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Chapter 4

Territorial Conflicts on the World Stage: International Organizations, the "Third World," and the Global Cold War

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Broadly speaking, annexations and secessions rarely succeeded during the Cold War, and international borders remained surprisingly stable.[1] The territorial integrity norm, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, has proven to be very robust—which is somewhat remarkable, as the UN Security Council, the organ originally expected to prevent breaches of the norm, was for the most part unable to act due to the antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union. Within Europe, this antagonism manifested itself in nuclear deterrence, preventing the outbreak of an open war between East and West, while the division of Europe and the integration of the rival camps into security alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—impeded the escalation of territorial disputes between members within each camp.[2] Yet in Africa and Asia, territorial conflicts repeatedly erupted in the wake of the waves of decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s.[3]

Existing explanations for the strength of the territorial integrity norm after the Second World War agree that border changes by violent means were indeed rare during this period, but views on which actors were responsible for this stability differ widely. Mark W. Zacher, building on democratic peace theory, emphasizes the role played by Western liberal democracies.[4] Malcolm Anderson argues that the superpowers "maintained an environment hostile to secessionist movements and to the acquisition of territory by violent means."[5] Studies on state borders on the African continent tend to focus on the desire of Africa's postcolonial elites to maintain the borders their states inherited when they became independent.[6] Congruently, historical studies on secessionist conflicts and the norm of self-determination have demonstrated that the leaders of the newly independent states predominantly agreed that only anti-colonial liberation movements could

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claim the right to independence in a given colony, while separatist demands from national movements within postcolonial states were perceived as illegitimate.[7]

This chapter situates the evolution of the territorial integrity norm in the context of the global Cold War and thus contributes to research examining the connections between superpower rivalries and regional conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.[8] It aims to shed light on how the interplay of the rise of Afro-Asian internationalism and the Cold War struggle over influence in the "Third World"[9] shaped debates at the United Nations and thereby facilitated the establishment of an international order of sovereign states with fixed borders on a global scale.

The Emergence of an Afro-Asian Consensus on the Inviolability of Postcolonial Borders and the Anti-imperialism of the 1960s

When the newly independent states in Africa and Asia started to forge links between each other, they regularly invoked the United Nations and its charter, particularly the territorial integrity norm. A defining moment in this regard was the Bandung Conference in April 1955, attended by representatives of twenty-nine Asian and African countries, including three countries still under colonial rule: Cyprus, Gold Coast (Ghana), and Sudan. The purpose of the conference was to further Afro-Asian cooperation and to discuss the problems of colonialism.[10] The conference's Final Communiqué lists "Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations" as one of the ten guiding principles forming the basis of peaceful relations between states.[11]

It was, however, the shared stance against colonialism that made the Bandung Conference a frame of reference for future initiatives for Afro-Asian cooperation,[12] as well as the pan-African activities of the Ghanian government under prime minister Kwame Nkrumah to further the cause of liberation and unity on the continent.[13] In this context, Ghana hosted the Conference of Independent African States in April 1958, inviting representatives from Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic (the short-lived union of Egypt and Syria) to Accra. In his opening speech, Nkrumah pledged his support for the principles of Bandung,[14] and at the final session, he described "the problem of how we can maintain our hard-won independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" as a "central theme of our conference."[15] As a result, one resolution resolved to respect the "territorial integrity of one another" and to "co-operate with one another to safeguard their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" as well as condemn "outside interference" against the "territorial integrity of the Independent African States."[16] The resolution shows that the newly independent states feared violations of the territorial integrity norm from two directions: conflicts among themselves and (neo-)colonial aggression by non-African states.

With the outbreak of the Congo Crisis in July 1960, the threat of (neo-) colonial aggression to the territorial integrity of newly independent states became inextricably linked to the risk of secessionism as the Katanga Province, supported by its former colonial ruler Belgium, attempted to secede from the newly

independent Republic of Congo. At least in the beginning, the United States had an interest in keeping the ostentatiously anti-communist government of Katanga intact as a counterweight to the central government of prime minister Patrice Lumumba. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and members of his administration even played with the thought of recognizing the secessionist province.[17] Conversely, the Soviet Union had provided military aid to Lumumba's government to fight the secessionists. In response, the United States backed Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu and military strongman Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu in their struggle to seize and maintain the power of the central government.[18] Africa was divided in its response to the crisis: the so-called "Casablanca states" (Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic/Egypt), a group of "radical" states actively pursuing a non-aligned and anti-imperialist policy, backed Lumumba; the "Brazzaville states," a group of "conservative" Francophone states interested in cultivating close relations with their former colonial ruler, supported Kasavubu; and a third group of "moderate" states, including Ethiopia and Tunisia, hoped to reconcile the rivaling camps.[19]

The twelve Francophone states were also willing to enter into negotiations with Katanga's secessionist leader Moïse Tshombé; in December 1960, Kasavubu and Tshombé were invited to a conference in Brazzaville that gave the group its name. Yet, on the UN stage, the Brazzaville states at most supported negotiations between Kasavubu and Tshombé to transform the Congo into a confederation, never endorsing Katanga's independence.[20] In contrast, all other African states strongly condemned the secession. They found strong allies in Asian states like Indonesia and India that promoted a policy of non-alignment and anti-colonialism. Hence, Afro-Asian statements linking their opposition to the Katanga secession with a general commitment to the territorial integrity norm and the promotion of an anti-imperialist agenda dominated debates at the United Nations.[21]

The stance taken by the Afro-Asian states influenced wider reactions to the Katanga secession. The administration of President John F. Kennedy showed much more concern for American prestige in the Third World than had his predecessor and supported attempts to end the Katanga secession by diplomatic means.[22] In response to the demands made by Afro-Asian states, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld also attempted to restore the territorial unity of the Congo. His successor, U Thant, increased the pressure on Katanga, and eventually the secession was ended by military means in January 1963.[23]

At the United Nations, the reactions to the Congo Crisis shaped the anti-imperialist agenda advanced by the postcolonial states. Commitment to the territorial integrity norm had become an essential part of the Afro-Asian solidarity discourse. Consequently, the ground-breaking "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," adopted in December 1960, stipulated the territorial integrity of newly independent states in two separate paragraphs.[24] Even though all Afro-Asian states voted in support of the resolution, the consensus on the inviolability of borders was broad, but not unanimous. Afghanistan supported self-determination for the Pashtuns in Pakistan, hoping to integrate the Pakistani territory inhabited by Pashtuns into the Afghan state.[25]

Similarly, Somalia pursued an irredentist policy of uniting all ethnic Somalis in one state and thus made a claim for French Somaliland (later Djibouti) and parts of Ethiopia and Kenya.[26]

Moreover, in several cases concerning contested colonial territory, interpretation on the application of the territorial integrity norm differed widely. This was the case when postcolonial states argued that further territory still under colonial rule had historically belonged to them, because it was part of their territory in colonial or precolonial times.

In the Security Council debate on the crisis in the Congo on September 17, 1960, the permanent representative of Morocco, El Mehdi Ben Aboud, raised the question of Mauritania and argued that Morocco also faced "a threat of 'Katanganization,' the carving up of its national territory."[27] Yet it could not stop France from granting independence to Mauritania in November 1960. At the United Nations, France could count on the support of the Brazzaville group. Mauritania's admission to the UN was, however, vetoed by the Soviet Union; several Asian states, including India, hesitated to recognize Mauritania in light of the Moroccan claim. On the African continent, Morocco was able for a time to mobilize the support of its allies in the Casablanca group, but all other African states publicly endorsed Mauritanian independence. In October 1961, the Soviet Union gave up its resistance to Mauritania's UN admission as part of a package deal that also paved the way for the UN membership of its ally Mongolia. In 1963, Mauritania became a founding member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU); by 1969, even Morocco recognized Mauritania.[28]

While Morocco's Mauritania policy had failed, India's succeeded with its claim on Goa, an enclave in India that remained under Portuguese rule after India's independence in 1947. The government in Lisbon argued that Goa was an integral part of Portugal, not a colonial territory, and rejected all Indian calls for negotiations on the question. In December 1961, India eventually annexed Goa within a few days by military means. At the UN Security Council, Western and Latin American states, in addition to the Republic of China (Taiwan), deplored the use of force by India (without backing Portugal's position), while the remaining Afro-Asian states and the Soviet Union sided with India.[29]

Indonesia similarly succeeded in framing its claim on West Papua, the Western half of the island of New Guinea, as part of the global anti-imperialist struggle, even though the outcome of that conflict was more controversial than in the case of Goa. After the outbreak of the Congo Crisis, the Indonesian government compared the West Papua question to the Katanga Crisis, arguing that in both cases a colonial power violated the territorial integrity and national unity of a postcolonial state.[30]

When, at the UN General Assembly debate in October 1961, Dutch foreign minister Joseph Luns presented a plan for West New Guinea that included transferring the administration of the territory to an international administration and a plebiscite under UN supervision, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio rejected the proposal as "nothing else but neo-colonialism. Another Congo. Another Katanga."[31] Subsequently, the Brazzaville group submitted a resolution

that called on both parties to continue negotiating, but also envisaged an international administration in case the negotiations failed. The resolution was supported by most Western and Latin American countries, while the Soviet Union and its allies, most Asian countries, and all African countries except the Brazzaville group and Somalia opposed it. The resolution failed to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority.[32]

Shortly afterwards, India succeeded in its "liberation" of Goa. Encouraged, Indonesia threatened the use of force to solve the conflict. Worried that the Soviet Union—a steadfast supporter of Indonesia's claims—might profit from a violent escalation in Asia, and in line with the Kennedy administration's determination to woo non-aligned countries, the White House shifted its support from the Netherlands to Indonesia. The United States pressured the Netherlands into signing a treaty according to which authority over the territory was—after a short interim period under UN administration—transferred to Indonesia, which would then be responsible for organizing a vaguely defined "act of free choice" by the end of 1969. The treaty was submitted to the UN General Assembly on September 21, 1962.[33] In the end, the resolution was adopted by a large majority, with only twelve Francophone African countries, France, and Haiti abstaining (and no votes against).[34]

The "act of free choice" eventually organized by Indonesia in 1969 was in many ways a fraud: despite the fact that the members of the responsible assemblies were handpicked by Indonesia, intimidation was still necessary to achieve the desired outcome. Even though all informed outside observers estimated that in a free vote, the inhabitants of the territory would have opted for independence, the special representative of the Secretary-General, Fernando Ortiz Sanz, wrote a report that—with some reservations—concluded that the population had "expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia."[35] This time, Indonesia was met with more opposition from African countries than it had in 1962. In the meantime, West Papuan independence activists had increased their efforts: when addressing the United Nations, they stressed their right to self-determination; in their appeals to African countries and the OAU, they also framed the question in racial terms, arguing that, in West New Guinea, a Black population was fighting for its freedom against foreign Indonesian oppressors.[36]

As a result, when the UN General Assembly was asked in November 1969 to take note that the "act of free choice" had been completed, the Francophone states that had criticized the 1962 treaty were now joined by new voices. The Sierra Leonean permanent representative, Davidson S.H.W. Nicol, warned that white minority regimes in southern Africa could use this case as a precedent to adopt similar methods when consulting the will of the African population in their territories. Ghana's UN ambassador, Richard Maximilian Akwei, described the "act of free choice" as a "mockery of the democratic process and a breach of the principle of self-determination."[37] The overwhelming majority in the General Assembly, however, supported Indonesia.[38]

In the case of West Papua as in the case of Mauritania, the conservative Brazzaville states were among the first to support self-determination for the

territories. This policy can be attributed in part to power struggles on the African continent: Morocco was a leader of the rival Casablanca group, and the Brazzaville states regarded the interference of Asian non-aligned states like Indonesia and India during the Congo Crisis with hostility. But in both cases, more and more African states sided with the Brazzaville group. A growing majority of African states favored a strict interpretation of the territorial integrity norm that could not be harnessed to justify annexations of colonial territories.

Consequently, when the newly independent states in Africa founded the OAU in 1963, they once again endorsed the territorial integrity norm in its charter.[39] A resolution passed by the OAU in Cairo in the following year contains the most rigid formulation of the territorial integrity norm to this day, warning against "extra-African manoeuvres aimed at dividing African States," stating that "the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality," and declaring "that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence."[40] Once more, threats to the inviolability of postcolonial borders were linked to imperialist influences from outside.

This consensus made it extremely difficult for separatist movements to find international support for their objectives.[41] When a war of secession broke out in Nigeria in 1967, an overwhelming majority of African states supported the federal government in Lagos against the secessionist authorities in Biafra. France publicly endorsed Biafran self-determination and secretly provided military assistance because it hoped to weaken Nigerian and British influence in Africa.[42] In this goal, it was supported by two conservative Francophone states, Ivory Coast and Gabon, which both recognized Biafra in May 1968. One month earlier, Tanzania had recognized Biafra in the hope of forcing the Nigerian government to the negotiation table. Zambia followed shortly afterwards, out of frustration with the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the secessionist region and Nigeria's unwillingness to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. Haiti officially recognized Biafra a year later.[43]

On the other side of the conflict, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union provided military equipment to the federal government of Nigeria. The Soviets did so "to burnish their image as the reliable allies of nationalist regimes facing the rise of ethnic particularisms" and to increase their influence in Nigeria.[44] The British government wanted to protect British oil investments; moreover, it feared that the Soviet position would be strengthened by a halt in British arms supplies to its former colony and that France would benefit from a break-up of Nigeria.[45] Thus, even though the Biafra Crisis was not a typical Cold War conflict in which the West supported one side while the socialist camp supported the other, Cold War ideas of prestige, influence, and containment still provided incentives to the governments in London and in Moscow to support the suppression of a secessionist rebellion.

On the diplomatic front, the OAU clearly sided with Nigeria.[46] Since the overwhelming majority of African states insisted on dealing with the Biafra War in an African context, the crisis was never inscribed on the UN agenda. Still, Biafra's supporters raised the issue during the general debates. On October 7, 1968,

the French minister of foreign affairs, Michel Debré, called for a solution of the conflict "which is consistent with the principle of self-determination."[47] However, even among Biafra's allies, such an open endorsement of the Biafran position was rare. Among the four African states that had recognized Biafra, only the Zambian minister of foreign affairs, Reuben Kamanga, mentioned his country's recognition of Biafra in the General Assembly on October 10, 1968 and justified it by stating that the "situation in Biafra has taken on the character of genocide" and "real unity between peoples cannot be achieved through mass and indiscriminate slaughter."[48]

The hesitancy of Biafra's allies to openly make a case for recognition indicates that support for secessionism was deeply unpopular in the General Assembly. This is particularly noteworthy as the Biafran crisis was the first time that a claim to independence was justified with grave human rights violations. Massacres committed by the Nigerian federal army and the starvation caused by the blockade of the secessionist region had caused an international outcry. In the West, solidarity activists accused the government of Nigeria of genocide and backed Biafran claims to self-determination.[49] Yet, at the United Nations, non-African countries at most expressed their concern over the humanitarian situation and supported the efforts of the OAU to settle the conflict peacefully.[50]

New Conflicts and the Evolution of the Territorial Integrity Norm in the 1970s

The Bangladesh War in 1971 reveals that the anti-secessionist consensus was not limited to conflicts on the African continent. The war erupted in March 1971, when the Pakistani military began to brutally suppress the Awami League, an autonomy movement in East Pakistan that had recently won the national elections in all of Pakistan. In response to the actions of the Pakistani military, the leader of the Awami League declared the independence of Bangladesh and its supporters began a guerrilla war against the Pakistani authorities. India supported the secessionist movement against its traditional rival Pakistan by providing military aid for the liberation movement fighting the Pakistani army and launching an international campaign to mobilize support for the Bangladeshi cause. Ostensibly, it appealed to governments around the world to convince Pakistan to settle the conflict peacefully; but by constantly accusing Pakistan of human rights violations and atrocities, it also hoped to create favorable conditions for military intervention.

As results of its efforts, India was able to secure Soviet support for its position. For the Soviet Union, however, concerns about the humanitarian situation in East Pakistan were not the decisive factor. Rather, the Soviet Union had long pursued a policy of forging closer links with India. Nonetheless, as the Bangladesh crisis unfolded over the course of 1971, the Soviet government repeatedly warned India against direct military intervention in the conflict. Soviet support for India showed itself mainly through appeals to Pakistan to settle the crisis by peaceful means.[51] Partly in response to the human rights violations of the Pakistani army, partly in the interest of keeping good relations with India, several West European

countries and the US Congress also showed a measure of understanding for the Indian position.[52]

On the other hand, US President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger's foreign policy clearly followed a Cold War logic: Pakistan was deemed an essential ally for US rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (PRC), a policy Nixon and Kissinger pursued to weaken the Soviet Union.[53] Besides the US White House, India faced its strongest opposition when it sought to mobilize support among Afro-Asian states. Even close allies in the Non-Aligned Movement opposed any political solution that could lead to the independence of East Pakistan.[54]

When the Bangladesh War escalated into a full-scale war between India and Pakistan at the end of 1971, the Security Council assembled to discuss the conflict. A resolution submitted by the US ambassador to the UN, George H.W. Bush, demanding a withdrawal of "armed forces present on the territory of the other to their own sides" (i.e., India's troops in East Pakistan), was supported by eleven members of the council, but vetoed by the Soviet Union on December 4, 1971. Poland voted with the Soviet Union; France and the United Kingdom abstained.[55] A similar resolution by the General Assembly three days later passed with 104 votes, with only eleven states voting against it (the Soviet Union and its closest socialist allies, India, and Bhutan), and ten countries abstaining (in addition to Britain, France, Denmark, and Chile, only six Afro-Asian states).[56]

Even though the secession of Bangladesh succeeded as a result of India's prompt military victory, the international reaction to it was characterized by a broad consensus at the United Nations to uphold the territorial integrity norm. In particular, the overwhelming majority of Afro-Asian states was keen not to set a precedent for future violations of the norm.

The Afro-Asian land grabs in the mid-1970s were more controversial. As with the struggles over West Papua, the disputed territories—the Western Sahara and East Timor, annexed by Morocco and Indonesia respectively in 1975–76—were colonies. But this time, the military occupation took place after the UN General Assembly had passed resolutions declaring the right of the populations of the respective territories to decide their own destiny in a referendum. However, interventions by Indonesia and Morocco (together with Mauritania) precluded the holding of any referenda. In both cases, the expansionist state could count on the support of the United States. In the 1970s, Indonesia and Morocco were both reliable allies of the West, and self-determination would almost certainly have resulted in the success of the leftist liberation movements Polisario (backed by Algeria) in the Western Sahara and FRETILIN (modeled after the pro-Soviet liberation movement in Mozambique, FRELIMO) in East Timor.[57]

Similar to Indonesia's course of action in West Papua in 1969, the occupying powers in both cases orchestrated statements by assemblies loyal to them in support of the annexation. This time, however, they faced significantly more international opposition: the General Assembly condemned the annexation of East Timor in a resolution on December 1, 1976. Invoking Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and asking member states to refrain from the "use of

force against the territorial integrity or national independence of any State," the resolution called for Indonesia to withdraw and for true self-determination for the people of East Timor. The resolution was adopted by sixty-eight votes to twenty, with forty-nine abstentions. Among its supporters were the Soviet Union and its allies as well as most African states; the United States, Turkey, Uruguay, Chile, and several Arab and Asian countries backed Indonesia.[58] Thus, even though the support for the territorial integrity of East Timor was higher than for that of West Papua seven years earlier, it was still lower than in cases where an independent state was threatened by secession as during the Congo, Biafra, and Bangladesh crises. In particular, Indonesia's neighbors, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members, approved the annexation of East Timor, sharing Jakarta's concern over the destabilizing effect of an independent East Timor ruled by a leftist government on the region.[59]

In this regard, the regional response to the annexation of East Timor differed substantially from the OAU's reaction to Morocco's land grab. At the request of African states, the question of the Western Sahara was transferred from the UN to the OAU in December 1976. There, most African states demanded a real choice for the inhabitants of the Western Sahara; Morocco eventually agreed to a referendum. Calls for the admission of the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic (SARD, the state declared by Polisario, the guerrilla movement fighting the Moroccan occupation) to the OAU, however, caused deep cleavages among African states. Yet, due to the Moroccan tactic of repeatedly delaying the referendum demanded by the OAU, support for the SARD increased. By July 1980, more than half of the fifty OAU members had recognized the SARD, and in 1984 the SARD became a full member of the OAU while Morocco resigned in response.[60] Although both land grabs de facto had succeeded for the time being and international opposition was limited (especially in the case of East Timor), the annexations did not lead to a weakening of the territorial integrity norm. In both cases, the territory in question was still under colonial rule and UN and OAU members argued over the correct implementation of the self-determination norm. Thus, these interventions could not set a precedent for violations of the territorial integrity of sovereign states.

The ongoing strength of the territorial integrity norm was once again on display when Somalia invaded Ethiopia in the summer of 1977, aiming to annex the Ogaden region largely inhabited by ethnic Somalis. Ethiopia had broken with the West and joined the Soviet camp after a revolution in 1974. Conversely, Somalia, a Soviet ally since 1963, had indicated its willingness to switch sides if the West was ready to take over as its main arms supplier. Despite concerns over Somalia's expansionist policy, the United States promised military aid shortly before the outbreak of the war and even made this promise public after the Somali invasion. Still, partially in response to the opposition to this decision on the African continent, the administration of President Jimmy Carter soon declared that it would suspend all military aid while the war was ongoing and paid lip service to the territorial integrity of African states. But it also approached African states in the hope that they would denounce the drastic increase in Soviet military

aid and the presence of Cuban troops in Ethiopia. However, even pro-Western African states such as Nigeria were willing to tolerate the Soviet-Cuban military intervention as long as it served the purpose of protecting the territorial integrity of an OAU member. Consequently, American attempts to mobilize opposition against the Soviet Union among African states failed, and Ethiopia succeeded in expelling the Somali invasion.[61]

Conclusion: Afro-Asian Solidarity, the Cold War Competition for Prestige in the "Third World," and the Territorial Integrity Norm at the United Nations

Overall, Afro-Asian backing for the territorial integrity norm remained remarkably strong during the Cold War. Despite controversies over the status of legally contested colonial territories and the successful annexations of Goa and West Papua (framed as contributions to the global anti-imperialist struggle), more and more states, particularly African countries, took the position that the territorial integrity norm applied to all colonial territories and their integration into existing states was only legitimate when the population expressed their agreement in a free referendum. As a result, the annexations of the Western Sahara and East Timor were opposed in the OAU and the UN respectively.

The condemnations of annexations of colonial territory by postcolonial states were, however, never as strong as in cases when the territorial integrity of independent states was threatened. In those cases, a broad, but not always unanimous, consensus on upholding the inviolability of postcolonial borders had emerged in the OAU and among the Afro-Asian members of the UN, despite the fact that it was usually Afro-Asian states that violated the territorial integrity norm. Yet overall, annexations and open military support for secessionist movements were rare during the Cold War, occurring mainly in the wake of the waves of decolonization in the early 1960s and mid-1970s. After the Ogaden War, few new territorial conflicts erupted in Africa and Asia during the Cold War, and none resulted in border changes.[62] Considering the inability of the UN Security Council to punish violators of the territorial integrity norm, the fundamental transformation of the territorial order in Africa and Asia and the rapid increase in independent states after the end of empire, as well as the numerous "hot wars" that plagued the Third World during the Cold War, the Afro-Asian commitment to this principle is remarkable.

Admittedly, even aggressions against independent states were usually supported by a small number of Afro-Asian countries. Those states, however, usually kept a low profile on the stage of the United Nations. During the Biafra Crisis, only Zambia defended its recognition of the secessionist region. And although several countries, most importantly Egypt, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, supported Somalia during the Ogaden War, the US Mission at the United Nations reported that "there has been no open and almost no tacit support by anyone for Somalia during the General Debate." Overall, there existed "a strong undercurrent of sentiment for Ethiopia on the floor of the General Assembly, especially by the Africans."[63] This

way, the overwhelming majority of Afro-Asian states dominated the reactions to annexations and secessions in the United Nations, and adherence to the territorial integrity norm could be framed as an essential element of Afro-Asian solidarity and the advancement of an anti-imperialist agenda. The fact that Afro-Asian states often opposed violators of the norm even when it was against their usual geopolitical orientations—as with the support of pro-Western states like Nigeria for socialist Ethiopia during the Ogaden War or the stance taken by India's friends in the Non-Aligned Movement during the Bangladesh War—further attests to the Afro-Asian consensus on the inviolability of postcolonial borders.

Conversely, the policy decisions of the Cold War superpowers during territorial conflicts consistently followed a Cold War logic. The initial reaction of the United States (and many Western European countries) to the Congo Crisis demonstrated that the Eisenhower administration by no means took it for granted that the borders of postcolonial states were inviolable. The subsequent attempts of the Kennedy administration to end the Katanga secession were mainly motivated by its concern over its reputation in the Third World. During the Bangladesh crisis, Nixon and Kissinger did not support Pakistan out of strong commitment to international law, but rather because they needed Pakistan for their rapprochement with the PRC. And while the United States first backed the Netherlands in the conflict over West Papua, it changed tacks when the standing of the United States among non-aligned countries became a priority of the Kennedy administration. Similarly, the Ford administration supported Indonesia's annexation of East Timor and Morocco's annexation of Western Sahara because, in the mid-1970s, both states were reliable US allies. Later, the Carter administration agreed to arms deliveries to Somalia in 1977 even though its expansionist ambitions were well-known, but the benefits from extricating Somalia from the socialist camp seemed greater than the worries about the potential ramifications of military aid.

The Soviet Union expressed sympathy for the Afghan position on self-determination for the Pashtuns in Pakistan in 1955. At that time, the Soviet government disagreed with Pakistan's membership in the two anti-Soviet military alliances, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO).[64] In contrast, after the outbreak of the Congo Crisis, the Soviet Union harnessed the opportunity to pose as a staunch enemy of secessionism and champion of the anti-imperialist cause at the United Nations.[65] It continued this policy during the Biafra War; at the beginning of the Bangladesh War, it urged India not to militarily escalate the conflict. Yet once a full-scale war had broken out, Moscow still sided with India and backed it at the Security Council. And while the USSR had initially shown consideration for Morocco's position on Mauritania and vetoed the latter's UN admission, a year later it agreed to it in return for the admission of Mongolia—a goal it had long pursued. While it had committed itself to supporting Indonesia's claim on West Papua at a time when this position was widely supported by Afro-Asian states, it opposed the annexations of East Timor and the Western Sahara when Morocco and Indonesia were allies of the United States

Although neither the United States nor the Soviet Union were staunch adherents of the territorial integrity norm, Cold War rivalry provided a major incentive not

to back violators of the norm. Ultimately, the US government attempted to end the Katanga secession, even though its leader Tshombé professed his strong anti-communist convictions at every opportunity to win American support. Similarly, the Soviet Union backed Nigeria during the Biafra Crisis even though the secessionist leaders were ideologically closer to the socialist camp than the pro-Western government in Lagos. In both cases, it was concern over their reputation in the Third World rather than commitment to international law that guided policy. For this reason, the Soviet Union initially also tried to convince India not to escalate the conflict over Bangladesh into a full-scale war with Pakistan.

Similarly, the United States preferred to pursue a policy of caution when it sympathized with violators of the territorial integrity norm. Although the Ford administration supported Indonesia and Morocco during their land grabs in the mid-1970s, it mainly used its influence at the UN to weaken or thwart resolutions that condemned their actions, but did not *de jure* recognize the annexations of East Timor and the Western Sahara.[66] In response to African support for Ethiopia, the Carter administration changed its policy during the Ogaden War by suspending the arms deliveries to Somalia it had previously promised and by publicly declaring its support for the OAU principle of the inviolability of borders.

At the first Conference of Non-Aligned States in Belgrade in September 1961, the Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie argued that both superpowers were "highly sensitive to our reactions to their policies" and expressed the hope that, "if we remain faithful to the principles of Bandung and apply them in our international life, we will maximize the influence which we can bring to bear on world problems."[67] At least in regard to the strength of the territorial integrity norm during the Cold War, Haile Selassie was not wrong.[68] The broad Afro-Asian consensus on the inviolability of borders combined with the Cold War rivalry for prestige in the Third World enabled the strengthening of the territorial integrity norm in the United Nations every time it was challenged by annexations and secessions.

Notes

1 Mark W. Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force," *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (2001): 215–50, here 234.

2 Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 30–1. The Greek–Turkish conflict over Cyprus is a notable exception.

3 For the United Nations' reaction to a territorial conflict during the early Cold War, see the chapter by Daniel Gorman on the Kashmir crisis in this volume.

4 Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," 238–41.

5 Anderson, *Frontiers*, 104.

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