

Dubletten

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Institut für Zeitgeschichte

Archiv

Interrogation
of
Walter Schellenberg
by
Henry Schneider)
Lt. Herbert DuBois)
(In German)
Interpreter: Lt. E. Holton

Palace of Justice, Room 163
Nurnberg, Germany
19 December 1945.
10.50 A.M.

Institut f. Zeitgeschichte
München
ARCHIV
834/53

- Q. You are the same Walter Schellenberg who appeared on other occasions and you understand that your statements are made under oath?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you know of any applications which were made to the Reichsbank for transfers of funds abroad during 1944 or 1945?
- A. As far as I can recollect, there might have been a special application made in 1944. Details about this should be known to the men in charge of the cash funds and transactions, that is, Dr. Joergers and Administrative Counsel Wiesinger.
- Q. Were Joergers and Wiesinger both in AMT VI?
- A. Joergers was in AMT MIL and AMT VI, and Wiesinger only in AMT VI.
- Q. Do you know where either of these men is now?
- A. I heard that Joergers is in your hands. About Wiesinger I do not know.
- Q. Do you know their first names?
- A. No.
- Q. Perhaps these two men know the details, but I am quite sure that you know something about this special application.
- A. It was not customary, as I told you before, to use the channels of the Reichsbank for our purposes. Only on a special occasion was the Reichsbank approached to help us out. In this connection, as far as I can remember, we approached the Reichsbank for the special funds in the operation with America. I remember that we also made a special application in 1943, but I do not recollect whether it was in connection with a mission in America or Iran. Under normal circumstances you know we received our foreign exchange from the office of the Four-Year plan and from the Ministry of Economics. But when, on special occasions, the funds of the Ministry of Economics depleted to such an extent that allowances could not be covered, Funk, who was not only head of the Ministry of Economics but also president of the Reichsbank, would deviate and use the gold funds that he administered in the Reichsbank to meet the allowances, I know that this happened on two occasions.
- Q. Can you give us more details of this transfer of funds which was supposed to have taken place in 1943 involving America?
- A. At the moment I cannot recall the exact dates of these various missions, but I know that we tried to obtain funds for these missions from special allowances and not from those allotted to us through normal channels. On this basis I had conferences at various times with State Secretary Landfried, but he had no

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authority to make decisions and therefore it was up to Funk. Funk was ready to cooperate but mentioned that he would have to use

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old gold funds that he had in the Reichsbank because we wanted to include gold in the funds for this mission. That was very important, especially for Palestine and Iran. I remember that in two cases, one mission to America and one mission to Iran, Funk gave permission to receive from the Reichsbank in each case half a cwt. (between 25 and 50 kilos) of gold to be drawn from the Reichsbank. This was done through normal banking channels by depositing the equivalent amount in value in Reichsmarks and receiving the gold. Then another time - either late in '43 or early in '44 - I am not sure, but I believe these dates are correct

- Q. Before this transaction that you have begun to mention, I would like to ask a few questions about the other two. These other two transactions - one was in 1943 and the other in '44, is that correct?
- A. The mission to Iran was definitely in '43 and I believe, as I remember, that the missions to America were one in '43 and one in '44.
- Q. On the Iran mission, what amount was involved?
- A. There were numerous missions to Iran. By that I mean that subsequent reinforcements were flown there. The first mission carried a considerable amount of U.S. dollars and I believe 25 kilos in gold coins (Napoleon or). These gold coins had to be carried because native tribes desired them.
- Q. How much in U.S. dollars was carried?
- A. It is only an estimate, but I do not think it was more than 50,000.
- Q. How many missions were made to Iran?
- A. As far as I remember, 3 flights - all in 1943.
- Q. Did this one application cover the entire amount involved, or were there other applications?
- A. There were at least 2 applications.
- Q. What was the amount carried on the other flights?
- A. I want to estimate that on the other flight, the second flight, the gold amount was increased. It was 25 kilos in gold coin and 25 kilos in gold bars, and the dollar amount was decreased I believe to 100,000. On the third flight the gold amount was decreased, but there was a substantial amount of Iranian pounds sent along. These Iranian pounds were purchased on the black market in Istanbul because they could be used very easily and without suspicion by our men in Iran. For us it was a very expensive foreign exchange - almost as expensive as gold.
- Q. Who was in charge of each of these missions?
- A. The mission was under the supervision of AMT VI C, headed by Dr. Graefe.
- Q. Do you know his first name?

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A. I do not think it will help you because he died in the first part of 1944. A referend who probably knows details about it was Sturm-bannführer Schuback.

Q. Did Graefe actually fly with the money, or was that just sent through ordinary agents? 14

A. The first flight was a reinforcement flight for agents that had been in Iran for at least two or three years, to a marked-off place where we dropped our parachute with the money and other supplies. The second flight was a flight of 6 or 7 SS leaders who were parachuted down and who worked as a separate group. The third flight was again a reinforcement flight with two purposes. In one place additional supplies were dropped for the use of the old agents and those who had been dropped later on, and in another place 2 new men were dropped. The principal agents there were Meiyer and Gamotha, and in the south Lt. Col Schulz.

Q. Do you know the first names of these three men?

A. No.

Q. Am I to understand that these 3 men were in Iran originally, or were they dropped by parachute during these flights?

A. These three people were already in Iran. The other seven men jumped during the later flights.

A. Who was in charge of this group of seven?

A. One was Hauptsturmführer Kurmis and I believe, though I might be mistaken, that the second important man in that group was also called Schulz. He was also a Hauptsturmführer.

Q. You do not know the first names?

A. No.

Q. Where you do know first names, please give them to us as we go along. In what vicinity were the reinforcements and supplies and money dropped?

A. There were always prearranged airports marked by red lights where the money was received by our own people.

Q. Near what cities?

A. The first one was in the vicinity of Teheran and the other two were prearranged geographical points in the desert region of Gaichgais.

Q. Have you given us the amount involved on the third mission?

A. I cannot recall exactly. I think we brought as many Iranian pounds as we could - it might have been around 40,000 or 50,000 Iranian pounds.

Q. Do you recall the sum total in Reichsmarks for which applications were made to the Reichsbank for these three Iranian missions?

A. I cannot recall because I was only concerned with the basic issue of securing the permission for this foreign exchange. I had enough Reichsmarks in my budget and therefore after the preliminary arrangements were made it went through normal channels.

Q. What was the mission of the group in Iran?

A. The mission was outside the normal intelligence information, to influence the native tribes and the Iranian government to such an extent that they would be pro-German. In other words, to bring the country under the leadership of the Gaichais.

Q. Were the funds to be used principally for bribery?

A. Yes. The first aim was to use the money solely to bribe the heads of certain tribes in order to give our men the bases from which they could work intelligence missions.

Q. Was the mission successful in the sense that those who were contacted accepted the bribes?

A. The mission was initially successful and would have promised great success if it had not been for the fact that the Air Force was not able to supply the necessary aeroplanes for reinforcements and relief. Therefore, our agents became discredited among the tribes and were finally held prisoner by them. Some of them were handed over to the authorities, others shot themselves.

Q. Was any accounting ever made of the funds of these missions?

A. No. The radio transmissions were much too valuable to use them for accounting.

Q. Do you believe that the funds so transmitted have been exhausted?

A. Yes, definitely, because they showed that they had lack of funds.

Q. Would you believe that your agents in Iran appropriated some of these funds for their own purposes?

A. I would believe it of one - that is, Meiyer - but about the others I definitely would not believe that they would do such a thing.

Q. Did those agents in Iran have standing orders to carry on their work even after defeat?

A. By that time they were all arrested or dead.

Q. Are you sure that all your agents in Iran are arrested or dead?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you exhausted all of your own information on this subject of the missions to Iran? Is there anything else we should know?

A. It would be of interest to you to interrogate Lt. Col. Schulz who, by way of repatriation and exchange of prisoners, was returned to Germany by the British in early 1945.

Q. Do you know where he is now?

A. I heard in April 1945 that he together with AMI MIL went to the southern part of Germany, and therefore is probably in your hands. Further details could be given by Lt. Col. Ohletz, who was head of MIL C.

Q. You do not remember the first name of Lt. Col. Schulz?

- A. It could be Richard. He once wrote me about a 120 page report which I read, but since I was overburdened I could not study it. It was really very interesting, since Schulz is the expert on Iran.
- Q. When was Schulz repatriated?
- A. He arrived in Germany, as far as I can recollect, in Jan. 1945.
- Q. On what grounds was he repatriated?
- A. Some high British generals were exchanged on that occasion

- Q. Was Schulz rated as a diplomat to Iran? Did he have some kind of diplomatic rank or recognition?
- A. Yes, I believe he was Consul, but everybody was aware that this was just a cloak.
- Q. Do you know Ohletz' first name?
- A. He is in ^{YOUR} hands. I believe he is in Freising.
- Q. Is there any other interesting information in connection with the Iranian missions which we do not have?
- A. About Gamotha, it would be interesting to know that he had to flee under rather peculiar circumstances from Iran in the latter part of '43 and escaped via Tabriz to Turkey, from where I got him to Germany. Then he headed the Department of Iran in Berlin, and was supposed to return to Iran by parachute but, due to illness, this was delayed and I last heard that he was in Vienna. During my interrogation in England the suggestion was made by the interrogator as to whether I had ever thought that Gamotha might have worked for the Russians on the side. I hardly believe that since I always trusted him, but it would be interesting to know now where he is and if he actually did work for the Russians.
- Q. Is there anybody who would know any more about this subject of the missions to Iran than you do?
- A. Yes. I have already mentioned Schuback and Gamotha and Schulz. Though really not Schulz because he only has expert knowledge of the southern part of Iran, but of course could give you information about everything. However, he did not have an inside view into the conferences of government departments in Teheran.
- Q. Was it your decision to make these missions?
- A. Yes.
- A. In other words, you laid down the general objectives with regard to these missions.
- A. Of course I supervised them, but I was only a tool since the orders came from the top - Himmler, Hitler and also the army. Cooperation was given to me by the office of Canaris which, at that time, I did not head, and also violation of neutrality laws occurred since we flew over the territory of Turkey.
- Q. Were you interrogated extensively on the subject of the Iranian missions in England?
- A. Yes.

Q. Was an American interrogator present?

A. No.

Q. Have you been previously interrogated on this subject by Americans?

A. No.

Q. If you think of anything further of interest on these missions to Iran, you might bring it up on another occasion when we talk to you. Did you consider the gold and foreign exchange which you sent to Iran on these three missions as being sufficient to accomplish the missions

A. No. There was a definite lack of gold and that is why we were supposed to fly reinforcements in gold and medical supplies, but since I did not obtain planes from the Air Force, the whole thing failed.

Q. How much more did you consider necessary in order to do the job successfully?

A. The greatest lack, of course, was Iranian pounds and gold coins, and I believe that we would have needed at least two or three times the amount we had already sent to Iran. Also, of course, medical supplies were almost as valuable as gold.

Q. Do you believe that there was sufficient gold and Iranian pounds available at the Reichsbank to meet your demands, or do you believe that the denial was due to the fact that the top men did not have confidence in you?

A. I do not think it was a question of confidence because of the order came from the top to carry out these missions, the Reichsbank had to supply us with the money. Naturally, of the Reichsbank thought that the interest of the Reich was impaired, then they could object to further allowances. That happened once, but I will tell you about this later.

Q. Were these men, including the seven, the only intelligence agents in Iran, to the best of your knowledge?

A. Yes, except of course the sub-organizations consisting of Iranians. Of these organizations I have no knowledge.

Q. And these funds which you have mentioned, were they the only intelligence funds which were available in Iran?

A. Yes.

Q. What are the names of the organizations in Iran that were contacted - that is, the native organizations?

A. Principally I remember the group of the Gaichgais. Then there were some other groups who were in opposition to the government, but I do not recall their names. They were Iranian names.

Q. How about the present rebels in northern Iran?

A. The Gaichgais at that time were a wandering tribe that remained in the southern and middle part. At that time the northern tribes were completely quiet and impartial, but Gamotha was supposed to work in the northern territory.

Q. Did he do any work in the northern territory?

A. No, he did not come to that mission. It might be that he is there now. I do not know where he is.

Q. Now you said there were missions to America in '43 and '44. Were there any previous missions?

A. Not before this time.
I must mention the mission to North America in the Year 1943, since the conferences concerning the money were conducted in '43, but the mission itself was carried out in '44.

Q. In other words, there were several missions in '44?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any in '45? Let me put it this way: Weren't there one or more missions in 1945 which arose as a result of conferences in 1944?

A. As far as I remember, two missions were planned for 1945 - one to

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South America utilizing a sailing sloop, and one to North America by submarine. If I remember correctly, the preparations for the mission to South America had reached such a stage that moneys were already appropriated, but I do not think that the missions to North America reached the stage where money was talked of or secured.

Q. Was the mission to South America to be by sloop?

A. Yes.

Q. How many missions were there in 1944, including the one that was planned in '43?

A. Two to South America and two to North America and one to Palestine.

Q. What were the approximate dates of the two missions to North America? If you cannot date them, give them to us by seasons.

A. One was in the late summer and the other in autumn, or approximately around those times.

Q. How about the two to South America? My purpose is to identify these.

A. One mission to South America I estimate was around July, when I was already responsible for counter-intelligence, and therefore it was planned overlappingly by counter-intelligence.

Q. That was after you took over from Canaris?

A. Yes. The second mission was around November.

Q. What was the date of the mission to Palestine?

A. The mission to Palestine was flown in aX Liberator bomber from Athens. It must have been naturally while Athens was in German hands sometime around October.

Q. Which of these missions was planned in '43?

A. As far as I remember, one mission to North America.

Q. Were all these missions matters which were handed down from the top?

A. Yes.

Q. In other words, by Hitler, Himmler, or Kaltenbrunner?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you give me the details of the first mission to North America - that is, the one in the late summer of '44?

A. In which respect, financial or otherwise?

Q. Suppose you tell us how much money was to be carried, and what kind.

A. The first mission to North America had its origin in orders received from above. Special interest was furnished by Ribbentrop, who wanted to know the effect of German propoganda against Roosevelt at the time of the election. The original order was to establish an intelligence net in the States.

Q. Was this intelligence net to be established in the States only, or in North America as a whole?

A. Only in the States.

Q. No plans were made for Canada, Mexico, Central America?

A. No. The aim was only political intelligence. I want to mention right now that the submarine, one of the most modern we had, together with money, all equipment and everything else, was destroyed by death charges en route, therefore it never arrived.

Q. How did you get this information that it was destroyed?

A. I learned about that from the OKM who after eight weeks without any communication from the submarine, declared it lost and all occupants dead.

Q. In other words, it was presumed to be lost. It was not a case in which definite information was obtained on it?

A. The last radio message stated that a heavy air attack was in progress and therefore we drew our conclusions that it was sunk. Financial arrangements for these missions were made at the end of 1943. Here we encountered the first difficulties. The funds were supposed to derive from our normal allowances and that would have been too great a burden for me, since our budget was already allotted to the various countries and special importance was laid ~~to~~ the fact that gold was supposed to be carried along. I think at that time Kaltenbrunner, on orders of Himmler, conferred with Funk and as far as I recollect the following agreement was reached: Funk wanted to approve the demands, but he also wanted all foreign exchange that was confiscated by the Security Police under Kaltenbrunner to be handed over either to Funk or the Reichsbank. I believe that Kaltenbrunner's State Police confiscated rather substantial sums of foreign exchange from agents dropped by America, England and Russia. I can estimate that this must have run into the millions of dollars, Swiss francs, rubles and Reichsmarks, and their agreement was that any gold I was to receive from the Reichsbank would be paid for by foreign exchange which was in the hands of Kaltenbrunner. I never knew about these substantial amounts of

foreign exchange that Kaltenbrunner had, nor did I have any jurisdiction over them. Further detailed information could be furnished by Scheidler, who administered cash funds, and head of AMT II, Spacil.

- Q. Did Mueller have anything to do with these funds?
- A. Yes. Mueller, of course, headed the different State Police officers and these were the people who confiscated foreign exchange, but I know that to the largest extent these funds were in the hands of Scheidler or Spacil. I believe that either the gold used for the Palestine mission or that for South America was paid for out of the foreign exchange funds which were just described. One mission to North America also had gold.
- Q. It is getting close to the recess, so think this over during that period. There is one question I want to ask before we stop. Didn't Funk also mention in this negotiation with Kaltenbrunner the fact that Kaltenbrunner's State Police had confiscated huge amounts of devises, jewelry and gold from the occupied countries?
- A. I do not recall that.
- Q. Didn't you know that?
- A. No. I only know that this was all in reference to confiscated moneys taken from parachute agents.
- Q. But you did know that Staffeldt was working on just such a project, didn't you?
- A. No. I know that Staffeldt had connections with Goering and the Four-Year Plan to carry out such things, but I did not know that

he worked for Kaltenbrunner or Mueller.

- Q. He did work for Heydrich, didn't he?
- A. I do not know that. I only know that Heydrich objected to Staffeldt.
- Q. Was it an objection, or was it a battle between Heydrich and Goering as to who would run Staffeldt's organization?
- A. I had no good insight into the matter, but I take it that Staffeldt was such a clever intriguer that he played both sides against each other to obtain the most benefit.

Interrogation recessed at 12.20

Für die Richtigkeit der Abschrift
ke

München, 9. 12. 1952

Institut für Zeitgeschichte - Archiv

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A. It would be of interest to you to interrogate Lt. Col. Schulz who, by way of repatriation and exchange of prisoners, was returned to Germany by the British in early 1945.

Q. Do you know where he is now?

A. I heard in April 1945 that he together with AMI MIL went to the southern part of Germany, and therefore is probably in your hands. Further details could be given by Lt. Col. Obletz, who was head of MIL C.

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- A. He is in ^{your} hands. I believe he is in Freising.
- Q. Is there any other interesting information in connection with the Iranian missions which we do not have?
- A. About Gamotha, it would be interesting to know that he had to flee under rather peculiar circumstances from Iran in the latter part of '43 and escaped via Tabriz to Turkey, from where I got him to Germany. Then he headed the Department of Iran in Berlin, and was supposed to return to Iran by parachute but, due to illness, this was delayed and I last heard that he was in Vienna. During my interrogation in England the suggestion was made by the interrogator as to whether I had ever thought that Gamotha might have worked for the Russians on the side. I hardly believe that since I always trusted him, but it would be interesting to know now where he is and if he actually did work for the Russians.
- Q. Is there anybody who would know any more about this subject of the missions to Iran than you do?
- A. Yes. I have already mentioned Schuback and Gamotha and Schulz. Though really not Schulz because he only has expert knowledge of the southern part of Iran, but of course could give you information about everything. However, he did not have an inside view into the conferences of government departments in Teheran.
- Q. Was it your decision to make these missions?
- A. Yes.
- A. In other words, you laid down the general objectives with regard to these missions.
- A. Of course I supervised them, but I was only a tool since the orders came from the top - Himmler, Hitler and also the army. Cooperation was given to me by the office of Canaris which, at that time, I did not head, and also violation of neutrality laws occurred since we flew over the territory of Turkey.
- Q. Were you interrogated extensively on the subject of the Iranian missions in England?
- A. Yes.

Q. Was an American interrogator present?

A. No.

Q. Have you been previously interrogated on this subject by Americans?

A. No.

Q. If you think of anything further of interest on these missions to Iran, you might bring it up on another occasion when we talk to you. Did you consider the gold and foreign exchange which you sent to Iran on these three missions as being sufficient to accomplish the missions?

A. No. There was a definite lack of gold and that is why we were supposed to fly reinforcements in gold and medical supplies, but since I did not obtain planes from the Air Force, the whole thing failed.

Q. How much more did you consider necessary in order to do the job successfully?

A. The greatest lack, of course, was Iranian pounds and gold coins, and I believe that we would have needed at least two or three times the amount we had already sent to Iran. Also, of course, medical supplies were almost as valuable as gold.

Q. Do you believe that there was sufficient gold and Iranian pounds available at the Reichsbank to meet your demands, or do you believe that the denial was due to the fact that the top men did not have confidence in you?

A. I do not think it was a question of confidence because of the order came from the top to carry out these missions, the Reichsbank had to supply us with the money. Naturally, of the Reichsbank thought that the interests of the Reich was impaired, then they could object to further allowances. That happened once, but I will tell you about this later.

Q. Were these men, including the seven, the only intelligence agents in Iran, to the best of your knowledge?

A. Yes, except of course the sub-organizations consisting of Iranians. Of these organizations I have no knowledge.

Q. And these funds which you have mentioned, were they the only intelligence funds which were available in Iran?

A. Yes.

Q. What are the names of the organizations in Iran that were contacted - that is, the native organizations?

A. Principally I remember the group of the Gaichgais. Then there were some other groups who were in opposition to the government, but I do not recall their names. They were Iranian names.

Q. How about the present rebels in northern Iran?

A. The Gaichgais at that time were a wandering tribe that remained in the southern and middle part. At that time the northern tribes were completely quiet and impartial, but Ganotha was supposed to work in the northern territory.

- Q. Did he do any work in the northern territory?
- A. No, he did not come to that mission. It might be that he is there now. I do not know where he is.
- Q. Now you said there were missions to America in '43 and '44. Were there any previous missions?
- A. Not before this time.
I must mention the mission to North America in the Year 1943, since the conferences concerning the money were conducted in '43, but the mission itself was carried out in '44.
- Q. In other words, there were several missions in '44?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Were there any in '45? Let me put it this way: Weren't there one or more missions in 1945 which arose as a result of conferences in 1944?
- A. As far as I remember, two missions were planned for 1945 - one to

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South America utilizing a sailing sloop, and one to North America by submarine. If I remember correctly, the preparations for the mission to South America had reached such a stage that moneys were already appropriated, but I do not think that the missions to North America reached the stage where money was talked of or secured.

- Q. Was the mission to South America to be by sloop?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How many missions were there in 1944, including the one that was planned in '43?
- A. Two to South America and two to North America and one to Palestine.
- Q. What were the approximate dates of the two missions to North America? If you cannot date them, give them to us by seasons.
- A. One was in the late summer and the other in autumn, or approximately around those times.
- Q. How about the two to South America? My purpose is to identify these.
- A. One mission to South America I estimate was around July, when I was already responsible for counter-intelligence, and therefore it was planned overlappingly by counter-intelligence.
- Q. That was after you took over from Canaris?
- A. Yes. The second mission was around November.
- Q. What was the date of the mission to Palestine?
- A. The mission to Palestine was flown in a Liberator bomber from Athens. It must have been naturally while Athens was in German hands: sometime around October.
- Q. Which of these missions was planned in '43?
- A. As far as I remember, one mission to North America.

Q. Were all these missions matters which were handed down from the top?

A. Yes.

Q. In other words, by Hitler, Himmler, or Kaltenbrunner?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you give me the details of the first mission to North America - that is, the one in the late summer of '44?

A. In which respect, financial or otherwise?

Q. Suppose you tell us how much money was to be carried, and what kind.

A. The first mission to North America had its origin in orders received from above. Special interest was furnished by Ribbentrop, who wanted to know the effect of German propaganda against Roosevelt at the time of the election. The original order was to establish an intelligence net in the States.

Q. Was this intelligence net to be established in the States only, or in North America as a whole?

A. Only in the States.

Q. No plans were made for Canada, Mexico, Central America?

A. No. The aim was only political intelligence. I want to mention right now that the submarine, one of the most modern we had, together with money, all equipment and everything else, was destroyed by death charges en route, therefore it never arrived.

Q. How did you get this information that it was destroyed?

A. I learned about that from the OKM who after eight weeks without any communication from the submarine, declared it lost and all occupants dead.

Q. In other words, it was presumed to be lost. It was not a case in which definite information was obtained on it?

A. The last radio message stated that a heavy air attack was in progress and therefore we drew our conclusions that it was sunk. Financial arrangements for these missions were made at the end of 1943. Here we encountered the first difficulties. The funds were supposed to derive from our normal allowances and that would have been too great a burden for me, since our budget was already allotted to the various countries and special importance was laid ~~to~~ the fact that gold was supposed to be carried along. I think at that time Kaltenbrunner, on orders of Himmler, conferred with Funk and as far as I recollect the following agreement was reached: Funk wanted to approve the demands, but he also wanted all foreign exchange that was confiscated by the Security Police under Kaltenbrunner to be handed over either to Funk or the Reichsbank. I believe that Kaltenbrunner's State Police confiscated rather substantial sums of foreign exchange from agents dropped by America, England and Russia. I can estimate that this must have run into the millions of dollars, Swiss francs, rubles and Reichsmarks, and their agreement was that any gold I was to receive from the Reichsbank would be paid for by foreign exchange which was in the hands of Kaltenbrunner. I never knew about these substantial amounts of

foreign exchange that Kaltenbrunner had, nor did I have any jurisdiction over them. Further detailed information could be furnished by Scheidler, who administered cash funds, and head of AWT II, Spacil.

Q. Did Mueller have anything to do with these funds?

A. Yes. Mueller, of course, headed the different State Police officers and these were the people who confiscated foreign exchange, but I know that to the largest extent these funds were in the hands of Scheidler or Spacil. I believe that either the gold used for the Palestine mission or that for South America was paid for out of the foreign exchange funds which were just described. One mission to North America also had gold.

Q. It is getting close to the recess, so think this over during that period. There is one question I want to ask before we stop. Didn't Funk also mention in this negotiation with Kaltenbrunner the fact that Kaltenbrunner's State Police had confiscated huge amounts of devises, jewelry and gold from the occupied countries?

A. I do not recall that.

Q. Didn't you know that?

A. No. I only know that this was all in reference to confiscated moneys taken from parachute agents.

Q. But you did know that Staffeldt was working on just such a project, didn't you?

A. No. I know that Staffeldt had connections with Goering and the Four-Year Plan to carry out such things, but I did not know that

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he worked for Kaltenbrunner or Mueller.

Q. He did work for Heydrich, didn't he?

A. I do not know that. I only know that Heydrich objected to Staffeldt.

Q. Was it an objection, or was it a battle between Heydrich and Goering as to who would run Staffeldt's organization?

A. I had no good insight into the matter, but I take it that Staffeldt was such a clever intriguer that he played both sides against each other to obtain the most benefit.

Interrogation recessed at 12.20

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Ka

München, 9. 12. 1952

Institut für Zeitgeschichte - Archiv

Interrogation
of
Walter Schellenberg
by
Henry Schneider)
Lt. Herbert DUBois)
(In German)
Interpreter: Lt. E. Holton.

Palace of Justice, Room 163
Nurnberg, Germany.
19 December 1945.
2.55 P.M.

Institut f. Zeitgeschichte
München
ARCHIV
831/53

- Q. You understand that you are still under oath, Mr. Schellenberg?
- A. Yes.
- Q. On this mission to North America in the late summer, do you remember the amount of gold or foreign currency which was taken with the group?
- A. We are talking about the mission that was planned in '43 and was the first mission to the U. S. They carried 100,000 American dollars cash and 25 kilos of gold. There were four men.
- Q. Was this gold in coin or bars?
- A. I do not know exactly. I would estimate there were both types.
- Q. Who was in charge of that first mission?
- A. I do not recall the man who was in charge during the missions but the man who supervised the training and planning was Dr. Paeffgen. He is now in Oberursel.
- Q. Paeffgen was in the main office, wasn't he, in charge of North and South America?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who was in charge of Spain?
- A. Steimle. He is also at Oberursel.
- Q. Were they in the military branch or were they in AMT VI?
- A. AMT VI. Later Steimle was also chief of MIL B.
- Q. Did Paeffgen supervise all four branches, or which branch did he supervise? I think you mentioned you had group leaders for the political, military, economic and technical branches.
- A. For North America he was in charge of all these fields. At that time we had not split it into different departments. The same goes for South America.
- Q. Did you later split it up for North America and South America?
- A. No, it did not pay because the results were not coming in. I had no organization going in North America.
- Q. How about Spain? You mentioned Steimle - was he head of all four branches, or was there a spl-it-up there?

A. Spain was sort of an experimental ground. I tried to arrange it so that Steimle would have complete knowledge of what happened in all four different fields and would finally be able to head all four different fields.

Q. What were the names of the four men who went on the first mission to North America?

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A. I was questioned about this several times, but I cannot recall the names.

Q. You have no recollection at all of their names?

A. No. Paefgen told them to me in Oberursel but I have forgotten them again.

Q. Was this regarded as an important mission?

A. I considered it important but later completely forgot about it since it was such a failure.

Q. While we are on the subject, of all these missions that we have discussed - the three Iranian missions, the two to North America, and the two to South America, and the one to Palestine - did the idea originate with you?

A. That is not correct. As I told you before, the mission to North America originated at the request of Ribbentrop. The two missions to South America were ordered by Himmler in '42, and the mission to Palestine was on the basis of the intervention of the Grand Mufti had made and Himmler ordered me to execute it.

Q. It was suggested by the Grand Mufti to Himmler?

A. Yes.

Q. How about the three Iranian missions - who suggested those?

A. These missions to Iran were the result of the following: For one year complete lack of news of Gamotha and Meiyer and suddenly, through an agent in Turkey, they established a basis of communications with us. These foregoing facts were brought to the attention of Himmler through routine channels, who in turn ordered us to give all necessary assistance to these people-

Q. What was the purpose of the first mission to the United States?

A. To secure political intelligence generally and to carry out Ribbentrop's request to report the effect of German broadcasts on the population as a whole. In other words, he wanted to have somebody there telling us what was done right and what was done wrong. An attempt was made to approach the Irish, Polish, Czechs, Yugoslav and Italian minorities by means of broadcasts.

Q. Was this the mission on which you wanted to have tested the effect of German propaganda on the election in the States?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the idea generally? Can you give us a few more details about that part of the mission?

- A. It was really to get reports for Ribbentrop on the effect of his propaganda on these minorities, and for me it was to secure political intelligence since we had no direct contact with the United States.
- Q. Perhaps my question was not clear. I was addressing my remarks to the election. Can you explain what kind of information you wanted on the election?
- A. Ribbentrop's desire was to approach these minorities and through clever election propaganda, keep them from reelecting Roosevelt. I took no part in this because it was of no interest to me.
- Q. What type of propagaandare you referring to?
- A. I cannot tell you anything about it since I was not concerned with it. It was performed solely by the Foreign Office.

- Q. Were these agents themselves to spread propaganda?
- A. No. They were only supposed to secure information as to the effect of the propaganda.
- Q. You said the mission was late in the summer of '44. Was it also one of Ribbentrop's purposes, as far as you knew, to obtain from these agents a report indicating what changes should be made in the type of propaganda that was being put forth?
- A. No. I think the mission was initiated at Ribbentrop's request. It was soon found that the Foreign Office was getting slowly disinterested in the whole affair since apparently they believed they would arrive in the States too late to do any good, and also since certain differences existed between Ribbentrop and myself. Later on the last plans were to have this mission go over mainly to install intelligence service and, secondarily, to carry out Ribbentrop's request.
- Q. Since what date were you and Ribbentrop at odds?
- A. This was frequently, but our relations were strained especially since 1944.
- Q. Where in the U. S. were these men to be landed by submarine?
- A. I would like you to ask Dr. Paeffgen. I really do not know where they were to be landed and, since I am under oath, do not want to say. It might have been north of New York.
- Q. Let us get down to the second mission to North America, which you stated was in the autumn of '44. Give us the details on that mission.
- A. There were only two men who were later captured by the police in North America. In money I believe they carried 50,000 U. S. dollars and also some gold - I do not know how many kilos. Details about this mission could also be learned from Paeffgen.
- Q. We intend to interrogate Paeffgen. However, do you remember the names of the two men?
- A. I recollect the name of one man, Gimpel.

- Q. Which of the two men was in charge?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. What was the general purpose of their mission?
- A. Also to further intelligence.
- Q. Was there anything to which they were specifically to direct their attention?
- A. No, only political news.
- Q. Any sabotage intended?
- A. No, never in North America.
- Q. They never had any specific objective?
- A. No. You see, we had nothing in North America and they were supposed to establish a basis for intelligence service.
- Q. How were they landed?
- A. Also by submarine.

- Q. Is there anything further about these two North American missions which you know and could tell us?
- A. Both these missions were just weak attempts due to the lack of proper personnel, and both failed.
- Q. Was it lack of proper personnel, or was it insufficient planning, or insufficient money? You say, for example, that the first failed because the submarine was sunk. That is why I ask you that question
- A. It was mainly lack of proper personnel since those people who returned from the States were afraid of the FBI and generally unwilling to do that kind of work. Of course, they needed specific training and preparation, especially due to the strong counter-measures taken in the States.
- Q. Do you mean that the U. S. was found not to be a good field in which your agents could operate?
- A. I cannot pass judgment on that because the second mission (Gimpel's) was only a second-rate mission anyway. The first mission, which never reached the shores, was very well trained and well planned, and under normal circumstances they should have found refuge in the States.
- Q. Why did you wait until 1944 to send missions of this type to America?
- A. I was rather skeptical of the whole matter and was more or less pushed into it by Ribbentrop. My skepticism arose from the failure of Canaris' mission to the States and I did not want to burden myself with such ventures. My theory was that it is very difficult to perform such operations by landing agents by submarine. This should all have been done in peace time.

Q. Canaris' was the 8-men incident?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any such missions attempted by Ribbentrop's outfit?

A. I do not know but it is possible that, on the basis of controversies, he might have tried something like that.

Q. Was the 8-men expedition the only one that Canaris tried?

A. I do not know but I only heard about these eight people-

Q. Did you have any paid agents in the U. S. other than these agents whom you tried to land on these two missions?

A. AMT VI did not have any agents in the States. I believe that Canaris, whose office I took charge of later on, had through a counter-espionage agency in Hamburg two contacts in the States.

Q. Have you been interrogated on the subject of these two North American missions previously by the British?

A. I was interrogated and could give about the same information as I gave you today.

Q. How about the Americans?

A. Yes, at Oberursel, by Lt. Col. Flex.

Q. How long were you at Oberursel?

A. 14 days.

Q. Have you been interrogated on the North American expeditions here?

A. No, only about South America.

Q. Let us turn to the first South American expedition, which I believe you said was some time around July '44. Can you give us the details on that?

A. I hardly remember anything about the first mission to South America. I only mentioned it because I had some knowledge of it. It took place just at the time of my changing offices from counter-espionage to intelligence. Certainly, on the financial aspects, you should interrogate Dr. Joergers. I estimate it was somewhere around 100,000 U. S. dollars.

Q. Was there any gold?

A. No.

Q. What was the means of navigation?

A. It was also a sailing enterprise.

Q. Why did they use sailing sloops as opposed to submarines for South America?

A. It was a small sail boat that could easily pass as a fishing boat in whatever waters it was, therefore it could easily pass through strict controles, camouflaging and using different flags. Sometimes it was a Spanish vessel or Portugese. They always got through without any difficulties whatsoever.

Q. What was the place of embarkation?

A. Normally from a French port, but I do not know exactly.

Q. Not from Spain?

A. No, never.

Q. Hew many of these sailing expeditions were there?

A. The one we are talking about another that we will come to soon, and I believe, during the time I was in charge of counter-espionage, there were also two such sailings.

Q. Under Canaris?

A. Yes, under Canaris.

Q. Who were your agents on your first expedition?

A. I do not recall the names. I described the mission just as I remember it.

Q. Do you know how many men were on the mission?

A. I do not know because I did not take part in the preparations.

Q. You do not know approximately how large it was?

A. At the most 2 or 3.

Q. Was that planned and carried through under Paeffgen?

A. No. That was a mission prepared by counter-intelligence.

Q. Was this one of the missions of Canaris?

A. Yes. I tried to explain to you already that these preparations were made just at the time I changed office and I had no part in them.

Q. Do you know the port of debarkation?

A. As far as I know, all these landings were made in Argentina.

Q. Do you know the city in this one case?

A. It was never in a city. It was usually at a prearranged point.

Q. Why was that necessary?

A. Because it always went rather fast. I do not know about the first mission at all.

Q. Do you know generally what the purpose of that first mission was?

A. The first line was reinforcement supplies.

Q. Now we come to the second mission and that is the one around November, 1944. That was the one that was not planned by Canaris' branch, but by yourself. Will you give us the details on that?

A. The man in charge again was Dr. Paeffgen. He again worked with the navy to secure the services of a famous sportsman sailor. It was always the same fellow who carried out these sailing enterprises.

Q. What was his name?

A. I mentioned him several times at other interrogations, but I cannot recall his name now.

Q. Will you try to remember his name?

A. Yes. He was decorated with the Ritterkreuz. The boat was able to reach a prearranged point and make radio connection to shore just at the proper time. All arrangements had previously been made through radio with our people in Argentina.

Q. How much money was carried on this occasion?

A. I estimate 50,000 dollars and large quantities of medical supplies.

Q. How many men were there on this expedition?

A. I do not know exactly - I believe there were three. On their return trip they brought two or three men back from Argentina.

Q. What were the names of the men who went to Argentina?

A. I never recalled the names. I did not bother with them because they changed so frequently through the use of various code names that I did not want to burden myself. That is the reason why at times I cannot give you any names.

Q. The Reasons why I asked about his particular case is that it was under your supervision and it was as late as November '44 - that is not so long ago.

A. Paeffgen probably mentioned them to me in Oberursel, but I purposely did not try to remember them since I did not want to burden myself with them.

Q. To whom were these men to report?

A. They were supposed to establish contact with our main organization-

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that is, Becker and Utzinger.

Q. First names?

A. Becker's is Siegfried; Utzinger's I do not know.

Q. Any other people to whom they were to report?

A. No, just those two.

Q. Do you remember the names of the men who came back?

A. No, they were subordinates.

Q. Was any accounting ever made of the funds that were taken on this expedition?

A. No.

Q. Do you believe the funds have been exhausted?

A. Yes, because they were in need of money for a long time.

Q. Were there any standing instructions that the work in Argentina was to be carried on even after the war ended?

A. At the time of the mission nothing was mentioned to these people about the possibility of defeat and we did not prepare anything for post-defeat times.

Q. Yes, but I understand that considerable sums of foreign exchange were deposited in various countries - much larger than were necessary up to the close of the war; that these sums were deposited later on when defeat appeared practically inevitable; and that specific orders were given that intelligence activities continue beyond defeat. I was told that by a prominent member of the RSHA. Isn't that correct?

A. Then you have to bring that man face to face with me. Perhaps he knows more than I do. What he said is not correct. The only thing that I did is that I supplied the agents with two or three months in salaries and allowances. That was because the closer we came to defeat, the harder it was to secure foreign exchange.

Q. Do you mean to say that nothing was planned about post-defeat operations at all?

A. I have been grilled about this questions almost to the point of exhaustion. I can only repeat to you^{too} that it would only have been logical to prepare an information net, or post-defeat operations if part of the German Reich would not have been occupied. If that would have been the case, I would be in that unoccupied part and lead the operations; but if everything is occupied why should there be any reason to lead post-defeat operations in foreign countries? For whom and for what?

Q. I will endeavor to answer this question by another question. Before that I do want to bring out this point: I do not intend to grill you on something you do not know. In fact, I am not grilling you, I am asking questions. But it is pretty obvious that Kaltenbrunner had plans, or at least provided funds for plans in the post-defeat period. We have pretty clear evidence of that and it seems strange to us that you would not have been called in to discuss those plans with him, or have been advised by him.

A. I can only make one declaration on that point. That is that my relations with Kaltenbrunner were such that he did not inform me of his plans and I was not important in them since I had different interests.

- Q. Would he have informed Spacil or Scheidler and not you?
- A. In any case, because he carried out his own financial policies through them and not through me.
- Q. Would he have informed Ohlendorf and not you? Ohlendorf was rather small fry.
- A. If he had seen an advantage in doing so, I think he would have done it because he trusted Ohlendorf and not me.
- Q. He did trust Ohlendorf more than you?
- A. Yes.

- Q. In other words, you assure me that you knew nothing about it?
- A. I would have no interest today in not telling you if I prepared anything, because it was my plan to inform you of everything that went on. If I had a working organization I would even put it at your disposal. To throw the proper light on these problems especially because of the confusion that existed during my interrogations in England, you should distinguish between post-defeat preparations, which I never made, and invasion funds, which I would like to explain.

Invasion funds were maintained in Portugal, Spain, Bulgaria, Rumania, Croatia and Greece. These were moneys that I saved from my monthly allowances and thereby built up funds in these countries. The purpose of these funds was to permit the agents, in case of invasion, to at least subsist for another 6 months or year during the period of occupation. The maximum amount which these "I" funds should have had was never reached since the process of saving foreign exchange was too slow. I estimate that the "I" fund in Portugal amounted to 300,000 escudos; in Spain I remitted monthly the counter value of 50,000 Reichsmarks in pesetas. This money was invested in the Rowak or the Sofindus and was administered by my principal agent, Mr. Bernhardt. In reference to the funds in the Balkan countries, I want to refer to - as a help to my memory - Obersturmbann-führer Weneck and Sturmführer Dr. Hoettl. In Rumania the invested sum might have amounted to 200,000 either U. S. dollars or Swiss francs. In Bulgaria in the first line was a fund which went into several millions of leva. This, as you know, was so-called "weak" exchange. Then I estimate we saved an amount of 50,000 dollars. In Croatia there were several millions of Croatian currency, called kuna, and there were stores of gold, approximately twenty or thirty thousand dollars and also some gold stocks, but they did not amount to much. What was invested in Hungary I do not know. I would have to consult Hoettl. I had very little in Czechoslovakia.

On the whole, I had to be very careful to execute these transfers because otherwise I would have been branded as a defeatist. Then you would have to talk to Dr. Joergers and Steinle. They could give you information as to the amount deposited by the AMT MIL. I know an amount was saved by AMT MIL in Portugal. About Spain I do not know. Then this amount of AMT MIL, which was deposited in Switzerland and about which Steinle and also KO Capt. Meissner should know the details, should be in the amount of one or one and a half million Swiss francs. I would also like to know what happened to this amount. KO stands for Kriegsorganisation, an abbreviation used often meaning AMT MIL. This is all the information I can recollect about the "I" funds. The moneys in the Balkans were definitely lost because as soon as these countries were occupied the entire organizations were thoroughly disorganized, but the amounts floating around in Portugal, Spain - and especially that rather free account in Switzerland - should

1) Nach "approximately" einfügen: *ben kilos in gold coins. In my opinion part of that was split and used for Albania. In Greece there were approximately*

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still be available and definite information about them should be obtained.

I want to explain that these "I" funds were not intended to be used in case of defeat of Germany, but rather to be used in case the countries in which they were kept were invaded. For instance, it was anticipated that Portugal would be invaded. Therefore, the funds were to be used to keep the agents going while they had no contact with the Reich.

I would not designate the fund maintained in Switzerland especially as an "I" fund, but in the other countries the "I" organization was such that agents and equipment were not to be used until Case "I" became effective.

Q. Is that all?

A. Yes.

Q. You wanted to make a correction to indicate that the first group of funds you mentioned related only to AMT VI, is that correct?

A. That I brought out that in Portugal, Spain and Switzerland AMT MIL maintained separate funds.

Q. To clear up another point, were both AMT VI and AMT MIL funds called "I" funds by you?

A. I do not recall right now, but I believe that another name was also used and that was Case "R" for retreat, and "R" Net, retreat net. Whether Case "I" was used by AMT VI or AMT MIL, I cannot recall.

Q. One used "I" and the other "R", is that right?

A. Yes, but I don't know which is which.

Q. You referred to the "I" funds for use only in case of invasion. Invasion by whom?

A. I do not think I have to go into details about the Balkans.

Q. Did you mean Russia and the Allies, or Germany?

A. No, only by the Allies in all cases.

Q. It was contemplated that the Allies would invade Portugal?

A. Yes, we had news about this fact in '43.

Q. Spain, too?

A. Spain too. As a continuation of the invasion of North Africa and subsequent occupation, we had to be prepared that Southern France, Northern Italy, also Portugal and Spain were to be invaded.

Q. Switzerland too?

A. No. I corrected myself later on by saying that the fund in Switzerland could not be designated as an "I" fund. You see, this amount was transferred by AMT MIL and not by AMT VI, but I nevertheless thought of leaving the fund there to use it in case we wanted to build up an "I" fund in Turkey, especially after relations with Turkey had been discontinued; also in case Portugal and Spain were to break relations with Germany we wanted to use this fund to feed the needs of these countries.

Q. Was there an "I" fund in Sweden?

A. No, there was no money as yet in Sweden.

Q. Do you mean that the fund was originally transferred to Switzerland for the purposes which you have just stated?

A. No. I was taken by surprise that AMT MIL had transferred this money to Switzerland and I gave this reason to Steidle to keep these funds in Switzerland. In other words, this was my justification for it. I therefore instructed Steidle to use these moneys for that purpose. Since I am under oath, I want to further explain concerning Sweden. I know definitely that AMT VI had no funds there and I believe, though I do not know for sure, that AMT MIL also had no funds there, but it would be advisable to ask Dr. Joergers for specific information.

Q. Did AMT VI or AMT MIL, or both, have funds in Argentina?

A. I only know about moneys that were sent there covering the missions described and also that certain compensation accounts were used by the organization in Argentina. I think they were exhausted and I know that there were no special funds kept there.

Q. How about the United States? Is the same thing true?

A. There we had nothing.

Q. Was there an "I" fund or "R" fund in Iran?

A. No, all the money was exhausted. The organization failed due to lack of money.

Q. Another question to clear up something that was said before. You mentioned something about confusion during the British interrogations as the starting point for this discussion on invasion funds. Briefly, what was that confusion?

A. Apparently the English interrogators had reports about these "I" funds and mistook them for post-defeat preparations made by me and it took some time to clear up this misunderstanding.

Q. With whom in Spain was the "I" fund deposited?

A. The saving account, as you might say was in the custody of Bernhardt and the man authorized to use it was KO leader Lt. Col. Kleyenstueber.

Q. And the AMT MIL fund?

A. They were together.

Q. With whom in Portugal was the "I" fund deposited?

A. For AMT VI with Sturmabfuhrer Nassenstein, and for AMT MIL, Col. Friederici.

Q. Were the funds in Portugal deposited in a bank?

A. I cannot say for certain. I do not think they were. I believe they were cash.

Q. Do you think the same is true about Spain?

A. Yes.

Q. And Switzerland?

A. No. In Switzerland there must have been a bank connection.

Q. What bank?

A. That I do not know. Steinle and Meissner certainly ought to know.

Q. Do you know where in Switzerland the individuals concerned were located?

A. Meissner was in Bern as General Consul.

Q. Weren't these funds deposited in the Wehrli Bank?

A. I cannot say in which bank. I only know that they were in connection with a bank.

Q. Were these individual depositories instructed to place the money or retain it in their own names and not under any official designation? Take, for example, Meissner in Switzerland. If he deposited the money in a bank, would he have deposited it in his own name or in the name of AMT VI or AMT MIL?

A. I take it that they were under code names. I do not know whether Meissner would have used his name. I rather suppose, for example, that the name of Waetjens was used.

Q. With whom in the Balkans were the various moneys deposited?

A. Those were all cash amounts which were at the disposal of the principal agents designated for Case "I".

Q. Did you have any other funds indicated by letters of the alphabet in either AMT VI or AMT MIL?

A. No.

Q. Didn't Kaltenbrunner do the same thing for his organization as you did for your office with respect to names?

A. That I cannot say. I only know that Kaltenbrunner, through the disbursing of counterfeit pound notes, acquired certain funds of which Scheidler and Spacil knew, but I didn't.

Q. Did the Foreign Office of von Ribbentrop establish similar funds?

A. I know that the Foreign Office had available many times the size of the funds that were at my disposal. What happened to all these moneys, I do not know.

Q. Did you ever hear or receive any indication that Ribbentrop made similar provision with respect to funds in case of invasion or retreat?

A. I have never heard anything definite about it.

Q. Do you know Bernhardt's first name - the Bernhardt of Sofindus?

A. I do not know.

Q. Was it Johann?

A. Yes.

Q. He is a good friend of Goering's?

A. He was at one time.

Q. Why do you say "at one time"? Did the relationship change?

A. Yes, they cooled off considerably. I do not know the reason, but later on they did not have the close contact they used to have.

Q. Was Bernhardt at one and the same time your agent and Goering's agent for the Four-Year Plan?

A. Since Bernhardt was head of the State-owned Rowak and, through his position, had right contacts and connections, especially in the economic field, he later put himself at my disposal and wanted

to work just as he had worked for Canaris. I, of course, utilized him to the fullest extent.

Q. You mentioned the fact that the funds which were transferred to Switzerland might be, for example, in the name of Waetjens. What do you mean by that? Do you think it was a likelihood that the funds were put in his name?

A. The reason why I mentioned that name is that at the time I took AMT MIL from Col. Hansen, Mr. Waetjens received a rather large sum every month. I think it was 60,000 Swiss francs. But since I was so overburdened in work, I never really got a complete picture of the financial methods of that office and even now I know only perhaps two-thirds of that aspect. The other third of the possible transfers and actual transfers are not clear to me. I always wanted to investigate the Waetjens affair but, as I said, I was too burdened and had no time to do that.

Q. So that you believe the fund is probably now in a Swiss bank under some code name?

A. It is possible, but as far as I can see it this question could be cleared up immediately by questioning Steimle and Meissner.

Q. When did you first start making preparation for these "I" funds?

A. That began in the middle of 1943.

Q. Was it your idea on Kaltenbrunner's idea?

A. It was my idea. Kaltenbrunner had nothing to do with the "I" funds. Kaltenbrunner, of course, had to know about it and as my superior had to approve it, but I had to present it to him very carefully so as not to be marked as a defeatist.

- Q. Did he know about the "I" funds from the very beginning, or did you keep it secret from him for a while?
- A. I informed him of it piece by piece.
- Q. Did you give the British the same details on these "I" funds that you have given to us today?
- A. On many points, yes. On other points I have given you additional information.
- Q. Were there any Americans present when you gave them the information on "I" funds?
- A. No.
- Q. I want to clear up today the tail end of that second South American mission which we did not quite finish. Was that mission undertaken by AMT VI or AMT MIL?
- A. AMT VI.
- Q. In addition to these two South American missions, you said there were others. Will you give me the approximate dates?
- A. That was during the time of counter-intelligence and I do not know about it.
- Q. Were they prior to 1944?
- A. Yes. One might have been in '44 and one in '43.
- Q. Were there just two others, as far as you know?
- A. Yes.
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- Q. Do you have any idea about how much was taken in money or gold?
- A. I do not.
- Q. Was the destination in both cases Argentina?
- A. Yes.
- Q. The dollars that were taken over on these missions and also the dollars that were deposited in the "I" funds, for example - were counterfeit dollars included among those?
- A. I never had any counterfeit moneys and anyway, for such important intelligence missions, I never used counterfeit dollars.
- Q. Any other kind of counterfeit money - pounds?
- A. Pounds were used in less important instances, also at times when conditions were favorable to buy desired foreign exchange. I never wanted to use it in my intelligence work because I did not want to impair the success of any mission.
- Q. That leaves us with the Palestine mission and the two projected missions for '45 that you mentioned before, which we will discuss tomorrow.

One thing I would like you to do before we see you tomorrow is to write up a short memorandum stating the approximate dates of the beginning of each of the "I" and "R" funds, so far as you know, then we can read it into the record and save time.

Interrogation adjourned at 5.15 P.M.

Für die Richtigkeit der A/bechrift

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München, 9. 12. 1952

Interrogation
of
Walter Schellenberg
by
Henry Schneider)
Lt. Herbert DUBois)
(In German)
Interpreter: Lt. E. Holton.

28-29118-33
Palace of Justice, Room 163
Nurnberg, Germany.
19 December 1945.
2.55 P.M.

Institut f. Zeitgeschichte
München
ARCHIV

831/53

- Q. You understand that you are still under oath, Mr. Schellenberg?
- A. Yes.
- Q. On this mission to North America in the late summer, do you remember the amount of gold or foreign currency which was taken with the group?
- A. We are talking about the mission that was planned in '43 and was the first mission to the U. S. They carried 100,000 American dollars cash and 25 kilos of gold. There were four men.
- Q. Was this gold in coin or bars?
- A. I do not know exactly. I would estimate there were both types.
- Q. Who was in charge of that first mission?
- A. I do not recall the man who was in charge during the missions but the man who supervised the training and planning was Dr. Paeffgen. He is now in Oberursel.
- Q. Paeffgen was in the main office, wasn't he, in charge of North and South America?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who was in charge of Spain?
- A. Steimle. He is also at Oberursel.
- Q. Were they in the military branch or were they in AMT VI?
- A. AMT VI. Later Steimle was also chief of MIL B.
- Q. Did Paeffgen supervise all four branches, or which branch did he supervise? I think you mentioned you had group leaders for the political, military, economic and technical branches.
- A. For North America he was in charge of all these fields. At that time we had not split it into different departments. The same goes for South America.
- Q. Did you later split it up for North America and South America?
- A. No, it did not pay because the results were not coming in. I had no organization going in North America.
- Q. How about Spain? You mentioned Steimle - was he head of all four branches, or was there a split-up there?

A. Spain was sort of an experimental ground. I tried to arrange it so that Steinle would have complete knowledge of what happened in all four different fields and would finally be able to head all four different fields.

Q. What were the names of the four men who went on the first mission to North America?

A. I was questioned about this several times, but I cannot recall the names.

Q. You have no recollection at all of their names?

A. No. Paeffgen told them to me in Oberursel but I have forgotten them again.

Q. Was this regarded as an important mission?

A. I considered it important but later completely forgot about it since it was such a failure.

Q. While we are on the subject, of all these missions that we have discussed - the three Iranian missions, the two to North America, and the two to South America, and the one to Palestine - did the idea originate with you?

A. That is not correct. As I told you before, the mission to North America originated at the request of Ribbentrop. The two missions to South America were ordered by Himmler in '42, and the mission to Palestine was on the basis of the intervention of the Grand Mufti had made and Himmler ordered me to execute it.

Q. It was suggested by the Grand Mufti to Himmler?

A. Yes.

Q. How about the three Iranian missions - who suggested those?

A. These missions to Iran were the result of the following: For one year complete lack of news of Gamotha and Heiyer and suddenly, through an agent in Turkey, they established a basis of communications with us. These foregoing facts were brought to the attention of Himmler through routine channels, who in turn ordered us to give all necessary assistance to these people-

Q. What was the purpose of the first mission to the United States?

A. To secure political intelligence generally and to carry out Ribbentrop's request to report the effect of German broadcasts on the population as a whole. In other words, he wanted to have somebody there telling us what was done right and what was done wrong. An attempt was made to approach the Irish, Polish, Czechs, Yugoslav and Italian minorities by means of broadcasts.

Q. Was this the mission on which you wanted to have tested the effect of German propaganda on the election in the States?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the idea generally? Can you give us a few more details about that part of the mission?

A. It was really to get reports for Ribbentrop on the effect of his propaganda on these minorities, and for me it was to secure political intelligence since we had no direct contact with the United States.

Q. Perhaps my question was not clear. I was addressing my remarks to the election. Can you explain what kind of information you wanted on the election?

A. Ribbentrop's desire was to approach these minorities and through clever election propaganda, keep them from reelecting Roosevelt. I took no part in this because it was of no interest to me.

Q. What type of propoganda are you referring to?

A. I cannot tell you anything about it since I was not concerned with it. It was performed solely by the Foreign Office.

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Q. Were these agents themselves to spread propoganda?

A. No. They were only supposed to secure information as to the effect of the propoganda.

Q. You said the mission was late in the summer of '44. Was int also one of Ribbentrop's purposes, as far as you knew, to obtain from these agents a report indicating what changes should be made in the type of propoganda that was being put forth?

A. No. I think the mission was initiated at Ribbentrop's request. It was soon found that the Foreign Office was getting slowly disinterested in the whole affair since apparently they believed they would arrive in the States too late to do any good, and also since certain differences existed between Ribbentrop and myself. Later on the last plans were to have this mission go over mainly to install intelligence service and, secondarily, to carry out Ribbentrop's request.

Q. Since what date were you and Ribbentrop at odds?

A. This was frequently, but our relations were strained especially since 1944.

Q. Where in the U. S. were these men to be landed by submarine?

A. I would like you to ask Dr. Paeffgen. I really do not know where they were to be landed and, since I am under oath, do not want to say. It might have been north of New York.

Q. Let us get down to the second mission to North America, which you stated was in the autumn of '44. Give us the details on that mission.

A. There were only two men who were later captured by the police in North America. In money I believe they carried 50,000 U. S. dollars and also some gold - I do not know how many kilos. Details about this mission could also be learned from Paeffgen.

Q. We intend to interrogate Paeffgen. However, do you remember the names of the two men?

A. I recollect the name of one man, Gimpel.

Q. Which of the two men was in charge?

A. I do not know.

Q. What was the general purpose of their mission?

A. Also to further intelligence.

Q. Was there anything to which they were specifically to direct their attention?

A. No, only political news.

Q. Any sabotage intended?

A. No, never in North America.

Q. They never had any specific objective?

A. No. You see, we had nothing in North America and they were supposed to establish a basis for intelligence service.

Q. How were they landed?

A. Also by submarine.

Q. Is there anything further about these two North American missions which you know and could tell us?

A. Both these missions were just weak attempts due to the lack of proper personnel, and both failed.

Q. Was it lack of proper personnel, or was it insufficient planning, or insufficient money? You say, for example, that the first failed because the submarine was sunk. That is why I ask you that question

A. It was mainly lack of proper personnel since those people who returned from the States were afraid of the FBI and generally unwilling to do that kind of work. Of course, they needed specific training and preparation, especially due to the strong counter-measures taken in the States.

Q. Do you mean that the U. S. was found not to be a good field in which your agents could operate?

A. I cannot pass judgment on that because the second mission (Gimpel's) was only a second-rate mission anyway. The first mission, which never reached the shores, was very well trained and well planned, and under normal circumstances they should have found refuge in the States.

Q. Why did you wait until 1944 to send missions of this type to America?

A. I was rather skeptical of the whole matter and was more or less pushed into it by Ribbentrop. My skepticism arose from the failure of Canaris' mission to the States and I did not want to burden myself with such ventures. My theory was that it is very difficult to perform such operations by landing agents by submarine. This should all have been done in peace time.

- Q. Canaris' was the 8-men incident?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Were there any such missions attempted by Ribbentrop's outfit?
- A. I do not know but it is possible that, on the basis of controversy, he might have tried something like that.
- Q. Was the 8-men expedition the only one that Canaris tried?
- A. I do not know but I only heard about these eight people-
- Q. Did you have any paid agents in the U. S. other than these agents whom you tried to land on these two missions?
- A. AMT VI did not have any agents in the States. I believe that Canaris, whose office I took charge of later on, had through a counter-espionage agency in Hamburg two contacts in the States.
- Q. Have you been interrogated on the subject of these two North American missions previously by the British?
- A. I was interrogated and could give about the same information as I gave you today.
- Q. How about the Americans?
- A. Yes, at Oberursel, by Lt. Col. Flex.
- Q. How long were you at Oberursel?
- A. 14 days.

- Q. Have you been interrogated on the North American expeditions here?
- A. No, only about South America.
- Q. Let us turn to the first South American expedition, which I believe you said was some time around July '44. Can you give us the details on that?
- A. I hardly remember anything about the first mission to South America. I only mentioned it because I had some knowledge of it. It took place just at the time of my changing offices from counter-espionage to intelligence. Certainly, on the financial aspects, you should interrogate Dr. Joergers. I estimate it was somewhere around 100,000 U. S. dollars.
- Q. Was there any gold?
- A. No.
- Q. What was the means of navigation?
- A. It was also a sailing enterprise.
- Q. Why did they use sailing sloops as opposed to submarines for South America?

A. It was a small sail boat that could easily pass as a fishing boat in whatever waters it was, therefore it could easily pass through strict controles, camouflaging and using different flags. Sometimes it was a Spanish vessel or Portugese. They always got through without any difficulties whatsoever.

Q. What was the place of embarkation?

A. Normally from a French port, but I do not know exactly.

Q. Not from Spain?

A. No, never.

Q. How many of these sailing expeditions were there?

A. The one we are talking about another that we will come to soon, and I believe, during the time I was in charge of counter-espionage, there were also two such sailings.

Q. Under Canaris?

A. Yes, under Canaris.

Q. Who were your agents on your first expedition?

A. I do not recall the names. I described the mission just as I remember it.

Q. Do you know how many men were on the mission?

A. I do not know because I did not take part in the preparations.

Q. You do not know approximately how large it was?

A. At the most 2 or 3.

Q. Was that planned and carried through under Paeffgen?

A. No. That was a mission prepared by counter-intelligence.

Q. Was this one of the missions of Canaris?

A. Yes. I tried to explain to you already that these preparations were made just at the time I changed office and I had no part in them.

Q. Do you know the port of debarkation?

A. As far as I know, all these landings were made in Argentina.

Q. Do you know the city in this one case?

A. It was never in a city. It was usually at a prearranged point.

Q. Why was that necessary?

A. Because it always went rather fast. I do not know about the first mission at all.

- Q. Do you know generally what the purpose of that first mission was?
- A. The first line was reinforcement supplies.
- Q. Now we come to the second mission and that is the one around November, 1944. That was the one that was not planned by Ganaris' branch, but by yourself. Will you give us the details on that?
- A. The man in charge again was Dr. Paeffgen. He again worked with the navy to secure the services of a famous sportsman sailor. It was always the same fellow who carried out these sailing enterprises.
- Q. What was his name?
- A. I mentioned him several times at other interrogations, but I cannot recall his name now.
- Q. Will you try to remember his name?
- A. Yes. He was decorated with the Ritterkreuz. The boat was able to reach a prearranged point and make radio connection to shore just at the proper time. All arrangements had previously been made through radio with our people in Argentina.
- Q. How much money was carried on this occasion?
- A. I estimate 50,000 dollars and large quantities of medical supplies.
- Q. How many men were there on this expedition?
- A. I do not know exactly - I believe there were three. On their return trip they brought two or three men back from Argentina.
- Q. What were the names of the men who went to Argentina?
- A. I never recalled the names. I did not bother with them because they changed so frequently through the use of various code names that I did not want to burden myself. That is the reason why at times I cannot give you any names.
- Q. The Reasons why I asked about his particular case is that it was under your supervision and it was as late as November '44 - that is not so long ago.
- A. Paeffgen probably mentioned them to me in Oberursel, but I purposely did not try to remember them since I did not want to burden myself with them.
- Q. To whom were these men to report?
- A. They were supposed to establish contact with our main organization-

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that is, Becker and Utzinger.

Q. First names?

A. Becker's is Siegfried; Utzinger's I do not know.

Q. Any other people to whom they were to report?

A. No, just those two.

Q. Do you remember the names of the men who came back?

A. No, they were subordinates.

Q. Was any accounting ever made of the funds that were taken on this expedition?

A. No.

Q. Do you believe the funds have been exhausted?

A. Yes, because they were in need of money for a long time.

Q. Were there any standing instructions that the work in Argentina was to be carried on even after the war ended?

A. At the time of the mission nothing was mentioned to these people about the possibility of defeat and we did not prepare anything for post-defeat times.

Q. Yes, but I understand that considerable sums of foreign exchange were deposited in various countries - much larger than were necessary up to the close of the war; that these sums were deposited later on when defeat appeared practically inevitable; and that specific orders were given that intelligence activities continue beyond defeat. I was told that by a prominent member of the RSHA. Isn't that correct?

A. Then you have to bring that man face to face with me. Perhaps he knows more than I do. What he said is not correct. The only thing that I did is that I supplied the agents with two or three months in salaries and allowances. That was because the closer we came to defeat, the harder it was to secure foreign exchange.

Q. Do you mean to say that nothing was planned about post-defeat operations at all?

A. I have been grilled about this questions almost to the point of exhaustion. I can only repeat to you that it would only have been logical to prepare an information net, or post-defeat operations if part of the German Reich would not have been occupied. If that would have been the case, I would be in that unoccupied part and lead the operations; but if everything is occupied why should there be any reason to lead post-defeat operations in foreign countries? For whom and for what?

Q. I will endeavor to answer this question by another question. Before that I do want to bring out this point: I do not intend to grill you on something you do not know. In fact, I am not grilling you, I am asking questions. But it is pretty obvious that Kaltenbrunner had plans, or at least provided funds for plans in the post-defeat period. We have pretty clear evidence of that and it seems strange to us that you would not have been called in to discuss those plans with him, or have been advised by him.

A. I can only make one declaration on that point. That is that my relations with Kaltenbrunner were such that he did not inform me of his plans and I was not important in them since I had different interests.

- Q. Would he have informed Spacil or Scheidler and not you?
- A. In any case, because he carried out his own financial policies through them and not through me.
- Q. Would he have informed Ohlendorf and not you? Ohlendorf was rather small fry.
- A. If he had seen an advantage in doing so, I think he would have done it because he trusted Ohlendorf and not me.
- Q. He did trust Ohlendorf more than you?
- A. Yes.

- Q. In other words, you assure me that you knew nothing about it?
- A. I would have no interest today in not telling you if I prepared anything, because it was my plan to inform you of everything that went on. If I had a working organization I would even put it at your disposal. To throw the proper light on these problems especially because of the confusion that existed during my interrogations in England, you should distinguish between post-defeat preparations, which I never made, and invasion funds, which I would like to explain.

Invasione funds were maintained in Portugal, Spain, Bulgaria, Rumania, Croatia and Greece. These were moneys that I saved from my monthly allowances and thereby built up funds in these countries. The purpose of these funds was to permit the agents, in case of invasion, to at least subsist for another 6 months or year during the period of occupation. The maximum amount which these "I" funds should have had was never reached since the process of saving foreign exchange was too slow. I estimate that the "I" fund in Portugal amounted to 300,000 escudos; in Spain I remitted monthly the counter value of 50,000 Reichsmarks in pesetas. This money was invested in the Rowak or the Sofindus and was administered by my principal agent, Mr. Bernhardt. In reference to the funds in the Balkan countries, I want to refer to - as a help to my memory - Obersturmbann-führer Weneck and Sturmführer Dr. Hoettl. In Rumania the invested sum might have amounted to 200,000 either U. S. dollars or Swiss francs. In Bulgaria in the first line was a fund which went into several millions of leva. This, as you know, was so-called "weak" exchange. Then I estimate we saved an amount of 50,000 dollars. In Croatia there were several millions of Croatian currency, called kuna, and there were stores of gold, approximately twenty or thirty thousand dollars and also some gold stocks, but they did not amount to much. What was invested in Hungary I do not know. I would have to consult Hoettl. I had very little in Czechoslovakia.

On the whole, I had to be very careful to execute these transfers because otherwise I would have been branded as a defeatist. Then you would have to talk to Dr. Joergers and Steimle. They could give you information as to the amount deposited by the AMT MIL. I know an amount was saved by AMT MIL in Portugal. About Spain I do not know. Then this amount of AMT MIL, which was deposited in Switzerland and about which Steimle and also KO Capt. Meissner should know the details, should be in the amount of one or one and a half million Swissfrances. I would also like to know what happened to this amount. KO stands for Kriegsorganization, an abbreviation used often meaning AMT MIL. This is all the information I can recollect about the "I" funds. The moneys in the Balkans were definitely lost because as soon as these countries were occupied the entire organizations were thoroughly disorganized, but the amounts floating around in Portugal, Spain - and especially that rather free account in Switzerland - should

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1) Nach "approximately" einfügen: ten kilos in gold coins. In my opinion part of that was left and used in Greece there were approximately 28-29

still be available and definite information about them should be obtained.

I want to explain that these "I" funds were not intended to be used in case of defeat of Germany, but rather to be used in case the countries in which they were kept were invaded. For instance, it was anticipated that Portugal would be invaded. Therefore, the funds were to be used to keep the agents going while they had no contact with the Reich.

I would not designate the fund maintained in Switzerland especially as an "I" fund, but in the other countries the "I" organization was such that agents and equipment were not to be used until Case "I" became effective.

Q. Is that all?

A. Yes.

Q. You wanted to make a correction to indicate that the first group of funds you mentioned related only to AMT VI, is that correct?

A. That I brought out that in Portugal, Spain and Switzerland AMT MIL maintained separate funds.

Q. To clear up another point, were both AMT VI and AMT MIL funds called "I" funds by you?

A. I do not recall right now, but I believe that another name was also used and that was Case "R" for retreat, and "R" Net, retreat net. Whether Case "I" was used by AMT VI or AMT MIL, I cannot recall.

Q. One used "I" and the other "R", is that right?

A. Yes, but I don't know which is which.

Q. You referred to the "I" funds for use only in case of invasion. Invasion by whom?

A. I do not think I have to go into details about the Balkans.

Q. Did you mean Russia and the Allies, or Germany?

A. No, only by the Allies in all cases.

Q. It was contemplated that the Allies would invade Portugal?

A. Yes, we had news about this fact in '43.

Q. Spain, too?

A. Spain too. As a continuation of the invasion of North Africa and subsequent occupation, we had to be prepared that Southern France, Northern Italy, also Portugal and Spain were to be invaded.

Q. Switzerland too?

A. No. I corrected myself later on by saying that the fund in Switzerland could not be designated as an "I" fund. You see, this amount was transferred by AMT MIL and not by AMT VI, but I nevertheless thought of leaving the fund there to use it in case we wanted to build up an "I" fund in Turkey, especially after relations with Turkey had been discontinued; also in case Portugal and Spain were to break relations with Germany we wanted to use this fund to feed the needs of these countries.

Q. Was there an "I" fund in Sweden?

A. No, there was no money as yet in Sweden.

Q. Do you mean that the fund was originally transferred to Switzerland for the purposes which you have just stated?

A. No. I was taken by surprise that AMT MIL had transferred this money to Switzerland and I gave this reason to Steidle to keep these funds in Switzerland. In other words, this was my justification for it. I therefore instructed Steidle to use these moneys for that purpose. Since I am under oath, I want to further explain concerning Sweden. I know definitely that AMT VI had no funds there and I believe, though I do not know for sure, that AMT MIL also had no funds there, but it would be advisable to ask Dr. Joergers for specific information.

Q. Did AMT VI or AMT MIL, or both, have funds in Argentina?

A. I only know about moneys that were sent there covering the missions described and also that certain compensation accounts were used by the organization in Argentina. I think they were exhausted and I know that there were no special funds kept there.

Q. How about the United States? Is the same thing true?

A. There we had nothing.

Q. Was there an "I" fund or "R" fund in Iran?

A. No, all the money was exhausted. The organization failed due to lack of money.

Q. Another question to clear up something that was said before. You mentioned something about confusion during the British interrogations as the starting point for this discussion on invasion funds. Briefly, what was that confusion?

A. Apparently the English interrogators had reports about these "I" funds and mistook them for post-defeat preparations made by me and it took some time to clear up this misunderstanding.

Q. With whom in Spain was the "I" fund deposited?

A. The saving account, as you might say was in the custody of Bernhardt and the man authorized to use it was KO leader Lt. Col. Kleyenstueber.

Q. And the AMT MIL fund?

A. They were together.

Q. With whom in Portugal was the "I" fund deposited?

A. For AMT VI with Sturmbannführer Nassenstein, and for AMT MIL, Col. Friederici.

Q. Were the funds in Portugal deposited in a bank?

A. I cannot say for certain. I do not think they were. I believe they were cash.

Q. Do you think the same is true about Spain?

A. Yes.

Q. And Switzerland?

A. No. In Switzerland there must have been a bank connection.

Q. What bank?

A. That I do not know. Steimle and Meissner certainly ought to know.

Q. Do you know where in Switzerland the individuals concerned were located?

A. Meissner was in Bern as General Consul.

Q. Weren't these funds deposited in the Wehrli Bank?

A. I cannot say in which bank. I only know that they were in connection with a bank.

Q. Were these individual depositories instructed to place the money or retain it in their own names and not under any official designation? Take, for example, Meissner in Switzerland. If he deposited the money in a bank, would he have deposited it in his own name or in the name of AMT VI or AMT MIL?

A. I take it that they were under code names. I do not know whether Meissner would have used his name. I rather suppose, for example, that the name of Waetjens was used.

Q. With whom in the Balkans were the various moneys deposited?

A. Those were all cash amounts which were at the disposal of the principal agents designated for Case "I".

Q. Did you have any other funds indicated by letters of the alphabet in either AMT VI or AMT MIL?

A. No.

Q. Didn't Kaltenbrunner do the same thing for his organization as you did for your office with respect to names?

A. That I cannot say. I only know that Kaltenbrunner, through the disbursing of counterfeit pound notes, acquired certain funds of which Scheidler and Spacil knew, but I didn't.

Q. Did the Foreign Office of von Ribbentrop establish similar funds?

A. I know that the Foreign Office had available many times the size of the funds that were at my disposal. What happened to all these moneys, I do not know.

Q. Did you ever hear or receive any indication that Ribbentrop made similar provision with respect to funds in case of invasion or retreat?

A. I have never heard anything definite about it.

Q. Do you know Bernhardt's first name - the Bernhardt of Sofindus?

A. I do not know.

Q. Was it Johann?

A. Yes.

Q. He is a good friend of Goering's?

A. He was at one time.

Q. Why do you say "at one time"? Did the relationship change?

A. Yes, they cooled off considerably. I do not know the reason, but later on they did not have the close contact they used to have.

Q. Was Bernhardt at one and the same time your agent and Goering's agent for the Four-Year Plan?

A. Since Bernhardt was head of the State-owned Rowak and, through his position, had right contacts and connections, especially in the economic field, he later put himself at my disposal and wanted

to work just as he had worked for Canaris. I, of course, utilized him to the fullest extent.

Q. You mentioned the fact that the funds which were transferred to Switzerland might be, for example, in the name of Waetjens. What do you mean by that? Do you think it was a likelihood that the funds were put in his name?

A. The reason why I mentioned that name is that at the time I took AMT MIL from Col. Haasen, Mr. Waetjens received a rather large sum every month. I think it was 60,000 Swiss francs. But since I was so overburdened in work, I never really got a complete picture of the financial methods of that office and even now I know only perhaps two-thirds of that aspect. The other third of the possible transfers and actual transfers are not clear to me. I always wanted to investigate the Waetjens affair but, as I said, I was too burdened and had no time to do that.

Q. So that you believe the fund is probably now in a Swiss bank under some code name?

A. It is possible, but as far as I can see it this question could be cleared up immediately by questioning Steimle and Meissner.

Q. When did you first start making preparation for these "I" funds?

A. That began in the middle of 1943.

Q. Was it your idea on Kaltenbrunner's idea?

A. It was my idea. Kaltenbrunner had nothing to do with the "I" funds. Kaltenbrunner, of course, had to know about it and as my superior had to approve it, but I had to present it to him very carefully so as not to be marked as a defeatist.

- Q. Did he know about the "I" funds from the very beginning, or did you keep it secret from him for a while?
- A. I informed him of it piece by piece.
- Q. Did you give the British the same details on these "I" funds that you have given to us today?
- A. On many points, yes. On other points I have given you additional information.
- Q. Were there any Americans present when you gave them the information on "I" funds?
- A. No.
- Q. I want to clear up today the tail end of that second South American mission which we did not quite finish. Was that mission undertaken by AMT VI or AME MIL?
- A. AMT VI.
- Q. In addition to these two South American missions, you said there were others. Will you give me the approximate dates?
- A. That was during the time of counter-intelligence and I do not know about it.
- Q. Were they prior to 1944?
- A. Yes. One might have been in '44 and one in '43.
- Q. Were there just two others, as far as you know?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you have any idea about how much was taken in money or gold?
- A. I do not.
- Q. Was the destination in both cases Argentina?
- A. Yes.
- Q. The dollars that were taken over on these missions and also the dollars that were deposited in the "I" funds, for example - were counterfeit dollars included among those?
- A. I never had any counterfeit moneys and anyway, for such important intelligence missions, I never used counterfeit dollars.
- Q. Any other kind of counterfeit money - pounds?
- A. Pounds were used in less important instances, also at times when conditions were favorable to buy desired foreign exchange. I never wanted to use it in my intelligence work because I did not want to impair the success of any mission.
- Q. That leaves us with the Palestine mission and the two projected missions for '45 that you mentioned before, which we will discuss tomorrow.

One thing I would like you to do before we see you tomorrow is to write up a short memorandum stating the approximate dates of the beginning of each of the "I" and "R" funds, so far as you know, then we can read it into the record and save time.

Interrogation adjourned at 5.15 P.M.

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Für die Richtigkeit der Abschrift

bc

München, 9. 12. 1952

INTERROGATION

of
WALTER SCHELLENBERG

by
Henry Schneider)
Lt. H. G. DuBois)
(In German)

Interpreter: Lt. E. Holton

75-29718-52
Institut f. Zeitgeschichte
München
ARCHIV

831/53

Palace of Justice, Room 163,
Nürnberg, Germany,
20 December 1945.
TIME: 10:45 am - 12:25 pm

Q. Do you understand that you are still under oath?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you able to prepare those statements we asked about yesterday?

A. I reconsidered some of the details we discussed yesterday and I want to make an addition to them. I also want to add reference to the I. and R. nets. They were to go into effect not only in case of invasion but also in case diplomatic relations were discontinued with the various neutral countries. It is not necessarily a military occupation that would effect their initiations. And then I want to stress the importance of Dr. Joergers. If I could get together with him, a lot of factors that are not now cleared up but of definite interest to you could be explained. I thought about it during the night because I really want to help you but there are too many items which were never too clear to me.

Perhaps I may now refer once again to the various countries. Let us start with Portugal. I was supposed to recall how the funds were transferred, or transmitted, and who had custody of those funds. Here you must distinguish once again between the Sector of AMT MIL. and AMT VI. The "I" fund of the AMT VI was rather small. I believe only 2 or 3 Portuguese were found or in case diplomatic relations were broken. One part of the monthly remittances was transferred in order to meet the expenses, installations of radios and rental of houses for these agents, but this part of the expenses was included in the general "I" fund. All of the foreign exchange that could be spared from monthly allotments was used to build up that special "I" fund, but, I cannot mention any specific monthly allotments for that fund and estimate that the total saved during all these years did not exceed five hundred thousand escudos and twenty thousand dollars.

Persons responsible for administering these funds were, jointly, so-called Wassenstein and Schroeder. I know that for AMT MIL. the "I" net was very elaborate and very extensive and used rather large funds, but how much I cannot tell.

Of a standing "I" fund for MIL, I have no knowledge, but I know that remittances to the K.O. Leaders were made in such a way that in case of an invasion or the breaking of diplomatic relations that they would have two or three months' supply of necessary funds on hand.

For the Sector of AMT. MIL. for Portugal, exact information should be obtained from Col. Friederici, and at the main office, Lt. Col. von Bohlen and Joergers. And of course Steigle should be questioned. As far as I was informed, all foreign exchange sent to Portugal was in cash.

I have no knowledge of any bank connections. Only once a compensation transaction was proposed, but how it was carried out I am not sure. Details were that the Minister of Economics offered us

frozen funds which were the result of the Wolfram transactions. I believe the amount was five hundred thousand escudos, but whether the money was paid to our Legation or to my people direct I do not know.

Now we come to Spain. There I knew that the only amount which was to be used as "I" funds was the already mentioned "I" fund, in care of Rowak, amounting to two million pesetas. About this question, you should interrogate Steinle, in Spain, Bernhardt and Mosig. Here also monthly remittances were made with the regular "I" fund remittances to meet expenses for the preparation of the "I" nets.

The amount of various transfers I do not know, but I knew that large sums were spent by the former I-wi, which was counter intelligence, later taken over by VI-wi. Concerning the amount of AMT. MIL, I have no definite knowledge, but I believe here again the policy was to put enough funds at the disposal of the K.O. Leader to give him some lead-way. The man Joergers should know some definite details, and also Steinle. I estimate that the K.O. Leader had at his disposal four to five million pesetas at the end. People in Spain who should have knowledge about that are the K. O. Leader Kleyenastueber, Naval Captain Lenz, and Lt. Col. von Rohrscheidt.

- Q. Did this man Lenz also go under the name of August Fink?
- A. He had several camouflage names, and it is possible that that is one of them.
- Q. Did he call himself Dr. LENZ?
- A. Yes.
As far as I remember, there was no bank connection with Spain except assistance rendered by Rowak.
- Q. How about the Banco March?
- A. I never heard this name before.
And here again, you would have to ask Joergers, since I told you that at least one-third of the activities of the AMT.MIL. were not clear to me.
And I want to mention that AMT.MIL. had numerous "I" connections which used up large funds, although they were not active. Concerning Switzerland, I cannot add anything to yesterday's information, but I would like to stress once again the importance of Meissner, Joergers and Steinle.
Now, I want to jump to Sweden. There AMT VI had also a limited "I" net, which used up monthly a certain amount of funds. I estimate that it was not more than three or four thousand crowns. A fixed amount was only once transferred by me which amounted to fifteen thousand crowns. This whole organization was not effective since it was arrested by the Swedish police. AMT.MIL. also had an "I" net in Sweden which consumed funds every month, but I have no knowledge of a fixed fund.
Concerning AMT VI, you could also ask Paeffgen and their representative in Sweden, Oberregierungsrat Finke.
- Q. Would Finke in Sweden by any chance be the same man as Dr. Lenz, whom we mentioned before?

A. No.

Q. Do you know his first name?

A. His first name is August, and his camouflaged name was von Schilling. And for AMT. MIL., Col. Wagner. Now we come to Turkey. In Turkey we had an "I" net for AMT VI, which consumed, by my estimates, some eight to ten thousand Turkish pounds per month. I know that shortly before the diplomatic relations were discontinued we tried to remit the amount of one hundred thousand Turkish pounds to our agent there whose name was Hocyzesch. AMT. MIL. also had an "I" net which consumed certain funds, the amount of which I do not know. Information about this could be supplied by K. O. Leader Navy Captain Pfeiffer. I know

that he was in London about the same time that I was in custody there.

Q. What is his first name?

A. Erich Pfeiffer. As far as I remember, no bank connections were maintained there. The entire net there really had only communications from four different transmitters, but they did not work until the end of the war, and one by one they failed to report. And now I want to mention the Balkans. Here the people who could supply valuable information are Lt. Col. Ohletz, and for the field of AMT-VI, that I already mentioned, Wannack and Dr. Hoettl.

Q. What was Hoettl's exact position in the entire set-up?

A. Hoettl was an expert for the Southeastern question for the whole Balkans but he supplied in fields of Hungary, Croatia and Albania.

Q. Was Hoettl in the mainoffice?

A. He was in the main office but later on together with the old Southeastern Department transferred to Vienna. Nevertheless, the Department in Vienna was still an integrate part of the main office

Q. In other words, Hoettl had a position in the Balkans that was equal to Steimle's in Spain?

A. No, one echelon lower. In other words, his superior was Wannack. Mentally, he was Wannack's superior. I can add no further views to the information I have supplied on the Balkans yesterday, but I am certain that no bank connections were maintained. I want to make an exception in the AMT. MIL, where once again I cannot supply information. I did not mention yesterday the remittances of one hundred thousand dollars to a certain Mihailoff, a Bulgarian Macedonian who was charged with a mission to built up a "I" net in Macedonian in Bulgaria. Wannack should also supply information, together with referent for Rumania Hauptsturmführer Auner. He is also in your hands. They could tell you what foreign exchange was dropped by parachute towards the end in Rumania. AMT. MIL. Had also the "I" nets in Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece. They, of course, consumed funds but were not effective since they were badly organized.

I do not know whether AMT. MIL used any bank connections, but I believe only in case transfers were involved. Yesterday I believe I mentioned that it would be valuable if I got, for instance, together with Joergers in your presence. I am certain I could supply them valuable information.

Q. Do you know where Joerger is now?

A. He is in your hands. I heard from Dr. Sandburger, who is in Oberursel, who is also an important man to question on finances, especially on the amounts carried by the Southern Group - that is the Group that went south after we were split up. He was in charge of these funds.

Q. To what extent did you reveal information on previous interrogations to the British or to the Americans? In other words, what information have you given before?

A. I told them about the organizations but I did not go into the details of the financial arrangements.

Q. You mentioned the names of Nassenstein and Schroeder. Do you know their first name?

A. No.

Q. Who were the two or three men in Portugal who were willing to work for Germany in case of invasion?

A. I only can remember one name, and he was a Brazilian, Albuquerque. He was a Secretary of the Brazilian Intergrest Organization by the name of Plivio il Salgado.

Q. Is that the only name that you know?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you give us the date, approximately, when the "I" and "R" nets were started?

A. Depending on the various countries. In Portugal they commenced in the beginning of 1943; in the Balkans I only started after the surrender of Italy. You can say it started between the middle of 43 and the middle of 44.

Q. Do you recall the name of the man who was the prominent sail boat expert?

A. I don't remember the name but Paeffgen would.

Q. You mentioned previously that the Minister of Economics had offered you some frozen funds amounting to five hundred thousand escudos in Portugal. Where were these funds?

A. I don't know the financial details of this transaction, but I believe that Portugal and Germany had clearing arrangements whereby credit was built up through the import of Wolfram from Portugal, and compensation payments resulting from the sale of goods from Germany. But it might have been therefore that certain credit was built up which was offered to us by the Minister of Economics. As I mentioned before, we paid the Minister of Economics

in Berlin the counter value in Reichsmarks.

- Q. I believe we have one more mission to clear up and that was the mission to Palestine. Can you give us the details on that?
- A. As you know, the mission was initiated at the request of the Grand Mufti, who did this because of egotistical reasons. He wanted to bring his name to his whole Arabian world. It is interesting to know that the Mufti wanted to make a contract with me stating who of the personnel who were to parachute into Palestine were to administer funds, - whether the German SS officers or Arabian members of the Party. Mufti even wanted to keep part of the money designated for this mission for himself in Germany. As far as I remember, the mission carried along one-half cwt. in gold coins, twenty thousand in English pounds, and ten thousand in U. S. dollars. Concerning this mission, I already mentioned that Obersturmbannführer Schubach should be questioned.
- Q. That mission you mentioned was around October 1944, wasn't it?
- A. Yes. The arrangements were that after eight weeks they would contact us and reinforcements would be dropped. I remember that I gave instructions to prepare the necessary gold coins for the reinforcement mission.
- Q. Do you know where Schubach is?
- A. I know that he is a prisoner, but whether he is in your hands or British hands I do not know.
- Q. You stated that mission was in a captured Liberator. Is that right?
- A. Yes. It started from Athens and the men were dropped in Palestine.
- Q. How many men were there?
- A. Four, - two Germans and two Arabs.

- Q. Do you remember the names of the two Germans?
- A. No. One was captured in Palestine.
- Q. What was the purpose of the mission?
- A. The main purpose was to establish bases for further reinforcement flights in order to establish an information net. We had the task of supplying information concerning the Suez Canal.
- Q. Did you talk with the Mufti himself in Germany?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you know the vicinity in which the men were dropped?
- A. No, I don't know. I believe that through the one man captured the other man was found later, and the name of the place where they jumped was broadcast by the British. I believe it was somewhere in Transjordania.

Q. Is there any further information on this mission that you have to tell us?

A. No.

Q. Was there any follow-up on this mission?

A. No.

Q. Were applications made to Funk for foreign exchange for all the missions we have mentioned?

A. Not for all missions because after the basic policy had been established in the conference between Kaltenbrunner and Funk, everything went through routine channels. It is possible that the conferences were conducted between Kaltenbrunner, Funk and Landfried.

Q. Have you mentioned all the missions that actually took place?

A. Different departments made their own missions, but they certainly did not carry this importance. I know that numerous flights were made to France, Belgium and Holland. Also two missions were flown to North America, and AMT. MIL. carried out numerous missions about which I don't remember any details.

Q. Was your AMT VI more important as an information net than the information organization of AMT. MIL?

A. I don't think you can answer that question as it was put as the fields of interest of the two departments were different. One was only political intelligence and the other was military intelligence. On the basis of material and personnel available and funds at their disposal, AMT. MIL. was of course a more extensive source of information.

Q. You stated that there were two additional missions projected for 1945, one to South America and one to North America. Can you give me the fundamental details for the proposed South American mission?

A. I may have mentioned the North American mission because although I had the impression that it was a further progressed planned mission I was informed by Paeffgen in Oberursel that only the selection of personnel had been made and therefore we can dismiss the whole mission.

Q. I want to ask a few more question on the North American mission. Was it to be by way of submarine?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the amount of money to be carried about equal to similar missions?

A. It probably would have been the same but it was not prepared.

Q. Who was to be in charge of the mission?

- A. Dr. Paeffgen was supposed to plan and prepare the whole mission.
- Q. Who was to be in charge of the group that was to go by submarine?
- A. I did not reach that stage of planning.
- Q. What was the planned place of embarkation?
- A. Norway, because we had lost our ports in France.
- Q. What was the planned place of debarkation?
- A. All this was not planned.
- Q. How many men were to go in the mission?
- A. It was planned to have three.
- Q. What was the purpose of the mission?
- A. Again, political intelligence.
- Q. Any special item of importance?
- A. No, only to establish basis of operation.
- Q. That is all on that mission. Go on with the South American mission.
- A. As far as I know, the mission was all ready to take off from Hamburg but due to lack of suitable weather it never left. About financial arrangements and detailed plans, I don't know anything since during the latter part of the operations I was out of touch with Paeffgen.
This mission too was supposed to go by sail sloop with the same Captain in charge. I suggest that you ask Paeffgen about the details of this mission. You must remember that during the latter part I received reports which were not correct any more since everything was pretty well disorganized.
- Q. Was there any special purpose for this mission?
- A. It was primarily reinforcements for the people in South America.
- Q. Do you know where it was proposed that the sloop land for reinforcements?
- A. I believe that a point was arranged by radio communications between the sloop and agents in South America.
- Q. How many men were to go on this mission?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Was Paeffgen in charge of this one?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You say that the mission was ready, or practically ready, to leave when the war ended. Is that correct?
- A. No. It was ready before the end of the war but delayed due to lack of good weather.

- Q. Why was such a mission projected so late in the war when defeat was inevitable?
- A. I was already planned before that time and people in South America were promised that it would be carried out.
- Q. But according to what you said, the mission never came off not because during the course of planning defeat loomed as certain, but merely because of weather conditions. Was it not really the case to have the organization continue to maintain contact in Argentina?
- A. It was not carried out because of all the circumstances surrounding the planning and departure, but it had definitely nothing to do with defeat or victory.
- Q. Do you think that some of the agents in Argentina are still operating there?
- A. About that I do not know. I have had no news from Argentina for a long time.
- Q. I think we will continue with this tomorrow, and at that time I would like to take up the transaction about which the Reichs Minister refused to give you permission to obtain funds from the Reichsbank.

INTERROGATION TERMINATED AT 12:25 pm.

Für die Richtigkeit der Abschrift

K:

München, 10. 12. 1952

INTERROGATION
of
WALTER SCHELLENBERG

by
Henry Schneider }
Lt. H. G. DuBois }
(In German)
Interpreter: Lt. N. Holton

35-29118-60
Institut f. Zeitgeschichte
München
ARCHIV

831/53

Palace of Justice, Room 163,
Nürnberg, Germany,
20 December 1945.
TIME: 10:45 am - 12:25 pm

Q. Do you understand that you are still under oath?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you able to prepare those statements we asked about yesterday?

A. I reconsidered some of the details we discussed yesterday and I want to make an addition to them. I also want to add reference to the I. and R. nets. They were to go into effect not only in case of invasion but also in case diplomatic relations were discontinued with the various neutral countries. It is not necessarily a military occupation that would effect their initiation. And then I want to stress the importance of Dr. Joergers. If I could get together with him, a lot of factors that are not now cleared up but of definite interest to you could be explained. I thought about it during the night because I really want to help you but there are too many items which were never too clear to me.

Perhaps I may now refer once again to the various countries. Let us start with Portugal. I was supposed to recall how the funds were transferred, or transmitted, and who had custody of those funds. Here you must distinguish once again between the Sector of AMT MIL. and AMT VI. The "I" fund of the AMT VI was rather small. I believe only 2 or 3 Portuguese were found or in case diplomatic relations were broken. One part of the monthly remittances was transferred in order to meet the expenses, installations of radios and rental of houses for these agents, but this part of the expenses was included in the general "I" fund.

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Persons responsible for administering these funds were, jointly, so-called Nassenstein and Schroeder.

I know that for AMT MIL. the "I" net was very elaborate and very extensive and used rather large funds, but how much I cannot tell.

Of a standing "I" fund for MIL, I have no knowledge, but I know that remittances to the K.O. Leaders were made in such a way that in case of an invasion or the breaking of diplomatic relations that they would have two or three months' supply of necessary funds on hand.

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frozen funds which were the result of the Wolfram transactions. I believe the amount was five hundred thousand escudos, but whether the money was paid to our Legation or to my people direct I do not know.

Now we come to Spain. There I knew that the only amount which was to be used as "I" funds was the already mentioned "I" fund, in care of Rowak, amounting to two million pesetas. About this question, you should interrogate Steinle, in Spain, Bernhardt and Mosig. Here also monthly remittances were made with the regular "I" fund remittances to meet expenses for the preparation of the "I" nets.

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Q. Did this man Lenz also go under the name of August Pink?

A. We had several camouflage names, and it is possible that that is one of them.

Q. Did he call himself Dr. LENZ?

A. Yes.

As far as I remember, there was no bank connection with Spain except assistance rendered by Rowak.

Q. How about the Banco March?

A. I never heard this name before.

And here again, you would have to ask Joergers, since I told you that at least one-third of the activities of the AMT.MIL. were not clear to me.

And I want to mention that AMT.MIL. had numerous "I" connections which used up large funds, although they were not active.

Concerning Switzerland, I cannot add anything to yesterday's information, but I would like to stress once again the importance of Meissner, Joergers and Steinle.

Now, I want to jump to Sweden. There AMT VI had also a limited "I" net, which used up monthly a certain amount of funds. I estimate that it was not more than three or four thousand crowns. A fixed amount was only once transferred by me which amounted to fifteen thousand crowns. This whole organization was not effective since it was arrested by the Swedish police. AMT.MIL. also had an "I" net in Sweden which consumed funds every month, but I have no knowledge of a fixed fund.

Concerning AMT VI, you could also ask Paeffgen and their representative in Sweden, Oberregierungsrat Finke.

Q. Would Finke in Sweden by any chance be the same man as Dr. Lenz, whom we mentioned before?

A. No.

Q. Do you know his first name?

A. His first name is August, and his camouflaged name was von Schilling. And for AMT. NIL., Col. Wagner. Now we come to Turkey. In Turkey we had an "I" net for AMT VI, which consumed, by my estimates, some eight to ten thousand Turkish pounds per month. I know that shortly before the diplomatic relations were discontinued we tried to remit the amount of one hundred thousand Turkish pounds to our agent there whose name was Hoyzesesch. AMT. NIL. also had an "I" net which consumed certain funds, the amount of which I do not know. Information about this could be supplied by K. O. Leader Navy Captain Pfeiffer. I know

that he was in London about the same time that I was in custody there.

Q. What is his first name?

A. Erich Pfeiffer. As far as I remember, no bank connections were maintained there. The entire net there really had only communications from four different transmitters, but they did not work until the end of the war, and one by one they failed to report. And now I want to mention the Balkans. Here the people who could supply valuable information are Lt. Col. Ohletz, and for the field of AMT-VI, that I already mentioned, Wannack and Dr. Hoettl.

Q. What was Hoettl's exact position in the entire set-up?

A. Hoettl was an expert for the Southeastern question for the whole Balkans but he supplied in fields of Hungary, Croatia and Albania.

Q. Was Hoettl in the mainoffice?

A. He was in the main office but later on together with the old Southeastern Department transferred to Vienna. Nevertheless, the Department in Vienna was still an integrate part of the main office.

Q. In other words, Hoettl had a position in the Balkans that was equal to Steimle's in Spain?

A. No, one echelon lower. In other words, his superior was Wannack. Mentally, he was Wannack's superior. I can add no further views to the information I have supplied on the Balkans yesterday, but I am certain that no bank connections were maintained. I want to make an exception in the AMT. NIL, where once again I cannot supply information. I did not mention yesterday the remittances of one hundred thousand dollars to a certain Mihailoff, a Bulgarian Macedonian who was charged with a mission to built up a "I" net in Macedonian in Bulgaria. Wannack should also supply information, together with referent for Rumania Hauptsturmführer Auser. He is also in your hands. They could tell you what foreign exchange was dropped by parachute towards the end in Rumania. AMT. NIL. Had also the "I" nets in Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece. They, of course, consumed funds but were not effective since they were badly organized.

I do not know whether AMT. MIL used any bank connections, but I believe only in case transfers were involved. Yesterday I believe I mentioned that it would be valuable if I got, for instance, together with Joergers in your presence. I am certain I could supply them valuable information.

Q. Do you know where Joerger is now?

A. He is in your hands. I heard from Dr. Sandburger, who is in Oberursel, who is also an important man to question on finances, especially on the amounts carried by the Southern Group - that is the Group that went south after we were split up. He was in charge of these funds.

Q. To what extent did you reveal information on previous interrogations to the British or to the Americans? In other words, what information have you given before?

A. I told them about the organizations but I did not go into the details of the financial arrangements.

Q. You mentioned the names of Massenstein and Schroeder. Do you know their first name?

A. No.

Q. Who were the two or three men in Portugal who were willing to work for Germany in case of invasion?

A. I only can remember one name, and he was a Brazilian, Albuquerque. He was a Secretary of the Brazilian Intergrest Organization by the name of Elivio il Salgado.

Q. Is that the only name that you know?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you give us the date, approximately, when the "I" and "R" notes were started?

A. Depending on the various countries. In Portugal they commenced in the beginning of 1943; in the Balkans I only started after the surrender of Italy. You can say it started between the middle of 43 and the middle of 44.

Q. Do you recall the name of the man who was the prominent sail boat expert?

A. I don't remember the name but Paefgen would.

Q. You mentioned previously that the Minister of Economics had offered you some frozen funds amounting to five hundred thousand escudos in Portugal. Where were these funds?

A. I don't know the financial details of this transaction, but I believe that Portugal and Germany had clearing arrangements whereby credit was built up through the import of Wolfram from Portugal, and compensation payments resulting from the sale of goods from Germany. But it might have been therefore that certain credit was built up which was offered to us by the Minister of Economics. As I mentioned before, we paid the Minister of Economics

in Berlin the counter value in Reichsmarks.

- Q. I believe we have one more mission to clear up and that was the mission to Palestine. Can you give us the details on that?
- A. As you know, the mission was initiated at the request of the Grand Mufti, who did this because of egotistical reasons. He wanted to bring his name to his whole Arabian world. It is interesting to know that the Mufti wanted to make a contract with me stating who of the personnel who were to parachute into Palestine were to administer funds, - whether the German SS officers or Arabian members of the Party. Mufti even wanted to keep part of the money designated for this mission for himself in Germany. As far as I remember, the mission carried along one-half cwt. in gold coins, twenty thousand in English pounds, and ten thousand in U. S. dollars. Concerning this mission, I already mentioned that Obersturmbannführer Schubach should be questioned.
- Q. That mission you mentioned was around October 1944, wasn't it?
- A. Yes. The arrangements were that after eight weeks they would contact us and reinforcements would be dropped. I remember that I gave instructions to prepare the necessary gold coins for the reinforcement mission.
- Q. Do you know where Schubach is?
- A. I know that he is a prisoner, but whether he is in your hands or British hands I do not know.
- Q. You stated that mission was in a captured Liberator. Is that right?
- A. Yes. It started from Athens and the men were dropped in Palestine.
- Q. How many men were there?
- A. Four, - two Germans and two Arabs.
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- Q. Do you remember the names of the two Germans?
- A. No. One was captured in Palestine.
- Q. What was the purpose of the mission?
- A. The main purpose was to establish bases for further reinforcement flights in order to establish an information net. We had the task of supplying information concerning the Suez Canal.
- Q. Did you talk with the Mufti himself in Germany?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you know the vicinity in which the men were dropped?
- A. No, I don't know. I believe that through the one man captured the other man was found later, and the name of the place where they jumped was broadcast by the British. I believe it was somewhere in Transjordania.

- Q. Is there any further information on this mission that you have to tell us?
- A. No.
- Q. Was there any follow-up on this mission?
- A. No.
- Q. Were applications made to Funk for foreign exchange for all the missions we have mentioned?
- A. Not for all missions because after the basic policy had been established in the conference between Kaltenbrunner and Funk, everything went through routine channels. It is possible that the conferences were conducted between Kaltenbrunner, Funk and Landfried.
- Q. Have you mentioned all the missions that actually took place?
- A. Different departments made their own missions, but they certainly did not carry this importance. I know that numerous flights were made to France, Belgium and Holland. Also two missions were flown to North America, and AMT. MIL. carried out numerous missions about which I don't remember any details.
- Q. Was your AMT VI more important as an information net than the information organization of AMT. MIL?
- A. I don't think you can answer that question as it was put as the fields of interest of the two departments were different. One was only political intelligence and the other was military intelligence. On the basis of material and personnel available and funds at their disposal, AMT. MIL. was of course a more extensive source of information.
- Q. You stated that there were two additional missions projected for 1945, one to South America and one to North America. Can you give me the fundamental details for the proposed South American mission?
- A. I may have mentioned the North American mission because although I had the impression that it was a further progressed planned mission I was informed by Paeffgen in Oberursel that only the selection of personnel had been made and therefore we can dismiss the whole mission.
- Q. I want to ask a few more question on the North American mission. Was it to be by way of submarine?

- A. Yes.
- Q. Was the amount of money to be carried about equal to similar missions?
- A. It probably would have been the same but it was not prepared.
- Q. Who was to be in charge of the mission?

- A. Dr. Paeffgen was supposed to plan and prepare the whole mission.
- Q. Who was to be in charge of the group that was to go by submarine?
- A. I did not reach that stage of planning.
- Q. What was the planned place of embarkation?
- A. Norway, because we had lost our ports in France.
- Q. What was the planned place of debarkation?
- A. All this was not planned.
- Q. How many men were to go in the mission?
- A. It was planned to have three.
- Q. What was the purpose of the mission?
- A. Again, political intelligence.
- Q. Any special item of importance?
- A. No, only to establish basis of operation.
- Q. That is all on that mission. Go on with the South American mission.
- A. As far as I know, the mission was all ready to take off from Hamburg but due to lack of suitable weather it never left. About financial arrangements and detailed plans, I don't know anything since during the latter part of the operations I was out of touch with Paeffgen.
This mission too was supposed to go by sail sloop with the same Captain in charge. I suggest that you ask Paeffgen about the details of this mission. You must remember that during the latter part I received reports which were not correct any more since everything was pretty well disorganized.
- Q. Was there any special purpose for this mission?
- A. It was primarily reinforcements for the people in South America.
- Q. Do you know where it was proposed that the sloop land for reinforcements?
- A. I believe that a point was arranged by radio communications between the sloop and agents in South America.
- Q. How many men were to go on this mission?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Was Paeffgen in charge of this one?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You say that the mission was ready, or practically ready, to leave when the war ended. Is that correct?
- A. No. It was ready before the end of the war but delayed due to lack of good weather.

- Q. Why was such a mission projected so late in the war when defeat was inevitable?
- A. I was already planned before that time and people in South America were promised that it would be carried out.
- Q. But according to what you said, the mission never came off not because during the course of planning defeat loomed as certain, but merely because of weather conditions. Was it not really the case to have the organization continue to maintain contact in Argentina?
- A. It was not carried out because of all the circumstances surrounding the planning and departure, but it had definitely nothing to do with defeat or victory.
- Q. Do you think that some of the agents in Argentina are still operating there?
- A. About that I do not know. I have had no news from Argentina for a long time.
- Q. I think we will continue with this tomorrow, and at that time I would like to take up the transaction about which the Reichs Minister refused to give you permission to obtain funds from the Reichsbank.

INTERROGATION TERMINATED AT 12:25 pm.

Für die Richtigkeit der Abschrift
K:

München, 10. 12. 1952

Vernehmung des Walter Schellenberg, Chef des Geheimdienstes.
durch Mr. RAPP vom 29. 7. 1946
Stenographie: Frl. Drath.

Institut f. Zeitgeschichte
München
ARCHIV
834/53

- 1. Fr.: Ich möchte Sie erst allgemein fragen, wer Ihrer Ansicht nach, die meisten eidesstattlichen Erklärungen für die Anklage gegeben hat?
A.: Wer die meisten eidesstattlichen Erklärungen abgegeben hat? Nicht Schmausser gab die meisten eidesstattlichen Erklärungen sondern Rode.
- 2. Fr.: Sie sind der persönlichen Ansicht, dass diese Leute der Ansicht sind, dadurch, dass sie sich selbst angeklagt haben die Sache überhängig machen sollte, oder dass sie sich zusammengeschlossen haben und genau das Gegenteil sagen. Das betrifft Sie weniger. Ihre eidesstattliche Erklärungen werden nicht als Angeklagte betrachtet. Wem würden Sie Ihrer Ansicht nach in diese Anklage einziehen?
A.: Ich habe mich unterhalten mit Rode und ich hatte den Eindruck, was Sie zu eingangs anführten. Wobei ich das Gefühl habe, dass es weder Furcht noch Angst vor einer Selbstanklage ist, sondern dass sie sich beeinflusst fühlen. Wobei ich das Gefühl habe, dass nun Müller, Rode usw. unter allen Umständen versuchen nicht bei Ihrer Führerauffassung zu bleiben. Sie sagen sich, dass Leben geht unter allen Umständen weiter und wir sind dann die Verräter in den Augen des deutschen Volkes.
- 3. Fr.: Sie haben damit nicht ganz Recht. Schmausser hat 100 %ig zur Sachlage gestanden. Rode ist umgefallen.
A.: Ich habe das Gefühl, dass man Rode in Dachau fertig gemacht hat.
- 4. Fr.: Held war gut. Brauchtsch war lächerlich.
A.: Brauchtsch hatte immer unter den Einfluss Mannsteins gestanden. Wenn ich nochmal wiederholen darf: Ich habe den Eindruck, dass die höhere Führung der Wehrmacht versucht, die ganzen Beweise die gegen sie stehen an einem Nagel der Haltung vor dem deutschen Volke aufzuhängen.
- 5. Fr.: Wissen Sie über Holz Bescheid?
A.: Holz war politischer Sachbearbeiter der Kriegswirtschafts-Verwaltung von der Marine SS und Obergruppenführer. Dieser Holz ist in einem Lager in Hersbruck und zwar sind dort alle Leute herausgeholt worden und über diese Fragen vernommen worden. Es kam durch eine Angabe von Lahousen. Holz

- A.: es Lahousen erzählt und sagte nun: Er habe das gar nicht so ernst gemeint, er habe keinen ernststen Anlass gehabt.
6. Fr.: Diese ganze Sache ist also nur ein Geschwätz von HOLZ?
A.: HOLZ wäre nur ein ganz kleiner Beamter gewesen, dem das 100 x leid tute, dass er bei LAHOUSEN geschwätzt hätte. Ich frug ihn aber weiss wo MÜLLER sein kann.
7. Fr.: Glauben Sie, dass HUPPENKOTHE weiss?
A.: GLUCKS war zuletzt oben in Norddeutschland. Mehr weiss ich nicht. Die Rede ging, dass er sich ermordet hat.
8. Fr.: Was denken sie von POHL?
A.: Ich habe POHL nur einmal selbst erlebt und das war als er mich angeschossen hatte. Ich halte ihn für einen Grössenwahninnigen der als Zahlmeister der Marine angefangen hatte. Ich habe mit LANGE gesprochen, der die Leute zu untersuchen hatte. Er sagte: POHL wäre nicht normal, er wäre grössenwahninnig. Der MÜLLER galt auch für grössenwahninnig.
9. Fr.: Wissen Sie, dass er an Experimenten beteiligt war, und die Anpflanzung des Schweigrohrs förderte?
A.: Nein.
10. Fr.: Sind Sie der Ansicht, dass Rudolf BRANDT ein guter Zeuge wäre?
A.: Ja, er muss viele Dinge wissen. Er sorgte dafür, dass ich immer rechtzeitig Bescheid wusste. Da hat er sich immer betragen wie ein eichter kleiner Sekretär, den man durch kleine Schmeicheleien immer dahin brachte, wo man ihn haben wollte. Er war HIMMLER sehr anhänglich. Die Stufe seiner geistigen Fähigkeiten war sehr gering. Wenn man mit ihm gesprochen hatte und ihm verschiedene Dinge erklärt hatte, sah er das wohl ein, aber einige Tage später war das schon wieder vergessen. Gehirnmässig ist er ein schwacher Mann.
11. Fr.: Ist das dieselbe Position die WOLF hatte?
A.: Nein, WOLF war Chef des persönlichen Stabes des Reichsführer. Aufgeteilt auf BRANDT und BAUMERT. BAUMERT, ein Feldwebeltyp, der vielleicht einen guten Offizier gegeben hätte, der aber von WOLF gefördert wurde. Zuletzt war er Stabsadjutant. Dann wurde er von HIMMLER gefördert. Er hatte HIMMLERS Ehefrau zu betreuen. Das sind die Gründe für seinen Aufstieg. Die Rede-Position ist eine andere.

12. Fr.: Wie konnte ein Mann wie RODE jemals Obergruppenführer werden?
- A.: RODE ist Intrigant im Gegensatz zu BACH. Er wurde bestochen mit Sekt.
13. Fr.: Er wurde die blonde Pest genannt?
- A.: Nein, er war nur Intrigant. Er sprach HIMMLER nach dem Munde, wie RIBBENTROP zum Führer. Er war ein gutes Auswärtigeschild, um mit Leuten von O.K.H. zu verhandeln.
14. Fr.: BACH ist jüdisch versippt?
- A.: Ja, das ist einer der Gründe warum ihn HIMMLER immer unterdrückte.
15. Fr.: Können Sie sich über andere "Persönlichkeiten", wo Sie glauben unsere Aufmerksamkeit darauf lenken zu müssen.
- A.: Ich glaube es wäre nicht uninteressant zu wissen, was aus RUDEL und JÜNGER geworden ist, die im engen Kontakt mit TWINGER, GEISLER und TWIRSING gestanden sind. Eine andere Person die Aufmerksamkeit verdient und zwar in Berlin Dr. LEMMERT. Dieser Mann, wenn es derselbe ist, war in Berlin Jurist und war der beste Freund von RICHMANN. Er hätte früher mit dem russischen Handel enge Fühlung gehabt. Ich lese seine Ausgaben öfters in der Zeitung. Und von Anthon hörte ich folgendes, dass er von den Engländern schlecht behandelt worden wäre. Er wurde des russischen Spionagedienstes bezeichnet und ein engl. Hauptmann hätte ihn festgenommen.
16. Fr.: In welcher Sektion?
- A.: Das weiss ich nicht mehr. Ich glaube in der amerik. Sektion. Ich meine das ist eine Sache, die die Amerikaner nachprüfen müssten.
17. Fr.: Ihrer Ansicht nach sind die Russen sehr geschickt in ihrem Nachrichtendienst.
- A.: Sie haben eine neue Methode seit 1919 eingeführt, Sie legen keinen Wert auf die Diplomatie. Wenn z. B. Stalin irgend etwas wissen möchte, wird ihm 3 x berichtet. Erstens die Auswärtigen Ämter, zweitens die Handelsvertretungen und drittens die eigenen Agenten.
18. Fr.: Könnte man Ihren Nachrichtendienst nicht gegenüberstellen?
- A.: Nein, denn RIBBENTROP hatte keinen richtigen Nachrichtendienst gehabt. Er wollte keine Nachrichten-Grundlage. RIBBENTROP hat mich als Phantasten abgelehnt, weil ich solch eine Grundlage schaffen wollte. Aber das Auswärtige Amt kam

zu mir und wollte Unterlagen bekommen um Hitler einen Gesamtbericht vorlegen zu können. Ohne eine methodische Ausführung kann man von einem Nachrichtendienst nicht sprechen. Das andere ist nur eine

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Teil davon. Ich kam erst 1944 in den deutschen Nachrichtendienst herein. Canaries war Deutschlands bester Agent, aber es fehlte in Deutschland ein Mann, der diese Arbeitsphantasie mitbrachte.

20. Fr.: Entwickelt haben sie sich aber sehr gut ?

A.: Aber im Anfang hat uns das Ausland weit überschätzt. Das was am Schluss stand war erst der Anfang von meinen Plänen. Der Russe lässt sich Zeit seine Leute auszubilden. Er versieht sie 2 - 3 Jahre nur mit Geld ohne sie mit einem Auftrag zu bedenken. Erst nach Jahren, wenn sie richtig eingearbeitet sind und in der Gesellschaft sicher geworden sind, gibt er ihnen Aufträge.

21. Fr.: Dadurch, dass von der Führung aus immer gesagt wurde, dass alle anderen Menschen Idioten wären, hat der Agent einen Partner unterschätzt.

A.: Ja, das war einer der Gründe.

22. Fr.: Ist Ihnen von bestimmten Leuten der Wehrmacht oder der SS bekannt, die durch Überhäufung von Arbeit übersehen worden sind oder denen andere weniger Leute vorzogen worden sind? Z.B. würden wir gerne Näheres über Herrn JÄCKEL wissen.

A.: Er wurde von HIMMLER sehr gefördert. Dr. Wilhelm STUCKART hatte einen Posten im Innenministerium. Er war ein Mann der zu allem Ja und Amen sagte und heute davon nichts mehr wissen will.

23. Fr.: Was wissen Sie über PUEL?

A.: Über diesen hat man sich immer gewundert wie auf diese Position solch ein Mann kommen konnte.

24. Fr.: Ich meine den Rüstungsmann.

A.: Er kam HIMMLER in jeder Weise entgegen. Er war im Sperrkreis I und kam als Nachfolger von SCHMUNDT.

25. Fr.: Was wissen Sie über Philipp RUELBE?

A.: Er war ein 100 %iger Anhänger Hitlers. Das Verhältnis von ihm zu Bormann kann ich nicht feststellen. Er vertrat HEYDRICH.

26. Fr.: Was wissen Sie über BUCH?

A.: BUCH war der Schwiegersohn von BORMANN und ein grosser Nazi. DAR'E stand in einer Verbindung mit HIMMLER und schrieb

die Bücher Blut und Boden. Später kam er mit ihm auseinander.

27. Fr.: Kennen Sie THYRAK?

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A.: Ja. Ein Beamter.

28. Fr.: PRHISESSEN ist tot. HILDEBRANDT, der SS-Obergruppenführer behauptet heute, dass er den Kopf einer Widerstandsbewegung gegen HITLER gewesen wäre.

A.: Er hat kein Recht das zu sagen. Er machte die ganze Mueterung vom Warthegau.

29. Fr.: Kennen Sie den früheren Gauleiter von Danzig ?

A.: RAUSCHUG ? Ja. seine Bücher sind sehr interessant. Er hatte die Überwachung deutscher Reichsangehöriger in Deutschland.

30. Fr.: Wer hat Sie überwacht?

A.: MUELLER UND HUPPENKOTHE.

31. Fr.: Waren die beauftragt alle anderen auch zu überwachen?

A.: Es war nicht eine Dauerüberwachung sondern eine periodische Überwachung.

32. Fr.: Hat MUELLER auch HIMMLER überwacht?

A.: Ja. MUELLER hatte auch alle anderen Arbeiten.

33. Fr.: Wurde GÖRING überwacht?

A.: Ja, aber GÖRING lies auch überwachen.

34. Fr.: Was kam durch das Forschungsamt heraus?

A.: Alle Telephon-Gespräche. Forschungsamt war ein Deckname.

35. Fr.: Wer hat die Armece überwacht?

A.: Die Armece wurde überwacht vom Reichs-Kriegs-Gericht und MUELLER wurde überwacht ^{durch} RÖDER. Über das muss HUPPENKOTHE eine Menge wissen. Wenn MÜLLER einen Mann verdächtig gefunden hatte, konnte seine Festnahme eingeleitet werden.

36. Fr.: War MÜLLER HUPPENKOTHE gegenüber verantwortlich?

A.: Ja, er hatte die Massnahmen gegen angesehene Leute einzuleiten, die man nicht einfach festnehmen konnte.

37. Fr.: Ihrer Ansicht nach, war MÜLLER ein einflussreicher Mann? Was waren seine charakterlichen Eigenschaften?

A.: Falsch wie die Nacht.

38. Fr.: Wie weit hat HILDEBRANDT von MÜLLER die Arbeit gekannt?

A.: HILDEBRANDT war damit beauftragt für das Gebiet der Spionageabwehr. Ich glaube, dass HILDEBRANDT über die Wehrmacht besser Bescheid wiess. Ich Er weiss mehr als er sagt.

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Soeben fällt mir noch ein Name ein: KLOPPER. Mitarbeiter von BORMANN. Den halte ich für wichtiger als alle anderen genannten Namen. Er steht weit über den meisten.

39. Fr.: Was ist Ihre persönliche Ansicht von BORMANN?

A.: BORMANN war HESS' erster Mitarbeiter. Er hat aus dieser Position heraus dem Führer beigebracht, dass eine Stelle wie HESS sie inne hatte nicht mehr nötig wäre. So wurde er Sachbearbeiter des Führers und Chef der Partei-Kanzlei.

40. Fr.: Und war somit der Mächtigste Mann?

A.: Ja.

41. Fr.: Mächtiger als HIMMLER?

A.: HIMMLER hatte die reale Macht und BORMANN hatte die geistige Macht, durch den Umgang mit Hitler. BORMANN machte HIMMLER vor HITLER immer wieder fertig.

42. Fr.: Worin hatte er die persönliche Macht über HITLER?

A.: Er konnte mit ein paar Sätzen den Schwerpunkt erklären und zum Inhalt einer Redemachen. Dieses begeisterte HITLER. BORMANN ist der typische aus der Bahn geworfene Offizier, der sich 1918-19 als Freikorpemann und Bombenleger betätigte. Da fällt mir soeben eine sehr interessante Sache ein.

Müller war einmal bei einer Gesellschaft angetrunken, es war 1943, und hat mir einen Vortrag über die Unterschiede zwischen STALIN und HITLER gehalten. Er erkennt BORMANN an und auch HITLER sagte, er hätte von den Russen die letzte Härte, die den Deutschen fehlt.

43. Fr.: BORMANN ist heute in Russland? Welchen Zweck würden sie verfolgen BORMANN zu haben?

A.: Über diese Dinge müsste der Nachrichtendienst des Personalwesens Bescheid wissen.

44. Fr.: Hat es eigentlich im Führer-Hauptquartier verständige Menschen gegeben?

A.: Zu anfangs hatte so mancher versucht das Gute durchzusetzen und brachte auch den guten Willen mit. Aber nach einigen Monaten war das immer vorbei.

45. Fr.: Selbstkritik gab es nicht?

A.: Nein.

Ich habe die 6 Seiten des Protokolls meiner Vernehmung sorgfältig durchgelesen und habe jede der Seiten eigenhändig unterzeichnet und bestätige hiermit, dass dieses Protokoll eine getreue Wiedergabe meiner Vernehmung ist.

75-29/18-74

Für die Richtigkeit der Abschrift

Ki

München, den 5. 12. 1952

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Vernehmung des Walter Schellenberg, Chef des Geheimdienstes.
durch Mr. RAPP vom 29. 7. 1946
Stenographin: Frä. Drath.

Institut f. Zeitgeschichte
München
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831/53

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2. Fr.: Sie sind der persönlichen Ansicht, dass diese Leute der Ansicht sind, dadurch, dass sie sich selbst angeklagt haben die Sache überhängig machen sollte, oder dass sie sich zusammengeschlossen haben und genau das Gegenteil sagen. Das betrifft Sie weniger. Ihre eidesstattliche Erklärungen werden nicht als Angeklagte betrachtet. Wem würden Sie Ihrer Ansicht nach in diese Anklage einziehen?
- A.: Ich habe mich unterhalten mit Rode und ich hatte den Eindruck, was Sie zu eingangs anführten. Wobei ich das Gefühl habe, dass es weder Furcht noch Angst vor einer Selbstanklage ist, sondern dass sie sich beeinflusst fühlen. Wobei ich das Gefühl habe, dass nun Müller, Rode usw. unter allen Umständen versuchen nicht bei Ihrer Führerauffassung zu bleiben. Sie sagen sich, dass Leben geht unter allen Umständen weiter und wir sind dann die Verräter in den Augen des deutschen Volkes.
3. Fr.: Sie haben damit nicht ganz Recht. Schmausser hat 100 %ig zur Sachlage gestanden. Rode ist umgefallen.
- A.: Ich habe das Gefühl, dass man Rode in Dachau fertig gemacht hat.
4. Fr.: Held war gut. Brauchtisch war lächerlich.
- A.: Brauchtisch hatte immer unter den Einfluss Manasteins gestanden. Wenn ich nochmal wiederholen darf: Ich habe den Eindruck, dass die höhere Führung der Wehrmacht versucht, die ganzen Beweise die gegen sie stehen an einem Nagel der Haltung vor dem deutschen Volke aufzuhängen.
5. Fr.: Wissen Sie über Holz Bescheid?
- A.: Holz war politischer Sachbearbeiter der Kriegswirtschafts-Verwaltung von der Marine SS und Obergruppenführer. Dieser Holz ist in einem Lager in Hersbruck und zwar sind dort alle Leute herausgeholt worden und über diese Fragen vernommen worden. Es kam durch eine Angabe von Lahousen. Holz

12. Fr.: Wie konnte ein Mann wie RODE jemals Obergruppenführer werden?
- A.: RODE ist Intrigant im Gegensatz zu BACH. Er wurde bestochen mit Sekt.
13. Fr.: Er wurde die blonde Pest genannt?
- A.: Nein, er war nur Intrigant. Er sprach HIMMLER nach dem Munde, wie RIBBENTROP zum Führer. Er war ein gutes Aushängeschild, um mit Leuten von O.K.H. zu verhandeln.
14. Fr.: BACH ist jüdisch versippt?
- A.: Ja, das ist einer der Gründe warum ihn HIMMLER immer unterdrückte.
15. Fr.: Kussern Sie sich über andere "Persönlichkeiten", wo Sie glauben unsere Aufmerksamkeit darauf lenken zu müssen.
- A.: Ich glaube es wäre nicht uninteressant zu wissen, was aus RUDEL und JÜNGER geworden ist, die im engen Kontakt mit TWINGER, GEISLER und TWIRSING gestanden sind. Eine andere Person die Aufmerksamkeit verdient und zwar in Berlin Dr. LEMBERT. Dieser Mann, wenn es derselbe ist, war in Berlin Jurist und war der beste Freund von RICHMANN. Er hätte früher mit dem russischen Handel enge Fühlung gehabt. Ich lese seine Ausgaben öfters in der Zeitung. Und von Anthon hörte ich folgendes, dass er von den Engländern schlecht behandelt worden wäre. Er wurde des russischen Spionagedienstes bezeichnet und ein engl. Hauptmann hätte ihn festgenommen.
16. Fr.: In welcher Sektion?
- A.: Das weiss ich nicht mehr. Ich glaube in der amerik. Sektion. Ich meine das ist eine Sache, die die Amerikaner nachprüfen müssten.
18. Fr.: Ihrer Ansicht nach sind die Russen sehr geschickt in ihrem Nachrichtendienst.
- A.: Sie haben eine neue Methode seit 1919 eingeführt, Sie legen keinen Wert auf die Diplomatie. Wenn z. B. Stalin irgend etwas wissen möchte, wird ihm 3 x berichtet. Erstens die Auswärtigen Ämter, zweitens die Handelsvertretungen und drittens die eigenen Agenten.
19. Fr.: Könnte man Ihren Nachrichtendienst nicht gegenüberstellen?
- A.: Nein, denn RIBBENTROP hatte keinen richtigen Nachrichtendienst gehabt. Er wollte keine Nachrichten-Grundlage. RIBBENTROP hat mich als Phantasten abgelehnt, weil ich solch eine Grundlage schaffen wollte. Aber das Auswärtige Amt kam

zu mir und wollte Unterlagen bekommen um Hitler einen Gesamtbericht vorlegen zu können. Ohne eine methodische Ausführung kann man von einem Nachrichtendienst nicht sprechen. Das andere ist nur eine

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Teil davon. Ich kam erst 1944 in den deutschen Nachrichtendienst herein. Canaries war Deutschlands bester Agent, aber es fehlte in Deutschland ein Mann, der diese Arbeitsphantasie mitbrachte.

20. Fr.: Entwickelt haben sie sich aber sehr gut ?

A.: Aber im Anfang hat uns das Ausland weit überschätzt. Das was am Schluss stand war erst der Anfang von meinen Plänen. Der Russe lässt sich Zeit seine Leute auszubilden. Er versieht sie 2 - 3 Jahre nur mit Geld ohne sie mit einem Auftrag zu bedenken. Erst nach Jahren, wenn sie richtig eingearbeitet sind und in der Gesellschaft sicher geworden sind, gibt er ihnen Aufträge.

21. Fr.: Dadurch, dass von der Führung aus immer gesagt wurde, dass alle anderen Menschen Idioten wären, hat der Agent seinen Partner unterschätzt.

A.: Ja, das war einer der Gründe.

22. Fr.: Ist Ihnen von bestimmten Leuten der Wehrmacht oder der SS bekannt, die durch Überhäufung von Arbeit übersehen worden sind oder denen andere weniger Leute vorgezogen worden sind? Z.B. würden wir gerne Näheres über Herrn JÄCKEL wissen.

A.: Er wurde von HIMMLER sehr gefördert. Dr. Wilhelm STUCKART hatte einen Posten im Innenministerium. Er war ein Mann der zu allem Ja und Amen sagte und heute davon nichts mehr wissen will.

23. Fr.: Was wissen Sie über PUEHL?

A.: Über diesen hat man sich immer gewundert wie auf diese Position solch ein Mann kommen konnte.

24. Fr.: Ich meine den Rüstungsmann.

A.: Er kam HIMMLER in jeder Weise entgegen. Er war im Sperrkreis I und kam als Nachfolger von SCHMUEDT.

25. Fr.: Was wissen Sie über Philipp RUELBEE?

A.: Er war ein 100 %iger Anhänger Hitlers. Das Verhältnis von ihm zu Bormann kann ich nicht feststellen. Er vertrat HEYDRICH.

26. Fr.: Was wissen Sie über BUCH?

A.: BUCH war der Schwiegersohn von BORMANN und ein grosser Nazi. DAR'E stand in einer Verbindung mit HIMMLER und schrieb

die Bücher Blut und Boden. Später kam er mit ihm auseinander.

27. Fr.: Kennen Sie THYRAK?

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A.: Ja. Ein Beamter.

28. Fr.: FRIESEN ist tot. HILDEBRANDT, der SS-Obergruppenführer behauptet heute, dass er den Kopf einer Widerstandsbewegung gegen HIMMLER gewesen wäre.

A.: Er hat kein Recht das zu sagen. Er machte die ganze Musterung vom Warthegau.

29. Fr.: Kennen Sie den früheren Gauleiter von Danzig ?

A.: RAUSCHUG ? Ja. seine Bücher sind sehr interessant. Er hatte die Überwachung deutscher Reichsangehöriger in Deutschland.

30. Fr.: Wer hat Sie überwacht?

A.: MUELLER UND HUPPENKOTHE.

31. Fr.: Waren die beauftragt alle anderen auch zu überwachen?

A.: Es war nicht eine Dauerüberwachung sondern eine periodische Überwachung.

32. Fr.: Hat MUELLER auch HIMMLER überwacht?

A.: Ja. MUELLER hatte auch alle anderen Arbeiten.

33. Fr.: Wurde GÖRING überwacht?

A.: Ja, aber GÖRING lies auch überwachen.

34. Fr.: Was kam durch das Forschungsamt heraus?

A.: Alle Telephon-Gespräche. Forschungsamt war ein Deckname.

35. Fr.: Wer hat die Armee überwacht?

A.: Die Armee wurde überwacht vom Reichs-Kriegs-Gericht und MUELLER wurde überwacht ^{durch} RÖDER. Über das muss HUPPENKOTHE eine Menge wissen. Wenn MÜLLER einen Mann verdächtig gefunden hatte, konnte seine Festnahme eingeleitet werden.

36. Fr.: War MÜLLER HUPPENKOTHE gegenüber verantwortlich?

A.: Ja, er hatte die Massnahmen gegen angesehene Leute einzuleiten, die man nicht einfach festnehmen konnte.

37. Fr.: Ihrer Ansicht nach, war MÜLLER ein einflussreicher Mann? Was waren seine charakterlichen Eigenschaften?

A.: Falsch wie die Nacht.

38. Fr.: Wie weit hat HILDEBRANDT von MÜLLER die Arbeit gekannt?

A.: HILDEBRANDT war damit beauftragt für das Gebiet der Spionageabwehr. Ich glaube, dass HILDEBRANDT über die Wehrmacht besser Bescheid wiess. Ich Er weiss mehr als er sagt.

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Soeben fällt mir noch ein Name ein: KLOPPER, Mitarbeiter von BORMANN. Den halte ich für wichtiger als alle anderen genannten Namen. Er steht weit über den meisten.

39. Fr.: Was ist Ihre persönliche Ansicht von BORMANN?

A.: BORMANN war HESS' erster Mitarbeiter. Er hat aus dieser Position heraus dem Führer beigebracht, dass eine Stelle wie HESS sie inne hatte nicht mehr nötig wäre. So wurde er Sachbearbeiter des Führers und Chef der Partei-Kanzlei.

40. Fr.: Und war somit der Mächtigste Mann?

A.: Ja.

41. Fr.: Mächtiger als HIMMLER?

A.: HIMMLER hatte die reale Macht und BORMANN hatte die geistige Macht, durch den Umgang mit Hitler. BORMANN machte HIMMLER vor HITLER immer wieder fertig.

42. Fr.: Worin hatte er die persönliche Macht über HITLER?

A.: Er konnte mit ein paar Sätzen den Schwerpunkt erklären und zum Inhalt einer Redemachen. Dieses begeisterte HITLER. BORMANN ist der typische aus der Bahn geworfene Offizier, der sich 1918-19 als Freikorpsmann und Bombenleger betätigte. Da fällt mir soeben eine sehr interessante Sache ein.

Müller war einmal bei einer Gesellschaft angetrunken, es war 1943, und hat mir einen Vortrag über die Unterschiede zwischen STALIN und HITLER gehalten. Er erkennt BORMANN an und auch HITLER sagte, er hätte von den Russen die letzte Hemte, die den Deutschen fehlt.

43. Fr.: BORMANN ist heute in Russland? Welchen Zweck würden sie verfolgen BORMANN zu haben?

A.: Über diese Dinge müsste der Nachrichtendienst des Personalwesens Bescheid wissen.

44. Fr.: Hat es eigentlich im Führer-Hauptquartier verständige Menschen gegeben?

A.: Zu anfangs hatte so mancher versucht das Gute durchzusetzen und brachte auch den guten Willen mit. Aber nach einigen Monaten war das immer vorbei.

45. Fr.: Selbstkritik gab es nicht?

A.: Nein.

Ich habe die 6 Seiten des Protokolls meiner Vernehmung sorgfältig durchgelesen und habe jede der Seiten eigenhändig unterzeichnet und bestätige hiermit, dass dieses Protokoll eine getreue Wiedergabe meiner Vernehmung ist.

Für die Richtigkeit der Abschrift

Li

München, den 5. 12. 1952

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Confidential Pruden

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Col. Knox Pruden

DATE: 29 December 1947

FROM : H. Plummer, PBM

HP/mhc mt

SUBJECT: Friedrich Walter SHELLENBERG

Institut f. Zeitgeschichte
München
ARCHIV
831/53

Born 16 January 1910 in Saarbruecken. Parents: Guido, a piano maker and Lydia, nee RIEDL. Three brothers: Bernhardt, Ludwig, Guido; three sisters: Christina, Elisabeth, Johanna. Married 18 May 1938 to Kathe KORTEKAMP. Divorced November 1939. No children. Remarried in October 1940 to Irene GROSS-SCHOENPAUCK. Three children by his second wife: Ingo, Ilke, and Sybille.

Schoolings: Volksschule in Saarbruecken 1916-1918. Reform-Realgymnasium in Saarbruecken 1918-1928. Studied jurisprudence at Universities of Marburg, Bonn a/RH and Cologne (latter as auditor) 1928-1933. Passed Referendar examinations at Duesseldorf in March 1933.

Party Affiliations: Joined SS with rank of Anwaerter and became member of National Socialist Party in May or June 1933, in order to qualify for a state subsidy to help him start in his profession.

Legal Profession: About April 1933 began training as Gerichtsreferendar at the Land u. Amtsgericht at Bonn and Sinzig a/Rh. Spring 1936 attached to Administrational Training Center at Police HQ (Kriminal und Staatspolizei), Frankfurt a/M. as Gerichtsreferendar. While at Bonn, lectured on legal questions to other members of the SS, in order to avoid compulsory attendance at regular SS parades.

Career: Started work in the SD Hauptamt (Organization und Verwaltungs Abteilung) in Berlin, Spring 1935. Also received pay as probationary assessor of Police Dept. of the Innen Ministerium.

November 1935 took three months legal training at Referendar Camp at Jueterbog.

In January 1936, took a job at the Oberlandesgericht in Duesseldorf and later as assistant to a lawyer friend of his father, whose partner Schellenberg was to become.

On 8 December 1936, Schellenberg passed his Assessor examination (Praedikat) with honors.

In January 1937, he returned to Berlin, giving up private lawyer's practice. Appointed assistant to the Hauptabteilungsleiter of I/II Administrational Dept. of the SD Hauptamt, Berlin.

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March 1938 to April 1938, travelled with HIMMLER to Vienna to assimilate the Austrian legal system with that of the German Reich, and for a short while had control there of administrative matters.

In April 1938, he spent four weeks in Rome with MUELLER, chief of the Staatspolizei, to make security arrangements for the Hitler-Mussolini meeting in May. He briefed the secret German contingent who were to be posted at strategic points throughout the city.

On 18 May 1938 he was married in Berlin. During this month he returned to his duties at the SD Hauptamt where he was working on unification of the German Reich, with particular emphasis on the legal administration of the Sudetenland, Danzig and Austria.

From May to August of 1939 he suffered a nervous breakdown as a result of marital difficulties and other worries. It was at this point that he decided to change his position.

In August of 1939 he was appointed head of the new section of the RSHA, Gruppe IV E (counter-espionage) through the assistance of HEYDRICH, head of the SD and Sicherheitspolizei.

In September 1939 he accompanied HIMMLER to Poland in the capacity of an Ordnanz Offizier to carry out liaison between HIMMLER and the staff of the Higher Command of the OKW.

In October 1939 he completed the organization of Gruppe IV E and took a trip to Dortmund to make personal observations on the re-organizing of industrial espionage.

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In November 1939 he received the Iron Cross First Class for his part in the kidnapping of the British agents, STEVENS and BEST on the 9th or 10th of November, even though he had previously advised HIMMLER and HEYDRICH against the abduction because of the risk of international scandal. He suffered a heart attack in Dusseldorf as a result of excitement over the kidnappings. Was granted a divorce from his first wife. He returned to his work in Gruppe IV E and started a compilation of a handbook formalizing all counter-espionage matters relating to foreign countries.

In May 1940 he accompanied HIMMLER to maneuvers in Westwald, near Koblenz. His request for a leave of absence from the Ministry of Interior and the RSHA to serve at the front was refused by HIMMLER, but it was arranged to send him as a liaison officer to the OKW for two months.

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In July 1940 he was chosen by RIBBENTROP to contact the Duke of Windsor in Portugal and invite the latter to Germany, the plan being to make use of the Duke for purposes of propaganda against the British. Subject was conspicuously unsuccessful and returned to his work in Gruppe IV E, Berlin.

On 10 October 1940 he married his second wife, Irene GROSSE-SCHOENE-PAUCK.

In November 1940 his health deteriorated sharply (believed to be poisoning of the liver or gall bladder) and he obtained sick leave.

By February 1941 he had sufficiently recovered to again resume his work with Gruppe IV E, but he was already thinking of leaving this department and turning his energies in another direction. It had been no secret that he wished to be employed at Amt VI of the RSHA or possibly even in the Foreign Office. During his work for Amt IV subject had become convinced of the importance of economics in the life of the state. He felt that most Germans in positions of authority had little understanding of countries other than their own and he conceived the idea of forming a central information office for foreign countries from which information of a political-economic nature could be collected and disseminated. Another cause for his despondency was the incompetence of officials both on higher and lower levels due to the absence of any principles of selection. He believed that HIMMLER was the only member of the higher hierarchy of the Nazi regime capable of grappling with the corruption and ignorance of the administration. Apart from considerations of police and his own interest in the work, there was a more personal reason for his wish to transfer to Amt VI -- his personal difficulties with MUELLER, chief of Amt IV.

*His
Great
Business
Mission*

In July 1941 he was appointed assistant to JOST, chief of Amt VI.

After September 1941 JOST was suspended and subject became chief of that department, although his appointment was not confirmed until June 1942. He revised the headquarters personnel and administration and then turned to secret service in enemy and neutral countries.

In November 1941 he went on an inspection tour to Stockholm. It was at this time that his friendship with LUNDQUIST, head of the Swedish IS, began.

In February 1942 he succeeded through negotiations with LUTHER, Unterstaatssekretar of the German Foreign Office, in securing the use of diplomatic channels for his agents' reports, provided these reports were submitted in duplicate to the Foreign Office.

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In May 1942, he attended a German Intelligence Service conference in Prague with CANARIS and HEYDRICH. He also journeyed to The Hague to inspect some captured Allied agents' WT equipment and investigate the Dutch Resistance Movement for Amt VI.

In July 1942 visited Portugal and Spain to see his intelligence representatives and to inspect the work of CANARIS' KOs (Abwehr organizations in neutral countries).

In August 1942 went to Zhitomir in the Ukraine to confer with HIMMLER about Amt VI activities and Germany's withdrawal from the war. *Zav*

In September 1942 took a four-day drip to Paris to meet BOSQUET, Chief of the French Police in an attempt to establish greater co-operation with the Deuxieme Bureau in return for German financial assistance.

In the spring of 1943 a series of negotiations took place between subject and certain of the leading Swiss authorities to avert an attack on Switzerland from the German side.

On 17 March 1943 went to Bern to attend a meeting with General GUIBAN, G.I.C. Swiss Armed Forces.

On 21 March General GUIBAN handed subject a signed, secret declaration of neutrality on the part of the Swiss Army

In June 1943 he traveled to Sweden to arrange further subsidies for the Swedish Fascist newspaper "Volkets Dagblad".

In July 1943, at the time of the collapse of Italy, he visited Turkey with the object of carrying on conversations with PERKEL, Chief of the Turkish IS, on common intelligence objectives as directed against Russia, in order to reassure Turkey that Germany would not allow Bulgaria to indulge in national ambition inimical to Turkish Thrace; to arrange continued Turkish deliveries of chrome to Germany.

In October 1943 he made his last trip to Switzerland to reiterate the German guarantee of neutrality and to inform the Swiss of Germany's desire to preserve Swiss neutrality.

By the end of October 1943, Germany's relations with Sweden had deteriorated considerably and subject decided to visit that country in order to obtain a first-hand impression for himself. On orders from HIMMLER, he returned to Sweden again in November 1943.

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Most of the year 1944 was taken up with domestic problems over the amalgamation of the two intelligence services -- the Abwehr, which became the Militaerisches Amt of the RSHA, and the RSHA; subject's renewed attempts to secure improved relations with Mil Amt and the Foreign Office.

On 28 July 1944 KALTENBRUNNER, chief of the RSHA, provisionally put subject in charge of Mil Amt.

On 30 January 1945, he was appointed Major General of the Police by HIMMLER, on KALTENBRUNNER's suggestion, but against subject's express wishes.

The war situation was so bad in February 1945 that subject decided on his own initiative Mil Amt and Amt VI from Berlin. At this time he fell ill with pneumonia and KALTENBRUNNER immediately took the opportunity of trying to have him removed from his position in the RSHA. He once again attempted to make peace proposals through Switzerland. From this time until the capitulation he was engaged in furthering peace negotiations between Count BERNADOTTE of Sweden and HIMMLER.

On 28 April 1945 HIMMLER stated that he was prepared to nominate subject his "Sonderbevollmaechtigtter" to negotiate with the Swedish Government for a peaceful solution. He set off at once for Apenrade for a discussion with BERNADOTTE within the limits of his authority.

On 1 May 1945 he was dismissed from Amt IV by KALTENBRUNNER and was relieved of all his appointments in the RSHA.

On 4 May 1945 Admiral DOENITZ, HITLER's successor, appointed subject as "Gesandter" and signed a document conferring plenary powers upon him to negotiate with the Swedish Government. The negotiations, however, were brought to an end by the final capitulation. Subject then accepted the offer of BERNADOTTE to remain at his home near Stockholm as his guest. In the course of one of his conversations with BERNADOTTE, the latter informed him that he was engaged in writing an account of his mission to Germany, with the intention of putting on record the events leading up to the capitulation and he suggested that subject undertake on his side a similar task. This suggestion was followed by subject and moved to Saltjoe-Duvnaes, Sweden to carry out this work.

On or about 8 June 1945 he was informed by BERNADOTTE, who had suggested further that he give the information voluntarily to the Western Powers, that arrangements had been made for him to fly on the 16th or 17th of June to Frankfurt in order to place himself at the disposal of the American authorities.

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