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More Than a FREEZE

Political Mobilization and the Peace Movement in 1980s U. S. Society

By now it is no longer particularly original to use Google NGram graphs to introduce a complex topic. But tracking and visualizing the vocabulary in "a lot of English books" (as Google says) is nonetheless a useful way to generate both a first impression of how popular one term or another was and to bring up some first questions for study.

As Figure 1 shows, the trajectories for the occurrence of "peace" and "security" developed in different directions. Not surprisingly, the term "peace" peaked after World War I and after World War II, while the term "security" had a steadier career, rising slowly throughout the twentieth century. This happened parallel to the rise of the fields and subjects in which the term became the conceptual centerpiece: International Relations and Political Science. It is quite remarkable but unsurprising that the quantitative use of both terms—"peace" and "security"—intersected during the last third of the 1970s.

In the period from 1977 to 1979, the nuclear weapon stockpiles of the U. S. and the Soviet Union reached more or less the same levels.[1] But this was only the most visible aspect of a complex mixture of factors that made the international situation appear very threatening. After this period, tensions and anxieties accumulated in Western societies. This spurred both a broad mobilization of anti-nuclear peace movements in almost every Western country and increasing political debates and diplomatic activities regarding security issues. As international tensions grew, the question of how to maintain, or even improve, the Soviet–American nuclear status quo became an urgent topic, regardless of whatever position groups were taking on nuclear weapons.[2]

In a heated atmosphere in which political and emotional arguments were all too often inextricably entangled, the task of framing the language of political discourse and influencing public opinion to particular ends became more and

1 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2013, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69/5 (2013), pp. 75–81, here p. 78, https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340213501363.

2 Various contemporary concepts in P. Edward Haley, David M. Keithly, and Jack Marritt, Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, and the Future, New York/NY 1985. An overview in Lawrence Freedman/Jeffrey H. Michaels, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, London 2019.



Fig. 1: Occurrence of the words "peace" (dark gray) and "security" (light gray).

more important. Terms like "peace" and "security" had been in use for a long time. Now, there was a need to endow them with new meanings and enhance their political efficacy. In the context of protests and grassroot debates, the peace concept served as an important synthesis of ideas, critique, and fear. It covered concerns that preoccupied a large majority of politically interested citizens.[3] Basic security issues had already been raised in connection with the numerous sites that posed nuclear risks and which were identified by the anti-nuclear movement during the 1970s. These included "power plants, missile silos, army bases, research laboratories, radioactive waste dumps [and] assembly facilities,"[4] and the issue caught the public's attention in 1979 with the events surrounding the reactor accident in the Three Mile Island power plant.[5]

Security concepts had also been part of anti-nuclear debates within the peace movement due to the input of experts, scientists, political renegades, and institutional brokers like church communities, who raised basic ethical, technological, military, political, and strategic issues. This happened, for example, in the context of the civil defense debate when physicists and physicians fed the peace movements with professional data, graphs, and projections buttressing their

3 Holger Nehring and Helge Pharo, A Peaceful Europe? Negotiating Peace in the Twentieth Century, in: Contemporary European History 17/3 (2008), pp. 277–299.

4 Kyle Harvey, American Anti-Nuclear Activism, 1975–1990. The Challenge of Peace, London 2014, pp. 8 f.; Susanne Schregel, The Spaces and Places of the Peace Movement, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), The Nuclear Crisis: the Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s, New York/Oxford 2016, pp. 173–188.

5 Dario Fazzi, The Nuclear Freeze Generation: The Early 1980s' Anti-nuclear Movement between "Carter's Vietnam"' and "Euroshima", in: Knud Andresen and Bart van der Steen (eds.), A European Youth Revolt. European Perspectives on Youth Protest and Social Movements in the 1980s, Oxford/New York 2016, pp. 145–158, here p. 149. On the changes caused by the anti-nuclear protests in Europe in the late 1970s see Andrew S. Tompkins, Better Active than Radioactive! Anti-Nuclear Protest in 1970s France and West Germany, Oxford 2016.

political argument against nuclear civil defense plans.[6] While "peace" remained the overriding political issue in such debates, the peace movement referred to security concepts, just as the inventors and proponents of civil defense plans did, but they drew different conclusions.

In spite of these different levels of argumentation, public and political perceptions often reduced the peace movement's political agenda to the pursuit of "peace". However, this perspective only concealed the fact that the movement was heterogeneous and was trying to develop a minimal consensus in order to perform a common protest strategy; and this least common denominator was inevitably moderate.[7] To reduce the peace movement to a rather naïve demand for peace would be superficial. Interpretations of this kind only serve to downplay its contributions to the rising questions of how a modern state could deal with existing nuclear weapons in the safest way, of how to avoid a nuclear war, and finally how to mobilize substantial opposition to the U. S. Presidential Administration of the period. The following essay does not focus on whether the peace movement succeeded or failed, however. Rather, it takes a closer look at different aspects of the U. S. peace movement and in particular at FREEZE, the most prominent campaign within it.[8] The aim of this approach is to refute oversimplistic assessments of the peace movement and to show the extent to which it was a driving force—among others—which strengthened the anti-nuclear consensus in the country. This, in turn, helped lay an important basis for the success of the INF Treaty.[9]

6 See e.g. the series of articles "Programs for Surviving Nuclear War: A Critique" by Jennifer Leaning, Matthew Leighton, John Lamperti and Herbert A. Abrams in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 39/6 (1983), pp. 1–16. Another example: Howard Kornfeld, Nuclear Weapons and Civil Defense. The Influence of the Medical Profession in 1955 and 1983, in: The Western Journal of Medicine 138/2 (Feb 1983), pp. 207–212. See also Claudia Kemper, Medizin gegen den Kalten Krieg. Ärzte in der anti-atomaren Friedensbewegung der 1980er Jahre, Göttingen 2016; Claudia Kemper, "The Nuclear Arms Race is Psychological at its Roots." Physicians and their Therapies for the Cold War, in: Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann (eds.), Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945–90, Manchester 2016, pp. 213–237.

7 Harvey, American Anti-Nuclear Activism, p. 9.

8 The capitalized term FREEZE refers here to the nuclear freeze campaign or movement that included the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign as well as other groups but was not an acronym used at the time. It is used to differentiate the movement from the strategic concept of "freezing" the nuclear arms race.

9 This thesis is based on Müller's considerations, according to which anti-nuclear activism worked on many levels, especially in cultural and media contexts, and had a far-reaching effect on political culture. See William M. Knoblauch, Nuclear Freeze in a Cold War. The Reagan Administration, Cultural Activism, and the End of the Arms Race. Culture and Politics in the Cold War and Beyond, Amherst 2017, p. 8.

1. Becoming FREEZE

Figure 2, another Google NGram graph, shows the frequency of occurrence of the terms “freeze,” “disarmament,” and “arms control” during the twentieth century.

Despite its long tradition as an instrument for demilitarization, the term “arms control” only became popular after it had come into use in professional (political) contexts as an element of Cold War thinking.[10] Even in times of détente, the prospects for negotiating any fundamental disarmament did not appear very promising, but arms control at least seemed to offer a diplomatic opportunity to stay in conversation with one another.[11] In their representation in Figure 2, we do not know the contexts in which the terms were used. But it is likely that “freeze” was increasingly used because, after years of growing tensions, the idea of simply freezing the nuclear arms race had become particularly popular. Previous ideas on arms control or segmented disarmament, which had been discussed at the diplomatic level for years, seemed less and less convincing as reliable and fail-safe security systems.[12] In the face of a growing loss of confidence in the state’s ability to cope with nuclear weapons the idea of freezing the arms race through a moratorium on nuclear warheads had been circulating widely since the second half of the 1970s.[13] The popularity of the idea was strengthened by the fact that the Western alliance set contradictory priorities in its defense strategy, and international relations drifted into a series of crises.[14] As early as 1978, two peace groups had appealed to stop uranium mining bilaterally, and in 1979 there was even a proposal from the Republican side to add a clause to the SALT II treaty corresponding to a FREEZE.[15]

Within this atmosphere various scientific and civil society groups developed concepts to solve the precarious situation from both a security and a peace policy perspective. On the one hand, when things took a turn for the worse between the superpowers, academic associations like the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) stepped forward with fresh ideas to keep arms

10 Peter N. Stearns, Introduction, in: Peter N. Stearns (ed.), Demilitarization in the Contemporary World, Urbana, IL 2013, pp. 1–16, here p. 11.

11 Leopoldo Nuti (ed.), The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985, London 2009; Wilfried Loth and Georges-Henri Soutou (eds.), The Making of Détente. Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–75, London 2008.

12 See e.g. the chapter title The Nuclear Freeze Movement: The Reagan Administration’s Greatest Threat, in: Christian Peterson, Ronald Reagan and Antinuclear Movements in the United States and Western Europe, 1981–1987, Lewiston, NY 2003, p. 87.

13 Dario Fazzi, The Nuclear Freeze. Transnational Pursuit of Positive Peace, in: The Routledge History of World Peace since 1750, ed. by Christian Petersen, William M. Knoblauch, and Michael Lodenthal, New York 2018, pp. 229–237, 229.

14 Leopoldo Nuti, The Origins of the 1979 Dual Track Decision—A Survey, in: Nuti (ed.), The Crisis of Détente, pp. 57–71.

15 Fazzi, Nuclear Freeze, p. 229.

Fig. 2: Occurrence of the terms “freeze” (black), “disarmament” (light gray), and “arms control” (dark gray).

control going; while others, like the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), even sought personal contacts with Soviet scientists in order to restart the negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).[16] Test-ban activists recognized that new safeguards—such as guaranteed access to test sites—were needed to convince the U. S. government that mutual control was possible, at least on a technical level.[17] On the other hand not only experts but also more and more groups and initiatives were incorporating general concerns about nuclear armament into their political demands in order to influence the government’s rhetoric, or even its strategy. This constellation is often portrayed as the actions of two different groups—here the advocates (or experts), and there the activists[18]—even though the activities and personnel of both groups overlapped in many ways. Within this heterogeneous landscape of anti-nuke experts and laypeople, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC), founded in 1980, quickly emerged as both an important focal point for mobilization and the “political manifestation of [nuclear] fear.”[19]

16 Kai-Henrik Barth, Catalysts of Change. Scientists as Transnational Arms Control Advocates in the 1980s, in: John Krige and Kai-Henrik Barth (eds.), Global Power Knowledge. Science and Technology in International Affairs, Chicago 2006, pp. 182–206, here pp. 186–188.

17 See for a history of Verification Diplomacy Nancy W. Gallagher, The Politics of Verification, Baltimore/MD 1999. A general approach to the concept of Trust in International Politics is offered by Martin Klimke, Reinhild Kreis, and Christian F. Ostermann (eds.), Trust, but Verify. The Politics of Uncertainty and the Transformation of the Cold War Order, 1969–1991, Washington, D. C. 2016.

18 Rebecca Johnson, Advocates and Activists: Conflicting Approaches on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty, in: Ann M. Florini (ed.), The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society, Tokyo/Washington 2000, pp. 49–82.

19 Paul Boyer, Fallout. A Historian Reflects on America’s Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons, Columbus, OH 1998, p. xv.

Taking a last look at the second NGram graph, Figure 2, we can see that "freeze," as a political and strategic concept, peaked in 1983, as the campaign gained momentum. The campaign was initially able to form numerous coalitions at local and state level and to pass resolutions there. The campaign's collaboration with the Democrats was not the result of targeted cooperation. Rather it was due to there being some political and strategic overlap between the Democrats and FREEZE. The former wanted above all to oust the President from power, while the campaign called for an arms freeze, no matter who had the power. The campaign began to be successful at the time when Democrats in Congress were trying to obstruct the President's policies. The campaign, in turn, needed party-political access to Congress in order to be able to bring about concrete decisions. In the Republican-led Senate, a FREEZE resolution failed in 1983, but in the same year the Democrats were successful with their resolution in Congress, where, after various attempts, a resolution tabled by Edward Kennedy based on the demands of FREEZE was approved. Among other things, this resolution called on the government to agree and implement an immediate halt to the arms race with the Soviet Union.

Although the INF Treaty, signed a few years later, represented an extraordinary diplomatic breakthrough, its emergence cannot be explained by diplomatic history alone. The process that led to making the reduction of medium-range weapons conceivable and negotiable included oppositional politics, the efforts of arms control talks, and the FREEZE campaign. So it makes little sense to attribute victory to either the peace movement or to diplomacy, and it is especially crass to assume that Reagan made the crucial shift from a nuclear hardliner to a disarmament-supporting diplomat overnight.[20] Rather, it can be assumed that many of the political changes that occurred during the 1980s also depended on the perceptions and interpretations of the political opposition. Such a perspective can help us understand the heterogeneous dynamics that made the INF Treaty possible.

The role of non-state actors like the peace movement in general and FREEZE in particular should be seen as an important part of these dynamics.[21] In turn, the success of the campaign must not conceal the fact that the U.S. peace movement was quite diverse even before 1987 and certainly after the ratification of the INF Treaty. Indeed, the U.S. peace movement was both heterogeneous *and* focused on the freeze concept as an overarching idea. This was because a call to halt the nuclear arms race was both easily comprehensible and a way to connect the heterogeneous strands of national protest in the U.S., also linking them to global sentiment and protest. This is all the more interesting because the breadth

20 Cortright laments a bit too schematically the lack of a significant "role of the peace movement": David Cortright, Protest and Politics: How Peace Movements Shape History, in: Mary Kaldor and Iavor Rangelov (eds.), The Handbook of Global Security Policy, Chichester 2014, pp. 482–504, here p. 493 f.

21 Angela Santese, Ronald Reagan, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and the Nuclear Scare of the 1980s, in: The International History Review 39/3 (2017), pp. 496–520, here p. 497.

of the term "freeze" made it possible for activists, supporters, and the public to read further implications into it, notably criticism of the political establishment in Washington.[22]

In order to grasp these interrelationships, it is important to understand the concept of "framing," a term readers will almost certainly know, but which has to be explained in its relation to protest movements. Every local or national political initiative or NGO needs global frames to ensure that the specific issues they focus on remain relevant for a longer time period and for more people than just the local or national peer group. A frame, as originally outlined by Erving Goffman, is a set of concepts and theoretical perspectives that organizes experiences and guides the actions of individuals, groups, or societies.[23] Such frames can explain how protest movements are able to connect the different issues that concern their individual members with global politics. Or, as David A. Snow explains:

> Applied to all varieties of social phenomena, including civil disturbances, social movements, and politics in general, the idea of framing problematizes the meanings associated with relevant events, activities, places, and actors, suggesting that those meanings are typically contestable and negotiable, and thus open to debate and differential interpretation.[24]

Such frames were created, for example, when protests referred to "nuclear fear" as a common factor for all people involved, regardless of their specific political preferences. In this usage the frame "fear" worked like a bracket making it possible to share an interpretation of reality.[25] The same applied to the word "freeze"—a simple term that denoted a distinct first step towards solving all the nuclear issues. And in a way it worked: "The genius (and limitation) of the nuclear weapons freeze was that it reduced a complex issue to a simple idea that was linked to a deliberate strategy for mobilization."[26] But, as so often in the history of protest

22 See Wilfried Mausbach, Vereint marschieren, getrennt schlagen? Die amerikanische Friedensbewegung und der Widerstand gegen den NATO-Doppelbeschluss, in: Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive, Munich 2011, pp. 283–304.

23 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience, New York 1974.

24 David A. Snow, Frames and Framing Processes, in: Kathrin Fahlenbrach, Martin Klimke, and Joachim Scharloth (eds.), Protest Cultures: A Companion, New York 2016, pp. 124–129, here p. 125; see also Dieter Rucht, Studying Social Movements: Some Conceptual Challenges, in: Stefan Berger and Holger Nehring (eds.), The History of Social Movements in Global Perspective. A Survey, London 2017, pp. 39–62.

25 David A. Snow, Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields, in: David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, Oxford 2004, pp. 380–405.

26 Sam Marullo, Ron Pagnucco, and Jackie Smith, Frame Changes and Social Movement Contraction: US Peace Movement Framing after the Cold War, in: Sociological Inquiry 66/1 (February 1996), pp. 1–28, here p. 4.

movements, the story was more complex, because although the terminology and idea united very different factions of arms critics, the cooperation was neither unambiguous nor conflict-free.

Utilizing the framing concept to explain the peace movement's strategies for mobilization is only one side of the coin. The other side concerns heterogeneous concepts and groups that facilitate our understanding of INF as an important milestone and a point of rupture for the peace movement. Yet, they also reveal how support for an INF Treaty was just a minor part of another overarching theme in terms of global peace and security. In other words, perceiving the peace movement only within the INF frame is far too narrow. It leaves out both the political dynamics and strategic debates of the early 1980s and the long-term peace discourses about societal and technological developments which, in addition to armaments, are perceived as threats to peace.

2. FREEZE

The core idea of the FREEZE campaign was to persuade the U. S. and the Soviet Union simultaneously to adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of any nuclear weapons and missiles as well as on new aircraft primarily designed to deliver nuclear weapons—in the American case, the MX and Pershing II missiles in particular.[27] The key figure in the FREEZE movement, Randall Forsberg, initiated the idea of a "mutual, verifiable" freeze. In 1979, in a first bid at introducing it, she addressed over 600 activists from already existing peace organizations at a convention, calling on them to collaborate on the nuclear FREEZE proposal. In the same year, she popularized her nuclear freeze idea in an influential pamphlet which she co-authored under the title "The Price of Defense."[28] As a strategic analyst,[29] she had recognized the window of opportunity for mass mobilization. The necessary political resources were

27 M-X was short for LGM-118A Peacekeeper, this was a missile capable of carrying multiple warheads that could be deployed at short notice to multiple targets. The missile was thus considered a fast defensive weapon. Compared to MX, Pershing II was the modernized form of a classic medium-range ballistic missile.

28 Boston Study Group, The Price of Defense, New York 1979. See also Fazzi, Nuclear Freeze, p. 230.

29 Randall Forsberg (1943–2007) studied at Barnard College, worked as a teacher in Pennsylvania, and moved with her Swedish husband to Stockholm where she got a job as a typist at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). After her divorce she moved to Boston in 1974 and enrolled in a MIT PhD program studying defense policy and arms control. Utilizing her many contacts, she began disseminating the "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race" in 1979. In the same year she founded her own Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts and in the following years she became an important disarmament advisor. See Mitchell K. Hall (ed.), Opposition to War. An Encyclopedia of US Peace and Antiwar Movements, Santa Barbara/CA 2018, p. 266.

already available, but a vehicle for mobilizing and uniting the existing networks of groups and activists was lacking. Later she described the circumstances at that time and her motivation:

> […] Then in December [1979], the Soviet Union went into Afghanistan and in January of 1980, Carter withdrew the [SALT II] treaty and it never did come up before the Senate. Well, it was in that environment that the FREEZE movement was born. The way I saw it, and other people who were concerned with arms control and disarmament—the SALT II Treaty was not that strong. It was a relatively weak treaty which essentially codified the next generation of nuclear weapons on both sides.[30]

Forsberg had wondered how such a "weak treaty" could arouse political debate and saw the opportunity of attracting the public's attention:

> And it started as a movement to create popular pressure to support those people in Washington and the Senate and the Congress who wanted to see good arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, support them over the opposition of the vested interests.

The recent experience of a perilous nuclear accident at the Three Mile Island reactor,[31] together with growing tensions in international relations, no doubt contributed to promoting the foundation of FREEZE as well. In an interview, Forsberg suggested a further factor, referring to a general mood after the Vietnam War and in the years that followed:

> So, in my view, between 1974 and 1979–80, we had the pendulum swing back completely in the other direction from what it had been during the Vietnam era. And I think that it was during that period when we had the SALT II Treaty—we had arms control negotiations, but we had this kind of against-criticism-of-the-military public sentiment. So, there wasn't much support for the arms control process. [But at the end of the 70s] the period where no criticism of the military was acceptable in the national mood was ending.[32]

Forsberg not only proposed a call for a nuclear FREEZE but also offered arguments for how it should be presented and its perspective. She suggested that the movement should:

> couple public education about the danger of nuclear war and the arms race with a concrete proposal to take an initial first step that leads in a good direction; this would have the opposite effect of empowering people, giving them hope, giving them something

30 War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Missile Experimental; Interview with Randall Forsberg, November 11, 1987 on Open Vault from WGBH Media Library and Archives, http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_F6CC542AF94B434FBC7E1DBE45F07024; (31 August 2018).

31 Natasha Zaretsky, Radiation Nation. Three Mile Island and the Political Transformation of the 1970s, New York 2018.

32 War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Missile Experimental; Interview with Randall Forsberg, November 11, 1987.

to work for. And it was that coupling of both, the sense of the negative, the terrible danger and fear, and also the sense of the positive step of something to work for that I thought would really turn the trick in creating a national movement.[33]

From the start FREEZE offered a comprehensive outline of a secure peace process but, above all, it disseminated a "Call to Halt the Arms Race"[34] in moderate and clear language, a text that "was easily accessible and salable to the general public."[35] In this way, FREEZE propagated an arms control concept in which the option of disarmament was only the second step. This aspect was decisive for gaining broader support within the United States, but at the same time made its demands different from those of the European peace movements, which, as a rule, called for bilateral disarmament.[36]

The Call was printed jointly and initially disseminated by Forsberg's Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Clergy and Laity Concerned, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation. It is noteworthy that religious denominations, especially Quakers and the Catholic Church, formed a strong backbone to the peace movement. (The AFSC, founded as an aid organization after the First World War, and the American Episcopal Conference have been involved in many anti-nuclear protests since 1979.)[37] Consequently, these groups supported the FREEZE Call, which was designed to address both peace activists and the American public.[38] Forsberg and other supporters of the campaign calculated that, to convince politicians, they needed not only factual arguments but, above all, strong public support. Accordingly, the first objective of FREEZE was to build coalitions and to raise public awareness and support.[39] The organizers developed a strategy for popularizing their claims and encouraged the public to contact their senators and representatives in Congress.

It is difficult to say to what extent FREEZE influenced public opinion in this way but, strikingly, the campaign resonated with existing anxiety over the nuclear threat in general. Although, with the "zero option," Reagan offered his own proposal to break the impasse, peace activists were swayed more by his

33 Ibid.

34 The Call was published in various journals and pamphlets, see e.g. Jane O. Sharp, Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race: Proposal for a Mutual US-Soviet Nuclear-Weapon Freeze, in: Bulletin of Peace Proposals 12/4 (1981), pp. 417–421.

35 David S. Meyer, A Winter of Discontent. The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics, New York 1990, p. 157.

36 Kyle Harvey, The Promise of Internationalism. US Anti-Nuclear Activism and the European Challenge, in: Jan Hansen, Christian Helm, and Frank Reichherzer (eds.), Making Sense of the Americas. How Protest Related to America in the 1980s and Beyond, Frankfurt a. M. 2015, pp. 225–243.

37 Mausbach, Vereint marschieren, p. 288; Lawrence Stephen Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present. The Struggle against the Bomb, Vol. 3, Stanford 2003, pp. 172–177.

38 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 498.

39 Ibid., p. 499.

threatening rhetoric, which did not alleviate any of the prevalent fears of "the enemy" and its nuclear potential.[40]

Although FREEZE spread very quickly and gained in popularity, neither the media nor the Reagan Administration took the campaign as seriously as they did the European peace movements. Moreover, activists had to acknowledge considerable "criticism from European anti-nuclear campaigns [which] alleged that the FREEZE did not consider opposition to Euromissiles deployment as a particularly high priority."[41] The campaign moved beyond this defensive position in the course of 1982, as it experienced growing success at the local and state level. A petition campaign in California to put the FREEZE proposal on the ballot at an upcoming state election was overwhelmingly successful because "local organizers collected more than 700,000 valid signatures in just a few months, twice the number needed to qualify for the ballot."[42] Politicians from the Democratic Party like House members Edward Markey and Mark Hatfield, along with Senator Edward Kennedy, noted the growing public awareness and introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives and the Senate.[43] From that point on, the campaign's agenda had to be recognized as a serious political demand and its organizers "still saw the potential for the FREEZE campaign to move beyond its domestic work [on a transatlantic and international level] if the freeze proposal were ratified by Congress."[44]

The first reactions of the Reagan Administration had been cautious and defensive, rejecting FREEZE as a crude mixed bag of unprofessional suggestions.[45] The Administration's alternative, the "zero option," was proposed not only as a diplomatic coup (as peace activists liked to describe it), but also as "a way of co-opting peace movement demands."[46] It was not until another resolution was introduced to the Senate at the end of March 1982 that Reagan showed the first signs of adopting a different position. In a public speech, he expressed his "concern for the effects of nuclear war," though he made no explicit mention of the campaign.[47] Nevertheless, the campaigners were able to use this statement to their advantage. Forsberg and the NWFC had correctly assessed their window of opportunity, and in view of the upcoming mid-term Congressional elections, politicians in almost every federal state had to recognize and respond to an increasingly nuclear-sensitive public opinion.

40 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 500. See also the contributions by Beth Fischer and Ronald Granieri in this volume.

41 Harvey, Promise of Internationalism, p. 235.

42 David Cortright, Protest and Politics: How Peace Movements Shape History, in: Mary Kaldor and Iavor Rangelov (eds.), The Handbook of Global Security Policy, Chichester, UK 2014, pp. 482–504, here p. 491.

43 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 502.

44 Harvey, Promise of Internationalism, p. 235.

45 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 504.

46 Cortright, Protest and Politics, p. 493.

47 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 503.

3. Further Issues

The public adopted the FREEZE concept and its rhetoric not so much as an expression of an unequivocal anti-nuclear stance but because of its oppositional and connectable political language. Since FREEZE and its appeal to the political establishment were mostly discussed and protested at the local level, it provided an opportunity to express general dissatisfaction with public policy and with the political decision-makers in Washington D.C.[48] As the FREEZE resolution presented itself as a manifesto of "We the people," it was fueled by "the people's" dissatisfaction and feelings of uncertainty towards U.S. government politics that clashed with majority attitudes and moral perspectives.[49] So, although this rhetoric no doubt boosted broader mobilization of support, the extended interpretation was also a handicap for the campaign. FREEZE ran the risk of abandoning its core mission, which was its focus on strategic doctrines and arms policy. Increasingly it became an instrument of domestic opposition.

This effect can be seen, for example, in the significance of opinion polls. As mentioned above, there were noteworthy changes in public opinion that ran parallel to the campaign's success. In 1980, polls showed that support for a ratification of SALT II decreased dramatically, while at the same time more and more Americans supported higher military spending.[50] This indicated that there "was significant public support for a more hawkish posture and greater fears of war" occurring at the same time.[51] The majority feared a nuclear war and simultaneously supported defense concepts, no matter how they were to be implemented. However, in order to assess the success of FREEZE correctly—or indeed the policies of the U.S. government of the period—it must be noted that,

48 Fazzi argues in a generational perspective that young protesters in both the European and U.S. movements "aimed to challenge capitalism, support different models of economic development, promote anti-militarism and non-violence or redefine urban and social spaces." Dario Fazzi, The Nuclear Freeze Generation. The Early 1980s Anti-nuclear Movement between "Carter's Vietnam" and "Euroshima", in: Knud Andresen and Bart van der Steen (eds.), A European Youth Revolt. European Perspectives on Youth Protest and Social Movements in the 1980s, New York/Oxford 2016, pp. 145–158, here p. 149.

49 "All forms of communication involve creating audiences and making certain assumptions. The 'people' are constituted in the process, and their existence is confirmed through the artifice of public opinion polls and market research […]. Individual answers to pollsters' questions are aggregated into 'public opinion' […] The creation of these phenomena allows them to become tools for legitimizing partisan opinion or media agendas." John Street, Mass Media, Politics, and Democracy, Basingstoke 2011, p. 71. Snowball provides a study of the communication and rhetoric of the Christian and conservative organization "The Moral Majority" and its success during the early 1980s. His perspective on structures and strategies of influencing public opinion is remarkable for many public related movements. David Snowball, Continuity and Change in the Rhetoric of the Moral Majority, New York 1991.

50 Meyer, A Winter of Discontent, p. 85.

51 Ibid.

even though opinions on the nuclear issue had become more ambivalent between 1980 and 1984, in general "Americans' opinions on nuclear weapons and war" scarcely changed between World War II and the end of the 1980s.[52]

In a nutshell: most Americans vacillated between long-term uneasiness about nuclear weapons, "a fear of nuclear war […], and a distrust of the Soviet Union."[53] This led to quite uneven and, from today's vantage point, seemingly inconsistent opinions. Over 80 per cent of the U. S. population believed both "that the Soviet Union was hostile and couldn't be trusted (85 % in 1984) and that nuclear weapons were dangerous."[54] Over 80 per cent wanted "the superpowers to agree to stop making nuclear weapons," while another 82 % per cent opposed unilateral U. S. disarmament.

Obviously, any peace initiative had to engage with this highly ambivalent set of opinions, which remained much the same throughout the 1980s. These strong popular opinions about war and weapons and about the Soviet Union help to explain why FREEZE "achieved massive popular support" so quickly, as David S. Meyer highlights in his study *A Winter of Discontent*.[55] The FREEZE campaign did not grow out of a general change in attitudes toward nuclear weapons; instead, it was successful because it was able to crystallize diverse fears by focusing on common ground and transforming them into a single political demand. However, a detailed look at the opinion polls reveals significant limitations to the support for FREEZE:

> First, the public supported only a bilateral freeze or a freeze among all nuclear nations. […] Second, very high levels of support for the freeze depended in considerable measure on confidence that such an agreement could be verified. […] Finally, public support for the freeze was conditional upon belief in the equivalency of the two superpowers' arsenals.[56]

Such restrained and heterogeneous opinions revealed that support for FREEZE was not only an expression of an all-embracing anti-nuclear conviction but was also motivated by a desire to voice a general and pressing dissatisfaction with U. S. security policy and its efficacy, and to express active concern about it.

Political rhetoric indicates too that the campaign was used for further concerns in its criticism of the political establishment. As mentioned above, FREEZE was spearheaded by an extremely visible contingent of academic experts and scientists who played "a critical role in focusing public attention on the dangerous capabilities of nuclear weapons."[57] The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

52 J. Michael Hogan and Ted J. Smith III, Polling on the Issues: Public Opinion and the Nuclear Freeze, in: The Public Opinion Quarterly 55/4 (Winter 1991), pp. 534–569, here p. 537.

53 Meyer, Winter of Discontent, p. 86.

54 Ibid., p. 87. Meyer refers to The Public Agenda Foundation, Voter Options on Nuclear Policy Providence, RI, May 1984.

55 Ibid.

56 Hogan and Smith III, Polling on the Issues, p. 541 f.

57 Meyer, Winter of Discontent, p. 97.

and the FAS, in particular, provided knowledge and infrastructure for the peace movement. With this backdrop, FREEZE united a number of nuclear scientists and strategic experts like Robert Alridge, Daniel Ellsberg, George Kistiakosky, Jerome Wiesner, Hans Bethe, Harrison Brown, Karl Menninger, George Wald, Bernard Feld, Carl Sagan, and Jonas Salk, who were all highly visible in the media as they attacked the Reagan administration's nuclear policies.[58] But, since Forsberg and the early activists intended to gain support from the mass media and spark a mass movement, they needed support from more than just scientists.

Politicians like Edward Kennedy were a key factor in providing this; but so were celebrities like the actress Patti Davis (Ronald and Nancy Reagan's daughter), Paul Newman, and associations of clergymen.[59] Another substantial but less visible group of players in the FREEZE context were business people who had not wholeheartedly supported Reagan's candidacy, some of them because of his military or ideological policies, others because of their dependence on trade with the Soviet Union, or because of the growing federal deficit. Many of these business people were supporters of the Democratic Party, and were interested in arms control for economic reasons. They supported foundations conducting research on arms control (institutions like the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the MacArthur Foundation).[60]

This type of support for FREEZE could have considerable impact, as the case of California highlights. The Californian FREEZE campaign was initiated in 1981 and was soon joined by Harold Willens, "a millionaire who had long been an arms control advocate within the Democratic Party establishment. [His] participation in the freeze campaign was welcomed as it meant an infusion of money, media attention, and mainstream legitimacy."[61] But there was also unrest within the campaign because of Willens's intervention into its grassroots style and, on top of this, his attempts to influence the resolution. He aimed especially to reduce any links to other issues or overarching questions, such as demands to transfer the funds used in the arms race to the civil sector in order to strengthen development policies, which was one of Forsberg's long-term goals.

In the course of the California political campaign, the resolution was watered down to the point where it became an inoffensive request and ultimately a tame appeal for a nuclear armament freeze lacking broader societal perspectives on accompanying issues such as the technological arms race, nuclear weapon production, and extended deterrence. To be sure, the campaign had become highly visible and successful by the end of 1982, when "12 state legislatures,

58 Ibid., p. 98 f.

59 On the context of social mobilization, popular music, musicians, and campaign shows like "Artists United against Apartheid" and others see Christian Lahusen, The Rhetoric of Moral Protest: Public Campaigns, Celebrity Endorsement and Political Engagement, Berlin 1996.

60 Meyer, Winter of Discontent, p. 109 f.

61 Ibid., p. 111.

275 city governments, and 446 New England town meetings had passed freeze resolutions, and voters had approved freeze referenda in eight states, the District of Columbia, and over two dozen cities."[62] But in 1981 California had already shown that popular victories were ambivalent, all the more so when FREEZE was becoming a synonym for general opposition to the government and for anti-establishment rhetoric.

Typically, the FREEZE rhetoric heard at rallies or in statements by local politicians was marked by a combination of classic anti-elitism and the speakers' desire to set themselves apart from a supposed elitist political establishment and demonstrate empathy with the common people.[63] As Senator Tom Harkin (an early Congressional supporter) stressed: "US citizens would no longer 'allow their lives to be held in constant peril by the decisions of an elite group of generals, politicians and scientists'" and another Democratic representative asserted that "The issue of nuclear war and nuclear arms control belongs to the people."[64] On the one hand, backing for the nuclear FREEZE was more a response to the perceived excesses of the Reagan Administration than primarily support for an anti-nuclear security concept. On the other hand, these features, plus the essential moderateness of its key idea created the image of the campaign as a massive grassroots movement that had to be recognized and taken seriously in Washington D.C. The FREEZE campaign itself was essentially robbed of its international political context. "The alliance between freeze organizers and national politicians put the freeze on the front page and on the floor of Congress, but in a stripped-down version without the meaning the early supporters intended."[65] However, for a brief moment FREEZE attracted huge interest and a high level of media coverage.

On first sight, FREEZE succeeded when Edward Kennedy and Jonathan Bingham announced their introduction of the nuclear freeze resolution into Congress in March 1982. But Kennedy used vague language, merely calling upon the President to "decide when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze." This watered down the resolution to a mere request for a schedule and nothing more. Forsberg and other FREEZE leaders were disappointed, because the original resolution had called for an "immediate freeze." It took another year and another vote in Congress for the movement to make a real breakthrough.[66] After a delaying tactic by the government, Resolution 13 came up for a vote on the floor of the House of Representatives in March 1983. The debate took more than 40 hours and involved several amendments. When 278 Representatives finally approved

62 Hogan and Smith III, Polling on the Issues, p. 535.

63 As a communication and language scientist, Dan F. Hahn calls these mechanisms simplifications, generalizations, and "the art of saying nothing." See Political Communication. Rhetoric, Government, and Citizens, State College, PA 1998, pp. 96–109.

64 Quoted after Meyer, Winter of Discontent, p. 161 (unfortunately without dates).

65 Meyer, Winter of Discontent, p. 113.

66 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 511.

the FREEZE resolution, it was the first time that any bill asked the President "to propose to Moscow a mutual and bilateral nuclear weapons freeze."[67]

Yet, the limitations of this success were evident in the small print, or rather in the amendments that were added, weakening the text and downgrading the resolution from the mandatory to the advisory level.[68] The inconsistent politics of the House of Representatives probably led to even more disappointment among activists: only two months later, in May 1983, a majority approved "the release of $625 million for the testing and deploying of 100 MXs,"[69] The resolution had previously failed in the Senate, where the decisive foreign policy decisions could have been made. Obviously, a majority of the representatives were pursuing a dual strategy, on the one hand taking into account domestic politics and the mood of their voters to support the FREEZE resolution, and on the other, sustaining a nuclear-based national security policy.

Circumstances had changed by the time the Presidential election campaign was underway in 1984 and FREEZE again tried to build up pressure on the Reagan Administration. First, Reagan's most important project, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), had begun to take shape, a defense system that was not covered by the FREEZE concept and was difficult to integrate into any populist rhetoric. And second, FREEZE's position during the Presidential campaign was complicated by the campaign's support for the Democratic Party candidate, Walter Mondale. The Democrats' politics concerning armaments were very ambiguous, including advocating a freeze at the same time as backing the construction of new intercontinental ballistic missiles like Midgetman, and the sea-launched Trident II as well as supporting the deployment of Euromissiles.[70]

When, on November 6, 1984, Reagan won his second term in office, FREEZE could only emphasize that the movement's demands had been a major issue in the election campaign and claim that the President's now moderate tone and talk of arms control was partly a result of FREEZE. This change was no doubt real, so that a rapprochement between the Administration and the campaign seemed visible. But this was hardly a relevant response to the original FREEZE demands and FREEZE's previous impact as a pressure group was weakening. Moreover, Reagan and his Administration were able to present their shift in strategy as a move deriving from their own policy-making insights.

67 Ibid., p. 512.

68 Ibid. In a meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning group, U.S. Minister of Defense Caspar Weinberger therefore denied any importance for this non-binding resolution. (See AAPD 1983, Doc. 77, p. 397).

69 Ibid.

70 Meyer, Winter of Discontent, p. 250. The special characteristic of these missile types was their high mobility: Midgetman was a mobile intercontinental nuclear missile which could be moved rapidly from one firing location to another. Trident missiles were launched from submarines.

4. Diversification as a Feature of the U.S. Peace Movement

By the end of 1984 FREEZE had literally exhausted all its resources, money, and volunteers in mobilizing support during the election campaign, and after Reagan's re-election it proved very difficult to regain political momentum.[71] Certainly, activists and "political organizations continued their work, now including virtually all the types of political action that characterized the movement in earlier years: civil disobedience and direct action, symbolic demonstration and educational events."[72] But the numerous activities now lacked a unifying campaign and a slogan that everyone could work with. The FREEZE campaign lost much of the public's attention, creating the impression that the peace movement as a whole had collapsed after Reagan's election victory. In fact, the process of diversification continued. To understand this process in the second half of the 1980s, it is worth taking a look at basic ideas that were relevant in the whole U.S. peace movement.

In 1986, after peak public attention for the peace movement as a whole had long since subsided, some 500 "significant" U.S. peace organizations (meaning those with a budget in excess of $30,000) were active, between them covering a broad spectrum of issues.[73] As a rough breakdown: one portion of the movement concentrated on lobbying for FREEZE and arms control; another important set of groups dealt with anti-interventionism, an issue made relevant by U.S. policy towards Central America during the 1980s; and a third portion can be categorized as the nonviolent current within the movement. Differences between these strands of peace activism were not based solely on political distinctions or preferences in strategy; rather, all three portions of the movement can be traced back to strong peace traditions and ideas, stemming from the nineteenth century, that were connected with certain concepts of world order.[74]

What the FREEZErs, the anti-interventionists, and the nonviolence groups had in common was their concern over the question of how to end wars, or how to avoid them altogether. The point where they diverged, however, was in their analysis of the causes of war. Like other schools of political analysis, the underlying assumptions of their peace concepts can be distinguished according to whether they were inclined to interpret the mechanisms of the international system as a result of interaction between the great powers, or as an essentially anarchical world order, or as the outcome of human relationships on a large scale.[75] First, the *great power* analysis "attributes the causes of war and peace

71 Ibid., p. 253.

72 Ibid., p. 254.

73 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith (eds.), Frame Changes, p.11.

74 About the many different peace groups that supported FREEZE see Lawrence Stephen Wittner, Confronting the Bomb. A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, Stanford 2009, pp. 152–158.

75 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith (eds.), Frame Changes, p. 6.

to the policies and behaviors of a small number of great nations."[76] This is the basis of most bilateral security concepts, like the one that was favored by FREEZE. Secondly, the *world order* analysis "views the cause of war as the result of the anarchy of the international system,"[77] and this raises the issue of promoting multilateral institutions and more coordinated policy-making processes. This conception of international conflicts was favored by anti-interventionist groups who interpreted U. S. foreign policy as part of the problem of global inequality and human rights violations. Finally, the *nonviolence* analysis "sees the cultural acceptance and use of violence in the range of human relationships as the core obstacle to peace."[78] If international relations are interpreted from this third perspective, then conversely, appropriate frames for peace must be developed that offer plausible strategies for preventing the system from pursuing acts of violence, armament, or war.[79]

All of these three peace frameworks have had a presence throughout the history of peace movements in the U. S., alternatively favoring the establishment of international organizations or a preference for bilateral agreements. A focus on the advancement of civilized human behavior in order to establish a non-violent culture[80] partially underlies many educational programs and is an explicit aim of peace education.[81] While in the first half of the twentieth century many peace organizations followed world order analysis and supported the League of Nations and other international institutions, from the 1970s on, more and more organizations and activists focused on "more great power-oriented unilateralist and bilateralist approaches," especially when they were critical of the U. S. nuclear strategy.[82]

Against this backdrop, we should keep in mind that "peace" and "security" are always interconnected, but which one of the two terms is preferred at any time depends on the political context and its framing. This "rule" applied to the peace movement of the 1980s. The U. S. case illustrates perfectly how peace movements can raise public awareness (and how they need the public's attention), but it also shows the costs. The complex meaning of the activists' topic (security and peace) and their political intentions were not fully perceived and recognized. This

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 These three concepts are quite static and should only outline the horizon of peace ideas at this point. But it is important to note that these interpretations are based on the same fundamental assumptions as those of international relations theorists. See e.g. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis, New York 1959.

80 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith (eds.), Frame Changes, p. 7.

81 Till Kössler and Alexander Schwitanski (eds.), Frieden lernen. Friedenserziehung und Gesellschaftsreform im 20. Jahrhundert, Essen 2013.

82 Charles Chatfield with Robert Kleidman, The American Peace Movement. Ideals and Activism, New York 1992; Lawrence Stephen Wittner, One World Or None: a History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953, Stanford 1993.

was partly due to the close interdependence of protest and the media—the media being necessary because the latter "create public attention for their [protesters'] concerns and help them gain influence on the thematic agenda of the political system."[83] Since the logic they follow is based on newsworthiness, the mass media create content based on a simple distinction between information or non-information, which immediately affects the medial perception and representation of any event or phenomenon.[84] This mechanism fostered a reduction of the demands spelled out in the "Call to Halt the Arms Race" to the simple "FREEZE" formula. Eventually, the idiosyncratic public sphere, which is closely linked to the logic of the media system and its modes of communication, adopted and interpreted the FREEZE concept and campaign. But the closer the diplomatic success of a treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union became, the less news value FREEZE could offer and the less attention the campaign received.

After the re-election of Ronald Reagan not only FREEZE but members of the whole peace movement questioned their strategies and goals. The reactions ranged from downright romantic gestures to strategies of professionalization. For example, a part of the movement relied on completely new forms of protest to attract public attention and to satisfy the need for concrete action. This included the Great Peace March for Global Nuclear Disarmament, which David Mixner, a prominent gay rights activist and political campaign strategist, was instrumental in bringing to life. In 1986 it brought some hundreds of peace activists from Los Angeles to Washington D.C.[85] In turn a large number of FREEZE supporters were in favor of organizational consolidation, which is why the campaign merged with another huge organization, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), which had been going since 1957. The advantages of a merger were obvious, as SANE was a well known organization originally founded by prominent Americans "to stimulate debate on the hazards of nuclear testing",[86] and had been involved in nuclear risk education for many years. Moreover, the campaigns that had previously focused on diverse issues decided to consolidate their resources and, in 1993, created Peace Action. In their own eyes, they had succeeded in implementing the anti-nuclear consensus of those opposing the

83 Benjamin Ziemann, Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA since 1945: Introduction, in: Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen 32 (2004), pp. 5–19, 17.

84 A general approach in Bart Cammaerts, Alice Mattoni, and Patrick McCurdy (eds.), Mediation and Protest Movements, Bristol 2013. See for the German case Kathrin Fahlenbrach and Laura Stapane, Visual and Media Strategies of the Peace Movement, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s, Oxford/New York 2016, pp. 222–241.

85 Harvey, American Anti-Nuclear Activism, pp. 143–167.

86 The Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/national-committee-sane-nuclear-policy-sane (last accessed on March 17, 2020).

Reagan Administration, nudging the latter finally to move away from the zero option and aspire to achieving the INF Treaty. In reality, their influence may have been more indirect. Their successes at the beginning of the 1980s reflected the mood of large parts of the population, which the government had to acknowledge.

5. INF and FREEZE in the Long Run

The question of who could claim the implementation of the INF Treaty as their political success remains to be discussed on different levels.[87] This question—of who succeeded—fails to address other decisive issues, such as the possibilities and strategies opposition politics had in the 1980s; and they were by no means limited to the Democratic Party. Furthermore, a look at the peace movement shows that the processing of international goals such as the INF Treaty was strongly linked to domestic political and social debates.

For the peace movement, the political debate of the 1980s became a lesson in the pitfalls of mass mobilization and cooperation with political elites, paradigmatically highlighted in the relation between the movement and the President. On the one hand, in the perception of the peace activists, Reagan's rhetoric and statements on limited nuclear war underwent significant changes within a year of his 1981 inauguration. This was strongly demonstrated in his radio address of May 1982, when he stressed that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."[88] Whatever motives had influenced the President and had led to this statement—inner conviction, a desire to contain the popularity of FREEZE, or concerns about public opinion—he eventually abandoned his earlier, strictly hawkish stance and stressed opportunities for diplomatic solutions to the arms race. On the other hand, the President continued to be suspicious of the movement, and he openly insinuated that it was influenced and manipulated by the Soviet Union.[89]

All in all, we can assume that FREEZE, together with many other smaller initiatives, was an important factor that shaped the oppositional climate, and thus also the reactions of the government. But international opposition exercised a lot of influence too, when the Reagan Administration found it had to take heed of the European peace movements and when public opposition to the NATO Double-Track Decision reached new heights. The campaign, however, interpreted the policy change as a consequence of its own educational work in influencing

87 Lawrence Wittner gives the peace movement "the bulk of the credit" for the breakthrough toward the INF Treaty, see Lawrence Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 403.

88 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 506 quoting Radio Address to the Nation on the Federal Budget and the Western Alliance, May 29, 1982, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/52982a. On Reagan's stance on nuclear weapons see the contributions by Beth Fischer and Ronald Granieri in this volume.

89 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 510.

public knowledge and the public's mood; they saw 1983 as "a turning point in shaping the premises for a change in Reagan's foreign policy."[90]

In the long run, U. S. peace activists have learned their lessons and have taken into account the interdependence of external and internal conditions for their protest and the need to develop multi-layered concepts of peace and security. As an arms control lobbyist and member of the Union of Concerned Scientists said in 1994:

> Trying to use the old strategies of the 1980s to cut military spending down does not work as well. It's just not as relevant. […] We are [now] getting into nonproliferation, peacekeeping, and cleaning up the weapons complex. But we are not just lobbying against things, but lobbying for things that we want to see us doing: multilateral responses to regional conflicts, developing new mechanisms and full funding for peacekeeping, full U. S. participation in the UN, repair the damage of the Cold War, economic conversion, and deciding what our security priorities should be after the Cold War. It is a whole cultural change for us.[91]

Indeed, since the mid-1980s, peace movement mobilization has seen a general decline and a substantial loss of public support, especially among arms control and FREEZE groups. But, at the same time, surviving peace groups and organizations have reasserted their demands and agenda and have shifted towards a more structural or radical critique of the system of international relations.[92] The 2017 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)—an extremely professional network and coalition of different NGOs supporting the implementation of the UN nuclear weapons ban treaty—is the best evidence of this shift.[93] Anyone who asks where the peace movement stands today must be aware that peace activism has changed. For example, it no longer employs concepts that tend to have a catch-all character, in the hope that this will advance its primary objective of gaining substantial influence. FREEZE was an extraordinarily popular campaign in the 1980s, but it is far from being the only manifestation of protest and campaigning among U. S. or international peace activists.

90 Ibid., p. 514.

91 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith, Frame Changes, p. 19. They are referring to Jenny Week from UCS.

92 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith, Frame Changes, pp. 20–23.

93 See The Nobel Peace Prize 2017, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2017/ican/facts/ and http://www.icanw.org/.