

Institut für Zeitgeschichte ARCHIV		
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Hans Schwarz van Berk, Stuttgart, 15.11.63

Biographical: Born 1902, joined NSDAP 1930 before September election because he admired its elan, was disillusioned with the national opposition in all the forms he had seen including Freikorps--S fought in Silesia--bündische Jugend, Stahlhelm and DNP. "You have to realize that we had no experience with democracy but none with dictatorship either." Might have gone in for party work but claims to have been influenced 1925 or 1926 by a conversation with Gregor Strasser whom he still admires and who, he thinks, might have done everything differently. Think and study, Strasser told him, and be available when we come to power. At the moment we ~~we~~ have all the speakers we need. ~~Schwarz~~ Schwarz studied in Munich, planned Ph.D. on Anglo-German relations in 1898 on the basis of the British press, a combination of history and Zeitungswissenschaft, but didn't finish. Instead edited national-oppositionist newspaper in Pommern from 1932 on, took over "Angriff" in Berlin in 1935 raising its circulation from 70,000 ~~to~~ to 120,000; quit and, finding himself at loose ends, spent a few months working for SA which he had previously not joined, then went on world tour 1937-39 to see how other countries solved elite problem that had interested him and that he didn't see being solved at home. Particularly impressed with British colonial service in Sudan, also that SD didn't have a single man in India or Far East. Returned abruptly in early 1939 anticipating war in Europe, as he told newspaper editors who had financed his trip; claims that they were surprised, but that war was anticipated even in Australia, and that he didn't want to be interned in Pacific under the circumstances. Short trip to England in July 1939, then guest lectures at Ordensburg Vogelsang. War correspondent and staff member of "Das Reich" during war, then Waffen-SS in Russia. Since he had no interest in party office and had turned down an invitation from Himmler to join SS, he felt himself an outsider in Third Reich. Would have liked to have organized a foreign policy school. Bundestag election 1961 voted SPD.

Third Reich, as Schwarz sees it, made following efforts to organize an elite:

- 1) SS. Schwarz disapproved of Himmler, of racist theory which he found "impractical" and of inconsistency of its application--opportunistic recruitment of influential civil servants, academics, members of nobility, etc.
- 2) Ordensburg. On basis of personal experience was impressed with appalling quality of their material. Ley intended to recruit 3000, succeeded in rounding up 1500-1800 candidates. Intelligent young men made their careers in SS or ministries. Party career appealed only to the second-rate; sons of party officials, DAF functionaries, etc. plus smalltown Handwerker and farmboys who were sent to Ordensburg to make their careers as they might in other centuries have been sent to theological seminaries. Summary: Kleinbürger representative of Kleinbürgerliche Bewegung. Estimates 5-10% had abitur, 1% or less had been at university. Great majority had got no farther than Volksschule. At foreign policy seminar Schwarz tried to organize he found perhaps 10-15 qualified participants among 500 Ordensjunker; let English acquaintance address them and describes results as "katastrophal." Complained to Ley --Schwarz claims to have had a certain "Warrenfreiheit" in Third Reich and to be man of Zivilcourage--and was told "Sie sind doch ein Intellektueller." Was impressed that there was not a room at the Ordensburg that housed fewer than 8-12, that solitary thought was virtually impossible. Ordensburg bred Massenmensch, not new elite: graduates were to fill planstellen, were ultimately sent off to Russia where they became "Goldfasanen" despised by all troops including Waffen SS a) for living well, b) for executing anti-Russian policies that made occupation all but impossible. (Schwarz himself was great believer in Wlassow movement, he says).
- 3) Napola. Schwarz was impressed with their graduates whom he met as officers in Russia. Compares them with public school graduates; but

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- too little and too late. Most of them were killed during war.
- 4) Arbeitsdienst. Schwarz calls them specialized but "sauber."
 - 5) HJ. Problem, as he sees it, was consequence of turning exclusive bündische Jugend into all-inclusive Staatsjugend. Necessarily anti-elite because of size, also tendency to turn functionaries into bonzen; short step from Führerkorps to Klubsessel. Nonetheless had relatively high impression of them, believes many were genuinely impressed and shaken by Schirach's testimony at Nürnberg.
 - 6) SS Mannschaftshäuser. Erected at universities, 500-1000 participants from respectable homes, Schwarz says; but too young for influence and sent to war at early age where most were killed.

General sociological observations. No elite in Third Reich. Hitler was himself Massenmensch, could express himself only in Massenbewegung. Result was not elite, which presupposes concentration, but anti-elite. Recalls wartime conversation with Staatssekretär Stuckart who declared that unprecedented centralized, monolithic exterior concealed unprecedented decentralized chaotic interior. Nonetheless apparent social reorganization. In Italy trains were met by priest, indigenous nobility, then by party functionary; same held for distribution of good theater tickets or presence at corner stone-layings. In Germany the Gauleiter came first, then a general, then the regierungspräsident. But Gauleiter's telephone was tapped, personal affairs reported by SS. But SS was also questionable elite since elite can't be organized around premises and functions as disparate as race, police duty, etc. Himmler, says Schwarz, was creator of "Verbrechenspaket" which implicated all in mutual guilt: police commissars sent to Poland to kill Jews, doctors sent to KZ's to experiment on prisoners. Was there an establishment in British sense? Probably not. No homogeneity, no direct connection between title and actual power. All had a chance and none had a chance, related in part to supply and demand, function, luck and patronage: "Jeder versuchte seine Leute hereinzubringen." Schwarz himself employed two former Tatkreis members at Angriff.

On Ley: a) demagogue, b) drunk, c) bauernschlau; told Schwarz once that he would never present a project for consideration unless it would cost at least a million.

on Rosenberg: inaccessible in his profundity, wouldn't talk to anybody.

on Himmler: anecdote about two Potsdam Wehrmacht cadets transferred one day without notice to SS-Junkerschule. One noble, one bourgeois; both had been riding with SS on suggestion of father of one, an army general, who admired SS riding facilities. While riding they attracted Himmler's attention. Commander of SS-Junkerschule was shocked since he had not been notified they were coming, declared "I choose the people who come here myself." But they stayed. Schwarz had impression that educational level of Wehrmacht officer corps was bit higher than Waffen-SS but is doubtful of significant difference since Wehrmacht had been greatly democratized by 1939 anyway.

On Wannsee conference: Schwarz assumes majority of those present, including civil servants, were SS. Therefore, in sense that these made ultimate decisions involving death of millions, SS was elite. But--see observations above--SS was not elite by virtue of selection system, training or function.

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