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"The Reward of a Thing Well Done Is to Have Done It": The Rise and Fall of the INF Treaty, 1987–2019

An Introduction

On December 8, 1987 U.S. President Ronald Reagan welcomed his Soviet counterpart General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to the East Room of the White House for the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).[1] As they were preparing to sit down at the massive oak table, once used by Abraham Lincoln's cabinet at the time of the American Civil War, Reagan joked that the idea behind the INF Treaty had been "disarmingly simple." Unlike previous treaties, "it didn't simply codify the status quo." As the President made clear: "For the first time in history, the language of 'arms control' was replaced by 'arms reduction'—in this case, the complete elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles." Quoting Russian proverbs, Reagan took credit for having invented the "zero option" six years earlier. He also expressed his hope that the INF Treaty would not remain "an end in itself," but be "the beginning of a working relationship that will enable us to tackle the other urgent issues before us."[2]

Gorbachev joined Reagan in stressing the historic significance of the moment, claiming that their mutual venture had "a universal significance for mankind, both from the standpoint of world politics and from the standpoint of humanism." He exhorted his American partners, to "take full advantage of that chance and move together toward a nuclear-free world, which holds out for our children and grandchildren and for their children and grandchildren the promise of a fulfilling and happy life without fear and without a senseless waste of resources on weapons of destruction." Yet, he seemed a bit less triumphant, a bit more somber, a bit more skeptical than Reagan when it came "to bestow laurels upon each other." For Gorbachev that was still "too early." Smiling at Reagan, he quoted the famous nineteenth-century American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson: "The reward of a thing well done is to have done it." It would be up to future

1 "Reagan and Gorbachev Sign Missile Treaty and Vow to Work for Greater Reductions," in: The New York Times, December 9, 1987, p. A1.

2 Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, "Remarks on Signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty," December 8, 1987, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/120887c (last accessed January 30, 2020).

generations to "hand down their verdict on the importance of the event which we are about to witness."[3]

Now, thirty years later, a generation has passed. With the benefit of hindsight and access to new primary sources, we can take up Gorbachev's challenge. What historical "verdict" do we pass on the 1987 Reagan–Gorbachev agreement today? On the surface, things look far from good: the world is in a dismal state with regard to nuclear disarmament. The INF Treaty, Gorbachev's and Reagan's crowning achievement—for which the two could jointly have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize—is now obsolete.[4] As early as 2014, the Obama Administration started publicly to complain that Russia was in violation of the Treaty: Moscow was developing a new class of medium-range missiles.[5] Then, on October 20, 2018, two years into his Presidency, President Donald J. Trump announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the INF Treaty "in response to Russia's longstanding violation of its obligations."[6] On February 1, 2019, U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, gave a formal six-month notice of America's intention to withdraw if Russia would not return "to full and verifiable compliance." Otherwise, he said, "the Treaty will end."[7] Accordingly, on August 2, 2019, Pompeo declared that the INF Treaty had ceased to exist. Shortly thereafter the Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed that it was "formally dead."[8]

Thus, after 32 years, the INF Treaty has been relegated to Leon Trotsky's famous "dustbin of history." Reagan, Gorbachev, and their advisors, along with the representatives of their respective allies, may have done their "thing well" during the second half of the 1980s, as many of the contributions in this volume demonstrate, yet, their more hyperbolic expectations and historic predictions have not come true. Reagan's and Gorbachev's children and grandchildren are not living in a nuclear-free world. To the contrary. While few contemporaries of 1987 expected that *all* nuclear weapons could be abolished, they certainly thought that a "new thinking" had taken hold in international rela-

3 Ibid.

4 In 1990, Gorbachev alone was granted the Nobel Prize for his policy of *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* and "for his leading role in the peace process which today characterizes important parts of the international community." See https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1990/gorbachev/facts/ (last accessed March 10, 2020).

5 Amy F. Wolf (Congressional Research Service), "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress," updated August 2, 2019, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43832 (last accessed January 30, 2020).

6 "Remarks by President Trump Before Air Force One Departure," October 20, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-air-force-one-departure-4/ (last accessed January 30, 2020).

7 "U.S. Intent to Withdraw from the INF Treaty," Press Statement by Secretary of State, Michael R. Pompeo, February 2, 2019, https://www.state.gov/u-s-intent-to-withdraw-from-the-inf-treaty-february-2-2019/ (last accessed January 30, 2020).

8 "INF Nuclear Treaty: U.S. Pulls Out of Cold-War Era Pact With Russia", BBC News, August 2, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49198565 (last accessed January 30, 2020).

tions.[9] Yet, the opposite seems to be happening in recent years. Both, Russia and the United States are developing new and more sophisticated weapons, partly in response to a rising People's Republic of China.[10] In this perspective, future historians may see the ending of the INF Treaty as collateral damage arising from the failure of Russian and American containment efforts vis-à-vis Beijing. Whatever the reasons, the revocation of the INF Treaty taken together with an increasingly hostile U.S.–Russian relationship further undermines an already fragile post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. At the same time, Europeans, Americans, and Russians are at loggerheads over the best strategy for preventing Iran from becoming the tenth nuclear power.[11]

To the public eye, this all seems to be quite a turnaround from the situation even a decade ago when, in 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama delivered a famous speech in Prague to the thundering applause of his Czech audience, in which he envisioned "clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a *world without nuclear weapons*."[12] A few days later, Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the "New START Treaty," which further limited the strategic arsenals of the U.S. and Russia. Moreover, Obama promised new domestic political efforts to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of September 10, 1996 and to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of July 1, 1968, pointing to North Korea and Iran as imminent threats, but also to the need to keep terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet, in this same speech, Obama thanked both the Czech and the Polish governments for their courage in hosting a new American missile defense system. While ostensibly this was meant to protect Europe from an Iranian attack, it gave Russia an excuse to allege that the U.S. was not keeping to its side of the grand bargain struck in the late 1980s and early 1990s.[13] Therefore, despite all the extraordinary

9 To invoke Gorbachev's iconic phrase, see Marie-Pierre Rey, Gorbachev's New Thinking and Europe, 1985–1989, in: Fédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti (eds.), Europe and the End of the Cold War. A Reappraisal, London/New York 2008, pp. 23–25; Andrei Grachev, Gorbachev and the "New Political Thinking", in: Wolfgang Mueller, Michael Gehler, and Arnold Suppan (eds.), The Revolutions of 1989. A Handbook, Vienna 2015, pp. 33–46.

10 Both Russia and the U.S. saw themselves hemmed in by the INF Treaty with regard to the options available to them to respond to the development of intermediate-range nuclear weapons by China and by North Korea; see the contribution by Oliver Bange in this volume.

11 See the speech by Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy, May 21, 2018, https://www.state.gov/after-the-deal-a-new-iran-strategy/; Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, January 14, 2020, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2292574 (last accessed March 22, 2020).

12 Remarks by Barack Obama in Prague, April 5, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered (last accessed January 30, 2020), emphasis ours.

13 See the contributions by Ulrich Kühn and Oliver Bange in this volume as well as David Parker, U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Russia in the Post-Cold War Era. Ideational Legacies and Institutionalized Conflict and Co-Operation, London/New York 2019, pp. 198–204.

attention that the Trump Administration's recent actions are receiving, we should not forget that Russian–American relations were turning sour even during the Obama years. This became most clearly visible with the Russian occupation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014. But nuclear disarmament had already become a contentious issue in 2010. Future historians may find more continuity than change when it comes to the foreign policies of the Obama and Trump Administrations.[14]

Though the American withdrawal from the INF Treaty produced a short-lived outcry, surprisingly few people seem to be losing their sleep over a new "nuclear threat" in Europe today. Almost all the public attention of Europeans goes to global warming, the wars in the Near and Middle East, the questions brought up by refugees and illegal migration, and now by new pandemic diseases. When it comes to nuclear weapons, those who comment are mostly talking about Iran and North Korea, all but ignoring the new nuclear buildup in their immediate neighborhood. Although European NATO members formally backed the American allegations, they did not do so wholeheartedly. NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg cautiously stated that the "allies agree that the *most plausible* assessment would be that Russia is in violation of the Treaty."[15] In October 2018, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said he regretted the American decision. He criticized Russia for failing to clarify the "serious allegations that it has violated the INF Treaty."[16] Moreover, Maas lamented the end of the Treaty because "a piece of Europe's security has been lost."[17] Yet, the German Federal Government, while it officially continues to pursue the increasingly elusive goal of a Reaganesque INF "global zero," does not seem to give a possible new arms race in Europe much urgent consideration because of other, more pressing issues. France, after Brexit the last nuclear power within the European Union, seems to be slightly more concerned. French President Emmanuel Macron has criticized the apparent lack of awareness of most Europeans with regard to a new Russian nuclear missile threat, now that the INF Treaty has become obsolete.[18]

14 On continuity vs. change in U.S. Foreign Relations see Timothy J. Lynch, In the Shadow of the Cold War. American Foreign Policy from George Bush Sr. to Donald Trump, Cambridge 2020.

15 Amy F. Wolf (CRS), "U.S. Withdrawal from INF Treaty: What is Next?", Updated January 2, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IF11051.pdf (last accessed January 30, 2020), emphasis ours.

16 "Foreign Minister Maas on the U.S. announcement that it is withdrawing from the INF Treaty", October 21, 2018, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-inf-treaty/2151874 (last accessed January 30, 2020).

17 "Foreign Minister Maas on the end of the INF Treaty", August 2, 2019, https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/maas-inf-treaty-end/2237298 (last accessed January 30, 2020).

18 Speech of French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on the Defense and Deterrence Strategy delivered on February 7, 2020, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-deterrence-strategy.

1. What Was the INF Treaty? And What Can We Learn from It?

German Foreign Minister Maas's August 2, 2019 statement correctly points to an apparently forgotten fact: that the 1987 INF Treaty was about a new security architecture for Europe. Its structure was put in place in the years between 1987 and 1994—during the last years of the Cold War and the first decade after its end. The INF Treaty became the first milestone of this new architecture of "relaxing tensions", which was clearly characterized by a massive reduction of weapons of mass destruction. Whereas the INF Treaty had only reduced a very small number of the overall nuclear arsenals of the superpowers, the START I Treaty of July 31, 1991 (expired in 2009) led to deep cuts in the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers. Moreover, the so-called "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" of 1991/92 melted away the bulk of U.S. and Soviet short-range tactical or "battlefield" nuclear weapons.[19] With the peaceful revolutions and the end of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, a new era of democracy, international cooperation, harmony and trust seemed to emerge. The "Charter of Paris for a new Europe," signed by 34 heads of states and governments on November 21, 1990, is the best known manifesto of this burgeoning optimistic belief in a "New World Order." Moreover, the so-called "Helsinki process" was made permanent by the transformation of the noncommittal "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" (CSCE) into a more ambitious "Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe" (OSCE) in 1994.[20]

The INF Treaty of 1987 was the landmark starting point of this epochal development. Most importantly, it abolished a whole class of nuclear weapons that would have carried their "payloads" (nuclear warheads) to a European theater of war and to the two Germanies in particular.

At the end of the day, the INF Treaty may have helped to increase *Europe's* security, but we should keep in mind that, of course, neither of the superpowers acted for primarily altruistic reasons or just to please their European allies. Quite the opposite. For the Soviet Union, the deployment of the fast-flying American Euromissiles was a devastating move against its security. The ballistic Pershing II missiles could reach their Soviet destinations within less than 15 minutes, reducing the time to reflect and react nearly to nil.[21] Worse, the USSR had

19 See the contribution by Oliver Bange in this volume.

20 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Our History", https://www.osce.org/whatistheosce (last accessed February 6, 2020); on the Helsinki process see Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah Snyder (eds.), The CSCE and the End of the Cold War. Diplomacy, Societies, and Human Rights, 1972–1990, New York/Oxford 2019.

21 The Soviet Union, as well as Western peace movements, postulated that the flight-time of a Pershing II from launch to impact would add up to 5 to 8 minutes whereas NATO's military experts calculated about 15 to 20 minutes. This difference was due to the fact that the Warsaw Pact's flight reconnaissance had a lower performance than NATO's. It thus could verify Pershing II launches only after about 10 minutes as West German diplomats realized quite

no antidotes whatsoever against this lethal threat. In his memoirs, Gorbachev leaves no doubt that the INF Treaty massively improved the security of the Soviet Union: "By signing the INF Treaty we had literally removed a pistol held to our head."[22] The United States mainland, of course, was never directly threatened by Soviet intermediate-range missiles (except for Alaska and the Aleutian Islands). Nevertheless, Washington felt relieved by the "decoupling" effect of the Treaty. Henceforward, the U. S. regained its free hand in choosing how to react to a case of Soviet aggression in Europe, without automatically being drawn into a nuclear exchange with its Cold War adversary right from the very beginning of any ensuing military conflict.

In his manifesto *Perestroika*, published in late 1987, Gorbachev proclaimed: "The INF Treaty represented the first well-prepared step on our way out of the Cold War, the first harbinger of the new times."[23] Some contemporaries went even further, claiming that this ground-breaking agreement had ended the Cold War altogether. Political Scientist Francis Fukuyama famously talked about the end of the Cold War epoch in a piece published during the summer of 1989, months before the final crisis of Communism; and historian John Lewis Gaddis, then the doyen of American Cold War Studies, wrote in his 1987 study *The Long Peace* as if he were looking back to a bygone period.[24] With superpower conflict gone, and the nuclear arms race over, the Cold War had seemingly ceased to exist. Again, with the benefit of hindsight, we know that this assumption was rather premature. Regional "East–West" conflicts like those in Afghanistan and Angola were far from being over in 1987. Moreover, the collapse of the Socialist states in Eastern Europe and of the USSR itself was still two or three years away. Nevertheless, while historians have engaged in a long-standing argument over the extent to which ideological or geopolitical conflicts drove the Cold War, the "nuclear arms race" was certainly one of its defining features. Today, the "new

late in spring 1983. See Memorandum of Political Director in the FRG's Foreign Office, Pfeffer, January 28, 1983, in: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik (henceforward: AAPD) 1983, ed. by Tim Geiger, Matthias Peter, and Mechthild Lindemann, Doc. 20, p. 103, Footnote 8.

22 Mikhail Gorbatschow, Memoirs, New York 1996, p. 444. Gorbachev had already used the metaphor of the Pershing II as "a gun pressed to our temple" in a preparatory meeting for the Reykjavik summit on October 4, 1986; see Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton (eds.), The Last Superpower Summits, Budapest/New York 2016, p. 163.

23 Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika. New Thinking for Our Country and the World, New York/London 1988, p. 443.

24 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, in: The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–18; John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, Oxford 1987; see also Nicholas Guyatt, The End of the Cold War, in: Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, Oxford 2013, pp. 605–622; Jonathan Hunt and David Reynolds, Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow, 1985–1988, in: Kristina Spohr and David Reynolds (eds.), Transcending the Cold War. Summits, Statecraft, and the Dissolution of Bipolarity in Europe, 1970–1990, Oxford 2016, pp. 153–174.

missile crisis," which in 2019 led to the end of the INF Treaty, may bring us "back to the future" of the 1980s.[25]

So, what was the now defunct INF Treaty?

First, the INF Treaty abolished all American and Soviet land-based nuclear missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers and associated support structures. These were to be scrapped within three years from when the Treaty entered into force.[26] This so-called "double zero option" referred to the removal of both long-range INF (LRINF 1,000–5,000 km) as well as shorter-range INF (SRINF 500–1,000 km) missiles from Europe.

This means, *second*, that air- or sea-launched missiles were not covered, nor were the atomic warheads necessarily destroyed.[27] The INF Treaty talks addressed only a certain type of missiles and their support structures—a point which is often overlooked. This does not diminish the overall diplomatic importance of the Treaty, but it does put the achievement of Reagan and Gorbachev into perspective.

Third, the INF Treaty eradicated a whole category of nuclear weapons. By May 31, 1991, at the end of the three-year destruction period that had started with the exchange of the instruments of ratification by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow on June 1, 1988, exactly 1,846 Soviet and 846 American INF missiles were to be eliminated.[28] These 2,692 missiles amounted to just 3 to 4 per cent of the existing nuclear arsenals.[29] This fact—that

25 Which is one of the scenarios that Ulrich Kühn lays out in his contribution.

26 Which meant after ratification. In the American case, this gained Senate approval on May 27, 1988. Ratification happened on June 1, 1988; on ratification see Robert Service, The End of the Cold War, 1985–1991, London 2015, p. 296; Maynard W. Glitman, The Last Battle of the Cold War. An Inside Account of Negotiating the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, New York/Basingstoke 2006, pp. 223–233.

27 In one of the annexes to the INF Treaty, in the "Protocol on Procedures governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems", Article II, No. 3 it was laid down: "Prior to a missile's arrival at the elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed." See https://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/text/inf4.htm. As the "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" reported in autumn 1990, the nuclear warhead of the dismantled Pershing II (W85) was on the verge of returning to Europe as a recycled and converted new nuclear bomb, also based on the original warhead ground-model B61 Mod. See Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, Beating Swords into Swords, in: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 46/9 (1990), pp. 14–17. See also "Aus alt mach neu", in: Stern No. 45, October 31, 1990.

28 Up to May 1991, the United States eliminated 234 Pershing II and 443 BGM-109 Cruise Missiles, as well as 169 Pershing IA SRINF missiles, while the Soviet Union eliminated 654 SS-20, 149 SS-4, 6 SS-5, and 80 SSC-X-4 INF missiles, as well as 239 SS-23 and 718 SS-12 SRINF missiles. See Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Chronology, https://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/inf-chron.htm (last accessed March 11, 2020). On treaty implementation see the essay by Wolfgang Richter in this volume.

29 See Telegram No. 2448 of German Ambassador Hellbeck, Bejing, on conversation between Bavarian Premier Minister Franz Josef Strauß and Chinese Premier minister Zhao Ziyang, October 15, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 288, p. 1469. On the Soviet side, the percentage of eliminated nuclear weapons from the global stockpile was estimated at 4 per cent, Eduard

the INF Treaty left about 97 per cent of the then nuclear stockpiles completely untouched—was vociferously pointed out by critics of the agreement at the time, but it seems to be forgotten by most historians or political observers nowadays.

Fourth, the British and French had "independent deterrents", and these were not included in the nuclear disarmament talks of the two superpowers. This was the result of long and protracted diplomatic wrestling which had gone on ever since the superpowers started the Geneva INF negotiations after NATO's Dual-Track Decision in 1979. Although initially, during his visit to Moscow on July 1, 1980, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) had been told by the Soviet leadership that the French and British "third countries systems" were not supposed to be part of future INF Talks between the superpowers,[30] the USSR soon pressed for their inclusion in the Geneva talks. Though sections of Western Europe's political elites and societies were inclined to accept this Soviet demand, it did not become NATO policy. Keeping the British and French nuclear weapons out of an INF deal remained a precondition for the Alliance. It was Gorbachev who, in 1986, finally accepted that an INF Treaty would solely deal with American and Soviet systems. In this way he helped to overcome one major obstacle that had hitherto caused stalemate in the negotiations.[31]

Fifth, the INF Treaty bound only the U. S. and the Soviet Union (and accordingly its successor state Russia). As a bilateral agreement it could not take care of any future INF proliferation. That China might at some stage become a potential threat was not yet regarded as a matter of great urgency back in 1987. However, already at the time of the negotiations, members of the Soviet military had misgivings about leaving East Asia out. Western experts were aware of this, too, but given the situation in the 1980s, East–West issues took priority over anything else.[32]

Sixth, one can therefore argue that the INF Treaty was a product of the Cold War world order, in which the superpower (or East–West) conflict was dominant. While the INF Treaty helped the powers overcome this conflict and contributed to the fall of Communism in Europe, its value was much diminished in a post-Cold War world marked by the rise of new nuclear powers such as China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Why should Russia or the United States, so the reasoning goes, have continued to bind themselves by a pact that was tying their hands in their strategic rivalry with China?[33]

Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, London 1991, p. 92; Aleksandr G. Savel'ev and Nikolaj N. Detinov, The Big Five. Arms Control and Decision Making in the Soviet Union, Westport, Conn. 1995, p. 137.

30 Memorandum of Conversation, in: AAPD 1980, Munich 2011, Doc. 193, p. 1038.

31 See the contributions by Oliver Barton and Christian Wenkel to this volume.

32 For the Asian aspects of the INF Talks see Glitman, Last Battle of the Cold War, pp. 145–156.

33 See the chapter by Ulrich Kühn in this volume; also see Christian Leuprecht, Joel J. Sokolsky, and Thomas Hughes (eds.), North American Strategic Defense in the 21st Century. Security and Sovereignty in an Uncertain World, Cham 2018.

Even though the INF Treaty is dead, what lessons does it hold for us today?

First of all, many historians, along with international relations and security experts, agree that, despite being a bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States only, the INF Treaty was a core piece, central to the formation of a new and multilateral post-Cold War security architecture for Europe.

Second, it helped to end the Cold War and to create an international environment conducive to the post-Communist transformation of Central and Eastern Europe.

Third, given that the post-Cold War order was already coming to an end in the first decade of the twenty-first century, as the "war on terror" helped to push America in new directions, it is actually surprising that the INF Treaty managed to survive for more than 30 years, making it one of the longest-lasting international disarmament treaties ever.

Fourth, while its demise was perhaps overdue, its emergence was a bit of a surprise. It took only four years, after a new heightening of tensions during the early 1980s and the deployment of new nuclear weapons in Western Europe as part of NATO's Dual-Track Decision in late 1983, before the INF Treaty was signed.[34] It was a policy reversal that made contemporaries gasp.

Fifth, a key element was "trust". The 1983–87 reversal would not have been possible, if Reagan and Gorbachev had not learned to trust each other and if their advisors as well as their societies had not gone along.[35]

Thus, the history of the INF Treaty may hold a tentatively optimistic message for the future, despite its recent demise. If the conditions are right, trust can be built step by step and lead to astounding results. It is often said, that trust is something that needs work,[36] and in general terms this is certainly true. But it

34 The Dual-Track (or sometimes Double-Track) Decision has been treated extensively in the literature, see the previous volume by the editors, Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive, Munich 2011, as well as Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War, Washington, D. C./Stanford, Cal. 2015; Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Bernd Rother (eds.), Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945–1990, New York/Oxford 2012; Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s, New York/Oxford 2016.

35 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Joshua Baker, and Laura Considine, Trust or Verfication? Accepting Vulnerability in the Making of the INF Treaty, in: Martin Klimke, Reinhild Kreis, and Christian F. Ostermann (eds.), Trust, But Verify. The Politics of Uncertainty and the Transformation of the Cold War Order, 1969–1991, Washington, D. C. 2016, pp. 121–139.

36 George H. W. Bush wrote in hindsight: "You can't develop or earn this mutual trust and respect unless you deliberately work at it." Quoted in J. Simon Rofe, Trust between Adversaries and Allies. President George H. W. Bush, Trust, and the End of the Cold War, in: Klimke, Kreis, Ostermann (eds.), Trust, pp. 63–81, here p. 63; on trust see the contribution by Bernd Greiner to this volume.

seems that the work of building personal trust between political leaders does *not* need years and years of previous cooperation—as Reagan and Gorbachev realized quite rapidly in 1986–87.[37] Nevertheless, since it was definitely in the *interest* of both sides to *trust* each other, one can say that without this interest a trust-based relationship would not have emerged.[38] Though the INF Treaty may now be history, its genesis as well as its legacies may offer us valuable insights and lessons. It is these that this volume will address. The five thematic sections of our book will look at the superpower negotiations (I), then move on to the reactions of Western (II) and Eastern Allies (III), before surveying the socio-political contexts in selected countries (IV). The final chapters will examine the legacy of the INF Treaty and attempt a look into the future (V).

2. It Takes Two to Tango: Reagan, Gorbachev, and the Superpowers

A history of the INF Treaty needs to start with Ronald Reagan—as the contributions in the first section of this volume demonstrate. But then we need to move swiftly on to Gorbachev, though he did not enter the scene until 1985. So, Reagan happens to be first, since he was the first to come up publicly with what would later be called the "zero option," which became the core principle of the INF Treaty. In a speech at the National Press Club in Washington on November 18, 1981, he proposed the cancellation of American "deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. This would be a historic step. With Soviet agreement, we could together substantially reduce the dread threat of nuclear war which hangs over

37 Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton (eds.), The Last Superpower Summits. Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush. Conversations that Ended the Cold War, New York 2016; Robert Service, The End of the Cold War, 1985–1991, London 2015.

38 That old habits die hard is shown by the fact that the visit of Secretary Shultz to the USSR in April 1987, which brought Gorbachev's offer of the double zero solution was in instant danger of cancellation because of allegations that the KGB had bugged the construction area of the new American Embassy in Moscow; see George Pratt Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph. My Years as Secretary of State, New York 1993, pp. 889–891; for the Soviet side Pavel Palazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter, University Park 1997, pp. 65 f. Another telling episode was witnessed by Colin Powell, in winter 1987, as Reagan's National Security Advisor. He remembers that the National Security Agency, the CIA and other intelligence agencies heavily tapped the White House before the signing ceremony of the INF Treaty in order to get information about the Soviet "nuclear football" that of course permanently accompanied the General Secretary just as did the nuclear emergency satchel of the President on the American side: "Anybody walking across the White House lawn wearing a pacemaker during the summit would be lucky not to be microwaved." See Colin Powell, My American Journey, New York 1995, p. 358.

the people of Europe. This, like the first footstep on the moon, would be a giant step for mankind."[39]

Reagan's speech caused consternation among some of his advisors as well as among his adversaries. It also left some of the NATO Allies puzzled.[40] But it fits well with his overall, relatively consistent approach to nuclear weapons as both *Beth Fischer* and *Ronald Granieri* argue in their contributions to this volume. Not hesitating to compare the "zero option" to the "race to the moon," which epitomized the high point of superpower Cold War rivalry, Reagan also linked his proposal to earlier efforts of détente. It is worthwhile re-reading Reagan's speech, because Reagan places himself in the context of the Nixon–Kissinger approach to the Soviet Union, which has often been contrasted with an allegedly more "hawkish" Reaganesque or "neo-conservative" approach.[41] Quoting from a letter he had written to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev earlier that year, Reagan reminded the General Secretary that he had been first introduced to Brezhnev by Nixon, when in June 1973 the two leaders had met at Nixon's western home in San Clemente.[42] At that time Reagan was serving as Governor of California:

> Mr. President: When we met, I asked if you were aware that the hopes and aspirations of millions of people throughout the world were dependent on the decisions that would be reached in those meetings. You took my hand in both of yours and assured me that you were aware of that and that you were dedicated with all your heart and soul and mind to fulfilling those hopes and dreams.[43]

Few took Reagan's reference to détente at face value. The way he reminded his audience of a tradition of mutual interaction and negotiation was probably seen as a clever PR trick disguising a more sinister agenda. After all, Reagan had been elected as a staunch anti-Communist and a "crusader for freedom," who believed in "peace through strength."[44] And, though historians continue to argue about Reagan's intentions and debate the extent to which the labels of "hawk" or "dove" can be applied to him with much explanatory value, the emerging historiographic

39 Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/111881a (last accessed February 3, 2020).

40 The British side knew in advance, see the contribution by Oliver Barton in this volume; West Germany all along had pushed for the "zero option", see Tim Geiger's contribution in this volume.

41 See Justin Vaïsse, Neoconservatism. The Biography of a Movement, Cambridge 2010.

42 Tiffany Thompson, Summitry and President Nixon's Legacy, in: Richard Nixon Foundation Website (January 12, 2017) https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2017/01/summitry-president-nixons-legacy/ (last accessed February 7, 2020).

43 Reagan, Remarks, November 18, 1981, ibid.

44 James Graham Wilson, Ronald Reagan's Engagement and the Cold War, in: Bradley Linn Coleman and Kyle Longley (eds.), Reagan and the World. Leadership and National Security, 1981–1989, Lexington, KY 2017, pp. 11–29, here pp. 14 f.

picture is that of a man who stuck to his guns and consistently followed a nuclear abolitionist agenda.[45]

Beth Fischer, in her chapter on "Nuclear Abolitionism, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty," lends support to the idea of Reagan, "the consistent," qualifying her own earlier argument of a "Reagan Reversal" in 1983/84.[46] As Fischer argues, Reagan's announcement of a massive military buildup, after entering office in January 1981, his "zero proposal" of November of that same year, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which he made public in a seminal speech on March, 23 1983, should not be seen as being in conflict with each other.[47] Reagan had unconventional views about security, but basically, as *Fischer* affirms, he "abhorred nuclear weapons and sought to eliminate them." The President did not believe in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) nor did he buy into flexible response.[48] He thus undercut the core principle that NATO had upheld in its strategy since 1968.[49] By building up the American military arsenal, he wanted to force the Soviets to the negotiating table so as to make massive cuts in the nuclear deterrents possible and to end the Cold War. SDI, too, served the goal of making nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," as the President famously framed it.[50]

Part of the trouble Reagan faced was that neither the governments of the Western Allies nor many of his own advisors bought into his enthusiasm for abolishing nuclear weapons. As *Ronald Granieri* shows in his contribution "The American Road to INF, 1986–1987," contemporaries as well as historians have had difficulties reconciling themselves to the idea "that armament and disarmament always went together." To some extent the future fortieth President contributed to this confusion, because in 1976, as well as in 1980, he had run as a staunch critic of the disarmament process. The "zero option" idea, while rejected by some (more "dovish") members of his Administration, was shared by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the hardliners within the Pentagon.[51] The same

45 Ryan Carpenter, Researching Reagan. A Guide for Scholars of National Security Policy during the Ronald Reagan Presidency, in: Coleman and Longley (eds.), Reagan and the World, pp. 293–306; Jeffrey L. Chidster and Paul Kengor (eds.), Reagan's Legacy in a World Transformed, Cambridge, Mass. 2015.

46 Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, Columbia 1997.

47 On SDI, most recently, Ralph Dietl, The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks, 1981–1988, Lanham 2019.

48 See also Beth Fischer, A Question of Morality: Ronald Reagan and Nuclear Weapons, in: Coleman and Longley (eds.), Reagan and the World, pp. 31–49.

49 See Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution. A Crisis of Credibility 1966–1967, Oxford 2005.

50 Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/32383d (last accessed February 3, 2020).

51 See also Ronald J. Granieri, Beyond Cap the Foil. Caspar Weinberger and the Reagan Era Defense Buildup, in: Bradley Coleman and Kyle Longley (eds.), The Enduring Legacy. Leadership and National Security Affairs during the Reagan Presidency, Lexington, KY 2017, pp. 51–80.

group was also most enthusiastic about SDI. Yet, if it had not been for Reagan's consistent commitment to the abolition of the nuclear arsenal, the INF Treaty might never have come about. After all, many members of the national security establishment could not imagine that abolishing a whole class of nuclear weapons would be feasible.[52]

Granieri also reminds us of the very mundane, domestic political context that helped pave the way to the INF Treaty. Part of the winding road to the INF Treaty was the "near-death experience" of the Iran-Contra affair, during which Reagan's team, in direct violation of Congressional orders, sold arms to Iran and used the proceeds to support the anti-Sandinista "Contra" rebels in Nicaragua.[53] The scandal left Reagan exposed to accusations of criminality or incompetence, because he claimed not to know what his underlings had done. A severely wounded Reagan urgently needed a success. As the historian Sean Wilentz has written, Reagan "found, in his work with Gorbachev, an escape route out of his political morass."[54] As Gorbachev gave him a helping hand, Reagan managed to accomplish what he had set out to do from the beginning. As *Granieri* writes, "an understanding of the winding path should temper the enthusiasm of [Reagan's] hagiographers." The INF Treaty was not the result of chance, but of a "combination of principles and the political realities of the moment."

This brings us to the second father of the INF Treaty, Mikhail Gorbachev, who introduced his own landmark proposal to abolish nuclear weapons in January 1986. As *Svetlana Savranskaya* and *Thomas Blanton* argue in their chapter "The Nuclear Abolition Package of 1986 and the Soviet Road to INF," Soviet nuclear thinking had started to change even before Gorbachev came to power in March 1985. As early as the mid-1970s, Soviet military planners had come to realize that the nuclearization of European war scenarios "would negate the Soviet/Warsaw Pact's advantages in conventional forces over NATO." However, the NATO Dual-Track Decision as well as the increasingly hostile Soviet–American relationship limited the space for "new thinking" among Soviet military planners. Thus, Gorbachev's election to General Secretary helped the military reformers gain the upper hand in the Soviet political machine at the end of 1986, and finally prevail in 1987.[55]

According to *Savranskaya* and *Blanton*, Gorbachev was not initially the radical reformer we think of today; but he "was committed to stopping the arms race which he saw as both dangerous for humankind and devastating for the Soviet economy." Even though the INF Treaty cut deeper into the Soviet nuclear arsenal than the American one, Gorbachev and his supporters came to see it as being in

52 See Wilson, Ronald Reagan's Engagement, pp. 11–29.

53 See James F. Siekmeier, The Iran-Contra Affair, in: Andrew L. Johns (ed.), A Companion to Ronald Reagan, Malden/Oxford 2015, pp. 321–338.

54 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan. A History, 1974–2008, New York 2009, p. 244.

55 See also Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, Chapel Hill 2007, pp. 294–296; Jonathan Haslam, Russia's Cold War. From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall, New Haven/London 2011, pp. 354–363.

the interest of Soviet security. Early into his tenure Gorbachev was exposed to the thinking of leading military figures not normally seen as part of his reform team, such as the Chief of General Staff, Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, and these men promoted their own Soviet version of the "zero solution." Though they did not expect the Americans to accept "zero," if they were actually to do so, the Soviets would be able to get by on their conventional superiority. When Gorbachev revealed this plan in the spring of 1986, the American side was not yet ready. While U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz seems to have seen the beauty in it—in part because the Reagan Administration was plunging into the Iran-Contra abyss—negotiations did not lead to any results in 1986.[56]

It was the failed Summit at Reykjavik in October 1986 that opened the road to the INF Treaty, as *Savranskaya* and *Blanton* show. At this point, the Soviet military was stalling, because SDI was going ahead and the American side refused to compromise on it. In 1983, when Reagan first introduced SDI, the Soviets still believed that it could be workable. By early 1987, however, Gorbachev and his associates had come to understand from their own experts that SDI was technologically not feasible, at least not in the foreseeable future. Moreover, and "perhaps even more important," *Savranskaya* and *Blanton* propose, "the perception of threat from the United States was giving way to the new sense of trust and productive cooperation that emerged from the experience of the two previous Summits" and this "promised important payoffs in the future." Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze therefore sidestepped the Defense Ministry and forced the Soviet military to make concessions. The Soviets were even willing to go beyond American expectations when it came to the all-important verification regime, which became "remarkably extensive and intrusive." This turned out to be the most potent symbol yet of trust between the superpowers.[57]

3. Europe: Left Out in the Cold? The Uneasy Reaction of the Western Allies

Any history of the INF Treaty also needs to bring the 1979 NATO Dual-Track Decision in at the start. After all, the negotiations between Soviets and Americans about intermediate-range nuclear forces hoped to put a perceived military imbalance in *Europe* right.[58] In 1979 NATO had been addressing a growing European

56 See Granieri's contribution in this volume.

57 Accordingly, the demise of further INF verification after 2001 was part of the growing tensions between the Russians and Americans; see the contribution by Wolfgang Richter in this volume.

58 While it had serious ramifications for the situation in East Asia, which contributed to the recent demise of the INF Treaty, concerns about China were tabled in 1987. The genesis of the NATO Dual-Track Decision is covered by the contributions of Oliver Barton and Tim Geiger in this volume; see also Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg; Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), Nuclear Crisis; as well as Nuti et al. (eds.), Euromissile Crisis.

security problem, when it answered the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles with a threat to deploy 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 land-based Cruise Missiles if negotiations over the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear arsenals failed to yield success. From NATO's point of view, it was the Soviet challenge that had been the catalyst for a Western arms upgrade, for, as West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl put it in hindsight, since the mid-1970s the Warsaw Pact had taken advantage of détente and "acquired substantial military predominance in Europe."[59] This was creating a problem for NATO because its doctrine of *flexible response*, adopted in 1967, required a commensurate reaction to military aggression. Since NATO had no weapon equivalent to the SS-20, if there were a case of nuclear aggression the U.S. could only stand by its Allies by threatening to use its own strategic arsenal, and this might well provoke a retaliatory Soviet intercontinental strike on the American homeland.[60]

While the logic of NATO's nuclear doctrine has always been contested, it is important to realize that the 1979 Dual-Track Decision was at least as much about the credibility of the Alliance and the strength of West European–American ties as it was about the Soviet threat. Therefore, to see the Dual-Track Decision as a direct response to a unilateral nuclear arms buildup by the Eastern bloc is only half the story. As is clear from today's vantage point, it was to some extent an unintended consequence of the relaxation of Cold War tensions during the 1960s and 1970s. As the "father of the Dual-Track Decision," West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt argued in a speech delivered in October 1977 to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, the SALT negotiations on intercontinental ballistic missiles between the superpowers had "forgotten" the intermediate-range missiles.[61] The SS-20 fell into a "grey area" because of its target range of under 5,000 km, which only threatened Europe and the East Asian allies of the U.S., but not the American mainland. Since the SS-20 was not considered to be an intercontinental weapon, the European theater of war could potentially be isolated, if the American President decided not to use intercontinental weapons in response to an SS-20 attack on Western Europe. The SS-20 therefore created a problem for NATO because the doctrine of *flexible*

59 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990, Munich 2005, p. 140.

60 The concept of "flexible response" harks back to the late 1950s. It became NATO's official policy in December 1967 through MC 14/3, see Report of the Military Committee of NATO, January 16, 1968, http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a680116a.pdf.

61 Helmut Schmidt, The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, in: Survival 20/1 (1978), pp. 2–10; on Schmidt's geopolitical nightmares see Philipp Gassert, Did Transatlantic Drift Help European Integration? The Euromissiles Crisis, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the Quest for Political Cooperation, in: Kiran Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode (eds.), European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s, New York 2013, pp. 154–176, here pp. 161 f.; Tim Geiger, Die Regierung Schmidt-Genscher und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss, in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds), Zweiter Kalter Krieg, pp. 95–122, here pp. 97–100; Kristina Spohr, The Global Chancellor. Helmut Schmidt and the Reshaping of the International Order, Oxford 2016, pp. 85–101.

response it had adopted in 1967/68 required an appropriately nuanced reaction to military aggression. Since NATO had no equivalent weapon to match the SS-20, this inequality in the escalation continuum allegedly destabilized the nuclear balance of power.

Obviously, there would not have been the need for an INF Treaty if NATO had not come up with its 1979 Dual-Track Decision. Since the INF Treaty addressed the military balance of power in Europe, America's European allies observed what was going on between the superpowers with great apprehension. The huge strides made by Reagan and Gorbachev towards an INF Treaty took care of the threatening SS-20s. But these negotiations did nothing to address the still very considerable military superiority of the Warsaw Pact in Europe. West European leaders like Kohl and Thatcher had been wedded to pushing the NATO Dual-Track Decision through their reluctant parliaments and publics. Grudgingly, they had to go along with Reagan and Gorbachev and the public mood in the West, which reacted enthusiastically to an impending INF Treaty because it was sold as a first step towards even bigger disarmament.[62] After all, the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced (conventional) Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe had been dragging on without success for more than a decade—since 1973. No one in 1987 expected these negotiations to yield any meaningful results anymore, so first thoughts were ventilated about a new forum for conventional arms reductions.[63] On paper, the Soviets still held a huge military advantage with respect to conventional, short-range nuclear forces (SNF), and chemical weapons in Europe. Accordingly, some feared that after an INF Treaty, NATO would not be able to deter the Soviets adequately—at least not within the framework of its still binding nuclear doctrine.

Early on, the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, voiced her misgivings about "Ronnie's" nuclear abolitionist agenda, as *Oliver Barton* shows in his contribution "'The Most Staunch and Dependable of the Allies'? Britain and the Zero Option." Thatcher admitted in her memoirs that she always had "mixed feelings" about the INF talks, because they enshrined the "zero option" and thus brought back the very thing that Schmidt had been concerned about: a possible decoupling of European NATO partners from the American nuclear security guarantee and the creation of a "gap" in NATO's deterrence continuum.[64] So when, in November 1981, Reagan came up with the "zero option" as a political goal for the opening Geneva negotiations, the "Iron Lady" publicly welcomed it, but in reality she and her defense officials had "deep misgivings about Reagan's declared negotiating objective." Moreover, the British security establishment

62 On public opinion see the contributions by Barton, Gassert, Kemper, and Juntunen in this volume.

63 Only in 1989 were the MBFR negotiations replaced by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations (also in Vienna), which would then lead to huge cuts in conventional armaments; see the contribution by Tim Geiger in this volume.

64 Margaret Thatcher, Downing Street Years, London 1993, p. 771.

harbored similar misgivings about Schmidt's idea, that just by securing the removal of the SS-20, all would be well and dandy: "Britain's overriding strategic interest was in INF modernization; arms control was the price, not the prize." This was quite the opposite of what Reagan and Schmidt seemed to be thinking.

Because of the political affinity between Reagan and Thatcher, as well as the peculiar nature of their "special" security (and in particular their nuclear "sharing" partnership), the British were in a unique position to try to influence the American side. But, as *Barton* tells us, the ways in which Reagan's call for the "zero option" on November 18, 1981 had come about, "were a galling reminder of the limitations to Britain's insight and influence in Washington, at least when it came to arms control." The British (together with the French, who from 1966 were outside NATO military integration anyway) were successful in keeping their own nuclear capabilities outside the INF disarmament talks, but they were now finding themselves less successful in keeping the Americans from embracing "zero." Nevertheless, with the negotiations in Geneva heading nowhere and the Soviets politically stalled during the final Brezhnev years, the Thatcher Administration achieved its main goal of having the Dual-Track Decision implemented, and this created the hoped-for "seamless robe of deterrence" as well as a position of strength that the British thought was essential to stunt any Soviet efforts at the "decoupling" of Western Europe.[65]

Margaret Thatcher always took pride in having been the first of the major Western European leaders to have met Gorbachev. This was even before he became General Secretary, when he visited London in 1984 and she famously proclaimed that he was "a man we can do business with."[66] This did not prevent her from pursuing a strong anti-Communist agenda and from having a vision of Communism coming to an end in Eastern Europe.[67] Thatcher, like Kohl, was very outspoken about Soviet military strength. She drove the point home during her seminal visit to Moscow in March 1987: "You have superior intermediate-range weapons and strategic offensive weapons, if we count warheads, as well as chemical and conventional arms. You are very powerful, not weak."[68] Now, this perceived military strength of the Soviet Union presented conservative Western

65 Kristan Stoddart, Creating the "Seamless Robe of Deterrence": Great Britain's Role in NATO's INF Debate, in: Nuti et al. (eds.), Euromissile Crisis, pp. 176–195, here p. 191; Beatrice Heuser and Kristan Stoddart, Großbritannien zwischen Doppelbeschluss und Anti-Kernwaffen-Protestbewegungen, in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg, pp. 305–324.

66 The Thatcher–Gorbachev Conversations, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 422, ed. by Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB422/.

67 Ilaria Poggiolini, Thatcher's Double-Track Road to the End of the Cold War. The Irreconcilability of Liberalization and Preservation, in: Bozo et al. (eds.), Visions, pp. 266–279.

68 Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher, March 30, 1987, Moscow, in: Thatcher–Gorbachev Conversations, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB422/docs/Doc%201%201987-03-30%20Gorbachev-Thatcher%20memcon.pdf.

leaders like Thatcher and Kohl with a problem: the INF Treaty would not only interrupt the Western nuclear deterrence continuum, but would also resurrect the old problem that had already haunted NATO in the 1950s and had led to the setting up of nuclear deterrence in the Eisenhower period. The problem was that in sheer numbers the Warsaw Pact was always stronger than NATO. This explains the unenthusiastic reaction of the Thatcher government to the doomed idea of total denuclearization put forward at the Reagan–Gorbachev Reykjavik Summit in the fall of 1986. To the prospect of a real breakthrough for an INF zero option in spring 1987, the British reacted in a similar fashion. In February 1987, British Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe bluntly told his German counterpart Hans-Dietrich Genscher that he had reservations about the zero option. While NATO's Dual-Track Decision lasted, however, there could be no rejection of it.[69] A month later, Thatcher confided to French President François Mitterrand that she feared that, through an additional offer to include shorter range nuclear missiles, "Gorbachev wanted to tempt Europe down a path towards de-nuclearisation, including getting rid of the British and French deterrents. This must be resisted firmly."[70]

Despite Thatcher's dislike of the final "double zero option"—the abolition of both the LRINF as well as the SRINF—she followed her supreme principle that the United Kingdom must always stay firmly and steadily at the side of the United States. In June, general elections were scheduled in Britain. Because there was no doubt that the Reagan Administration favored "double zero," the "Iron Lady" made a complete U-turn. From May 1987 she publicly supported Reagan's approach, willy-nilly and very much to the dismay of Chancellor Kohl of West Germany.[71] At the end of the day, the most important aspects for Britain were *first* that its own nuclear deterrent was sure to remain unaffected by the superpowers' disarmament agreement, and *second* that there would be a "firebreak" in the anticipated stampede to disarmament. This pause was considered necessary in order to thwart any Soviet conspiracy to bring about a complete denuclearization of Western Europe. In view of this, right up to 1990, London stubbornly insisted on a rapid modernization of NATO's arsenal of short-range nuclear weapons (with ranges under 500 km) even though this was total anathema to West

69 Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon) between Howe and Genscher in Bonn, February 25, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Munich 2018, Doc. 54, p. 254. Thatcher repeated this argument in her Bonn talk with Chancellor Kohl on March 23, 1987, ibid, Doc. 79, p. 254.

70 Memcon between Thatcher and Mitterrand in Normandy on March 23, 1987, The National Archives Kew, PREM19/2182f67, https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/205881 (accessed March 8, 2020).

71 On May 11, 1987 Mitterrand told German Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker that he had received a letter in which the British Prime Minister supported double zero; see diary of Weizsäcker's Press Secretary Friedhelm Pflüger, Richard von Weizsäcker. Ein Porträt aus der Nähe, Stuttgart 1990, p. 225. In mid-May, another letter from Thatcher to Kohl in support of the double zero option was leaked in West Germany, see "Nichts gelernt", in: Der Spiegel No. 21, May 18, 1987, p. 20.

Germany for self-evident reasons. One of the consequences of the INF Treaty was therefore to bring serious strain in Anglo–German relations.[72]

On a personal level, Thatcher and Kohl did not get along very well, right from the beginning, despite their political consensus as staunch pro-American, anti-Communist political leaders. The West German Chancellor, who had replaced Schmidt in 1982, had even less enthusiasm for the INF Treaty than his British counterpart. As *Tim Geiger* explains in his contribution "Controversies Over the Double Zero Option: The Kohl–Genscher Government and the INF Treaty," the prospect of an INF Treaty almost ripped the Kohl government apart and was not at all seen as something that would help the cause of German reunification. Kohl had gotten off to a bad start with Gorbachev as well:[73] his publicly comparing the Russian leader to Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels did not help.[74] Although Foreign Minister Genscher was a frequent visitor to Moscow, Kohl and those on the conservative wing in his government, were suspicious of what the Soviet General Secretary was up to. They were also uneasy about Reagan's apparent willingness to make huge concessions to the Soviets, leaving the Europeans (as it were) out in the rain. As *Geiger* indicates, it was the coalition partner of Kohl's Christian Democrats, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) under Genscher's leadership, that benefitted from the renewed détente.

Again according to *Geiger*, the Soviet–American rapprochement, starting with the Reykjavik meeting, "disclosed the fundamental inconsistencies and paradoxes of Bonn's security policy. Until then, the Germans had been worried by the arms race and the nuclear buildup, and because the superpowers had not talked enough or effectively with each other. However, now with Soviet–U. S. rapprochement and a looming chance of real disarmament, the Germans were no less concerned." In a strange reversal of the usual order of things, the erstwhile staunch "Atlanticist" Kohl was at odds with the Reagan Administration, while Genscher, and to some extent the Social Democratic opposition, were in sync with their "American friends." The debate was further complicated by the looming discussion about NATO's "short-range" deterrent (SNF, up to 500 km), which of course would have devastated the two German states (as well as adjacent countries such as Czechoslovakia). In this context, there seemed to be a return of the "German Question."[75] In the end, West Germany's isolated Christian

72 See Percy Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests. Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major, London 1999, pp. 80–85. See also the essay by Tim Geiger in this volume.

73 During their first meeting at Chernenko's funeral, Kohl felt insulted by Gorbachev, who accused him of "standing at attention" on orders from Washington. See Ambassador Kastl to Auswärtiges Amt, March 15, 1985, in: AAPD 1985, Munich 2016, Doc. 68.

74 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie, Munich 2012, p. 456 calls this a "disaster in communication" ("*Kommunikationsdesaster*"). See also Hermann Wentker, Vom Gegner zum Partner: Gorbatschow und seine Politik im Urteil Helmut Kohls, in: Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen 22 (2015), pp. 1–34, here pp. 7–10.

75 See also the contribution by Hermann Wentker in this volume.

Democrats had to accept that neither the German public nor their main ally, the mighty U.S., would support any of the demands being made by Kohl and the conservative wing of the Christian Democrats.[76] Cunningly, the Soviets seized their moment and urgently pressed that the 72 Pershing IA weapons of the West German *Bundeswehr* should be included in the Western share of INFs to be destroyed following an INF treaty—despite the fact that the Geneva Talks had always been exclusively about Soviet and American missiles. Here again, a divided Kohl government was forced, grudgingly, to give in and bend to international pressure and to overwhelmingly anti-nuclear opinion amongst the public at home. However, in the longer run this apparent defeat turned out to be a decisive step for improving Soviet–West German relations.

The French, like the British, disliked a "zero solution", as *Christian Wenkel* highlights in his chapter on "Resuming European Détente and European Integration. France and the INF Treaty." Moreover, like the British, they were skeptical when it came to superpower deals, partly for the same reasons, and partly because of their own specific interests. President Mitterrand had been elected in 1981. Despite adhering to the Socialist Party and not being one of the "founding fathers" of the NATO Double-Track Decision, he staunchly supported the deployment of the Euromissiles, thus helping the Christian Democrat Kohl against his Social Democratic domestic adversaries.[77] This was the case even though France had not been a member of NATO military integration since 1966 and did not participate in the INF buildup of 1983. Moreover, *Wenkel* argues, the French, like the British, were "far from convinced by the West German conception of the strategic imbalance in Europe." Nevertheless, Mitterrand supported Kohl, whom he expected in turn to take a stance against inclusion of the French nuclear deterrent in the Geneva negotiations.[78]

In addition to keeping the *Force de Frappe* out of an INF deal at all costs, Mitterrand (like Thatcher) wanted to gain political capital from his position as a bridge-builder between East and West. While he encouraged Reagan to talk to

76 In addition to Geiger, see also the contribution by Philipp Gassert in this volume.

77 Most famously in a speech in the German Bundestag on January 20, 1983: for Mitterrand's speech see Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. Stenographischer Bericht, 9th Legislation Period, 143rd Session, pp. 8978–8992; on Mitterrand's role during the Euromissiles crisis see Georges-Henri Soutou, Mitläufer der Allianz? Frankreich und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss, in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg, pp. 363–376.

78 As the Kohl-Genscher government dutifully did. The West German government regularly reiterated NATO's political position: that INF negotiations were exclusively about the nuclear systems of both superpowers, see for example letter from Genscher to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, August 24, 1983, in: AAPD 1983, Doc. 241, p. 1231, fn. 24; Defense Minister Wörner at NATO's Defense Planning Committee Ministerial Meeting on July 1/2, 1983, ibid., Doc. 166, p. 872. In contrast, the SPD opposition supported the renewed Soviet demands to include both Western European nuclear arsenals in the Geneva INF talks, see for example letter from Willy Brandt to General Secretary Andropov, September 22, 1983, in: Willy Brandt, Berliner Ausgabe, Vol. 10: Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Internationale Beziehungen und deutsche Frage 1982–1992, Bonn 1992, Doc. 8, p. 155.

his Soviet counterparts, in his conversations he comes across as an even more ardent hawk than the supposedly arch-anti-Communist Reagan. *Wenkel* quotes Mitterrand, who gave Reagan the following advice:

> With regard to the USSR, it is necessary: 1) not to give up anything, 2) not to concede anything, 3) to place yourself in a good psychological situation for the day when the Soviets want to discuss.

Domestically, however, Mitterrand was dealing with the French public, and, like the publics of Britain, West Germany, and to some extent the United States, people were truly smitten by Gorbachev. Moreover, it was not only those on the leftist spectrum who were hugely in favor of an INF Treaty. Here, for once, France was not so different from the rest of Europe. But its policies diverged from Britain with regard to the process of European integration. For Mitterrand the INF Treaty made it necessary to push forward with plans for deeper European integration, not just in the field of defense. It did not escape his notice, nor that of British observers, that the INF Treaty was bringing the "German question" to the fore (though most Germans did not realize this at the time). Like *Geiger*, *Wenkel* therefore sees the INF Treaty as a dynamic factor in the process leading toward the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which created the European Union, as well as to closer Franco–German military cooperation during the 1990s.

4. Looking Forward to the Easing of Cold War Tensions: The Reactions of the Eastern Allies

Unlike their Western counterparts, who had many qualms about Reagan's "zero option" plans and the impending INF Treaty, the Eastern allies of the Soviet Union welcomed the prospect of the removal of intermediate nuclear forces from all of Europe. The reasons were manifold and not the same in all Warsaw Pact countries: *First* of all, Eastern bloc leaders like Erich Honecker and Wojciech Jaruzelski were genuinely worried about the short and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which could devastate their territories far more than those of the Soviet Union.[79] *Second*, in narrow military "balance of power" terms, the undoing of NATO's Double-Track Decision with the scrapping of the American INFs might have reassured Warsaw Pact countries that they would have the advantage in numeric conventional superiority. However, that was not the most common perception in the capitals of the Eastern alliance. Quite to the contrary, military and political leaders there were particularly concerned about the growing conventional strength they saw in NATO, thanks to an ongoing "revolution in military affairs."[80] That was the reason why in May 1987, at the Warsaw Pact

79 See the contributions by Hermann Wentker and Wanda Jarząbek in this volume.

80 See Oliver Bange, SS-20 and Pershing II: Weapon Systems and the Dynamization of East-West Relations, in: Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), Nuclear Crisis, pp. 70–86.

Summit in East Berlin, a new military doctrine was announced which replaced the war planning that had hitherto relied on offensive tactics with a new one, appropriately based on the primacy of defense. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact also agreed to a new Vienna Forum for Conventional Armed Forces Reductions in Europe (CFE) to replace the ailing MBFR talks. *Third*, most East Europeans hoped for the "peace dividend" of a new détente. The crippling arms race demanded many resources, which could not be used for consumer goods that might help to buy acquiescence amongst the people of the Socialist countries. *Fourth*, they also hoped to gain economically from increased East–West trade. Countries like Poland, the GDR, Hungary, and Romania were dependent on Western loans and trade relations with the capitalist "class enemy."[81] And *finally*, there seems to have been a tactical element. Some *Perestroika*-critical Communist leaders like Honecker and the Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu could lend support to Moscow on an INF Treaty while being critical of Gorbachev's agenda for reforming the Communist system.[82] So, we must understand, the Eastern allies were not just paying lip service to the peace moves of their "big brother."

The generally welcoming stance of the Eastern allies with regard to an INF Treaty should also be seen in the context of their longstanding criticism of the Kremlin's handling of the Euromissiles issue (normally not publicly voiced). The implementation of the NATO Dual-Track Decision turned out to be a disaster for the Warsaw Pact, while simultaneously both "imperial overstretch" in Afghanistan and the economic crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s were hitting COMECON members hard.[83] The Polish crisis of 1980/81 was a clear sign of the bloc's inability to cope with the fallout of the oil price hike. Despite all the public displays of "unity," the Euromissiles crisis had "had a bruising impact on Warsaw Pact members."[84] And this was just one constituent of a much broader malaise in the Eastern bloc; it "highlighted a number of institutional and systemic weaknesses that for years had been eroding the Warsaw Pact and the political-

81 See Stephen Kotkin, The Kiss of Death. The East Bloc Goes Borrowing, in: Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent (eds.), The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in Perspective, Cambridge, Mass. 2010, pp. 80–93.

82 For the different attitudes to *Perestroika* among Communist party leaders in Eastern Europe see Francesco Di Palma (ed.), Perestroika and the Party. National and Transnational Perspectives on European Communist Parties in the Era of Soviet Reform, New York/Oxford 2019, especially Tamás Péter Baranyi, Perestroika Made in Hungary? The HSWP's Approach to the Soviet Reform of the Late 1980s, pp. 88–104; Wanda Jarząbek, The Polish United Workers' Party and Perestroika, pp. 118–131; Hermann Wentker, SED and Perestroika: Perceptions and Reactions, pp. 132–152; Stefano Bottoni, Between External Constraint and Internal Crackdown: Romania's Non-reaction to Soviet Perestroika, pp. 153–175.

83 On the economic situation see Chris Miller, The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy. Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR, Chapel Hill, N.C. 2016; on "imperial overstretch" and Afghanistan see Zubok, Failed Empire, pp. 227–264.

84 Malcolm Byrne, The Warsaw Pact and the Euromissile Crisis, 1977–1983, in: Nuti et al. (eds.), Euromissile Crisis, pp. 104–120, here p. 104.

economic-ideological order that underpinned it."[85] Moscow had underestimated NATO's ability to pull itself together. During the final years of the Brezhnev era and the devastating Andropov and Chernenko interim, the Kremlin had an increasingly gerontocratic leadership, and lacked the resources either for an energetic, coordinated response to the immediate international relations issue in the Geneva negotiations, or for overcoming the economic, cultural, and social crisis of Communism.[86]

The ascent of Gorbachev to the Chairmanship of the CPSU thus made a huge difference to the international relations of the Eastern allies. Erich Honecker, Chief of the East German Communist Party (SED) and GDR Head of State, came into the equation, too. As *Hermann Wentker* writes in his contribution "The German Democratic Republic, Gorbachev, and the INF Treaty," Honecker "was not a friend of nuclear weapons in Europe," and very much favored a "double zero" solution in Europe. As he argued in a speech delivered to the SED Central Committee in November 1986, shortly after the Reagan–Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik: "If the INF question is solved, it will no longer be necessary to have tactical missiles […] in the GDR."[87] While, in domestic policy, the East German leadership eyed Gorbachev's reform Communist agenda very warily, it welcomed the new line in international affairs. In that area, the East German–Soviet relationship improved after 1985. In 1983, after NATO had gone ahead with the deployment of Pershing II and nuclear-armed Cruise Missiles, the GDR leader had cautiously distanced himself from Moscow's plans to increase the Soviet nuclear arsenal deployed on the territory of its East European allies.[88] Now things looked set to change.

As *Wentker* shows, Honecker did not follow up on Soviet demands that he should make it clear "to the FRG how much the situation had changed after the deployment of the missiles." Surprisingly, he was able to get away (for a while) with his veiled critique of Soviet counter-deployments after the NATO Dual-Track Decision. At that time the gerontocratic Soviet leadership was weak and confused about how to react to Western rearmament, and Honecker had to engage in damage control because of the GDR's economic dependency on West German loans and trade. Moreover, a "peacenik" East German population seemed to welcome Honecker's "peace power" stances, even though the GDR government did not command much respect with regard to its economic and social policies—it still had to rely on frequent crackdowns on dissent. For Honecker, this

85 Ibid., p. 117.

86 Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, New York 2009, pp. 481–618.

87 "Mit Initiative, Schöpfertum und Tatkraft verwirklichen wir die Beschlüsse unseres XI. Parteitages. Aus dem Schlußwort auf der 3. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED", November 21, 1986, in: Erich Honecker, Reden und Aufsätze, Vol. 12, Berlin (East) 1988, p. 203.

88 "In kampferfüllter Zeit setzen wir den bewährten Kurs des Parteitages für Frieden und Sozialismus erfolgreich fort. Aus der Diskussionsrede von Erich Honecker, Generalsekretär des Zentralkomitees der SED", in: Neues Deutschland, November 26/27, 1983, p. 3.

made it even more imperative to avoid going back to the heightened East-West tensions that had characterized the early 1980s. Kohl's constructive approach vis-à-vis Honecker's "peace" moves pushed the East Germans still further into the disarmament camp. When Honecker coined the term "coalition of reason," Kohl gladly took up the formula of his East German counterpart.[89]

So, when Gorbachev came to power, Honecker could happily demonstrate that, at least in international affairs, he was in line with the new Soviet team. This gradually increased in importance, as Gorbachev was moving ahead with domestic reforms that the GDR leadership remained adamantly opposed to. Honecker also needed to stress détente as a means to keep the East–West German relationship going. Constantly in search of legitimacy, he was eager to realize his long-term goal of making a visit to the Federal Republic. He also wanted to prove to Moscow that the GDR was pushing Bonn towards an agreement, thereby exaggerating his role "enormously," as *Wentker* comments. Furthermore, for the East Berlin government, the INF Treaty was in the interest of its own security, as it would contribute to the removal of Soviet nuclear missiles from East German soil. To further this, the relationship with Bonn was critical, because it was one way to influence the process on the Eastern side. It also helped in securing the all-important trade and financial relationship with the FRG. Furthermore, according to *Wentker,* it was good domestic politics as well, since the East German population was hugely in favor of détente, even though Honecker's "popularity seems not to have benefitted from this identity of views."

When discussing the winding road to the INF Treaty, we therefore have to take Eastern bloc public opinion into account, even though there was no such thing in the strict sense of the term. As *Wentker* demonstrates in his analysis of reports in the East German secret police files, the GDR population gave Gorbachev most of the credit, while holding Reagan in low regard. In that at least, the Communist "anti-Imperialist" propaganda fell on fertile ground.[90] The East Germans hoped for a "peace dividend" and saw the easing of international tensions as the prologue to domestic reform, which was decidedly not Honecker's idea of the INF agreement. In Poland, too, "fear of war" and "love of peace" worked toward an overall positive perception of the INF talks and in favor of Gorbachev's international role in particular. As *Wanda Jarząbek* shows in her contribution, the Poles seem to have expected an easing of the economic burden of defense, even though the Polish contribution to Warsaw Pact armaments was on the conventional side,

89 Letter from Honecker to Kohl, October 5, 1983; letter from Kohl to Honecker, October 24, 1983, in: Innerdeutsche Beziehungen. Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1980–1986. Eine Dokumentation, ed. by Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Bonn 1986, pp. 154 f., pp. 158 f.

90 On Anti-Americanism in Eastern Europe see Jan C. Behrends, Árpád von Klimó, and Patrice G. Poutrus (eds.), Antiamerikanismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Studien zu Ost- und Westeuropa, Bonn 2005.

and at best only indirectly affected by an INF deal. Moreover, she finds, the Poles, unlike the East Germans, perceived the impact of the INF Treaty as not equal for all sides. While everyone's security was supposed to be growing, that of the Soviet Union was likely to be growing to a greater degree than that of Poland. For Poland, as for West Germany, it was therefore important to complement the INF arrangement with a resumption of new Vienna talks about conventional armaments.

Poland, like the GDR and all other Warsaw Pact members, was not directly involved in the INF Treaty negotiations and was kept at arm's length by the Soviet leadership. Given the salience of the "German question" and earlier Polish "peace initiatives," such as the 1957 Rapacki Plan, however, the proposed INF Treaty fitted well into long-standing Polish (and other Eastern bloc) efforts to make the 1945 Potsdam Conference post-war settlement permanent.[91] What the Poles seemed to anticipate was an issue that the East German government apparently failed to see: that a relaxation of East–West tensions could lead to a situation in which the "German question" would come up with force. While the Jaruzelski government wanted to intensify the dialogue with both German states and hoped that the GDR and FRG would present "some elements of the Polish initiative as their own," he certainly did not want German unification. Moreover, given their geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, the Poles were very keen on having the INF Treaty implemented once it had been signed and ratified. Today, Poland's current government, despite being a staunch supporter of NATO and the Trump White House, believes there could be much to lose from the recent turn in Russian–American relations, with new missiles being introduced in the Russian military enclave of Kaliningrad.

Though it has not been possible to supply further essays covering other Eastern allies of the Soviet Union, similar stories can probably be told about Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Within the Eastern Pact organization, the ČSSR was among the staunchest supporters of Moscow, once the country had stabilized after the 1968 crackdown. As Malcolm Byrne has shown, in the case of Prague, it took a lot of cajoling and "convincing" on the part of the Soviet leadership to get the government to accept the deployment of new SS-12 and SS-23 missiles as part of the Warsaw Pact countermeasures against the deployment of Western Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in 1983.[92] In this, the Czechs were reacting like the East Germans.

Although the East European populations were in general supportive of the thaw and welcomed the easing of tensions that came after 1985, they did not

91 Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, 1945. The "Bitter Victory". Poland and its "Liberation", in: Jürgen Luh (ed.), Potsdam Conference 1945. Shaping the World, Dresden 2020, pp. 114–125.

92 Byrne, Warsaw Pact, pp.111–116; see also Ivo Pejčoch, Kernwaffenträger in der tschechoslowakischen Armee, in: Oliver Bange (ed.), Zwischen Bündnistreue und staatlichen Eigeninteressen. Die Streitkräfte der DDR und der ČSSR 1968 bis 1990, Potsdam 2016, pp. 151–163.

really trust the Western peace movements. Given Poland's historically well founded suspicion of the Soviet Union, "peace" was the wrong term. The Polish government suppressed *Solidarność* while at the same time propagating its own work towards "peace." It is fair to say that the West European peace movements were viewed with suspicion by Polish and other Eastern European dissidents.[93]

5. Mobilizing for Peace *and* Security: Public Opinion and Protest Movements

Peace movements have a long history in North America and Europe, going back to the decades before World War I.[94] Yet the nuclear buildup of the 1980s gave the various societal actors organizing protest demonstrations for peace a new urgency and a common goal. During the 1980s, Western Europe as well as the United States saw one of the largest protest mobilizations in post-war history. During the Euromissile debate, millions took to the streets to voice their opposition to NATO's Dual-Track Decision. While the general story of the 1980s peace movement is well known, historians have long debated its impact on the end of the Cold War. Scholars like Lawrence S. Wittner have highlighted the impact of the peace movement on the Kremlin as well as on the Western side.[95] Recently, the historian Angela Santese has credited the U. S. peace movement with pushing Ronald Reagan towards disarmament and "Freeze."[96] In his contribution to this volume, *Tapio Juntunen*, even sees "widespread agreement among Cold War historians" that the anti-nuclear campaign had a decisive impact on NATO's decisions within the Euromissiles crisis. Other historians, are more guarded in their judgement, and propose a multi-causal model to explain the end of the Cold War.[97]

As *Claudia Kemper* argues in her contribution "More than a FREEZE. Political Mobilization and the Peace Movement in 1980s U. S. Society," perennial debates

93 Idesbald Goddeeris and Małgorzata Świder, Peace or Solidarity? Poland, the Euromissile Crisis, and the 1980s Peace Movement, in: Nuti et al. (eds.), Euromissile Crisis, pp. 291–308, here p. 303.

94 Benjamin Ziemann, Situating Peace Movements in the Political Culture of the Cold War. Introduction, in: Benjamin Ziemann (ed.), Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War, Essen 2008, pp. 11–38; David Cortright, Peace. A History of Movements and Ideas, Cambridge 2008; Holger Nehring, Peace Movements, in: Stefan Berger and Holger Nehring (eds.), The History of Social Movements in Global Perspective. A Survey, London 2017, pp. 485–513.

95 Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present, Stanford 2003, pp. 395–401.

96 Angela Santese, Ronald Reagan, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and the Nuclear Scare of the 1980s, in: The International History Review 39 (2017), pp. 496–520.

97 See for example Florian Pressler, A Triumph of Disarmament? The 1980s and the International Political System, in: Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), Nuclear Crisis, pp. 348–351.

over "who could claim the implementation of the INF Treaty as their political success" may not lead us very far. As always in history, success has many parents, while failure is an orphan. What was popular, however, were superpower deals that cut nuclear arsenals, while unilateral disarmament never went down very well with the American audiences who "vacillated between long-term uneasiness about nuclear weapons" and "distrust of the Soviet Union." Like their President, Americans supported more military spending while favoring a nuclear "zero" at the same time.[98] Though the U.S. peace movement was successful in mobilizing millions for peace, its impact on the actual political decision process leading to the NATO Dual-Track Decision, was negligible, even though the FREEZE motion passed Congress. Afterwards, nothing happened until Reagan and Gorbachev started their negotiations, beginning in 1985.[99]

FREEZE was a very peculiar American umbrella campaign, involving traditional peace movement activists—Quaker Organizations like the American Friends Service Committee, anti-imperial groups like the War Resisters League and professional organizations like the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Federation of Atomic Scientists. But it also included politicians, such as Senator Edward Kennedy, "critical" experts and scientists like Carl Sagan, and some celebrities like the actor Meryl Streep. To some extent, *Kemper* argues, FREEZE also focused a general critique of society, providing an outlet "to express general dissatisfaction with public policy and with political decision makers," and voiced a general cultural-critical perspective. Thus, against the backdrop of the re-election of Ronald Reagan in 1984, the American peace movement became disillusioned and saw a general decline. Now the future of the peace movement has moved into the hands of professional organizations, such as ICAN, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which was founded in 2007. These new-model peace movements have built on the experiences of 1980s movements like FREEZE, and, as *Kemper* explains, have developed into more focused and "extremely professional" networks, striving for a UN nuclear weapons ban treaty. Though ICAN was presented with the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017, it was unable to prevent the recent round of rearmament, especially on the Russian side.[100]

98 J. Michael Hogan and Ted J. Smith III., Polling on the Issues: Public Opinion and the Nuclear Freeze, in: Public Opinion Quarterly 55/4 (Winter 1991), pp. 534–569.

99 Wilfried Mausbach, Vereint marschieren, getrennt schlagen? Die amerikanische Friedensbewegung und der Widerstand gegen den NATO-Doppelbeschluss, in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg, p. 302; on the ability of the U.S. peace movement to mobilize hundreds of thousands of street demonstrations see Kyle Harvy, American Anti-Nuclear Activism, 1975–1990. The Challenge of Peace, New York 2014.

100 ICAN was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 2017 "for its work to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and for its groundbreaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of such weapons." See https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2017/summary/.

Up to the mid-1980s, the supporters of the U.S. peace movement could not put a stop to the deployment of new nuclear weapons. Yet like their European counterparts, they created a framework for peace, which in turn helped to support the societal momentum and positive climate of public opinion in the Western countries where the INF Talks were taking place. As *Philipp Gassert* argues in his contribution "West German Politics, the INF Treaty, and the Popular Dynamics of Peace," a "dovish" political context forced West German Chancellor Kohl's hand. Grudgingly he had to comply with the "double zero option" and he was then obliged to make even more concessions with regard to West Germany's outdated Pershing IA missiles. Initially reluctant, Kohl sided with his liberal coalition partner against the conservative wing of his own party. He was also acting against the CDU's Bavarian sister party, the CSU, whose chairman, the baroque Bavarian Premier Franz Josef Strauß, thought this to be a "totally irresponsible" act, endangering West Germany's future security and making the country susceptible to Soviet pressure.[101] But Kohl, a shrewd and expedient politician, knew exactly where the West German public stood, thus, *Gassert* writes, "giving in to the prevailing sentiment of the German population as well as a majority of deputies in the Federal Parliament."

One of the deep ironies of the second half of the 1980s is the slow death of the peace movement, against the backdrop of a final round of détente that would contribute to the demise of the complete Cold War order. As *Gassert* argues, years of talk about "peace," "disarmament," and "making peace with ever fewer weapons" (a slogan that had been pioneered by the CDU) "had moved the emphasis of West German political culture into the direction of the peace movement's core positions." Kohl, who had risen to the Federal Chancellery's office in 1982/83 in part by steadfastly supporting the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles following the NATO Dual-Track Decision, now chose to shed the mantle of the "Cold War hawk" and realign himself with his dovish public and coalition partner. He knew very well that West Germany could not go through another "hot autumn" of protests like the one in 1983. With Gorbachev at the top of the Kremlin's hierarchy, old enemy images were crumbling. Germans were seized by Gorbimania, maybe taking it even further than was shown in similarly enthusiastic receptions in Britain, France, and Italy where, in 1989, Gorbachev was greeted throughout his visits by cheering crowds.[102]

There is a second irony here. Not only did the West German peace movement fall apart after 1983, but West Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD) lost power in 1982, in part because a significant portion of its membership and parliamentary representatives felt they must break with Chancellor Schmidt over

101 Franz Josef Strauß, Die Erinnerungen, Berlin 1989, p. 552.

102 Hermann Wentker, Die Deutschen und Gorbatschow. Der Gorbatschow-Diskurs im doppelten Deutschland 1985–1991, Berlin 2020; William Taubman, Gorbachev. His Life and Times, New York/London 2016, pp. 475–478 and p. 495; on Gorbimania in the U.S. see Kristina Spohr, Post Wall, Post Square. Rebuilding the World after 1989, London 2019, p. 11.

the deployment of the Euromissiles at that time.[103] After 1987, Kohl reaped the benefits of détente. Having been re-elected in March 1987 (with some losses), he now sided with the "peace camp," or at least the informal coalition of parliamentarians across both wings of the German Bundestag, whether of his own party or not. The INF Treaty, while it created difficulties and fractures within Kohl's Christian Democrat-led coalition government, was very much in sync with the majority of West Germans, or at any rate of those who responded to public opinion surveys. This, *Gassert* argues, concluded the "move toward peace" and the acceptance of the "Potsdam" status quo in Europe that had begun in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

It fell to the Danes to bring the new term "footnote policy" into the vocabulary of NATO and the Cold War. As *Tapio Juntunen* remarks in his contribution to our volume, the Danish government's tendency to add "several reservations on its participation in NATO's operations and procedures" was one of the "most evident examples of the effect of public opinion and transnational peace movements" on the 1980s foreign policy practiced by the NATO countries. For a long time, the governments of the NATO states Denmark and Norway, and also of neutral Finland, had been confronted with strong anti-nuclear sentiment from their citizens. Increasingly they warmed to the idea of a Nordic Nuclear Free Zone (NNFZ), which went back to 1963 when it had first been introduced by the Finnish government. Even though Denmark and Norway, the NATO members, took a skeptical stance toward the NNFZ initially, by the late 1970s and early 1980s such proposals had "matured into a shared practical connection between anti-nuclear movements and certain parts of the Nordic political elite."

Juntunen also shows some results of disarmament and the INF Treaty that were unwelcome or paradoxical for the Nordic countries. While the Danes, Norwegians and Finns were very much in favor of nuclear disarmament, they were afraid of an impending nuclearization of the Northern seas. They anticipated that the removal of land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles would lead to more sea-based nuclear weapons on submarines, which, of course, were not covered by the INF Treaty. Thus, the Nordics feared that the denuclearization of Central Europe would lead to a sea-borne nuclearization of the North of Europe and the Arctic. So, while the countries of this area welcomed the INF Treaty "as a historically and symbolically significant political achievement," they highlighted the fact that one superpower treaty would not solve all strategic uncertainties, especially in the North. The Danish parliament even passed a resolution that reminded the world that warships visiting Danish harbors were not allowed to

103 Even though it remains difficult to measure the exact impact of the peace movement on the establishment; see Tim Geiger and Jan Hansen, Did Protest Matter? The Influence of the Peace Movement on the West German Government and the Social Democratic Party, 1977–1983, in: Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon (eds.), Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s, Cambridge 2017, p. 309; Jan Hansen, Abschied vom Kalten Krieg? Die Sozialdemokraten und der Nachrüstungsstreit (1977–1987), Munich 2016.

carry nuclear weapons. Therefore, on the sub-regional level, the INF Treaty created new problems of a nuclear as well as non-nuclear balance of power. This was not really taken into serious consideration within the superpower negotiations.

6. Back to the Future: The World After the INF Treaty

While in hindsight, the INF Treaty has looked like an opening gambit in the overcoming of the East–West division of Europe, blazing a trail towards the fall of the Wall, such a perspective is more of a "post-Cold War" one and was not a very widely held view among contemporary observers, at least in Germany.[104] When he spoke in Berlin on June 12, 1987, the challenge Ronald Reagan made to Gorbachev to "tear down this wall" seemed too much like a public relations stunt that willfully neglected the political basics in Europe. From a West German point of view, the speech appeared to be mostly for domestic U.S. consumption and, in the eyes of many, an almost comic return to an outdated Cold War rhetoric. The words did not square easily with the same President's ground-breaking work towards achieving disarmament in Geneva. The INF Treaty thus seemed like just one more effort to ratify and ultimately consolidate the European order established by the victorious powers with the 1945 Potsdam Agreements.

Today, it is obvious that the INF Treaty was indeed an important step in overcoming the Cold War order. It was part and parcel of the momentous "conversations" held between Reagan, Gorbachev, Bush Sr., and the foreign ministers and advisors who contrived to "end the Cold War."[105] On September 11, 1990, less than a year after the Berlin Wall had fallen, President George H.W. Bush (Sr.) addressed both houses of Congress in a famous speech, in which he saw the dawn of new era:

> stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come.[106]

104 See the contribution by Philipp Gassert in this volume.

105 To use Blanton's and Savranskaya's inspired phrase.

106 George H.W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, September 11, 1990, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2217 (last accessed February 27, 2020); see also George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, New York 1999.

Bush's 1990 vision of a new multipolar order that would emerge from the Cold War did not materialize. Due to the decomposition of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 1990s and early 2000s have been described as a "unipolar" moment, especially by conservative American pundits.[107] During the first two post-Cold War decades the United States tried to assert a power that amounted to "global hegemony." This could not be sustained after 2008/09, and is now being dismantled by the U. S. itself. This dismantling process started with President Obama, and is now in full swing under the leadership of President Trump.

For 30 years, however, the INF Treaty worked surprisingly well. This was because of its verification system. In his conversations with Gorbachev and in his public speeches, Reagan himself had repeatedly quoted the Russian proverb: "Trust but verify." Following this precept, the INF Treaty established a detailed system of rules for defining, counting, and verifying all relevant armaments and accompanying equipment, and then for monitoring their final destruction within the three years of its coming into force (on June 1, 1988). Through additional protocols and Memoranda of Understanding, it laid down a complicated system of intrusive mutual control and observation. The rigor of verification was unprecedented: nothing before it had been so comprehensive and reliable—or so necessary. This central aspect of the INF Treaty is usually skipped over by historians and journalists—perhaps because following the detail has seemed to be too complicated or too technical, or even too "boring". In the present volume, *Wolfgang Richter*, an expert who has worked in the German *Bundeswehr* Verification Center, is able to offer the reader insights into the provisions and actual practice of verification—right up to the year 2001, when the verification system expired according to the Treaty's terms.

As *Oliver Bange* outlines in his essay, the INF Treaty, along with the other extraordinary disarmament measures negotiated between 1985 and the early 2000s, did indeed make Europe a more secure place, at least in the perceptions of the public in the various European countries, and of the majority of their politicians. The recent demise of the Treaty thus raises fears that we might "return to the future"—to the uneasy state of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, when nuclear weapons seemed to destabilize what only in hindsight looks like a stable, post-World War II order.

This perception of stability, however, is a Eurocentric one. People in the "Global South," which had become the main battleground of the "Global Cold War" from the 1960s on, have never been able to share this point of view.[108] And even in the so-called "First World" (the West) and "Second World" (the East), it would be wrong to take too rosy a view of the tense situation when two

107 See Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, in: Foreign Affairs 70/1 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 23–33. See also Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment. U. S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order, Ithaca 2016.

108 See first and foremost Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, Cambridge 2005.

ideologically, politically, economically, and militarily antagonistic alliances faced each other with "over-kill" capacities of nuclear weapons, with—in the worst case scenario—the possibility of nuclear Armageddon unleashed in less than one hour.[109]

As *Ulrich Kühn* reminds us in his contribution, the INF Treaty was not just a "landmark arms control and disarmament treaty." Despite its global ambition, it was first and foremost about the security of the European–Western Hemisphere, of which the Soviet Union was a part. While the symbolism of the signing ceremony in Washington carried meaning way beyond Europe, the Treaty had serious flaws because it had a purely European perspective. This laid it open to its demise in the post-Cold War order. As *Bange* shows, the INF Treaty did not address the East-Asian nuclear balance of power. China has risen in global importance, and both Russia and the U.S. feel that they need to contain its growing power. By the 2010s the INF Treaty was increasingly being seen as an impediment to global security. Moreover, in present-day Russia the INF Treaty has become a symbol of an unequal post-Cold War order that has kept Russia in check and rendered it geopolitically more vulnerable than need be, while the U.S. has remained unconstrained, especially after 9/11.[110]

Since the turn of the millennium, we have had to witness the decline of the security architecture that was so successfully built in the last decade of the Cold War and the following years. The INF Treaty was a center-piece in this structure. Its termination in 2019 is the result of a long chain of events, starting in December 2001 with George W. Bush (Jr.)'s decision to renounce the ABM Treaty of 1972, which had been the foundation block of all later Soviet–U.S. disarmament agreements. Subsequent key events have ranged from Russia's withdrawal from the 1990 CSE Treaty in 2007 to the failed attempts to renew the seriously outdated "Vienna Document" on Confidence and Security Building Measures which had its last overhaul in 2011. Worse, after ending the INF Treaty, the Trump Administration is threatening to cancel the Open Skies Treaty (another pillar for verification measures). As at present (spring 2020), there are no convincing signs that there will be a suitable replacement for the new START Treaty of 2010, which, if nothing is done, is due to expire in February 2021. Should this happen, for the very first time since 1972 (SALT I) there will be no treaty or other legal instrument between Washington and Moscow that restrains nuclear armament.

Consequently, while the INF Treaty in 1987 signaled the beginning of the end of the Cold War, the end of the INF Treaty in 2019 may thus signal the beginning of the post-*post Cold War* world, for which we do not yet have a name.

109 See Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon, Introduction: Between Accidental Armageddons and Winnable Wars: Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Fears in the 1980s, in: Conze, Klimke, and Varon (eds.), Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear, pp. 1–23.

110 See Parker, U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Russia, pp. 7–10.