aftermath of the assassination attempt of July 20 (Maser),[120] while a contemporary eyewitness (Picker)[121] dismisses this as nonsense? What can one say when a historian who is considered a Hitler scholar (Irving) admits to colleagues that he is being paid by a tabloid newspaper to expose the diaries as a forgery?[122]

Finally, I wish to point out that in the case of the Hitler diaries, even renowned historians have had no qualms about delivering remote diagnoses; they have given their verdict without having seen anything of the documents.[123]

Now, I am sure these are not the people you are proposing to us for the group of experts. But this brings me back to the difference between historians and physicians: both feel pressured by their profession (and professor is,

after all, the Latin word for confessor) to dedicate themselves to research and to publish their findings. The physician, however, is subject to doctor-patient confidentiality, while the historian is not.

If we were to disclose the material in its entirety to an international commission of historians, then there would no longer be any point in *Stern* publishing the diaries, for the sole reason that exclusivity for *Stern* would no longer be assured. The not inconsiderable resources invested by *Stern*—not only for the purchase of the diaries, but also for the many costly research trips—would be wasted.[124]

Your letter also reproaches *Stern* for publishing to pursue the financial goal of boosting circulation. I am not so mendacious, Professor Broszat, that I would deny this. A magazine such as *Stern* is also a commercial enterprise, but a commercial enterprise is only successful if it has a flawless "product" to offer.

Do you really think we are stupid enough to seek a temporary surge in circulation by publishing potentially forged documents, only to risk certain financial repercussions when these are unmasked as such?

A word of self-criticism is in order. The introduction to the first installment contained the rather overweening proclamation that in the light of what we have learned from these diaries, large parts of the history of the Third Reich will need to be rewritten. This wording, unfortunately adopted by the editors, comes from a historian.[125] In my opinion, the history of the Third Reich was written solely by the deeds of Adolf Hitler and his vassals. Six million murdered Jews and many millions of fallen and war dead cannot be explained away or trivialized by any diary.

Nevertheless, the diaries will provide new and historically highly interesting insights into the motivations of the persons involved and into their relationships with each other and with statesmen of other nations.

I am confident that the continuation of publication will increasingly silence the understandable skepticism toward this discovery, which is indeed sensational.

Yours sincerely,

Henri Nannen[126]

IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/228, fols. 17–21

DOCUMENT 5

[Memorandum by Hellmuth Auerbach[127] on May 2, 1983, about a meeting with Evgueni Silianoff[128] about the alleged Hitler diaries]

On the afternoon of April 29, 1983, Mr. Evgueni Silianoff, an employee of the French magazine *Paris-Match*, esp. on matters of contemporary German history, visited me at the IfZ. Mr. S. has been in touch with the IfZ for a long time. Among other things, he helped Raymond Cartier[129] gather material for his contemporary history books and collaborated on a French book about the German resistance.

Paris-Match has acquired the French rights to the so-called Hitler diaries from *Stern*. As an expert on Germany who also speaks, and especially understands, German quite well, Mr. S. took part in the negotiations between the heads of *Paris-Match* and the people from *Stern*. Mr. S. told me that *Stern* put heavy pressure on the Parisians to decide quickly. The entire negotiations took place in a period of just over two weeks. The *Stern* people behaved brusquely and arrogantly during the talks; the French were quite appalled by their negotiating style, according to Mr. S. It was agreed that *Stern* and *Paris-Match* would start publishing at the same time. But in the end *Stern* published a weekend earlier because of the English indiscretion.[130]

During this time, Mr. S. visited Mr. Heidemann once in his private apartment in Hamburg. S. said that he felt as if he was in a Hitler museum. On the walls hung numerous paintings (watercolors, etc.) supposedly by Hitler, but some of which S. believed to be forgeries, as well as framed documents, certificates, etc. Heidemann had not only collected paintings and documents, but also other Hitler "souvenirs," such as a hat and a jacket allegedly worn by Hitler. During this visit Mr. S. received only a photocopy of a handwritten NSDAP manifesto, allegedly written by Hitler and from the Börnersdorf discovery. The same item is also in the IfZ.

At a "local meeting" at Züricher Bank, the French negotiating delegation got to see the alleged diaries. Mr. Silianoff told me and Mr. Broszat (who was present for some of our conversation) that they comprised bound notebooks (not ring binders, as I had assumed from the photograph in *Stern*) in black imitation leather binding. The handwriting, a mixture of old German script and Latin letters, was all but illegible to Mr. S. Although many pages in the notebooks were filled with writing, according to Mr. S., the dates indicated that there were also considerable gaps, i.e. periods for which there were no entries.

For the later years, the entries often consisted of only a few sentences or brief notes. On many A4 pages, then, there were only a few lines, hastily written. The French were given only several volumes to flick through quickly; they had no opportunity to examine these originals in more detail, but they evidently had the impression that the diaries were genuine, Mr. S. said. They requested copies and typed up a few passages dealing with French matters. Mr. S. said that he had been disappointed by the banality of the content—nothing new, at any rate!

There is a typewritten copy of the entire contents of the "diaries," which is used as the basis for the published extracts in the magazines. However, *Paris-Match* does not have this copy, Mr. S. says, and instead every week receives from *Stern* the material ("maquettes") for the next issue, which is then translated in Paris. The excerpts from the "diaries" in *Stern* and *Paris-Match* will therefore be basically identical. However, *Paris-Match* intends to add critical commentary from French experts (e.g. Poliakov)[131] on problematic passages.

Mr. Silianoff informed us that the discovery of the alleged Hitler diaries and their imminent publication in a French magazine caused even more of a stir in France than in the Federal Republic. There have already been several discussions about it on television, and the tabloids are running huge headlines (even *Le Monde* is running an article on it in almost every issue), he said. At least in the quality French press skepticism and the assumption of forgery prevail. At *Paris-Match* they therefore obviously got rather cold feet. The main purpose of Mr. S.'s trip now is to gather evidence for the authenticity of the diaries. He asked me for the exact wording of Hans Bauer's passage, and he had already interviewed Heinrich Heim[132] (formerly of Bormann's staff), who was convinced that the diaries were genuine. He also planned to visit Henry Picker; the widow of Hitler's chauffeur, Kempka;[133] and others.

In response to the question about the verdict on the "diaries" here at the IfZ, I informed Mr. S. that we are extremely skeptical about the matter for the time being and are very reluctant to announce a verdict, especially given that only fragments of copies and passages have been shared so far. I said that we are extremely dismayed by the secretive behavior of the *Stern* people with regard to the provenance and availability of the originals. As long as the documents cannot be examined, I said, we basically have to assume that they are forgeries in whole or in part, though in my opinion they are most likely to have been penned by former Nazis rather than in a GDR workshop. I notified Mr. Silianoff that Mr. Broszat had written to the editor of *Stern* and supported

Alan Bullock's call for an international expert commission of renowned historians to examine the documents, preferably in the Federal Archives in Koblenz. Mr. S. taped my statements.
Munich, May 2, 1983
H. Auerbach[134]
IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/228, fols. 13–16

DOCUMENT 6

[Martin Broszat to Hans Booms,[135] May 5, 1983]

Dear Hans,
The day before yesterday, the publishing house Gruner&Jahr announced that it would now comply with the demand I, along with others, had made for the appointment of a commission of experts to conduct a comprehensive examination of the form and content of the alleged Hitler diaries.[136] The publishing house refers, among other things, to a new agreement apparently reached with the Federal Archives, which, as I gather from today's report in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*,[137] stipulates that a few volumes of the original material are to be handed over to the Federal Archives and the Federal Criminal Police Office for a few days to allow a review of the form and content, with a result expected very quickly.

I cannot hide the fact that, if the news to which I have access is largely accurate, I am extremely concerned about this procedure. It certainly does not meet the demand made to *Stern* for a comprehensive examination. The practice of having only experts approved by *Stern* review only selected material to unacceptably tight deadlines has not been satisfactory to date and will not be so in the future either. If, because of a far too narrow selection of material and far too short time for review, it should transpire that it is impossible to make major objections of a formal and substantive nature, this would not constitute compelling evidence at all, and we, among others, would have to say so publicly and in no uncertain terms. But no doubt the Federal Archives and other federal authorities would—whether they like it or not—provide *Stern* with a most welcome alibi.

Personally, I am increasingly of the opinion that these are forgeries. But even if you take a different view of the material, I believe extreme caution is called for. How would the Federal Archives look if it ultimately emerged that, after all the examinations they themselves had performed or arranged, they

had welcomed forged material with open arms? The Federal Archives would be unnecessarily dragged into the scandal awaiting *Stern*.

If all options have not been exhausted and you have not completely made your mind up yet, I would strongly advise you to demand far more than what seems to have been or is currently being negotiated. As I told Mr. von Köckritz[138] and Mr. Hölder[139] in a telephone call I had requested the day before yesterday, I consider the Federal Archives, because of its agreement with *Stern*, to have the most legitimacy to appoint the independent commission of criminological experts and historians according to its judgment, a commission that continues to be necessary. However, the condition for this would be that all of the original material received by *Stern* be handed over to the Federal Archives for a substantial period.[140] In my opinion, anything less than this procedure will utterly fail to yield a satisfactory result. Scholars and the public have a right to such a satisfactory review procedure. And even then (in addition to the examinations of form and content), there would still be the third crucial element for any procedure involving sources: a verifiable disclosure of the provenance of the alleged Hitler diaries.[141] But here again the Federal Archives will probably be stonewalled. In my opinion, this makes the two aforementioned elements all the more essential.

Best wishes,

[Broszat][142]

IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/228, fols. 4–6

Notes

Translation by Sinéad Crowe

1. *Schtonk!*, directed by Helmut Dietl (Cologne: Westdeutscher Rundfunk, 1992).

2. Robert Harris, *Selling Hitler: The Story of the Hitler Diaries* (London: Pantheon Books, 1986).

3. See Petra Cichos, *Originale Ermittlungsakte Hitler-Tagebücher* (Munich: Cichos Press, 2020); Maximilian Kutzner, "Die Stasi und die gefälschten Hitler-Tagebücher," *Deutschland Archiv*, August 19, 2021, https://www.bpb.de/geschichte/zeitgeschichte/deutschlandarchiv/338793/die-stasi-und-die-gefaelschten-hitler-tagebuecher; Maximilian Kutzner, "Die gefälschten Hitler-Tagebücher: Skandal-, Krisen- und Boykottfigurationen eines Medienereignisses," in *Krise—Boykott—Skandal: Konzertierte Ausnahmezustände*, ed. Elfi Vomberg, Sebastian Stauss, and Anna Schürmer (Munich: edition text + kritik, 2021), 169–89.

4. See Dietmar Süß, "'Hochkonjunktur für Scheinheilige': Die 'Hitler-Tagebücher' und der Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit in den 1980er Jahren," in *Demokratisierung der Deutschen: Errungenschaften und Anfechtungen eines Projekts*, ed. Tim Schanetzky et al. (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2020), 220–37.

5. See Norbert Frei, "Führerbilderwechsel: Hitler und die Deutschen nach 1945," in *Hitler und die Deutschen: Volksgemeinschaft und Verbrechen*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Thamer and Simone Erpel (Dresden: Sandstein, 2010), 142–47; Paul Nolte, "Öffentliche Geschichte: Die neue Nähe von Fachwissenschaft, Massenmedien und Publikum; Ursachen, Chancen und Grenzen," in *Aufklärung, Bildung, 'Histotainment'? Zeitgeschichte in Unterricht und Gesellschaft heute*, ed. Michele Barricelli and Julia Hornig (Frankfurt a. M.: Lang, 2008), 131–46; Harald Schmid, "Von der 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung' zur 'Erinnerungskultur': Zum öffentlichen Umgang mit dem Nationalsozialismus seit Ende der 1970er Jahre," in *Öffentliche Erinnerung und Medialisierung des Nationalsozialismus: Eine Bilanz der letzten dreißig Jahre*, ed. Gerhard Paul and Bernhard Schoßig (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010), 171–202.

6. See the special issue on *Nostalgie* in *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 18, no. 1 (2021), in particular the article by Tobias Becker (44–72), "Er war nie weg: 'Hitler-Welle' und 'Nazi-Nostalgie' in der Bundesrepublik der 1970er Jahre"; Monica Rüthers, ed., *Gute Erinnerungen an schlechte Zeiten? Wie nach 1945 und nach 1989 rückblickend über glückliche Momente in Diktaturen gesprochen wurde* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2021).

7. See Michele Barricelli and Hannes Liebrandt, eds., *Aufarbeitung und Demokratie: Perspektiven und Felder der Auseinandersetzung mit der NS-Diktatur in Deutschland* (Frankfurt a. M.: Wochenschau, 2020); Judith Keilbach, Béla Rásky, and Jana Starek, eds., *Völkermord zur Primetime: Der Holocaust im Fernsehen* (Vienna: new academic press, 2019); Frank Bösch, *Zeitenwende 1979: Als die Welt von heute begann* (Munich: C.H.Beck, 2019), 363–95; Jeffrey K. Olick, "Turning Points and Myths of German Memory," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 5, no. 3 (2008): 372–86.

8. See Klaus Große Kracht, "Kontroverse Zeitgeschichte: Historiker im öffentlichen Meinungsstreit," in *Geschichte und Öffentlichkeit: Orte, Medien, Institutionen*, ed. Sabine Horn and Michael Sauer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 15–23.

9. See Andreas F. Beitin and Roger Diederen, eds., *Lust der Täuschung: Von antiker*

Kunst bis zur Virtual Reality (Munich: Hirmer 2018); Martin Doll, *Fälschung und Fake: Zur diskurskritischen Dimension des Täuschens* (Berlin: Kadmos, 2012); Christian Fuhrmeister, "Warum man Lügen glaubt: Kunstgeschichte und Kunsthandel 1945–2016," in *Markt und Macht: Der Kunsthandel im "Dritten Reich,"* ed. Uwe Fleckner, Thomas Gaehtgens, and Christian Huemer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2017), 401–24.

10. Examples include the forged memoirs of an alleged prisoner doctor at the Auschwitz concentration camp, the forged memoirs of the alleged Holocaust survivor Binjamin Wilkomirski, and the invented family history of the historian Marie-Sophie Hingst. See "Die Historikerin, die 22 Holocaust-Opfer erfunden hat," *Der Spiegel*, May 31, 2019; Bogdan Musial, *Mengeles Koffer: Eine Spurensuche* (Hamburg: Osburg, 2019); Stefan Mächler, "Aufregung um Wilkomirski: Genese eines Skandals und seine Bedeutung," in *Das Wilkomirski-Syndrom: Eingebildete Erinnerungen oder von der Sehnsucht, Opfer zu sein*, ed. Irene Diekmann and Julius H. Schoeps (Zurich: Pendo, 2002), 86–131.

11. See Kutzner, "Stasi." Heidemann continues to deny that he provided East Berlin with information after the 1950s. See "Dann bist Du erledigt," *Der Spiegel*, July 28, 2002, and my interview with Gerd Heidemann, June 26, 2021.

12. "Auf der Straße der Landsknechte," *Der Stern*, November 22, 1964.

13. See Harris, *Hitler*, 57–59, 64, 77.

14. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BArchK), N 1832/1695, Witness statement by Fritz Stiefel, October 10, 1984.

15. Heidemann taped some face-to-face conversations and almost all of his telephone calls. He transcribed these recordings himself during his time in prison. Some of the tapes were also transcribed by the Hamburg public prosecutor's office in the run-up to the trial in 1984. BArchK, N 1932/742, tape recordings—transcripts.

16. See *Faking Hitler: Die wahre Geschichte der gefälschten Hitler-Tagebücher*, a podcast series hosted by Malte Herwig, broadcast between 2019 and 2020 by *Stern*, https://www.stern.de/faking-hitler/; *Die Jahrhundertfälschung: Hitlers Tagebücher*, 2013, directed by Jörg Müllner, television documentary, https://www.crew-united.com/de/ZDFzeit-Die-Jahrhundertfaelschung-Hitlers-Tagebuecher__169776.html.

17. See the special issue of *Praxis Geschichte*, no. 4 (July 2014): "Deutschland 1945–1961: Gegenstände 'erzählen' Geschichte(n)"; Suzie Thomas, Oula Seitsonen, and Vesa-Pekka Herva, "Nazi Memorabilia, Dark Heritage and Treasure Hunting as 'Alternative Tourism': Understanding the Fascination with the Material Remains of World War II in Northern Finland," *Journal of Field Archaeology* 41, no. 3 (2016): 331–43; Peter Wyden, *The Hitler Virus: The Insidious Legacy of Adolf Hitler* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2001), 135–82. On the term "Zeitgeschichtliche Sammlung" (contemporary collection) see also Burkhard Assmus, "'Chronistenpflicht' und 'Sammlerglück': Die Sammlung 'Zeitgeschichtliche Dokumente' am Deutschen Historischen Museum," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 4, no. 1/2 (2007): 177–88.

18. Morten Reitmayer, "Gewinner und Verlierer nach dem Boom—eine vorläufige Bilanz," in *Gewinner und Verlierer nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die westeuropäische Zeitgeschichte*, ed. Christian Marx and Morten Reitmayer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020), 9–26.

19. See Tobias Becker, "Rückkehr der Geschichte? Die 'Nostalgie-Welle' in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren," in *Zeitenwandel: Transformationen geschichtlicher Zeitlichkeit nach dem Boom*, ed. Fernando Esposito (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017), 93–118, here 103.

20. See Mark D. van Ellis, "An Amazing Collection: American GIs and Their Souvenirs of World War II," in *War and Memorials: The Second World War and Beyond*, ed. Frank Jacob and Kenneth Pearl (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2019), 105–48.

21. See Daniel Grant, "Analysis: The Market for Disturbing Nazi Artifacts Is Growing; Who Is Buying Them—and Why?," *Artnet-news*, November 27, 2019, https://news.artnet.com/market/market-nazi-art-1714905.

22. See the catalog of the 1974 Weinmüller/Neumeister auction: "Freiwillige Versteigerung aus dem ehemaligen Besitz von Hermann Göring," Munich, October 25, 1974; "Auktionen: Görings silberner Humpen," *Der Spiegel*, October 27, 1974.

23. See Harris, *Hitler*, 117.

24. Ibid., 118.

25. See "Im Namen des 'Führers,'" *Die Welt*, February 8, 2019.

26. Hellmuth Auerbach and August Priesack, "Hitlers Handschrift und Masers Lesefehler: Eine notwendige Berichtigung," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 21, no. 3 (July 1973): 334–36; August Priesack, "Hitler-Forschung oder: Was man Käufern teurer Bücher zumutet," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 25 (1974): 63–64.

27. BArchK, N 1932/1695, Witness statement by Fritz Stiefel, October 9, 1984.

28. Eberhard Jäckel and Axel Kuhn, eds., *Hitler: Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen 1905–1924* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1980), 39.

29. See Harris, *Hitler*, 117–19.

30. For example, Heidemann kept in close contact with Karl Wolff, Hans Baur, Otto Günsche, and Christa Schröder: Gerd Heidemann's personal archive (hereafter PAH), 1980—December 10, Hans Baur, Christa Schröder, Jakob Tiefenthäler telephone calls.

31. Becker, "Hitler-Welle." See Joachim Fest, *Hitler: Eine Biographie* (Frankfurt a. M.: Propyläen, 1973).

32. "Neue Serie, Adolf Hitler," *Der Stern*, July 8, 1973.

33. *Der Spiegel* published the series between October 10, 1966, and March 5, 1967; it served as the basis for Heinz Höhne, *Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf: Die Geschichte der SS* (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1967).

34. See "Liebe in Flandern: Hat Hitler als Soldat im Ersten Weltkrieg einen Sohn gezeugt?," *Der Spiegel*, November 6, 1977.

35. See Harris, *Hitler*, 43–46; Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, *The Last Days of Hitler* (London: MacMillan, 1947).

36. In *The Times* in 1970 there were 285 mentions; 1975, 300; 1978, 315; 1980, 316. See the DFG-Nationallizenzen portal.

37. See "Un grand document inédit: Hitler," *Paris Match*, August 26, 1977; "Hitler," *L'Express*, August 22, 1977; "Springtime for Hitler," *Newsweek*, April 30, 1973.

38. See Christoph Classen, "Back to the Fifties? Die NS-Vergangenheit als nationaler Opfermythos im frühen Fernsehen der Bundesrepublik," and Wulf Kansteiner, "Populäres Geschichtsfernsehen vor 'Holocaust': Die Darstellung des Nationalsozialismus und des

Zweiten Weltkrieges in drei Erfolgssendungen des ZDF," both in *Historical Social Research* 30, no. 4 (2005): 112–27 and 53–73, respectively.

39. See Frank Bösch, "Versagen der Zeitgeschichtsforschung? Martin Broszat, die westdeutsche Geschichtswissenschaft und die Fernsehserie 'Holocaust'," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 6, no. 3 (2009): 477–82; Frank Bösch, "Film, NS-Vergangenheit und Geschichtswissenschaft: Von 'Holocaust' zu 'Der Untergang'," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 55, no. 1 (January 2007): 1–32.

40. See, for example, Frank Bösch and Constantin Goschler, "Der Nationalsozialismus und die deutsche Public History," in *Public History: Öffentliche Darstellungen des Nationalsozialismus jenseits der Geschichtswissenschaft*, ed. Frank Bösch and Constantin Goschler (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2009), 7–23.

41. See Harald Schmid, "Vom publizistischen Kampfbegriff zum Forschungskonzept: Zur Historisierung der Kategorie 'Geschichtspolitik'," in *Geschichtspolitik und kollektives Gedächtnis: Erinnerungskulturen in Theorie und Praxis*, ed. Harald Schmid (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 53–75; Schmid, "Vergangenheitsbewältigung," 181; Andreas Wirsching, "Die mediale 'Konstruktion' der Politik und die 'Wende' von 1982/83," *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen* 9 (2002): 127–39; Edgar Wolfrum, *Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Der Weg zur bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung 1948–1990* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1999).

42. See Gerrit Dworok, *"Historikerstreit" und Nationswerdung: Ursprünge und Deutung eines bundesrepublikanischen Konflikts* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2015), 186, 234–40.

43. See Jacob S. Eder, *Holocaust Angst: The Federal Republic of Germany and American Holocaust Memory since the 1970s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

44. See "Hitlers Tagebücher: Der Fall Heß," *Der Stern*, May 5, 1983.

45. See Klaus-Dietmar Henke, "Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte unter der Ägide Martin Broszat 1972–1989," in *Mit dem Pathos der Nüchternheit: Martin Broszat, das Institut für Zeitgeschichte und die Erforschung des Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Claudio Natoli (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 1991), 39–57, here 52.

46. See Nicolas Berg, *Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker: Erforschung und Erinnerung* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), 568–615.

47. See Werner Röder, Hermann Weiß, and Klaus A. Lankheit, "Das Archiv des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," in *50 Jahre Institut für Zeitgeschichte: Eine Bilanz*, ed. Horst Möller and Udo Wengst (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 105–25, here 105–6.

48. My interview with Dr. Josef Henke, May 4, 2021; BArchK, N 1832/1662, Note from Lieselotte Kinder (4721 HA/6), March 7, 1974.

49. See Mikael Nilsson, "Hitler redivivus: 'Hitlers Tischgespräche' und 'Monologe im Führerhauptquartier'—eine kritische Untersuchung," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 67, no. 1 (January 2019): 105–45; Mikael Nilsson, *Hitler Redux: The Incredible History of Hitler's So-Called Table Talks* (Oxon: Routledge, 2021).

50. BArchK, N 1832/1662, Note from Lieselotte Kinder (4721 HA/6), March 7, 1974.

51. See "Edition sämtlicher Aufzeichnungen Adolf Hitlers bis 1924/25," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 21, no. 2 (April 1973): 243; "Frühe Aufzeichnungen Hitlers," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 18, 1973.

52. See "Gereimtes vom Gefreiten H.," *Der Stern*, August 23, 1980.

53. Martin Broszat, "Nationalsozialistische Konzentrationslager 1933–1945," in *Anatomie des SS-Staates*, vol. 2: *Konzentrationslager, Kommissarbefehl, Judenverfolgung*, Hans Buchheim et al. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter, 1965), 9–160.

54. See Hermann Rumschöttel, "Archive, Landesgeschichte und Zeitgeschichtsforschung: Das Projekt Widerstand und Verfolgung in Bayern 1933–1945," in Möller and Wengst, *50 Jahre*, 303–13.

55. I obtained these results by using the DFG-Nationallizenzen portal to conduct an advanced search in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*'s full-text archive. The frequency of the term over the years is as follows: 1949–59, 35 mentions; 1960–69, 75; 1970–79, 52; 1980–89, 85; 1990–99, 121; 2000–2009, 154; and 2010–19, 211.

56. See Röder, Weiß, and Lankheit, "Archiv des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," 120.

57. PAH, GHS Prof. Jäckel, Transcript of the telephone call between Michael Hepp and Gerd Heidemann, May 13, 1981.

58. See Eberhard Jäckel, Axel Kuhn, and Hermann Weiß, "Neue Erkenntnisse zur Fälschung von Hitler-Dokumenten," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 32, no. 1 (January 1984): 163–69; and Document 2 in the appendix.

59. On Stiefel, see Harris, *Hitler*, 87–90.

60. See Richard J. Evans, *Telling Lies about Hitler: The Holocaust, History and the David Irving Trial* (New York: Verso, 2002); Jobst C. Knigge, *David Irving: Vom Bestseller-Autor zum Holocaust-Leugner* (Hamburg: Dr. Kovač, 2021).

61. See Süß, "Hochkonjunktur," 230.

62. See letter to the editor, *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, December 22, 1982; letter to the editor, *National Zeitung*, December 24, 1982; "Was hat Hitler gewußt?," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, December 24, 1982.

63. See Josef Henke, "Die sogenannten Hitler-Tagebücher und der Nachweis ihrer Fälschung: Eine archivfachliche Nachbetrachtung," in *Aus der Arbeit der Archive: Beiträge zum Archivwesen, zur Quellenkunde und zur Geschichte; Festschrift für Hans Booms*, ed. Friedrich P. Kahlenberg (Boppard: Boldt, 1989), 287–317.

64. Report of the editorial committee investigating internal processes surrounding the forged Hitler diaries, undated (1983), 48. Just a few hours after the forgeries were exposed, *Stern*'s editorial team set up an internal committee to investigate the background. The final report was not published; I have a copy.

65. Archives of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (hereafter IfZ-Archiv), ID 104/228, fols. 33–34, Hermann Weiß to Josef Henke, December 30, 1982 (published as Document 1 in the appendix). On cooperation between the Federal Archives and the IfZ, see Udo Wengst, "Kooperationen des Bundesarchivs mit außeruniversitären Forschungseinrichtungen am Beispiel des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte," *Mitteilungen aus dem Bundesarchiv* 1 (2013): 80–88.

66. This was also the verdict Weiß shared with Martin Broszat in early 1983. See Süß, "Hochkonjunktur," 230.

67. BArchK, N 1832/1662, Note from Lieselotte Kinder (4721 HA/6), March 7, 1974.

68. PAH, GHS Prof. Jäckel, Transcript of a telephone call between Michael Hepp and Gerd Heidemann, May 13, 1981.

69. See in particular Süß, "Hochkonjunktur," 230–31, which quotes from Martin Broszat's open letter to Henri Nannen.

70. Document 3 in the appendix. The letter was presumably sent to various media houses, but *Der Spiegel* referred to it directly. "Viel Lärm—viel Zweifel," *Der Spiegel*, May 1, 1983.

71. See Süß, "Hochkonjunktur," 231.

72. Nannen ought to have known better, given that even before publication an expert report by scientists had determined that some of the documents examined had been written on postwar paper. In addition, more and more inconsistencies in the content were emerging, for example in the dating or the names used for certain events and persons. Report of the editorial committee investigating the internal processes surrounding the forged Hitler diaries, 35–50.

73. Document 4 in the appendix.

74. Henri Nannen, "Hochkonjunktur für Scheinheilige oder: Die Kritik der reinen Unvernunft," *Der Stern*, May 11, 1983.

75. See Document 5 in the appendix.

76. Document 6 in the appendix.

77. Quoted in "'Plump?—Das hat mich gekränkt': Konrad Kujau über seine gefälschten Hitler-Tagebücher," *Der Spiegel*, March 11, 1984.

78. The letters published here as Documents 3, 4, and 6 were previously quoted in Süß, "Hochkonjunktur."

79. Hermann Weiß (1932–2015), historian and archivist; IfZ staff historian, 1961–97; deputy director of the IfZ archives from 1972.

80. Dr. Josef Henke (b. 1944), historian and archivist; head of the Federal Archives department responsible for the Nazi Party's written and printed material.

81. Weiß is referring here to Henke's letters of December 15 and December 22, 1982, kept under the file number III-24721 HA/5.

82. Weiß is referring here to the businessman Fritz Stiefel, who first purchased documents from Konrad Kujau in 1973 and between 1978 and 1983 had on loan from Kujau a half-year volume of the forged Hitler diaries for 1935.

83. Wilhelm Arndt (1925–45), lieutenant and one of Hitler's valets; was in the plane that crashed near Börnersdorf on April 21, 1945.

84. This refers to the cemetery in Börnersdorf, Saxony, where the crew members who died in the plane crash of April 21, 1945, were buried. The plane was said to have had Hitler's personal possessions on board. Heidemann believed that Hitler's diaries were also on board.

85. The story about the major general of the East German People's Army was invented by Kujau in order to convince Heidemann that the diaries were discovered in the GDR. Kujau also used the name Fischer as an alias and claimed that Major General Fischer was his brother. There was no connection to Erwin Fischer, who had handed over parts of Joseph Goebbels's diaries to the publishing house Hoffmann und Campe in the early 1970s.

86. Rudolf Hess (1894–1987), Hitler's private secretary from 1923 to 1933; Reich minister without portfolio and "deputy Führer"; given a life sentence in 1946.

87. On May 10, 1941, Hess flew to Scotland on a peace mission without Hitler's knowledge.

88. Hitler's radio speech delivered at 1 a.m. on July 21, 1944, following the failed attempt to assassinate him on July 20, 1944.

89. Irving's visits in December 1982 and January 1983.

90. Karin Popp was the archive director's secretary.

91. Gitta Sereny (1921–2012), Austrian British journalist and historian; author of *Am Abgrund: Eine Gewissensforschung; Gespräche mit Franz Stangl, Kommandant von Treblinka, und anderen* (Frankfurt a. M.: Ullstein, 1979).

92. Werner Meyer (1932–2008), journalist and chief reporter at the Munich *Abendzeitung*.

93. Dr. Horst Möller (b. 1943), historian; deputy director of the IfZ, 1979–82; professor of contemporary history at Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1982–89; director of the Deutsches Historisches Institut Paris, 1989–92; director of the IfZ, 1992–2011.

94. This refers to the Jäckel/Kuhn collection, which they compiled between 1974 and 1981 while researching their volume; it was stored in the IfZ archives.

95. Weiß is referring here to the book *Adolf Hitler als Maler und Zeichner: Ein Werkkatalog der Ölgemälde, Aquarelle, Zeichnungen und Architekturskizzen* (Zug: Gallant, 1983), which was published by Billy F. Price.

96. Weiß is alluding to the suspicion that the documents in question were created in a forgers' workshop run by the GDR's Ministry for State Security.

97. Wolf Rüdiger Hess (1937–2001), architect; son of Ilse and Rudolf Hess.

98. Between 1981 and 1983 Fritz Stiefel had on loan a half-year volume for 1935. Before the publication of the diaries, Stiefel had to return the volume to Kujau, who then passed it on to Heidemann.

99. IfZ-Archiv, ID 104/228, fol. 32, "Freie Aussprache: Was hat Hitler gewußt?," undated newspaper cutting with David Irving's letter to the editor.

100. Heinrich Himmler's appointment calendar from the final years of the war was first published by Matthias Uhl et al., *Die Organisation des Terrors: Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers von 1943–1945* (Munich: Piper, 2020). Heidemann was never in possession of Himmler's diaries. The Federal Archives and the Hoover Institution did not have them either. They were found in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in Podolsk.

101. Enclosure 2 is missing from the file.

102. Kujau did not date any of the volumes he forged for the years preceding 1933.

103. Hans Baur (1897–1993), pilot; SS Gruppenführer; leader of the Reichsregierung squadron; Hitler's chief pilot.

104. See Document 1 in the appendix.

105. Dr. Anton Hoch (1914–81), historian; director of the IfZ archives from 1949 to 1978.

106. See pages 221–22.

107. Handwritten.

108. Dr. Werner Röder (1938–2016), historian; director of the IfZ archives from 1980 to 1999.

109. Dr. Martin Broszat (1926–89), historian; staff historian at the IfZ from 1955; IfZ

director from 1972 to 1989; honorary professor at the University of Konstanz and from 1980 at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.

110. Henri Nannen (1913–96), journalist; editor-in-chief and publisher of *Stern* from 1949 to 1983.

111. Alan Bullock (1914–2004), British historian; professor of history at the University of Oxford from 1962 to 1981; author of *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (London: Odhams, 1952).

112. The Federal Archives and *Stern* had intended to agree that the Hitler diaries would be added to the Federal Archives' holdings after they had been marketed to the public. A donation receipt was to be issued in return.

113. The letter has survived as a carbon copy and bears Martin Broszat's initials and a handwritten distribution list.

114. The forensic scientist Max Frei Sulzer wrote the first expert report on the material in 1982. Before the diaries were published in 1983, a second report was arranged by the Federal Archives in Koblenz and produced by the Criminal Police Office of the State of Rhineland-Palatinate. Arnold Rentz, a forensic chemist, submitted another report shortly before the diaries' publication in April 1983. The first expert report on the handwriting was produced in 1982 by the American autograph collector Ordway Hilton, while Heidemann consulted Wolf Rüdiger Hess and Karl Wolff about Hitler's handwriting and activities. In addition, the Federal Criminal Police Office was commissioned to produce an expert report, but this was not ready by the time the diaries were published and the forgery detected. All expert reports were commissioned before publication of the diaries on April 26, 1983. The reports' findings were inconclusive, partly because of the flawed comparison materials, which had also been produced by Kujau. Rentz's report (which stated that whitener had been detected in the paper) together with Wolff's statements suggested that the diaries were not genuine.

115. Dr. Thomas Walde (b. 1941), journalist; *Stern* employee, 1971–83; head of the contemporary history desk, 1980–83.

116. Leo Pesch (b. 1947), journalist; *Stern* employee, 1978–83.

117. Hugh Trevor-Roper (1914–2003), British historian; professor at the University of Oxford, 1957–90.

118. Dr. Gerhard L. Weinberg (b. 1928), German American historian; professor at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, 1974–96; editor of *Hitlers zweites Buch: Ein Dokument aus dem Jahre 1928* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1961). Weinberg had been consulted by the news magazine *Newsweek*, which was negotiating licensing rights with *Stern*. Unable to examine the material in detail, he was allowed only a brief look at some diary volumes that were being kept in a bank in Zurich. He also met Heidemann, who read out excerpts from the alleged diaries. All of this took place under time pressure and amid great secrecy. Weinberg never definitively claimed that the diaries were authentic and insisted that they be subjected to rigorous forensic analysis. See Gerhard L. Weinberg, "The Fake Hitler Diary," in *Hayek: A Collaborative Biography*, part 3, *Fraud, Fascism and Free Market Religion*, ed. Robert Leeson (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2014), 257–261, esp. 258.

119. Prior to the diaries' publication, Hugh Trevor-Roper downplayed his assessment and demanded that Heidemann reveal the diaries' provenance.

120. Dr. Werner Maser (1922–2007), author and historian; editor of *Hitlers Briefe und Notizen: Sein Weltbild in handschriftlichen Notizen* (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1973).

121. Dr. Henry Picker (1912–88), lawyer; Oberregierungsrat (senior government official) and legal staff member in the Führer Headquarters, 1942; stenographer of the "table talk" when Heinrich Heim was absent. See Henry Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1942*, arranged, introduced, and published by Gerhard Ritter (Bonn: Athenäum, 1951).

122. Irving was paid a fee by *Bild* for claiming at the *Stern* press conference on April 25, 1983, that the diaries were forgeries.

123. Among these historians was Joachim Fest (1926–2006), coeditor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and author of *Hitler: Eine Biographie*.

124. A total of 9.3 million deutsche marks was given to Heidemann, who was the only person in contact with Kujau, to purchase the diaries. Heidemann was instructed to forward the money to Kujau, but Kujau stated at the trial before the Hamburg Regional Court in 1985 that he had received only a small part of this sum. Heidemann was sentenced to four years and eight months in prison for embezzlement, and Kujau to four years and six months for fraud and the forgery of documents. The amount paid by *Stern* for Heidemann's travel expenses was considerable.

125. The claim that with the discovery of the diaries "large parts of the history of the Third Reich" would have to be "rewritten" (*Stern*, April 28, 1983, p. 20) was attributed to Hugh Trevor-Roper. Trevor-Roper later took legal action to deny that he had said this.

126. Typed and signed by hand.

127. Hellmuth Auerbach (1930–2001), historian; IfZ employee, 1952–95; member of the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* editorial team, 1967–95.

128. Evgueni Silianoff (1907–97), diplomat and journalist; author of various works on Hitler, e.g. *Les derniers témoins du bunker: La vérité sur la fin d'Hitler* (Paris: Filipacchi, 1989) (cowritten with Pierre Galante).

129. Raymond Cartier (1904–75), French journalist; co-founder and occasional editor-in-chief of *Paris Match*; author of history books.

130. The British *Sunday Times*, one of the licensees, published the story about the diaries on April 23, 1983, thereby breaking the terms of its agreement with *Stern*.

131. Léon Poliakov (1910–97), Russian French journalist and historian; postwar pioneer of Holocaust research.

132. Heinrich Heim (1900–88), lawyer; Martin Bormann's adjutant, 1939–42; head of the Referat für die Bearbeitung von Grundsatzfragen einer Neugestaltung Europas (Department for Addressing Fundamental Questions of a New European Order), 1942–45.

133. Erich Kempka (1910–75), chauffeur; Hitler's driver, 1932–45.

134. Handwritten.

135. Dr. Hans Booms (1924–2007), historian and archivist; honorary professor at the University of Cologne from 1970; president of the Federal Archives, 1972–89.

136. After the press conference, *Stern* gave Josef Henke (of the Federal Archives in Koblenz), who had attended the conference, three volumes of the diaries for review.

137. "BKA untersucht umstrittene Tagebücher: 'Stern' übergibt dem Bundesarchiv Exemplare der angeblichen Hitler-Aufzeichnungen," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 5, 1983.

138. Sieghardt von Köckritz (1928–96), ministry official; official in the Federal Ministry of the Interior, finally Ministerialdirigent (head of government department), 1960–93.

139. Egon Hölder (1927–2007); head of the Sub-division for Federal Cultural Affairs and Political Education in the Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1974–83; president of the Federal Statistical Office, 1983–92.

140. Underlining in the original.

141. Up to this point Heidemann had kept Kujau's existence from the magazine's editors and directors, claiming that he himself had brought the books from the GDR to the Federal Republic. According to Heidemann the books came from the plane that crashed in Börnersdorf. Only after the diaries were exposed as forgeries did he reveal that he had obtained the books from a Mr. Fischer in Stuttgart.

142. The letter has survived as a carbon copy and bears the initials of Martin Broszat and a distribution list.

About the Contributions to this Yearbook

The articles by Astrid M. Eckert, Alan E. Steinweis, and Gerhard L. Weinberg were written specifically for this volume and have not appeared previously.

Hans Rothfels's article was published originally as "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1, no. 1 (January 1953): 1–8.

Magnus Brechtken's article was published originally as "Die Gründungswege des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte—eine Aktualisierung," in *Aufarbeitung des Nationalsozialismus: Ein Kompendium*, ed. Magnus Brechtken (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2021), 61–101.

Gaëlle Fisher's article was published originally as "Geschichtsschreibung und Rechtsprechung: Martin Broszat und die Entschädigung jüdischer Überlebender des Holocaust aus Rumänien 1955 bis 1965," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 70, no. 2 (April 2022): 327–59.

René Schlott's contribution was published originally as "Ablehnung und Anerkennung: Raul Hilberg und das Institut für Zeitgeschichte," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 69, no. 1 (January 2021): 85–119.

Moritz Fischer and Thomas Schlemmer's article was published originally in a longer version as "Wider das Establishment: Die Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle Ingolstadt zwischen Apologie und Wissenschaft—aus den Akten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte und des Bundesarchivs," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 72, no. 1 (January 2024): 127–201.

Maximilian Kutzner's contribution was published originally as "Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte und die Affäre um die gefälschten Hitler-Tagebücher 1982/83," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 71, no. 3 (July 2023): 599–631.

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

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